C.

Does Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in section 25 of Rep. Act No.
9!9, have the po"er to revie", revise, amend and approve the #mplementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on $lections shall promulgate "ithout violating the independence of the CO%$&$C under section ,
Article #'(A of the Constitution)
Both the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agree with the petitioner
that sections 19 and 2 of !ep" #ct $o" 91%9 are &nconstit&tional on the gro&nd that the' (iolate the independence of the
COMELEC")*+, -he imp&gned pro(isions re.&ire the p&/lic respondent COMELEC to s&/mit its 0mplementing !&les and
!eg&lations to the 1oint Congressional O(ersight Committee for re(iew2 re(ision2 amendment2 or appro(al2 viz3
Sec. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules.- The Commission shall issue the necessary rules and regulations to
effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint !ersight Committee created by !irtue of this Act for prior appro!al.
n the formulation of the rules and regulations! the Commission shall coordinate with the "epartment of #oreign Affairs! "epartment of
$a%or and &mployment! 'hilippine (verseas &mployment Administration! (verseas )or*ers+ )elfare Administration and the
Commission on #ilipino (verseas. ,on-government organi-ations and accredited #ilipino organi-ations or associations a%road shall %e
consulted.
.
Sec. "#. Joint Congressional !ersight Committee.- A /oint Congressional (versight Committee is here%y created! composed of the
Chairman of the 0enate Committee on Constitutional Amendments! 1evision of Codes and $aws! and seven (2) other 0enators designated
%y the 0enate 'resident! and the Chairman of the 3ouse Committee on 0uffrage and &lectoral 1eforms! and seven (2) other mem%ers of
the 3ouse of 1epresentatives designated %y the 0pea*er of the 3ouse of 1epresentatives4 Provided! That! of the seven (2) mem%ers to %e
designated %y each 3ouse of Congress! four (5) should come from the ma/ority and the remaining three (6) from the minority.
The 7oint Congressional (versight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall
re!ie$% re!ise% amend and appro!e the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission. (emphases supplied)
4&/lic respondents a(er that as an independent constit&tional /od'2 the COMELEC is not &nder the control of the
e5ec&ti(e or the legislati(e)*6, in the performance of its constit&tional f&nction to 7enforce and administer all laws and
reg&lations relati(e to the cond&ct of an election"8)*, 4&/lic respondent COMELEC asserts that its right to form&late r&les
and reg&lations flows from its power to enforce and administer election laws and reg&lations")*9, -his power is e5cl&si(e and
its e5ercise is not s&/:ect to the re(iew2 re(ision2 or appro(al of Congress")**, -he Solicitor General shares the same (iew
that the role of the legislat&re ends with the finished tas; of legislation" )*%, <e opines that nothing in #rticle =0 of the 19%*
Constit&tion s&ggests that Congress is empowered to enforce and administer election laws conc&rrent with the COMELEC"
)*9,
#long the same lines2 p&/lic respondent COMELEC assails section 1*"1 of !ep" #ct $o" 91%9 s&/:ecting the
implementation of (oting /' mail to prior re(iew and appro(al of the 1oint O(ersight Committee" 0t maintains that the
de(elopment of a s'stem for (oting /' mail in(ol(es the 7administration of election laws8 and falls s.&arel' within its e5cl&si(e
f&nctions")%>, Section 1*"1 of !ep" #ct $o" 91%9 reads3
Sec. 1&. 'oting by mail.(
82.8. #or the 9ay! :005 elections! the Commission shall authori-e voting %y mail in not more than three (6) countries! sub)ect to the
appro!al of the Congressional !ersight Committee. ;oting %y mail may %e allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions4
(a) )here the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion of fraud<
(%) )here there exists a technically esta%lished identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting< and
(c) )here the system of reception and custody of mailed %allots in the em%assies! consulates and other foreign service
esta%lishments concerned are ade=uate and well-secured.
Thereafter! voting %y mail in any country shall be allo$ed only upon re!ie$ and appro!al of the Joint !ersight
Committee. (emphases supplied)
-he ma:orit' s&stains the petitioner as it holds that 7)/,' (esting itself with the powers to appro(e2 re(iew2 amend and
re(ise the 0!! forThe Overseas Voting Act of 20032 Congress went /e'ond the scope of its constit&tional a&thorit'" Congress
trampled &pon the constit&tional mandate of independence of the COMELEC"8
# agree "ith the ma*orit+ ,ut "ish to add m+ hum,le thoughts on this all important constitutional issue((( the
e-tent of the e-ercise ,+ Congress of its oversight po"ers in the implementation of Rep. Act No. 9!9. -he resol&tion
of the iss&e entails a two?tiered disc&ssion of the following3 (1) whether Congress has o(ersight f&nctions o(er constit&tional
/odies li;e the COMELEC@ and (2) ass&ming that it has2 whether Congress e5ceeded the permissi/le e5ercise of its
o(ersight f&nctions"
Before proceeding2 we m&st foc&s on the e5act place of the power of congressional o(ersight in o&r constit&tional
can(ass" -his will in(ol(e an e5position of two principles /asic to o&r constit&tional democrac'3 separation of powers and
chec;s and /alances"
.eparation of po"ers and chec/s and ,alances
-he principle of separation of powers pre(ents the concentration of legislati(e2 e5ec&ti(e2 and :&dicial powers to a
single /ranch of go(ernment /' deftl' allocating their e5ercise to the three /ranches of go(ernment" -his principle dates /ac;
from the time of Aristotle)%1, /&t the 7modern8 concept owes its origin in the se(enteenth and eighteenth cent&r' writings of
political philosophers incl&ding &oc/e and%ontes0uieu" -heir writings were mainl' reactions to the r&ino&s str&ggle for
power /' the monarchs and the parliaments in Aestern E&rope")%2,
0n his .econd 1reatise of Civil 2overnment2)%+, 1ohn Loc;e ad(ocated the proper di(ision of the legislati(e2
e5ec&ti(e and federati(e powers of the commonwealth" <e defined legislative po"er as 7that which has a right to direct how
the force of the commonwealth shall /e emplo'ed for preser(ing the comm&nit' and the mem/ers of it"8)%6, <e
(iewed e-ecutive po"er as in(ol(ing 7the e5ec&tion of the m&nicipal laws of the societ' within its self2 )and, &pon all that are
parts of it8)%, and federative po"er as concerned with 7the management of the sec&rit' and interest of the p&/lic witho&t8
incl&ding 7the power of war and peace2 leag&es and alliances2 and all the transactions2 with all persons and comm&nities
witho&t the commonwealth"8)%9,
Loc;e e5post&lated that e5ec&ti(e powers sho&ld not /e placed in one person or gro&p of persons e5ercising legislati(e
power /eca&se 7it ma' /e too great a temptation to h&man frailt'2 apt to grasp at power2 for the same persons2 who ha(e the
power to e5ec&te them2 where/' the' ma' e5empt themsel(es from o/edience to the laws the' ma;e2 and s&it the law2 /oth
in its ma;ing2 and e5ec&tion2 to their own pri(ate ad(antage2 and there/' come to ha(e a distinct interest from the rest of the
comm&nit'2 contrar' to the end of societ' and go(ernment"8)%*, B&t while the e5ec&ti(e and the federati(e are two distinct
powers2 Loc;e conceded that the' are intricatel' related and th&s ma' /e e5ercised /' the same persons")%%,
Loc;e mothered the modern idea of di(ision of power /&t it was Montes.&ie& who refined the concept" 0n his famed
treatise2 1he .pirit of the &a"s2)%9, Montes.&ie& a&thoritati(el' anal'Bed the nat&re of e5ec&ti(e2 legislati(e and :&dicial
powers and with a formida/le foresight co&nselled that an' com/ination of these powers wo&ld create a s'stem with an
inherent tendenc' towards t'rannical actions2 th&s3
n every government there are three sorts of power4 the legislative< the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations< and
the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law. >y virtue of the legislative power! the prince or magistrate enacts
temporary or perpetual laws! and amends or a%rogates those that have %een already enacted. >y the second! he ma*es peace or war! sends
or receives em%assies! esta%lishes the pu%lic security! and provides against invasions. >y the third! he punishes criminals! or determines
the disputes that arise %etween individuals. The latter we shall call the /udiciary power! and the other! simply the executive power of the
state.
The political li%erty of the su%/ect is a tran=uility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. n order to have this
li%erty! it is re=uisite the government %e so constituted as one man need not %e afraid of another.
)hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person! or in the same %ody of magistrates! there can %e no li%erty<
%ecause apprehensions may arise! lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws! to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again! there is no li%erty! if the /udiciary power %e not separated from the legislative and the executive. )ere it /oined with the legislative!
the life and li%erty of the su%/ect would %e exposed to ar%itrary control< for the /udge would %e then the legislator. )ere it /oined to the
executive power! the /udge might %ehave with violence and oppression.
There would %e an end of everything! were the same man or the same %ody! whether of the no%les or of the people! to exercise those three
powers! that of enacting laws! that of executing the pu%lic resolutions! and that of trying the causes of individuals.?@A0B
#t the time of the American Revolution2 the more infl&ential political leaders in the new states s&/scri/ed to
Montes.&ie&Cs concept of separation of powers")91, Some constit&tions of the earl' state go(ernments e(en referred to the
principle" B&t the concept espo&sed at that partic&lar time was a lot different" #s then &nderstood2 separation of powers
re.&ires a watertight compartmentaliBation of the e5ec&ti(e2 :&dicial2 and legislati(e f&nctions and permits no sharing of
go(ernment powers /etween and among the three /ranches of go(ernment" -he Massach&setts Constit&tion of 1*%>2 for
instance2 pro(ides3
n the government of this commonwealth! the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and /udicial powers! or either of
them< the executive shall never exercise the legislative and /udicial powers! or either of them< the /udicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers! or either of them4 to the end that it may %e a government of laws and not of men.@A:B
-he 3!3 4... Constitution did not contain a similar pro(ision li;e that fo&nd in the Massach&setts Constit&tion or an'
principle proclaiming the adherence of the Dramers to the principle of separation of powers" B&t legal scholars are of the (iew
that the Dramers essentiall' followed Montes.&ie&Cs recommendation for the di(ision of powers2 noting that the E"S"
Constit&tion (ests 7all legislati(e powers8 in the Congress of the Enited States2)9+, the 7e5ec&ti(e power8 in the 4resident2
)96, and the 7:&dicial power8 in one S&preme Co&rt and in s&ch inferior co&rts as Congress ma' pro(ide")9,
-hese legal scholars also note that the E"S" Constit&tion allows the 7sharing8 of the three great powers /etween and
among the three /ranches" -he 4resident2 for instance2 shares in the e5ercise of legislati(e power thro&gh his (eto power2
and the co&rts thro&gh their power to ma;e r&les of :&dicial proced&re and especiall' thro&gh their right to interpret laws and
in(alidate them as &nconstit&tional" Congress shares in the e5ercise of e5ec&ti(e power thro&gh its confirmation of
appointments and assent to treaties2 and in the :&dicial power thro&gh its power to create inferior co&rts and reg&late the
n&m/er and pa' of :&dges")99, -h&s2 the' post&late that the Dramers esta/lished a go(ernment g&ided not /' strict
separation of powers /&t one of chec/s and ,alances to pre(ent the separate /ranches from 7r&nning wild8 and to a(ert
deadloc;s and /rea;downs2 viz3
The #ramers expected the %ranches to %attle each other to ac=uire and defend power. To prevent the supremacy of one %ranch over any
other in these %attles! powers were mixed< each %ranch was granted important power over the same area of activity. The >ritish and
Conference experience has led the #ramers to avoid regarding controversy %etween the %ranches as a conflict %etween good and evil or
right or wrong! re=uiring definitive! institutionally permanent resolution. 1ather! they viewed such conflict as an expression of the
aggressive and perverse part of human nature that demanded outlet %ut has to %e *ept from finding lasting resolution so that li%erty could
%e reserved.@A2B
E(en then2 some legal l&minaries were of the (iew that the concept of chec;s and /alances is diametricall' opposed to
the principle of separation of powers" 1ames Madison2 howe(er2 e5plained that Montes.&ie&Cs concept of separation of
powers did not re.&ire a strict di(ision of f&nctions among the three /ranches of go(ernment" Madison defended the
Constit&tion as ha(ing s&fficient di(ision of f&nctions among the three /ranches of go(ernment to a(oid the consolidation of
power in an' one /ranch and also stressed that a rigid segregation of the three /ranches wo&ld &ndermine the p&rpose of
the separation doctrine")9%, <e noted that &nless the three /ranches 7/e so far connected and /lended as to gi(e to each a
constit&tional control o(er the others2 the degree of separation which the ma5im re.&ires as essential to a free go(ernment2
can ne(er in practice /e d&l' maintained"8)99, MadisonCs (iew has since then /een the accepted interpretation of the
concept of separation of powers &nder the Constit&tion" -h&s2 in 5oungsto"n .heet 6 1u,e Co. v. .a"+er2)1>>, the E"S"
S&preme Co&rt held that 7)0,n designing the str&ct&re of o&r Go(ernment and di(iding and allocating the so(ereign power
among the three co?e.&al /ranches2 the Dramers of the Constit&tion so&ght to pro(ide a comprehensi(e s'stem /&t the
separate powers were not intended to operate with a/sol&te independence"8 0n 7uc/le+ v. 8aleo2)1>1, the Co&rt r&led that
the Constit&tion /' no means contemplates total separation of each of these essential /ranches of go(ernment and the
framers (iewed the principle of separation of powers as a (ital chec; against t'rann'" 0t li;ewise warned that the 7hermetic
sealing off of the three /ranches of Go(ernment from one another wo&ld precl&de the esta/lishment of a $ation capa/le of
go(erning itself effecti(el'"8)1>2, -h&s2 in Ni-on v. Administrator of 2eneral .ervices2)1>+, the Co&rt re:ected the 7archaic
(iew of separation of powers as re.&iring three airtight departments of go(ernment"8 0n determining whether an act disr&pts
the proper /alance /etween the coordinate /ranches2 the Co&rt s&ggested that the proper in0uir+ should focus on the
e-tent to "hich it prevents the other ,ranch from accomplishing its constitutionall+ assigned functions")1>6,
#n this *urisdiction2 o&r adherence to the principle of separation powers was s&ccinctl' disc&ssed /' 1&stice La&rel
in Angara v. $lectoral Commission)1>, decided in 19+92 less than a 'ear after the effecti(it' of the 19+ Constit&tion"
1&stice La&rel emphasiBed that 7)-,he separation of powers is a f&ndamental principle in o&r s'stem of go(ernment" 0t o/tains
not thro&gh e5press pro(ision /&t /' act&al di(ision in o&r Constit&tion"8)1>9, -h&s3
&ach department of the government has exclusive cogni-ance of the matters within its /urisdiction! and is supreme within its own sphere.
>ut it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to %e *ept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to %e
a%solutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an ela%orate system of chec*s and %alances to
secure coordination in the wor*ings of the various departments of the government. #or example! the Chief &xecutive under our
Constitution is so far made a chec* on the legislative power that this assent is re=uired in the enactment of laws. This! however! is su%/ect
to the further chec* that a %ill may %ecome a law notwithstanding the refusal of the 'resident to approve it! %y a vote of two-thirds or
three-fourths! as the case may %e! of the ,ational Assem%ly. The 'resident has also the right to convene the Assem%ly in special session
whenever he chooses. (n the other hand! the ,ational Assem%ly operates as a chec* on the &xecutive in the sense that its consent through
its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers< and the concurrence of a ma/ority of all its mem%ers
is essential to the conclusion of treaties. #urthermore! in its power to determine what courts other than the 0upreme Court shall %e
esta%lished! to define their /urisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support! the ,ational Assem%ly controls the /udicial department
to a certain extent. The Assem%ly also exercises the /udicial power of trying impeachments. And the /udiciary in turn! with the 0upreme
Court as the final ar%iter! effectively chec*s the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law! and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.@802B
0n 9lanas v. 2il2)1>%, 1&stice La&rel f&rther disc&ssed the intricate interpla' of the principle of separation of powers and
chec;s and /alances2 viz3
The classical separation of governmental powers! whether viewed in the light of political philosophy of Aristotle! $oc*e or 9ontes=uieu!
or to the postulations of 9a%ini! 9adison! or 7efferson! is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of powers! for as o%served %y 7ustice 3olmes in a case of 'hilippine origin! we
cannot lay down Cwith mathematical precision and divide the %ranches in watertight compartments? not only %ecause Cthe ordinances of
the Constitution do not esta%lish and divide fields of %lac* and white? %ut also %ecause Ceven more specific to them are found to terminate
in a penum%ra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.?@80AB
0t is no" ,e+ond de,ate that the principle of separation of powers (1) allows the 7,lending8 of some of the e5ec&ti(e2
legislati(e2 or :&dicial powers in one /od'@ (2) does not pre(ent one /ranch of go(ernment from in.&iring into the affairs of the
other /ranches to maintain the /alance of power@ (+) ,ut ensures that there is no encroachment on matters "ithin the
e-clusive *urisdiction of the other ,ranches"
Dor its part2 this Court chec;s the e5ercise of power of the other /ranches of go(ernment thro&gh :&dicial re(iew" 0t is
the final ar/iter of disp&tes in(ol(ing the proper allocation and e5ercise of the different powers &nder the Constit&tion" -h&s3
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. )ho is to determine the nature! scope and extent of such powersD The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the /udiciary as the rational way. And when the /udiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional %oundaries! it does not assert any superiority over the other departments< it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature! %ut only asserts the solemn and sacred o%ligation assigned to it %y the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to esta%lish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed E/udicial supremacyE which properly is the power of /udicial
review under the Constitution. @880B
-he power of :&dicial re(iew is2 howe(er2 limited to 7act&al cases and contro(ersies to /e e5ercised after f&ll opport&nit'
of arg&ment /' the parties2 and limited f&rther to the constit&tional .&estion raised or the (er' lis mota presented28 for 7an'
attempt at a/straction co&ld onl' lead to dialectics and /arren legal .&estions and to sterile concl&sions of wisdom2 :&stice or
e5pedienc' of legislation"8)111, Co&rts are also en:oined to accord the pres&mption of constit&tionalit' to legislati(e
enactments2 7not onl' /eca&se the legislat&re is pres&med to a/ide /' the Constit&tion /&t also /eca&se the :&diciar' in the
determination of act&al cases and contro(ersies m&st reflect the wisdom and :&stice of the people as e5pressed thro&gh their
representati(es in the e5ec&ti(e and legislati(e departments of the go(ernment"8)112,
-he role of the :&diciar' in mapping the metes and /o&nds of powers of the different /ranches of go(ernment was
redefined in the 19%* Constit&tion which e-panded the *urisdiction of this Court to incl&de the determination of 7gra(e
a/&se of discretion amo&nting to lac; or e5cess of :&risdiction on the part of an' /ranch or instr&mentalit' of the
Go(ernment"8)11+, -he e5pansion was made /eca&se of the dissatisfaction with the practice of this Co&rt in fre.&entl'
in(o;ing the 7political .&estion8)116, doctrine d&ring the period of martial law to dodge its d&t'")11, Be that as it ma'2 the
e5panded power 7definitel' does not do awa' with the political .&estion doctrine itself"8)119,
-h&s2 in %arcos v. %anglapus2)11*, the Co&rt held3
Fnder the Constitution! /udicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has %een a grave a%use of discretion amounting
to lac* or excess of /urisdiction on the part of any %ranch or instrumentality of the Government. @Art. ;! 0ec. 8.B Given this wording!
we cannot agree with the 0olicitor General that the issue constitutes a political =uestion which is %eyond the /urisdiction of the Court to
decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political =uestion doctrine and %roadens the scope of /udicial in=uiry into areas which the
Court! under previous constitutions! would have normally left to the political departments to decide. >ut nonetheless there remain issues
%eyond the CourtHs /urisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the 'resident! for Congress or for the people themselves
through a ple%iscite or referendum. )e cannot! for example! =uestion the 'residentHs recognition of a foreign government! no matter how
premature or improvident such action may appear. )e cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the
%eneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. ,or can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute %rought %efore
us %ecause the power is reserved to the people.@88IB
Since then2 the Co&rt has &sed its e5panded power to chec; acts of the <o&se of !epresentati(es2)119, the 4resident2
)12>, and e(en of independent /odies s&ch as the Electoral -ri/&nal2)121, the Commission on Elections)122, and the Ci(il
Ser(ice Commission")12+,
Congress chec;s the other /ranches of go(ernment primaril' thro&gh its law ma;ing powers" Congress can create
administrati(e agencies2 define their powers and d&ties2 fi5 the terms of officers and their compensation")126, 0t can also
create co&rts2 define their :&risdiction and reorganiBe the :&diciar' so long as it does not &ndermine the sec&rit' of ten&re of
its mem/ers")12, 1he po"er of Congress does not end "ith the finished tas/ of legislation" Concomitant "ith its
principal po"er to legislate is the au-iliar+ po"er to ensure that the la"s it enacts are faithfull+ e-ecuted" #s well
stressed /' one scholar2 the legislat&re 7fi5es the main lines of s&/stanti(e polic' and is entitled to see that administrati(e
polic' is in harmon' with it@ it esta/lishes the (ol&me and p&rpose of p&/lic e5pendit&res and ens&res their legalit' and
propriet'@ it m&st /e satisfied that internal administrati(e controls are operating to sec&re econom' and efficienc'@ and it
informs itself of the conditions of administration of remedial meas&re"8)129,
Concept and ,ases of congressional oversight
Broadl' defined2 the po"er of oversight em/races all acti(ities &nderta;en /' Congress to enhance its &nderstanding
of and infl&ence o(er the implementation of legislation it has enacted")12*, Clearl'2 o(ersight concerns post(
enactment meas&res &nderta;en /' Congress3 (a) to monitor /&rea&cratic compliance with program o/:ecti(es2 (/) to
determine whether agencies are properl' administered2 (c) to eliminate e5ec&ti(e waste and dishonest'2 (d) to pre(ent
e5ec&ti(e &s&rpation of legislati(e a&thorit'2 and (d) to assess e5ec&ti(e conformit' with the congressional perception of
p&/lic interest")12%,
1he po"er of oversight has ,een held to ,e intrinsic in the grant of legislative po"er itself and integral to the
chec/s and ,alances inherent in a democratic s+stem of government")129, #mong the most .&oted :&stifications for this
power are the writings of 1ohn St&art Mill and Aoodrow Ailson" 0n his Consideration of Representative 2overnment2
)1+>, Mill wrote that the d&t' of the legislat&re is 7to watch and control the go(ernment@ to throw the light of p&/licit' on its
acts@ to compel a f&ll e5position and :&stification of all of them which an' one considers o/:ectiona/le@ and to cens&re them if
fo&nd condemna/le"8)1+1, Ailson went one step farther and opined that the legislat&reCs informing f&nction sho&ld /e
preferred to its legislati(e f&nction" <e emphasiBed that 7)E,(en more important than legislation is the instr&ction and
g&idance in political affairs which the people might recei(e from a /od' which ;ept all national concerns s&ff&sed in a /road
da'light of disc&ssion"8)1+2,
O(er the 'ears2 Congress has in(o;ed its o(ersight power with increased fre.&enc' to chec/ the perceived
:e-ponential accumulation of po"er; ,+ the e-ecutive ,ranch")1++, B' the /eginning of the 2>
th
cent&r'2 Congress has
delegated an enormo&s amo&nt of legislati(e a&thorit' to the e5ec&ti(e /ranch and the administrati(e agencies" Congress,
thus, uses its oversight po"er to ma/e sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions "ithin the
authorit+ delegated to them")1+6,
-he o(ersight power has also /een &sed to ens&re the acco&nta/ilit' of regulator+ commissions li;e the Sec&rities
and E5change Commission and the Dederal !eser(e Board2 often referred to as representing a 7headless fo&rth /ranch of
go(ernment"8)1+, Enli;e other ordinar' administrati(e agencies2 these /odies are independent from the e5ec&ti(e /ranch
and are o&tside the e5ec&ti(e department in the discharge of their f&nctions")1+9,
Categories of congressional oversight functions
-he acts done /' Congress p&rportedl' in the e5ercise of its o(ersight powers ma' /e di(ided into three categories2
namel'3 scrutin+, investigation and supervision")1+*,
a. .crutin+
Congressional scrutin+ implies a lesser intensit' and contin&it' of attention to administrati(e operations"
)1+%, 0ts primar+ purpose is to determine econom' and efficienc' of the operation of go(ernment acti(ities" 0n the e5ercise
of legislati(e scr&tin'2 Congress ma' re.&estinformation and report from the other /ranches of go(ernment" 0t can gi(e
recommendations or pass resol&tions for consideration of the agenc' in(ol(ed"
&egislative scrutin+ is ,ased primaril+ on the po"er of appropriation of Congress" Ender the Constit&tion2 the
7power of the p&rse8 /elongs to Congress")1+9, -he 4resident ma' propose the /&dget2 /&t still2 Congress has the final sa'
on appropriations" Conse.&entl'2 administrati(e officials appear e(er' 'ear /efore the appropriation committees of Congress
to report and s&/mit a /&dget estimate and a program of administration for the s&cceeding fiscal 'ear" F&ring /&dget
hearings2 administrati(e officials defend their /&dget proposals"
-he power of appropriation carries with it the power to specif' the pro:ect or acti(it' to /e f&nded")16>, <ence2 the
holding of ,udget hearing has /een the &s&al means of re(iewing polic' and of a&diting the &se of pre(io&s appropriation to
ascertain whether the' ha(e /een dis/&rsed for p&rposes a&thoriBed in an appropriation act" -he consideration of the /&dget
is also an opport&nit' for the lawma;ers to e5press their confidence in the performance of a Ca/inet Secretar' or to manifest
their disg&st or disfa(or of the contin&ance in office of a /&rea&crat")161, Congress can e(en c&rtail the acti(ities of the
administrati(e agencies /' denial of f&nds")162, 0n the Enited States2 for instance2 Congress /ro&ght to end the e5istence of
the Ci(ilian Conser(ation Corps2 the $ational Go&th #dministration and the $ational !eso&rces 4lanning Board2 simpl' /'
den'ing them an' appropriation")16+,
7ut legislative scrutin+ does not end in ,udget hearings. Congress can as/ the heads of departments to
appear ,efore and ,e heard ,+ either <ouse of Congress on an+ matter pertaining to their departments" Section 222
#rticle =0 of the 19%* Constit&tion pro(ides3
The heads of departments may! upon their own initiative! with the consent of the 'resident! or upon the re=uest of either 3ouse! as the
rules of each 3ouse shall provide! appear %efore and %e heard %y such 3ouse on any matter pertaining to their departments. )ritten
=uestions shall %e su%mitted to the 'resident of the 0enate or the 0pea*er of the 3ouse of 1epresentatives at least three days %efore their
scheduled appearance. nterpellations shall not %e limited to written =uestions! %ut may cover matters related thereto. )hen the security of
the 0tate or the pu%lic interest so re=uires and the 'resident so states in writing! the appearance shall %e conducted in executive session.
1his provision originated from the Administrative Code)166, and "as later elevated to the level of a
constitutional provision due to its :great value in the "or/ of the legislature"8)16, 0n drafting the 19+ Constit&tion2
some delegates opposed the pro(ision arg&ing that it is a feat&re of a parliamentar' s'stem and its adoption wo&ld ma;e o&r
go(ernment a 7h'/rid s'stem"8)169, B&t mainl' attac;ed was the pro(ision a&thoriBing the department secretaries on their
own initiati(e to appear /efore the legislat&re2 with the right to /e heard on an' matter pertaining to their departments" 0t was
pointed o&t that this wo&ld 7gi(e a chance to the department secretaries to lo//' for items in the appropriation /ill or for
pro(isions of other /ills in which the' had special interest2 permitting them to /ear infl&ence and press&re &pon Mem/ers of
the law?ma;ing /od'2 in (iolation of the principle of separation of powers &nderl'ing the Constit&tion"8)16*, Fespite the
o/:ections2 the pro(ision was adopted to 7pre(ent the raising of an' .&estion with respect to the constit&tionalit' of the
practice8 and 7to ma;e open and p&/lic the relations /etween the legislati(e and the e5ec&ti(e departments"8 )16%, #s
incorporated in the 19+ Constitution2 the pro(ision reads3
The heads of departments upon their own initiative or upon the re=uest of the ,ational Assem%ly on any matter pertaining to their
departments unless the pu%lic interest shall re=uire otherwise and the 'resident shall state so in writing.@85AB
-he whole tenor of the pro(ision was permissive3 the department heads co&ld appear /&t the legislati(e was not
o/liged to entertain them@ reciprocall'2 the legislat&re co&ld re.&est their appearance /&t co&ld not o/lige them especiall' if
the 4resident o/:ected")1>, 1he rule radicall+ changed2 howe(er2 with the adoption of the 93= Constitution2 esta/lishing
a parliamentar' s'stem of go(ernment" 0n a parliamentar' s'stem2 the administration is responsi/le to the 4arliament and
hence2 the 4rime Minister and the Ca/inet Mem/ers ma' /e 7re.&ired to appear and answer .&estions and interpellations8 to
gi(e an acco&nt of their stewardship d&ring a 7.&estion ho&r28 viz3
0ec. 8: (8) There shall %e a =uestion hour at least once a month or as often as the 1ules of the >atasang 'am%ansa may provide! which
shall %e included in its agenda! during which the 'rime 9inister! the "eputy 'rime 9inister or any 9inister may %e re=uired to appear
and answer =uestions and interpellations %y 9em%ers of the >atasang 'am%ansa. )ritten =uestions shall %e su%mitted to the 0pea*er at
least three days %efore a scheduled =uestion hour. nterpellations shall not %e limited to the written =uestions! %ut may cover matters
related thereto. The agenda shall specify the su%/ects of the =uestion hour. )hen the security of the 0tate so re=uires and the 'resident so
states in writing! the =uestion hour shall %e conducted in executive session.
-he 7.&estion ho&r8 was retained despite the re(ersion to the presidential s'stem in 19%1" F&ring the deli/erations of
the 9!3 Constitution2 the report of the legislati(e committee called for the adoption of the 7.&estion ho&r8 for the following
reasons3
. ts purposes are to elicit concrete information from the administration! to re=uest its intervention! and when necessary! to expose
a%uses and see* redress. The procedure provides the opposition with a means of discovering the government+s wea* points and %ecause of
the pu%licity it generates! it has a salutary influence on the administration. (n the whole! %ecause of the detailed facts elicited during the
interpellation or in the written answers! it will help mem%ers to understand the complicated su%/ect matter of %ills and statutory measures
laid %efore the Assem%ly. t may %e added that the popularity of this procedure can %e attri%uted to the fact that in ma*ing use of his right
to as* =uestions! the mem%er is a completely free agent of the people. The only limits on his actions are the rules governing the
admissi%ility of =uestions concerned with matters of form and not with the merits of the issue at hand. The fact that we also impose a time
limit means that the government is o%liged to furnish the information as*ed for and this o%ligation is what gives the procedure its real
strength..@8J8B
-his proposal was (igoro&sl' opposed on the gro&nd of separation of powers" CO$COM Felegate Christian Monsod
pointed o&t that the pro(ision was historicall' intended to appl' to mem/ers of the legislat&re who are in the e5ec&ti(e /ranch
t'pical in a parliamentar' form of go(ernment" 0n fine2 the 7.&estion ho&r8 was cond&cted on a peer /asis" B&t since the
delegates decided to adopt a presidential form of go(ernment2 ca/inet mem/ers are p&rel' alter egos of the 4resident and
are no longer mem/ers of the legislat&re" -o re.&ire them to appear /efore the legislators and acco&nt for their actions 7p&ts
them on &ne.&al terms with the legislators8 and 7wo&ld (iolate the separation of powers of the e5ec&ti(e and the legislati(e
/ranches"8)12, Felegate Monsod2 howe(er2 recogniBed that a mechanism sho&ld /e adopted where Ca/inet mem/ers ma'
/e s&mmoned and ma'2 e(en on their own initiati(e2 appear /efore the legislat&re" -his2 he said2 wo&ld promote coordination
witho&t s&/ordinating one /od' to another" <e th&s s&ggested that the original tenor of the pro(ision in the 19+ Constit&tion
/e retained")1+,
#fter m&ch deli/eration2 delegate MonsodCs s&ggestion pre(ailed" -h&s2 the 4resident ma' or ma' not consent to the
appearance of the heads of departments@ and e(en if he does2 he ma' re.&ire that the appearance /e in e5ec&ti(e session"
!eciprocall'2 Congress ma' ref&se the initiati(e ta;en /' a department secretar'"
&i/e"ise, Congress e-ercises legislative scrutin+ thru its po"er of confirmation" Section 1%2 #rticle =0 of the 19%*
Constit&tion pro(ides for the organiBation of a Commission on #ppointments consisting of the 4resident of the Senate as ex
officio Chairman2 twel(e Senators and twel(e mem/ers of the <o&se of !epresentati(es2 elected /' each <o&se on the /asis
of proportional representation from the political parties or organiBations registered &nder the part'?list s'stem" Consent of the
Commission on #ppointments is needed for the nominees of the 4resident for the following positions3 (a) heads of e5ec&ti(e
departments2 (/) am/assadors2 other p&/lic ministers and cons&ls2 (c) officers of the armed forces from the ran; of colonel or
na(al captain2 and (d) other officers whose appointments are (ested with the 4resident &nder the Constit&tion")16,
-hro&gh the power of confirmation2 Congress shares in the appointing power of the e5ec&ti(e" -heoreticall'2 it is
intended to lessen political considerations in the appointment of officials in sensiti(e positions in the go(ernment" 0t also
pro(ides Congress an opport&nit' to find o&t whether the nominee possesses the necessar' .&alifications2 integrit' and
pro/it' re.&ired of all p&/lic ser(ants"
0n the Enited States2 apart from the appropriation and confirmation powers of the E"S" Congress2 legislati(e scr&tin'
finds e5pression in the Legislati(e !eorganiBation #ct of 1969 charging all <o&se and Senate Standing Committees with
contin&o&s (igilance o(er the e5ec&tion of an' and all laws falling within their respecti(e :&risdictions 7with a (iew to
determining its econom' and efficienc'"8)1, 4&rs&ant to this law2 each committee was a&thoriBed to hire a certain n&m/er
of staff emplo'ees" #ll Senate committees were li;ewise gi(en the power to s&/poena witnesses and doc&ments")19,
,. Congressional investigation
Ahile congressional scr&tin' is regarded as a passi(e process of loo;ing at the facts that are readil'
a(aila/le2 congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts")1*, -he power of Congress to cond&ct
in(estigation is recogniBed /' the 19%* Constit&tion &nder section 212 #rticle =02 viz3
The 0enate or the 3ouse of 1epresentatives or any of its respective committee may conduct in=uiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly pu%lished rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected %y such in=uiries shall %e respected.
B&t e(en in the a/sence of an e5press pro(ision in the Constit&tion2 congressional in(estigation has /een held to /e an
essential and appropriate a&5iliar' to the legislati(e f&nction" 0n the Enited States2 the lac; of a constit&tional pro(ision
specificall' a&thoriBing the cond&ct of legislati(e in(estigations did not deter its Congresses from holding in(estigation on
s&spected corr&ption2 mismanagement2 or inefficiencies of go(ernment officials" E5ercised first in the failed St" Clair
e5pedition in 1*922 the power to cond&ct in(estigation has since /een in(o;ed in the -eapot Fome2 Aatergate2 0ran?Contra2
and Ahitewater contro(ersies")1%, S&/se.&entl'2 in a series of decisions2 the Co&rt recogniBed 7the danger to effecti(e and
honest cond&ct of the Go(ernment if the legislati(e power to pro/e corr&ption in the E5ec&ti(e /ranch were &nd&l'
&nhampered"8)19,
0n $astland v. 4nited .tates .ervicemen>s ?und2)19>, the E"S" S&preme Co&rt r&led that the scope of the
congressional power of in.&ir' 7is penetrating and far(reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate &nder the
Constit&tion"8)191, 0t encompasses e(er'thing that concerns the administration of e5isting laws as well as proposed or
possi/l' needed stat&tes")192, 0n the e5ercise of this power2 congressional in.&iries can reach all so&rces of information and
in the a/sence of co&nter(ailing constit&tional pri(ilege or self?imposed restrictions &pon its a&thorit'2 Congress and its
committees2 ha(e (irt&all'2 plenar' power to compel information needed to discharge its legislati(e f&nctions from e5ec&ti(e
agencies2 pri(ate persons and organiBations" Aithin certain constraints2 the information so o/tained ma' /e made p&/lic"
)19+, 0n %c2rain v. Daughert+2)196, it held that 7a legislati(e /od' cannot legislate wisel' or effecti(el' in the a/sence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect change"8)19, B&t while the congressional
power of in.&ir' is /road2 it is not &nlimited" $o in.&ir' is an end in itself@ it m&st /e related to2 and in f&rtherance of2 a
legitimate tas; of Congress"8)199, Moreo(er2 an in(estigating committee has onl' the power to in.&ire into matters within the
scope of the a&thorit' delegated to it /' its parent /od'")19*,B&t once its :&risdiction and a&thorit'2 and the pertinence of the
matter &nder in.&ir' to its area of a&thorit' are esta/lished2 a committeeCs in(estigati(e p&r(iew is s&/stantial and wide?
ranging")19%,
American *urisprudence upholding the inherent po"er of Congress to conduct investigation has ,een adopted
in our *urisdiction in Arnault v. Na@areno2)199, decided in 19>2 when no pro(ision 'et e5isted granting Congress the
power to cond&ct in(estigation" 0n the said case2 the Senate passed !esol&tion $o"% creating a special committee to
in(estigate the B&ena(ista and the -am/o/ong Estates Feal wherein the go(ernment was allegedl'
defra&ded 42>>>2>>>">>" -he special committee e5amined (ario&s witnesses2 among whom was 1ean L" #rna&lt" F&e
to the ref&sal of #rna&lt to answer a .&estion which he claimed to /e 7self?incriminator'28)1*>, the Senate passed a
resol&tion citing #rna&lt in contempt" -he Senate committed him to the c&stod' of the Sergeant?at?#rms and ordered his
imprisonment &ntil he shall ha(e answered the .&estion" #rna&lt filed a petition /efore this Co&rt contending that (a) the
Senate has no power to p&nish him for contempt@ (/) the information so&ght to /e o/tained /' the Senate is immaterial and
will not ser(e an' intended or p&rported legislation@ and (c) the answer re.&ired of him will incriminate him"
Epholding the power of the Senate to p&nish #rna&lt for contempt2 the Co&rt r&led as follows3
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either 3ouse of Congress with power to ma*e investigations and
exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively! such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to %e implied. n other words! the power of in=uiry K with process to enforce it K is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative %ody cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the a%sence of information respecting the
conditions which legislation is intended to affect or change< and where the legislative %ody does not itself possess the re=uisite
information K which is not fre=uently true K recourse must %e had to others who do possess it. &xperience has shown that mere re=uests
for such information are often unavailing! and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete< so some
means of compulsion is essential to o%tain what is needed. The fact that the Constitution expressly gives the Congress the power to
punish its 9em%ers for disorderly %ehaviour! does not %y necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other
person.@828B
-he Co&rt f&rther r&led that the power of the Senate to p&nish a witness for contempt does not terminate &pon the
ad:o&rnment of the session")1*2, 0t held that the in(estigation was within the power of the Senate since the 7transaction
in(ol(ed a .&estiona/le and allegedl' &nnecessar' and irreg&lar e5pendit&re of no less than 42>>>2>>>">> of p&/lic f&nds2
of which the Congress is the constit&tional g&ardian"8)1*+, -he in(estigation was also fo&nd to /e 7in aid of legislation"8 #s
res&lt of the 'et &nfinished in(estigation2 the Co&rt noted that the in(estigating committee has recommended2 and the Senate
has appro(ed three /ills")1*6,
-he Co&rt f&rther held that once an in.&ir' is admitted or esta,lished to /e within the :&risdiction of a legislati(e /od'
to ma;e2 the in(estigating committee has the power to re.&ire a witness to answer an' .&estion pertinent to that in.&ir'2
s&/:ect to his constit&tional right against self?incrimination" -he in.&ir' m&st /e material or necessar' to the e5ercise of a
power in it (ested /' the Constit&tion" <ence2 a witness can not /e coerced to answer a .&estion that o/(io&sl' has no
relation to the s&/:ect of the in.&ir'" B&t the Co&rt e5plained that 7the materialit' of the .&estion m&st /e determined /' its
direct relation to the s&/:ect of the in.&ir' and not /' its indirect relation to an' proposed or possi/le legislation"8 -he reason
is that the necessit' or lac; of necessit' for legislati(e action and the form and character of the action itself are determined /'
the s&m total of the information to /e gathered as a res&lt of the in(estigation2 and not /' a fraction of s&ch information
elicited from a single .&estion")1*,
Dinall'2 the Co&rt r&led that the gro&nd on which #rna&lt in(o;ed the right against self?incrimination 7is too sha;'2 infirm2
and slipper' to afford him safet'"8)1*9, 0t noted that since #rna&lt himself said that the transaction was legal2 and that he ga(e
the 466>2>>>">> to a representati(e of B&rt in compliance with the latterCs (er/al instr&ction2 there is therefore no /asis &pon
which to s&stain his claim that to re(eal the name of that person wo&ld incriminate him" )1**, 0t held that it is not eno&gh for
the witness to sa' that the answer will incriminate him for he is not the sole :&dge of his lia/ilit'2 th&s3
.@TBhe danger of self-incrimination must appear reasona%le and real to the court! from all the circumstances and from the whole case! as
well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. The fact that the testimony of the witness may tend to show that he
has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination! unless
he is at the same time lia%le to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege %y reason of some
fanciful excuse! for protection against an imaginary danger! or to secure immunity to a third person.@82IB
As no" contained in the 9!3 Constitution2 the power of Congress to in(estigate is circ&mscri/ed /' three
limitations2 namel'3 (a) it m&st /e in aid of its legislati(e f&nctions2 (/) it m&st /e cond&cted in accordance with d&l'
p&/lished r&les of proced&re2 and (c) the persons appearing therein are afforded their constit&tional rights"
0n 7eng@on, Jr. v. .enate 7lue Ri,,on Committee2)1*9, this Co&rt held that the senate committee e5ceeded the
permissi/le e5ercise of legislati(e in(estigation" -he case started with a speech /' Senator Enrile s&ggesting the need to
determine possi/le (iolation of law in the alleged transfer of some properties of former #m/assador Ben:amin 7Ho;o'8
!om&aldeB to the Lopa Gro&p of Companies" -he Senate Bl&e !i//on Committee decided to in(estigate the transaction
p&rportedl' in aid of legislation" Ahen the Bl&e !i//on Committee s&mmoned the petitioners to appear2 the' as;ed this
Co&rt for a restraining order on the gro&nd2 among others2 that the in(estigation was not in aid of legislation and that their
appearance /efore the in(estigating /od' co&ld pre:&dice their case /efore the Sandiganbayan" !&ling in fa(or of the
petitioner2 we held as follows3
;erily! the speech of 0enator &nrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation< he merely called upon the 0enate to loo* into a
possi%le violation of 0ec. J of 1A ,o. 608A! otherwise *nown as CThe Anti-Graft and Corrupt 'ractices Act.? n other words! the purpose
of the in=uiry to %e conducted %y respondent >lue 1i%%on Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of 'resident A=uino!
particularly! 9r. 1icardo $opa! had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 66 or 6A corporations %elonging to
>en/amin CLo*oy? 1omualde- to the $opa Group. There appears to %e! therefore! no intended legislation involved.
-he cond&ct of legislati(e in(estigation is also s&/:ect to the r&les of each <o&se" 0n the <o&se of !epresentati(es2
)1%>, an in.&ir' ma' /e initiated or cond&cted /' a committee motu proprio on an' matter within its :&risdiction &pon a
ma:orit' (ote of all its Mem/ers)1%1, or &pon order of the <o&se of !epresentati(es)1%2, thro&gh3
(8) the referral of a privilege speech containing or conveying a re=uest or demand for the conduct of an in=uiry! to the
appropriate committee! upon motion of the 9a/ority $eader or his deputies< or
(:) the adoption of a resolution directing a committee to conduct an in=uiry reported out %y the Committee on 1ules after
ma*ing a determination on the necessity and propriety of the conduct of an in=uiry %y such committee4 Provided! That
all resolutions directing any committee to conduct an in=uiry shall %e referred to the Committee on 1ules< or
(6) the referral %y the Committee on 1ules to the appropriate committee! after ma*ing a determination on the necessity and
propriety of the conduct of in=uiry %y such committee! of a petition filed or information given %y a 9em%er of the
3ouse re=uesting such in=uiry and endorsed %y the 0pea*er4 Provided! That such petition or information shall %e
given under oath! stating the facts upon which it is %ased! and accompanied %y supporting affidavits.@8I6B
-he committee to which a pri(ilege speech2 resol&tion2 petition or information re.&esting an in.&ir' is referred ma'
constit&te and appoint s&/?committees composed of at least one?third (1I+) of the committee for the p&rpose of performing
an' and all acts which the committee as a whole is a&thoriBed to perform2 e5cept to p&nish for contempt" 0n case a pri(ilege
speech is referred to two or more committees2 a :oint in.&ir' /' the said committees shall /e cond&cted" -he in.&iries are to
/e held in p&/lic e5cept when the committee or s&/?committee deems that the e5amination of a witness in a p&/lic hearing
ma' endanger national sec&rit'" 0n which case2 it shall cond&ct the hearing in an e5ec&ti(e session")1%6,
-he !&les f&rther pro(ide that 7the filing or pendenc' of a case /efore an' co&rt2 tri/&nal or .&asi?:&dicial or
administrati(e /odies shall not stop or a/ate an' in.&ir' cond&cted to carr' o&t a specific legislati(e p&rpose"8 )1%, 0n
e5ercise of congressional in.&ir'2 the committee has the power 7to iss&e subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness
in an' part of the co&ntr'2 signed /' the chairperson or acting chairperson and the Spea;er or acting
Spea;er"8)1%9, D&rthermore2 the committee ma'2 /' a (ote of two?thirds (2I+) of all its mem/ers constit&ting a .&or&m2 p&nish
for contempt an' person who3 (a) ref&ses2 after /eing d&l' s&mmoned2 to o/e' s&ch s&mmons witho&t legal e5c&se@ (/)
ref&ses to /e sworn or placed &nder affirmation@ (c) ref&ses to answer an' rele(ant in.&ir'@ (d) ref&ses to prod&ce an' /oo;s2
papers2 doc&ments or records that are rele(ant to the in.&ir' and are in hisIher possession@ (e) acts in a disrespectf&l
manner towards an' mem/er of the Committee or commits mis/eha(ior in the presence of the committee@ or (f) &nd&l'
interferes in the cond&ct of proceedings d&ring meetings")1%*,
$e(ertheless2 an' person called to /e a witness ma' /e represented /' a co&nsel)1%%, and is entitled to all rights
incl&ding the right against self?incrimination")1%9,
c. &egislative supervision
-he third and most encompassing form /' which Congress e5ercises its o(ersight power is thr&
legislati(e supervision" 7S&per(ision8 connotes a contin&ing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding e-ecutive operations in a gi(en administrati(e area")19>, Ahile /oth congressional scr&tin' and
in(estigation in(ol(e in.&ir' into past e-ecutive ,ranch actions in order to infl&ence f&t&re e5ec&ti(e /ranch
performance2 congressional supervision allo"s Congress to scrutini@e the e-ercise of delegated la"(ma/ing
authorit+, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authorit+"
Congress e-ercises supervision over the e-ecutive agencies through its veto po"er. #t t+picall+ utili@es veto
provisions "hen granting the 9resident or an e-ecutive agenc+ the po"er to promulgate regulations "ith the force
of la". 1hese provisions re0uire the 9resident or an agenc+ to present the proposed regulations to Congress, "hich
retains a :right; to approve or disapprove an+ regulation ,efore it ta/es effect" S&ch legislati(e (eto pro(isions &s&all'
pro(ide that a proposed reg&lation will /ecome a law after the e5piration of a certain period of time2 onl' if Congress does not
affirmati(el' disappro(e of the reg&lation in the meantime" Less fre.&entl'2 the stat&te pro(ides that a proposed reg&lation
will /ecome law if Congress affirmati(el' appro(es it")191,
-he legislative veto was de(eloped initiall+ in response to the pro/lems of reorganiBing the E"S" Go(ernment
str&ct&re d&ring the Great Fepression in earl' 2>
th
cent&r'" Ahen E"S" 4resident <oo(er re.&ested a&thorit' to reorganiBe
the go(ernment in 19292 he co&pled his re.&est with a proposal for legislati(e re(iew" <e proposed that the E5ec&ti(e
7sho&ld act &pon appro(al of a :oint Committee of Congress or with the reser(ation of power of re(ision /' Congress within
some limited period ade.&ate for its consideration"8)192, Congress followed 4resident <oo(erCs s&ggestion and a&thoriBed
reorganiBation s&/:ect to legislati(e re(iew")19+, #ltho&gh the reorganiBation a&thorit' reenacted in 19++ did not contain a
legislati(e (eto pro(ision2 the pro(ision ret&rned d&ring the !oose(elt administration and has since /een renewed se(eral
times")196, O(er the 'ears2 the pro(ision was &sed e5tensi(el'" =ario&s #merican 4residents s&/mitted to Congress some
11 !eorganiBation 4lans2 2+ of which were disappro(ed p&rs&ant to legislati(e (eto pro(isions")19,
F&ring Aorld Aar 002 Congress and the 4resident applied the legislati(e (eto proced&re to resol(e the delegation
pro/lem in(ol(ing national sec&rit' and foreign affairs" -he legislati(e (eto offered the means /' which Congress co&ld
confer additional a&thorit' to the 4resident while preser(ing its own constit&tional role" F&ring this period2 Congress enacted
o(er +> stat&tes conferring powers on the E5ec&ti(e with legislati(e (eto pro(isions")199,
#fter Aorld Aar 002 legislati(e (eto pro(isions ha(e /een inserted in laws delegating a&thorit' in new areas of
go(ernmental in(ol(ement incl&ding the space program2 international agreements on n&clear energ'2 tariff arrangements2
and ad:&stment of federal pa' rates")19*, 0t has also fig&red prominentl' in resol(ing a series of ma:or constit&tional disp&tes
/etween the 4resident and Congress o(er claims of the 4resident to /road impo&ndment2 war and national emergenc'
powers")19%, O(erall2 29 congressional (eto?t'pe proced&res ha(e /een inserted in 199 different stat&tes since 19+2 when
the first (eto pro(ision was enacted into law")199,
.upporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessar' to maintain the /alance of power /etween the legislati(e and
the e5ec&ti(e /ranches of go(ernment as it offers lawma;ers a wa' to delegate (ast power to the e5ec&ti(e /ranch or to
independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel partic&lar e5ercise of s&ch power witho&t ha(ing to pass new
legislation or to repeal e5isting law")2>>, -he' contend that this arrangement promotes democratic acco&nta/ilit' as it
pro(ides legislati(e chec; on the acti(ities of &nelected administrati(e agencies")2>1, One proponent th&s e5plains3
t is too late to de%ate the merits of this delegation policy4 the policy is too deeply em%edded in our law and practice. t suffices to say that
the complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether %y actual or perceived necessity- to legislate %y declaring %road
policy goals and general statutory standards! leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress
articulates legislative aims! %ut leaves their implementation to the /udgment of parties who may or may not have participated in or agreed
with the development of those aims. Conse=uently! a%sent safeguards! in many instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could %e
effected4 Congress proposes! the &xecutive disposes. (ne safeguard! of course! is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to
change existing law. >ut without some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive %ranch! Congress would %e una%le
to determine whether its policies have %een implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is
appropriate.@:0:B
0ts opponents2 howe(er2 critici@e the legislative veto as &nd&e encroachment &pon the e5ec&ti(e prerogati(es" -he'
&rge that an' post?enactment meas&res &nderta;en /' the legislati(e /ranch sho&ld /e limited to scr&tin' and in(estigation@
an' meas&re /e'ond that wo&ld &ndermine the separation of powers g&aranteed /' the Constit&tion")2>+, -he' contend that
legislati(e (eto constit&tes an impermissi/le e(asion of the 4residentCs (eto a&thorit' and intr&sion into the powers (ested in
the e5ec&ti(e or :&dicial /ranches of go(ernment")2>6, 4roponents co&nter that legislati(e (eto enhances separation of
powers as it pre(ents the e5ec&ti(e /ranch and independent agencies from acc&m&lating too m&ch power")2>, -he' s&/mit
that reporting re.&irements and congressional committee in(estigations allow Congress to scr&tiniBe onl' the e5ercise of
delegated law?ma;ing a&thorit'" -he' do not allow Congress to re(iew e5ec&ti(e proposals /efore the' ta;e effect and the'
do not afford the opport&nit' for ongoing and /inding e5pressions of congressional intent")2>9, 0n contrast2 legislati(e (eto
permits Congress to participate prospecti(el' in the appro(al or disappro(al of 7su,ordinate la"8 or those enacted /' the
e5ec&ti(e /ranch p&rs&ant to a delegation of a&thorit' /' Congress" -he' f&rther arg&e that legislati(e (eto 7is a necessar'
response /' Congress to the accretion of polic' control /' forces o&tside its cham/ers"8 0n an era of delegated a&thorit'2 the'
point o&t that legislati(e (eto 7is the most efficient means Congress has 'et de(ised to retain control o(er the e(ol&tion and
implementation of its polic' as declared /' stat&te"8)2>*,
0n #mmigration and Naturali@ation .ervice v. Chadha2)2>%, the E"S" S&preme Co&rt resol(ed the (alidit' of legislati(e
(eto pro(isions" -he case arose from the order of the immigration :&dge s&spending the deportation of Chadha p&rs&ant to J
266(c)(1) of the 0mmigration and $ationalit' #ct" -he Enited States <o&se of !epresentati(es passed a resol&tion (etoing the
s&spension p&rs&ant to J 266(c)(2) a&thoriBing either <o&se of Congress2 /' resol&tion2 to in(alidate the decision of the
e5ec&ti(e /ranch to allow a partic&lar deporta/le alien to remain in the Enited States" -he immigration :&dge reopened the
deportation proceedings to implement the <o&se order and the alien was ordered deported" -he Board of 0mmigration
#ppeals dismissed the alienCs appeal2 holding that it had no power to declare &nconstit&tional an act of Congress" -he Enited
States Co&rt of #ppeals for $inth Circ&it held that the <o&se was witho&t constit&tional a&thorit' to order the alienCs
deportation and that J 266(c)(2) (iolated the constit&tional doctrine on separation of powers"
On appeal2 the E"S" S&preme Co&rt declared J 266(c)(2) &nconstit&tional" B&t the Co&rt shied awa' from the iss&e of
separation of powers and instead held that the pro(ision (iolates the presentment cla&se and /icameralism" 0t held that the
one?ho&se (eto was essentiall' legislati(e in p&rpose and effect" #s s&ch2 it is s&/:ect to the proced&res set o&t in #rticle 0 of
the Constit&tion re.&iring the passage /' a ma:orit' of /oth <o&ses and presentment to the 4resident" -h&s3
&xamination of the action ta*en here %y one 3ouse pursuant to M :55(c)(:) reveals that it was essentially legislative in purpose and effect.
n purporting to exercise power defined in Art ! M I! cl 5! to Cesta%lish a uniform 1ule of ,aturali-ation!? the 3ouse too* action that had
the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights! duties! and relations of persons! including the Attorney General! &xecutive >ranch
officials and Chadha! all outside the $egislative >ranch. 0ection :55(c)(:) purports to authori-e one 3ouse Congress to re=uire the
Attorney General to deport an individual alien whose deportation otherwise would %e canceled under M :55. The one-3ouse veto operated
in these cases to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha+s deportation< a%sent the 3ouse action! Chadha would remain in the
Fnited 0tates. Congress has acted and its action altered Chadha+s status.
The legislative character of the one-3ouse veto in these cases is confirmed %y the character of the congressional action it supplants.
,either the 3ouse of 1epresentatives nor the 0enate contends that! a%sent the veto provision in M :55(c)(:)! either of them! or %oth of
them acting together! could effectively re=uire the Attorney General! in exercise of legislatively delegated authority! had determined the
alien should remain in the Fnited 0tates. )ithout the challenged provision in M :55(c)(:)! this could have %een achieved! if at all! only %y
legislation re=uiring deportation. 0imilarly! a veto %y one 3ouse of Congress under M :55(c)(:) cannot %e /ustified as an attempt at
amending the standards set out in M :55(a)(8)! or as a repeal of M :55 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and repeal of statutes! no less
than enactment! must conform with Art .
The nature of the decision implemented %y one-3ouse veto in these cases further manifests its legislative character. After long experience
with the clumsy! time-consuming private %ill procedure! Congress made a deli%erate choice to delegate to the &xecutive >ranch! and
specifically to the Attorney General! the authority to allow deporta%le aliens to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. t
is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority is precisely the *ind of decision that can %e implemented only in accordance with the
procedures set out in Art . "isagreement with the Attorney General+s decision on Chadha+s deportation- that is! Congress+ decision to
deport Chadha- no less than Congress+ original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to ma*e decision! involves
determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way< %icameral passage followed %y presentment to the 'resident.
Congress must a%ide %y its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revo*ed. @:0AB
-wo wee;s after the Chadha decision2 the Co&rt &pheld2 in memorand&m decision2 two lower co&rt decisions
in(alidating the legislati(e (eto pro(isions in the $at&ral Gas 4olic' #ct of 19*%)21>, and the Dederal -rade Commission
0mpro(ement #ct of 19%>")211, Dollowing this precedence2 lower co&rts in(alidated stat&tes containing legislati(e (eto
pro(isions altho&gh some of these pro(isions re.&ired the appro(al of /oth <o&ses of Congress and th&s met the
/icameralism re.&irement of #rticle 0" 0ndeed2 some of these (eto pro(isions were not e(en e5ercised")212,
Gi(en the concept and config&ration of the power of congressional o(ersight2 the ne-t level of in0uir+ is whether
congress e5ceeded its permissi/le e5ercise in the case at /ar" B&t /efore proceeding2 a disc&ssion of the nature and
po"ers of the Commission on $lections aspro(ided in the 19%* Constit&tion is decisive to the iss&e"
Congressional Oversight and CO%$&$C
-he Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is a constit&tional /od' e-clusivel+ charged with the enforcement and
administration of 7all laws and reg&lations relati(e to the cond&ct of an election2 ple/iscite2 initiati(e2 referend&m2 and
recall28)21+, and is in(ested with the power to decide all .&estions affecting elections sa(e those in(ol(ing the right to
(ote" )216,
Gi(en its important role in preser(ing the sanctit' of the right of s&ffrage2)21, the COMELEC was purposel+
constituted as a /od'separate from the e5ec&ti(e2 legislati(e2 and :&dicial /ranches of go(ernment")219, Originall+2 the
power to enforce o&r election laws was (ested with the 4resident and e5ercised thro&gh the Fepartment of the 0nterior"
#ccording to Fean Sinco2)21*, howe(er2 the vie" ultimatel+ emerged that an independent ,od+ co&ld /etter protect the
right of s&ffrage of o&r people" <ence2 the enforcement of o&r election laws2 while an e5ec&ti(e power2 was transferred to the
COMELEC"
-he shift to a modified parliamentar+ s+stem with the adoption of the 19*+ Constit&tion did not alter the character
of CO%$&$C as an independent ,od+")21%, 0ndeed2 a 7definite tendenc' to enhance and invigorate the role of the
Commission on Elections as the independent constit&tional /od' charged with the safeg&arding of free2 peacef&l and honest
elections8 has /een o/ser(ed")219, -he 19*+ Constit&tion ,roadened the power of the COMELEC /' ma;ing it the sole
*udge of all election contests relating to the election2 ret&rns and .&alifications of mem/ers of the national legislat&re and
electi(e pro(incial and cit' officials")22>, -h&s2 the COMELEC was gi(en *udicial po"er aside from its traditional
administrati(e and e5ec&ti(e f&nctions"
1he trend to"ards strengthening the CO%$&$C continued "ith the 9!3 Constitution. -oda'2 the COMELEC
enforces and administers all laws and regulations relati(e to the cond&ct of elections2 ple/iscites2 initiati(es2 referenda and
recalls" Election contests in(ol(ing regional2 pro(incial and cit' electi(e officials are &nder its e5cl&si(e original :&risdiction
while all contests in(ol(ing electi(e m&nicipal and /aranga' officials are &nder its appellate :&risdiction")221,
.everal safeguards have ,een put in place to protect the independence of the CO%$&$C from un"arranted
encroachment ,+ the other ,ranches of government. Ahile the 4resident appoints the Commissioners with the
conc&rrence of the Commission on #ppointments2 the Commissioners are not acco&nta/le to the 4resident in the discharge
of their f&nctions" -he' ha(e a fi5ed ten&re and are remo(a/le onl' /' impeachment")222, -o ens&re that not all
Commissioners are appointed /' the same 4resident at an' one time2 a staggered s'stem of appointment was de(ised"
-h&s2 of the Commissioners first appointed2 three shall hold office for se(en 'ears2 three for fi(e 'ears2 and the last three for
three 'ears")22+, !eappointment and temporar' designation or appointment is prohi/ited")226, 0n case of (acanc'2 the
appointee shall onl' ser(e the &ne5pired term of the predecessor")22, -he COMELEC is li;ewise granted the power to
prom&lgate its own r&les of proced&re2)229, and to appoint its own officials and emplo'ees in accordance with Ci(il Ser(ice
laws")22*,
1he CO%$&$C e-ercises 0uasi(*udicial po"ers ,ut it is not part of the *udiciar+" -his Co&rt has no general power
of s&per(ision o(er the Commission on Elections e5cept those specificall' granted /' the Constit&tion" )22%, #s s&ch2 the
!&les of Co&rt are not applica/le to the Commission on Elections")229, 0n addition2 the decisions of the COMELEC are
re(iewa/le onl' /' petition for certiorari on gro&nds of gra(e a/&se of discretion2)2+>, viz3
Conceived %y the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular suffrage! endowed with independence and all the
needed concomitant powers! it is %ut proper that the Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption of regularity to its course of
action and choice of means in performing its duties! to the end that it may achieve its designed place in the democratic fa%ric of our
government. deally! its mem%ers should %e free from all suspicions of partisan inclinations! %ut the fact that actually some of them have
had stints in the arena of politics should not! unless the contrary is shown! serve as %asis for denying to its actuations the respect and
consideration that the Constitution contemplates should %e accorded to it! in the same manner that the 0upreme Court itself which from
time to time may have mem%ers drawn from the political ran*s or even from the military is at all times deemed insulated from every
degree or form of external pressure and influence as well as improper internal motivations that could arise from such %ac*ground or
orientation.
)e hold! therefore! that under the existing constitutional and statutory provisions! the certiorari /urisdiction of the Court over orders!
rulings and decisions of the Comelec is not as %road as it used to %e and should %e confined to instances of grave a%use of discretion
amounting to patent and su%stantial denial of due process.@:68B
-he COMELEC is2 howe(er2 su,*ect to congressional scrutin+ especiall' d&ring /&dget hearings" B&t Congress
cannot a/olish the COMELEC as it can in case of other agencies &nder the e5ec&ti(e /ranch" -he reason is o/(io&s" -he
COMELEC is not a mere creat&re of the legislat&re@ it owes its origin from the Constit&tion" D&rthermore2 the salar' of the
Chairman and the Commissioners cannot /e decreased d&ring their ten&re")2+2, En:o'ing fiscal a&tonom'2 the COMELEC
has a wider discretion in the dis/&rsement and allocation of appro(ed appropriations" -o safeg&ard the COMELEC from
&nd&e legislati(e interference2 the 19%* Constit&tion pro(ides that its appro(ed ann&al appropriations are to /e a&tomaticall'
and reg&larl' released")2++, #lso2 Congress has no power to call the commissioners of the COMELEC to a .&estion ho&r"
-he Constit&tion pro(ides that the .&estion ho&r is limited to heads of departments &nder the E5ec&ti(e /ranch2 and the
deli/erations d&ring the drafting of the 19%* Constit&tion clearl' reflect this sentiment" Be that as it ma'2 the COMELEC is
mandated to 7s&/mit to the 4resident and the Congress a comprehensi(e report on the cond&ct of each election2 ple/iscite2
initiati(e2 referend&m and recall"8)2+6, -his pro(ision allows Congress to re(iew and assess the effecti(it' of election laws
and if necessar'2 enact new laws or amend e5isting stat&tes"
7e that as it ma+, # respectfull+ su,mit that the legislative veto po"er or congressional oversight po"er over
the authorit+ of CO%$&$C to issue rules and regulations in order to enforce election la"s is unconstitutional"
#s aforedisc&ssed2 the Constit&tion di(ided the powers of o&r go(ernment into three categories2 legislati(e2 e5ec&ti(e2
and :&dicial" #ltho&gh not 7hermeticall' sealed8 from one another2 the powers of the three /ranches are f&nctionall'
identifia/le" 0n this respect2 legislati(e power is generall' e5ercised in the enactment of the law@ e5ec&ti(e power2 in its
e5ec&tion@ and :&dicial power2 in its interpretation" 0n the a/sence of specific pro(ision in the Constit&tion2 it is f&ndamental
&nder the principle of separation of powers that one /ranch cannot e5ercise or share the power of the other"
0n addition2 o&r Constit&tion created other offices aside from the e5ec&ti(e2 the legislati(e and the :&diciar' and defined
their powers and prerogati(es" #mong these /odies especiall' created /' the Constit&tion itself is the COMELEC"
1he CO%$&$C occupies a distinct place in our scheme of government" #s the constit&tional /od' charged with
the administration of o&r election laws2 it is endowed with independence in the e5ercise of some of its powers and the
discharge of its responsi/ilities" 1he po"er to promulgate rules and regulations in order to administer our election
la"s ,elongs to this categor+ of po"ers as this has ,een vested e-clusivel+ ,+ the 9!3 Constitution to the
CO%$&$C. #t cannot ,e trenched upon ,+ Congress in the e-ercise of its oversight po"ers"
0n 2allardo v. 1a,amo, Jr"2)2+, this Co&rt traced the origin of COMELECCs power to prom&lgate r&les and
reg&lations" #t "as initiall+ a statutor+ grant" Both the 19+ and the 19*+ Constit&tions did not e5plicitl' grant the
COMELEC the power to prom&lgate r&les and reg&lations" -he power was (ested /' Congress to the COMELEC in the
Omni/&s Election Code2)2+9, viz3
0ec. J:. 'owers and functions of the Commission on &lections.- n addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it %y the
Constitution! the Commission shall have the exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free! orderly and honest elections! and shall4
.
(c) 'romulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is re=uired to enforce
and administer.
.
-his statutor+ po"er "as elevated to a constitutional status with the insertion of the word 7reg&lations8 in section
2(1) of #rticle 0K?C of the 19%* Constit&tion2 viz3
)hile under the 8A6J Constitution it had Eexclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections!E exercised Eall other functions . . . conferred upon it %y lawE and had the power to deputi-e all law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government for the purpose of insuring free! orderly and honest elections! and under the 8A26 Constitution it
had! inter alia! the power to (a) E@&Bnforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of electionsE (%) E@"Beputi-e! with the consent
or at the instance of the 'rime 9inister! law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government! including the Armed #orces
of the 'hilippines! for the purpose of ensuring free! orderly! and honest elections!E and (c) E@'Berform such other functions as may %e
provided %y law!E it was not expressly vested with the power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct of an election. That power
could only originate from a special law enacted %y Congress< this is the necessary implication of the a%ove constitutional provision
authori-ing the Commission to E@'Berform such other functions as may %e provided %y law.E
The present Constitution! however! implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations. The pertinent
portion of 0ection : of Article N-C thereof reads as follows4
E0&C. :. The Commission on &lections shall exercise the following powers and functions4
(8) &nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election! ple%iscite! initiative! referendum! and
recall.E (emphasis supplied)
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
The word regulations is not found in either the 8A6J or 8A26 Constitutions. t is thus clear that its incorporation into the present
Constitution too* into account the CommissionHs power under the (mni%us &lection Code (>atas 'am%ansa >lg. II8)! which was already
in force when the said Constitution was drafted and ratified! to4
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
E'romulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is re=uired to enforce
and administer . . . .E
3ence! the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission %roader and
more flexi%le powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions. "ou%tless! if its rule-ma*ing
power is made to depend on statutes! Congress may withdraw the same at any time. ndeed! the present Constitution envisions a truly
independent Commission on &lections committed to ensure free! orderly! honest! peaceful and credi%le elections! and to serve as the
guardian of the peopleHs sacred right of suffrage K the citi-enryHs vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and in
achieving and promoting political sta%ility.@:62B
1he elevation of the CO%$&$C>s po"er to promulgate rules and regulations in the 9!3 Constitution is
suffused "ith significance" <eretofore2 it was Congress that granted COMELEC the power to prom&lgate r&les and
reg&lations2 and hence2 Congress can withdraw or restrict it /' the e5ercise of its (eto or o(ersight power" Ender the 19%*
Constit&tion2 the power to prom&lgate r&les and reg&lations has /een directl' granted /' the Constit&tion and no longer /'
Congress" Endo&/tedl'2 the power was granted to COMELEC to strengthen its independence2 hence2 its e5ercise is /e'ond
in(asion /' Congress" Ender an' lens2 sections 19 and 2 of !ep" #ct $o" 91%9 constit&te &nd&e restrictions on the
constit&tional power of the COMELEC to prom&lgate r&les and reg&lations for s&ch r&les are made s&/:ect to the prior re(iew
and appro(al of Congress" -he imp&gned pro(isions can res&lt in the denial of this constit&tionall' conferred power /eca&se
Congress can (eto the r&les and reg&lations the COMELEC has prom&lgated" -h&s2 0 respectf&ll' s&/mit that sections 19
and 2 of !ep" #ct $o" 91%9 granting Congress the power to re(iew2 re(ise2 amend and appro(e the implementing r&les and
reg&lations of the COMELEC2 otherwise ;nown as s&/ordinate legislations in other co&ntries2 are &nconstit&tional"
# no" come to section 3. of Rep. Act No. 9!9 "hich providesA
Sec. 1&. 'oting by mail.(
82.8. #or the 9ay! :005 elections! the Commission shall authori-e voting %y mail in not more than three (6) countries! sub)ect to
the appro!al of the Congressional !ersight Committee. ;oting %y mail may %e allowed in countries that satisfy the following
conditions4
(d) )here the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion of fraud<
(e) )here there exists a technically esta%lished identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting< and
(f) )here the system of reception and custody of mailed %allots in the em%assies! consulates and other foreign service
esta%lishments concerned are ade=uate and well-secured.
Thereafter! voting %y mail in any country shall be allo$ed only upon re!ie$ and appro!al of the Joint !ersight
Committee. (emphases supplied)
Drom the law itself2 it is clear that Congress has alread' set the necessar' standards to g&ide the COMELEC in
identif'ing the co&ntries where (oting /' mail ma' /e allowed2 viz3 (1) the co&ntries m&st ha(e a mailing s'stem which is
fairl' de(eloped and sec&re to pre(ent occasion of fra&d@ (2) there e5ists a technicall' esta/lished identification that wo&ld
precl&de m&ltiple or pro5' (oting@ and (+) where the s'stem of reception and c&stod' of mailed /allots in the em/assies2
cons&lates and other foreign ser(ice esta/lishments concerned are ade.&ate and well?sec&red"
Since the legislati(e standards ha(e /een defined2 all that remains is their enforcement" O&r Constitution has
specificall+ given the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and reg&lations relati(e to the cond&ct of an
election" 1he po"er is e-clusive and it ought to ,e self(evident that it cannot ,e su,*ect to revie" and revision or
veto ,+ Congress in the e-ercise of its oversight po"er" #gain2 the reason for the e5cl&si(it' is to ins&late COMELEC
from the (ir&s of partisan politics" 0n the e5ercise of this e5cl&si(e power2 the Commission m&st /e accorded considera/le
latit&de" Enless the means and methods adopted /' COMELEC are clearl' illegal or constit&te gra(e a/&se of discretion2
the' sho&ld not /e interfered with")2+%, -h&s3
There are no ready-made formulas for solving pu%lic pro%lems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the
ends of good government. n the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections! as well as in the appointment
of election inspectors! we must not %y any excessive -eal ta*e away from the Commission on &lections the initiative which %y
constitutional and legal mandates properly %elongs to it. "ue regard to the independent character of the Commission! as ordained in the
Constitution! re=uires that the power of this court to review the acts of that %ody should! as a general proposition! %e used sparingly! %ut
firmly in appropriate cases. )e are not satisfied that the present suit is one of such cases.@:6AB
# *oin the ma*orit+ in holding that section 1*"1 of !ep" #ct $o" 91%9 is unconstitutional for it allows Congress to
negate the e-clusivepower of the COMELEC to administer and enforce election laws and reg&lations granted /' the
Constit&tion itself"
-his is not to maintain that the 0mplementing !&les and !eg&lations prom&lgated /' the COMELEC2 or the s'stem it
de(ised to implement (oting /' mail cannot /e challenged" 0f the' are illegal or constit&te gra(e a/&se of discretion2 the
co&rts can stri;e them down in an appropriate case" -his power is (ested to the co&rts &nder section 12 #rticle =000 of the
Constit&tion defining the scope of :&dicial power2 and more specificall' &nder section 2 #rticle =000 empowering this Co&rt to
re(iew2 re(ise2 re(erse2 modif' or affirm on appeal or certiorari2 7all cases in which the constit&tionalit' or (alidit' of an' treat'2
international or e5ec&ti(e agreement2 law2 presidential decree2 proclamation2 order2 instr&ction2 ordinance2 or reg&lation is in
.&estion"8 #gain2 this power is e5cl&si(e and is not meant to /e shared /' an' other /ranch or agenc' of the go(ernment"
0n s&m2 it is m' h&m/le (iew that in the case at /ar2 Congress e5ceeded the permissi/le e5ercise of its o(ersight
powers for the following reasons3 (1) it restricts the COMELECCs constit&tional grant of power to prom&lgate r&les and
reg&lations@ and (2) it in(ades COMELECCs e5cl&si(e constit&tional domain to enforce and administer all laws and reg&lations
relati(e to the cond&ct of an election2 ple/iscite2 initiati(e2 referend&m2 and recall"
0 wish to stress2 howe(er2 that granting the petition "ill not invalidate the entire Rep. Act No. 9!9" 0t does not also
mean that all o(erseas Dilipinos cannot (ote" -he law affects two classes of o(erseas Dilipinos3 (1) those who remain a
domiciliar' of the 4hilippines /&t were a/sent at the time of the elections either /riefl' or for a long time@ and (2) those who
are now considered domiciled in foreign co&ntries" -o the first class of o(erseas Dilipinos /elong the contract wor;ers2
st&dents2 mem/ers of the diplomatic corps and their families2 /&sinessmen2 and the li;e" -o the second class /elong Dilipinos
who are considered immigrants or permanent residents of foreign co&ntries" -he constit&tional challenge in the case at /ar
appertains onl' to the incl&sion of the second categor' of o(erseas Dilipinos in the co(erage of !ep" #ct $o" 91%9" Li;ewise2
the challenge on the e5ercise of Congressional o(ersight power o(er the COMELEC does not taint the core of the law" 0t
merel' affects the proced&re in adopting the mechanisms to implement the law" 0t cannot (oid the whole law"
#N 8#$B O? 1<$ ?OR$2O#N2, 0 dissent from the ma:orit'Cs r&ling &pholding the constit&tionalit' of section (d) of
!ep" #ct $o" 91%92 which allows an immigrant or a permanent resident of a foreign co&ntr' to (ote for 4resident2 =ice?
4resident2 Senators and 4art'?List !epresentati(es after e5ec&ting the re.&ired affida(it" 0 conc&r2 howe(er2 with the
ma:orit'Cs r&ling &pholding the constit&tionalit' of section 1%" of !ep" #ct $o" 91%9 with respect to the a&thorit' gi(en to the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and 4art'?List !epresentati(es /&t not as to the power to
can(ass the (otes and proclaim the winning candidates for 4resident and =ice?4resident" 0 also conc&r with the ma:orit' with
respect to the &nconstit&tionalit' of sections 1*"12 19 and 2 of !ep" #ct $o" 91%9 s&/:ecting the implementation of (oting /'
mail2 and the 0mplementing !&les and !eg&lations of !ep" #ct $o" 91%9 to /e prom&lgated /' COMELEC2 to prior re(iew
and appro(al /' Congress"
0 so (ote"
)1, 7#n #ct 4ro(iding for # S'stem of O(erseas #/sentee =oting /' L&alified CitiBens of the 4hilippines #/road2 #ppropriating
D&nds -herefor2 and for Other 4&rposes"8 !ep" #ct $o" 91%9 was signed into law /' 4resident Gloria Macapagal
#rro'o on De/r&ar' 1+2 2>>+2 and was p&/lished on De/r&ar' 192 2>>+ at aily Tribune andToday"
@:B C0ec. :. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the %allot as well as a system for a%sentee voting
%y =ualified #ilipinos a%road.
-he Congress shall also design a proced&re for the disa/led and the illiterates to (ote witho&t the assistance of other
persons" Entil then2 the' shall /e allowed to (ote &nder e5isting laws and s&ch r&les as the Commission on
Elections ma' prom&lgate to protect the secrec' of the /allot"8
@6B 0ec. 8. 0uffrage may %e exercised %y all citi-ens of the 'hilippines not otherwise dis=ualified %y law! who are at least eighteen years
of age! and who shall have resided in the 'hilippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election. ,o literacy! property! or other su%stantive re=uirement shall %e imposed on
the exercise of suffrage.?
@5B 8A8 0C1A ::A (8AA0).
@JB 'etition! pp. 2-A.
@6B "ecision! p. ::.
@2B Id.
@IB Id. at :6.
@AB Supra note 5.
@80B "ecision! p. :6.
@88B >ernas! The 8AI2 Constitution of the 1epu%lic of the 'hilippines4 A Commentary JI: (8AA6).
@8:B C0overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.?
@86B >rent O $evinson! 'rocess of Constitutional "emocracy4 Cases and 9aterials 80J6 (8AA:).
@85B 9cCrary on &lections 80 (8IA2).
@8JB : $d. 1aymond! A6I (8 0mith+s $eading Cases! p. 52:)! cited in 9cCrary! id. at A.
@86B Id. at 80.
@82B $ie%erman! The &volving Constitution J66.
@8IB Id.
@8AB The last survival of religious test appears in the Constitution of 0outh Carolina (Article N)! in force from 822I to 82A0! limiting
suffrage Cto every free white man who ac*nowledges the %eing of a God! and %elieves in a future state of rewards and
punishments.? See 9cCrary on &lections! supra note 85! f.n. 2 at J (8IA2).
@:0B Id. at 6.
@:8B $ie%erman! supra note 82.
@::B Fnited 0tates v. Crui*shan*! A: F.0. J5:.
@:6B Id.
@:5B The exclusion of women originated in the common-law idea of the merger of a married woman+s existence in that of her hus%and!
and her unfitness %y nature for the occupation of civil life. See Cooley on Const. $imitation at 6I.
@:JB 6: 'hil. A5J (8A66).
@:6B Id. at A5I! citations omitted.
@:2B Aruego! The #raming of the 'hilippine Constitution :82 (8A66).
@:IB Id. at :86.
@:AB Id. at :82.
@60B Id. at :8I-:8A.
@68B Id. at ::J.
@6:B Id. at ::J-::6.
@66B 8J 0C1A 2 (8A6J).
@65B Id. at A.
@6JB $aurel! 'hilippine $aw on &lections : (8A50).
@66B Id. at 86.
@62B Gallego v. ;era! 26 'hil. 5J6! 5JA (8A58).
@6IB Supra note 86 at 8066-8062.
@6AB 1omualde--9arcos v. Commission on &lections! :5I 0C1A 600! 6:6 (8AAJ).
@50B See ,uval v. Guray! J: 'hil. 65J (8A:I).
@58B (ng v. 1epu%lic! 8A 0C1A A66! A6A (8A62).
@5:B Supra note 6A.
@56B Id. at 6:J.
@55B >ernas! Constitutional 1ights and "emands4 ,otes and Cases JJI (8AA8).
@5JB 1ecords at 65-6J.
@56B Id. at 88-8:.
@52B 1&C(1"0 at 6J-66.
@5IB :J Am 7ur :d! "omicil M 88 at 86.
@5AB Id. at M 8:.
@J0B Id. at M 86.
@J8B Supra note 6A.
@J:B Id. at 668.
@J6B Supra note 5.
@J5B Id. at :62.
@JJB See for instance! 1ep. Act ,o. 2860! section 50 (f)< >.'. >lg. J: ! sec. 5< >.'. >lg. II8! sec. 6I.
@J6B "ecision! p. :J.
@J2B Id. at :6.
@JIB Id. at :I.
@JAB 1estatement of $aw (Conflict of $aws) :d! p. 52 (8A28).
@60B >eale! A Treatise on the Conflict of $aws 8I6 (8A6J).
@68B :J Am 7ur :d! 0ection 8J at 86.
@6:B 0coles! et al., Conflict of $aws! 6
rd
ed.! p. :6I (:000).
@66B Id. at :6A. See Graveson! 1eform of the $aw of "omicile! 20 $.P. 1ev. 5A: (8AJ5)< At*in! The "omicile Act of 8A26! 2 ,.Q.F. $.
1ev. :I6 (8A22)< 1afferty! "omicile! The ,eed for 1eform! 9an. $.7. :06 (8A22).
@65B Supra note JA at 2I.
@6JB Id. at 6:-6J.
@66B 0coles! et al., supra note 6: at :5I-:5A.
@62B >eale! supra note 60 at 8I:.
@6IB Id. at 8I6-8I5.
@6AB Supra note JA at I8.
@20B Id. at I:.
@28B Id.
@2:B 0coles! et al., supra note 6: at :5A.
@26B 9emorandum of 'u%lic 1espondent C(9&$&C! p. 2.
@25B Citing $ucman v. "imaporo! G.1. ,o. 68JJI! 9ay :A! 8A20< Tic-on v. C(9&$&C! G.1. ,o. J:5J8! 9arch 68! 8AI8< 'angarungan
v. C(9&$&C! G.1. ,o. 80256J! "ecem%er 88! 8AA:.
@2JB 8AI2 Constitution! Article N-C! section :.
@26B Citing Gallardo v. Ta%amo! 7r.! :8I 0C1A :J6 (8AA6).
@22B Ibid.
@2IB (0G 9emorandum! p. 8I.
@2AB Id. at 82.
@I0B 9emorandum of 'u%lic 1espondent C(9&$&C! p. J.
@I8B (gg O 1ay! ntroduction to American Government! 80
th
ed.! p. :I (8AJ8).
@I:B ,owa*! et al.! Constitutional $aw! 6
rd
ed.! p. 8:8 (8AI6).
@I6B 7. $oc*e! 0econd Treatise of Government (9achperson! ed. 8AI0).
@I5B M 856! Id. at 2J.
@IJB M 85J! Id. at 26.
@I6B M 856! Id.
@I2B M 856! Id. at 2J-26.
@IIB M 85I! Id. at 22. CThough! as said! the executive and federative powers of every community %e really distinct in themselves! yet they
are hardly to %e separated! and placed at the same time! in the hands of distinct persons4 for %oth of them re=uiring the force of
the society for their exercise! it is almost impractica%le to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct! and not su%ordinate
hands< or that the executive and federative power should %e placed in persons! that might act separately! where%y the force of
the pu%lic would %e under different commands4 which would %e apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin.?
@IAB 9ontes=uieu! The 0pirit of the $aws (trans. %y Thomas ,ugent! 8A5A).
@A0B Id. at 8J8-8J:.
@A8B ,owa*! et al.! supra note I:.
@A:B Article NNN of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 9assachusetts (82I0). See 7affe! Administrative $aw4 Cases and
9aterials! p. 68 (8A26).
@A6B Article ! section 8. CAll legislative powers herein granted shall %e vested in a Congress of the Fnited 0tates! which shall consist of a
0enate and 3ouse of 1epresentatives.?
@A5B Article ! section 8. CThe executive power shall %e vested in a 'resident of the Fnited 0tates of America.?
@AJB Article ! sec. 8. CThe /udicial power of the Fnited 0tates shall %e vested in one 0upreme Court! and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from to time ordain and esta%lish.?
@A6B Supra note I8 at :I-:A.
@A2B A. 0ofaer! )ar! #oreign Affairs! and Constitutional 'ower4 The (rigins 60 (8A26).
@AIB 7. 9adison! The #ederalist ,o. 52 at 60:-606 (new American $i%rary &d. 8A68).
@AAB 7. 9adison! The #ederalist ,o. 5I at 656 (>. )right &d. 8A68).
@800B 656 F0 J2A! 66J (8AJ:).
@808B 5:5 F0 8 (8A26).
@80:B Id. at 8:8.
@806B 566 F0 5:J! 566 (8A22).
@805B Id.
@80JB 66 'hil. 86A (8A66).
@806B Id. at 8J6.
@802B Id. at 8J6-8J2.
@80IB 62 'hil. 6: (8A6A).
@80AB Id. at 26-25.
@880B Angara v. &lectoral Commission! supra note 66.
@888B Id.
@88:B Id.
@886B 8AI2 Const.! Article ;! sec. 8. n Sinon !. Ci!il Ser!ice Commission! :8J 0C1A 580 (8AA:)! the Court defined grave a%use of
discretion as Csuch capricious and whimsical exercise of /udgment as is e=uivalent to lac* of /urisdiction. The a%use of
discretion must %e patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty en/oined %y
law! or to act at all in contemplation of law! as where the power is exercised in an ar%itrary and despotic manner %y reason of
passion or hostility.?
@885B The accepted meaning of Epolitical =uestionE is that Ewhere the matter involved is left to a decision %y the people acting in their
sovereign capacity or to the sole determination %y either or %oth the legislative or executive %ranch of the government! it is
%eyond /udicial cogni-ance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the 'resident or Congress! or
any of its %ranches for that matter! the courts refused to act.E See A=uino v. 'once &nrile! JA 0C1A 8I6! 8A6 (8A25).
@88JB 1&C(1"0 at 565.
@886B 1&C(1"0 at 556. 'ertinent part of the deli%eration of the delegates of the Constitutional Commission are hereto =uoted! viz4
D!" BE!$#SM" On another point2 is it the intention of Section 1 to do awa' with the political .&estion doctrineN
Mr" CO$CE4C0O$" $o"
D!" BE!$#S" 0t is not"
M!"CO$CE4C0O$" $o /eca&se whene(er there is an a/&se of discretion2 amo&nting to lac; of :&risdictionM
D!" BE!$#S" So2 0 am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do awa' with the political .&estion doctrine"
M!" CO$CE4C0O$" $o certainl' not"
Ahen this pro(ision was originall' drafted2 it so&ght to define what is :&dicial power" B&t the Gentleman will notice it sa's2
7:&dicial power incl&des8 and the reason /eing that the definition that we might ma;e ma' not co(er all possi/le
areas"
D!" BE!$#S" So it is not an attempt to sol(e the pro/lems arising from political .&estion doctrine"
M!" CO$CE4C0O$" 0t definitel' does not eliminate the fact that tr&l' political .&estions are /e'ond the pale of :&dicial power"
@882B 822 0C1A 66I (8AIA).
@88IB Id. at 6AJ-6A6.
@88AB >ondoc v. 'ineda! :08 0C1A 2A: (8AA8).
@8:0B Supra note 6A.
@8:8B $erias v. 31&T! :0: 0C1A I0I (8AA8).
@8::B 9ogueis! 7r. v. C(9&$&C! 805 0C1A J26 (8AI8).
@8:6B "ario v. 9ison! 826 0C1A I5 (8AIA).
@8:5B 1ivera! $aw of 'u%lic Administration 82J (8AJ6).
@8:JB 8AI2 Const.! Art. ;.
CSec" 2" -he Congress shall ha(e the power to define2 prescri/e2 and apportion the :&risdiction of the (ario&s co&rts /&t ma'
not depri(e the S&preme Co&rt of its :&risdiction o(er cases in Section thereof"
$o law shall /e passed reorganiBing the :&diciar' when it &ndermines the sec&rit' of ten&re of its mem/ers"8
@8:6B )hite! ntroduction to the 0tudy of 'u%lic Administration JA: (8A5I).
@8:2B 7avits O Llein! Congressional (versight and The $egislative ;eto4 A Constitutional Analysis! J: ,RF $aw 1ev. 5JJ! 560 (8A22).
@8:IB Id. at 568.
@8:AB 3earings of the 0u%committee on 1ules O (rgani-ations of the 3ouse Committee on 1ules! 7une 8J! 8AAA
Shttp4TTwww.house.govTsearchA2cgiTsA2Ucg.ctionV
@860B 9ill! Considerations on 1epresentative "emocracy (8A52).
@868B Id.
@86:B )ilson! CCommittee or Ca%inet GovernmentD!? (verland 9onthly :2J (8II5)! =uoted in Gross! The $egislative 0truggle4 A
0tudy in 0ocial Com%at 862 (8AJ6).
@866B 7avits O Llein! supra note 8:2 at 5JA-560.
@865B Id. at 560.
@86JB 0trauss! The 'lace of Agencies in Government4 0eparation of 'owers and the #ourth >ranch! I5 Colum%ia $aw 1ev. J26! JI6
(8AI5).
@866B 9artin! The $egislative ;eto and the 1esponsi%le &xercise of Congressional 'ower! 6I ;a. $. 1ev. :J6! :65 (8AI:).
@862B Gross! supra note 86:.
@86IB Ibid.
@86AB 'hilippine Constitution Association v. &nri=ue-! :6J 0C1A J06 (8AA5).
@850B Id. at J::.
@858B 1ivera! supra note 8:5 at 822-82I.
@85:B Supra note I8 at 605.
@856B Ibid.
@855B CThe 0ecretaries may %e called! and shall %e entitled to %e heard! %y either of the two 3ouses of the $egislature! for the purpose of
reporting on matters pertaining to their "epartments! unless the pu%lic interest shall re=uire otherwise and the Governor-General
shall so state in writing.? See Aruego! supra note :2 at 55I.
@85JB Id.
@856B Id. at 55I-55A.
@852B Id.
@85IB Id. at 55A.
@85AB 8A6J Const.! Art. ;! sec. 80.
@8J0B >ernas! supra note 88 at 6I:.
@8J8B 1&C(1" 56.
@8J:B Id. at 866.
@8J6B Id.
@8J5B 8AI2 Const.! Art. ;! sec. 86.
@8JJB Gross! supra note 86: at 86I.
@8J6B Id.
@8J2B Id.
@8JIB nvestigative (versight4 An ntroduction to the $aw! 'ractice and 'rocedure of Congressional n=uiry! C10 1eport for Congress!
April 2! 8AAJShttp4TTwwws.house.govTsearchA2TcgiTsA2WctionVlast accessed on 9ay :5! :006.
@8JAB )at*ins v. Fnited 0tates! 6J5 F.0. 82I! 8A5-8AJ (8AJ2).
@860B 5:8 F.0. 5A8 (8A2J).
@868B Id. at J05.
@86:B Supra note 8JA at 8I2.
@866B Supra note 8JI.
@865B :2: F.0. 86J (8A:2).
@86JB Id.
@866B Lil%ourn v. Thomson! 806 F.0. 86I! :05 (8II0).
@862B Fnited 0tates v. 1umely! 65J F.0. 58 (8AJ6).
@86IB )il*inson v. Fnited 0tates! 66J F.0. 50I-50A (8A68).
@86AB I2 'hil. :A (8AJ0).
@820B Id. at 5:. The =uestion involved the identity of the person to whom Arnault allegedly gave the amount of ' 550!000.00.
@828B Id. at 5J.
@82:B Id. at 66. The Court opined4 C>y refusing to answer the =uestion! the witness has o%structed the performance %y the 0enate of its
legislative function! and the 0enate has the power to remove the o%struction %y compelling the witness to answer the =uestions
thru restraint of his li%erty until he shall have answered them. That power su%sists as long as the 0enate! which is a continuing
%ody! persists in performing the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt
only during the session in which the investigation was %egun! would %e to recogni-e the right of the 0enate to perform its
function %ut at the same time to deny it an essential and appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this! if we should
hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the ad/ournment of the session! the 0enate would have to resume the
investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation
is completed- an a%surd! unnecessary! and vexatious procedure! which should %e avoided.?
@826B Id. at 56-52. (ne %ill prohi%its the 0ecretary of 7ustice or any other department head from discharging functions and exercising
powers other than those attached to his office! without previous congressional authori-ation. Another prohi%its %rothers and near
relatives of any 'resident of the 'hilippines from intervening directly or indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in
which the Government is a party! more particularly where the decision lies in the hands of the executive or administrative
officers who are appointees of the 'resident. #inally! one %ill provides that purchases of the 1ural 'rogress Administration of
%ig landed estates at the price of ' 800!000.00 or more! and loans guaranteed %y the Government involving ' 800!000.00 or
more! shall not %ecome effective without previous congressional confirmation.
@825B Id.
@82JB Id. at 5I.
@826B Id. at 65.
@822B Id. at 6J.
@82IB Id. at 66.
@82AB :06 0C1A 262 (8AA8).
@8I0B 3ouse 1ules and 'rocedure Governing n=uiries in Aid of $egislation! adopted on August :I! :008.
@8I8B Id. at section 8 (a).
@8I:B Id. at section 8 (%).
@8I6B Id. at section 8(%.8) to (%.5).
@8I5B Id. at section 6.
@8IJB Id. at section 8.
@8I6B Id. at section 2.
@8I2BId. at section A.
@8IIB Id. at section 6.
@8IAB Id. at section 2.
@8A0B Gross! supra note 86: at 862.
@8A8B ,owa*! et al.! supra note I: at :J6.
@8A:B 'u%lic 'apers of the 'u%lic 'apers of the 'residents! 3er%ert 3oover! 8A:A! p. 56: (8A25).
@8A6B Act of 7une 60! 8A6:! M 502! 52 0tat 585.
@8A5B See 56: F0 A8A! A6A (8AI6)! 22 $ &d :d 682! 6J6. ()hite! 7.! dissenting).
@8AJB Id.
@8A6B Id.
@8A2B Id. at A20< Id. at 6J2.
@8AIB Id.; Id.
@8AAB #rom 8A6: to 8A6A! five statutes were effected< from 8A50-8A5A! nineteen (8A) statutes< %etween 8AJ0-8AJA! thirty-four (65)
statutes< from 8A60-8A6A! forty-nine (5A)< and from 8A20-8A2J! at least one hundred sixty-three (866) such provisions were
included in eighty-nine (IA) laws. See A%oure-*! The Congressional ;eto4 A Contemporary 1esponse to &xecutive
&ncroachment on $egislative 'rerogatives! J: nd $ 1ev 6:6! 6:5 (8A22).
@:00B Tri%e! American Constitutional $aw 85: (:000).
@:08B Id.
@:0:B 7avits and Llein! supra note 8:2 at 560.
@:06B >ruff O Gellhorn! Congressional Control of Administrative 1egulation4 A 0tudy of $egislative ;etoes! A0 3arv $ 1ev 866A! 8626
(8A22).
@:05B Id. See also 0tewart! Constitutionality of $egislative ;eto! 86 3arv $ 7. $egis JA6 (8A26).
@:0JB A%oure-*! supra note 8AA at 6:2.
@:06B 7avits O Llein! supra note 8:2 at 568-56:.
@:02B Id.
@:0IB 56: F0 A8A (8AI6)! 22 $ &d :d 682.
@:0AB Id. at AJ:-AJJ.
@:80B Consumer &nergy v. #ederal &nergy 1egulation Commission! 626 #.:d 5:J (".C.Cir. 8AI:)! affirmed su% nom.! 'rocess Gas
Consumers Group v. Consumers &nergy Council of America! 566 F.0. 8:86! 806 0.Ct. 6JJ6! 22 $.&d.:d 850: (8AI6)!
rehearing denied 566 F.0. 8:J0! 805 0.Ct. 50! 22 $.&d.:d 85J2 (8AI6).
@:88B Consumers Fnion of the Fnited 0tates! nc. v. #ederal Trade Commission! 6A8 #.:d J2J (".C.Cir. 8AI:)! affirmed su% nom.!
'rocess Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers &nergy Council of America! 566 F.0. 8:86! 806 0.Ct. 6JJ6! 22 $.&d.:d 850:.
@:8:B &=ual (pportunity Commission v. Allstate nsurance Company! J2 #.0upp. 8::5! 805 0.Ct. 65AA! I: $.&d.:d I80 (8AI5)! case
remanded 250 #.:d A66 (J
th
Cir. 8AI5)! &=ual (pportunity Commission v. The 3ernando >an*! nc.! 2:5 #.:d 88II (J
th
Cir.
8AI5).
@:86B 8AI2 Constitution! Article N-C! sec. : (8).
@:85B Id. at sec. : (6).
@:8JB 0umulong v. C(9&$&C! 26 'hil. :II! :A5 (8A58).
@:86B ,acionalista 'arty v. >autista! IJ 'hil. 808! 806-802 (8A5A).
@:82B 'hilippine 'olitical $aw 6I6-6I6 (8A6:).
@:8IB 8A26 Constitution! Article N-C.
@:8AB Aratuc v. C(9&$&C! II 0C1A :J8! :20 (8A2A).
@::0B 8A26 Const.! Art. N-C! sec. :.
@::8B 8AI2 Const.! Art. N-C! sec. :.
@:::B Id. at Art. N-A! sec. :.
@::6B Id. at Art. N-C! sec. 8 (:).
@::5B Ibid.
@::JB Ibid.
@::6B 8AI2 Const.! Art. N-A! sec. 6.
@::2B Id. at Art. N! sec. I.
@::IB ,acionalista 'arty v. "e ;era! IJ 'hil. 8:6 (8A5A).
@::AB Id. at 860.
@:60B 8AI2 Const.! Art. N-A! sec. 2.
@:68B Aratuc v. C(9&$&C! II 0C1A :J8! :28-:2: (8A2A).
@:6:B 8AI2 Const.! Art. N! sec. 6.
@:66B Id. at Art. N! sec. J.
@:65B Id. at Art. N-C! sec. : (A).
@:6JB :8I 0C1A :J6 (8AA6).
@:66B >.'. >lg. II8! section J: (c).
@:62B Gallardo v. Ta%amo! 7r.! supra note :6J at :66-:65.
@:6IB 9aruhom v. C(9&$&C! 526 0C1A 668 (:000).
@:6AB 0umulong v. C(9&$&C! 26 'hil. :II! :A6 (8A58).