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Alcazar v Alcazar, G.R. No.

174451, October 13, 2009

FACTS: Veronica and Rey got married. After their wedding, they lived in Reys house in Occidental
Mindoro. Then they returned to Manila, but Rey did not live with Veronica in her home in Tondo. Rey
then left for Riyahd where he was working. He never contacted his wife since he left about a year and a
half, despite numerous attempts by petitioner to call him. Veronica was informed by a co-teacher that
her husband is coming home. But she was surprised that he did not go directly to her in Tondo but to his
house in Mindoro instead. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code. Respondent has been uncooperative to the
investigation. Dr. Tayag, the petitioners mother, testified that Rey was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, and that it is a sufficient ground for declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marriage

HELD: Supreme Court denied. The action originally filed was annulment of marriage based on Article 45,
paragraph 5 of the Family Code. Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.
Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the
complete act of sexual intercourse. No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that
respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner.
Dr. Tayags psychological report concluding that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, traceable to the latters experience during his childhood, did not help the
petitioners cause. It must be noted that in evaluating respondents psychological state, Dr. Tayag was
not able to personally examine the respondent and had to rely on information provided by the
petitioner, who was hardly impartial. The report was insufficient to come up with such a conclusion and
failed to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to
perform his obligations as a husband. The burden falls upon the petitioner not only to prove that his
husband suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such disorder renders him truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or neglect in the
performance of some marital obligations.
It remains settled that the state has greater interest in preserving the sanctity of marriage and
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Presumption is always in
favour of the validity of marriage. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade the court that
respondents actions are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.