1

What led to the Ousting of President Morsi in Egypt in July 2013?

Introduction
The aim of this essay is to consider what exactly led to the ousting of President Morsi in
Egypt. President Morsi was a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, an
exclusivist/religious ideological Islamic movement and the Chairman of the Freedom for
Justice Party which won Egypts May-June 2012 presidential elections.
1
In July 2013, the
Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi was forced out of office and replaced by the head of
Egypts constitutional court in a move described as a complete military coup.
2
These events
echoed Arab Spring in 2011 when President Hosni Mubarak was obliged to resign. Morsi
was branded a despot and the military once again took charge in Egypt. However, Morsis
ousting represented an even larger scale revolt than the one that ended Mubaraks political
career.
3
Although Arab Spring was intended to herald a democratic era, in fact it has given
pro-Islamist organisations an opportunity to rise to power in the Middle East through taking
advantage of the power vacuum created by these revolts.
4
Egypt was a significant example of
this phenomenon as demonstrated in 2012 when President Morsi and his pro-Islamist party
gained a two-thirds majority. Similarly, El-Nahda has risen to power in Tunisia whilst
Islamist parties have been reported to be gaining ground in Libya.
5
A number of factors have
contributed to political instability in Egypt and the Middle East as a whole throughout its
history. Examples of such factors include military force, Islamic extremism and
secularisation. A study of the historical background behind the recent instability in Egypt in
both 2011 and 2013 suggests that the competing factors of religion and nationalism played a
significant role in these events. Although Morsis Islamist political party won the 2012
elections it became increasingly clear that with the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood his
administration could potentially abandon the democratic project. For these reasons, a second
uprising can be seen as inevitable. In the example of the hostilities in Egypt in 2013, these
can be partly attributed to the power vacuum that descended upon Egypt during the aftermath

1
A. Omer and J.A. Springs, Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, 2013), p.31; M.
Ennaji, ed., Multiculturalism and Democracy in North Africa: Aftermath of the Arab Spring (Abingdon, 2014),
p.249
2
M. Bradley and R. Abdelatif, Egyptian Military Ousts President Morsi, The Wall Street Journal (July 4 2013),
p.1
3
M.A. Tabaar, Assessing (In)Security after the Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt, P.S: Political Science and Politics
46 (4), (2013), p.727
4
L. Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, 3
rd
Ed (Oxford, 2013), p.93
5
Ibid
2

of Arab Spring and widespread opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood.
6
In order to assess this
issue, the following paragraphs will consider how political instability has affected the Middle
East and Egypt in the past and how these examples have contributed to the current situation
before conclusions are presented on this topic.
Morsi, Democracy and Egypt
Morsi was ousted from his presidency due to his alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood and
his authoritarian policies. Both these factors alienated secular and liberal Egyptians.
7
Whilst
Morsi claimed to be a president for all Egyptians he increasingly showed worrying signs of
Brotherhoodism of the state, characterised by attempts to monopolise state apparatus and
plans for long-term political domination.
8
Morsi also excluded the political opposition from
the political process and ignored Egypts Sunni and Christian minorities.
9
This orthodox view
of the uprisings concurs that the ousting of Morsi was necessary in order for Egypt to become
a fully democratic nation. Democracy was seen as the solution for religious and social
tensions within Egypt. For example, from an Egyptian Christian perspective dissident and
author Alaa al-Aswany, stated in 2009 that:
Justice alone will protect the Copts [Egyptian Christians but]. They cannot demand
justice for themselves to the exclusion of others, and they cannot obtain it alone at the
expense of the Muslims. Justice must be achieved for all and justice comes about only
through democracy, for democracy is the solution.
10

Such sentiments were used to convince Egyptian Christians to support the regime change of
Arab Spring. This suggests that Arab Spring was fought in the name of promoting democracy
in Egypt; however, the regime of President Morsi failed to address the wishes of the majority.
Ultimately, it has been suggested that supporters of democracy in Egypt felt obliged to
support a coup as they feared that the elected Islamists would monopolise the political
administration of Egypt and fail to democratically relinquish power when it came to that

6
C. Altomonte and M. Ferrara, eds., The Economic and Political Aftermath of the Arab Spring: Perspectives
from the Middle East and North African Countries (Cheltenham, 2014), p.21
7
G. Aftandilian, Pitfalls in Egypt, Parameters 43 (3), (2013), p.17
8
P. Gerbudo, The Roots of the Coup, Soundings, 54, (2013), p.105
9
D. Sharma and U. Gielen, The Global Obama: Crossroads of Leadership in the 21st Century (London, 2014),
p.223
10
P.S. Rowe, Christian-Muslim Relations in the Wake of the Arab Spring, Digest of Middle East Studies 22 (2),
(2013), p.262
3

point.
11
Originally, the Muslim Brotherhood had pledged that they would promote
participation not domination but once Morsi had gained power they asserted their control
over the President and his legislature.
12
Despite this, considerable opposition meant that the
Muslim Brotherhood was obliged to go into hiding before they fully neutralised the judiciary
and the army.
13
It is clear that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were ousted from power
due to their lack of regard for anyone who opposed them. In order for a state to be truly
democratic Robert Fisk explained in a speech in Cairo that:
You must respect the rights of minorities, and participate with a spirit of tolerance
and compromise; you must place the interests of your people and the legislative
workings of the political process above your party. Without these ingredients,
elections alone do not make true democracy.
14

These examples suggest that the 2013 uprising can be attributed to the fact that the new
regime appeared to go against the wishes of the citizens of Egypt to properly democratise the
nation. Instead, they attempted to dominate the political stage by force, disregarding the
democratic process which led to the coup.
Foreign Relations
However, not everyone has cast Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood as anti-democratic
oppressors. It has been argued that the Muslim Brotherhood, from the fall of President
Mubarak onwards has acted as a stabilising force in Egypt abandoning the street and leading
democratic legitimacy to the political process designed by the army.
15
Once Egypt had been
stabilized the Muslim Brotherhood was no longer needed and therefore disposed of. In fact, it
has been claimed that the strategy of the Brotherhood has been overly conservative and
gradualist and that they should have adopted a bolder strategy in order to successfully seize
power.
16
However, this argument ignored the fact that a significant proportion of Egypts
population were opposed to Islaminism, instead being in favour of democracy. Whilst
Aftandilian and Rowe both attribute the July 2013 uprising to Morsis failure to democratise

11
M.A. Tabaar, Assessing (In)Security after the Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt, P.S: Political Science and
Politics 46 (4), (2013), p.727
12
Ibid
13
Ibid
14
D. Sharma and U. Gielen, The Global Obama: Crossroads of Leadership in the 21st Century (London, 2014),
p.223
15
D. Pioppi, Playing with Fire: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Leviathan, The International
Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 48 (4), (2013), p.51
16
Ibid
4

Egypt others suggest that tensions between Egypt and its erstwhile allies such as Saudi
Arabia were what really led to Morsis forced removal from office. Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, Jordan and the United States were all, in fact, involved in the coup.
17
The
reason for this was that these international players shared the concerns of secular and liberal
Egyptians about the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood over President Morsis
administration, feeling that it would be detrimental to Egypts long term interests. It is clear
that some inside Morsis cabinet had become concerned about Egypts new regime and the
influence of the Muslim Brotherhood within four months of the new Presidents election. In
November 2012, General Sisi, the defence minister, colluded with former officials who had
been involved in Mubaraks regime in order to create a power base outside the Presidents
administration.
18
Additionally, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia had become
involved in these conspiracies, secretly pledging billions of dollars in support of the cause.
19

The reason behind the support the coup attracted from Egypts neighbours in the Middle East
lies in the fact that Morsis regime could potentially destabilise international relations in the
region. Initially, it was thought that massive-scale regime change in the Middle East would
not have much of an impact on international relations as the post-Cold War global system has
become less polarised on an ideological level.
20
However, historically Egypt was a major
game-player in the new Middle East the bilateral pattern of relations between Egypt, Israel
and the United States inspired by the 1978 Camp David accords.
21
These accords promoted
peace and order in the region. But President Morsis new regime meant that such accords and
the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty would need renegotiating.
22
This theory was proven in
November 2012 when Israel attacked the Gaza strip. Morsis reaction was to arrange a truce
with Hamas, disregarding Egypts formerly cordial relations with Israel and revising Egypts
established foreign policy.
23
Therefore, Morsis regime represented a potentially destabilising
force on an international level. It could be suggested that other powers in the Middle East
might have felt that it would be easier to put a regime in place in Egypt which would be
guaranteed to be respectful to the established pattern of alliances.

17
A. Taimimi, From Democracy to Military Dictatorship: Egypt 2013= Chile 1973, Insight Turkey 16 (1), (2014),
p.1
18
Ibid
19
Ibid
20
L. Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, 3
rd
Ed (Oxford, 2013), p.95
21
Ibid
22
Ibid
23
M. Ennaji, ed., Multiculturalism and Democracy in North Africa: Aftermath of the Arab Spring (Abingdon,
2014), p.249
5

Military Coup
Although their coup clearly attracted a degree of popular support, those behind the ousting of
President Morsi still felt that there was a need to justify their actions. For example, they
claimed that pro-Morsi supporters had resorted to violence in order to justify their coup,
something which these supporters denied.
24
These allegations refer to the fact that the
demonstrations against the military coup of July 2013 resulted in violent protests ending in
death and injuries amongst the protesters.
25
In fact, these pro-Morsi supporters had adopted a
slogan along the lines that their peaceful protests were more powerful than the bullets shot by
the coup organisers would ever be.
26
This demonstrates the fact that the coup was not entirely
legitimate or justifiable. It has been said that:
Most likely, the military rulers would have wished to see the pro-legitimacy camp
slide into violent tactics. That would have aided these authorities in their defence of
their heavy-handedness. It would have justified what has hitherto been rather difficult
to justify.
27

Due to the peaceful tactics adopted by Morsis supporters the coup struggled to appear
legitimate as the involvement of the military made them look overly authoritarian. Instead,
the coup has been ascribed to the fact that has been unable to develop any form of credible
alternative to Morsis regime or the Muslim Brotherhood. Politically, they could not come up
with a mid-term strategy which would defeat the Islamists in power and had no guarantee of
defeating them in an election.
28
Therefore:
.This ineptitude has ultimately resulted in their seeing in the intervention of the
army the only possible means of regaining control of what they have perceived to be
their hijacked revolution.
29


24
A. Taimimi, From Democracy to Military Dictatorship: Egypt 2013= Chile 1973, Insight Turkey 16 (1), (2014),
p.1
25
D. Sharma and U. Gielen, The Global Obama: Crossroads of Leadership in the 21st Century (London, 2014),
p.223
26
A. Taimimi, From Democracy to Military Dictatorship: Egypt 2013= Chile 1973, Insight Turkey 16 (1), (2014),
p.1
27
Ibid
28
P. Gerbudo, The Roots of the Coup, Soundings, 54, (2013), pp.104-105
29
Ibid, p.105
6

The mix of religious, nationalist and wider regional tensions have their roots in Egypts
history. Therefore, it is important to understand the reasons behind these tensions in order to
fully appreciate the reasoning behind the ousting of President Morsi from power in July 2013.
Historical Explanations
The events surrounding the ousting of President Morsi can be seen to have resulted from
various elements within the history of Egypt as a nation-state and that of the Middle East.
The nationalist, secularist, religious and social tensions within Egypt can be attributed to
various elements within recent Egyptian history. For example, the notion of Egyptian
nationalism and its utilization as a means of control within the nation dates back to the
nineteenth century. In the early 1800s, Muhammad Ali an Albanian army officer and
previously a follower of Napoleon in Egypt introduced the ideas of nationalism and
modernisation to Egypt, then a dependency of the Ottoman Empire
30
. The nations social
system was reinvented along European, capitalist lines whilst nationalism also led to
modernisation with western writing being translated into Arabic, leading to further,
diplomatic, social, trade and learning opportunities.
31
It was noted that if Ali had tried to
introduce the blessings of European civilization, which he certainly valued, this was purely
for political ends.
32
Whilst this may well have been the case these changes also served to
isolate Egypt from the rest of the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East through introducing
the nation to the European process.
33
However, from 1956 Egypts constitution has officially
recognised that the nation is an Arab country.
34
These ideas of culture, progress and
secularisation continue to dominate Egyptian politics today creating strong opposition to
Islaminism in some quarters.
Ultimately, the rest of the Ottoman Empire would catch up with Egypt in terms of
nationalist sentiment. The Ottoman Empire introduced two decrees; the first in 1839 and the
second in 1856 following the end of the Crimean War in order to secure the loyalty of the
Empires Christian subjects due to nationalist agitation within its European provinces. It was
said that the decrees of 1839 and 1856 sought to break down the religious and cultural

30
B. Lewis, What went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford, 2002), p.140
31
B. Tibi, Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State (New York, 1997), p.83; B. Lewis, What went
Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford, 2002), p.140
32
B. Tibi, Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State (New York, 1997), p.82
33
Ibid
34
B. Lewis, From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East (London, 2004), p.120
7

autonomy of the [people]and create a notion of common Ottoman citizenship.
35
These
decrees meant that all citizens of the Ottoman Empire were obliged to do military service but
also fostered an early sense of national pride which continues to linger in Egypt today.
Following these decrees the beginnings of a form of democratic governance were introduced
to Egypt in 1866. In order to attempt to appeal to and gain support from European powers the
Khedive of Egypt created an assembly of delegates which consisted of 75 elected
representatives who each served three year terms and were elected by an indirect system of
collegiate elections.
36
It has been said that such changes also go hand and hand with
secularisation. This is demonstrated by the secular socialist regime of Nasser which increased
state influence and came to power in Egypt following a military coup in 1952.
37
However, the
rise to power of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood appeared to some to challenge the idea
that all nationalist movements are inherently secular.
38

Historically, a sense of nationalism in Egypt was further fuelled by the occupation of
the nation by Britain in 1882. During this period, Egypts colonial administrator, Lord
Cromer managed Egypts economic, political and social development in a way which further
British as opposed to Egyptian interests.
39
Examples of this policy include Cromers attempts
to limit educational opportunities for Egyptians meaning that they were unable to
intellectually challenge British domination. Instead, these policies had the effect of increasing
the notion of Egyptian nationalism which had been installed by the Ottoman Empire earlier in
the century.
40
These changes did not satisfy but did shape Egypts growing need for increased
political freedom and representation.
Conclusion
A mixture of a wish for democracy, a need to uphold international alliances and religious
tensions led to the ousting of President Morsi from power in Egypt in July 2013. All these
factors were influenced by the history of nationalism and democracy in Egypt from the
nineteenth century onwards. Since this date Egypt has experienced considerable European
influence leading to a secularised state. Whilst Islamism has gained popularity in the Middle
East as a whole in recent years, including Egypt the secular and democratic influence within

35
W. Cleveland and M. Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 3
rd
Ed (Philadelphia, 2000), p.83
36
B. Lewis, What went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford, 2002), p.57
37
R. Owen, State, Power and Politics: The Making of the Modern Middle East (London, 1992), p.25
38
A. Omer and J.A. Springs, Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, 2013), p.31
39
W. Cleveland and M. Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 3
rd
Ed (Philadelphia, 2000), p.115
40
Ibid
8

the nation made it unlikely that Islamist nationalism would take over. Instead, President
Morsi was ousted in power in Egypt due to the fact that his Islamist policies alienated a
significant minority of the Egyptian population and because the increasing domination of the
Muslim Brotherhood made it apparent that the regime was becoming increasingly
authoritarian. Also, the dramatic regime change resulted in changes in Egypts foreign policy
which would destabilise the Middle East meaning that other Arab nations were keen to
support the coup. Therefore, it is clear that Egypts history meant that the nation had, since
the nineteenth century been under secularist and nationalist influences. Its traditional role as a
mediator in foreign policy matters also meant that any dramatic regime change could affect
the region as a whole. For these reasons, it is unsurprising that both grassroots citizens and
foreign powers supported the coup against President Morsi in July 2013.

9

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