1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. This is a writ petition brought by way of public interest litigation in order to ensure
observance of the provisions of various labour laws in relation to workmen employed in the
construction work of various projects connected with the Asian Games.
2. Petitioner No. 1 is an organisation formed for the purpose of protecting democratic rights. It
commissioned three social scientists for the purpose of investigating and inquiring into the
conditions under which the workmen engaged in the various Asiad Projects were working.
3. Based on the report made by these three social scientists after personal investigation and
study, the 1st petitioner addressed a letter to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bhagwati complaining of
violation of various labour laws by the respondents and/or their agents and seeking
interference by the Supreme Court to render social justice by means of appropriate directions
to the affected workmen.
4. The allegations made in the letter were:
i. Violation of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act,
ii. Violation of the provisions of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976
iii. Violation of the provisions of Employment of Children Acts, 1938
iv. Violation of the provisions of
v. Threat to the fundamental rights of the workers through the violation of the
provisions of Article 14, 23 and 24 of the Indian constitution.
5. The Supreme Court treated the letter as a writ petition on the judicial side and issued notice
to the Union of India, Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority.







2

ISSUES RAISED

1. WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO MAINTAIN THE WRIT
PETITION AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS?
2. WHETHER THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF
THE WORKERS AND OTHER LABOUR LAWS?






















3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS


1. WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO MAINTAIN THE
WRIT PETITION AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS?
The petitioners have locus standi to maintain the petition against the respondents on the basis of
the concept of Public Interest Litigation in order to help people who are not in a position or are
negligent to approach the Court. The respondents are responsible for the violation of the
fundamental rights of the workers as they are the prime employer.
2. WHETHER THERE WAS VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF
THE WORKERS AND OTHER LABOUR LAWS?
The respondents have violated fundamental rights mentioned under article 23, 24 and 14 of the
Constitution of India and labour laws like Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, Contract Labour
(Regulations and Abolition) Act, 1970, Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulation of
Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 and Minimum Wages Act 1948 by exploiting
the workers.







4

W WR RI IT TT TE EN N S SU UB BM MI IS SS SI IO ON N

I. ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO
MAINTAIN THE WRIT PETITION AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS?
C CO ON NT TE EN NT TI IO ON N 1 1: : T TH HE E P PE ET TI IT TI IO ON NE ER RS S H HA AV VE E L LO OC CU US S S ST TA AN ND DI I T TO O M MA AI IN NT TA AI IN N T TH HE E
P PE ET TI IT TI IO ON N
Though the complaint of the petitioners in the writ petition is in regard to the violations of the
provisions of various labour laws designed for the welfare of workmen and therefore from a
strictly traditional point of view, it would be only the workmen whose legal rights are violated
who would be entitled to approach the court for judicial redress. But the traditional rule of
standing which confines access to the judicial process only to those to whom legal injury is
caused or legal wrong is done has now been jettisoned by the Supreme Court and the narrow
confines within which the rule of standing was imprisoned for long years as a result of
inheritance of the Anglo-Saxon System of jurisprudence have been broken and a new dimension
has been given to the doctrine of locus standi which has revolutionised the whole concept of
access to justice in a way not known before to the Western System of jurisprudence. This is the
concept of Public Interest Litigation.
1

Beginning with the first few instances in the late-1970s, the category of Public Interest
Litigation (PIL) has come to be associated with its own people-friendly procedure. The
foremost change came in the form of the dilution of the requirement of locus standi for
initiating proceedings. Since the intent was to redressal to those who were otherwise too poor to
move to the courts or were unaware of their legal entitlements, the the Court allowed actions to
be brought on their behalf by social activists and lawyers.
2
In numerous instances, the Court took
suo moto cognizance of matters involving the abuse of prisoners, bonded labourers and inmates
of mental institutions, through letters addressed to sitting judges. This practice of initiating

1
Mamta Rao, Public Interest Litigation in India a Renaissance in Social Justice, 2nd edn. (Lucknow: Eastern Book
Company, 2004)
2
Susan D. Susman, Distant voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of standing in Public Interest Litigation,
13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 (Fall 1994)
5

proceedings on the basis of letters has now been streamlined and has come to be described as
epistolary jurisdiction.
One of the earliest cases of public interest litigation was that reported as Hussainara Khatoon (I)
v. State of Bihar.
3
It acquired a new dimension namely that of epistolary jurisdiction with the
decision in the case of Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration.
4
A powerful thrust to public interest
litigation was given by a 7-judge bench in the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India.
5
The Court
opined:
It must now be regarded as well-settled law where a person who has suffered a legal wrong or
a legal injury or whose legal right or legally protected interest is violated, is unable to approach
the court on account of some disability or it is not practicable for him to move the court for some
other sufficient reasons, such as his socially or economically disadvantaged position, some other
person can invoke the assistance of the court for the purpose of providing judicial redress to the
person wronged or injured, so that the legal wrong or injury caused to such person does not go
unredressed and justice is done to him.
Here the workmen whose rights are said to have been violated and to whom a life of basic human
dignity has been denied are poor, ignorant, illiterate humans who, by reason of their poverty and
social and economic disability, are unable to approach the courts for judicial redress and hence
the petitioners, have under the liberalised rule of standing, locus standi to maintain the present
writ petition espousing the cause of the workmen as they are not acting out of any malafide or
extraneous motives.
C CO ON NT TE EN NT TI IO ON N 1 1. .1 1: : T TH HE E P PE ET TI IT TI IO ON N C CA AN N B BE E M MA AI IN NT TA AI IN NE ED D A AG GA AI IN NS ST T T TH HE E R RE ES SP PO ON ND DE EN NT TS S
It is true that the workmen whose cause has been championed by the petitioners are employees of
the contractors but the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development
Authority which have entrusted the construction work of Asiad projects to the contractors cannot
escape their obligation for observance of the various labour laws by the contractors. So far as the
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 is concerned, it is clear that under section

3
(1980) 1 SCC 81
4
(1978) 4 SCC 494
5
(1981) Supp. SCC 87
6

20, if any amenity required to be provided under sections 16, 17, 18 or 19 for the benefit of the
workmen employed in an establishment is not provided by the contractor, the obligation to
provide such amenity rests on the principal employer and therefore if in the construction work of
the Asiad projects, the contractors do not carry out the obligations imposed upon them by any of
thesesections, the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development
Authority as principal employers would be liable and these obligations would be enforceable
against them. The same is the case with violation of other labour laws and fundamental rights
too.














7

II. ISSUE 2: WHETHER THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS OF THE WORKERS AND OTHER LABOUR LAWS?
C CO ON NT TE EN NT TI IO ON N 2 2: : T TH HE ER RE E W WA AS S A A V VI IO OL LA AT TI IO ON N O OF F F FU UN ND DA AM ME EN NT TA AL L R RI IG GH HT TS S A AN ND D
L LA AB BO OU UR R L LA AW WS S
In this case the fundamental rights of the workers were violated namely Right against
exploitation, prohibiting all forms of forced labour, child labour and traffic in human beings(
Articles 23 and 24 of the Indian Constitution) and Right to Equality( Article 14). Labour laws
such as Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, Contract Labour (Regulations and Abolition) Act, 1970,
Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979
and Minimum Wages Act 1948 have also been violated.

C CO ON NT TE EN NT TI IO ON N 2 2. .1 1: : T TH HE ER RE E W WA AS S V VI IO OL LA AT TI IO ON N O OF F F FU UN ND DA AM ME EN NT TA AL L R RI IG GH HT TS S
Three fundamental rights which have been violated in this case are:
Right against exploitation
Right against child labour
Right to Equality
C CO ON NT TE EN NT TI IO ON N 2 2. .1 1( (A A) ); ; T TH HE ER RE E W WA AS S V VI IO OL LA AT TI IO ON N O OF F A AR RT TI IC CL LE E 2 23 3 O OF F T TH HE E
I IN ND DI IA AN N C CO ON NS ST TI IT TU UT TI IO ON N
Article 23 of the Indian Constitution talks about Prohibition of traffic in human beings and
forced labour. It says:
(1) Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited
and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law
(2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public
purpose, and in imposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds
only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.
Article 23 is clearly designed to protect the individual not only against the State but also against
other private citizens. Article 23 is not limited in its application against the State but it prohibits
8

"traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour" practised by anyone
else. The prohibition against "traffic in human being and begar and other similar forms of forced
labour" is clearly intended to be a general prohibition, total in its effect and all pervasive in its
range and it is enforceable not only against the State but also against any other person indulging
in any such practice.
6

The word "begar" in Article 23 is not a word of common use in English language, but a word of
Indian origin which like many other words has found its way in English vocabulary. It is a form
of forced labour under which a person is compelled to work without receiving any remuneration.
Begar is thus clearly a film of forced labour.
It is not merely 'begar' which is constitutionally prohibited by Article 23 but also all other similar
forms of forced labour. Article 23 strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest
itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. To contend
that exacting labour by passing some remuneration, though it be inadequate will not attract the
provisions of Article 23 is to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition against forced
labour enacted in Article.
7


The words "other similar forms of forced labour" are used in Article 23 not with a view to
importing the particular characteristic of 'begar' that labour or service should be exacted without
payment of any remuneration but with a view to bringing within the scope and ambit of that
Article all other forms of forced labour and since 'begar' is one form of forced labour, the
Constitution makers used the words "other similar forms of forced labour". . Every form of
forced labour, 'begar' or otherwise, is within the inhibition of Article 23 and it makes no
difference whether the person who is forced to give his labour or service to another is
remunerated or not. Even if remuneration is paid, labour supplied by a person would be hit by
Article 23 if it is forced labour, that is, labour supplied not willingly but as a result of force or
compulsion.
Specific performance of a contract of service cannot be enforced against an employee and the
employee cannot be forced by compulsion of law to continue to serve the employer. Of course, if

6
Raj Bahadur v Legal Remembrancer AIR 1953 Cal 522
7
Vasudevan v. S.D. Mittal AIR 1962 Bom. 53
9

there is a breach of the contract of service, the employee would be liable to pay damages to the
employer but he cannot be forced to continue to serve the employer without breaching the
injunction of Article 23.
8


Where a person provides labour or services to another for remuneration which is less than the
minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him clearly falls within the scope and ambit of
the words "forced labour" under Article 23.
9
Such a person would be entitled to come to the
court for enforcement of his fundamental right under Article 23 by asking the court to direct
payment of the minimum wage to him so that the labour or service provided by him ceases to be
'forced labour' and the breach of Article 23 is remedied.
10


Ordinarily no one would willingly supply labour or service to another for less than the minimum
wage, when he knows that under the law he is entitled to get minimum wage for the labour or
service provided by him. Therefore when a person provides labour or service to another against
receipt of remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, he is acting under the force of
some compulsion which drives him to work though he is paid less than what he is entitled under
law to receive.
11
What Article 23 prohibits is 'forced labour' that is labour or service which a
person is forced to provide. This may be physical or mental.
12


In this case, the contractors engaged workers through "Jamadars" who brought them from
different parts of India particularly the States of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa and paid to
these Jamadars the minimum wage of Rs. 9.25 per day per worker and not to the workmen direct.
The Jamadars deducted Rupee one per day per worker as their commission with the result that
there was a violation of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, making the workers
Forced Labourers. The Union of India in the affidavit reply filed on itsbehalf by Madan
Mohan; Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour asserted that the contractors did pay the minimum
wage of Rs. 9.25 per day but frankly admitted that this minimum wage was paid to the jamadars

8
Baily v. Aalabama, 219 US 219
9
Dubar Goala v Union of India AIR 1952 Cal 496
10
Pollock v. Williams, 322 US 4:88 Lawyers Edn. 1095
11
Shama Bai v State of U.P. AIR 1959 All 57
12
Suraj Narain v State of M.P. AIR 1960 MP 303
10

through whom the workers were recruited and the jamadars deducted rupee one per day per
worker as their commission and paid only Rs. 8.25 by way of wage to the workers. The result
was that in fact the workers did not get the minimum wage of Rs. 9.25 per day. This leads to
breach of a Fundamental Right enshrined in Article 23 which is violated by non-payment of
minimum wage to the workmen.

C CO ON NT TE EN NT TI IO ON N 2 2. .1 1( (B B) ): : T TH HE ER RE E W WA AS S V VI IO OL LA AT TI IO ON N O OF F A AR RT TI IC CL LE E 2 24 4 O OF F T TH HE E
I IN ND DI IA AN N C CO ON NS ST TI IT TU UT TI IO ON N
There was violation of Article 24 of the Constitution and of the provisions of the Child
Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986 in as much as children below the age of 14 years
were employed by the contractors in the construction work of the various projects.
Article 24 of the Indian Constitution states that:
Prohibition of employment of children in factories, etc :No child below the age of fourteen years
shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment
Provided that nothing in this sub clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the
maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub clause (b) of clause ( 7 );
or such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament
under sub clauses (a) and (b) of clause ( 7 )
That would be in consonance with Convention No. 59 adopted by the International Labour
Organisation and ratified by India. This is a constitutional prohibition which, even if not
followed up by appropriate legislation, must operate proprio vigore and construction work being
plainly and indubitably a hazardous employment, it is clear that by reason of this constitutional
prohibition, no child below the age of 14 years can be allowed to be engaged in construction
work.
13
It embodies a fundamental right which is plainly and indubitably enforceable against
every one and by reason of its compulsive mandate, no one can employ a child below the age of
14 years in a hazardous employment and since, as pointed out above, construction work is a
hazardous employment, no child below the age of 14 years can be employed there.

13
M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu[(1991) 1 SCC 283]

11

This position has been reiterated in Labourers, Salal Hydro Project v. Sate of J &K
14
, where
again it held that employment of children below 14 in construction work violates Article 14.
Moreover, Section 3 of Part II of the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986
prohibits children from working in any occupation listed in Part A of the Schedule; for example:
catering in railway establishments, construction work, etc. Section 2(ii) of the act defines child as
a person who has not completed his fourteenth year of age. Thus, employment of such children
by the respondents violates the provisions of this act.
C CO ON NT TE EN NT TI IO ON N 2 2. .1 1( (C C) ): : T TH HE ER RE E W WA AS S V VI IO OL LA AT TI IO ON N O OF F A AR RT TI IC CL LE E 1 14 4 O OF F T TH HE E
I IN ND DI IA AN N C CO ON NS ST TI IT TU UT TI IO ON N
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution states that:
Equality before law The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
Section 4(1) of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1946 states that:
Duty of employer to pay equal remuneration to men and women workers for same work or work
of a similar nature: No employer shall pay to any worker, employed by him in an establishment
or employment, remuneration, whether payable in cash or in kind, at rates less favourable than
those at which remuneration is paid by him to the workers of the opposite sex in such
establishment or employment for performing the same work or work of a similar nature.
The supreme Court has held that although the principle for equal pay for equal work is not
expressly declared by the Constitution to be a fundamental right, but it is certainly a
constitutional goal under Article 14 of the Constitution.
15

In this case, while the male workers were exploited by giving a remuneration of Rs. 8.25, the
female workers were exploited even more by being given a lesser remuneration of Rs. 7 for the
same work and the balance of the amount of the wage was being misappropriated by the
jamadars.. It is the principle of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution which finds

14
(1983) 2 SCC 181; AIR 1984 SC 177
15
Randhir Singh v Union of India ,1982 AIR 879, 1982 SCR (3) 298
12

expression in the provisions of the Equal Remuneration Act 1946 and if the Union of India, the
Delhi Administration or the Delhi Development Authority at any time finds that the provisions of
the Equal Remuneration Act 1946 are not observed and the principles of equality before the law
enshrined in Article 14 is violated by its own contractors, it cannot ignore such violation and sit
quiet by adopting a non-interfering attitude and taking shelter under the executive that the
violation is being committed by the contractors and not by it.
C CO ON NT TE EN NT TI IO ON N 2 2. .2 2: : T TH HE ER RE E W WA AS S V VI IO OL LA AT TI IO ON N O OF F O OT TH HE ER R L LA AB BO OU UR R L LA AW WS S
The respondents have not only threatened the fundamental rights of the workers, but have also
violated the provisions of many labour laws.

C CO ON NT TE EN NT TI IO ON N 2 2. .2 2( (A A) ): : T TH HE ER RE E W WA AS S V VI IO OL LA AT TI IO ON N O OF F I IN NT TE ER R S ST TA AT TE E M MI IG GR RA AN NT T W WO OR RK KM ME EN N
( (R RE EG GU UL LA AT TI IO ON N O OF F E EM MP PL LO OY YM ME EN NT T A AN ND D C CO ON ND DI IT TI IO ON NS S O OF F S SE ER RV VI IC CE E) ) A AC CT T 1 19 97 79 9
A large number of migrant workmen coming from different States were employed in the
construction work of various Asiad projects and if the provisions of a social welfare legislation
like the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service)
Act 1979 were applied and the benefit of such provisions made available to these migrant
workmen, it would have gone a long way towards ameliorating their conditions of work and
ensuring them a decent living with basic human dignity. As far as rights and benefits conferred
upon migrant workmen under the provisions of section 13 to 16 of the Act are concerned, the
responsibility for ensuring such rights and benefits rests not only on the contractors but also on
the Union of India, the Delhi Administration or the Delhi Development Authority who is the
principal employer in relation to the construction work entrusted by it to the contractors.
C CO ON NT TE EN NT TI IO ON N 2 2. .2 2( (B B) ): : T TH HE ER RE E W WA AS S V VI IO OL LA AT TI IO ON N O OF F C CO ON NT TR RA AC CT T L LA AB BO OU UR R( ( R RE EG GU UL LA AT TI IO ON N A AN ND D
A AB BO OL LI IT TI IO ON N A AC CT T) ), , 1 19 97 70 0
The various authorities to whom the execution of the different projects was entrusted engaged
contractors for the purpose of carrying out the construction work of the projects and they were
registered as principal employers under section 7 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and
Abolition) Act, 1970. The contractors started the construction work of the projects and for the
13

purpose of carrying out the construction work, they engaged workers through jamadars. The
jamadars brought the workers from different parts of India and particularly the States of
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa and got them employed by the contractors. The petitioners
also alleged violation of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act
1970 and pointed out various breaches of those provisions by the contractors which resulted in
deprivation and exploitation of the workers employed in the construction work of most of the
projects. It was also the case of the petitioners that the workers were denied proper living
conditions and medical and other facilities to which they were entitled under the provisions of
the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970.














14

P PR RA AY YE ER R F FO OR R R RE EL LI IE EF F

In the light of facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, this
Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. The appeal be allowed.


The honourable court may also be pleased to pass any of the order which it may feel deemed in
the light of justice, equity and good conscience.

All of which is most humbly prayed.






Place: New Delhi
Date: 02.09.2014
Ayushi Dwivedi
(Counsel for the Appellant)