Meerson - Put' Against Logos - The Critique of Kant and Neo-Kantianism by Russian Religious Philosophers in The Beginning of The Twentieth Century - Weber PDF

Put' against Logos: The Critique of Kant and Neo-Kantianism by Russian Religious
Philosophers in the Beginning of the Twentieth Century

Author(s): Michael A. Meerson
Source: Studies in East European Thought, Vol. 47, No. 3/4, Neo-Kantianism in Russian
Thought (Dec., 1995), pp. 225-243
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20099584 .
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MICHAEL A. MEERSON
PUT AGAINST LOGOS: THE
CRITIQUE
OF KANT AND
NEO-KANTIANISM BY RUSSIAN RELIGIOUS
PHILOSOPHERS IN THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
KEY WORDS:
Puf, Logos,
Kant, neo-Kantians, Berdiaev,
Bulgakov,
Trubetskoi
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the 20th
century
Russian
philosophical thought
acquired
new
vitality through
a
polemical
encounter with German
neo-Kantianism. The central issue of the
polemic
concerned the
nature of
philosophy.
The
group
of Russian thinkers
gathered
around
Puf
publishing
house
developed
a new realist
approach,
while con
testing
the reduction of
philosophy
to
methodology actually
effected
by
German neo-Kantians.
Confronting philosophy's
reduction to
methodology,
Russian thinkers maintained that
knowledge
has an
ontological
and
metaphysical
basis. Puf 's
thinkers,
different as
they
were,
unanimously
maintained that
a
gradual
reduction of
philosoph
ical
ontology
to
methodology
resulted from Kant's
emancipation
of
epistemology
from
metaphysics.
The Russian
argument
with Kant and neo-Kantians at first took
the form of a
polemic
between the
religio-philosophical publishing
house Puf
(1910-1917)
and the neo-Kantian
journal Logos (1910
1914)
in Moscow. Both
publishing enterprises
reflected the
philo
sophical awakening
of the Russian educated
public
and its
growing
need to
develop
self-consciousness on the one
hand,
and to achieve
fuller
integration
into the intellectual life of
contemporary Europe
on the other. Puf
pursued primarily
the first
task,
while
Logos
was
mainly designed
to fulfill the second.
Since,
in
fact,
neither task
could have been achieved
separately,
the fields o? Puf 's and
Logos's
labor
inevitably overlapped.
Puf
published
translations of
European
philosophers
and Russian studies
on
them,
while
Logos
featured
Studies in East
European Thought
47:
225-243,1995.
?
1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
226
MICHAEL A. MEERSON
articles on
indigenous
Russian
philosophical thought,
both
past
and
contemporary.
Both
groups
emerged
in the milieu of the Russian
intelligentsia
that was at best
notoriously suspicious
of,
and at worst
contemptuous
of,
and even hostile
to,
both
religious
and theoretical
philosophy.
Both Puf and
Logos
were
therefore small and
exotic,
and
felt,
especially
in the
beginning,
as outcasts
among
their kin.
Often the same authors contributed to both
Logos
and
Put\
and
since both
groups
ventured into a rather elite
field,
they
served as
necessary
interlocutors and contenders to each other.
Puf had the
advantage
of
having
a domestic
philosophical
forum
of its own. It
emerged
as an
offspring
of the Moscow
Religio-Philo
sophical Society
founded in 1905
by Margarita
Morozova
(1873
1958),
Prince
Evgenii
Trubetskoi
(1863-1920), Sergei Bulgakov
(1871-1944),
Nikolai Berdiaev
(1874-1948),
Pavel Florenskii
(1882-1937),
and Vladimir Ern
(1882-1917),
to name its most
active board members and
participants. Margarita
Morozova,
a
widow of Mikhail
Morozov,
a
prominent
Moscow industrialist and
art
supporter, managed
the Puf
publishing
house with the
help
of
Trubetskoi,
Bulgakov
and
Berdiaev,
the leaders of its editorial board.
The board defined Puf
goal
as the
philosophical rediscovery
of East
ern
Orthodoxy
and of its
applicability
in the
contemporary
world.1
The
journal Logos, published
in German in
T?bingen,
and in
Russian in
Moscow,
was founded with the
help
of Heinrich Rickert
(1863-1936).2
Its editorial board consisted of two
groups
of
young
neo-Kantians of Wilhelm Windelband's
(1848-1915)
school: the
Russians Feodor
Stepun (1884-1965),
Nikolai
Bubnov,
and
Sergei
Gessen,
and the Germans Richard Kroner and
Georg
Mehlis. The
emergence
of the
journal
in 1910 reflected Russians'
growing
interest
in
contemporary
academic
philosophy.
The
sophisticated philosoph
ic
technique
of
neo-Kantianism,
as well as its claim to
provide
the
system
of
logical
foundation for both natural sciences and humani
tarian
culture,
attracted
many
Russian students.
Both Puf and
Logos
were
financially supported by
Morozova.
She housed both Puf and Solov'ev's
Religio-Philosophical Society,
thus
providing
nascent Russian
religious philosophy
with its
unique
forum,
and also
helped funding Musaget,
a
Symbolist publishing
house under the editorial
leadership
of Emil Metner
(1872-1936),
which
published Logos.3
A
philosophical
tournament between
Logos
PUT AGAINST LOGOS
227
and Puf went on at the
gatherings
of the Solov'?v
Society
-
which
became the Platonic
Academy
of Moscow
-
provoking
and sustain
ing
endless
dialogues
on
ultimate issues. Both
Logos
and Puf could
claim the
legacy
of Vekhi
[Landmarks],
the famous collection of arti
cles on Russian
intelligentsia; they
can
be viewed as the two branches
resulting
from the
philosophical
bifurcation of the Vekhi movement.
While
Berdiaev,
Bulgakov
and Gershenzon wrote for Puf
? Frank,
Struve and
Kistiakovskii,
three other Vekhfs
contributors,
published
in
Logos.5
Puf 's authors
argued
that
philosophical
and
theological
revival should be achieved
through
the
integration
of modern
philos
ophy
into the tradition of Christian Platonism and
neo-Platonism,
an
integration
started
by
Vladimir Solov'?v.
Logos
set the double
goal
of the
philosophical
education of the Russian
public
in the latest
achievements of Western
philosophy
and the
integration
of Russian
thought
with the mainline of
European philosophical development,
chiefly
neo-Kantian.
I shall concentrate on Puf's
polemics,
and shall discuss four
Puf
authors, Ern, Berdiaev,
Bulgakov,
and Trubetskoi. All of them
addressed the issue of neo-Kantianism and created the
general image
of Russian
thought's
unified front
against
the
Germanophile Logos.
In
summing up
Puf's
argument, Stepun points
out some
affinity
in the criticism of neo-Kantianism made
respectively by
American
pragmatists
and
by
Russian
religious
thinkers. Both
opposed pure
epistemology
with a
living
and
practical
holistic
philosophy. Stepun,
however,
simplifies
the Russian reaction to neo-Kantianism
by say
ing
that Russian
philosophy "generally
shared Berdiaev's
opinion
that the interest in
epistemological
issues
develops
where the access
to existence is lost."6 Berdiaev's existential
protest
that
impressed
Stepun
the most was
only
one of the
aspects
of Puf 's criticism.
Along
with several common features of this
criticism,
each thinker
presented
his
critique
with his own
particular
slant.
ERN'S MILITANT NEO-SLAVOPHILISM
It was Vladimir
Ern,
the most zealous advocate of the 'Russian
idea,'
who
gave
a
militant flavor to the otherwise harmless debate with his
book The Battle
for Logos.
Ern launched the
polemics
with his article
'Something
on
Logos,
Russian
philosophy
and
scientism,'
written
228 MICHAEL A. MEERSON
in
response
to the first issue of
Logos.
The article was
first
published
in Trubetskoi's 'Moscow
Weekly,'
and was
subsequently
included
in Bor'ba za
Logos.
Ern
opposed
the Russian
philosophical style,
which he defined
as
"logism, ontologism
and
thorough personalism,"
to modern Western
philosophy
which,
according
to
Ern,
had come
to the blind
alley
of "rationalism
...
and
impersonalismo'7
He
stipu
lated that his
critique
aimed at the dominant trend of this
philosophy,
rather than at Western
thought
as a
whole. He
singled
out some Italian
philosophers
as 'faithful to
Logos,' especially
Gioberti
( 1801-1852),
whose
'ontologism'
he traced to Plato and Bonaventura8 Ern defined
the task and character of Russian
thought
as one that
grew
on the
foundations of Western
philosophy,
but
preserved
its own
tendency
-
toward
religious
and
mystical
holism,
in the
spirit
of Christian
neo-Platonism. He blamed
Logos9s
editors
mainly
for
usurping
the
ancient trademark of holistic
philosophy
in order to label their
prod
uct
which,
in
fact,
had been "made in
Germany."9
He
presented
the
innocent
philosophical polemic
as a contest of universal historical
proportion
between the Russian and the German
spirit.
Ern's
continuing argument peaked
in his
paper
"From Kant to
Krupp,"
delivered in the fall of 1914 to the Solov'?v
Society,
at the
height
of anti-German
feeling
in Russia. Therein he
depicted
German
militarism as "a natural
offspring
of Kant's
phenomenalism."
More
over,
he maintained that Kant's critical revolution in
philosophy
meant for German
patriotic
awareness what the French Revolution
of 1789 meant for the French. Kant was the real father of the anthro
pocentric
world view that did
away
with old
religious metaphysics.
It
was not Nietzsche but Kant who
"guillotined
the old
living
God in the
labyrinths
of the Transcendental
Analytic."
Kant's
phenomenalism,
along
with half a
century
of the neo-Kantians' collective
labors,
sev
ered the channels of the intellectual communication between
man
and
God,
and locked the human mind in the realm of
earthly,
limited
goals, thereby preparing
the
ground
for the fast advance of German
technology.
The
latter,
aiming
at the war
for German
domination,
found its ultimate
expression
in
Krupp's military industry,
his can
nons,
which Ern called the most
perfect
and
sophisticated
tools of
destruction.
Thus,
Krupp
's arms
represent,
in Ern's
words,
the
purest
form of Kant's "Sein
fur
sich
organized scientifically
and techno
logically."
"With his
philosophy,
Kant
dialectically posits Krupp,"
PUT AGAINST LOGOS
229
claims
Ern,
"and
Krupp,
in his most
perfect products, gives
the mate
rial
expression
for the
phenomenalist premises
of Kant's
thought."
Ern concludes his lecture with an
appeal
to the Russian
army
"to use
their
spiritual might
to overthrow the armored German
legions."10
Many
Russian
critics,
including
some of his
colleagues
in
Put\
were bewildered and even
appalled by
Ern's bizarre conclusions. Ern
responded
to these critics in another
public
lecture,
'The Essence
of German
Phenomenalism,'
delivered in
Petrograd
in
November,
1914,
and in Moscow in
January,
1915. He
supported
his
argumen
tation,
developed along
the
same lines with a new vivid illustration:
two weeks after he had delivered his lecture 'From Kant to
Krupp,'
the Bonn
University Department
of
Philosophy granted
doctorates
honoris causa to both
Krupp
and
Ausenberg,
the
manager
of
Krupp
's
industrial
complex.11
BERDIAEV'S
CRITIQUE
Polemics with both Kant and neo-Kantians made one
of the
key
theses and served as the
departing point
in Berdiaev's first
philo
sophical
book,
The
Philosophy of
Freedom.
Having developed
his
philosophical style
under Nietzsche's
influence,
Berdiaev insisted
on
the
right
of a
philosopher
to
speak directly
out of his own existential
experience.
Berdiaev attacked neo-Kantianism as the
very epitome
of modern scholasticism hostile to life and to the
spontaneous
search
for truth. He
appreciated,
of
course,
the
positive
contribution of crit
ical
epistemology:
it
occupied
the central
position
in the intellectual
life of his
age,
and it
represented
"the finest
product
of intellec
tual culture." Neo-Kantianism had also
provoked
a
philosophical
revival and advanced the
technique
of
philosophizing.
Berdiaev
maintained, however,
that the movement lacked the
philosophical
eros that enlivened the
great systems
of German idealism such as
Hegel's. Uninspiring
and
purely
technical,
neo-Kantianism
symp
tomatized the loss of
integrity by
the
contemporary
mind,
and its
indecisiveness,
"Hamletism in
philosophy."
For
Berdiaev,
Kant's
genius
indicated a
serious disease of Western civilization: Kant for
mulated the fatal
rupture
of
philosophical
mind from the sources of
being.
After
Kant,
neo-Kantians
merely deepened
this fatal
rupture
by completing
the substitution of abstract
cognition
for "the
real,
230
MICHAEL A. MEERSON
living
attitude" of
subject
to
object.
Their critical
epistemology
radi
cally
denies the
primary goal
of
knowledge
-
the
uniting
of
knowing
subject
with
being.12
Divorced from
life,
neo-Kantian criticism could
produce only
illusionistic and
solipsistic
doctrines. Its claim to construe a
philo
sophical
method free from the
psychological
and
ontological
premises
was
ridiculous,
because "it is the human
being
who
philos
ophizes,
and human
knowledge
takes
place
in the
anthropological
milieu." For
Berdiaev,
critical
epistemology
addressed
only
a limited
form of
knowledge,
which he calls
fictional,
since
a
cognizing
sub
ject
taken outside of existence is
purely
fictional. Neo-Kantians
articulated the
concept
of
experience arbitrarily
and limited it
by
rationalistic boundaries
as
they pleased. According
to
Berdiaev,
the
opposition
between
thinking
and existence
was caused
by
a
philosophic
malnutrition of
sorts;
philosophy
must be nourished
by
two kinds of
experience,
scientific and
mystical.
Berdiaev
grounded
this
argument
in the
philosophy
of Nikolai
Losskii,
a Russian who
"defended
mystical empiricism"
and extended the realm of
possible
experience
far
beyond
rational
limits,
as well as in William James'
pragmatism
and
Bergson
's
philosophy
of life: the latter two looked
for the "existential
justification
of
knowledge."
Berdiaev
emphasized
that
James,
like
Losskii,
recognized experience beyond
the limits of
the
rational,
such as the
perfectly
valid
experiences
of saints and
mystics. Calling
Kant's ratio 'small
reason,'
Berdiaev
opposed
to
it
Logos,
the
'big
reason' of the
mystical philosophy
of
Augustine,
Eriugena,
Eckhart, Boehme,
and other
mystics,
who were nourished
by
the
Catholic,
or
worldwide,
soborny experience
of the Eastern and
Western churches.
Extending
this tradition of
mystical philosophy
to
the Russian
thought
of the
Slavophiles,
Solov'?v and
Dostoevskii,
Berdiaev
argued
that for this Russian tradition neo-Kantianism could
have
only
a
very limited,
technical value.13
KANTIANISM AND BULGAKOV'S TRANSCENDENTAL BASE FOR
ECONOMY
Bulgakov
also
partly
owed the main thesis of his first
philosophic
book,
The
Philosophy of Economy,
to his
polemics
with Kant and
neo-Kantianism. Kant
attempted
to answer
the
question
of how
PUT AGAINST LOGOS 231
knowledge, especially
scientific
knowledge,
is
possible. Recogniz
ing
the
validity
of this
problem, Bulgakov
added to it another
ques
tion that constituted the central
topic
of his
study:
how
production,
or
economic
activity,
is
possible,
i.e. "what are the
a
priori
conditions
for an
objective
industrial action." He considered his task
regarding
economy
to be
fully analogous
to Kant's task
regarding knowledge
set out in the
Critique of
Pure Reason.14
According
to
Bulgakov,
knowledge
and economic
activity merge
in
technology. Basing
his
assertion
on Leo
Lopatin's study, Bulgakov
maintained that "scien
tific
knowledge
is
practical,
i.e. it is technical."
Technology,
whether
primitive
or
highly sophisticated,
is a
necessary part
of
any industry.
In terms of
epistemology, technology
is a
leap
from
knowledge
to
action. In
Bulgakov's aphoristic language, "technology
is
logical,
and
logic
is
technological:
one builds a
bridge
across a river
through
calculus."15 Therefore all
aspects
of human
activity, including cog
nition,
ultimately
can be reduced to economic
goals,
and all kinds
of
knowledge,
even the most
abstract,
are
productive. Bulgakov
rejected
Kant's idea that
knowledge
is
passive,
and maintained that
it is a volitional
activity
that
requires
an
effort. While
economy
acts
upon
the material world and claims ever new terrains for its own
advance,
cognition
acts
laboriously upon
the ideal
world,
opening
ever new
fields for human
knowledge.16
Kant
postulated
the unsurmountable
opposition
between
subject
and
object. Bulgakov
viewed this
postulate
as
merely hypothetical,
a
postulate
needed
by
Kant for
methodological
reasons. Knowl
edge,
like
production,
involves
labor,
a feature overlooked
by
Kant.
Having imported
the notion of labor from
political economy
to
epis
temology, Bulgakov
defined labor in
epistemological
terms as "a
living energy
that welds
together subject
and
object."
In economic
labor,
the
subject imprints
his/herself
on the
object
of
production.
The
subject's
action
presupposes objective reality.
As a form of
pro
duction,
knowledge
also involves the
"subject's stepping
out into
non-self (more precisely not-yet-self),
the actualization of the
pri
mordial
identity
of
self
md
non-self,
of
subject
and
object
in
every
act
of
cognition."
Since the
opposition
of
subject
and
object
is
overcome
through
labor in both
economy
and
cognition,
both activities have
the same
metaphysical ground, namely
the
identity
of
subject
and
232
MICHAEL A. MEERSON
object.
For
Bulgakov,
"life is the ceaseless
process
of the
discovery
and actualization of this
identity."17
Kant's
methodological
abstraction stems out of his
sundering
of
human mind into two
types
of
reason,
theoretical and
practical.
Bulgakov
considered this division which constitutes the
very
core
of Kant's
philosophy,
to be a
groundless
abstraction,
since
practical
and theoretical 'reasons' do not exist in
separation.
Neo-Kantianism
retains this
arbitrary
division,
and deals with the same Kantian sub
ject
reduced to
passive
reason
alone.
Bulgakov
called this
subject
"idle and
impersonalistic,"
and considered this
desubjectification
of the
subject
to be the cause of "the fatal determinism of Kan
tianism."
Being
'idle' and
passive,
"Kant's
subject
lacks the sound
self-consciousness of its own
subjectivity,
it is
deprived
of the
reality
of self." In
Bulgakov's opinion,
Kant
compensates
for the lack
of this selfhood
by replacing
it with "the
unity
of transcendental
apperception."18
Because
technology
and
production require
an
active,
labor
ing,
and,
for this
reason,
personalistic subject, technology
finds
no
place
or
explanation
in Kant's
theory. Bulgakov consistently empha
sized that in its both forms
-
cognitional
and
productive
-
labor
presupposes person.
Since Kant's
critique
lacked this
personalistic
perspective,
it had
destroyed
much more than Kant intended to.
With his
subject turning
into an
epistemological
abstraction,
Kant's
anthropocentric
revolution had failed.
"Upon
this nail hammered
into the
air,"
ruled
Bulgakov,
"one cannot
hang
even a bit of
fluff,
let alone the universe which the
'Copernican'
Kant wished to fasten
toit."19
Following
Losskii,
Bulgakov pointed
to
"epistemological
indi
vidualism"
as an Achilles' heel of both Kant and neo-Kantianism.
According
to Kant's
theory,
the
subject
exists alone and there is no
provision
for its interaction with others.
Following
the same
path,
Cohen and his school defined
"epistemological
individualism" as a
method, while,
according
to
Bulgakov
it is
merely
a
"methodological
fiction."20 Not
only
does Kant's
subjectivism
fail to lead to
person
alism,
but it also undermines his central thesis
-
the transcendental
method itself.
Bulgakov
rescued this method with the
help
of the
metaphysical
notion of
humanity
as a
whole. It is the human race
throughout
its
history
that is the "transcendental
subject"
of both
PUT AGAINST LOGOS
233
knowledge
and
economy.
The
presupposition
of
humanity,
rather
than of an individual or
individuals,
as the 'transcendental
subject'
is essential for both
knowledge
and
economy.
Kant's transcenden
talism
presupposed
the
agglomeration
of the
cognitive
labor of all
historic
humanity.
Without this
presupposition, Bulgakov argued,
all individual acts of
cognition
or
production
would
collapse, having
nothing
to hold them
together.21
Bulgakov
advocated the
personalistic approach developed by
Russian
philosophy: personality emerges
within a
community,
personhood
and sobornos f are correlative. The
concept
of transcen
dentalism as sobornosf takes
us,
however,
outside of
Bulgakov's
study
and leads to the
philosophy
of
prince Sergei
Trubetskoi,
who
developed
the notion of the conciliar consciousness
[sobornoe
soz
nanie]
of
humanity,
and to
prince Evgenii
Trubetskoi,
his
younger
brother.
Evgenii
in his
study
of Kant and
neo-Kantianism,
applied
the
transcendental method itself as an immanent criterion for evaluation
of their theories of
knowledge.22
TRUBETSKOI: TOWARDS THE TRUE GROUNDING OF
TRANSCENDENTALISM
Of all Puf 's critics of
neo-Kantianism,
Trubetskoi
presented
the
most
complete philosophical picture
with his own
epistemological
vision,
developed
on the basis of his minute
study
of the Kantian
theory
of
knowledge.
The main thesis of Trubetskoi's
study
is that
one cannot build
philosophy
on
epistemology
alone,
because
any
theory
of
knowledge collapses
without
being
rooted in
ontology.
Metaphysical presuppositions expelled by
the
philosopher's
con
scious mind sneak
through
the back door of the unconscious. Accord
ing
to
Trubetskoi,
this had
happened
to Kant and the neo-Kantians.
They
claimed to have
produced
a
pure
critical
epistemology
which
was
founded
on a
priori premises
and which had transcendental
validity.
In the
process, they uncritically adopted
some
metaphys
ical
presuppositions
which rendered their theories
self-contradictory
and
incomplete.23
Trubetskoi set himself the task of
laying
these
hidden
premises
bare,
pointing
out these
contradictions,
and
thereby
supplementing
the Kantian transcendental method.
Trubetskoi
pointed
out three basic flaws in Kant's
epistemolog
ical
enterprise.
First,
by confusing
the
psychological
and the
logical
in his
premises,
Kant undermined the foundation of his
apriorism.
Second,
he
automatically
allowed for
metaphysical presuppositions
without
taking
into account their
metaphysical
nature.
Third,
having
neglected
the transition from the individual to the
universal,
he failed
to
provide
his transcendental method
-
the most
original
contribution
of his
system
-
with secure axiomatic
grounds.
The confusion of the
psychological
and the
logical
had
already
occurred in the
key part
of Kant's
system,
where he
postulated
that
space
and time are a
priori
and
purely subjective
intuitions. Kant
sought
unconditional, pure knowledge,
rather than a
knowledge
tainted
by
sense
perception. According
to
Trubetskoi,
Kant failed
to find this
knowledge precisely
because it does not exist outside of
our
psychological experience.
Our
knowledge
of human
psychology,
upon
which Kant
relied,
is also
empirical.
As
such,
this
knowledge
is conditioned and mediated
by
the
very
forms of
thought
and
per
ception
that Kant wanted to found
upon
it. For
Trubetskoi,
"Kant
ungroundedly
turns the
psychological
limitation of our
perception
into the
logical necessity
for
thought."
Thus,
Kant's assertion that
space
and time are a
priori
necessary
conditions of
sense-experience
is based on
psychological
data on the
organization
of the human
mind. From this
postulate,
Kant inferred the transcendental
validity
of
space
and time for all humans.
According
to
Trubetskoi,
this
alone suffices to
destroy
Kant's
proof
of the
a
priori
nature of
our
judgement concerning space
and time.
Furthermore,
the
limiting
of
the universal
validity
[obshcheznachimosf]
of
spatial
and
temporal
forms to humans alone undermines the whole foundation for the a
priori
nature of mathematical
judgements.24
The
of Kant's
epistemology
become
especially apparent
in his
teaching
on the
thing-in-itself
[Ding-an-sich]. Following
Vladimir Solov'ev's criticism of
Kant,
Trubetskoi finds Kant's
sundering
of
reality
into
things-in-them
selves and
phenomena,
on the one
hand,
and Kant's claim that
we
cannot know a
thing-in-itself
as both
highly metaphysical
and contra
dictory.
If we
admit that a
thing-in-itself
exists,
then we
already
know
something
about it. And Kant
himself,
according
to
Trubetskoi,
knew
a lot about
it,
if he
postulated
its
unknowability.
This
unknowability
PUT AGAINST LOGOS
235
of the
thing-in-itself presupposes
its
reality:
for if the
thing-in-itself
were
merely
a
product
of human
thought
or
imagination
it would
be
totally
knowable. Kant often
depicted
the
thing-in-itself
as
being
correlative to
phenomenon,
and
presented
both as the two sides of
one
reality.
Without
noticing
the obvious contradictio in
adjecto,
he
even called the
thing-in-itself
'the
appearing
unknown.'25
These contradictions stem from the
disguised metaphysics
of the
Ding-an-sich concept
itself. As Trubetskoi
pointed
out,
for Kant the
thing-in-itself
is a
concept
on the border between the
physical
and
the
metaphysical,
what he called a 'frontier
concept'
of human rea
son. Trubetskoi
argued
that the
very
affirmation of such a 'frontier'
implies
a realm
beyond
it,
the
possibility
of
"rising
above the human
view
point
and of
judging
it from the
higher,
absolute view
point."26
In other
words,
in order to describe the
physical
world with
any
meta-language,
one
inevitably
has to assume a
metaphysical point
of view. Kant's
meta-language concept
of the
thing-in-itself
is no
exception.
Trubetskoi also maintained that an
epistemology
that denies the
possibility
of
knowing anything beyond phenomena
is
contradictory,
because
knowledge by
its nature transcends the realm of
phenomena:
"the
cognition
of
phenomena
reveals the truth that is
super-phenom
enal and
super-psychological."
This is true
especially
in the case of
scientific
knowledge,
with which Kant and the neo-Kantians were
particularly
concerned.
Astronomy,
or
physics study phenomena
like
galaxies
or atomic
particles
which
simply
cannot
appear
to man and
cannot become the
objects
of human
experience.27
Trubetskoi
pointed
out that
become
even more
apparent
in Kant's transcendental method.
According
to
Kant,
experience begins
when / link in
judgment
my
empirical
con
sciousness with 'consciousness in
general'
[Bewusstsein
?berhaupt].
Trubetskoi insisted that 'consciousness in
general'
is a
metaphysical
assumption
which has no
ground
in Kant's
theory,
but without which
Kant cannot make his
system
work. Kant
uncritically
assumed that
all human
beings
have the same forms of
thought
and
representa
tion. He
applied 'my' categories
to
phenomena
on the
ground
that
the
phenomena
are
'my' representations.
But if
phenomena
are
only
'my' representations,
T cannot
presuppose
that other
people
per
ceive the same
phenomena
in the same
way.
Trubetskoi
pointed
out
236
MICHAEL A. MEERSON
that
although
Kant
repeated
'we',
and 'our'
?fur
uns]
unceasingly,
his
system provided
no
ground
for the crucial transition from T to 'we.
'
According
to
Trubetskoi,
this is a
major
contradiction in Kant's
key
theory
of 'transcendental
apperception.'28
Trubetskoi maintains that
Kant in his
teaching
on transcendental
apperception actually
arrived
at absolute
consciousness,
but could not admit it because of his stand
on
metaphysics.
Therefore his 'I am' becomes the ultimate condi
tion of our
knowledge,
and
replaces
the
absolute,
banished from his
theory.
The
expelled
absolute nevertheless comes back in dis
guised
form
as
human
reason,
held
by
Kant to be "the
lawgiver
of
nature."29
Trubetskoi
saw the main tendencies of the neo-Kantian movement
in the extension of Kant's
struggle
on two
fronts,
against psycholo
gism
and
against metaphysics.
He found both tendencies
developed
in the work of Hermann Cohen. Cohen narrowed Kant's
goal
to the
epistemological
task of
explaining
how
knowledge
is
possible
for
science rather than for a
psychological subject.
Critical of Kant's
continual confusion of the
logical
and the
psychological,
Cohen
drove the
theory
of
knowledge away
from
psychological premises
to
purely logical ground.
If for Kant
knowledge
came from both sen
sibility
and
reason,
for Cohen
thought
did not
depend
on
anything
external to
it,
senses included. "Pure
thought
contains the first
prin
ciple [Ursprung]
of all
knowledge."
If Kant maintained that
only
the
form of
knowledge
is a
priori
and that
knowledge
is the
application
of
categories
of
thought
to the data of
senses,
Cohen insisted that
thought produces
out of itself the
givenness
of data which is a
part
of the
cognitive process.
As a
result,
he arrived at a total
rejection
of
sensibility
as an
independent
source of
knowledge.30
Cohen's ideal that
pure thought
itself
produces
the
object
of its
knowledge may give
the
wrong
impression
that he shares
Hegelian
pan-logicism.
But
resolutely rejecting
all
metaphysics, including
Hegelian,
Cohen turned his rational
grounding
of
cognition
into
methodological concepts.
In this
system,
which Trubetskoi called
pan-methodism,
Cohen recast all
reality
into method.
Knowledge,
which means for Cohen first of all scientific
knowledge,
does not
intend to
express any
knowledge
of
reality
;
it has
exclusively
method
ical
validity.
With science
deprived
of
empirical
contact with
reality,
and its
object
transformed into science's own
methodology,
Cohen's
PUT AGAINST LOGOS
237
scientism
destroys
the
very
foundation of science.31
Nevertheless,
in
reducing
a
posteriori
to a
priori
elements,
Cohen
regressed
from Kant
and in fact
destroyed
the
very
a
priori premises
of his
epistemology.
As Trubetskoi
demonstrated,
Kant
displayed
the stable
system
of
categories
that condition as
such and thus was
independent
of
empir
ical facts. For
Cohen,
categories
themselves
depended
on
any
given
science, and,
consequently,
on
particular
and
changeable
data. The a
priori
elements of
thought
are reduced to the hermeneutics of human
hypothesis,
which is
necessarily empirically
conditioned. The whole
enterprise
of transcendentalism comes to
naught.32
According
to
Trubetskoi,
Heinrich
Rickert,
the head of the
Freiburg
School,
understood better than Cohen the main
difficulty
of the
epistemological
issue: how to sail between the
Scylla
of
psychologism
and the
Charybdis
of
metaphysics.
Rickert admitted
that the
object
of
knowledge
is
independent
of and even transcen
dent to
thought.
Therefore in the act of
knowing, cognizing thought
reaches out for the transcendent. In order to do
so,
our
thought
has to
conform with the transcendent
object.
The
problem,
in Trubetskoi's
view,
started at this
point.
Whereas
Cohen,
fleeing
the
'danger'
of
metaphysics, replaced being
with
methodology,
Rickert,
out of the
same
fear,
replaced
it with value. He maintained that the transcen
dent of
knowledge
is not
being,
but rather the notion of "transcendent
value" or "transcendent
norm-setting."33
Trubetskoi observed that Rickert invests this 'transcendent value'
with all the features of the absolute. The transcendent
value,
though
a
non-being,
constitutes the
logical
and
metaphysical ground
of all
being.
Its
metaphysical
connotation is
suggested by
the
epigraph
from Plato's
Republic
that Rickert used for his main
epistemological
study.
Plato's text
says
that the
supreme good
is that which itself
is not
essence,
but which abides
beyond
essence,
excelling
it
by
importance
and
might,
and that it
supplies objects
with their knowa
bility.
Trubetskoi maintained that Rickert's 'transcendent
value,'
like
Plato's idea of
good,
is
super-subsistent;
it abides
beyond being,
and
grounds
both
being
and
knowledge.34
For
Rickert, any
knowledge necessarily presupposes
a
super
individual consciousness that transcends the limitations of
any
particular
individual. As Trubetskoi
maintained,
this idea of Rickert's
expresses
the
"necessary ontological premises
of
knowledge,"
which
238
MICHAEL A. MEERSON
he nevertheless failed to
develop.
Out of fear of
metaphysics,
Rickert
interpreted
the
super-individual
consciousness
as a
methodological
concept.
This
half-way acknowledgement
of universal conscious
ness aborts the transcendental
method,
thus
rendering
Rickert unable
to
complete
his
theory
of
knowledge. According
to
Trubetskoi,
Rick
ert
postulated
the
unity
of the immanent and the transcendent in
knowledge,
but admitted his
inability
to find for it an
adequate
philosophical expression,
and stated that the
"unity
of immanent
and transcendent in
knowledge
is a miracle that one can
ascertain
but cannot
explain."35
Having pointed
out the flaws and limitations of the Kantian tran
scendental
method,
Trubetskoi
attempted
to
complete
it and free
it from inner contradictions. He
appropriated
as a
lasting philo
sophical discovery
Rickert's thesis that there is no
being
without
consciousness,
and Cohen's thesis that all
knowledge
has a
rational
first
principle
as its foundation.36 But he drew different
conclusions,
maintaining
that the transcendental method
implies
the
infinity
of
knowledge.
He insists that our
knowledge,
limited as it
is,
can cover
all
ages
because it is based on the
super-temporal
truth. "Either
every
temporal
event is immortalized in absolute
consciousness,"
argued
Trubetskoi,
"or our human
knowledge
of
temporal
events is
deprived
of
any objective
foundation." The absolute consciousness
grounds
the
certainty
of human
knowledge,
since
only through
the absolute
can we
recognize
the universal and the transcendental common to all
mankind. Trubetskoi
emphasized
that without it we cannot find
any,
even
phenomenal knowledge,
since the latter is
knowledge
as
long
as it
has,
according
to
Kant,
the "formal characteristic of absolute
necessity
and
certainty."31
Trubetskoi
explained
the mechanism of human
cognition
in rela
tionship
with the absolute consciousness in his
analysis
of
judgment
which he
pursued
on
the basis of Kant's and Rickert's
investigations.
He relies
upon
Rickert's
discovery
that in the act of
judgment
the
truth binds as
imperative
a
knowing subject.
Trubetskoi
gives
back
the
ontological
status to the
binding
truth that Rickert
interprets
in a
methodological
sense.
According
to
Trubetskoi,
the
cognizing
human
subject
must come to the consciousness of his otherness in
relation to the
absolute,
because the essential law and form of our
thought,
its a
priori,
is that
any
judgment necessarily posits
the abso
PUT AGAINST LOGOS
239
lute. In Trubetskoi's
analysis, judgment
is a triune act that consists
of:
1)
the
presupposition
of the
absolute, 2)
the
positing
of
my self,
'I,'
as
other,
and
3)
the
linking
of these two
together.
Thus in
every
act of its
consciousness,
the self both affirms itself and
goes
out
beyond
itself. This means that
every
act of
judgment presupposes
also
self-consciousness,
not the self-consciousness of the absolute in
the
Hegelian
sense,
but the self-consciousness of a
cognizing subject
vis-?-vis the absolute. In other
words,
Trubetskoi affirmed the
per
sonalistic nature of
every
act of
judgment,
or
cognition,
the
aspect
which Kant had missed.
"My
/
think,
contrary
to
Kant,
is not
only
my
representation," argued
Trubetskoi,
"it also has
my
knowledge
of myself
which,
as
such, goes beyond subjective representation
to
the
trans-subjective
realm,
since this act
posits my
self as a
subsis
tent
subject, independent
of
any particular representations." Finally,
it
presupposes
the
linking
of self's individual
judgment
with the
transcendental
validity,
or with the absolute. In this
way,
Trubet
skoi
completes
the transcendental
method,
discovered
by
Kant,
and
developed by
neo-Kantians.38
Conclusion
Logos' activity,
which
provided
the
philosophical challenge
of
neo
Kantianism,
was a real
blessing
for Puf 's authors. It
required
from
them
greater terminological precision,
and confronted them with the
contemporary philosophical
issues. The
polemics
with
Logos helped
Puf to coin what
eventually
has become known as the
specific legacy
of Russian
philosophy.
Puf 's
philosophical enterprise,
aborted
by
the Bolshevik
revolution,
was carried out in
emigration, mainly
in
Berdiaev's Paris
journal
also entitled
Puf,
and in the Paris 'YMCA
Press,'
with Berdiaev as its director. Vasilii Zenkovskii
(1881-1962)
and Nikolai Losskii
(1870-1965),
each
writing
in
emigration
a
history
of Russian
philosophy,
contributed to Puf in Russia.39
Puf 's
polemics
with neo-Kantians had an
enduring
influence on
Russian
thought.
If
Ern,
who died in
1917,
and
Evgenii
Trubetskoi,
who died in
1920,
completed
their
dialogues
with the neo-Kantians
during
their Puf
years, Bulgakov
carried it on in
greater
detail in his
book The
Tragedy of Philosophy,
written in
1920-21,
and
published
in Russian
only
in 1993.40 In this
book,
he further
developed
Trubet
skoi 's thesis on the absolute foundation of transcendentalism and his
analysis
of the
tripartite
structure of the act of
judgment.
Berdiaev
incorporated many
of his
findings
from the
polemical period
into
the
subsequent development
of his
personalism.
Both Berdiaev and
Bulgakov adopted
the
key
thesis of neo-Kantian
philosophy, namely
that there is
no existence without
consciousness,
and transformed it
into a cornerstone of
personalism:
since consciousness is
personal,
there is no
impersonal being; being always
has
personhood
as its
ground.
This later
development
of their
thought
takes
us, however,
outside the historical frame of Puf
activity.
The
polemic
with
Logos
which
sought
to
integrate
Russian
thought
into the international
philosophical process
contributed to this
integration
in a
particular
way.
Thus Berdiaev and
Bulgakov
in the course of this
polemic
arrived at a criticism of neo-Kantianism similar to
Bergson
's
philos
ophy
of life and to American
pragmatism.
However,
Russian criti
cism was
highly original
and was carried out within the framework
of
religious-philosophy
which strove to achieve a new
synthesis
of
the Eastern Orthodox
religious
tradition with the most
sophisticated
achievements of
contemporary philosophy.
While the Puf authors' immediate influence on the neo-Kantians
was rather limited
-
they probably
influenced
Stepun
alone
-
they
articulated some of the inner
logic
of
neo-Kantianism, and,
in a
way, predicted
its
consequent
evolution toward
ontology,
even of
a
neo-Platonic
leaning. According
to
Stepun,
most of the
Logos
editors
eventually
abandoned the course of
pure epistemology
for
metaphysics. Stepun
and Hessen came to collaborate with
Bulgakov,
Berdiaev and other Russian Christian thinkers in Fedotov's
Novyi
Grad
[New
City]
in Paris
during
the 1930s. Mehlis embraced
romantic and
mystical philosophy
close to neo-Platonism.41 Richard
Kroner,
one of the most
productive
of
Logos's
editors,
during
his
long
philosophical
career
passed through
almost all of the
philosophical
positions opposed
to
pure
epistemology.
He first
judged theory
of
knowledge
from the
stand-point
of a
philosophy
of life close to that
of
Bergson.
Then he moved to
neo-Hegelianism, reinterpreting
Kant
in the
light
of
mystical ontology.
After he left Nazi
Germany
for the
United
States,
Kroner
developed
his
philosophy
of
revelation,
and
in the
last,
American
period, occupied
himself
mainly
with
religious
philosophy.42
Thus in the ironic recollection of
Stepun,
the
warning
of Windelband to his
students,
who had called their
journal Logos
and its first issue
Messiah,
that if
they
continued the same
path "they
would land with
monks," rang
true.43
In his article
on Ernst
Cassirer,
written in the late
1920's,
Alexei
Losev
(1893-1988)
observed the
unpredictable development
of neo
Kantianism toward
ontology
and
metaphysics.
Losev mentioned
Hartmann,
Natorp,
and Cohn. In the second edition of his famous
book on
Plato,
Natorp,
one
of the
leading
neo-Kantians,
renounced
his own Kantian rendition of
Plato,
and came to
interpret
him in the
spirit
of neo-Platonism.
According
to
Losev,
Natorp
in his last work
completely
revises his
epistemology
in the
light
of neo-Platonic
ontology.44
Cohn moved toward
Hegel.45
For Losev these devel
opments,
as well as the
philosophy
of
symbolic
forms of
Cassirer,
signify
the definite
spilling
over of neo-Kantianism
beyond
its own
epistemological
limits toward
metaphysics
and
ontology.46
Puf's
authors
anticipated,
however,
this
development,
in their
polemics
with
Logos.
NOTES
1
Cf.
Sbornikpervyio
Vladimire Solov'eve
(Symposium
I: On Vladimir
Solov'?v),
Moscow:
Puf, 1911,
Ot
izdatel'stva, p.
IL
2
Fedor
Stepun: Byvshee
i
nesbyvsheesia, (The
Fulfilled and
Unfulfilled),
Second
Edition,
Overseas Publications
Interchange
Ltd., London, 1990,
Vol.
I, pp.
130
1. The German edition of
Logos
was luckier than the Russian one. It survived
World War I and lasted another decade until Nazis'
coming
to
power.
Cf.
Logos
(Internationale
Zeitschrift f?r
Philosophie
der
Kultur),
Vol.
1-22, Mohr,
T?bingen,
1910-1933.
3
"Pis'ma S. N.
Bulgakova
k M. K.
Morozovoi,"
Published
by
N. A.
Struve,
Vestnik
Russkogo Khristianskogo
Dvizheniia
(Herald
of the Russian Christian
Movement). #144,1985,
Vyp.I-II, p.
123.
4
One can
compare
their VekhVs articles with Puf editorial
manifesto,
compiled
by
Berdiaev and
Bulgakov
in
Sbornikpervy:
O Vladimire Solovieve
(First
Com
pilation:
On Vladimir
Solov'?v), Puf, Moscow, 1911, p.
1.
5
See content of
Logos
in Mikhail V.
Bezrodnyj,
'Zur Geschichte des russis
chen Neukantianismus. Die Zeitschrift
Logos
und ihre Redakteure.'
Zeitschrift
?r
Slawistik 37
(1992), pp.
503-505.
6
Stepun, ByvsAee.., pp. 150,148.
7
Vladimir Ern:
Skovoroda, Put', Moscow, 1912, pp. 1,2,17,22.
8
Vladimir Ern:
Sochineniia, [Works],
Izd.
Pravda, Moscow, 1991, p.
405. Ern
wrote his Master's thesis on Rosmini's
theory
of
knowledge
and his Doctorate on
the
philosophy
of
Gioberti,
and
published
both studies in Puf.
9
Vladimir Ern: Bor'ba za
Logos (The Struggle
for
Logos),
Puf, Moscow,
1911.
pp. 73-75,84,91.
As
Stepun
sums
up
Ern's
polemics,
"In all his
critique against
us,
Logosists,
Ern
persistently
was
making
the
point
that as
advocates of scientific
philosophy
cut off from the Greek and Christian
tradition,
we
ought
not to have
invoked the term sanctified in the
Gospel
and
meaningful
for the Orthodox Chris
tian."
Stepun: Byvshee...,
I, p.
258.
10
'Ot Kanta k
Kruppu' (From
Kant to
Krupp),
Sochineniia, pp.
313-8.
11
'Sushchnosf
nemetskogo fenomenalizma (The
Essence of German Phenome
nalism), Sochineniia, p.
320.
12
Berdiaev,
Filosofiia svobody, Smysl
tvorchestva
(The
Philosophy
of
Freedom,
The Sense of
Creativity),
Moscow:
Pravda, 1989, pp. 15-8, 32,68-9.
13
Ibid., pp. 19, 29,35-37,47,54,68-73.
14
Bulgakov, Filosofiia
khoziastva
(Philosophy
of the
Economy),
Puf, Moscow,
1912, p.
52.
15
Leo
Lopatin, PolozhiteVnyie
zadachi
filosofii (The
Positive Tasks of Philos
ophy)
Part.
II, p.
231.
Bulgakov, Filosofiia..., pp.
184-5.
l?
Ibid., pp.
101-2.
17
Ibid., pp. 99,102-3.
18
Ibid., pp. 95-6,100.
19
Ibid., pp. 53,116.
20
Nikolai
Losskii,
Vvedenie
vfilosofiiu [Part I]
Vvedenie v teoriiu
znaniia
[An
introduction to
Philosophy.
Part I. An Introduction into the
theory
of
knowledge].
St.
Petersburg,
1911, pp. 164,198-9, Ibid., p.
116.
21
Ibid., pp. 114-5,119-20.
22
Prince
Evgenii
Trubetskoi, Metafizicheskie predpolozhenia poznania [The
Metaphysical Presuppositions
of
Knowledge],
Puf, Moscow, 1917, p.
4.
23
Ibid., pp.
i-ii.
24
Ibid., pp. 7,11,43-4. Cf.,
Frederick
Copleston,
S. J.: A
History of Philosophy,
Image
Books,
New
York, 1985,
vol.
VI, pp.
238-9.
25
Trubetskoi refers to the first edition of Kritik der reinen
Vernunft, Hartknoch,
Riga,
1781, pp. 358, 344;
Metafizicheskie..., pp.
118-23.
26
Ibid., p.
130.
27
Ibid., pp. 290,135.
28
Ibid., pp. 7,10,74,77,80,82.
29
Ibid., pp. 88, 76,74,131.
30
Trubetskoi refers to Cohen's Kants Theorie der
Erfahrung,
F. Dummlers Ver
lagsbuchhandlung,
Hartwitz und
Gossmann, Berlin, 1885, pp. 216-217,
and
Logik
der reinen
Erkenntniss,
B.
Cassirer, Berlin, 1902, pp. 67, 129,
Metafizicheskie...,
pp. 247,210-1,217,219,234.
31
Trubetskoi refers to Cohen's work Ethik der reinen
Willens,
B.
Cassirer, Berlin,
1904,1907, pp. 330-3; 446-7;
Metafizicheskie..., pp. 222,210,223-5,227.
32
Ibid., p.
231.
33
Trubetskoi discusses Rickert's two fundamental
works,
Zwei
Wege
d. Erken
ntnisstheorie, (Kantstudien, B.XIV,
vols. 2 u
3),
and Die
Grenzen der natur
wissenschaftlischen Begriffsbildung,
J. C. B.
Mohr,
T?bingen
u.
Leipzig,
1902.
Metafizicheskie..., pp. 250,273,249,276.
34
Ibid., pp. 276,279.
35
Ibid., pp. 266-7,283,280.
36
Ibid., pp. 236,241,275.
37
Ibid., pp. 33, 41,45-46.
38
Trubetskoi maintains that Kant's
teaching
on
transcendental
apperception
implies
the distinction between the individual
consciousness,
or
my 'self,'
and the
universal
consciousness,
or the absolute.
Ibid., pp. 251, 83,
85-7.
39
Nikolai Losskii: Intuitivnaia
filosofiia Bergsona {Bergson's
intuitive Philos
ophy),
Puf, Moscow,
1913. Zenkovskii wrote a two-volume
study
on Nikolai
Gogol's religious
views,
announced
by
Puf for
publication.
The
book,
shortened
and
rewritten,
appeared only
in Paris
YMCA-Press,
Puf 's
emigr?
successor.
40
S. N.
Bulgakov:
Sochineniia
v
dvukh
tomakh,
vol.
I,
Filosofiia
khoziaistva,
Tragediia filosofii,
Nauka, Moscow,
1993. Prior to
this,
the book was
published
only
in German
translation,
as Die
Trag?die
der
Philosophie,
Otto Reichl
Verlag,
Darmstadt 1927.
41
Cf.
Georg
Mehlis,
Einf?hrung
in ein
System
der
Religionsphilosophie,
J. C.
B.
Mohr,
T?bingen,
1917.
Eng.
Trans. The
Quest for
God;
an Introduction to the
Philosophy of Religion,
Tr.
by
Gertrude
Baker,
Williams and
Norgate,
London,
1927;
Die deutsche
Romantik, Rosi, M?nchen, 1922; Plotin,
F.
Frommann,
Stuttgart,
1924;
Die
Mystik
in der F?lle ihrer
Erscheinungsformen
in allen Zeiten
und
Kulturen,
F.
Bruckmann, M?nchen,
1927.
42
Richard
Kroner,
Das Problem der historischen
Biologie,
Gebruder Born
traeger,
Berlin, 1919;
Von Kant bis
Hegel,
Mohr,
Tubingen,
vols.
1-2, 1921-24;
The
primacy of
Faith,
The Macmillan
company,
New
York, 1943;
How do
we
know God? An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Religion, Harper
&
brothers,
NY
&
London, 1943;
Culture and
Faith,
1951 ;
Speculation
and Revelation in Modern
Philosophy,
Westminster
Press,
Philadelphia,
1961.
43
Stepun, Byvshee..., p.
175-176.
44
Paul
Natorp:
Piatos
Ideenlehre,
1st
ed., D?rr,
Leipzig,
1903;
2nd ed. F.
Meiner,
Leipzig,
1921;
Die deutsche
Philosophie
der
Gegenwart
in
Selbstdarstellungen,
R.
Schmidt.,
Leipzig,
1921.
45
Jonas Cohn: Theorie der
Dialektik,
F.
Meiner,
Leipzig,
1923.
46
Alexei Losev: 'Teoriia
mificheskogo myshleniia
u E. Kassirera'
(E.
Cassirer's
Theory
of
Mythical Thinking),
Simvol
(Zhurnal
khristianskoi
kul'tury pri
slavian
skoi biblioteke v
Parizhe),
30
(1993), pp.
311-312.
1847 47 Place N.W.
Washington,
DC 20007
USA

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