Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
Elviro L. Peralta and Hermenegildo A. Prieto for petitioner.
Faustino B. Tobia, Juan I. Ines and Federico Tacason for respondents.
PARAS, C.J .:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the will of Antero Mercado
dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect and contains the following attestation
clause:
We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of Antero
Mercado was signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this attestation clause
and that of the left margin of the three pages thereof. Page three the continuation of this
attestation clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood by the
testator, and it bears the corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and
all them were signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the
presence of the testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.
In testimony, whereof, we sign this statement, this the third day of January, one thousand
nine hundred forty three, (1943) A.D.
(Sgd.) NUMERIANO EVANGELISTA (Sgd.) "ROSENDA CORTES
(Sgd.) BIBIANA ILLEGIBLE
The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero
Mercado, followed below by "A reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero
Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of Appeals,
reversing the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, ruled that the attestation
clause failed (1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the
end of the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence of the
testator and each and every one of the witnesses; (2) to certify that after the signing of the name of
the testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said testator has written a cross at the end of his
name and on the left margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof; (3)
to certify that the three witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
In our opinion, the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado
caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express direction, as required by
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The herein petitioner (who is appealing by way of
certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals) argues, however, that there is no need for such
recital because the cross written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the
signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as much a
signature as a thumbmark, the latter having been held sufficient by this Court in the cases of De
Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104; Dolar vs. Diancin, 55 Phil., 479; Payad vs. Tolentino, 62
Phil., 848; Neyra vs. Neyra, 76 Phil., 296 and Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil., 429.
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado
or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are not prepared
to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and
does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine there is a sufficient recital in the
attestation clause as to the signing of the will by the testator in the presence of the witnesses, and by
the latter in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the petitioner. So ordered.

















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court
of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the
last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein
private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes
Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C.
Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed
an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated
unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a
will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for
her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and
was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the
testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167
Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament on
July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New
Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined
and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging
among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the
intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury
to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a
Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to
verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his
daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation of evidence for the reprobate of the
questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in
her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a permanent
residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when
alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-
3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in
the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and in the
United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the
Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of
Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not
suffering from any disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of
the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is
hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos
Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters
of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her
filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of
Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his
opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the
will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured
through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among
the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed
with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that
the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special
proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made several
motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the
Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice
of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in
the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable
Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of the
case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was called
for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of
adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order
dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also
denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally
has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null
and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was
granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos
merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and
forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice (sic)
upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests
against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the
hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public or
authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by way
of a motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the law
especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within 30
days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with
the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in
complete disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was
adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to
afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition a denial of the due process and a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the
time of death was a usual resident of Dasmarias, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court
of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No.
L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to
the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced to
support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means
and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of
the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that
the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion
was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case
and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner
cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of
filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing
the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the
probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed
by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
(Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of
Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the
law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent
judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent
resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the
Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records wig bear
the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was
the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is
no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished
the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing.
There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for
hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given
preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a
motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit.
Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at
the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of
America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled
rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See
Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.





















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellee.
Rosendo J. Tansinin for oppositor-appellant Natividad Icasiano.
Jaime R. Nuevas for oppositor-appellant Enrique Icasiano.
REYES, J.B.L., J .:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate the document and
its duplicate, marked as Exhibits "A" and "A-1", as the true last will and testament of Josefa
Villacorte, deceased, and appointing as executor Celso Icasiano, the person named therein as such.
This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition for the allowance and
admission to probate of the original, Exhibit "A" as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased,
and for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof.
The court set the proving of the alleged will for November 8, 1958, and caused notice thereof to be
published for three (3) successive weeks, previous to the time appointed, in the newspaper "Manila
chronicle", and also caused personal service of copies thereof upon the known heirs.
On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition; and on
November 10, 1958, she petitioned to have herself appointed as a special administrator, to which
proponent objected. Hence, on November 18, 1958, the court issued an order appointing the
Philippine Trust Company as special administrator. 1wph 1. t
On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as
his own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged will.
On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his evidence; but on
June 1, 1959, he filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging
that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on
that date, submitting the signed duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about
May 26, 1959. On June 17, 1959, oppositors Natividad Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano
filed their joint opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but by order of
July 20, 1959, the court admitted said petition, and on July 30, 1959, oppositor Natividad Icasiano
filed her amended opposition. Thereafter, the parties presented their respective evidence, and after
several hearings the court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this
order, the oppositors appealed directly to this Court, the amount involved being over P200,000.00,
on the ground that the same is contrary to law and the evidence.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of
Manila on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will
and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara
Street, Manila, published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys
Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by
the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose
Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will was actually prepared by
attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing of the decedent's
last will and testament, together with former Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon
Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental witnesses to the execution of the decedent's
last will and testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of the
hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary
Public before whom the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also
attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the document. The latter also testified upon cross
examination that he prepared one original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte last will and testament
at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one signed copy to Manila,
retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of
the petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in
every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V.
Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and
supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting
witnesses in each and every page.
The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original of the will and
its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and every page thereof by
the testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's
presence and in that of one another as witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney
Natividad on page three (3) of the original); that pages of the original and duplicate of said will were
duly numbered; that the attestation clause thereof contains all the facts required by law to be recited
therein and is signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is written in the language
known to and spoken by the testatrix that the attestation clause is in a language also known to and
spoken by the witnesses; that the will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies; and
that both the original and the duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose
Oyengco of Manila on the same date June 2, 1956.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he
may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3)
was signed in his presence.
Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the
testatrix in the duplicate (Exhibit "A-1") are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same
occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were
executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was
deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit
from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents-appellees
stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated
or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not
mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the
portion of free disposal.
We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the testatrix signed both
original and duplicate copies (Exhibits "A" and "A-1", respectively) of the will spontaneously, on the
same in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will;
and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were
executed in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and
read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they were actually signed; that
the attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses.
The opinion of expert for oppositors, Mr. Felipe Logan, that the signatures of the testatrix appearing
in the duplicate original were not written by the same had which wrote the signatures in the original
will leaves us unconvinced, not merely because it is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for
the proponents, but principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him to support the
conclusion that the differences between the standard and questioned signatures are beyond the
writer's range of normal scriptural variation. The expert has, in fact, used as standards only three
other signatures of the testatrix besides those affixed to the original of the testament (Exh. A); and
we feel that with so few standards the expert's opinion and the signatures in the duplicate could not
be those of the testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is particularly so since the comparison
charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that the are radical differences that would justify the
charge of forgery, taking into account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her
signatures, and the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed right the original. These,
factors were not discussed by the expert.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures
does not appear reliable, considering the standard and challenged writings were affixed to different
kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, therefore, we do not find
the testimony of the oppositor's expert sufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two
instrumental witnesses, Torres and Natividad (Dr. Diy being in the United States during the trial, did
not testify).
Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more
favored than others is proof of neither (see In re Butalid, 10 Phil. 27; Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163;
Pecson vs. Coronal, 45 Phil. 216). Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a
testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary dispositions that
the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution made in
the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part do not suffice to prove fraud or
undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as
shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the
hands of non-heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated
on another occassion. It is also well to note that, as remarked by the Court of Appeals in Sideco vs.
Sideco, 45 Off. Gaz. 168, fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other;
their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity
of the will.
On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to
one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not
per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not
only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its
bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified
by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to
penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she
had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its
component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the
evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated
in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) "witnesses
may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause".
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is
shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set
of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the
Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the
literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by
testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs.
Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of
a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs.
Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the
legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary
curtailment of the testamentary privilege.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the
duplicate (Exh. A-1) is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of original because it
lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a
dilemma; if the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed
carbon duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated,
then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant.
At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third
page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.
That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted without a new publication does
not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by the original publication of the
petition for probate. The amended petition did not substantially alter the one first filed, but merely
supplemented it by disclosing the existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made that new
interests were involved (the contents of Exhibit A and A-1 are admittedly identical); and appellants
were duly notified of the proposed amendment. It is nowhere proved or claimed that the amendment
deprived the appellants of any substantial right, and we see no error in admitting the amended
petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellants.






Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.
FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,
FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.
Nicanor Tavora for appellant.
Jose Rivera for appellees.
JOHNSON, J .:
The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of Miguel
Mamuyac, who died on the 2d day of January, 1922, in the municipality of Agoo of the Province of
La Union. It appears from the record that on or about the 27th day of July, 1918, the said Miguel
Mamuyac executed a last will and testament (Exhibit A). In the month of January, 1922, the said
Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union for the
probation of that will. The probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio
Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac (civil cause No. 1144, Province of La Union).
After hearing all of the parties the petition for the probation of said will was denied by the Honorable
C. M. Villareal on the 2d day of November, 1923, upon the ground that the deceased had on the
16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament.
On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was commenced. Its purpose was to secure
the probation of the said will of the 16th day of April, 1919 (Exhibit 1). To said petition Cornelio
Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac presented their oppositions,
alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed by the said Miguel
Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac
and (c) that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Anastacio R. Teodoro, judge, after hearing the
respective parties, denied the probation of said will of April 16, 1919, upon the ground that the same
had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920. Judge Teodoro, after examining the evidence
adduced, found that the following facts had been satisfactorily proved:
That Exhibit A is a mere carbon of its original which remained in the possession of the
deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his death as per testimony of
witness Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the testator on April 16, 1919, and Carlos Bejar,
who saw on December 30, 1920, the original Exhibit A (will of 1919) actually cancelled by the
testator Miguel Mamuyac, who assured Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had sold him a
house and the land where the house was built, he had to cancel it (the will of 1919),
executing thereby a new testament. Narcisa Gago in a way corroborates the testimony of
Jose Fenoy, admitting that the will executed by the deceased (Miguel Mamuyac) in 1919 was
found in the possession of father Miguel Mamuyac. The opponents have successfully
established the fact that father Miguel Mamuyac had executed in 1920 another will. The
same Narcisa Gago, the sister of the deceased, who was living in the house with him, when
cross-examined by attorney for the opponents, testified that the original Exhibit A could not
be found. For the foregoing consideration and for the reason that the original of Exhibit A has
been cancelled by the deceased father Miguel Mamuyac, the court disallows the probate of
Exhibit A for the applicant." From that order the petitioner appealed.
The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in not finding from the evidence that
the will in question had been executed with all the formalities required by the law; that the same had
been revoked and cancelled in 1920 before his death; that the said will was a mere carbon copy and
that the oppositors were not estopped from alleging that fact.
With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied,
which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law
does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore
becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such
cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence
showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found
is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the
absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be
found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person
without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or
revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the
circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by
the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fat that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel
Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the
conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence.
In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not
only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on
the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are
destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or
destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be
admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will
was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of
the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original
has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator. (Borromeo vs. Casquijo, G.R. No.
L-26063.)1
After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will presented for
probate had been cancelled by the testator in 1920. Therefore the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed. And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO,
ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D.
SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari
1
with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and
October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition
for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-
90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian
ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased
Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage
and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most
competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a
certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported
holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate
proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate proceedings
take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
2

The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at
anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa
akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia
Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon
gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa
mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng
lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha
mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi.
3

(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 9993396
were consolidated.
4

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings
5
primarily
on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain
any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which
would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred
from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for
probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the
property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority
of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private
respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply
because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more
compulsory heirs.
6

On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he
other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the
widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir
in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of
discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100
(1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and
allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void would have
been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility.
The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity
of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved(underscoring
supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
7

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE
76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR
INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED
THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL IS VOID
ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT
THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE
EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATORS
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE
FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE
WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned
may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be
published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general
circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator
Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states,Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus,
there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically
void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with
the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of
Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically
and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate
case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and
will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and
written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did
not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention
of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In
effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the
disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents,
taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and
that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under
Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such
child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;
8

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property,
the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
10

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
11

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert,
taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention
of the testator.
12
In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and
was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated,
13
the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
14

With regard to the issue on preterition,
15
the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct
line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did
not institute an heir
16
to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name
of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal
heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.1wphi 1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to
dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.
17

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to
reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo
Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of
the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the cases
were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice














Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J .:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Limvs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until
the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error.
It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil. net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and,
on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition
found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate
be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees,
and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.




















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J .:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law
to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land
situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63
centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each
parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this
marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's
death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue
and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina
Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan
appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the
registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be
recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of
exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of
the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only
be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and
denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be
reserved a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2)
Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3)
Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan
and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property
had between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
[gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code,
art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he
had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the
third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been
acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which
is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only
herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property
in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right
required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of
action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it"
(p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant
inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The
trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17,
20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her
son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall
from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had
passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary
provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of
law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was
abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No.
190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully
complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left
at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her
as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary
estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other
half, with the exception of what is established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved,
because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other
half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that
either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a
half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides
that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law that is, by intestate
succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party,
that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to sustain the
renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the
opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact
that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house
and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of
them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio
Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced
that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The
appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the
obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required by law to be
reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created
by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of
the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she
do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not
refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the
prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking
that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for
recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the
registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that
it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not
prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is
required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to
constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the
required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not
been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character
by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889,
and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14,
1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code
acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the
Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the
Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the
force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the
right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the
person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in
due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that
the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of
the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being
indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a
guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this
appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can
and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but
in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted
some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required
to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be
out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the
colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of
said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications
necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on
December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law on real
property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth
in article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds
marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the
ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by will, by
intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1,
189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions
intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when
their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court
of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been
reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the
right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract
second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes
in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such
must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said
provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate
or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with
property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and
it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature
of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court
has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required
by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in
article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of
the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case
had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right
would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must make the reservation,
proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance,
under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the
property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property;
and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value
of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this
is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right
reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in
article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain,
to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can
only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of
age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally represent them. In either
case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured
by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by
article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted,
so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property
required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety
days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the
effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down
a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the
period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the
persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must
make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the
proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment,
etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199
of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days
succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to
reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution
of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the
period for the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to
exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by
law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the
Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation
of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring
that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no
necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action
does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of
the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present
case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for
recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this
finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two
uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the
name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and
recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of
the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the
person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or
contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is
said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to
another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of
article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the
person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could
not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's
consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by
decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code,
and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the fee simple;
the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of
that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will
enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained that is,
that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be
regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has
no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law,
requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes
of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This
absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no
relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the
ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives
within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to
that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with
exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes
this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary,
depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as
it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the
father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a
man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his
property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the
first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform
any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in
accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except
the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the
fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and
the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they
might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and
recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is
required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may
dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse aftercontracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death
no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition
subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof
would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he
could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to
exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may
mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in
said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending,
that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily
happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the
right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive
him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would
disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective.
Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is
respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not
become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what
the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly
directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or
descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants
must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and
obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be
reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their
turn may pertain to them has beenassured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not
even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to
their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code
referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee
simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the
same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion
of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer
to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this
subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved
in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right
required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such
alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not
there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from
whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they
acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the
ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject
to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the
property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more
because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn
have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who
is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the
realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple,
because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the
usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt
at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the
law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it
and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,
even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their
possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they
can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right
should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take
their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree,
that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a
possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their
rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of
the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the
decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of
the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute
should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the
person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved,
because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal
title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order
to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us
that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third
degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him,
because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."
(Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of
a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that
may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that
which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the
conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is
authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property
required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and
in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible
manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re,
for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and
the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership,
he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in
law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to
the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent
is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has
inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided
that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once
acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent
annexed that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should
exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover
the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been
agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and
other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that
the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged that is to say,
the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may
alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that
he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than
the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day
what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person
who must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto,
since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis
dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter
of the applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to
either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without
special findings as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.






















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34480 February 16, 1932
In re Estate of the late Mrs. R. H. Frankel.
PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, administrator-appellee,
vs.
CLARA WEBBER, ET AL., appellants.
FERMA FISCHLER, appellee.
Gibbs & McDonough for appellant Clara and Gertrude Webber.
J. A. Wolfson for appellants Anna Hartske and Charles Albert Robinson.
Harvey & O'Brien for appellant Fred Frankel.
Feria & La O for administrator-appellee.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph for appellee Fischler.
Benj. S. Ohnick for Peoples Bank and Trust Co. as amicus curiae.
ROMUALDEZ, J .:
This appeal has been taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila entered in the
course of the present proceedings, and providing as follows:
In view of the foregoing (1) the item of two thousand pesos (P2,000) for attorney's fees in the
final account submitted by the administrator is hereby approved; but the scheme of partition
must be amended so as to charge this sum proportionally to the estate of each of the
spouses, Herman Frankel and Mrs. Frankel. In other words, this sum must be taken from the
value of the estate of the husband and of the wife pro rata.
(2) The opposition of Anna Hartske, her son Charles Robinson, Clara Webber and her
daughter, Gertrude Webber, to the scheme of partition is disallowed, together with every
other opposition to the final account based upon the amount of the interest due on the sum
of forty thousand eight hundred three pesos and seventy-three centavos (P40,803.73). To
this sum, however, must be added the interest for the month of May, 1930, which, according
to the report, amounts to eighty-three pesos and twenty-three centavos (P83.23), and the
interest thereon at the same rate from the date last mentioned until these funds are finally
delivered.
(3) Clara Webber's opposition in the matter of the jewels is also overruled.
(4) Lastly, Frema Fischler's opposition with reference to the payment of interest upon the
principal of her legacy is also overruled.
The judicial administrator shall fine a scheme of partition, amended in accordance with this
order, within five (5) days after it becomes final under the law. (Pp. 54 and 55, Bill of
Exceptions.)
The appellants, through counsel, assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court:
1. In overruling the oppositions of the appellants to the final account and project of partition
filed on May 19, 1930, and to the report filed on June 26, 1930.
2. In overruling Mrs. Clara Webber's additional objection to the project of partition with
reference to the jewelry.
These proceedings deal with a final account, a report, and a scheme of partition filed by the
administrator of the estate of the late R. H. Frankel.
The appellants objected to said final account, scheme of partition, and report, upon the following
grounds:
(1) That the value of the estate belonging to the conjugal partnership of Herman Frankel and his
wife, at the time of the latter's death, is not shown; (2) that the additional item of P2,000 for the
administrator's services is improper, unlawful, and exorbitant; (3) that the administrator did not invest
the funds belonging to the estate adequately and advantageously; and (4) that the interest earned,
according to the report filed by the administrator on June 26, 1930, is not accurate, and the
statement of the income and the expenses cannot be understood by the parties.
The value of the conjugal estate has been finally decided by a competent court, and is now res
judicata.
To grant an additional allowance for the services rendered by the judicial administrator was
discretionary with the trial court, and we find no reason for holding that said court abused that
discretion or made improper use of it, in view of the importance and duration of the work in question.
With reference to the investment of the inheritance funds, we find that the trial court rightly held such
investment to be in no way exceptionable or contrary to any law.
The conduct of the administrator of an inheritance who deposits the funds entrusted to his care in a
current account with a solid and responsible bank, instead of depositing them in fixed account at a
higher rate of interest, with a view to having them subject to withdrawal at a moment's notice, is not
unlawful or even improper, but rather worthy of approval; and he is not answerable for the low rate of
interest thus obtained, because, generally speaking and there is no reason for applying any
special rule in default of instructions to the contrary, a judicial administrator of an inheritance is
not called upon to speculate with funds in his custody or to place them where they may not be
withdrawn at once at the order of a competent court, but rather to manage them in accordance with
the law, keeping them subject to the orders of the proper court. (Sec. 643, Code of Civil Procedure.)
To this end when the administrator happens to be a trust company engaged in banking, as in this
case, there is nothing wrong in its depositing the inheritance funds in its own banking department
rather than in another bank, if there is no evidence that its own bank is lacking in security.
No question is raised regarding the rate of interest earned by such funds, but the computation of
interest is said to be inaccurate. There is no merit in this contention, considering the administrator's
report covering the period from August, 1926, to April 25, 1930. Furthermore, with reference to the
deposit and the rate of interest obtained, we consider the following remarks of the administrator-
appellee just and sound:
The Philippine Trust Company has had at all time and still now has sufficient lawful money of
the Philippine Islands to pay all the cash of said estate on deposit with it. It has not invested
the funds of the estate because it considers that in view of the will, the action of the residuary
legatees, and the nature of its duties, and such investment would make the funds unliquid,
and would violate the duties of its trust, which were to assemble the assets, in order to
distribute as this Honorable Court may decree. (Pp. 9 and 10 Brief of the administrator-
appellee.)
As to the second assignment of error with reference to Mrs. Clara Webber's objection, we find no
merit in it, considering the proposed adjudication of the jewelry according to the scheme of partition,
and the grounds upon which the trial court overruled this additional objection, to wit:
Mrs. Clara Webber filed an additional opposition to the scheme of partition in so far as it
gives her one-half of the jewelry. She contends that inasmuch as the will gives her one-half
of said jewelry, and as it value has depreciated considerable, being hardly worth P500 at
present, it is a serious error and a manifest lack of equity to appraise its value at P2,995.50,
adjudicating to her one-half thereof. She proposes that the jewelry be sold and the proceeds
divided equally between her and the other legatee. This contention is not well taken; first,
because the will of the testratrix must be carried out where it provides that one- half of the
jewelry itself is to be given to this opponent; and secondly, because there is no need of
selling the jewelry; as for the value, that is reasonable because it was fixed by the committee
of appraisal, and no proper objection was entered in due time. This additional opposition
must be rejected.
The last opposition is that filed by Frema Fischler, who claims the legal interest upon her
legacy of P10,000. It is argued that since this sum of money has been in the administrator's
hands for many years, this legatee is entitled to the legal interest upon it from the time of the
testratrix's death. There is no merit in this opposition. While it is true that under article 882 of
the Civil Code the legacy of a specific determinate thing vests in the legatee upon the
testator's death, as well as any pending fruits or income, inasmuch as we are here
concerned with a generic or a so-called legacy of quantity, article 884 of the Code must be
applied, which provides that interest from the time of the testator's death shall be given the
legatee if the testator has expressly so provided. With reference to the present opponent, it
appears that the testratrix has not clearly and expressly provided for the payment of the
interest upon the P10,000 legacy; according to the last-named article it is clear that the
opponent is not entitled to the interest claimed. In Fuentes vs. Canon (6 Phil., 177), and
Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao (8 Phil., 119), the Supreme Court ruled that generic legacies or
legacies of quantity, like the one adjudicated to the opponent, do not draw legal interest until
a demand is made for them; and a legacy cannot be legally demanded before the scheme of
partition is duly approved by the probate court. And in the case cited by counsel for Fred
Frankel (Ongpin vs. Rivera, 44 Phil., 808), the Supreme Court held that a cash legacy does
not earn interest until the person bound to deliver it in this case the judicial administrator
is in default. The administrator in the present case is not in default, for the scheme of
partition not only has not yet been approved, but is actually the subject matter of many
opposition filed by the legatees and the heir. (Pp. 52, 53, and 54, Bill of Exceptions.)
Finding the order appealed from to be justified by the merits of the case, we hereby affirmed it, with
costs against the appellants. So ordered.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24750 May 16, 1980
DOROTEO BANAWA, JULIANA MENDOZA, CASIANO AMPONIN and GLICERIA
ABRENICA, petitioners,
vs.
PRIMITIVA MIRANO, GREGORIA MIRANO, JUANA MIRANO and MARCIANO
MIRANO, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Recto Law Office for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J .:+.wph!1
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April
12, 1965
1
in CA G.R. No. 23597-R, entitled "Primitive Mirano, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus, Doroteo
Banawa, et al., Defendants-Appellants", the dispositive part of which is: t. hqw
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs
against defendants-appellants.
The judgment of the lower court which was affirmed reads as follows: t. hqw
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of the two parcels of land described in
paragraph 3 of the complaint;
(b) Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the said parcels of land to
the plaintiffs;
(c) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Roman Biscocho, Paula Biscocho and
Maria Carmen Mendoza in favor of Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, dated
April 4, 1940, as evidenced by Exhibit 'E' and its registration in the registry of deeds
of Batangas, to be null and void;
(d) Declaring null and void the deed of donation, dated August 7, 1956, evidenced by
Exhibit 'D' executed by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza in favor
of the spouses Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica as well as Tax Declarations
No. 26818 in the names of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, and
No. 26845 in the names of the spouses Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica, and
the registration of the said deed of donation in the registry of deeds of Batangas; and
(e) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs actual damages in the amount of
P 4,500 and attorney's fees in the amount of P500.00, and the costs of this action.
SO ORDERED.
2

The spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza both died during the pendency of this case in
the Court of Appeals. They have been substituted by the petitioners Casiano Amponin and his wife
Gliceria Abrenica, legally adopted daughter of one of the deceased petitioners and donee of the
Carsuche property.
3

The petitioners filed on May 20, 1965, a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Said motion was denied on June 28, 1965.
4

As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts are: t. hqw
It appears that sometime in 1911, Maria Mirano a niece of appellant Juliana
Mendoza, and who was then about nine years old, was taken in by the appellants-
spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, in the latter's house in Mahabang
Lodlod, Taal, Batangas. Appellants spouses being childless, treated and reared her
up like their own child. They hired a private tutor to teach her the rudiments of
reading, writing and arithmetic. They supported her, gave her money, clothes and
even jewelry. Maria reciprocated their care and affection by helping with the
household chores.
A few years later, the spouses opened up a store for general merchandise in barrio
Lutucan, Sariaya, Quezon, from which they derived considerable income and which
enabled them to acquire several parcels of land.
On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died in Taal, Batangas while
still living with the spouses. At the time of her death she left as her only nearest
relatives the herein plaintiffs, namely Primitiva Mirano, who is a surviving sister, and
Gregoria, Juana and Marciano, all surnamed Mirano, who are the children of a
deceased brother, Martin Mirano.
The parties do not dispute the Identity of the two parcels of land in controversy,
which are described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as follows: t.hqw
1. A parcel of sugar land situated in the Barrio of Iba, Taal, Batangas,
with an area of 44,200 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the
North, by Ravine; on the East, by the property of Leodovico Garcia;
on the South by the property of Gregorio Amponin; and on the West,
by the property of Gregorio Maria Aniversario (now Doroteo Banawa).
Under Tax Declaration No. 25994 in the name of Maria Mirano and
assessed at P2,210.00.
2. A parcel of sugar land situated in the barrio of Carsuche, Taal,
Batangas, with an area of 54,093 square meters, more or less.
Bounded on the North, by the property of Agapito Aro and Alley; on
the East, by an Alley; on the South, by the properties of Filomeno
Diomampo, Gregorio de la Rosa and Andres Moratilla; and on the
West, by the property of Agapito Aro. Under Tax Declaration No.
19786 in the name of Maria Mirano and assessed at P2,760.00.
For purposes of clearness and convenience, and since the respective assertions and
evidences adduced by the parties regarding the two parcels of land are in sharp
divergence, we shall refer to the first parcel as the Iba Property and to the second
parcel as the Carsuche property and, moreover, we shall treat and discuss the two
separately.
Parcel 1, or the Iba Property.
The parties agree that the Iba Property was originally owned by Placido Punzalan
from whom it was acquired on May 5, 1921. Plaintiffs' evidence upon this point tends
to show that the acquisition of the said parcel of land was pursuant to a deed of sale
contained in a public instrument acknowledged before Notary Public Ramon A.
Cabrera on the date aforesaid, a photostatic copy of which was introduced in
evidence as Exhibit 'A', the same having been secured from an original copy on file
with the Division of Archives, Bureau of Libraries. The deed of sale in question states
that the Iba property consisted formerly of two parcels of land and that they were sold
for the amount of P2,000.00 in favor of Maria Mirano. Defendant Doroteo Banawa
impliedly admitted the execution of this notarial document when he declared that in
the execution of the document concerning the purchase of the Iba property from
Punzalan the notary public charged him P20.00 and another P5.00 for stamps in the
name of Maria Mirano since 1923 (Exhs. 'A-1' to 'A-7').
By contrast, defendants' claim of ownership over the Iba property is predicated upon
their assertion that the money used in buying said land pertained to the spouses
Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Defendants contend that since 1919 Placido
Punzalan borrowed money from defendant spouses on three different occasions for
the sums of P1,200.00, P1,800.00 and P1,080.00, respectively, each of which was
evidenced by Exhs. '1', '2', and '3', respectively. Upon the failure of Placido Punzalan
to discharge said obligations in 1921, he agreed to sell the land aforementioned to
the spouses for P 3,700.00, but as the total value of the three loans was P4,080.00,
Punzalan had to reimburse to said spouses the difference of P380.00. The document
of sale stated the price to be only P2,000.00 in view of the fact that Doroteo Banawa
had only P25.00 with him when the deed was prepared by the notary public, and the
latter was charging P10.00 for every one thousand pesos mentioned as the
consideration of the contract, Defendants likewise maintain that the sale was made
to appear in favor of Maria Mirano because said spouses being already old, they
want to leave something to Maria Mirano for her to lean upon when they would have
been gone. They, however, made Maria understand that although the property was
placed under her name, they would continue to be the owners thereof, to administer
and enjoy the fruits of the same as long as they live, and that she would become the
owner of the land only after their death. Maria supposedly expressed her conformity
to and appreciation for the said arrangement. Maria Mirano was 19 years old when
the deed of sale was executed.
Parcel 2, or the Carsuche Property.
There is no dispute between the parties that the Carsuche property was acquired by
way of purchase from its original owners, to wit: Roman Biscocho, his sister Paula
Biscocho, and sister-in-law Carmen Mendoza. The sale took place sometime in
December, 1935. There is, however, a sharp conflict of evidence between the parties
concerning the form of the document evidencing the same and in whose favor the
sale was made at that time. The plaintiffs claim that the sale was evidenced by a
public instrument executed before and ratified by Notary Public Vicente Ilagan of
Taal, Batangas, and that the vendee mentioned in the said document was Maria
Mirano. The defendants, on the other hand, assert that the sale was evidenced by a
private writing prepared in the handwriting of Roman Biscocho and that it was in
favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Neither the public
instrument allegedly ratified by Atty. Ilagan nor the private writing supposedly
prepared by Roman Biscocho was presented before the lower court.
After laying the proper predicate for the presentation of secondary evidence, the
plaintiffs presented Atty. Vicente Ilagan and Roman Biscocho to testify upon the
execution of the aforesaid public instrument in December, 1935. These two declared
that sometime in December, 1935, the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana
Mendoza, Maria Mirano, Roman Biscocho, Paula Biscocho and Carmen Mendoza,
accompanied by Atty. Regino Aro, went to the office of Atty. Ilagan in Taal, Batangas;
that Atty. Aro, who was a classmate of Atty. Ilagan in the law school, asked the
latter's permission to use his typewriter on which he prepared a document in English
and which he asked Atty. Ilagan to ratify; that Atty. Ilagan translated into Tagalog the
contents of the said document to the parties and. the witnesses, after which they all
signed the same; that the document involved the sale of the Carsuche property in
favor of Maria Mirano: that after paying him P20.00 for his services which Atty. Ilagan
would not accept at first, Doroteo Banawa asked Atty. Ilagan in Tagalog whether the
document that he ratified was 'strong enough' (Matibay) to safeguard the rights of
Maria Mirano, to which Atty. Ilagan answered in the affirmative.
Doroteo Banawa, on the other hand, stated that on being offered the Carsuche
property by the owners thereof, they agreed on the purchase price of P3,700.00 of
which a down payment of P1,200.00 was made and, later, an additional sum of
P100.00 was given to Roman Biscocho, both payments being evidenced by a receipt
dated December 15, 1936 (Exh. '9'). A few days later, Roman Biscocho prepared in
his own handwriting a private document selling the Carsuche property in favor of the
spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza for the sum of P4,000.00, the
vendors having asked for a P300.00 increase in price. Doroteo Banawa, thereafter
brought said private document to the municipal treasurer of Taal, Batangas, to whom
he expressed the desire to have the land declared in the name of Maria Mirano so
that the latter might attend to the payment of taxes over the land whenever he was
away. This wish of Doroteo Banawa was done by his thumb-marking an affidavit,
thus accounting for the fact that said land appears in the name of Maria Mirano in the
tax declarations covering the same from 1934 to 1956.
5

The petitioners assign the following errors: t. hqw
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING
THAT THE PLACING OF IBA PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF THE LATE MARIA
MIRANO WAS IN THE NATURE OF A DONATION INTER-VIVOS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING
THAT PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 632 OF THE OLD CIVIL
CODE IS TOO LITERAL AND IGNORES THE RATIONALE OF THE LEGAL
PROVISION.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING
THAT THE 'EXCEPTIVE' CLAUSE' OF ARTICLE 1448 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS
APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING
THAT SECTION 5, RULE 100 OF THE OLD RULES OF COURT DOES NOT
APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE MARIA MIRANO WAS NOT LEGALLY
ADOPTED.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING
WITH RESPECT TO THE CARSUCHE PROPERTY (LOT NO. 2) THAT THE DEED
OF SALE EXECUTED IN 1940 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS DOROTEO
BANAWA AND HIS WIFE JULIANA MENDOZA AND WHICH WAS DULY
REGISTERED DID NOT IMPAIR THE PRETENDED SALE TO MARIA MIRANO.
6

The first, second, third and fourth errors assigned refer to the Iba property, parcel 1, while the fifth
error assigned refers to the Carsuche property, Lot 2.
7

As may be discerned from the assignment of errors, the basic issue is the ownership of the two
parcels of land in question. The plaintiffs appellees, respondents herein, assert title to the lands as
heirs of Maria Mirano. Defendants-appellants, petitioners herein, claim ownership over them by
virtue of purchase from the original owners.
Considering that in the case at bar the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not contrary to
those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by this Court of said findings is not necessary. In Tolentino
vs. de Jesus, et al.,
8
this Court held: t .hqw
The findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals are conclusive on the
parties and on this Court (Tamayo vs. Callejo, L- 25563, July 28, 1972, 46 SCRA 27;
Nery, et al. vs. Lorenzo, et al., L-23096 & L-23376, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 43 1;
Villacrucis vs. CA, L-29831, March 29, 1972, 44 SCRA 176; Dela Cruz, et al. vs. CA,
L-24000, Nov. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 68; Naga Dev. Corp. vs. CA, L-28175, Sept. 30,
1971, 41 SCRA 105, 115; Lacson & Basilio vs. Pineda, et al., L-28523, July 16,
1971, 40 SCRA 35; Qui;ano, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA
227; Reyes, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-28466, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 138, 142;
Gotamco Hermanas vs. Shotwell, et al., L-22519, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 112-
117; Limjoco vs. CA, L-20656, Feb. 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 663-669; De Garcia, et al.
vs. CA, L-20264, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 130, 136-137; Simeon vs. Pe;a, L-29049,
Dec. 29, 1970, 36 SCRA 611), unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based
on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellees
[Roque vs. Buan, L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 648]; (6) the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents [Garcia vs. CA, L-26490, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 622]
; and (9) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence
of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record [Salazar vs. Gutierrez, L-
21727, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 243].
The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions.
However, all the issues raised by the petitioners shall be passed upon individually.
The first error assigned reads: t.hqw
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that the placing of the
Iba Properly in the name of the late Maria Mirano was in the nature of a donation
inter-vivos.
The respondents
9
correctly pointed out that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Court of First Instance
of Batangas categorically stated that the placing of the properties in the name of Maria Mirano was in the
nature of a donation inter-vivos. In rejecting the petitioners' contention that a donation mortis causa was
executed, the Court of Appeals said that, under the facts and circumstances narrated by the petitioners,
the placing of the Iba property in the name of Maria Mirano-if it was to be called a donation at all - was not
in the nature of a donation mortis causa, but rather it would be in the nature of a donationinter-
vivos, giving its reasons and citing the applicable law and decisions of this Court on the matter. The Court
of First Instance made the same hypothetical conclusion.
10

The finding of the Court of First Instance of Batangas which was sustained by the Court of Appeals
is that what was donated by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza to Maria Mirano
was the money used in the purchase of the lands in question. This conclusion of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas was supported by the testimony of Macario B. Aro, a nephew of the deceased
Doroteo Banawa, that the money used by Maria Mirano in the purchase of the Iba and Carsuche
properties was given to her by, Doroteo Banawa.
11

If the money used by Maria Mirano in purchasing the properties was given to her by the spouses
Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, or by either of them, then the money had belonged to her.
Maria Mirano purchased and paid for the said properties with her money. As a matter or fact, the
deed of sale, Exhibit "A",
12
recites as follows: t .hqw
Que en consideracion a la suma de Dos Mil Pesos moneda filipina (P2,000.00) que
me ha pagado Maria Mirano ... .
It is also contended by the petitioners that the deeds of sale executed by the owners of the land in
favor of Maria Mirano were simulated contracts intended to shortcut two different transactions: (1) a
sale in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza; and (2) a donation of lands by
the spouses in favor of Maria Mirano.
13

There are two kinds of simulated contracts, namely: the absolutely simulated contract and the
relatively simulated one. In both instances, however, their nullity is based on the want of true
consent of the parties. There is no intent to be bound or the true intent is hidden or concealed. Such
contracts are even generally regarded as fraudulent with intent of injuring third persons. The
purpose, therefore, of a simulated contract which may be annulled is to conceal the parties' true
intent, or to deceive or defraud third persons.
From the record, there is no showing of deception or fraud, nor of concealment of intent of the
parties as to the sale of the Iba property by the vendors in favor of Maria Mirano. The transactions
which transpired were purely: (1) donations of money or things representing or equivalent to money
by the spouses in favor of Maria Mirano which could be made and accepted verbally; and (2)
purchase of lands by Maria Mirano with the use of that money or credits (pre-existing indebtedness
in favor of the spouses) as consideration thereof.
The petitioners' contention that "the contract of sale had been intended to be a contract of sale
between the vendors and the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza" has no merit. The
petitioners were present when the sales were made to Maria Mirano. They were the ones who
caused the titles to the properties to be placed in the name of Maria Mirano because they wished
"that after our death Maria Mirano could have something for her maintenance.
14
Moreover, the
testimony of Vicente Ilagan, the notary public before whom the deed of sale was executed, to the effect
that he was asked by Doroteo Banawa in Tagalog "Kung matibay ang documenting ito para kay
Maria"
15
and to which query he answered, "Yes, Sir",
16
supports this conclusion. The conduct of the
spouses at the time of the execution of the contracts are inconsistent with those which the petitioners, the
late spouses and their successors-in interest, now assert. Their intention to make Maria Mirano the owner
of the said parcels of land was clearly shown by their conduct at the time of the execution of the deeds of
sale which influenced the vendors to believe that Maria Mirano was indeed the vendee in their
agreement. The petitioners had full knowledge of the facts surrounding the execution of the document of
sale. They are equitably estopped
17
to deny that the transfer of the lands in question in favor of Maria
Mirano was the actual and true intent of the parties as embodied in the documents of sale of the Iba and
Carsuche properties. The documents are what they purport to be contracts of sale from the vendors to
the vendee, Maria Mirano.
The petitioners submit that since there was transfer of title to the land in litigation to Maria Mirano
when the purchase price was in fact actually paid by the petitioners-spouses, an implied trust was
created. The present law on implied trust is Article 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides: t.hqw
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is
granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having
beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the
beneficiary. However if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate
or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it
being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
The transactions in question took place before the Civil Code of the Philippines became effective on
August 30, 1950. Hence Article 1448 of said Code is not applicable.
18

Moreover, there is no showing that Maria Mirano bought the lands in question in trust for the
petitioners.
The petitioners also claim that they have become owners of the properties by acquisitive prescription
under Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code which provides: t.hqw
Ownership and other real rights in immovable property shall prescribe by possession
in good faith and under a just title for ten years as between persons present and for
twenty years as between absentees.
The above-cited provision speaks of two essential requirements: (1) possession for ten (10) years as
between persons present and twenty (20) years, for absentees; and (2) a just title.
As regards the Iba property (Lot No. 1), petitioners have not presented any title, just or otherwise, to
support their claim. And Article 1954 of the Old Civil Code provides, further, that a "just title must be
proven; it never can be presumed."
Not having a just title, as required by Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code, the petitioners cannot invoke
prescription with respect to the Iba property.
The petitioners also assert ownership by acquisitive prescription over the Iba property under Section
41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The pertinent portion of Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
reads t. hqw
Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that
time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by
occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise in whatever way such occupancy may have
commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such
land a full and complete title, saving to the persons under disabilities the rights
secured by the next section. In order to constitute such title by prescription or
adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or
through whom he claims must have been actual open, public, continuous, under a
claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants ...
It is a fact that while Maria Mirano was alive she possessed the property in question as the owner
thereof Hence, it is error for the petitioners to claim ownership over the Iba property by acquisitive
prescription under Article 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure for their possession of the said property
became adverse and exclusive only in July 1949 after Maria Mirano's death. From 1949 to the date
of the filing in 1957 of the present action by the respondents only eight years had elapsed.
The second error assigned is: t.hqw
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that petitioners'
interpretation of Article 632 of the Old Civil Code is too literal and ignores the
rationale of the legal provision.
Article 632 of the Old Civil Code provides: "Donations of personal property may be made verbally or
in writing. Verbal donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the gift. In the absence of this
requisite the donation shall produce no effect, unless made in writing and accepted in the same
form."
It is contended by the petitioners that oral donation of personal property requires simultaneous
delivery of the gift. As regards the Iba property, the consideration given by Maria Mirano for the
purchase of the said property from Placido Punzalan was the pre- existing debts of the latter to the
spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza.
The contention of the petitioners that there was no simultaneous delivery of the credits to Maria
Mirano is not meritorious. Delivery may be actual or constructive.
Actual delivery consists in the giving of actual possession to the vendee or his agent, as for
example, in manually transferring the possession of a thing from the vendor to the vendee.
Constructive delivery is a general term comprehending all those acts which, although not conferring
physical possession of the thing, have been held by construction of law equivalent to acts of real
delivery, as for example, the giving of the key to the house, as constructive delivery of the house
from the vendor to the vendee.
In the instant case, the oral donation of the gift consisting of pre-existing obligations of the vendor,
Placido Punzalan, was simultaneous or concurrent with the constructive delivery thereof to Maria
Mirano when the spouses consented to the execution of the deed of sale of the Iba property in favor
of Maria Mirano. The execution of the said deed of sale constituted payment by the vendor, Placido
Punzalan, of his outstanding obligations due to the spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza.
Consequently, there was constructive transfer of possession of the incorporeal rights of the spouses
over the property in question to Maria Mirano.
It is no longer necessary to discuss the third error assigned because of the holding that Article 1448
of the New Civil Code has no retroactive application to the instant case.
Anent the fourth error assigned, the petitioners urge that the donor spouses are entitled to the land
in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which
reads: t. hqw
... In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by
adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the
adopted child from either of his parents by adoption, which shall become the property
of the latter or their legitimate relatives who shall participate in the order established
by the Civil Code for intestate estates.
The submission of the petitioners is that extrajudicial adoption is within the contemplation and spirit
of this rule ofreversion adoptive. However, the rule involved specifically provides for the case of the
judicially adopted child. It is an elementary rule of construction that when the language of the law is
clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
The fifth error assigned is: t. hqw
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling with respect to the
Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) that the deed of sale executed in 1940 in favor of the
petitioner Doroteo Banawa and his wife Juliana Mendoza did not impair the
pretended sale to Maria Mirano.
The Court of Appeals found that there was a sale of the Carsuche property in 1935 in favor of Maria
Mirano and that such sale was embodied in a public instrument. However, in 1940 the same land
was sold to the petitioners. The sale was duly registered. The petitioners immediately entered into
the possession of the land as owners.
The claim of the petitioners that they have acquired by acquisitive prescription the Carsuche
property (Lot No. 2) is meritorious.
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Period of prescription as to real estate An
action for recovery of title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be
brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues."
That the aforesaid Section 40 governs the instant case is clear from Article 1116 of the New Civil
Code which provides that "prescriptions already running before the effectivity of the New Civil Code,
shall be governed by the laws previously in force." The prescriptive period commenced to run since
1940, the date the sale in favor of the Banawas was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Batangas. Hence the Code of Civil Procedure governs.
The instant case, not having been filed within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action
accrued in 1940, prescribed under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1950 because the
same was filed only in 1957, seventeen (17) years later.
The possession of the Banawas over the Carsuche property ripened into full ownership in 1950, ten
(10) years after 1940, when the possession of the petitioner-spouses which was actual, open, public
and continuous, under a claims of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claim
commenced. (Sec. 41, Code of Civil Procedure). The sale in favor of the Banawas was registered in
1940 with the Register of Deeds of Batangas. The actual and adverse possession of the petitioner-
spouses was continued by their present successors.
The alleged bad faith of the petitioners in that they knew that the land was previously sold to Maria
Mirano is of no consequence because Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that there
is prescription "in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced." As held in one case "...
guilty knowledge is of no moment for under the law title by prescription may be acquired in whatever
way possession may have been commenced or continued and so long as the possessor had
possessed the land openly, publicly, continuously and under a claim of title for a period of over ten
years."
19

The trial court found that the two parcels of land in question with a combined area of a little less than
ten (10) hectares had an average annual net yield of P 500.00. A total amount of P 4,500.00 as
actual damages was awarded in as much as Maria Mirano had been dead for nine (9) years when
the decision of the trial court was rendered. An adjustment should be made in view of the finding of
this Court that the Carsuche property, Lot 2, belongs to the petitioners.
The Iba property, Lot 1, is about 45% of the combined area of the two lands in question. Forty-five
percent (45 %) of the annual net income of P500.00 is equivalent to P225.00. Maria Mirano has
been dead for about thirty-one (31) years now. During all this period, the petitioners have been in
possession of the Iba property and receiving the products thereof. They should pay as actual
damages the total amount of P6,975.00 representing the net income for the period of thirty-one (31)
years on the basis of P225.00 a year.
The respondents are also entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed as to the Iba property (Lot
No. 1) but reversed as to the Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) which was acquired by the spouses
Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza who could validly donate the said property to Casiano
Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica The petitioners are ordered to pay the private respondents the total
amount of Six Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Five Pesos (P6,975.00) as actual damages and the
amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as attorney's fees, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.1wph 1. t
Teehankee (Chairman), concurs in the result.


Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J ., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent, re the Iba parcel; because there was no valid donation of the land or of the purchase
money. In addition to the views expressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, to which I
subscribe, I wish to stress the following:
1. The money with which to buy the property was not donated to Maria by the spouses Juliana
Mendoza and Doroteo Banawa. Said spouses would not donate the large amount of P4,080.00
(although the deed states the amount as P2,000.00) to Maria Mirano who was merely tutored to
learn the 3 R's reading, writing and arithmetic at the expense of said spouses. While it is true
that they supported her, gave her money, clothes and even jewelry, they did not send her to school,
much less give her a college education. It is unthinkable that the said spouses would give her
P4,080.00 when they could not even give her a primary education which would cost very much less
(from 1911 to 1915). The jewelry they could have given to her could not be better than trinkets, the
cost of which was negligible but could be a fond possession of a poor, impressionable child in the
rural area like Maria;
2. No cash actually passed to Maria from the spouses The amount of P4,080.00 allegedly donated
by the spouses to Maria represented the various loans in the amounts of P1,200.00, P1,800.00 and
P1,080.00 previously extended to Placido Punzalan who, as vendor, sold the Iba parcel in payment
of his debt. While the purchase price was P3,700.00, the purchase price was made to appear in the
document as P2,000.00 to save on notarial fees;
3. Up to the time of her death on July 31, 1949 at the age of 48, Maria was still living with the
spouses who reared her. This fact shows that Maria was still being supported by the spouses
Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza;
4. If there was a valid donation of the money to pay for the Iba sugar land in Taal in 1921, which
consists of 4.42 hectares, it would seem that Maria would have sufficient funds derived from the
produce of such a big parcel with which to purchase for herself the Carsuche parcel for the amount
of P3,700.00 or P4,000.00. But the fact of the matter is that it was still the spouses Juliana Mendoza
and Doroteo Banawa who paid for the Carsuche property, only that the sale was allegedly made in
favor of Maria, whom they did not legally adopt, to insure the survival of Maria long after they would
have been dead as they were then already old. Again, this goes against the grain of human nature;
because no such deep concern was exhibited by the spouses in favor of their legally adopted
daughter Gliceria Abrenica; and
5. The spouses legally adopted petitioner Gliceria Abrenica, wife of co-petitioner Casiano Amponin,
but never legally adopted Maria, niece of petitioner Juliana Mendoza. If the said spouses wanted to
favor their niece Maria for helping in their business, they could have easily adopted her legally and
thereby make her their legal heir, like petitioner Gliceria Abrenica.
I concur re the Carsuche parcel.
There was no valid sale in favor of Maria Mirano of said lot because:
1. While a photostat copy of the earlier deed of sale of 1921 was secured from the Division of
Archives of the Bureau of Libraries and submitted in evidence as Exhibit A; no copy of the later
alleged deed of sale in 1935 was presented in evidence concerning the Carsuche parcel. If there
was such a 1935 deed of sale (14 years after the 1921 deed), a certified true copy thereof could be
more easily secured from the Division of Archives of the Bureau of Libraries, as it was a later
document (1935) than the 1921 deed of sale, which is available. The alleged sale in December,
1935 was allegedly notarized by Atty. Vicente Ilagan. It is strange that Atty. Aro who allegedly
prepared the deed of sale, was not the one who notarized the same;
2. In 1935, Maria was already 23 years old. Being a very important document purportedly evidencing
her title to the Carsuche sugar land also in Taal, of 5.4093 hectares, she should have retained the
original or a copy of the alleged deed of sale, specially considering that the sum of P4,000.00 was
allegedly paid for the same;
3. The cancelled tax declaration of the previous owner the vendor - or the new tax declaration in the
name of the buyer, usually states the reason for such cancellation, like a deed of sale with its date
and may include the name of the notary public and place of execution of the document. There is no
intimation of such a statement or entry in the cancelled tax declaration of the vendor or in the new
tax declaration in the name of Maria Mirano; and
4. There is no discussion of any exhaustive examination of the other four possible sources of the
copies of the alleged 1935 deed of sale from the vendor, the notary public, the office of the clerk
of court, and as above-stated, the alleged vendee herself.













Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-appellant.
Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.
Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

GUERRERO, J .:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals
1
in accordance with the provisions of
Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the only issue raised is the correct
application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a legal question.
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City in Civil
Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of Appeals, show that:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh. "D") Of
this marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G),
Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died
ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Of this
second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic
(Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff Francisca
Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B)
survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her heirs, the
plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and
Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952
leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter
of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5)
months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died
leaving behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-
Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.
(Rollo,
pp. 2-
3)
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half undivided share
of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her
deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 38 fruit bearing
coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by German Garingan;
on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by Bernardino Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana
Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra
Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232, assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant
Geronimo Almanza;
B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with
fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by
Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and German Garigan; on the S. by
Esteban Calayag; and on the W. by Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714
for the year 1948 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with
376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area of 11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the
N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and Bernardino Alma; on the E. by
Bernardino Alma; on the S. by Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River;
and on the W. by Anacleto Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in
the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at P2,720.00 in the
name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San Pablo, with an
area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by heirs of Pedro Calampiano; on the E. by
Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio Yerro; and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera.
Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now
Tax No. 21452, assessed at P610.00 in the name of Cristeta Almanza; and
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria, Quezon, planted
with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area - 24,990 sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya)
by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E. by Julian Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian
Garcia, and on the W. by Taguan River. Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at
P910.00.
(Recor
d on
Appeal,
pp. 4-
6)
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children
of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic,
daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the
defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the
properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who
took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and
requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta
Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura
Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought
out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as
the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the
properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to
the defendants.
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs who are hereby
declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land in
dispute. The defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo
Almanza, who are represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino
Cartena, are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of
P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of
land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal interest from the time this decision shall
have become final.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.
(SGD)
JOSE
G.
BAUTI
STA
J
u
d
g
e
Record
on
Appeal,
p. 47
From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute defendant for
Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese, did
not appeal and execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land in his possession, that is,
those described under Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the case on
appeal was limited to the one-half undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land
described under letters A, B and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in
his possession.
2

On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of
the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the
properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the course of
the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the
sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14,
1952, Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New Civil
Code which provides that "should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares," and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not raised
as an issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in
the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9. 1945.
3

The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the trial court
and that the only issue left for determination is a purely legal question involving the correct
application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the appellate court certified this case
to Us.
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable to the
admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or
aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers
and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the
latter.
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita
or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the
full blood.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003
of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all
her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely
the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of
half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their
own right. InAbellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this
Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per
stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or
nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to
the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not
exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is
provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which
provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and
nieces of half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the deceased
has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December
27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA
610).
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her sister
of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is
unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa
Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus
she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs