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ME MORANDUM FOR THE RE CORD
E vent: North E astern Air Def ense Sector (NE ADS) f ieldsitevisit
Type of event: Interview
Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2003
Special Access Issues: Clearance check
Prepared by: Geof f rey Brown
TeamNumber: 8
Location: Commander's Conf erence Room, Building 102
Participants - Non-Commission: Major J ames Fox, Captain Daniel L. Warnock
Participants - Commission: J ohn Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geof f rey Brown
Note: Please ref er to therecorded interview f or f urther details.
Fox entered themilitary through ROTC in 1990. Hereceived his f irst assignment in
1991. That was at Tindle AFB inWeapons Control andTraining. InFebruary of 1992he.
completed his training and arrived at Grif f is Air ForceBasewithNE ADS. Hewas
involved inDesert Shield andDesert Storm; aswell as incounter-drug operations in
Panama.
Hebecame aWeapons Assignment Of f icer, which isthesameas aSenior Director. He
has been trained invarious possessions, including Mission Crew Commander (MCC).
Due to 9111andtheincrease inoperations tempo, Fox needed to dedicate most of his
time to Weapons. Today Fox is working f ull-time againas aMCC.
The Senior Director of the Weapons Section, which iscomposed of theWeapons
Controller and theWeapons Controller Technician, monitors anumber of teams of
controllers who areresponsible f or military aircraf t. TheSenior Director's immediate job
is to monitor theSenior Director Technician (SDT). TheSDC monitors theWeapons
Controllers Technicians who arehandling direction with theFAA andwith all phone
calls that need tobecoordinated sothat thecontroller canstay onthe f requency. Lt.
Powell, then Sgt. Powell, was working as as. Dir. Technician, andso was Ron Bilicia on
9/11. .
The Weapons Director Technician is incommunication with theFAA and coordinates all
issues over airspace. The Weapons Controller speaks directly to themilitary aircraf t, and
directs those aircraf t ontheir routeprogress through all airspace. Theprogress of orders
is f romtheMCC totheSenior Director, thentotheWeapons Controllers, then tothe
Operations f loor.
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Fox recalls that on 9111theWeapons Section was preparing f or thestart of theVigilant
Guardian exercise. They had amore robust staf f then would havebeen normal, but it is a
requirement that therebe adedicated team of controllers per group of aircraf t. And since
amission can vary insize f romapair of f ighters toasmany astwenty aircraf ts, including
tankers and other types of military aircraf t, thenumber of controllers reporting and
working at the Weapons Section at agiven timecan vary.
Fox notedthat he f irst received notif ication of thehijack f romPowell. Fox understands
that theFAA was attempting to locate ahijacked aircraf t ontheir radar, andthus made
the appropriate call tothe Senior Director Weapons Technician to notif y NE ADS of the
situation. He f urther noted that scramble orders arealways directed by either theSenior
Director or the Senior Weapons Director.
Fox noted to Commission staf f that there are"shout lines" used between dif f erent
sections on the f loor to coordinate timely inf ormation. And that these lines areused ina
scramble situation. Fox f urther noted that this timely coordination ispracticed andthat
theNE ADS readiness posture isto have f ighters airborne af ter ascramble is issued
within 17minutes.
Pre-9f11 NE ADS didnot work of tenwith Andrews AFB since it isnot anactiveNORAD
base.
Fox had awareness of where theSelf ridge missions weretaking place on9/11. TheSD
f or Weapons of ten keeps national airspace situational awareness since at times the
Weapons Controllers at NE ADS control f lights out to dif f erent areas of thecountry.
Though, pre 9/11 thereNE ADS had alimited knowledge of theexact weapons
conf iguration of their alert aircraf t. Hebelieves it was the"def ault standard" tohave a
"guns-only" status, andone f uel tank. The alert f ighters would possibly have AllvI 9s as
well. On 9/11 however, the"birds" at Otis AFB werepostured with moreweapons and
three f uel tanks because of theRussian Bear exercise. Fox noted that when ascramble
order is issued, thealert f ighters must take of f as is.
Fox noted f or Commission staf f someof thetechnical issues regarding thecontrol of air
weapons assets. Henoted that A10 f ighters areconsidered "f ighters" even though they
primarily serve anair to ground f unction.
The air alert f ighters would of tenhave Af M 9s, which areheat seeking, andcalled
"Sidewinders" or ''Heaters''. Sometimes alert f ighters would have AllvI7s aswell; which
arearadar guided missile andalso called "Sparrows". TheAMRAAM (Advanced
Medium Range Air toAir Missile), or AIM-120, is amediumsizedweapons that has its
own targeting mechanism that isal-weather, andbeyond-visible range. AMRAAMs are
also called "Slammers".
I E .O. 13526, section 1.4(a) I
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'-- --'Atthat point it goes to a"pitbull" f light, which is self directe . At this pomt
inthetargeting process, theAMRAAMs internal radar tracks tothetarget that was
designated by thef ighter's radar by thepilot. .
E .O. 13526, section 1.4(a)
TheF15scan obtain aspeed of Mach 1.1if f ully loaded. But whenthere is morethan one
tank onthef ighter it creates alargeamount of drag, which inturn compromises the
pilot's ability to control thef ighter. Thus, usually when a.f ighter goes supersonic andis
f ully loaded it drops two of its tanks bef orehand.
Fox believes theF16s armed at analert mode would behave amax speed of roughly 1.2
. machoHe also noted that supersonic speed andmaneuverability isnot very dif f erent
between theF15 andtheF16.
During day to day operations by agreement with theFAA f ighters will not go supersonic
overland at an altitude of less than FL 300. There areairspace sections intheUS where
this canbecoordinated. And at f urther than 10miles outside thecoast af ighter cango
supersonic at 10, 000f eet andabove. These agreements between theFAA and themilitary
do not completely apply inactive air scrambles if there is intelligence or reason tobelieve
it is adiresituation. Fox underscored this point by sayingthat onanactive air def ense
mission themission isparamount. Pilots havethecapability to make their own decisions
regarding what is necessary to f ulf ill their mission; but if af light goes supersonic the
order comes through Weapons. And Fox does recall voicing f or theOtis to go"super"
directed towards New York on9/11.
Pre-9/1l Fox understands NORAD's air def ense mission as atask tosurvey and identif y
all aircraf t entering United States airspace. If NORAD was unable to identif y anaircraf t,
then themission would beto scramble and actively identif y. NORAD is also tasked to
work with customs on counter-drug operations. Thirdly, NORAD istasked with
def ending against acoordinated air attack ontheUnited States.
TheNORAD hijack response mission is triggered by theFAA. NORAD's standard
operating procedure is to wait f or acall f romtheFAA specif ically requesting military
assistance. If theFAA does not request assistance, NORAD does not scramble. Af ter a
scramble within US airspace NORAD is taskedwith surveillance by air at af ivemile
distance f romthetarget. Themission only changes by agreement with Canada. In
Canadian airspace theair def ense f light would maintain al Itrail instead.
E .O. 13526, section 1.4(a)
If anaircraf t is intercepted over water, NORAD contro ers aremc arge0 the f ighters.
If it is inairspace over US land, then theFAA does thecontrolling to create air space
c1earance;but NORAD still maintains what is ref erred to as "command and guidance" by
aconstant radio link.
Intheair, both theFAA andHUNTRE SS areonly speaking with f ighters when they have
guidance to give. The f light leadwould beincharge of the f light's conf iguration. The
lead canhaveboth f requencies inear, anddirect which member of his f light heis
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speaking with. For example, thef light leadcould haveoneradio monitoring and
communicating with theFAA, andanother radio tohis wingman. Inthesame f light, the
wingman would have his f light leadinoneradio, andHUNTRE SS intheother. Fox
commented that this would beastandard conf iguration.
When considering inf light communications with multiple f ighters inthesame f light, Fox
noted that it is not aconf using. For example, theLangley air def ense f light had three F16
ADF (Air Def ense Fighter) aircraf ts, Those f ightersjust continue thesamesystemnoted
above with thethird member of thef light. Fox noted that theF16A (aversion of theF16)
has anUHF; aVHF and aHF radio. It isunique f or af ighter tohavethree radios, but the
third is not used f or thesametypeof communication astheother two. Inf act, thef ighters
would rarely use theHF radio. That HF radio isprimarily used speak back to acommand
post at great distance. The Langley aircraf t hadthis (F16A versions); but thevast
majority of air def ense f ighters areF16s areFI6Cs.
The basic range f or f ighters at 10to 15, 000f eet and above f or communications isroughly
a 150mile range tooneof NE ADS radio sites along thecoast. If anaircraf t is over water
thecommunication ispassed through Giant Killer. If over land thecommunication goes
through radio sites at theCenters.
Fox noted to Commission staf f that almost every training exercise is f or air def ense.
Their daily "Spades" or APE s (Alert Force E valuations) areindividual scrambles out of a
certain base to ascertain atarget or short twohour intercepts topractice identif ication
methods. A small exercise likethis or alargescale Vigilant Guardian type exercise all
deal with inpart identif ication of anaircraf t entering US airspace f romover water.
By posse commatadus NORAD was not allowed to intercept aircraf t internal tothe
United States. That mission was considered alaw enf orcement mission. Fox noted that he
was trained to that point of understanding. Henoted that this understanding stemsf rom
his early training. It was always theunderstanding at theOperation Floor level that to
intercept something that originated inUS airspace theintercept would have tobe
approved f romalevel over NORAD (ie. J oint Chief s of Staf f orNational Security
Council). Fox noted theoperational knowledge at NORAD was that it would never
consider taking that action on itsown authority. At NE ADS, they would seek higher
command guidance.
Fox made thedistinction to Commission staf f that it isthat authority to intercept that
needs higher authorization; but that scrambles canbeorder f romNE ADS.
Scrambles areof ten voiced but af ter atarget is identif ied there canbea"cancel
scramble" order voiced. Hef urther noted that it is not statistically considered ascramble
unless theaircraf t is actually airborne.
Training missions practiced f or counter-drug operations areonly practiced on aircraf t
coming i
I E .O. 13526, section 1.4(a) I
InFox's recollection
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most of this exercise was "in house". Intheevent of anactual intercept coordination with
FAA would begin as anaircraf t comes to
I E .O. 13526, section 1.4(a) I
Fox commented that NE ADS may giveoperational radar support ontracks over the
Maine/Canada airspace to theFAA.
Fox does not know of a counter-drug intercept that has happened real world at NE ADS.
Hecommented that NE ADS personnel havebeen trained, but Fox has never participated
inoneof those exercises; hedoes know that SE ADS has agreater counter-drug f ocus..
Fox statedthat small scaleexercises include scheduled training inthecontrolled military
airspace of f thecoast. Large scale exercises arecompletely simulated and would include
theentirecoordination and steps between theinitial intelligence of an event andthe
deployment response. To Fox's knowledge, Vigilant Guardian was building towards a
large scale simulated exercise.
Fox does not recall any real world, actual f lyingexercises coordinated with FAA to
practice hijack procedures. Any liveexercises would happen over theof f -coast airspaces.
Fox believes there may have been liveintercepts in practice over thecoast that would be
with thepurpose of practicing hijack scenarios.
Fox recalls asmall number of occurrences inwhich asimulated intercept of ahijacked
aircraf t coming inf romover seas "crashes into something" in'US territory. It was always
anaircraf t coming inf romover water. Hedoes not know what thereason f or why these
f lights might have been simulated tocrash. Hebelieves that disgruntled pilots mayhave
been ascenario that was exercised. Fox does not recall anexercised situation that the
pilots werenot controlling the aircraf t, or asituation practiced inwhich therewasno
communication f romtheaircraf t. Fox noted that other MCCs may remember these
scenarios inmore detail, or may have been involved with other exercises that interest the
Commission.
Fox was aWeapons Controller during theLuf tahansa hijack. Onthat day NE ADS
received intelligence "f ar ahead". Hewas toldby asenior director to look at regulations
on hijacks. Hewas toldthehijacked aircraf t hadintentions of entering US airspace, so
Fox reviewed thehijack exercises. Heremembers later onintheday having OtisAFB
aircraf t of f the coast that took theescort f romtheCanadian f ighters and escorted the
hijacked aircraf t toalanding. Fox does not recall many of thedetails.
Fox does not know where thenearest "hot gun" Canadian f ighters were on 9/11. But
since Canada is part of NORAD Fox does not.have expect theprocess f or drawing on
Canadian assets tobeany dif f erent than that f or drawing on assets f romSE ADS or
WADS.
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NE ADS deals with Boston, Cleveland, New York, Washington and Minneapolis. All
those sectors have direct hotlines. They rarely spoke with Chicago, and never to
Indianapolis. NE ADS worked with ZBW of ten; so probably coordinated the best with
ZBW on 9/11. Centers like Washington and ZNY, who NE ADS rarely worked with, were
not as f amiliar with NE ADS. Fox stated that this did not ef f ect the coordination on 9/11
since the space of time between the initial notice of hijack and the point at which the
military took over the national airspace was only a f ew hours.
At one point on 9/11 NE ADS had a Weapons Control team up f or almost every f light.
The sector has identif ied the f irst team "that sat down", but Fox cart not conf irm based of f
his memory. He does not know if there exists adirect record of who was at which
position during the course of September 11tho On multiple occasions over the last two
years the DOC (the of f ice that supervises the Ops Floor) has asked f or this inf ormation,
but Fox does not know where this inf ormation might be. .
Usually the Weapons SD Tech and the Weapons SD position are both "plugged in" to the
communications board at the Weapons desk. But on 9/11 Fox, the Weapons SD Tech,
"very quickly" unplugged and coordinated with the multiple Weapons teams that were
being set up on the f loor. This af f ects the amount of times he appears in the recordings.
According to Fox, as the day got more organized, at approximately around 11 or 12
o'clock, a Canadian Captain Bilicio came in as another SD and Fox may have plugged in.
On 9/11, the Vigilant Guardian exercise was on hold because of the Russian Bear
activity. They were expecting it to begin, and Fox went to perf orm some administrative
duties. As Fox entered the f loor, Powell was inf orming Colonel Deskins, then aMajor, of
the possible hijack. Deskins was on the Operations f loor at the time. Thatis why Powell
spoke to her instead of Nasypany. Powell came back to the desk and plugged into the SD
Tech position. Shortly thereaf ter the Weapons position was voiced to scramble Otis. He .
remembers asking f or atarget f or the scramble. E ventually the MCt said to direct the
f ighters towards New York.
Sgt. Powell was the f irst to inf orm Fox of the situation. Most of the details, once the
Weapons position knew of the possible hijack, would have come into the Huntress ID '
position. Fox only knew it was in ZBW airspace. He was not inf ormed of the details. At
that point, at the Weapons position, they were primarily concerned of where the scramble
was to be f rom, and where the f ighters should go. Since it takes aperiod of time to get the
aircraf t airborne, it is important to initially know where the aircraf t is going. Fox says he
does not need the altitude, since that can be adjusted. The speed is important though so
that the heading f or the intercept will be accurate.
Fox remembers that by the time the scramble order was given Nasypany was in the Battle
Cab, and Deskins was no longer there
Once the FAA asks f or assistance, if the Battle Commander is not available, the Director
of Operations (DO) has the authority to scramble aircraf t. Colonel McNealy was the DO
on 9/11. It would be procedure to check with the Battle Cab and the DO bef ore an MCC
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would issue anorder to scramble. Fox has seen thescramble order voiced bef orewithout
theDO, but theMCC would immediately beinf ormed.
OnceFox received thescramble order on9/11, he told Sgt. Powell to activatethe
scramble line andhead the Otis alert f ighters towards NewYork City. '
They brought the f ighters out over water sincethat was aneasier route f or command,
guidance, and control f romHuntress ID. Coordination with theFAA regarding clearing
airspace over theUnited States may havehampered theprogress of the f ighters if the
f ighters had been vectored to approach NewYork City over land.
Commission staf f begins to usedocuments of the f ighter track to assist theinterview.
On 9111Fox had limited inf ormation. Fox explains to Commission staf f that thevector
given to the f ighters was of f magnetic north; pilots always operate of f of magnetic north.
Thebasis f or FL 290 is that it issimply anappropriate altitude f or f uel ef f iciency. That is
adef ault altitude if there is limited inf ormation onthereason or destination governing a
hijack. When helaunched the f ighters, heasked theMCC f or inf ormation. Nasypany only
gavetheinf ormation to head themtoNew York City, and, according toFox, it is possible
that Nasypany may have had more inf ormation then what was given toFox.
The f ighters lef t Otis headed towards theNortheast which isthequickest routeout f rom
theOtis runway andalert bam. They perf ormed atight turn, andmoved towards their
assigned vector. They were told tohold southof Long Island, andFox directed theWD
Tech topick upanew heading inlinewith this. -
Fox explains that when thescramble lineisactivated all necessary f acilities are
simultaneously notif ied.
Commission staf f shows Fox arough transcript f romtheMCC position, andbegins to
play anaudio f ileprovided to Commission staf f byNE ADS labeled DRMI DAT 2
Channel 2MCC.
Major Fox explains that a"Z" track is atrack that isput into theQradar systemthat is
not meant tomove. It is meant tobestationary and mark aposition f or anaircraf t.
According to thetranscript at 8: 40 AM, MCC Nasypany asks Fox toscramble Otis.
-Nasypany tells Fox to scramble to aZ point north of NYC. Fox explains that hehas a
latitude longitude point.
Fox explains to Commission staf f that voicing a290 vector may indicate iris anactual
track of where thetarget is headed. TheFAA coordinates thevector f or thef ighter to
avoid aircraf t. TheFAA inserts af light planof what thef ighters want into theFAA
computer systems sothat thepath of thef ighters canbecleared. Fox expressed to
Commission staf f that tf the FAA believes it may bedif f icult to clear anarea, andmay
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take aperiod of time, themilitary would want this inf ormation; but, based onhis
experience, theFAA would probably not communicate theinf ormation.
Fox explains that ideally aircraf t arescrambled to aprojected intercept point asopposed
to acurrent location of thetarget.
At 8: 52 AM onthetape whenthe inf ormation that anaircraf t hit theWTC reached Fox,
he looks f or more updated inf ormation astowhether or not thescramble mission is still
necessary.
At 8: 54 AM Fox istold tocontinue thef ighter's f light towards J FK airport. Fox does not
remember if the f ighters were airborne yet. But hedoes suggest toNasypany that the
quickest route isover water. Nasypany tells himtowork with theFAA on clearing
aircraf t. Fox notes that thetraf f ic intheareaat that timeis extremely heavy andwould
need to becleared.
Powell, Gardner andBilucio were all sitting at theWeapons desk on9/11.
The controllers at Huntress actively attempted to coordinate with thef ighters tomaintain
thebest coursef or intercept andto stay away f romFAA controlled aircraf t. Thecontrol
of the aircraf t inair is through theFAA, andat 8: 55thef ighters were told to go toJ FK at
260. This heading would put the f ighters southof J FK. Fox decided that if thef ighters
f ollowed acourse toplace theminoneof thewarning areas, they could hold outside of
New York andwait f or an accurate position.
Fox was inf ormed that the last known position f or theAA 11is 20miles south of J FK,
and attempted to get other accurate inf ormation onthef light.
According to thetranscript at roughly 8: 56AM they were inf ormed that AA 11was the
aircraf t that hit theWTC. Fox believes this inf ormation came f romaZBW call to
Huntress that inf ormed themthat ZBW was almost certainthe f light that hit the WTC
was AA 11.
According to thetranscript, between 9: 03 AM and9: 04AM Major Nasypanytold Fox
that there was areport of "a second hit" ontheWTC. Thef ighters at this point were of f
thetip of Long Island. Fox guessed that thef ighters wereroughly 100or 120miles out of
New York City.
Fox estimates that if at 8: 53FAA had passed situational awareness to themilitary
regarding UAL 175's location, theOtis f ighters "barely" would have gotten toNYC. Fox
continued this lineof thought andnoted that they would not have been ableto 1) f indthe
aircraf t (f ighter radar would not havebeen abletopick upthe aircraf t inthemidst of the
buildings inNYC, andthepilots would havehadto visually make contact with the
aircraf t); 2) intercept the aircraf t; and3) receive permission f romanational command
authority that gavepermission to shoot. Fox explained that the lower anaircraf t f lies the
harder it is f or f ighter radar to distinguish thetarget f romterrain andbuildings. It would
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have been "nearly impossible" f or theradar topick uptheaircraf t. Theprocess would
have potentially taken longer than theactual f light f romOtis.
Sometime during theinitial events there was aCNN f eedpiped into theBattle Cab. That
morning Fox does not recall seeing thesecond impact, or CNN. Af ter ZBW reported that
they believe AA 11crashed into theWTC toNE ADS, Fox does not recall discussion that
AA 11was not theairplane that hit theWTC.
Fox was receiving inf ormation regarding thehijack through theMCC. It istheMCC's
job tocontinually inf ormtheWeapons Desk on any amplif ying inf ormation sothe
Weapons Desk can acquire itstarget, and f acilitate theintercept.
The armament conf iguration on9111was ref erred to around 9: 20 AM as "F1Ss with zero
(ref ers to AIM 120s), 2(AIM 7s), 2(AIM 9s) by gun (annedguns). Theexpression used
f or how thef ighters would engagethecommercial airliner if ashoot down order hadbeen
given was "Heaters inthef ace"; this indicates thesuggestion that thef ighter head
towards thetarget aircraf t and f ireheat seeking missiles. At somepoint during theday
NE ADS received authority to shoot down aircraf t that weredeemed hostile by CINC,
NORAD, and/or others. Hebelieves this was sometime af ter thePentagon impact (9: 37
AM). Without reviewing more transcripts, Fox stated that theMCC was most likely
thinking ahead when hegave theabove statement. (audio f ile49: 00 mark)
Thepoint at which theMCC communicates.to theWeapons section that f ighters f rom
Langely need tobescrambled andheaded towards Washington isFox's f irst indication
that "there ismore going on". .
Fox explained to Commission staf f that hemight haveknown that therewere additional
hijacks, but hedoes not have any awareness of it possibly being thesameairplane that
theWeapons section was already dealing with.
Regarding theLangley f ighters, theFl6 ARFs can carry AIM l20s, but theF 16Cs
cannot. The exact loadisrecorded ontranscript.
Fox comments once again that thereason to givethescramble f ighters aFL 290 ismost
likely independent f romthe last known altitude of AA 11.
Fox explains that theLangley f ighters usually headed directly east to acorridor ten to
f if teen miles of f thecoast bef ore they turn east and arehanded toHuntress. This
expectation is based onwhat theFAA always does. Fox would hopethat thef ighters
would get turned immediately north to010. But they wereturned 090 f or 60(miles),
whichwould take thef ighters tothecorridor. They would enter thecorridor and at some
point bereleased to Huntress. That inf ormation isbased onFox's knowledge of the
Langley airspace.
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,
Fox developed scramble headings at theposition, on 9/11, by using atrack roll ball toa
point on thescreen where they arelooking togo(OPE D). Heselects theto andf rom
points andis given apoint f romthecomputer.
At 9: 09 AM Langley was ordered to "Battle Stations", andto scramble at 9: 24 AM. Fox
remembers that they may not have been scrambled until thef act that there may beathird
hijack headed to Washington; sonot until that inf ormation comes through is theactual
scramble ordered. Fox thinks that putting Langley at Battle Stations was aprecaution. He
notes that it iscommon practice that as soonasonetactical action istaken, thenext steps
areprepared f or. Langley would have been put onBattle Stations torelieve theOtis
f ighters. Most likely theorder would have comef romtheBattle Staf f to theMCC.
Whenever thedatapicks up that thef ighter istracking east asopposed to north is the
point at which Fox andtheWeapons section knew thef ighters werenot on thenorth
heading. That deviation f romtheoptimal heading camethrough theFAA in order toput
thef ighters intheclear airspace corridor of f thecoast.
This makes anappearance that theFAA didnot send thef ighters onthecourse Huntress
requested. Fox noted that sincetheFAA "owns"the airspace, they can do asthey want.
Fox made theanalogy that historically thenation builds upits military prioritization in
time of war. FromanFAA point of view, short of thepreparation f or all out war, the
FAA reserves theright to what they want until thepoint at which they decide themilitary
is apriority. It would not surprise Fox to learnthat Washington Center didnot havethe
same sense of urgency that isbeing conveyed by Boston Center, or by the scrambled
f ighters.
At 9: 37 AM the Langley f ighters areturned of f the090(degree) heading, and changed to
anorthern heading. Fox notes that NE ADS normally gives theFAA alittle leeway when
it involves directing f ighters away f romair traf f ic, soNE ADS probably would have given
theFAA some space moving thef ighters onthe090 degree heading, but eventually the
WD Tech or the SD Tech would have moved f or thef ighters totake thecorrect course-
to "snap north" - quickly. Fox thinks at theleast it should beajoint responsibility to
coordinate and direct ascramble, instead of itbeing controlled by theFAA unless the
ATHIO is given. Fox explains that if there isareal world air def ense scramble order, he
would likeif theFAA gave the f ighters thehighest priority. Fox believes that on9/11 the
FAA should have been f ully awarethat it was areal world scramble out of Langley. Fox
would expect thepilots tocheck inwith NE ADS regarding theheading. But hedoesnote
that the areathey would pass through is extremely overlaid. Soit would not surpriseFox
if out over thecoast - themouth of theJ ames River south of Langley andnorth of
Oceana - not over open water, would bethef irst areathepilots would have the.chance to
speak with Huntress. If thepilots arejumping between theFAA agencies ontheradio
they may not have hadthetime tospeak withNE ADS. For Huntress to know they were
of f course would take either anotice of thechangeincourse ontheHuntress radar or f or
thepilots to notif y Huntress.
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As theother scramble was called there should have been another Weapons teambrought
in. Fox is not absolutely sureif another Weapons teamwas brought inat that point. It
would betheWD teamwhen they get inposition tomonitor those f ighters.
To set up f or anew WDteamiscomplicated - anecessary stepto control another air
def ense f light. It does takea solid f iveminutes bef ore theteambegins toobserve radar
data. The WD relies on Command Post calls that f ighters areairborne. Thesecond notice
would beanFAA call to transf er thef ighters over (that wouldbethelatest). Ideally when
theCommand Post calls toinf ormthat is when the WD Tech andWD begin actively
watching theradar.
Af ter thescramble f romLangley theonly instructions that theWeapons Desk was asked
togivethe f ighters was to head themtowards Washington, DC.
Around 9: 32 there isanFAA transcript that reads that Huntress wants thef ighters to start
tomove towards Washington, andmove towards Baltimore. Af ter reviewing the audio
me, staf f leams that thedirection given is f or BWI. This vector isrelated as230 degrees.
Fox noted that as f ar as therangeontheold Qradar systemBaltimore and Washington
aref or all vectoring purposes co-located. Quit 24mentioned it was squawking Quad 7
(beacon code 7777), which is anindication that thepilots hadbeen given the
authorization to intercept.
Declaring AFIO andQuad 7is astatement that thepilots areexcepting all responsibility
f or any air incident resulting f romthepilots clearing their own airspace. Quad 7and
AFIO had only happened oncepreviously inFox's entirecareer. The lowest level that
Quad 7and AFIO canbedeclared is f romtheDO (Col McNealy) position. Fox believes
prior to September IlthAFIO had only been declared once.
If the FAA had put thef ighters scrambled ona010 heading f romtheinitial scramble,
Fox approximates that they would havebeen at themost 10to20miles south of
Washington headed north at thetimethey wereactually turned. Inthis casethey
def initely could have gotten to Washington, andthere may havebeen time to acquire the
target andperhaps intercepted. Fox was receiving theguidance to vector themdirectly to
Washington. The f ighters probably would havebeen pushed at agreater point. It is an
extremely congested arrival/departure area. They could have gone af terburner until short
of that area, andthen slowed abit tointercept. It has beenreported of f icially that the
impact at thePentagon isroughly 9: 37AM. If theFAA hadbeen aware of the location of
AA 77atsometime between 9: 09AM and9: 24 AM thentheLangley f ighters might have
been inposition intheareatointercept AA 77, according to Fox. But henotes that if they
knew inthat time f rameandwere ableto giveaposition Langley could have launched
earlier. Fox speculates that if they had f iveor more minutes andhadgotten theposition in
timely manner they would have hadtime tointercept; but that theorders would still have
taken time.
Military controllers haveto communicate tothef ighters thetraf f ic ahead of thef ighters at
numerous scopes: Thepositions aretrained todo this, but arenot "f ederally qualif ied" so
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it canbedif f icult f or thecontrollers. Thef light leader conf irmed with Huntress that his
f ull teamwas squeaking Quad 7.
Fox knows that there was aconcern of ahijack headed towards Cleveland, andheknows
that there was some ef f ort to alert Toledo AFB.
There is apoint intheaudio f ileat 1: 20: 00that theMCC expresses f rustration with Giant
Killer. Fox explains that at Giant Killer thereareFAA controllers. Thereason they are
certif ied to work"with theFAA isbecause they f ollow thesameprocedures of theFAA, .
andareFAA controlled. Giant Killer is aNavy operation, andis tasked by theFAA. The
scope operators aremilitary personnel but areFAA controllers.
NCA is theNational Capital Area. Nasypany at this point has received apreliminary
report that thePentagon has been hit, andwas looking f or f ighter coverage.
Fox, speaking at thelower operations level not theof f icial level, notes that therewas not
too much discussion about this. Henotes that it was commonplace that theFAA would
have acted that way. There was no longtermdiscussion about it, inparticular sincetheir
jobs got much more intense inthemonths f ollowing 9/11. With theseverity of what had
happened and theincrease tempo of operations there was not, according to Fox, any real
time devoted to discussing theFAA's actions on9/11regarding theLangely f ighters'
coordination.
Sgt. Satino may have beenthe technician talking to Quit 25, and sitting with Sgt.
Huckibone.
Post 9111, at NE ADS Fox noted toCommission staf f that theradar capability has
increased ten f old at least. Coordination with theFAA isbetter, especially through the
DE N line, according toFox. Hecontinues by explaining that theDE N linewill help
coordinate quicker. Hewould liketo seebetter radar picture coordination; hewould like
to seethosepictures he linked operationally. NE ADS generates its picture with thenew
radar they have. There aredeployed people inWashington who seethe samepicture as
theradar operators at NE ADS. Hewould liketoseetotal coordination with these.
technologies. .
When SCATANA andNE SCAT operated, it worked f or themilitary. Fox does not want
to seemilitary control over civilian aircraf t. Initially post-9l1l there was littleresistance
by theFAA against having military f ighters operate inandout of thecaps. But nowthere
ismore andmore resistance ontheFAA sidetoallowing f ighters toperf orm their
operations as bestthey can.
Fox believes agenerated air picture, tracks, andradar databeing coordinated and
simultaneous would bealarge steptowards greater situational awareness. Themilitary is
gathering the samedata f romthesameradar, but theFAA generates its own set of data.
The military computers takethat dataandgenerate their own necessary data.
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Communication isgood but could still bebetter between theFAA andthemilitary,
according to Fox. Fox notes that oneof thef irst things done f or new recruits f or military
positions is to send that personnel to anFAA center toreview thoseoperations andbe
f amiliar socommunications areeasier.
Hotlines to sectors arenot present to Chicago, Indianapolis or Kansas City. There are
multiple sectors at which there isnot even onevoicepage hotline. TheDE N lineisa
good step, but ontheoperational sidethecommunication could bebetter.
On 9111, thecapability f or theradars onthecoast istogiveinf ormation at most 150
miles, and theradar will not seebelow 10, 000f eet. Therewas radar coverage f or the
Langley f ighters ontheir way toWashington. There was no good lowlevel picture. There
was enough coverage so they could bring thef ighters toWashington, but the extent of the
coverage andthus theability f or the f ighters to communicate was less.
The Chicago areahad an extremely limited amount of coverage, andonly at 30, 000 alt.
NE ADS would not have been ableto speak with them.
Fox noted that therewas relatively positive coordination with theFAA inthree or f our
missions prior to 9111.This positive coordination was increased by thef act that theFAA
is now helping with 8or 9f lights aday.
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