Voting in Austria

Voting across ethnic lines in late
Imperial Austria
1
PHILIP HOWE
Department of Political Science, Adrian College, Michigan, USA
ABSTRACT. The Austrian party system, following the introduction of universal
manhood suffrage in 1907, has conventionally been characterised as being divided
along ethno-national lines, reinforcing perceptions that politics within the Habsburg
Empire was overwhelmingly driven by nationalism. However, the electoral results in a
number of districts only make sense if one assumes that voters cast ballots for their
alleged ethnic opponents. A systematic analysis of election results, utilising a simple
process of elimination and drawing on the highly detailed statistical records available,
strongly suggests that such voting was commonplace. Furthermore, alternative
explanations based on differential voting qualication rates, errors in the census,
and electoral fraud do not withstand close scrutiny. One must therefore conclude that
although ethnic conict did occur, it was paralleled by inter-ethnic bargaining and
compromise, thereby supporting more positive appraisals of Austrian electoral and
parliamentary politics and of representative political institutions in ethnically divided
societies.
KEYWORDS: Austria-Hungary; East Central Europe; electoral systems; ethnic
group politics; nationalism; trans-ethnic voting
The study of parliamentary politics in late nineteenth and early twentieth-
century Austria has conventionally emphasised nationalist conict. An earlier
consensus within the historical literature is fairly represented by Alan Skeds
generalisation that
. . . the nationality problem . . . [determined] the whole course of political life there . . .
The result was that government fell into the hands of the bureaucracy, as parliamen-
tary life became paralysed and [Emperor] Franz Joseph selected premiers from the
ranks of the high civil service. There is no controversy surrounding the course of events
(1989: 21819).
Unsurprisingly, the Austrian party system has long been portrayed as being
divided along ethno-national lines, while even the Social Democrats, the sole
party to eschew an ethnic label, eventually succumbed to ethnic factionalism
(Pech 1989; Ritter von Juraschek and Riemer 1908: Plate IX; Ucakar 1985:
Table 3.4-1 & 3.4-2; Wandruszka and Urbanitsch 2000: Table A3). Aside
from highlighting the Monarchys failures, such a portrayal has rather bleak
implications for representative political institutions in ethnically and linguis-
tically divided societies.
Nations and Nationalism 16 (2), 2010, 308334.
r The authors 2010. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2010
EN
AS
J OURNAL OF THE ASSOCI ATI ON
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHNI CI TY
AND NATI ONALI SM
NATIONS AND
NATIONALISM
Recent parliamentary and party historiography, however, has increasingly
put Parliament in a more positive light, developing a keener eye for
compromise among and the practical accomplishments of Austrian politicians
(Binder 2005; Boyer 1981, 1995; Garver 1978; Ho belt 1993; Kelly 2006;
Wandruszka and Urbanitsch 2000; Winkler 2000). Simultaneously, a growing
literature has begun to question the naturalness of Austrias many nation-
alities, emphasising the coexistence of multiple identities within individuals,
competing denitions of the nation, the availability of transnational loyalties,
the institutionalisation of nationhood, the signicance of local contexts, and
the instrumental use of national identities by nationalist politicians (Cohen
2006; Howe 2002; Judson 2006; Judson and Rozenblit 2005; King 2002).
The present study builds on these developments by examining the role of
ethnic identity in Austrian electoral behavior, drawing on the comparative
political scientic study of electoral institutions. My own research has
suggested that ethnicity played a much less dominant role in electoral and
parliamentary politics than traditionally had been assumed. In particular:
The ethnic heterogeneity of electoral districts did not have signicant
effects on voter turnout, the effective number of parties receiving votes,
and the occurrence of rst-round majorities.
Non-instrumental (sincere) voting was at least as likely to be based on
non-ethnic factors such as religion or ideology as on ethnic divisions.
The multiethnic Social Democrats received considerable support regard-
less of districts ethnic composition.
Austrian parties were as divided along regional, urbanrural, religious
secular and socio-economic lines as they were along ethnic ones. This
hyper-fragmentation of the party system was not unique to Austria in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and need not be attributed to
ethnic divisions as such, but rather to the institutional environment in
which parliamentary representatives operated.
Parties demanding national autonomy were by far the least successful in
courting Austrian voters of any nationality.
Parliamentary obstructionism can as easily be attributed to a lack of
executive accountability as to ethnic conict. At the same time, it served as
a mechanism for protecting minorities and keeping the government in check.
Despite obstructionism, Parliament was quite capable of passing impor-
tant legislation, something that required the formation of multiethnic
majorities (Howe 2002).
These ndings were based on the seemingly straightforward assumption
that a partys ethnic label represented that of its electoral base. It gradually
became clear, however, that the electoral results in a number of districts
simply did not make sense unless one allowed that voters were casting ballots
across ethnic lines. For example, in the rst round of voting in 1907,
Gerichtsbezirk Jablunkau, a precinct in Silesias District Five (Stadt Bielitz),
cast 21% of it ballots for the German Progressives, 78% for the German
Voting across ethnic lines in late Imperial Austria 309
EN
AS
J OURNAL OF THE ASSOCI ATI ON
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHNI CI TY
AND NATI ONALI SM
NATIONS AND
NATIONALISM
Christian Socials, and 1% for a (German) Social Democrat, despite the fact that
Jablunkau was 85% Polish and only 15% German. Furthermore, this beha-
viour appeared to have occurred at a far greater frequency than has been
recognised in the historical literature (Howe 2002: 24050). These tentative
observations were nevertheless based on a very small number of cases. My
purpose here is therefore to determine whether such voting was more than an
isolated occurrence in Austria, drawing on the full range of relevant district
elections.
This analysis begins with a brief overview of the institutional and demo-
graphic context in which Imperial Austrian elections took place, followed by a
clarication of terminology. One of the advantages of this case is the highly
detailed statistical records maintained by the Imperial bureaucracy. As
elaborated in the section on case selection, nearly every multiethnic precinct
under universal manhood suffrage is included.
One of the difculties in analysing historical elections is that the secret
ballot and the impossibility of exit polling prevent one from directly
determining how voters voted. The measurement used here bypasses this
difculty through a simple process of elimination, taking advantage of the
demographic reality that the ethnic composition of precincts was not
necessarily the same as that of the electoral districts they composed. Even
under highly restrictive assumptions, it can be shown that voting across ethnic
lines was commonplace in multiethnic districts. Furthermore, alternative
explanations based on differential voting qualication rates, errors in the
census, and electoral fraud do not withstand close scrutiny.
These ndings, in turn, call for additional case studies at the local level in
order to better assess the motivations of trans-ethnic voters, in particular local
variations in appeals used by candidates to win their support. Such studies are
beyond the scope of the present work. However, the initial results presented
here do strongly suggest that elections in late Imperial Austria cannot be
reduced to ethno-national conict. Although conict did occur, it was
paralleled by inter-ethnic bargaining and compromise. This implies further
that conictual ethnic group politics is a strategy chosen by political elites
more than a reection of popular sentiment. More generally this interpreta-
tion, if it holds, supports more optimistic appraisals of representative political
institutions in ethnically divided societies.
Institutional and demographic context
The 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise established separate though similar
constitutions for the Western (Austrian) and Eastern (Hungarian) halves of
the Monarchy. Under constitutional rule, which lasted until World War I,
each half of the Monarchy maintained an elected parliament along with a
number of joint institutions, including the person of Franz Joseph, who ruled
as Emperor (Kaiser) in the Western and King (Konig) in the Eastern half
310 Philip J. Howe
(Brauneder 2000; Brauneder and Lachmayer 1976; Howe 2002; Pe ter 2000;
Ucakar 1985).
The Austrian half consisted of seventeen provinces, each of which elected
representatives to regional Diets and the central Parliament. In the Austrian
half, the franchise for Parliamentary elections was progressively expanded
through a series of electoral reforms, culminating in the introduction of
universal manhood suffrage in 1907. Hereafter, parliamentary representatives
were to be elected from single-member districts, with the exception of thirty-
six two-member districts in Eastern Galicia. Furthermore, electoral districts
were to be drawn so as to be as ethnically homogeneous as possible. Elections
were held using the absolute majority run-off rule, under which run-offs were
held between the top two candidates when no candidate received more than
50% of the votes in the rst round.
The establishment of ethnically homogeneous districts was an attempt to
cope with the enormous ethno-linguistic complexity of the Monarchy.
According to the 1910 census, which asked respondents to specify language
of everyday use, Austrias population of 27,963,872 was 23% Czech, 36%
German, 3% Italian, 18% Polish, 1% Romanian, 13% Ruthenian, 3% Serbo-
Croatian and 4% Slovenian (Kann 1950: 3004). The population was
subdivided further by religious, socio-economic and regional differences.
These ethno-linguistic groups did not live in compact territorial units,
limiting the degree to which homogeneous electoral districts could actually be
delineated. This problem was by no means unique to Austria-Hungary
(Lijphart 1977: 414). Indeed, district-level ethnic minorities are unavoidable
in any country that is not ethnically homogeneous and denes electoral
districts along territorial lines. That being said, Austria was remarkably
successful, in that 77% of the single-member districts established in 1907 were
effectively homogeneous. Nevertheless, district ethnic minorities were a
considerable presence, and district populations were furthermore subject to
demographic change. By 1911, 74% cent of single-member districts were
effectively homogeneous (Howe 2002: 23940).
The very existence of district ethnic minorities raises the question addressed
here: what did qualied members of the minority group do come election
time? Several options present themselves. They might simply abstain from
voting. They might submit an empty or spoiled ballot. They might cast a
protest vote for an ethnic minority-based party that has no chance of winning.
They might vote for a multiethnic party such as the Social Democrats.
Finally, they might choose the least conictual option, voting for a party
nominally representing the ethnic majority.
Denitions
Unless otherwise specied, the term district refers to one of the electoral
districts (Wahlbezirke) established by the 1907 electoral reform law (Reich-
sgesetzblatt 17 1907). Most of these comprised several smaller precincts, which
generally consisted of a judicial district (Gerichtsbezirk) or part thereof, often
corresponding with an individual town and each having its own polling
location (Wahlort). Place names are those listed in O
sterreichische Statistik
(K.k. statistischen Zentralkommission 1908).
The various groups discussed here (Czechs, Germans, etc.) are referred to
as ethnic groups, and occasionally by the ofcial usage nationalities (Natio-
nalitaten). With the exception of Jews, whose party politics are considered
here only in passing, all of these groups were distinguished by language. The
size of each group is based on the Austrian census, which specied nationality
by self-declared language of everyday use.
It should be noted that the equation of self-declared language with ethnic
identity is a simplifying assumption for the purpose of the initial analysis. The
relationship between these census data and actual identity, however, as well
as the role of the census itself in dening identity, is open to question (Brix
1982). The implications of these issues will be taken up under Alternative
Interpretations.
Ethnic majority refers to the majority in an electoral district (which is not
necessarily the majority in each precinct within that district). In the rare case
that a district has no true majority, majority refers to the largest group
(plurality) in that district. Ethnic minority refers to all other groups in a district.
Party labels (German Progressive, Czech National, etc.) are my own
translation of the names given in O
sterreichische Statistik (K.k. statistischen

Zentralkommission 1908). The term ethnically based party refers to a party
that draws on a single ethnic group for political support. Multiethnic party
refers to one that draws on more than one ethnic group (Horowitz 1985: 298
302). Here the latter term is applied exclusively to the Social Democrats (after
1911, the Social Democratic Centralists), who were organised as a federation
of national Social Democratic parties. All other parties are therefore con-
sidered to be ethnically based parties. Finally, the term trans-ethnic voting
(TEV) refers to the act of voting for a party that nominally represents an
ethnic group other than ones own.
Case selection
This analysis draws on precinct-level data from both rounds of the 1907 and
1911 elections, the rst to be held exclusively through universal manhood
suffrage. In those elections, 516 representatives were elected from 444 single-
member districts and thirty-six two-member districts in Eastern Galicia. Each
of the precincts making up those districts is considered an individual case.
Cases from six provinces were excluded for technical reasons. Lower
Austria, Salzburg, Upper Austria and Vorarlberg were more or less homo-
geneously German and O
sterreichische Statistik does not provide precinct-

level data for the tiny ethnic minorities that did live in these provinces.
312 Philip J. Howe
Moravian electoral districts, meanwhile, were dened along ethnic rather than
territorial lines. Since each district consisted entirely of either self-declared
Czechs or Germans, these districts effectively had no ethnic minorities. Finally,
Galicias districts were eliminated due to charges that electoral data for that
province are unreliable, a matter that will be taken up more generally below.
A number of cases from the remaining eleven provinces were also excluded,
specically:
A handful of precincts with incomplete demographic data.
Precincts with no ethnic minority.
Precincts in which Jewish parties received votes. Jews were not considered
a nationality on the Austrian census, and therefore were not represented
in precinct-level data.
One precinct in which a Socialist candidate whose ethnic afliation is
unspecied received votes in 1907.
Several additional comments are in order regarding the selection of cases.
First, by-elections (Erganzungswahlen) were not included. Second, two rather
obscure Tyrolean parties, the Christian Trentiner Peoples Party and the
Tyrolian Peoples Federation, were classied as Italian and German respectively,
following O
sterreichisch Statistik, Tafel IX. Finally, O
classies Serbo-Croats as a single nationality in Go rz and Gradisca and in Istria,
yet as separate nationalities in Dalmatia based on religious afliation. Here
Serbo-Croats are treated as a single ethnic group in all provinces. One of the
consequences of this is arguably to underestimate TEV in Dalmatia, since such
voting between Croats and Serbs is ruled out by denition.
The resulting dataset consists of 475 precincts for the rst round of
elections in 1907 and 547 in 1911, in all of which ethnic minorities were at
least 1% of the population. For the second round, it consists of 234 such
precincts in 1907 and 221 in 1911.
2
The test
The method used here to detect Trans-Ethnic Voting (TEV) involves a simple
process of elimination. Every ethnic minority vote possible is attributed to a
behavior other than TEV. Any remaining votes indicate that TEV must have
occurred in that precinct. An equivalent line of reasoning would be half of my
students are women and 40% are not political science majors, therefore some
of my female students must be political science majors.
Specically, detecting TEV involves subtracting the number of qualied
ethnic majority voters, all votes for the Social Democrats, all votes for ethnic
minority based parties, and all empty, split and spoiled ballots from the total
number of ballots cast, and then dividing by the number of qualied voters in
the district, the result being the minimum percentage of qualied voters who
were members of an ethnic minority and who voted for an ethnic majority
based party. This measurement takes advantage of the fact that the district
ethnic majority is not necessarily the largest group in all the precincts of that
district. For example, the Stadt Bielitz district had a German majority, but the
precinct Jablunkau within that district was overwhelmingly Polish. Since each
district elected only one representative, only a German or a multiethnic party
would have a chance of winning. At the same time, the large number of Poles
in Jablunkau makes it easier to detect Polish votes for German parties, since
not all of the votes that must have come from Poles can be assigned to the
Social Democrats, spoiled ballots, etc.
Several additional comments need to be made regarding this measurement.
First, it is based on highly conservative assumptions. Specically, it is
assumed that the ethnic majority had 100% turnout, that as many ethnic
majority votes as possible went to ethnic majority based parties, that as
many ethnic minority votes as possible went to the Social Democrats and to
ethnic minority-based parties, and that as many spoiled, split and empty
ballots as possible were cast by members of the ethnic minority. In other
words, this measurement presumes against TEV unless no other explanation is
available.
A second, more contestable assumption is that the ethnic proportions of
the population of qualied voters are the same as that of the general
population. Possible objections to this assumption will be taken up below.
Third, these estimated proportions of TEV are minimums. That is to say,
the number increases as soon as one weakens the implausibly strict assump-
tions that the ethnic majority had 100% turnout, that members of the ethnic
majority were disinclined to vote for their own Social Democratic candidate,
etc. In all likelihood, TEV actually occurred at a greater rate than has actually
been detected.
Fourth, the failure to detect TEV in a precinct does not mean that it did not
take place. Rather, it reects the limits of the measurement used here. In these
cases, 0% TEV is simply a minimum, and one cannot rule out the possibility
that ethnic minorities in these districts voted across ethnic lines but went
undetected. One factor limiting our ability to detect TEV is the size of the
minority group. In many cases the majority population percentage exceeds the
rate of electoral participation, and one cannot rule out the possibility,
however improbable, that all participating voters were members of the ethnic
majority. Indeed, the argument could be made that TEV, though harder to
detect, is more likely in these districts, since the ethnic minority provides an
insufcient base for a protest party.
Interestingly, another factor limiting our ability to detect TEV is the
popularity of the multiethnic Social Democrats. In districts where they did
well, it is generally harder to rule out that all ethnic minority votes went to the
Social Democrats. In most cases, in fact, minority voters who did not cross the
ethnic line must have voted for the ethnic majoritys Social Democratic
candidate. Although this is not TEV in the sense used here, it nevertheless
indicates a minimal concern for ethnic loyalty.
314 Philip J. Howe
The results
Under the highly restrictive assumption of 100% ethnic majority voter
turnout, minority voting across ethnic lines could be detected in 9% of cases
in the rst round in 1907 (Table 1). This proportion increased to 16% when
votes for Social Democratic candidates are counted as TEV. The respective
percentages for 1911 were 5 and 12%.
These proportions might appear to be small; however, one must consider
the sensitivity of the measurement used here to the size of the precinct
minority population. As discussed previously, the smaller the ethnic minority
group, the harder it is to rule out that they failed to participate, submitted
empty ballots, etc. In the rst round of elections in 1907, for example, the
average size of district minorities in a precinct was 14%. Average non-
participation, meanwhile, was 19%, 1% of ballots were invalid, empty or
split, and 25% went to the Social Democrats.
The sensitivity of this measurement to ethnic minority group size is
apparent when one considers the relationship between detection and precinct
minority population. As shown in Table 2, TEV is detected with greater
frequency as the proportion of minorities increases. Strikingly, in 1907
TEV occurred in at least sixty 60% of precincts with the largest minority
populations.
In short, in those precincts where the occurrence of TEV could most easily
be detected, it generally was detected. Logically, we cannot rule out the
possibility that TEV actually occurred more often in precincts with large
minority populations. Indeed, an argument could be made that majority
parties would be more likely to court minority voters in places where those
voters were a sizable presence. An alternative possibility is that TEV occurred
even more frequently in districts with fewer minorities, since those districts
provided less of a basis for minority protest parties. Either of these
interpretations afrms the claim that TEV was signicant.
On a behavioral level, this tells us that district minorities did not simply
rally behind their self-declared language group out of ethnic loyalty. Neither
did they stay at home, nor cast their ballot for the Social Democrats in order
to avoid supporting their alleged ethnic opponents. Rather, signicant
numbers put other political considerations to the fore. This indicates a far
more pragmatic attitude towards elections on the part of the Austrian voter
than has often been recognised.
One can also observe in Tables 1 and 3 that the detection of TEV increased
signicantly between the rst and second rounds in both elections. Even under
the most restrictive assumptions, TEV in the second round could be detected
in 14% of all cases in 1907 and 8% in 1911. In part, this could be due to the
fact that ethnic minorities were more aware in the second round that a
candidate representing their own ethnic group couldnt possibly win. Pre-
sumably this was clear before elections had even been held, however, since
Austrian electoral districts were designed to belong to specic ethnic
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4
316 Philip J. Howe
majorities. A stronger possibility is that some members of the district ethnic
minority voted for an ethnic minority candidate in the rst round in order to
give that candidate more bargaining power between rounds, acting as a
kingmaker in the second round. This once again indicates a pragmatic rather
than a nationalistic approach to voting.
Finally, the great frequency with which TEV can be detected brings into
question our restrictive assumptions about voter participation. If large
numbers of district ethnic minorities were willing to vote for their alleged
ethnic opponents, after all, then there is much less reason to assume that they
participated at a lesser rate than the ethnic majority.
The actual rates at which ethnic majorities and minorities turned out
to vote cannot be known. However, it is worth considering the results if
we assume that both groups participated at the same rate. Under this looser
assumption, unsurprisingly, TEV can be detected with much greater
frequency, in 22% of all rst-round precincts and 31% of all second-
round precincts in 1907, and in 22% and 34%, respectively, in 1911 (Tables
1 and 3). Furthermore, voting for either the ethnic majoritys nominal party
or the majoritys Social Democratic candidate could be detected in the
majority of precincts in the rst and second rounds. Given that TEV remains
undetected in at least some of the remaining precincts, and even if ethnic
minorities actual rate of participation was less than that assumed here, it is
clear that TEV occurred with great frequency. District ethnic minority
support for the ethnic majoritys nominal candidates, Social Democratic
and otherwise, was a normal part of Austrian elections under universal
manhood suffrage.
Table 2. Proportion of cases in which TEV is detected in relation to minority
group size (1907 1st Round)
% Ethnic
minorities
in precinct # Cases
Assume
majority participation
5100%
Assume majority
participation 5Minority
participation
TEV
TEV including
Social
Democrats TEV
TEV including
Social
Democrats
# P # P # P # p
40% 50 30 0.60 42 0.84 35 0.70 44 0.88
30% 72 35 0.49 54 0.75 45 0.63 63 0.88
20% 107 39 0.36 60 0.56 59 0.55 87 0.81
10% 179 42 0.23 68 0.38 77 0.43 140 0.78
1% 475 44 0.09 75 0.16 103 0.22 269 0.57
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4
318 Philip J. Howe
Alternative interpretations
Several alternative explanations, particularly those involving inaccuracies in
the census and election data, need to be addressed. Earlier it was assumed that
the ethnic proportions of the population of qualied voters were the same as
those of the general population. This might lead to objections that apparent
TEV could be explained away by inaccurate census data, changes in district
populations over time, variations in voting qualication between different
ethnic groups, and so forth.
One concern is that the census does not accurately reect the actual ethnic
makeup of the population. Critical studies of the Austrian census make
several interrelated claims that potentially challenge the preceding interpreta-
tion of events: (1) that language of everyday use was not the sole basis for
nationality; (2) that the census itself institutionalised language as nationality;
(3) that census results became political prizes for competing nationalists; and
(4) that local majorities campaigned for favorable census results, thereby
distorting them in their groups favor (Brix 1982).
The rst claim calls for clarication of what TEV actually meant. It
occurred when an Austrian declared a local minoritys language as his own on
the census, but voted for a party nominally representing the linguistic
majority. It tells us little about how such voters actually identied themselves
in terms of nationality, if at all. The second claim, however, suggests that a
language-based denition of nationality, although arbitrarily imposed, was
nevertheless effective. It is argued that, by privileging language as a basis for
political mobilisation, the census served as a means of national disintegra-
tion, in fact of national polarization on the personal level (Brix 1982: 13).
The ndings here, by contrast, reect the limited success of that project.
The third and fourth claims are of particular interest, since they suggest
that the linguistic data are simply not to be trusted. However, the censuss bias
in favor of local linguistic majorities actually works in favor of this studys
conclusions. To return to the example of GB Jablunkau in 1907, if the local
Polish-speaking minority was under-counted on the census, then the minimum
rate at which Poles actually voted for German parties was greater than
indicated.
Another explanation might be that the Polish population had simply shrunk
between the 1900 census and the 1907 election. However, the 1910 census
indicates that this was simply not the case (1907: 85% Polish, 15% German;
1910: 84% Polish, 14% German, 1% Czech), unless one wishes to argue that
the Poles in Jablunkau left before the 1907 election and returned afterwards.
Still another explanation might be that a higher proportion of the German
general population in Jablunkau was actually qualied to vote. For this
argument to be maintained, however, one must assume a general population
in which at minimum 116% of Germans were male residents at least twenty-
four years old! This is, of course, impossible. The same objection applies if one
wishes to argue that qualied Poles were for some reason not registered.
Short of arbitrarily deciding that electoral returns in GB Jablunkau were
false, one must concede that Poles voted for nominally German parties.
Similar arguments apply to any precincts in which ethnic minorities composed
a large proportion of the population. These, of course, are the cases in which
TEV is detected with the greatest frequency.
This raises an alternative, potentially more damaging interpretation of
these results. Apparent instances of TEV might actually be cases of electoral
fraud in which district ethnic majorities have falsied the returns in their own
favor. Fraud, after all, occurs to some degree in most electoral systems, and
would seem especially likely in cases such as Austria, where voting was a
relatively new experience. Furthermore, this would indicate that fraud was
very widespread, bringing into question the entire electoral dataset.
However, one should not jump to the conclusion that electoral fraud was
widespread. Arbitrarily contesting the data only for those district elections
where TEV was detected is dubious. Furthermore, historical accounts of the
1907 election fail to mention widespread fraud. On the contrary, William
Jenks, in his thorough study of the 1907 electoral reform and election, argues
that the campaign was relatively calm despite a vast array of candidates and
parties and that the government studiously avoided any attempt to inuence
the voters, though its distaste for the Social Democrats and Pan-Germans was
an open secret (Jenks 1950: 178). The only instances of malpractice that Jenks
discovers took place in Galicia, where
. . . the Ruthenes found that even secret balloting did not eliminate manipulation, but
their complaints could not be justly laid at the cabinets doorstep; the Polish political
machine, operating through electoral commissioners, was too effective to disintegrate
overnight (Jenks 1950: 178).
For this reason, Galicias districts have been eliminated from this analysis.
3
Nevertheless, even this Polish political machine was not absolutely effective.
For example, in Brody and in several other Galician districts, the Polish
candidate was soundly defeated by Zionists receiving non-Jewish Ruthenian
support (Everett 1982: 173; Ho belt 2000: 975; Howe 2002: 266; Rudnytsky
1982: 61). Finally, it should be noted that Jenks is hardly an apologist for
Austrian electoral reform. Indeed, the overall conclusion of his work is that
the 1907 reform was a failure, not, however, because of electoral malpractice,
but because it failed to solve the nationality problem (Jenks 1950: 199214).
In short, we have no reason to presume that electoral fraud is more plausible
than Catholics putting religion before ethnicity or businessmen thinking in terms
of class interest. Furthermore, there are several additional reasons to reject the
widespread fraud argument. First, it does not easily explain cases in which a
districts ethnic majority voted across ethnic lines. Going outside of the set of
examples discussed above, a strong case can be made that this happened in
Styrias Friedau district in 1907, where signicant numbers of German voters
favored the Slovene Liberals over the Social Democrats and the German
Radicals. However, apparent instances of TEV on the part of ethnic majorities,
320 Philip J. Howe
unlike minority TEV, are subject to the objection that the census data are
misleading. In the case of Friedau, it could be the case that these voters were
Slovenes who declared themselves German to the census-taker due to dominant-
group pressure, but revealed their true ethnic identity on Election Day.
Second, actual electoral procedures would seem to have hindered fraud.
Elections were overseen by Election Commissioners (Wahlkommissare) and
Election Commissions (Wahlkommissionen), while voting at the actual polling
station was overseen by candidates representatives (Vertrauensmanner). For each
precinct (Wahlort) within an electoral district, the Election Commissioner was
chosen by the district administration, the ve- to seven-member Commissions
were chosen by local government representatives, candidates representatives
were chosen by the candidates themselves, and all of these had to be qualied to
vote in the precinct in question (Reichsgesetzblatt 17 1907: 168, 23).
Given the high degree of multipartisan participation in this process, and of
public interest in the elections themselves, it is hard to believe that widespread
fraud could have simply been overlooked. Returning to the earlier example, it
is unlikely that Jablunkaus Christian Socials and Social Democrats would
have allowed blatant German Progressive cheating to go unquestioned. It
should also be acknowledged that the instances of Galician malpractice
mentioned above, though not adequately addressed, were nevertheless dis-
covered. In this regard one should note that the complaints to and reports of
the Lower Houses Legitimation Committee (Legitimationsausschuss), which
was responsible for reviewing contested elections, fail to mention the kind and
degree of electoral fraud that might explain away the central claims of this
analysis (Stenographische Protokolle 1908: Beilagen 799, 81920, 878, 880,
892, 895, 897, 899, 905, 926, 1078; 1912: Beilagen 11347, 12137, 124953,
13357, 13569, 1365, 141820, 145961, 14723, 15203, 153341, 15569,
1564, 157882; 1913: 18467, 18538, 1914, 19249, 19815).
Third and most importantly, with the exception of Jenkss comments
regarding Galicia no other evidence indicates widespread fraud. Indications of
electoral tampering (the number of ballots exceeding the number of qualied
voters, high numbers of unanimous elections, etc.) are noticeably absent.
Given the huge variety of winners in Austrian elections, fraud would have
involved a conspiracy among dozens of mutually hostile political parties, all
of whom had an uncanny ability to cover their tracks. Such an interpretation
cannot be credibly maintained.
Finally, were fraud widespread one would expect a much different outcome
from the elections themselves. According to Jenks, the most signicant results
of the 1907 election were that the guardians of privilege virtually disappeared,
. . . the parties which were generally representative of the middle class suffered
losses, and the most violent nationalists of every nationality were rejected by
the electorate (1950: 1789). In other words, those who were generally the
best equipped and the most motivated to engage in corruption, including those
most likely to hold positions within the administration, lost. If widespread
conspiracy actually existed, it was surprisingly counter-productive.
Conclusion
The ndings of this analysis can be summarised as follows:
In the rst round of elections in 1907, TEV occurred in 9 to 100% of
Austrian precincts with ethnic minority populations.
In the second round it occurred in fourteen to 100% of such precincts.
TEV continued at similar rates in the 1911 elections.
In 1907, TEV occurred in 60 to 100% of precincts with large ethnic
minorities.
The great sensitivity of this measurement to minority population size
raises the serious possibility that TEV occurred at rates far above the
minimum, potentially taking place in 100% of precincts.
Given these ndings, it is difcult to deny that Austrian voters regularly
sided with a local linguistic minority on the census, yet voted for the local
majoritys parties in elections. Although these quantitative measures can
indicate a general pattern, however, they do not reveal much about what
such votes actually meant and how that meaning might have varied regionally.
Were such voters often bilingual? Did some local versions of ethnic identity
deemphasise language? How often were these voters Jews whose actual
nationality was invisible to the census? Which parties were courting minority
votes? Such questions call for focused case studies of local electoral races, in
particular of parties appeals to ethnic minority voters. Although such
investigations go beyond the scope of the present work, a concluding appraisal
of existing examples and evidence suggest some directions they might take.
One of the few historians to have discussed TEV in Austria in any detail is
John W. Boyer in his writings on the German Christian Socials. Political
cooperation with Czechs was nothing new for the Christian Socials, who had
developed social and agitatorial connections with Czech Nationalist parties
in Bohemia in the 1890s, and electoral deals with Viennese Czechs are known
to have taken place under universal manhood suffrage. Surprisingly, Boyer
also documents Jewish support for Christian Social candidates as a lesser of
two evils, as well as occasional Jewish support for the Christian Socials anti-
Semitic opponents (Boyer 1981: 256; 1995: 63, 215, 2203, 2703)!
These behaviors resulted from the Christian Socials exible and at times
self-contradictory campaign tactics. Party founder Dr. Karl Lueger, sensing a
need to cultivate broad electoral support without alienating German nation-
alists, maintained a very inclusive denition of Catholic and German while
distancing himself from the more extreme forms of anti-Semitism. At the same
time he drew on a mixture of anti-Magyarism and anti-Semitism in an attempt
to rally both Germans and Slavs to his side. Co-founder Albert Gessmann,
recognising the reality of mass migration and the possibilities opened up by
intra-ethnic class conict, called for broad solidarity among Czech, German,
Italian, Polish and South Slav burgerlich parties against the hated Social
Democrats. Meanwhile, Alpine conservatives, an important basis of Christian
322 Philip J. Howe
Social support, aimed to keep national issues subordinate in their own
provinces (Boyer 1981: 212, 21517; 1995).
The reality of German Christian Socials courting non-German votes lends
additional plausibility to the ndings of this study, according to which some
or all of the following must have occurred:
In Bohemia:
Czech votes for the Free Pan-Germans (1907), German Agrarians, Ger-
man Christian Socials, German Progressives (1907), German Radicals
(1911), German Workers Party (1911) and/or Pan-Germans (1907)
German votes for the Czech Agrarians, Czech Christian Socials (1911),
Czech Clerical Agrarians (1907), Czech National Socials, Czech Progres-
sive States Rights Party (1911), Czech Radical Progressives (1907), Czech
Realists, Czech Social Democrats-Autonomists (1911) and/or Young
Czechs
In Bukowina:
German and/or Romanian support for the Old Ruthenians (1907), the
Russophiles (1911) and/or the Young Ruthenians
German and/or Ruthenian support for the Romanian Democrats, an
independent Romanian candidate and/or the Romanian Nationals
Romanian and/or Ruthenian support for the Christian German (1907),
German Agrarians and/or the German Christian Socials
In Carinthia:
Slovene support for the German Christian Socials and/or the German
Peoples Party
In Carniola:
German support for the Slovene National Progressives and/or the Slovene
Peoples Party
Slovene support for the German Agrarians (1907) and/or the German
Christian Socials (1907)
In Dalmatia:
Italian support for the Croatian Democrats (1907), the Croatian Party
(1907), the Croatian Pure Rights Party (1907), the Croatian Rights Party
(1911), an independent Croat (1907), an independent Serb (1907) and/or
the Serbian Party
In Go rz and Gradisca:
Italian support for the Slovene Clericals (1911) and/or Slovene Liberals
(1911)
Slovene support for the Italian Clericals (1907), the Italian Democrats-
Mazzinianer (1911), the Italian Liberals (1911), the Italian National
Liberals (1907), and/or the Italian Peoples Party (1911)
In Istria:
Italian support for the Slovene Nationals (1907) and/or Slavic Nationals
(1911)
Italian and/or Slovene support for the Croatian Nationals (1907)
Serbo-Croatian support for the Italian Christian Socials (1907), the Italian
National Liberals (1907) and/or the Slovene Nationals (1907)
Slovene and/or Serbo-Croatian support for the Italian Liberals (1911)
and/or Italian Peoples Party (1911)
In Silesia:
Czech and/or Polish support for Free Pan-Germans (1907), the German
Agrarians (1911), German Christian Socials, the German Peoples Party
(1911) and/or the German Progressives
German and/or Polish support for the Czech Agrarians (1911), the Czech
National Party and/or the Czech Social Democrats-Autonomists (1911)
In Styria:
German support for the German-Friendly Slovenes, the Slovene Clericals
and/or the Slovene Liberals
324 Philip J. Howe
Slovene support for the Christian Farmers Confederation (1907), the
German Christian Socials, German Conservatives (1907), German Frei-
heitliche (1911), German Peoples Party (1907), the German Radicals
(1907), and/or the Pan-Germans (1911)
In Trieste:
Italian support for the Slovene Nationals (1907)
In Tyrol:
German support for the Christian Trentiner Peoples Party (1907) and/or
the Italian Nationals (1907)
Italian support for German Christian Socials, German Conservatives, the
German Nationals (1911), the German Peoples Party (1907) and/or
German Progressives (1907).
Trans-ethnic voters were found among all of Austrias major nationalities.
Furthermore, it was detected not only on the rural language frontier, but in
all provinces studied and in both urban and rural districts. Certainly, some of
the party options listed above are more plausible than others, e.g. Czechs and
Poles seem more likely to have supported the liberal German Progressives
than radical Pan-German nationalists. Nevertheless, the set of logical possi-
bilities presented narrows the eld for further historical investigation by
suggesting which parties were the ones courting trans-ethnic votes.
Examining specic districts reveals the variety of possible motivations
behind such voting. In the 1907 election in Silesias District Four, e.g., the
Polish Nationals drew some ethnic protest votes (Table 4). Such votes,
however, were in no way commensurate with the Polish population. Clearly,
many Polish votes went to the German parties, as well as a German Social
Democratic candidate, in both rounds of the election. By the second round,
the election involved a choice between liberalism and socialism, and one
suspects even the former Polish National voters played a role in the German
Progressives eventual victory. By 1911 support for a Polish protest party, this
time the Polish Peoples Party, had more or less collapsed, and the German
Progressives took the district in the rst round. A plausible interpretation of
these results is the successful rallying of German and Polish middle-class
interests against the Social Democratic minority.
The 1907 results in Carinthias District Seven suggest a race in which the
religious-secular division overwhelmed ethno-national interests (Table 4). No
Slovene protest party emerges at all, and much support for the German
Christian Social candidate, who nevertheless was defeated by a German Social
Democrat, appears to have come from Slovene voters. In 1911, by contrast,
support had swung from the Christian Socials to the German Progessives and
the Social Democrats, indicating that politics in this district was as much a
matter of class interest as religion.
In both years, elections in Tyrols District Seventeen suggest a victory of
Catholicism and traditionalism over nationalism (Table 4). Once again, no
protest party emerged, and even overwhelmingly Italian precincts voted
exclusively for German Christian Social and German Conservative candi-
dates. Here, however, the massive support in favor of one candidate could
indicate a lack of sophistication on the part of this districts voters, or perhaps
outright fraud.
Finally, the results in Bukowinas District Ten suggest a kind of lesser of two
evils approach by ethnic minorities, as German and perhaps Ruthenian voters
inuenced the outcome in a race between exclusively Romanian candidates
(Table 4). The outcomes here parallel those in other districts in Bukowina, where
German and Ruthenian voters appear to have tilted the balance between
Romanian Democrats and Romanian Nationals, and German and Romanian
minorities chose between Old and Young Ruthenian candidates.
To these examples can be added that the famous separation of the Czech
Social Democratic Autonomists from the multiethnic Centralist party in 1911
cannot be reduced to irreconcilable hostility between Czech and German
workers. Although Autonomist candidates did tend to do much better that
their Centralist opponents in Bohemian Czech districts, they regularly won
with the help of German votes, while German Centralist candidates continued
to receive Czech support in Bohemian German districts. In Silesian Czech
districts, by contrast, Autonomists were defeated by either Czech Centralist
candidates or by Czech Agrarians with consistent German support.
These and many other examples suggest a great degree of sophistication on
the part of many Austrian voters, as well as the variety of factors besides
ethnicity that they weighed in casting their votes. Furthermore, they suggest
that the presence of ethnic minorities had a moderating inuence on ethno-
nationalism. Elsewhere, it has been argued that ethnic extremists could act as
kingmaker in elections. Supporters of the Czech National Socials, e.g., could
often decide between the liberal Young Czechs and Czech Social Democrats
in run-offs, thereby pulling both parties in a more nationalistic direction
(Ho belt 2000: 9856). More generally, it has been argued that the need to
outdo their co-national competitors led nationalists to continuously raise the
stakes against each other (Judson 2006: 89; Judson and Rozenblit 2005: 6).
Simultaneously, however, ethnic minorities might have played an opposite
role, even in races between two nominally national parties, by supporting the
party that showed the most concern for their interests, thereby serving as a
buffer against excessive nationalism.
All of this took place in a context in which Parliamentary elections were
quite local. Elsewhere I have pointed out that, although the Austrian party
326 Philip J. Howe
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B
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328 Philip J. Howe
(
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e
o
p
l
e
s
7
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
2
3
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
7
7
%
S
l
o
v
e
n
e
0
.
5
1
1
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
4
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
P
e
o
p
l
e
s
5
9
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
M
i
l
l
s
t
a
t
t
1
0
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
0
.
8
6
4
3
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
4
4
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
P
e
o
p
l
e
s
1
1
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
1
0
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
0
.
5
9
2
5
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
4
1
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
P
e
o
p
l
e
s
3
3
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
:
7
9
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
2
1
%
S
l
o
v
e
n
e
0
.
7
9
4
1
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
4
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
P
e
o
p
l
e
s
1
8
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
8
1
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
1
9
%
S
l
o
v
e
n
e
0
.
5
4
1
6
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
4
5
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
P
e
o
p
l
e
s
3
8
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
C
a
r
i
n
t
h
i
a
7
2
n
d
R
o
u
n
d
F
e
l
d
k
i
r
c
h
e
n
9
9
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
1
%
S
l
o
v
e
n
e
0
.
7
2
3
7
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
6
3
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
1
0
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
0
.
6
3
6
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
P
e
o
p
l
e
s
3
8
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
R
o
s
e
g
g
1
3
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
8
7
%
S
l
o
v
e
n
e
0
.
8
1
6
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
4
0
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
2
3
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
7
7
%
S
l
o
v
e
n
e
0
.
7
1
3
9
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
P
e
o
p
l
e
s
6
1
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
M
i
l
l
s
t
a
t
t
1
0
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
0
.
8
4
4
8
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
5
1
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
1
0
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
0
.
6
1
6
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
P
e
o
p
l
e
s
4
0
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
:
7
9
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
2
1
%
S
l
o
v
e
n
e
0
.
7
7
4
5
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
5
4
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
8
1
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
1
9
%
S
l
o
v
e
n
e
0
.
6
5
5
4
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
P
e
o
p
l
e
s
4
5
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
(
C
)
T
y
r
o
l
D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
1
7
(
1
9
0
7
a
n
d
1
9
1
1
)
T
y
r
o
l
1
7
B
r
u
n
e
c
k
9
9
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
1
%
I
t
a
l
i
a
n
0
.
8
9
9
4
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
3
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
9
7
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
3
%
I
t
a
l
i
a
n
0
.
7
7
8
9
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
8
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
T
a
u
f
e
r
s
1
0
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
0
.
8
5
9
6
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
1
0
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
0
.
7
1
9
1
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
6
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
E
n
n
e
b
e
r
g
2
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
9
8
%
I
t
a
l
i
a
n
0
.
8
7
9
5
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
1
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
2
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
9
8
%
I
t
a
l
i
a
n
0
.
7
1
8
7
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
7
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
B
u
c
h
e
n
s
t
e
i
n
1
0
0
%
I
t
a
l
i
a
n
0
.
3
8
9
3
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
1
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
3
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
9
7
%
I
t
a
l
i
a
n
0
.
4
1
7
6
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
1
8
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
W
e
l
s
b
e
r
g
9
8
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
2
%
I
t
a
l
i
a
n
0
.
9
1
9
5
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
2
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
1
0
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
0
.
8
1
9
2
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
6
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
:
7
3
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
2
7
%
I
t
a
l
i
a
n
0
.
8
3
9
5
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
2
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
7
4
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
2
6
%
I
t
a
l
i
a
n
0
.
7
1
8
9
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
7
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
T
a
b
l
e
4
.
(
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
P
r
e
c
i
n
c
t
1
9
0
7
1
9
1
1
E
t
h
n
i
c
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
P
a
r
t
i
c
.
B
a
l
l
o
t
s
E
t
h
n
i
c
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
P
a
r
t
i
c
.
B
a
l
l
o
t
s
330 Philip J. Howe
(
D
)
B
u
k
o
w
i
n
a
D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
1
0
(
1
9
0
7
a
n
d
1
9
1
1
)
B
u
k
o
w
i
n
a
1
0
D
o
r
n
a
W
a
t
r
a
4
9
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
5
7
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
3
%
R
u
t
h
e
n
i
a
n
0
.
8
4
1
0
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
6
7
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
2
2
%
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
(
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
)
4
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
5
6
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
4
%
R
u
t
h
e
n
i
a
n
0
.
7
6
7
6
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
(
A
p
a
r
a
r
e
a
)
5
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
(
A
p
a
r
a
r
e
a
)
1
7
%
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
(
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
)
K
i
m
p
o
l
u
n
g
2
6
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
6
8
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
6
%
R
u
t
h
e
n
i
a
n
0
.
8
5
1
3
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
1
8
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
6
9
%
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
(
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
)
2
6
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
7
3
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
2
%
R
u
t
h
e
n
i
a
n
0
.
7
9
4
1
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
(
A
p
a
r
a
r
e
a
)
4
3
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
(
A
p
a
r
a
r
e
a
)
1
5
%
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
(
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
)
S
t
u
l
p
i
k
a
n
y
2
5
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
6
4
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
1
1
%
R
u
t
h
e
n
i
a
n
0
.
8
5
4
0
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
(
A
p
a
r
a
r
e
a
)
5
6
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
(
A
p
a
r
a
r
e
a
)
2
%
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
(
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
)
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
:
3
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
6
5
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
5
%
R
u
t
h
e
n
i
a
n
0
.
8
5
1
2
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
3
3
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
5
5
%
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
(
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
)
3
0
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
6
6
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
4
%
R
u
t
h
e
n
i
a
n
0
.
7
9
5
1
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
(
A
p
a
r
a
r
e
a
)
3
4
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
(
A
p
a
r
a
r
e
a
)
1
3
%
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
(
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
)
system seemed to have been primarily divided into mutually hostile national
camps, Austrian parties and candidates actually appealed to very narrow
constituencies dened by socio-economic status, ideology, religious afliation
and geographic region as well as ethnicity (Howe 2002: ch. IV). To this must
now be added that Austrias larger party system was likely built on a series of
local compromises between candidates and the ethnic majorities and mino-
rities in their districts.
This raises further questions about what ethnic party labels meant. On the
one hand, there seems to have been a broad consensus that each district
belonged to its ethnic majority. Nominally Polish parties, after all, were
never elected in districts with a German majority. It is less clear, however,
whether these labels were declarations of deeply felt identity and political
purpose, convenient shorthand for ofcial compilers of electoral statistics, or
something in between. Here it is suggested that they often masked a much
more complex world of local inter-ethnic compromises.
Finally, these ndings have more general implications for students of
nationalism and ethnic conict. Austria-Hungary has long been presented as a
multinational empire torn apart by irresolvable nationalist conicts. The
Austrian half in turn has traditionally been portrayed as the more chaotic of
the two, due to the Germans inability, unlike their Hungarian counterparts,
to maintain an articial political majority. The evidence presented here
encourages a much more nuanced interpretation of that case, one that
emphasises reasoned choice and compromise as much as ethnic hostility.
More specically, it promotes a more top-down approach to the study of
ethnic conict and democracy, one that focuses on political institutions and
elite choice more than inter-group attitudes. Institutions such as electoral
districts and rules, after all, specify the demographic context in which
elections take place, while political elites choose which strategies are actually
pursued in that context. This emphasis on multiple possibilities and choice
allows a cautious optimism in a world in which democracy is desirable and
ethnic heterogeneity is inevitable.
Notes
1 This paper draws on Howe (2002, 2006).
2 The number of cases varies due to population shifts over time and because different districts
held run-offs each year.
3 There are also hints that electoral fraud might also have been commonplace in Vienna, which
as part of Lower Austria has also not been included in this analysis (Boyer 1995: 2512).
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Voting in Austria

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Voting across ethnic lines in late

sterreichische Statistik (K.k. statistischen

sterreichische Statistik does not provide precinct-

sterreichisch Statistik, Tafel IX. Finally, O

sterreichischen Akademie der

sterreich 1848 bis 1918, in Adam

sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

sterreichische Statistik 84, 2. Vienna: K.k. Hof- und

sterreichische Texte zur

sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

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