Merida vs People june 12 2008

DOCTRINE

In People v. Merida (G.R. No. 158182, June 12, 2008), the Supreme Court ruled that cutting a tree in private land for timber
without a permit from the DENR was punishable under this provision.


FACTS

The government hailed Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation
of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private
land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco
(Tansiongco) claims ownership

The RTC handed judgment rapidly. In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged,
sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and ordered
the seized lumber forfeited in Tansiongco's favor.
[12]
The trial court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view of his
repeated extrajudicial admissions that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calix's permission. With this finding and
petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.

ISSUE

w/n sec 28 of PD 705 prohibiting the cutting gathering and collecting of timber and other forest products apply to Petitioner
.

HELD

Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit

Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts
[25]
penalized under PD 705, provides:

SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, ortimber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products
from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;
[26]
and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents



Provident tree farms vs Batario mar 28 1994

DOCTRINE:

Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out before it prior to elevating the issues to a regular court in keeping
with the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

FACTS

In the extrant case, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of respondent court and prays for the continuation of the
hearing in Civil Case No. 89-48836. PTFI claims that what was brought before the trial court was a civil case for injunction, i.e.,
"restraining the entry of safety matches into the country . . . for the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l) of the
Forestry Code and for damages, "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated by the importation of safety matches
. . . . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the protection and incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . ."


Naturally, PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No. 1125 relative to incidents before the Court of
Tax Appeals because the instant action is not a protest case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then argues that since
it could not avail of the remedies afforded by the Tariff and Customs Code, resort to the courts is warranted, citing Commissioner
of Customs v. Alikpala.


Petitioner asserts his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code.
The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated products which is to be
enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and Customs Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over
seizure and forfeiture cases

and, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited
importations.


The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the
Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to
enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.

Now it follows that to allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches, as petitioner insisted,
is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a
judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the
importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other
words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau of Customs as well as the prayer for injunction against importation of matches by
private respondent AJIC may not be granted without the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs.

ISSUE
w/n the BOC holds jurisdiction in the matter of wood product importation
HELD

Petitioners position is inconceivable! The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban
under the Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does not at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the subject
matter. The enforcement of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of
Customs has the power to "promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs)
Code . . . subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance."



Moreover, it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does not require any particular method of procedure to be followed by
an administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions."

But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs

contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from
interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction


People vs CFI feb 13 1992

DOCTRINE:
Mere possession of lumber is punishable; ownership is not an element of the crime.
FACTS
Charges were levied against private respondents for the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which read:

That on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim, Municipality of
General Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John Does whose
identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging
Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion
Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title No.
6026, and once inside, illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the
said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of
different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) including government charges, to
the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount.

On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private respondents and the opinion of the trial court,
the information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D.
705. While it was admitted that the information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the
consent of the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry
away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease, lease, license or
permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for
utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that the asportation of the logs was
"without any authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs
was without the consent of the state.

ISSUE
W/N the theft of logs was committed in contravention of PD 705
HELD

The SCs agrees with the petitioner.

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement,
lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code. . . .

When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2 [a]
Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the law (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958]; People v. Abad, L-
55132, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 57).

The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other
forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to
any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement,
lease, license, or permit granted by the state.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the
information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking
was without any authority or license from the government.

The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the information
was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as prescribed in Section 80 of P.D. 705

The SC thereby granted the position and reversed the trial courts order of dismissing the information

Lagua vs Cusi april 15 1988

DOCTRINE:
It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way,
much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development
FACTS

In a vigorous complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others:

In Paragraph 5(a):
a) On 1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued a memorandum to the
Chief Security Guard of Defendant East coast directing the latter to prevent the passage of Plaintiff Laguas'
hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel (there were no other trucks hauling logs at that time)
on the national highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed. In compliance with this directive, the
security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and
effectively prevented their passage thereof while the vehicles and trucks

The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack of jurisdiction, and (2) lack of cause of
action.
The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of
respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads,
therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The private respondents also argued that petitioner Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as
her name was not registered as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.

ISSUE

w/n the petition for mandamus may be entertained by the trial court.

Yes.

The petition for mandamus will be treated as a petition for certiorari in the interest of justice.
The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts have jurisdiction over the same. According to
them, the respondent court had no basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first determine that the closure
of a logging road is illegal before an action for damages can be instituted.

P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest Development to
determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an
action for damages may be maintained.

Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging
road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be
disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power
and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny
the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Forest Development.

Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the trial court's ruling that since they were mere
agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga and were suing in their own behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue for damages.
They are not the real parties in interest. However, the complaint can still be maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real
parties in interest, Achanzar and Donga were also plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court should have ordered only the dropping of the
names of the spouses Laguas pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court but not the dismissal of the complaint.


Mustang Lumber vs CA june 18, 1996

DOCTRINE:
Possession of lumber is not a crime under PD 705. Timber is the punishable act

FACTS

The authorities got wind of a suspicious stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs that were seen inside the lumberyard of the
petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Readily, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct
surveillance at the said lumberyard.

During the sting operation, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-
322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound
at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.

On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-
4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be
cancelled.

On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already
secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted.
[


In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck,
which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber
without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search
and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where
warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle

The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in
favor of the Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive
Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.

On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on
the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not
penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said
section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case
No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which
involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question

ISSUE:

Whether the complaint charges an offense

HELD

No. The petitioner proposed to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge
an offense. Respondent Judge granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE
is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence,
possession thereof without the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.

Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed on the ground that the facts
alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of
the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the
offense, and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.


TAOPA VS PP
571 SCRA 610 (2008)

FACTS: The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac,
Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber (113 pieces of lumber of
Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species without any authority and/or legal
documents as required under existingforest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the
public interest) and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with
bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to
Petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized
lumber. Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were charged with violating Section 68 of
Presidential Decree(PD) No. 705 as amended, in the RTC Virac, Catanduanes. Taopa,
Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, RTC
found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Only Taopa and Cuison
appealed to CA, Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision read: In this petition, Taopa seeks his acquittal
from the charges against him alleging that the prosecution failed to prove that he was
one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was
seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705

HELD: Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopas alibi because
Cuisons testimony proved Taopas active participation in the transport of the seized
lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the
cargo in front of Taopas house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the
truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts
proved Taopas (and Ogalescos) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber
loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted
possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police
was likewise largely indicative of guilt.
We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized
lumber. Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats
cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without
license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. The
actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630. Following Article
310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one
day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630. The
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty
next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be
anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor
in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

factoran vs CA dec 13, 1999

DOCTRINE
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given
an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum

On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with
Plate No. NJT-881, carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended
the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation
Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty.
Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the following discrepancies in the documentation of the narra
lumber.

which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. The said BFD Circular requires possession or
transportation of lumber to be supported by the following documents: (1) Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be
issued only by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester; (2) Sales Invoice; (3) Delivery Receipt; and
(4) Tally Sheets.
[4]


Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code.
[5]
Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-
wheeler truck.

On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order
(TRO).
On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing by
petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.
[19]



ISSUE:

w/n the court injuction on the DENR lies, considering that exhaustion of administrative remedies were not followed

HELD:

NO.

All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by
the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the
aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President x x x. The decision of the Department Head may not be
reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given
an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.