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Provisional Remedies

Preliminary Attachment
(Mangila vs CA)
Preliminary attachment has 3 stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the
writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For
the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first
obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in
any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.

(Chuidian vs Sandiganbayan)
Supervening events which may or may not justify the discharge of the writ are not within the purview of
this particular rule.

When the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of
action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counterbond, in accordance with
Section 12 of the same rule

(Du vs Stronghold Insurance)
A levy on execution duly registered takes preference over a prior unregistered sale; and that even if the
prior sale is subsequently registered before the sale in execution but after the levy was duly made, the
validity of the execution sale should be maintained, because it retroacts to the date of the levy; otherwise,
the preference created by the levy would be meaningless and illusory.

(Wenceslao vs Readycon Trading)
If the applicant for a preliminary attachment is found by the court to be entitled as such, then no damages
may be recovered by adverse party resulting from such attachment.

The attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment
writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other.
Moreover, the filing of a counter-bond is a speedier way of discharging the attachment writ maliciously
sought out by the attaching party creditor instead of the other way, which in most instances like in the
present case, would require presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot easily
be settled in a pending incident of the case.

Preliminary Injunction
(Idolor vs CA)
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an
injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in
esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is
a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an
injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the
existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or
that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to
endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling
reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. It is always
a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and
no claim to the ultimate relief sought (filed beyond redemption period). The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of actual existing right is not aground for an injunction.

(Gustilo vs Real)
We do not see how the complainant's exercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate
the right of the losing candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order "to maintain
the status quo." We see no reason to disagree with the finding of the OCA that the evident purpose of the
second TRO was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of the Liga ng mga Barangay.

(OWWA vs Chavez)
The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. The status quo usually
preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded
the actual controversy. The status quo ante litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs which is existing at
the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive power to
alter such status. What is imperative in preliminary injunction cases is that the writ can not be effectuated
to establish new relations between the parties.

(Limitless Potential vs CA)
Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. This must be so, because to
require malice as a prerequisite would make the filing of a bond a useless formality. The dissolution of the
injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that the
injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately accrues.
Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon the injunction bond, the dissolution of the injunction because of
petitioners main cause of action provides the actionable wrong for the purpose of recovery upon the
The injunction bond is answerable for all damages suffered by reason only of the issuance of the writ
(Sy Yong Hu vs CA)
Receivership, which is admittedly a harsh remedy, should be granted with extreme caution. Sound bases
therefor must appear on record, and there should be a clear showing of its necessity. The need for a
receivership in the case under consideration can be gleaned from the aforecited disquisition by the Court
of Appeals finding that the properties of the partnership were in danger of being damaged or lost on
account of certain acts of the appointed manager in liquidation.

(Larrobis vs Phil Veterans Bank)
When a bank is prohibited from continuing to do business by the Central Bank and a receiver is appointed
for such bank, that bank would not be able to do new business, i.e., to grant new loans or to accept new
deposits. However, the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which
debts form part of the assets of the bank. The receiver must assemble the assets and pay the obligation
of the bank under receivership, and take steps to prevent dissipation of such assets. Accordingly, the
receiver of the bank is obliged to collect pre-existing debts due to the bank, and in connection therewith,
to foreclose mortgages securing such debts. Hence, Prescription will still run against the bank under

A bank is bound by the acts, or failure to act of its receiver. However, the bank may go after the receiver
who is liable to it for any culpable or negligent failure to collect the assets of such bank and to safeguard
its assets.

(Aguilar vs Manila Banking)
Besides, it would be absurd to adopt petitioners position that they are not obliged to pay interest on their
obligation when respondent was placed under receivership. When a bank is placed under receivership, it
would only not be able to do new business, that is, to grant new loans or to accept new deposits.
However, the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form
part of the assets of the bank. Thus, petitioners obligation to pay interest subsists even when respondent
was placed under receivership. The respondents receivership is an extraneous circumstance and has no
effect on petitioners obligation.

(Orosa vs CA)
If recovery of personal property is not possible, the applicant may recover its equivalent in money.

(Yang vs Valdez)
The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks
immediate possession of the property involved need not be holder of the legal title to the property. It
suffices, if at the time he applies for a writ of replevin, he is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled
to the possession thereof."

Hence, after defendant had been duly represented by counsel even at the inception of the service of
summons and a copy of the order of replevin on January 7, 1985, defendant Thomas Yang had already
been duly served, especially so, when counsel manifested in their comment to the opposition filed by
plaintiffs that Manuel Yap has been duly authorized to represent Thomas Yang. From then on defendant
should have been on guard as to the provision of Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court: the five (5)
days period within which to file the counter-replevin for the approval of the court, counted from the actual
taking of the property by the officer or the sheriff on January 7, 1985.

(Superlines Transportation vs PNC)
Following the conduct of an investigation of the accident, the bus was towed by respondents on the
request of Lopera. It was thus not distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or
seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis. It is
true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies only where
the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and
seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis.
As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar, "A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is
subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ."
Only when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law,
and not otherwise.
(De Asis vs CA)
The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Future support
cannot be the subject of a compromise. The agreement entered into between the petitioner and
respondent's mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the
dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates
the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

(People vs Manahan)
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a quo is
in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be
sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every
case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie
Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a
married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero, the rule is that if the rapist is a married
man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly
deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance
with law.

(Lopez vs CA)
En passant, the dismissal of the petition notwithstanding, petitioner is not without remedy. For as what he
seeks to assail is the amount of support he was adjudged to provide, he can file a motion with the trial
court for its modification since a judgment granting support never becomes final.

Special Civil Action

(Eternal Gardens vs IAC)
Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's objections to the deposit
of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance of the lower court by filing a complaint
for interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature of the action
but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development Program. As correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in
the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in
controversy with the court. it is a rule founded on justice and equity: that the plaintiff may not continue
to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of
whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto.

(Wack-wack Golf & Country vs Lee Won)
The remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the party from the annoyance and hazard of two or
more actions touching the same property or demand; but one who, with knowledge of all the facts,
neglects to avail himself of the relief, or elects to take the chances for success in the actions at law, ought
to submit to the consequences of defeat. To permit an unsuccessful defendant to compel the successful
plaintiffs to interplead, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits; to put upon the shoulders
of others the burden which he asks may be taken from his own.

(Mesina vs IAC)
Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances, respondent bank merely took the necessary
precaution not to make a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. It
has been shown that the interpleader suit was filed by respondent bank because petitioner and Jose Go
were both laying their claims on the check, petitioner asking payment thereon and Jose Go as the
purchaser or owner. Bank filed the interpleader suit not because petitioner sued it but because petitioner
is laying claim to the same check that Go is claiming. On the very day that the bank instituted the case in
interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for damages filed by petitioner against it as supported by the
fact that the interpleader case was first entitled Associated Bank vs. Jose Go and John Doe, but later on
changed to Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe when his name became known to respondent bank.

Declaratory Relief
(Velarde vs SJS)
The essential requisites: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.

In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions
does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes
that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.
Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

(Tambunting vs Sumabat)
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory
relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more
jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has
already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Under such circumstances,
inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing
more for the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order. Hence prescription would still

(Almeda vs Bathala Mktg)
Requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2)
the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3)
there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue
must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.

(Kawasaki Port Services vs Amores)
It is easy to see in the instant case, that what is sought is a declaration not only that private respondent is
a corporation for there is no dispute on that matter but also that it is separate and distinct from C.F.
Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha and therefore, not liable for the latter's indebtedness. It is evident that monetary
obligations does not, in any way, refer to status, lights and obligations. Obligations are more or less
temporary, but status is relatively permanent. But more importantly, as cited in the case of (Dy Poco v.
Commissioner of Immigration, et al., 16 SCRA 618 [1966]), the prevailing rule is that "where a
declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather than a construction of
definite stated rights, status and other relations, commonly expressed in written instrument, the case is
not one for declaratory judgment." Thus, considering the nature of a proceeding for declaratory judgment,
wherein relief may be sought only to declare rights and not to determine or try issues, there is more valid
reason to adhere to the principle that a declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where judgment would
have to be made, only after a judicial investigation of disputed issues. In fact, private respondent itself
perceives that petitioners may even seek to pierce the veil of corporate identity.

(Dy Poco vs Commissioner of immigration)
Where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather than a
construction of definite stated rights, status, and other relations, commonly expressed in written
instruments, the case is not one for declaratory judgment. And, here, the material issues are the
citizenship of the mother and the illegitimacy of the petitioner, and the rights and status of the latter
which are sought to be declared are dependent upon those disputed issues. A declaratory relief proceeding
is unavailable where the judgment would have to be made only after a judicial investigation of disputed

(Adlawan vs IAC)
This action was initiated on a petition for declaratory relief, ostensibly for a declaration of the rights and
obligations of the parties under the laws and ordinances involved therein or invoked by them.
Consequently, in such special civil action the judgment does not essentially entail an executory process
since generally, other than a declaration of such rights and duties, other affirmative reliefs, as these are
understood in ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the proponent. However, the Court has held that
although the action is for a declaratory judgment but the allegations in the complaints are sufficient to
make out a case for specific performance or recovery of property with claims for damages, and the
defendants did not raise an issue in the trial court to challenge the remedy or form of the action availed
of, the court can grant such affirmative relief as may be warranted by the evidence. This decisional rule
applies to the case at bar.

(Llamzon vs Logronio)
While the general rule is that before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the act or order complained of, the Court has dispensed with this requirement in
several instances. Thus, a previous motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari
is necessary unless: (i) the issue raised is one purely of law; (ii) public interest is involved; (iii) there is
urgency; (iv) a question of jurisdiction is squarely raised before and decided by the lower court; and (v)
the order is a patent nullity.

(Insular Life vs Serrano)
The courts do not interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in determining the specificity and
adequacy of the averments in a criminal complaint. The determination of probable cause for the purpose
of filing an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public
prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to
determine whether the executive determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with
grave abuse. At any rate, not every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an abuse of discretion.
Erroneous inferences of fact or conclusions of law are correctable by certiorari only if they are of such a
degree as to amount to a clear case of abuse of discretion of the grave and malevolent kind.

(Tuazon vs Register of Deeds of Caloocan)
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the
performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial
power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
may be established by law, the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably
perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly
beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law

(Torres vs Aguinaldo)
By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to
act at all in contemplation of law.

(Licaros vs Sandiganbayan)
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by the Constitution. To reiterate, the right
of the accused to the speedy disposition of a case is a right guaranteed under the fundamental law.
Correlatively, it is the bounden duty of a court, as mandated by the Constitution, to speedily dispose of
the case before it. Thus, a party to a case may demand, as a matter mandated by the Constitution,
expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.

Ideally, a petition for mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial but not of a discretionary
duty. More specifically, persons or public officials may be directed to act with or to exercise discretion, but
not as to how that discretion should be exercised. However, our jurisprudence is replete with exceptions in
this matter. Thus, it has been held that in a case where there is "gross abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice or palpable excess of authority," the writ may be issued to control precisely the exercise of such

(UP Board of Regents vs Ligot-Telan)
Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the
petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires
the exercise of discretion or judgment.

(Lacson vs Perez)
When there are surfeit of other remedies which can be availed of, prohibition and mandamus are

It is basic in matters relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the
performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus
will not issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award

Quo Warranto
(Calleja vs Panday)
Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase "or an office in a corporation
created by authority of law" which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to
actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers
who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated
despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition
for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority
of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John
Hospital, Incorporated.

(Mendoza vs Allas)
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This
rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the
respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This
follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but
always against the person to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform
any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In the case at bar, the petition for
quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the
trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray
Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial
court's decision.

(City of Manila vs Serrano)
Thus, a writ of possession may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these
requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. In this case, these requirements
were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession.

Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the
landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is
neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is
to demand payment of just compensation. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to
NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-
meter Property.

This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation.
Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of
Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before
commissioners, for instance, was dispensable. We have held that the usual procedure in the determination
of just compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural requirements.
NPC's taking of Pobre's property without filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him
just compensation is a transgression of procedural due process.

(Republic vs Phil-Ville Dev.)
To stress, payment of just compensation is not a condition sine qua non to the issuance of an order of
expropriation. In expropriation proceedings, it is the transfer of title to the land expropriated that must
wait until the indemnity is actually paid.

(Republic vs Andaya)
"Taking," in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actually
deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a
practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property.

Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
(Dayot vs Shell Chemical)
The obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial
foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property ceases to be ministerial once it is shown that there is a third
party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor and that such
third party is a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex-parte writ of possession was
applied for.

(Servicewide Specialist vs CA)
The mortgagor must be impleaded in a replevin suit for recovery of mortgaged property and not just the
possessor. Mortgagee must establish a clear right first before he may be entitled to possession of
property and this is only possible when mortgagor is impleaded. Hence, the mortgagor is an indispensable

(UnionBank vs CA)
It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if
it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. Consolidation took place
as a matter of right since there was no redemption of the foreclosed property. Notice to the mortgagors,
and with more reason, to private respondents who are not even parties to the mortgage contract nor to
the extra judicial sale, is not necessary.

(Ardiente vs Provincial Sheriff)
It is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary, hence, not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale.

(BPI vs Veloso)
Bona fide redemption necessarily implies a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price,
otherwise the rule on the redemption period fixed by law can easily be circumvented. In order to effect a
redemption, the judgment debtor must pay the purchaser the redemption price composed of the
following: (1) the price which the purchaser paid for the property; (2) interest of 1% per month on the
purchase price; (3) the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid on the
property after the purchase; and (4) interest of 1% per month on such assessments and taxes.
Redemption within the period allowed by law is not a matter of intent but a question of payment or valid
tender of the full redemption price within said period.

(Heirs of Teves vs CA)
Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed
to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
(CGR Corp vs Treyes)
An independent action may be filed for actions for damages arising from incidents occurring after

(Larano vs Calendacion)
In unlawful detainer, 2 requisites must be present: (a) there must be failure to pay the installment due or
comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be demand both to pay or to
comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2 of Rule 70.

(Raymundo vs Bandong)
Only possession is the issue in an ejectment suit

(Refugia vs CA)
An ejectment suit is limited only to the issue of possession, even when appealed to the RTC

(Javelosa vs CA)
The issue of ownership is different from the issue of possession, hence, the filing of a case before the RTC
questioning ownership does not preclude the filing before the MTC of an ejectment suit questioning

(Judge Espanol vs Formoso)
A person accused of indirect contempt may be punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity has been given to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel

(Montenegro vs Montenegro)
When the act which the trial court ordered the petitioner to do has already been performed, albeit
belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable length of time, the penalty of imprisonment may no
longer be imposed despite the fact that its non-implementation was due to petitioners absence.

(Sison vs Caoibes Jr.)
Contempt is improper if issued against a person that has no interest or relation to a case, especially if
such person is not a party to the case.

(Yasay vs Recto)
Contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense. The exoneration of the contemner from the charge
amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would not lie.

Special Proceedings

Settlement of Estates
(De Leon vs CA)
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to
an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.

(Valarao vs Pascual)
Whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a
matter left entirely to its sound discretion as to how to appoint an administrator. As to possession, the law
explicitly authorizes him to take possession of the properties in whatever state they are, provided he does
so to preserve them for the regular administrator appointed afterwards. Clearly, the special administrator
enjoys not merely subsidiary possession to be carried out when the heirs dissipate the properties but the
primary and independent discretion of keeping them so they may be preserved for regular administration.
Partisan possession exercised by litigants over properties of the estate differs greatly from the neutral
possession of a special administrator under the Rules of Court.

(Union Bank vs Santibanez)
Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as
in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction
over that part of the estate. The money claim must be filed against the decedents estate in the probate
court. The rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with
the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said
promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as
against the petitioner.

(Jamero vs Nelicor)
The appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-
appealable. However, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be shown that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion or lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.

(Lee vs RTC of QC)
The sale of any property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the probate
or intestate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.

(Estate of Ruiz vs CA)
Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law
clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.

(San Luis vs San Luis)
The word "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary. , there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions.

(Pilapil vs Heirs of Maximino Briones)
It should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in
rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the
hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of
the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication.

(Alvarico vs Sola)
Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad faith, only the
State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. In other words, a private
individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a
free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land
covered thereby will again form part of the public domain.

(Caro vs Sucaldito)
Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to
the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated
from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. In this
case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent,
cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.

(Caniza vs CA)
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated
by the death of the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. That action, not
being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her
interests in the appeal at bar.

(Goyena vs Ledesma-Gustilo)
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the

(Cang vs CA)
It would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration
in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children. There should be a holistic
approach to the matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and
spiritual needs of the child. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a
sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children.
The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child
but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.

(In the matter of adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia)
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. Hence, since there is no law
prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

(Republic vs CA & Caranto)
As to the correction of name, the trial court erred in upholding the same for failure to abide the procedure
provided under Rule 108, Rules of Court. While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was
notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, sec. 4. In that notice only the prayer
for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in
the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and,
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard. (This rule has now been abandoned)

(Republic vs Hernandez)
The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor
an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted. (This rule has now been abandoned)

(Vda de Jacob vs CA)
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. This
Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged
adoption is a sham.

Habeas Corpus
(Illusorio vs Bildner)
Habeas Corpus is not available to the wife to secure the custody of her husband, who voluntary chose not
to cohabit with her.

(Serapio vs Sandiganbayan)
A petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to bail. It cannot be
availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and
the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said
discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is
pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed. The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only
be unjustified but would also preempt the Sandiganbayan's resolution of the pending application for bail of
petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.

(Lacson vs Perez)
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to
relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.

(Pulido vs Abu)
However, for filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari that
questioned the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. As lucidly explained by the Court of Appeals, the
ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of
Gonzales and Mesa. Petitioner should not have filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus because the relief he is
seeking therein is the same relief he is asking for in the certiorari case. Moreover, the main issue in both
cases boils down to whether Gonzales and Mesa should be released on bail. Because of the presence of
the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue are substantially the same/similar in the two
cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be binding on the habeas corpus case "petitioner is thus
guilty of forum shopping.

(Sangca vs City Prosecutor of Cebu City)
When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is
effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic.
Writ if Amparo and Habeas Data
(Canlas vs NAPICO Homeowners)
Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment
adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis
for the issuance of the writ of amparo. Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land
in question is not alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest
had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued
unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be

(Tapuz vs del Rosario)
The writ is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.

Change of Name
(Eleosida vs Local Civil Registrar of QC)
If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is
one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case,
and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

(Republic vs Kho)
While the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of name) were not
complied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for. The
mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the

(Kilosbayan Foundation vs Ermita)
No substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order,
and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. Substantial corrections to the
nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a
petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, not under RA 9048.

(Republic vs Capote)
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive
the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature.

(Petition for change of name of Julian lim Carulason Wang)
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his
petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his
judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.

(Ceruilla vs Delantar)
All matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the date of
birth, fall under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which governs cancellation or correction of entries in the
Civil Registry. Thus, the petition filed by the Ceruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as having
been falsified, is properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with
jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process.


Preliminary Considerations
(People vs Fetalino)
The evidence which should be considered by the court in criminal cases need not be limited to the
statements made in open court; rather, it should include all documents, affidavits or sworn statements of
the witnesses, and other supporting evidence. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh
the totality of the evidence presented by the parties.
(Ong Chia vs Republic)
The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, sec. 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules
may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." Hence
the acceptance of additional evidence by the appellate court does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

(People vs Valdez)
It is a matter of judicial experience that an affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete
and often inaccurate. To be sure, a sworn statement taken ex parte is generally considered to be inferior
to a testimony given in open court as the latter is subject to the test of cross examination.

(Zulueta vs CA)
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable"
is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." One thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty
of fidelity that each owes to the other.

(People vs Yatar)
Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and
reliable. Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the above test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is
relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology.

(People vs Sartagoda)

What need not be proved
(Republic vs CA)
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior
proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same
parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In
addition judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court
between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case
between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of court personnel.

(People vs Kulais)
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are
actually pending before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has
the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

(Laureano vs CA)
As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of
the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has
the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.
(Processual Presumption)

(LBP vs Banal)
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records
of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge. They may only do so "in the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the opposing party,"
which are not obtaining here.

(Republic Glass Corp vs Qua)
A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) during the trial either
by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. To
constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered. If made
in another case or in another court, the fact of such admission must be proved as in the case of any other
fact, although if made in a judicial proceeding it is entitled to greater weight.

(Habagat Grill vs DMC-Urban Property)
Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality
in which they sit. Such notice, however, is limited to what the law is and what it states. The location of
Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such
location is precisely at the core of the dispute in this case.
(Clarion Printing vs NLRC)
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior
proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same
parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In
addition judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court
between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case
between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of court personnel.

Rules of Admissibility

Object Evidence
(People vs Rullepa)
A person's appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the
senses of the court, as provided in Section 1, Rule 130.

(People vs Ulzoron)
Such pieces of object evidence indeed are more eloquent than a hundred witnesses. The fact of carnal
knowledge is not disputed. It was positively established through the offended party's own testimony and
corroborated by that of her examining physician

(Macarrubo vs Macarrubo)
The saying that photographs do not lie could not be any truer in those submitted in evidence by
complainant, which show a typical happy family with respondent essaying out his role as a husband to
complainant and a father to their two kids.

Documentary Evidence
(De Vera vs Aguilar)
All originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. This, petitioners
failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies.

(CitiBank Mastercard vs Teodoro)
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales
invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the
loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the
offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct
order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

(Sison vs People)
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced.
The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original,
and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The
photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The
correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima
facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the
court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. This court notes that when the prosecution
offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants objected to their admissibility for lack of proper
identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, the same photographs were
presented to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have
participated in the mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted by appellants as part of the
defense exhibits.

(Garvida vs Sales)
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much
less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face
whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.

(Cuevas vs Munoz)
Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or
diplomatic cable, the practically of the use of which in conceded. Even our own Extradition Law (P.D. No.
1069) allows the transmission of a request for provisional arrest via telegraph. There is no requirement for
the authentication of a request for provisional arrest and its accompanying documents. The process of
preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents, and transmitting them
through diplomatic channels, is not only time-consuming but also leakage-prone.

(Heirs of Sabanpan vs Comorposa)
The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here
refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but
recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions. If the Certification were a sham as
petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order.

(Ortanes vs CA)
when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.
Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in
said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties.

(Lapu-lapu Foundation vs CA)
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous
verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve
the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
(Borillo vs CA)
(Cruz vs CA)
(People vs Golimlim)
It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid
objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.

(People vs Castaneda)
When an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs the Conjugal Relation, it comes within the
exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution
for a crime committed by one against the other. With more reason must the exception apply to the instant
case where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification
is not a third person but the wife herself. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore
the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be

(Bordalba vs CA)
The dead mans statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming
to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
communication made by the deceased to the witness.

(Razon vs CA)
The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock
in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of
the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the dead man statute. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the records show
that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of
his transaction with the late elder Chuidian.

(Sunga-Chan vs Chua)
But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is
necessary that: 1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case
in prosecuted; 2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person or a person of unsound mind; 3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind; 4. His testimony refers to any matter
of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind." Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case. First,
petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer before the trial court, and
with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit
of the "Dead Man's Statute". Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's
Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted."

(People vs Sandiganbayan)
If the client seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed,
he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot
be broken by the attorney without the client's consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does
not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for
purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice. . It is well settled that in order that a communication
between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a
lawful end.
(Lim vs CA)
(Almonte vs Vasquez)
Where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other
national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts
have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena
considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.

(Ching vs CA)
Under the Rules, pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as
pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against the pleader
as extrajudicial admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. If not
offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not be considered.

(People vs Gaudia)
A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception. The offer of
compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony
of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of his
parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it
shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim.

(Doldol vs People)
Such partial restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation
of the missing funds. Said payment is of no moment and could not have legally brought acquittal for the
appellant. On the contrary, as guided by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, We hold that said
payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with appellants commitment to gradually pay the
remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an implied
admission of appellants guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

(People vs Cui)
For this admission of a co-conspirator to be appreciated, the following requisites must be satisfied: a. that
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; b. that the admission relates to
the common objects; and c. that it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. The general rule is that extra-judicial declarations of a co-conspirator made before the
formation of the conspiracy or after the accomplishment of its object are inadmissible in evidence as
against the other co-conspirators, on the ground that the accused in a criminal case has the constitutional
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them.

(People vs Garcia)
Being taken ex-parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from
partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries. It has thus been held that
affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former are
often executed when an affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford her a fair opportunity
of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of
what the declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the
affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to her.

(Ladiana vs People)
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. There is no question that even in the absence of
counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional
rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was under
custody or interrogation.

(People vs Flores)
Where several accused are tried together for the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given by one
during the trial implicating the others is competent evidence against the latter. The extrajudicial admission
or confession of a co-conspirator out of court is different from the testimony given by a co-accused during
trial. The first is admissible against the declarant alone, but the second is perfectly admissible against his
co-accused who had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.

(People vs Sayaboc)
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this
presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements
safeguarding an accuseds rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially
when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any
fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating
environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to
have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for
maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders
the confession valueless and inadmissible.

(People vs Ulit)
Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the barangay
chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he was not
under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement. The exclusionary rule is
premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through
menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and
psychological, is forcefully apparent.

Conduct and Character
(People vs Santos)
We consider that the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the
limited purpose for proving knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that
the particular corner of two (2) particular streets in Manila was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its

(People vs Nardo)
Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor
did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. While lying may
constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment
to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one's own father of the
sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.

(Republic vs Heirs of Alejaga)
A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or good
or bad faith -- and the formers statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without
violating the hearsay rule.

Hearsay Evidence Rule
(People vs Montanez)
The statement is highly reliable, having been made in extremity when the declarant is at the point of
death and when any hope of survival is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the
mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth.

(People vs Bernal)
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: "(1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3)
that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his
aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be

(Tison vs CA)
The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both
claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the
declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the
declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate
of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of
some other member of the family.

(Jison vs CA)
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the
rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those
articles which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.
These have been described as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family," or those "which, if
preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition."

(People vs Mendoza)
The test of admissibility for evidence as a part of the res gestae is stated with congency by justice Ricardo
J. Francisco thus: whether the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected
with the principal fact or event which it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself,
and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. Tested by
this standard, the extra-judicial admission of accused-appellant was clearly part of the res gestae and
therefore correctly admitted by the trial court as evidence against the accused-appellant.

(People vs Villarama)
To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startling
occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such

(People vs Palmones)
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical.
The following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in
evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the
occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement
was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence
of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and
circumstances of the statement itself. Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the
statements attributed to the victim, we rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae.

(People vs Lobrigas)
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

(PAL vs Ramos)
A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent
to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of
greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and
recollection. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or
so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate,
qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as a part of the res gestae.

(Lao vs Standard Insurance)
The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the
following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
(MERALCO vs Quisumbing)
(People vs Ortiz-Miyako)
Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the
Paraaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception
contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous
proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments.

Opinion Rule
(People vs Abriol)
There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess
in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and
education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of
authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The question of whether a witness is properly
qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court.

(Bautista vs CA)
The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less
compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. As against
direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the
contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect
or circumstantial evidence at best.

(People vs Duranan)
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a
person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and
conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons
upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is.

Character Evidence
(People vs Deopita)

Burden of Proofs and Presumptions
(Ibaan Rural Bank vs CA)
Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when
he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the
former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

(Alcaraz vs Tangga-an)
Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another
to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of
such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; After recognizing the validity of the lease
contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the
contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over
the lot.

(People vs Padrigone)
Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that "evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced" does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the
suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an
exercise of a privilege.

(Metro Bank vs CA)
It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a
party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case
made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption
arises that the evidence, if produced would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his
adversary. No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it
exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact
does not exist.

(People vs Ong)
To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in
effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the
operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. For, the
courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty by law enforcement agents. This presumption should not by itself prevail over
the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual.
(People vs Gallego)
(People vs Edualino)
The Court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to
conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage.

Presentation of Evidence
(People vs Fabre)
In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to prove that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate likewise that he could
not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its

(People vs Guamos)
The right of every party to cross-examine a witness "with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue." It is also the duty of the witness to answer questions put to him or her,
subject to certain exceptions.

(People vs Perez)
As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness
is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or
suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.

(People vs Castillano)
Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence
consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner
must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness
being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent
inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made.
(People vs Plasencia)
The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Allowing a
witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the exercise of
that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be
accurate on dates and like details.

(Canque vs CA)
Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. Under Rule
132, sec. 10, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence,
and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on
the basis of refreshed memory.

(Dy vs CA)
In proving their due execution and genuineness, it is not sufficient that the witness state in a general
manner that the person whose signature appears thereon was the one who executed the document. The
testimony of an eye witness authenticating a private document must be positive, categorically stating that
the document was actually witnessed by the person whose name is subscribed thereto.

(Heirs of Lacsa vs CA)
For a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not
enough that it be more than 30 years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled;
(1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is
unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.

(People vs Canonigo)
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Nevertheless, despite the fact
that the baptismal certificate which reflected accused-appellants date of birth has not been formally
offered in evidence, the court may take note of the said date of birth as reflected in the baptismal
certificate. Not only was it the subject of the testimony of accused-appellants own witness, Ms. Macaria
Estacio, but during the course of the trial, repeated references have been made by the counsel for
accused-appellant to the latters date of birth as appearing in the said baptismal certificate. The absence
of any formal presentation of certain exhibits does not render their consideration thereof a reversible
error, if repeated references thereto in the course of trial by counsel for accused and of the court
convincingly show that the documents were part of prosecutions evidence.

(Ong vs CA)
The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or
has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to offer it if it believes this will
advance the cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. A document or an article is valueless
unless it is formally offered in evidence, and the opposing counsel is given an opportunity to object to it
and to cross-examine any witness called to present or identify it. Evidence not formally offered before the
trial court cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny the other parties
their right to rebut them.

Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
(People vs Suarez)
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a
degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty
is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

(People vs Bulan)
Indeed, the testimony of a lone witness, if found positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to
support a conviction especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity. While the
number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not necessarily with the greatest number. Conviction of the accused may still be had on the basis
of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. It must be stressed that evidence to be believed
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must also be credible in itself, such that
common experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference its probability under the

(DECS vs del Rosario)
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is
superior to that of the other. In other words, preponderance of evidence means the greater weight of the
evidence - or evidence that outweighs the evidence of the adverse party.

(Cervantes vs Cardeno)
Mere substantial evidence suffices in administrative cases.

(Reyes vs Mangino)
Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent Judge connotes misconduct so grave that, if proven,
it would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.
The Rules of Court requires that if a judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver
offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary
to which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, competent
evidence should be presented, since the charge is penal in character. Thus, the ground for the removal of
a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.

(Benares vs Pancho)
It is well to note at this point that in quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of evidence required to
support the findings of the NLRC is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

(PAL vs CA)
It is well entrenched that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial
and administrative bodies are generally accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. Substantial
evidence, which is the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.

(Lagon vs CA)
Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document
continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution and delivery.

(Domingo vs Domingo)
Being a public document, it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein expressed. It has the presumption
of regularity in its favor and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than
merely preponderant.