Published in Communications Lawyer, Volume 28, Number 1, June 2011. 2011 by the American Bar Association.

. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
Police offcers occupy a unique
position of trust in our society.
They are responsible for enforcing
the law and protecting society from
criminal acts. They are given the
authority to detain and to arrest
and, when necessary, use deadly
force. This authority ultimately rests
upon the communitys confdence
in the integrity of its police force.
1

The twentieth anniversary of the
beating of motorist Rodney King by
a group of Los Angeles police offcers
was observed on March3, 2011.
2
The
grainy home video footage of the
incident, captured by an onlooker and
broadcast worldwide, brought the is-
sue of police brutality to the forefront
of public consciousness.
3
Two decades
later, confrontations between the
police and citizens remain a regular
fxture of American society.
4
One
recent example is the fatal shooting
of Oscar Grant, an unarmed civilian,
by a Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART)
offcer in Oakland, California, in the
early morning hours of New Years
Day in 2009.
5
As the Grant case dem-
onstrates, technological advances like
camera phones have made it possible
to record events as they happen and to
upload the recordings, almost instan-
taneously, to the Internet.
6
Not all altercations between the
police and the public are captured on
video or reported by the media. To the
contrary, a signifcant number of com-
plaints of excessive force, discourtesy,
bias, and other offcer misconduct do
not garner the same national atten-
tion as the King and Grant cases. For
example, in Los Angeles County alone,
in the second quarter of 2010, citizens
fled 1,132 reports with the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) concerning
alleged misconduct by LAPD employ-
ees.
7
During that three-month period,
there were 595 allegations of unau-
thorized force and false imprisonment
and 104 allegations of biased policing,
including racial bias.
8
These reports
are not formal lawsuits but are merely
allegations of misconduct that citizens
brought to the attention of LAPD.
LAPD investigated its own offcers
and, in the vast majority of instances,
sided with the offcers rather than the
citizens. For example, of the 595 al-
legations of unauthorized force and
false imprisonment, LAPD found that
only four of the citizen reports were
sustainable. Of the 104 allegations
of biased policing, LAPD sustained
none. These statistics do not refect
an anomaly but are consistent with
the results over a three-year period.
Between 2008 and 2010, there were
a total of 694 allegations of unau-
thorized force, with only eleven of
those reports sustained (a rate of 1.6
percent).
9
For that same period, only
eight of 570 reports of false imprison-
ment were sustained (or 1.4 percent).
10

No reports of biased policing were
sustained between 2008 and 2010.
11
Publicly, LAPD encourages citizens
to bring instances of offcer miscon-
duct to its attention. The LAPD offcial
website proclaims that Quality Service
Is Your Right, explaining that [i]n
order to continue to provide quality
service to the community, we need your
assistance. This is your Police Depart-
ment and we welcome your comments.
We encourage you to let us know about
the quality of service you receive from
our employees.
12
The LAPD website
also provides a link to a report form (in
seven different languages) that a citizen
may fll out and submit to LAPDs In-
ternal Affairs department.
13
Notwithstanding LAPDs public
statements, reporting citizens may
rightfully be pessimistic about the like-
lihood that misbehaving offcers will
actually be disciplined, particularly
given the extremely low percentage of
sustained allegations.
14
But they are
unaware of an even greater risk: the
possibility of being sued for defama-
tion by the very offcers against whom
they fled their reports. Citizens might
assume that their constitutional rights
of free speech would protect them
from being haled into court for fling a
misconduct report against an offcer,
15

but they would be wrong in California.
A California statute provides police
offcers with a unique, police offcer
specifc avenue to sue citizens who fle
reports of alleged police misconduct.
16
Offcial Proceeding Privilege
Under 47(b)
Pursuant to 47(b) of the California
Civil Code, when a citizen contacts
law enforcement to make a report and
to instigate law enforcement personnel
to respond, the communication typi-
cally enjoys an unqualifed privilege,
known as the offcial proceeding
privilege.
17
Under this privilege, state-
ments urging law enforcement person-
nel to investigate suspected violations
of law are absolutely privileged and
shielded from tort liability.
18
A com-
munication to an offcial agency which
is designed to prompt action is consid-
ered a part of an offcial proceeding
for purposes of Civil Code section
47,
19
thereby creating an absolute
privilege for such proceedings.
The privilege established by 47(b)
is intended to assure utmost freedom
of communication between citizens
and public authorities whose respon-
sibility is to investigate and remedy
wrongdoing.
20
The idea behind the
absolute privilege is that [t]here must
be an open channel of communication
by which citizens can call attention to
Lee S. Brenner (lbrenner@whiteo.com) is
a partner and Hajir Ardebili (hardebili@
whiteo.com) is an associate in the Los An-
geles offce of Kelley Drye & Warren LLP.
To Protect and to Serve: Police Defamation
Suits Against California Citizens Who Report
Offcer Misconduct
LEE S. BRENNER AND HAJIR ARDEBILI
Published in Communications Lawyer, Volume 28, Number 1, June 2011. 2011 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
suspected wrongdoing. That channel
would quickly close if its use subjected
the user to a risk of liability for libel.
... Thus the absolute privilege is es-
sential.
21
In accordance with this
principle, California has a policy of
encouraging reports concerning sus-
pected misconduct or unftness by law
enforcement offcers.
22
The privilege applies not only to
communications with offcial agencies
but also to statements made in judicial
proceedings, including testimony in
court and statements made in plead-
ings.
23
The rationale for the privilege
in this context is to afford litigants
and witnesses . . . freedom of access
to the courts without fear of fac-
ing subsequent tort actions based on
their statements.
24
In this regard, the
privilege encourages open channels
of communication and the presenta-
tion of evidence in judicial proceed-
ings.
25
As the California courts have
long recognized, [t]he importance of
unabashed input into investigations
outweighs the occasional harm which
may befall a defamed individual.
26
Reports of Police Misconduct
Exempt from 47
Prior to the 1982 enactment of
California Civil Code 47.5, a citizen
report of police misconduct was abso-
lutely privileged under 47.
27
With the
enactment of 47.5, however, the Cali-
fornia Legislature expressly created a
statutory exception to the offcial pro-
ceedings privilege for reports of police
misconduct. Section 47.5 permits a
police offcer to bring an action for
defamation against an individual who
has fled a complaint with that offcers
employing agency alleging miscon-
duct, criminal conduct, or incompe-
tence, if that complaint is false, the
complaint was made with knowledge
that it was false and that it was made
with spite, hatred, or ill will.
28
Accordingly, for a complainant
to be liable for defamation under
47.5, an offcer must establish all
of the following: (1) one has fled a
report with that offcers employing
agency alleging misconduct, crimi-
nal conduct, or incompetence; (2)
the report is false; (3) the report was
made with knowledge that it was
false; and (4) the report was made
with spite, hatred, or ill will.
29
At frst blush, it might appear that
the prerequisites for a claim under
47.5 establish a high bar for liability.
Moreover, general principles of defa-
mation law would seem to make it dif-
fcult for an offcer to prevail on a defa-
mation claim. For instance, generally,
public fgures such as police offcers
cannot recover damages for defamation
unless they prove, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that the defendant made
the allegedly defamatory statement
with knowledge of its falsity or with
serious doubts about the truth of the
statement.
30
Moreover, in order for the
complainant to avoid liability, it is not
necessary that every word of the com-
plaint be literally true. In this regard, a
plaintiff has not proven falsity so long
as the statement appears substantially
true.
31
As the U.S. Supreme Court has
acknowledged, [m]inor inaccuracies
do not amount to falsity so long as the
substance, the gist, the sting, of the
libelous charge be justifed.
32
In theory, the foregoing principles
may provide some protection to a
complainant defending against an of-
fcer suit under 47.5. As a practical
matter, however, the prospect of squar-
ing off against an offcer in court will
likely deter citizens from fling a report
against a California police offcer in
the frst place. Making matters worse,
the police offcer may fle a complaint
against the citizen in small claims
court, in which case the citizen is not
entitled to a jury trial
33
and cannot be
represented by a lawyer at the trial.
34

At that small claims trial, it will be the
citizens word against the sworn testi-
mony of a police offcer, who generally
has much more experience testifying
in court, and possibly exercise more
sway with the judge, than the average
citizen. An award of damages in the
offcers favor, and against the citizen
who fled the police report, is therefore
a startlingly real possibility. Moreover,
a citizen against whom an offcer pre-
vails and obtains a judgment in small
claims court has no recourse because
the judgment of the superior court in
a small claims action is generally fnal
and cannot be appealed to the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal.
35

At the trial level, even if the of-
fcer has diffculty proving that he
sustained any economic injury as a
result of a false citizen complaint (the
vast majority of citizen allegations are
categorically rejected by LAPD),
36
the
citizen may still have to pay the offcer
damages, such as emotional damages.
Constitutional Challenges
The values of freedom of communi-
cation and accountability on which
the offcial proceedings privilege is
founded inevitably raise questions
about the constitutionality of the
carve-out for police offcers under
47.5. Federal and state courts in
California, however, have reached
inconsistent conclusions about the
constitutionality of the law, the status
of which remains unsettled.
California: Walker and Loshonkohl
The California Court of Appeal, the
states intermediate appellate court,
has reached conficting conclusions re-
garding the constitutionality of 47.5,
with the most recent decision holding
that the law is valid.
In its 2001 decision in Walker v.
Kiousis, the court held that sec-
tion47.5 impermissibly regulates
speech based on [its] content . . . and
therefore violates the constitutional
right of free speech.
37
The Walker
courts opinion was based on the no-
tion that 47.5 treat[s] citizen com-
plaints against police offcers differ-
ently from complaints against all other
government offcers.
38
The court also
noted that 47.5 discriminates based
on viewpoint because it makes ac-
tionable only a defamatory complaint
against a police offcer rather than
applying the exception to all defama-
tory statements made in an offcial
investigation of alleged police miscon-
duct (whether made by the complain-
ant, offcer, or other witness).
39
The Walker court also found that
the content-based discrimination cre-
ated by 47.5 was not supported by
a compelling governmental interest
for the same reason that the privilege
Publicly, LAPD
encourages citizens
to bring instances of
offcer misconduct
to its attention.
Published in Communications Lawyer, Volume 28, Number 1, June 2011. 2011 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
under 47(b) exists in the frst in-
stance, i.e., that providing citizens
open access to the government to
report illegal activity outweighs the
occasional harm sustained by one who
is defamed.
40
Based on these fndings,
the court concluded that section 47.5
is unconstitutional on its face.
41
Notwithstanding the intuitive logic
of the Walker courts reasoning, in
2003 a different division of the ap-
pellate court reached the opposite
conclusion in Loshonkohl v. Kinder.
42

Loshonkohl held that 47.5 does not
violate the First Amendment because
the nature of the content-based dis-
crimination does not present a realistic
possibility of the offcial suppression
of ideas.
43
The Loshonkohl court fo-
cused on the scienter requirement of
47.5, reasoning that the law does
not suppress all complaints of police
misconduct but only those complaints
that are knowingly false.
44
In this
regard, the Loshonkohl court relied
on the California Supreme Courts
decision in People v. Stanistreet.
45

Stanistreet, which was decided a year
after Walker, upheld the constitu-
tionality of a California Penal Code
statute that makes it a misdemeanor
to fle a knowingly false allegation of
misconduct against a peace offcer.
46

The Stanistreet courts holding was
similarly based on the idea that only
knowingly false complaints would be
suppressed under the statute at issue.
47

As for the Walker courts observa-
tion that 47.5 discriminates based on
viewpoint by making actionable only
complaints against police offcers, the
Loshonkohl court summarily disposed
of the concern, fnding that [i]t was
entirely reasonable for the Legislature
to make a policy judgment that only
formal complaints against peace of-
fcers should be exempted from the
absolute litigation privilege of section
47(b).
48
Thus, the court concluded
that 47.5 is constitutional.
49
Accordingly, California state courts
appear likely to uphold the constitu-
tionality of 47.5, given the California
Supreme Courts decision in Stanis-
treet to uphold the constitutionality of
a similar statute and the Loshkonkohl
decision.
Federal: 47.5 Not Resolved
After the trial court decision in Walker,
a federal district court in California
held in Gritchen v. Collier that 47.5
is unconstitutional on its face because
it violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
50
The Gritchen courts
conclusion was based on the same
reasoning as Walker: by treating citi-
zen complaints against police offcers
differently from complaints against all
other government offcers, 47.5 makes
an impermissible content-based dis-
crimination against a type of speech.
51

In Haddad v. Wall, another California
federal district court likewise held that
47.5 is an unconstitutional content-
based restriction on speech.
52
In Had-
dad, the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of Californiaheld that
47.5 impermissibly discriminates on
the basis of the content of the speech
which it purports to regulate, and thus
facially violates the First Amendment
as incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
53
Ultimately, however, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district courts decision in
Gritchen, fnding that the police of-
fcer was not acting under color of
state law in threatening to sue [the
complaining citizen] for defamation
under 47.5.
54
Based on that fnding,
the Ninth Circuit held that there was
no federal jurisdiction and did not
reach the question of whether 47.5 is
constitutional.
55
Haddad met a similar
fate: the Ninth Circuit vacated the
district courts order and its fnding
that 47.5 is unconstitutional, once
again on the basis that there was no
federal subject matter jurisdiction.
56

Thus, to date, the Ninth Circuit has
not reached any conclusion regarding
the constitutionality of 47.5.
A Frightening Proposition
A fair number of citizens, including
lawyers, probably would be surprised
to learn that they could be sued for fl-
ing a police report, particularly when
the police department expressly invites
them to fle reports and even provides
a form, in seven languages no less, to
do so. But as long as 47.5 remains
on the books (where it remains now,
unchallenged), citizens who believe
that they have been mistreated by the
police would be advised to consider
the implications of fling a report
against an offcer. They should know
that fling a report subjects them to
the possibility of being named in a
defamation lawsuit by that offcer.
They also should be aware that they
may have to face that offcer as the
defendant in a small claims court
action, where they have no right to
be represented by a lawyer in the trial
and have virtually no right to appeal
an unfavorable decision. The bottom
line? Citizens should know that they
are putting their rights and money at
stake when they fle a police miscon-
duct report in California.
The suggestion that citizens would
be prudent to remain silent in the face
of police misconduct is antithetical
to the First Amendment as well as
to policy considerations supporting
the fling of misconduct complaints.
Nevertheless, the risk of being the
target of an offcers lawsuit as a result
of fling a complaint is a genuine one
that a prospective complainant must
weigh against the benefts of report-
ing the misconduct. The complainant
also must consider the strong likeli-
hood that the offcer against whom
the complaint is fled will not face dis-
cipline in any event. No matter how
right they may be, citizens stand the
risk of getting sued for defamation,
losing, and having to pay damages to
the police offcer.
If a report against a police offcer is
fled, complainants should be certain
that none of the statements in the com-
plaint could be proven false. It would
be wise to state the supporting facts in
a manner that is succinct and devoid of
unnecessary elaboration or infamma-
tory rhetoric rather than risk being ac-
cused of recounting events inaccurately
or displaying spite or ill will toward
the offcer. The complainant should
attempt to compile as much support-
ing evidence as possible, e.g., witness
statements, photographs, or video.
Many police offcers regularly make
audio recordings of their interactions
with the public during traffc stops, and
thus the offcer will almost certainly
have some evidence regarding the mat-
ters described in the complaint. If
interviewed by the police in connection
with their report of offcer misconduct,
the citizen should be aware that the
ostensibly neutral interviewer may be
a friend or work colleague of the alleg-
edly offending offcer.
The complainant should also
understand that the complaint will
be very closely scrutinized, with the
Published in Communications Lawyer, Volume 28, Number 1, June 2011. 2011 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
veracity of each statement carefully
considered and compared to every
other statement in an effort to ferret
out any falsities. One should acknowl-
edge that a judge might assume that
the offcer is telling the truth (particu-
larly a judge who interacts with the
police on a regular basis). Further,
once the fact fnder concludes that a
statement in the complaint is untruth-
ful, it will be even more diffcult for
the complainant to maintain credibil-
ity vis--vis the offcer against whom
the complaint was fled.
Further, in many cases, the citizen
reporter will have to account for the
actions that may have triggered the
offcers alleged misconduct. Assume,
for example, that an offcer alleg-
edly used excessive force in response
to a complainant resisting arrest. If
the judge or jury determines that the
complainant has an incentive to ex-
aggerate or lie or that the complaint
against the offcer is retaliatory, then
it may be easy to conclude that any
false statements in the complaint were
made with knowledge of their falsity
and with malice against the offcer.
Particularly in light of the realistic
possibility that the complainant will
ultimately have to pay damages to the
offcer, fling a report of police mis-
conduct may seem a fools errand.
Notably, a citizen who fles a formal
lawsuit against a police offcer for the
same alleged misconduct has more
protection than the same citizen who
fles a police report. Filing a lawsuit
offers the protections of the litiga-
tion privilege under 47(b), thereby
precluding an offcer from relying on
statements made in the litigation as
a basis for liability against the victim
of the alleged misconduct in a later
defamation action. Accordingly, un-
der California law, a citizen who fles
a lawsuit against a police offcer has
greater rights and protections than a
person who puts the exact same al-
legations in a misconduct report.
57

This nonsensical result is precisely the
absurdity created by 47.5 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code.
Conclusion
In California, citizen reports urging
law enforcement personnel to inves-
tigate suspected violations of law
are privileged and shielded from tort
liability, unless those reports concern
alleged misconduct by the police off-
cers themselves. This reality in Cali-
fornia makes no sense and ignores the
public policy considerations underly-
ing the offcial proceedings privilege. Is
the need for utmost freedom of com-
munication between citizens and pub-
lic authorities whose responsibility is
to investigate and remedy wrongdoing
somehow less when it is a police offcer
who commits the malfeasance? Is the
fact that such channel of communica-
tion will quickly close if a citizen is
subject to risk of liability for libel for
reporting misconduct somehow imma-
terial when it is the police themselves
who are committing misconduct? Why
is Californias policy of encouraging
reports concerning suspected miscon-
duct or unftness by law enforcement
offcers being ignored? As it stands
today, the law in California is that the
importance of unabashed input into
investigations outweighs the occasional
harm which may befall a defamed indi-
vidual,
58
unless that allegedly defamed
individual is a police offcer.
Endnotes
1. Shaddox v. Bertani, 110 Cal. App.
4th 1406, 1416 (2003).
2. Joel Rubin, Andrew Blankstein &
Scott Gold, Twenty Years After the Beating
of Rodney King, the LAPD Is a Changed
Operation, L.A. TIMES, Mar.3, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/03/
local/la-me-king-video-20110301.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.; see also Matthew B. Stan-
nard & Demian Bulwa, BART Shooting
Captured on Video, SFGATE.COM, Jan.7,
2009, http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-01-07/
news/17199495_1_videos-use-of-force-
experts-offcer-johannes-mehserle.
6. Rubin et al., supra note 2.
7. L.A. POLICE DEPT, DISCIPLINE REPORT
FOR QUARTER 2, at 2 (2010), www.lapdon-
line.org/assets/pdf/QDR_2ND_QTR_2010_
FINAL.pdf.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE LOS
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, www.
lapdonline.org/our_communities/
content_basic_view/9217.
13. Id.
14. See L.A. POLICE DEPT, supra
note 7, at 4.
15. People v. Quiroga, 16 Cal. App. 4th
961, 966 (1993) (The appellant possessed
the right under the First Amendment to
dispute [the offcers] actions. The First
Amendment protects a signifcant amount
of verbal criticism and challenge directed
at police offcers. ... Indeed, the freedom
of individuals verbally to oppose or chal-
lenge police action without thereby risking
arrest is one of the principal characteris-
tics by which we distinguish a free nation
from a police state. While the police may
resent having abusive language directed at
them, they may not exercise the awesome
power at their disposal to punish individu-
als for conduct that is not merely lawful,
but protected by the First Amendment.
(citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461
(1987); Duran v. City of Douglas, Ariz.,
904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990)).
16. See CAL. CIV. CODE 47.5.
17. CAL. CIV. CODE 47(b); Hagberg v.
Cal. Fed. Bank FSB, 32 Cal. 4th 350, 364
(Cal. 2004); Walker v. Kiousis, 93 Cal.
App. 4th 1432, 1439 (2001) (investigation
of citizen complaint against law enforce-
ment offcer is offcial proceeding autho-
rized by law for purposes of California
Civil Code 47(b)); Williams v. Taylor, 129
Cal. App. 3d 745, 75354 (1982) (absolute
privilege applies for statements made to lo-
cal police department); Chabak v. Monroy,
154 Cal. App. 4th 1502, 151314 (2007)
(even allegedly false reports to police are
absolutely protected and privileged under
California Civil Code 47(b)).
18. Hagberg, 32 Cal. 4th at 364.
19. Id. at 370; Shaddox v. Bertani, 110
Cal. App. 4th 1406, 140809 (2003) (fnd-
ing that a person enjoys absolute statu-
tory immunity under section47, subdivi-
sion(b)(3) from making a communication,
which leads to an offcial investigation of a
police offcers conduct or competence).
20. Hagberg, 32 Cal. 4th at 360.
21. Id. at 36465.
22. Shaddox, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1412.
23. See Hagberg, 32 Cal. 4th at 361.
24. Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205,
213 (Cal. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
25. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 3d 961, 970
(1987).
26. Long v. Pinto, 126 Cal. App. 3d 946,
94950 (1981); see also Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d
at 21314; Tiedemann v. Superior Court,
83 Cal. App. 3d 918, 92526 (1978).
27. Imig v. Ferrar, 70 Cal. App. 3d 48,
5457 (1977).
28. CAL. CIV. CODE 47.5.
29. CAL. CIV. CODE 47.5; Hagberg, 32
Published in Communications Lawyer, Volume 28, Number 1, June 2011. 2011 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
Cal. 4th at 370.
30. Khawar v. Globe Intl, Inc., 19 Cal.
4th 254, 279 (Cal. 1998).
31. Vogel v. Felice, 127 Cal. App. 4th
1006, 1021 (2005) (emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 1021 (quoting Masson v. New
Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 51617
(1991)).
33. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 116.770(b).
34. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 116.530(a),
116.540(a). A litigant in small claims court
is permitted, however, to be represented by
an attorney at a de novo trial of the small
claims case (i.e., on appeal of the judgment
to the superior court). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
116.770(c).
35. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 116.780(a).
Although a defendant may obtain ap-
pellate review by extraordinary writ, an
appellate court will not entertain a writ
petition merely to consider a claim that the
superior court judge erred. Linton v. Supe-
rior Court, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1097, 1099 n.2
(1997); Pitzen v. Superior Court, 120 Cal.
App. 4th 1374, 1379 (2004).
36. Citizen complaints that are deemed
unfounded are removed from an offcers
general personnel fle. CAL. PENAL CODE
832.5(c) (Complaints by members of the
public that are determined ... to be frivo-
lous ... or unfounded or exonerated ...
shall not be maintained in that offcers gen-
eral personnel fle.). The California Penal
Code further provides that unfounded com-
plaints generally may not be used for puni-
tive or promotional purposes. CAL. PENAL
CODE 832(c)(2). Accordingly, a plaintiff
offcer suing under 47.5 may not be able
to demonstrate that he suffered economic
harm as a result of a false complaint.
37. Walker v. Kiousis, 93 Cal. App. 4th
1432, 1437 (2001).
38. Id. at 144849 (quoting Gritchen
v. Collier, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1153 (C.D.
Cal. 1999).
39. Id. at 1449 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 1455 (quoting Imig v. Ferrar,
70 Cal. App. 3d 48, 56 (1977)).
41. Id. at 1457.
42. 109 Cal. App. 4th 510 (2003), rehg
denied, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1052 (2003),
rev. denied, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 6531 (Cal.
2003), cert denied, 541 U.S. 938 (2004).
43. Id. at 518.
44. Id. at 51718.
45. 29 Cal. 4th 497 (Cal. 2002).
46. Id. at 501.
47. Id. at 50910.
48. Loshonkohl, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 518.
49. Id.
50. 73 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1153 (C.D.
Cal. 1999).
51. Id.
52. Haddad v. Wall, 107 F. Supp. 2d
1230, 123839 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
53. Id. at 1238.
54. Gritchen v. Collier, 254 F.3d 807,
814 (9th Cir. 2001).
55. Id.
56. Haddad v. Wall, 48 F. Appx 279
(9th Cir. 2002).
57. CAL. CIV. CODE 47(b); see Hagberg
v. Cal. Fed. Bank FSB, 32 Cal. 4th 350,
361 (Cal. 2004); Silberg v. Anderson, 50
Cal. 3d 205 (Cal. 1990).
58. Long v. Pinto, 126 Cal. App. 3d 946
(1981) (citing King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App.
3d 27, 34 (1972)).