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Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci.

34 (2003) 351368
www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa
Theory-ladenness of evidence: a case study
from history of chemistry
Prajit K. Basu
Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, Gachi Bowli, Hyderabad 500 046, India
Received 23 October 1998; received in revised form 10 June 2002
Abstract
This paper attempts to argue for the theory-ladenness of evidence. It does so by employing
and analysing an episode from the history of eighteenth century chemistry. It delineates
attempts by Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier to construct entirely different kinds of
evidence for and against a particular hypothesis from a set of agreed upon observations or
(raw) data. Based on an augmented version of a distinction, drawn by J. Bogen and J. Wood-
ward, between data and phenomena it is shown that the role of theoretical auxiliary assump-
tions is very important in constructing evidence for (or against) a theory from observation or
(raw) data. In revolutionary situations, rival groups hold radically different theories and theor-
etical auxiliary assumptions. These are employed to construct very different evidence from
the agreed upon set of observations or (raw) data. Hence, theory resolution becomes difcult.
It is argued that evidence construction is a multi-layered exercise and can be disputed at any
level. What counts as unproblematic observation or (raw) data at one level may become prob-
lematic at another level. The contingency of these constructions and the (un)problematic nature
of evidence are shown to be partially dependent upon the scientic knowledge that the scien-
tic community possesses.
2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Theory-ladenness of evidence; Eighteenth century chemical philosophy; Construction of evi-
dence; Observation/data; Theory resolution
E-mail address: pkbsh@uohyd.ernet.in (P.K. Basu).
0039-3681/03/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0039-3681(03)00022-0
352 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
1. Introduction
The traditional logico-empiricist or positivist account of science posits a sharp
distinction between theory and observation. According to this view, a theory predicts
and explains observations. A theory is expressed in a language whose vocabulary is
quite distinct from the vocabulary of the language in which observations are
expressed
1
. This view has been discredited by arguments offered by post-positivist
philosophers such as Thomas Kuhn
2
, Paul Feyerabend
3
, and Dudley Shapere
4
. They
arguedmotivated by their research into history of various sciences as well as into
actual practices of modern sciencethat the alleged distinction between theory and
observation was to some extent illusory and untenable. These post-positivist philos-
ophers have, in effect, extended the notion of observation and observability in their
attempts to argue for theory-ladenness of observation. They hold, for example, that
electrons are observable and that the core of the sun is observable.
There have been, however, attempts to illuminate the issue of theory-ladenness of
observation, or lack thereof, by paying closer attention (in the tradition of Kuhn et
al.) to actual scientic practice
5
. These attempts give us an enriched, although com-
plex, view of the matter. These investigators question the simple-minded view that
observations are straightforwardly theory-laden, without, however, sliding back into
the positivists mistakes.
In this paper, I argue for theory-ladenness of evidence (and not necessarily of
observation). In order to do this, I rst discuss very briey the conclusions of an
important paper by James Bogen and James Woodward
6
. I consider their argument
for the distinction between data and phenomena. I list the key aspects of their view
to avoid conation with their position with which I nd much to agree
7
. I then discuss
a simple historical episode (taken from history of eighteenth century chemistry) to
highlight a few problems with their account, especially those that arise in the context
of theory resolution across competing paradigms (a` la Kuhn). I show that the weak-
ness of their argument lies in not considering cases involving major conceptual or
paradigm change, i.e. scientic revolutions. Finally, I offer an analysis of another
historical episode, of eighteenth century chemistry to drive home the point that evi-
dence is theory-laden while the (raw) data or observation may not be. My analysis
also brings out the indenite and contextualised nature of the distinction between
evidence and observation. Examinations of these two episodes not only establishes
the distinction that Bogen and Woodward argue for quite convincingly, but also
1
Nagel (1961).
2
Kuhn (1970).
3
Feyerabend (1985).
4
Shapere (1982).
5
Hacking (1983); Laymon (1985).
6
Bogen and Woodward (1988).
7
Kosso and Kosso (1995). The authors employ the distinction between data and phenomena drawn a`
la Bogen and Woodward to show the reciprocity between theory and evidence, and then to argue for a
coherence model of scientic knowledge.
353 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
brings into open the theory-ladenness of evidence (or phenomena). In conclusion, I
point out that more careful analysis of scientic practice, of both past and present,
is required to illuminate the issue.
2. Saving the phenomena
Bogen and Woodward argue that (i)n the normal sense of observe, scientic
theories do not predict or explain facts about what we observe or what are observ-
ables
8
. They argue that there is a distinction between data and phenomena and
only the latter are predicted or explained by a theory. Data have three important
characteristics: (1) they play the role of evidence for the existence of phenomena;
(2) they can be straightforwardly observed; and (3) they typically cannot be predicted
or systematically explained by a theory
9
. A phenomenon, on the other hand, has
these properties: (1) well-developed scientic theories predict and explain facts about
phenomena; (2) phenomena are detected through the use of data; (3) they are not
straightforwardly observable; (4) and facts about phenomena are evidence for the
high level general theories by which they are explained
10
.
Bogen and Woodward subsequently go on to analyze a few specic instances of
scientic practice to illustrate the above mentioned properties of data and of phenom-
ena. They choose the phenomenon of the melting point of lead being 3270C, as
well as that of the weak neutral current. They point out that experimentalists justi-
ably move from data like thermometer readings (with statistical scatters) to a con-
clusion about the melting point of lead. This is justied because the reliability of
an inference from data to phenomena may be dependent upon (non-trivially) visual
perception or statistical analysis
11
.
Bogen and Woodward also point out that observational error (or error in data)
is a serious possibility in actual scientic practice
12
. They recognize that the kind
of errors to be corrected for differs and depends upon many different conditions
peculiar to the subject under investigation, the experimental design, and the equip-
ment employed
13
. Thus, the statistical analysis of thermometer readings in the case
of determination of melting point of lead is appropriate but the same method of
analysis is inadequate and inappropriate to handle data in the case of the weak neu-
tral current.
Bogen and Woodward also bring out the fact that data, in order to be useful in
science, must occur in a form which is accessible to our senses, and must occur
sufciently frequently and in sufciently large amounts for scientists to detect
8
Bogen and Woodward (1988), p. 305.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid., p. 311.
12
Ibid., p. 312.
13
Ibid.
354 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
enough of it in reasonably short period of time
14
. They also argue that data must
also be such that they are relatively easy to identify, classify, measure, aggregate,
and analyze in ways that are reliable and reproducible by others
15
. The data must
be amenable to demands for data-reduction and statistical analysis and must result
from processes in which there has been adequate control for various kinds of experi-
mental error
16
.
Phenomena, on the other hand, are derived from theory or allow systematic exhib-
iting of causal relations. Phenomena have stable and repeatable characteristics. These
characteristics must be detectable by means of a variety of experimental procedures.
These procedures may lead to various kinds of data. This is because instances of
phenomena can appear in diverse kinds of experimental situations. The phenomena
appear because of the interaction of some manageably small number of causal fac-
tors
17
.
Bogen and Woodward point out that their discussion is an empirical description
of various features of scientic practice that have been overlooked or misdescribed
in the philosophical literature
18
. Their discussion emphasizes that theory-ladenness
of data or observation is not transparent. Statistical analysis, for example, of data or
experimental results by themselves do not imply that data are theory-laden.
The main problem with Bogen and Woodwards analysis arises from the fact that
it is inadequate in handling cases of revolutions in science. In a scientic revol-
ution, an old paradigm (to employ Kuhns terminology) is replaced by a new one.
I shall explain the nature of the problem in more detail in Section 3. I start, however,
by discussing an episode in the history of eighteenth century chemistry, which
although not connected with the Chemical Revolution, is interesting in that it high-
lights some of the issues about theory-ladenness of evidence (or observation). This
episode concerns the attempt by Joseph Priestley, an eighteenth century chemist, to
refute the charge that he had plagiarized someone elses work.
3. An historical episode
This episode is somewhat different from the usual examples chosen by historians
or philosophers of science in support of their arguments. At stake is whether one
scientist, say A, duplicated and published the work of another scientist, say B, with-
out giving B any credit. B complains that A has stolen his ideas, methods, and his
ndings, and has published them without proper citation. How does B substantiate
this charge? Sometimes this is achieved by pointing out that A saw what B was
doing in the latters laboratory. The samples used, the way the experiments were
performed, and the results from these experiments, were observed by A, and sub-
14
Ibid., p. 319.
15
Ibid., p. 320.
16
Ibid., p. 321.
17
Ibid., p. 317.
18
Ibid., p. 337.
355 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
sequently A repeated the experiments and/or simply reported the results without
mentioning the contribution made by B. But what would count as establishing that
same samples were used by A, that the same experiments were performed, and
hence that the same results were observed? Could B, for example, argue that the
descriptions of the contents in beakers, the way the apparatus was set up, the descrip-
tions of effervescence or other observable effects would show that A stole Bs
ideas and results? The situation may be more dramatically described as follows.
Suppose there are similarities in the descriptions of the phenomenological experi-
ences of two scientists. Can we now say that both were doing the same experiments,
or, to borrow the term from Bogen and Woodward, were investigating the same
phenomena?
Joseph Priestley, a leading eighteenth century chemist, argued that descriptions of
contents in a beaker or vessel and descriptions or phenomenological descriptions of
such properties as the color and smell of substances do not constitute sufcient evi-
dence for whether experiments in chemistry are the same or not. Responding to a
charge of plagiarism, Priestley points out that mere sameness of observation reports
does not amount to sameness of experiment. Thus, he said:
Now this I take to have been the difference between Dr. Hss experiments
and mine, and I hope that the next time you shall see a man standing by a tub
of water, or a bason of quicksilver, with jars and phials, &c. before him, lled
partly with air, and partly with water, with a lighted candle, and a variety of little
implements at hand, and transferring his different kinds of airs, with same degree
of dexterity, from one vessel to another, a red colour appearing here, and a white
one appearing there, you will not be ready to afrm that the operation was institut-
ing the very same experiments that you saw at Shelburne home
19
.
Priestleys point is this. Suppose we see an experiment being performed. For the
sake of simplicity, let us say, take a white powder in a beaker. Pour a transparent
liquid on the powder. We see effervescence in the beaker. Now, we invert an empty
phial on the top of the beaker. We see a red fume being collected in the phial. We
may see the same experiment again later. The experiments are the same in
the sense that the description of the later experiment may be in no way different
from the description of the experiment given above. But that similarity in description
does not constitute the sameness of the experiment in the sense that both involved
same constituents, or were the same chemical experiment with the same constituents.
One of them might have been done as a control experiment to establish that light
does not play any causal role in the chemical reaction under investigation. Or the
constituents involved might be quite different even though they look the same.
The moral that I want to draw from this historical example is that if Bogen and
Woodwards analysis is correct, then there should not be any confusion regarding
what counts as the same experiment. Now given the fact that there can be agree-
19
Priestley (1774), pp. 7778.
356 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
ment regarding data or observation, as exemplied by the agreement between the
accuser and the responder in the particular case under consideration, how can the
conclusions drawn from these data be quite different? Observation, qua observation,
need not in any interesting sense be theory infected. But what the scientists do with
it is a different story. They surely employ it to establish phenomena (a` la Bogen
and Woodward) or a hypothesis. But the rival scientists, as we saw above, often
employ it to test or establish contrary hypotheses. More correctly, they employ these
same data or observations to construct (evidence for?) different phenomena. It is
in this employment that observations are made evidentially relevant. Priestleys reply
(quoted above) to the charge of plagiarism clearly points out that two rival scientists
may agree as to the (descriptions of) data, but yet disagree regarding their evidential
bearings on different phenomena (or theories or hypotheses). If the theories (or
phenomena or hypotheses) are radically different (like Kuhns paradigms), then the
evidential connection is brought about by suitably modifying (but not necessarily
changing) the observation such that the full evidential import of the observation is
in view. Are these data or observations then theory infected? In the particular case
in hand, we may agree that they are not. However, the data-theory relation or the
data-phenomena relation, as I shall argue below, is a multi-layered relation. What
counts as same data needs to be contextualised and is contingent upon the parti-
cular case in hand. The multi-layered transformation of data can be, and has been,
challenged by rival scientists who dispute the correctness of a hypothesis, or a theory,
or a paradigm. Analysis of these situations points to the following lesson. Obser-
vation, in order for it to be (evidentially) relevant for a theory, is theory infected.
To put it differently, observations, when transformed into evidence for a hypothesis,
phenomena, or a theory, are theory infected.
4. Theory-ladenness of observation
In this section, I argue for the ineliminable theory-ladenness of observation by
discussing an historical episode and offering an analysis of the episode to provide
an argument for my thesis that although one could legitimately hold that there are
observations that are not theory infected, such observations cannot be employed for
theory resolution. I conclude by considering some objections to my argument.
The episode that I shall consider in the history of eighteenth century chemistry
concerns the debate regarding the chemical nature of water. In this debate, Antoine
Lavoisier, the leading French chemist of the time, claimed that water is a chemical
compound by arguing for three separate hypotheses. The nal argument, which is a
collection of three separate arguments, aimed to show that water could be divided
into its constituents (the analytic method) and formed from its constituents (the syn-
thetic method)
20
.
20
The methodological assumption that underlies Lavoisiers arguments and experiments is that when
a chemical substance has been divided into chemically distinct parts and has been formed by combining
those parts, the chemical constituents of that substance has been conclusively established.
357 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
First, the analytic part: Lavoisier argued that iron reacts with steam to produce
iron oxide and hydrogen. Therefore, he argued that hydrogen is a constituent of
water. He independently attempted to show that iron reacts with oxygen to form iron
oxide, and that the product of the iron-oxygen reaction is chemically similar to the
solid product in an iron-steam reaction. The explanation of iron oxide being produced
in the iron-steam reaction was given by arguing that the oxygen must have come
from the water. The synthetic part: Lavoisier argued that water can be formed from
oxygen and hydrogen by performing the combustion of hydrogen in oxygen.
Joseph Priestley objected that the black powder produced in the reaction of iron
and steam is not iron oxide. He then attempted to show that iron is not a simple
substance by arguing that in the iron-oxygen reaction both iron oxide and an air
(xed air-carbon dioxide) are produced.
I shall start by emphasizing the distinction between evidence and observation or
data. I will employ the historical episode outlined above to develop this distinction.
Roughly, the distinction between evidence and data amounts to this. A piece of
evidence for (or against) a theory is a construction in the context of that theory from
(raw) data. In this construction, a set of auxiliary assumptions is employed. These
auxiliaries may themselves be theoretical in character. From the same (raw) data it
is possible to construct different evidence for (or against) different theories since the
auxiliaries employed in connection with different theories can be different
21
. Finally,
although the (raw) data are expressed in a language which is acceptable to partisans
of competing theories, the evidence constructed from the same (raw) data is often
expressed in the partisans differing theoretical languages. I shall now explain in
detail the distinction between evidence and (raw) data. I shall start by offering a
very sketchy outline of the existing literature on the theory-observation distinction.
It is well known that some philosophers, when they talk about evidence or data,
use the terms to mean one and the same thing and for that usage to be uncontro-
versial. They also take it for granted that in actual scientic practice there is no
dispute among scientists concerning what the evidence or data are. Data are
expressed in a theory-neutral language, the observation language (L
O
). The obser-
vation language is sharply distinguished from the language in which a theory is
expressed. The language in which a theory is expressed (L
T
) has its own specic
vocabulary. The theoretical terms or sentences are given cognitive signicance by
connecting them, using certain correspondence principles or bridge laws, to obser-
vation reports that use only the observation vocabulary. Since these observation
reports can be publicly veried, at least if L
O
is a physicalist language, scientists
with competing theories can appeal to this impartial data or evidence for adjudi-
cation
22
. There are, however, other philosophers who do not accept this theory-obser-
vation dichotomy. For them, evidence or data statements are theory-laden. These
21
See Longino (1990). See especially Ch. 3, Evidence and hypothesis, and Ch. 4, Values and objec-
tivity, for an alternative treatment of the role that background assumptions play on the evidential bearing
on theories and hypotheses.
22
The theoryobservation dichotomy proposed by the logical positivists is well documented and sum-
marized in Suppe (1977).
358 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
philosophers fail to see what sense can be made of the claim that scientists with
competing theories appeal to the same evidence or data
23
.
A moderate philosophical position recognizes the nature of actual scientic prac-
tice and recognizes that scientists holding rival theories and belonging to rival
research programs still manage to communicate among themselves. As a result, the
moderate position may hold that the evidence is a construction in a theoretical langu-
age (of the theory and auxiliaries), L
T
, from the observation language, L
O
, used to
describe the data
24
. These translations are taken to be possible in principle, and this
is what I shall assume. A piece of evidence is then expressed by a sentence in the
language, L
T
, of the theory. It is in this sense that a piece of evidence is theory-
laden. Ultimately the evidence sentence uses the vocabulary of the theory for or
against the theory for which it is evidence. It is not the (raw) data that serves this
function. The sentences describing the (raw) data can be expressed in a language,
L
O
, whose vocabulary could be, and in general is, quite different from L
T
. It requires
no great philosophical insight to understand that scientists with competing theoretical
viewpoints may employ the same L
O
to talk about the same (raw) data. Thus,
although the scientists may disagree about what the evidence is, they do, in practice,
agree about the (raw) data. In fact, I will argue, by way of an example, that Priestley
and Lavoisier agreed concerning the (raw) data but disagreed as to their evidential
potential. Translated into different theoretical languages, the data can take on very
different guises.
Before I discuss the historical details a preliminary qualication is in order. The
distinction between the L
O
and L
T
vocabularies is a matter of gradation. Sometimes
the sentences describing the (raw) data employ terms of the theory. The question
then is how these descriptions of (raw) data can be said to be about (raw) data when
the language for (raw) data is supposedly different from that of the theory. The
answer to this question is that, what counts as (raw) data and what counts as legit-
imate descriptions of them are more often than not determined by what can be agreed
by the scientists who are party to a dispute. They may, of course, disagree about
whether and to what degree these descriptions are theory infected. But once they
agree upon (raw) data and the descriptions of these data, they can proceed with the
subsequent steps in their arguments.
Let us recapitulate the controversy between Priestley and Lavoisier concerning
the hypothesis that the reaction in which iron is heated in oxygen produces a black
powder (iron oxide) and nothing else. Lavoisier claimed that this hypothesis is con-
rmed by the evidence he obtained. Priestley argued that iron oxide is not formed,
23
Although the theory-ladenness of observation has been employed by Kuhn (1970) in his argument
for conceiving scientic revolutions in terms of shifts in paradigms, that the theory-observation dichotomy
is untenable has been argued very effectively by (besides those cited in notes 3 and 4), Achinstein (1970),
pp. 234250, and Spector (1970), pp. 276293.
24
Richard Burian (1987), among others, appears to hold the view that any philosophical analysis of
scientic activity including conceptual change must not exclude point-by-point comparison of the predic-
tions, and descriptions of contemporaneous versions of rival theories belonging to rival research tra-
ditions. See especially Burian (1987), pp. 1619.
359 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
although he did not deny that a black powder is formed. Thus, the presence of the
black powder is the (raw) data which both scientists agreed upon. Priestley, of course,
claimed that not only a black powder but also an air (a gas) is formed, and challenged
the Lavoisians regarding their accuracy reporting the (raw) data.
The example under consideration is the ironoxygen reaction. The Lavoisian
hypothesis, H, is: H
1
: Whenever iron is heated in oxygen, iron oxide is produced;
and H
2
: Nothing else is produced in the ironoxygen reaction. Thus, there are two
parts, H
1
and H
2
, of the hypothesis, H. Both parts, H
1
and H
2
, employ theoretical
language, including terms such as iron, oxygen, being heated, iron oxide
25
.
The evidence, E, for the hypothesis, H, are claims of the sort: E
1
: Iron oxide is
produced; and E
2
: On that occasion nothing else is produced. Thus, apparently, E
1
conrms H
1
, E
2
conrms H
2
, and E conrms H.
I shall list the set of (raw) data for the ironoxygen reaction acceptable to both
the Lavoisians and Priestley:
1. A pure sample of iron was employed. Presumably purity can be checked by
appealing to the Stahlian theses
26
. These tests will also establish whether the solid
substance is iron or not.
2. A pure sample of oxygen was employed. Presumably the purity of the sample is
established by appealing to the Stahlian theses. These tests will also establish
whether the gas is oxygen or not.
3. Balance reading of the weight measurement of the pure sample of iron: M
1
.
4. Balance reading of the weight measurement of the pure sample of oxygen: M
2
.
5. A black powder is formed in the vessel (e
1
).
6. Balance reading of the weight measurement of the black powder: M
3
.
It should be obvious that the evidence, E
1
, is not expressed by the sentence, there
is a black powder in the vessel or a black powder is formed in the vessel. It is
more complex than that. Let r
1
be the sentence There is a black powder in the
vessel. This is the (raw) data as expressed in L
O
. The other (raw) data include the
balance reading of the weight measurement of black powder and the balance readings
of the weight measurements of the samples of iron and of oxygen. These data do
not constitute any evidence by themselves. One constructs evidence out of these raw
data. How this evidence is constructed depends on what theories or background
assumptions are employed. Once we pay attention to these complexities the concept
and nature of evidence does not seem so straightforward. Let r
2
be the sentence The
balance reading of the weight measurement of the iron sample is M
1.
. Let r
3
be the
sentence, The balance reading of the weight measurement of the oxygen sample is
M
2
. Let r
4
be the sentence, The balance reading of the weight measurement of the
black powder is M
3
. The four statements r
1
, . . ., r
4
taken jointly do not yet form
25
However, it will become clear that both H
1
and H
2
are argued for by appealing to rather sophisticated
evidence, somewhat removed from the level of (raw) data.
26
Stahlian theses for characterizing chemical substances as well as for establishing purity of chemical
substances have been listed and discussed in detail elsewhere, see Basu (1992a).
360 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
the evidence for Lavoisiers hypothesis. These statements about (raw) data are not,
prima facie, evidence for or against Lavoisiers hypothesis. If they were the evidence
for Lavoisiers hypothesis, Priestley could not have challenged Lavoisiers theory.
This is because, as mentioned above, Priestley accepted these statements about the
(raw) data. If they were uncontroversial as evidence, Priestley would have to accept
the way the evidence was constructed from the (raw) data. Once the evidence was
constructed in the way mentioned above, it would be hard for Priestley to reject the
Lavoisian argument. Priestley did not accept these statements as evidence for Lavois-
iers hypothesis. What he objected to was the employment of the data to construct
evidence for Lavoisiers theory
27
.
These data became evidence only in the light of the background (theoretical) assump-
tions including some principles that were controversial (at that time), e.g. the Principle
of Conservation of Mass (hereafter PCM) and the Principle of Chemical Simplicity
(hereafter PCS). The PCM says that mass is conserved in any chemical reaction. This
entails that the mass of the black powder must be equal to the mass of iron and of
oxygen if and only if nothing else is produced in the reaction. Lavoisier computed and
established the equality of the masses, i.e. M
B
= M
J
+ M
O
. That equality constituted
evidence for Lavoisier for the claim that only the black powder is produced and nothing
else. Priestley could have objected to this construction of evidence from the raw data.
The evidence is favorable evidence for Lavoisiers hypothesis only in the context of the
PCM, and the plausibility of the PCM rests on a specic kind of theory of matter
28
.
Since Priestleys theory of matter was very different from that of Lavoisier, he could
have objected on this count. However, he did not. This is an aspect of Priestleys scien-
tic generosity which has been overlooked by most Priestley scholars
29
. It also brings
out an important aspect of the theory of conrmation. This is that a comparison between
theories should be as fair as possible, i.e. one needs to grant ones opponents the premises
the opponents require for their argument
30
.
27
Priestley also objected to the inaccuracy of the raw data, as mentioned earlier. But he need not have,
as will be clear from the subsequent discussion.
28
See Ch. 3 of my unpublished dissertation for details, Basu, 1992b.
29
I have in mind the ground breaking research on Priestleys sceintic work by R. E. Schoeld and
J. G. McEvoy. See especially: Schoeld (1964a,b, 1966, 1967); McEvoy (1978a,b,c, 1979). While both
Schoeld and McEvoy are extremely sympathetic to Priestleys scientic work, their research does not
sufciently emphasize how Priestley took enormous pain in identifying the nitty-gritty problems that
inform, from an eighteenth century chemical philosophers perspective, Lavoisiers work and arguments.
Priestleys challenge had often been to show that if one assumes that Lavoisiers experiment was correctly
carried out one ends up in a result which conicts with the theoretical assumptions of the experiment.
See, for example, Priestleys refutation of the Lavoisian experiment purporting to establish that synthesis
of water is possible. Priestleys arguments were at various levels. At one level he showed that the experi-
ment invariably produces acid as well, and this conicts with the Lavoisian claim that only water is
synthesized. I have given examples of similar generous arguments on the part of Priestley elsewhere.
See especially Basu, 1992b, Ch. 4.
30
One may wonder whether the opponent should be granted all the premises that he or she needs. I
have argued elsewhere (see Basu, 1992b, Ch. 5) how much can be granted and why. The idea that
conrmation of a hypothesis or a theory is based on a fair causal comparison is hardly new. See Miller
(1987), especially Ch. 4. I have employed the idea to understand Priestleys work quite fruitfully.
361 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
Let me now go back to the specic example to clarify how evidence sentences
are constructed from the (raw) data. I shall start with the (raw) data described by
item 5 above. I claim that the (raw) data is expressed in L
O
. A black powder was
formed in the vessel. L
O
is a language acceptable to both groups. Let this datum
be e
1
. It should be obvious that, prima facie, e
1
is not an evidence for H, or H
1
, or
H
2
, or any combination of them. However, e
1
can be transformed into E
1
by making
use of some auxiliary assumptions. These auxiliary assumptions, S, include the gen-
eral Stahlian theses concerning determining the chemical nature and the specic
reactivities of iron oxide
31
. Thus, (e
1
and S) imply E
1
. The statement E
1
is also
arrived at from H
1
by means of a different set of auxiliary assumptions, namely the
assumption that both the iron and oxygen samples were pure, and the assumption
that the iron was heated in oxygen. The evidence statement, E
1
, is thus constructed
in two different ways and these constructions are not interchangeable. Thus,
e
1
and S imply E
1
; (1)
H
1
and A
1
imply E
1
. (2)
However, H
1
and A
1
and S do not imply e
1
; and e
1
and A
1
and S do not imply H
1
.
This is because the construction of E
1
in (1) is asymmetrical. The fact that iron
oxide is produced does not entail (along with S) that a black powder is produced
32
.
This asymmetry also gives us some idea regarding how classication of objects into
different kinds can and does proceed, as follows.
The (raw) data about an object to be classied is employed along with some
auxiliary assumptions to determine if the object falls under a certain class. It should
be obvious that terms like iron and oxygen are classicatory terms that are, at
least one level removed from the terms employed to express the (raw) data. It should
also be apparent that what counts as agreed upon (raw) data and what counts as
disputed evidence has a multi-layered nature. That a solid metallic sample was iron
and was pure, could only be determined (in the eighteenth century) by subjecting
the sample to Stahlian tests. Thus, strictly speaking, the existence of a solid metallic
body was the (raw) data that both the Lavoisians and Priestley could agree upon.
However, they also agreed that this solid metallic body was a sample of pure iron.
This represented thus a rst level of evidence construction. Because of the agreement
on all sides, this premissthat one was using a sample of pure ironcould be
considered (uncontroversial) (raw) data at that time.
Scientists can and sometimes do disagree whether a certain e
1
(a sentence express-
ing raw datum) leads to the conclusion that E
1
(a sentence expressing evidence).
Their disagreement might be basic, at the e
1
level, but may also be at the level of
31
If the black powder undergoes specic reactions (characteristic of iron oxide), then it is iron oxide.
32
The chemical structure of iron oxide and the properties of light are jointly causally responsible for
the color of iron oxide, i.e. the wavelength at which a specimen of pure iron oxide reects white light.
The formation of iron oxide (a phenomenon a` la Bogen and Woodward) should not lead scientists to
believe that it would have a particular color that can be predicted. Even with current knowledge it is
hard, if not impossible, to predict the color of a new compound that is synthesized.
362 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
S. For example, which aspects of e
1
are relevant as (raw) data can be debated. Also,
the assumptions S are expressed in a language that facilitates transformation of e
1
(expressed in the raw data language) to E
1
(expressed in the language of the
evidence). Disagreements at the level of S can and sometimes do involve theory. It
is not my purpose here to show how such a transformation is carried out in actual
cases, but simply to point out that they are carried out and that scientists sometimes
employ different sets of auxiliary assumptions {S
i
} to transform the same e
1
into
very different kinds of E
1
.
The transformation of (raw) data into evidence becomes very apparent when we
consider how the part, E
2
, of the total evidence, E, was constructed by Lavoisier
and how E
2
was pressed into service to argue for H
2
and thus for H. The question
remains whether Lavoisier was justied in employing controversial assumptions like
the PCM to transform the (raw) data into evidence.
The Lavoisians employed a set of assumptions, A
2
, about the nature of matter
(derived from a Newtonian view of matter), about the identity of the inertial mass and
gravitational mass of any object, and about the balance being a reliable instrument to
determine the gravitational mass of an object, in order to construct rst order evi-
dence from the balance readings. Thus,
r
2
and A
2
imply SM
J
(the mass of the particular sample of pure iron is M
J
);
r
3
and A
2
imply SM
O
(the mass of the particular sample of pure oxygen is M
O
);
r
4
and A
2
imply SM
B
(the mass of the black powder produced in the reaction is M
B
).
Priestley could have objected to this construction of evidence from the (raw) data
on the grounds that he did not accept the set of assumptions (A
2
). However, he did
not. Once again, we see that the mass of these three samples could and was agreed
upon by the disputants. Let e
2
constitute the set of mass data (M
J
, M
O
, M
B
). Before
we consider the evidential worth of e
2
and further transformation of e
2
to E
2
, which
is considered to be evidence for H
2
, a digression is in order. This concerns the
question whether the transformation from M
1
and A
2
to M
J
is asymmetric. The ques-
tion assumes importance when we ask whether it is possible to predict the (raw)
data from the hypothesis by employing suitable auxiliary assumptions.
We have seen that H
1
conjoined with any reasonable set of auxiliary assumptions
cannot predict that a black powder will be produced. The question remains whether
H
2
can predict that the mass of the sample of pure iron is equal to the number of
units specied by the balance reading. It must be remembered that a substance having
a mass of x g is neither a necessary nor a sufcient condition for the balance reading
to be X
33
. Thus, given the assumption A
2
, one could reasonably conclude that the
balance reading reects the mass, provided one holds that a general statement like
Whenever the balance reading is X, the mass of the substance, being weighed in
33
It might be argued that the mass ( = x g) of a substance is a necessary and sufcient condition for
the balance reading to be X when the balance is working properly. But that is not true. The body might
be subjected to external forces making it levitate and thereby leading to a discrepancy in the balance
reading even though the balance is working properly.
363 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
the balance, is x, ceteris paribus is true
34
. An important issue arises at this point.
The ceteris paribus clause includes assumptions described in A
2
, as well as various
ones about appropriate functioning of mechanical balance (employing laws of
mechanics), the action of appropriate forces (or absence of action), and so on. This
brings out the role of these clauses (assumptions) in constructing evidence. The
importance of these assumptions should be emphasized in the construction of evi-
dence especially when the revolutionary change in theory is at issue, and those
assumptions may even be questioned. The balance reading being X is not a necessary
condition but at best an INUS (Insufcient but Necessary Part of an Unnecessary but
Sufcient) condition for the mass of a substance being x
35
. It is an INUS condition in
the context of Newtonian classical mechanics and theory of matter. However, this
assumption may be disputed by scientists who do not agree with the Newtonian
account. For a mechanical philosopher of the eighteenth century, the Newtonian
account is a sine qua non to read off the mass of an object from the balance reading
when the the object is placed on a balance to measure its mass. However, these
qualications may be challenged by scientists (natural philosophers), and in that case
the balance reading being X cannot even be considered to be an INUS condition for
the determination of a substance having a mass x. This asymmetry between the (raw)
data (the balance reading) and the evidence (determination of mass based on balance
reading) is worth emphasizing because the data-to-evidence transformation is cru-
cially dependent upon the background assumptions employed.
Returning to the evidence e
2
in support of H
2
, it should be obvious that since e
2
is a set of mass data (M
J
, M
O
, M
B
), the evidence by itself does not support or
disconrm the hypothesis, H
2
. Hence another level of construction of evidence, E
2
from e
2
, is required. This transformation of e
2
to E
2
(the statement that on a particular
occasion of pure iron being heated in pure oxygen, nothing else but iron oxide is
produced) is achieved by appealing to the PCM, and showing that M
B
= M
J
+ M
O
.
Since the PCM requires that mass is conserved in any chemical reaction, mass should
be conserved in this particular case as well. The mass of black powder is equal to
the mass of (pure) iron and the mass of (pure) oxygen. Since the mass of the product
is equal to the mass of the reactants, no other product except the black powder could
have been produced in that particular chemical reaction. This is now evidence for
H
2
, and thus for H. It is also an evidence for H, since nothing else but the black
powder is produced in this chemical reaction, and the starting materials are (pure)
iron and (pure) oxygen, so the black powder is probably a compound (and not a
mixture) of iron and oxygen, an iron oxide.
34
I am indebted to one of the anonymous referees for helping me to bring out the point more forcefully.
35
One might object that if the assumption that the balance is working properly is to be included in A
2
,
then there is no asymmetry between the translation from evidence to data or from data to evidence. The
fact that such an assumption needs to be employed shows that such translations are not unproblematic.
Also, inclusion of that assumption does not do the job. One also has to assume, among other things, that
the acceleration due to gravity remains constant during the time of measurement of the mass. In fact,
there are indenite number of such assumptions that need to be specied to ascertain that there is a
symmetry in translation. However, that seems to be a hard, if not impossible task.
364 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
These considerations reinforce the view that there may be several layers of these
transformations of evidence, and that objections against such constructions may be
raised at any level, for at every level different sorts of assumptions are employed
to achieve the transformation. Also, the evidence(raw) data distinction can be relati-
vized with respect to these levels. Thus, a group of scientists may argue, in the
particular case in hand, that the data are the balance readings and not the particular
mass values. Here, the objection is the construction of evidence at the rst stage
36
.
Having made my point that evidence is constructed from raw data in the context
of a theory before the evidence is appealed to as a conrming or disconrming for
a hypothesis, I will now return to the question of whether observations are theory-
laden. Observations understood as (raw) data are trivially theory-laden. But in a more
interesting sense, they may not be. This is because the consensus within the scientic
community about what observations (or raw data) are, does not emphasize the inelim-
inably theoretical aspect these observations have. This consensus is historically con-
tingent. If there is a dispute within the scientic community of a fundamental and
revolutionary kind, then the underlying theoretical aspects of the alleged unproblem-
atic observations can be questioned, and the theory-ladenness of observations
becomes apparent. However, (raw) data never have any evidential bearing. To the
extent that these (raw) data are transformed into evidence, and for any evidential
bearing these data might have on a particular theory and hence any bearing they
might have on theory resolution, the evidence is theory-laden.
5. Replies to some objections
An important objection to my discussion is that Bogen and Woodwards analysis
is not, in principle, vitiated by the historical episode discussed above. The objection
proceeds as follows. H
1
is a phenomenon and theory-laden but not E
1
. E
1
is an
observation or piece of data. This may be granted provided we recognize that E
1
,
in this case, is constructed from the lower level data or observation. This construction
is achieved by employing specic theoretical assumptions, e.g. the Principle of Con-
servation of Mass (PCM) and the Newtonian theory of matter. These theoretical
assumptions might be questioned by scientists who hold a different theory of matter
or do not accept the PCM, or who think that the property of mass is a physical
property of matter and does not in any way inuence or is inuenced by chemical
properties of bodies
37
. So, the status of E
1
as undisputed observation or data is contin-
gent upon whether rival scientists share theoretical assumptions. This becomes clear
36
One could object that the balance reading does not give us the mass of the sample being weighed.
Priestley, as I have mentioned above, did not object at this level of evidence construction. His objection
was the correctness of E
2
.
37
Joseph Priestley at times made the point that properties like weight or mass of a substance do not
have any bearing on the chemical properties of the substance. See especially Priestley (1799); Priestley
(1794), p. 4; Priestley (1796), p. 42. See also Schoeld (1961, 1966). See also references cited in Basu
(1992a).
365 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
when we look at the construction of E
2
. The role of PCM is crucial in transforming
mass data to E
2
. The role of the Newtonian theory of matter is crucial in transforming
a balance reading to mass data, and it is also the ground for accepting principles
like the PCM or the Principle of Chemical Simplicity. Joseph Priestley rejected data
and evidence constructed in such a way. His theoretical assumptions were incompat-
ible with the Newtonian theory of matter, or with the PCS, or the PCM. Thus, theor-
etical auxiliary assumptions required for transforming data to evidence might be
contested and Bogen and Woodwards analysis is inadequate to handle these prob-
lems with the sensitivity they deserve.
Consider Priestleys attempt to respond to Lavoisian argument. Priestleys analysis
constructs E
1
from e
1
by employing an entirely different set of auxiliary assump-
tions. The phlogiston hypothesis transforms e
1
to the following evidential sentence,
E
1
: Iron calx, a simple substance, is produced in the reaction between iron and
dephlogisticated air. It is now impossible to determine the evidential bearing of E
1

on H
1
or of E
1
on H
1
(H
1
: Whenever iron is heated in dephlogisticated air, a calx
of iron is produced). It is, however, possible to recognize the evidential bearing of
E
1
on H
1
. Not only that, the historical episode brings out more interesting turns in
the debate. Priestleys hypothesis predicts that the phlogiston in iron (a complex of
iron calx and phlogiston) can react with dephlogisticated air to produce xed air.
Priestley actually identied the presence of xed air in the results of the experiments
he performed. In cases such as these, the transformation of the (same?) data to evi-
dence varies as the auxiliary assumptions needed for translation differ, and can in
fact result in the production of contrary evidence. The validity of these transform-
ations are at the heart of disputes in the context of revolutions in science. This
aspect of these disputes is not adequately captured by the analysis provided by Bogen
and Woodward.
Another important objection is that it has not been established that theory-infected
observations must play a role in theory adjudication in cases that involve scientic
revolution. Since observations must be transformed to evidence by theoretical con-
cepts, they are theory-infected. But that does not show that neutral observations are
not enough for theory adjudication. In one class of cases, theory adjudication is
possible without appealing to non-trivially theory-laden observations. This is the case
where within a given theory the controversy is, say, whether a particular relation
obtains between two concepts or not. Bogen and Woodward provide an excellent
account of how data is handled in these situations. In these cases, with enough infor-
mation, one can perhaps decide whether the relation obtains or not. The observations
are transformed into evidence but the conceptual resources of the competing hypoth-
eses belong to the shared conceptual resource of the general theory. The examples
Bogen and Woodward employ, including those establishing the melting point of lead
or weak neutral current, bring out the point adequately. An equally interesting
example would be establishing Van der Waals Gas Law as opposed to the Ideal
Gas Law. The observations in these cases are turned into evidence for the Van der
Waals law by pointing out a systematic deviation in the data (pressure and volume).
This systematic deviation is transformed into appropriate evidence by introducing
auxiliary assumptions like Van der Waals interaction among the gas particles, and
366 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
the volume of an individual particle. Both laws employ conceptual resources that
belong to the shared general theory, classical mechanics. And hence, the transform-
ation of data to evidence is rather unproblematic. In other cases, where the competing
theories do not share conceptual resources, the apparently theory-neutral observations
will be transformed into very different evidence by the different conceptual resources
of these theories. Hence, rational theory resolution will be difcult. It will be difcult
because the evidential value of the observation will not be comparable on inde-
pendent theories if such value is calculated in terms of (increase or decrease of)
probability of the theory by the observation.
6. Conclusion
I conclude by pointing out that the above analyses of the two historical episodes
give at least some reason to believe that what counts as unproblematic observation
or data, and what counts as evidence for a theory, or phenomena, or a hypothesis,
is never straightforward. What might be taken as unproblematic observation or data
at a certain time by a certain community of scientists may change at a later time.
Scientists may subsequently differ about whether something is a piece of observation
or data. If they do, the evidential value of the contested observations for competing
hypotheses is seriously modied. There are various reasons why scientists might
agree to accept something as an unproblematic observation only to disagree later.
To give an historical example, we saw that Joseph Priestley in the episode discussed
above, agreed to accept mass data as unproblematic. This was because he thought
that he had an empirical refutation of the Lavoisian explanation. At a later stage,
when the pressure of evidence arising from more careful experiments mounted,
Priestley attacked the more theoretical assumptions like the Principle of Conservation
of Mass, or the employment of a property like mass to adjudicate in chemical prob-
lems
38
. It is conceivable that what is taken as unproblematic data may become prob-
lematic later on.
Layers of observation or evidence are constructed from observations or data from
an experiment. At which level scientists should stop constructing and start employing
these (observations as) evidence is hard to decide a priori. It will depend upon what
kind of problem is at hand, and hence the kind of evidence one is looking for (or
against) as a pertinent solution to the problem. As a result, more often than not, it
is the context of the research and the scientic communitys abilities that will decide
what should count as the right kind of evidence, and right kind of observation from
which the evidence is constructed with the help of theoretical auxiliary assumptions.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Professor E. Fales of the Department of Philosophy, the
University of Iowa, USA, Professor M. Ash of the Department of History, University
38
See note 37.
367 P.K. Basu / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 351368
of Vienna, Austria, Dr. S. Lawrence of the Department of History, the Univeristy
of Iowa, USA, Dr. R. Nola of the Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland,
New Zealand, and Dr. R. Nair of the National Institute of Science, Technology, and
Development Studies, India, for going through the draft of the manuscript and mak-
ing invaluable suggestions. I am also very much indebted to two anonymous referees
whose critical suggestions helped in improving this paper.
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