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Prevention and Control of Ignition Sources in the Explosives
Industry BOS (Basis of Safety)



Dr. Martin Held
Austin International, Inc.
25800 Science Park Drive
Cleveland, OH 44122
martin.held@austinpowder.com







Prepared for Presentation at
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
2013 Spring Meeting
9th Global Congress on Process Safety
San Antonio, Texas
April 28 May 1, 2013


UNPUBLISHED


AIChE shall not be responsible for statements or opinions contained in papers or printed in its
publications.
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Prevention and Control of Ignition Sources in the Explosives
Industry BOS (Basis of Safety)



Dr. Martin Held
Austin International, Inc.
25800 Science Park Drive
Cleveland, OH 44122
martin.held@austinpowder.com


Keywords: Control of Ignition Sources, Explosives, Basis of Safety

Abstract
Prevention and control of ignition sources is the key element in manufacturing and processing of
explosives. The fundamental approach of BOS (Basis of Safety) and its application principles
will be described.
Examples will be given to demonstrate how safe operation principles based on BOS are
implemented in inherent plant design for manufacturing of explosives of varying sensitivity and
also describe trends in modern plant processes.
1. Introduction
As with other industries, the explosives manufacturing industry has gotten safety policies and
procedures, regular safety audits and tries and usually does comply with any available safety
standard. However, despite all this paperwork, time and attention the explosives industry
continues to carry a fair number of safety incidents, the vast majority of which could have been
anticipated. Conclusively, it can be said that for a whole variety of reasons there is in many cases
a lack of attention to basic explosive safety, or so called BOS (Basis of Safety) in the explosives
industry. In simple words, BOS is a set of simple established principles to do just two things:
1) prevent unintentional explosions (by preventing ignition) and
2) manage the consequences of a potential explosion.
The consequent application of BOS principles ensures that all (process) controls are appropriate
and in place.
With general principles on prevention and control of ignition sources from the chemical process
industry in place as applicable, this paper is putting a focus on principles for materials and
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substances with an immanent explosion hazard that does not require explosive atmospheric
conditions as reactive oxygen and fuel are chemically bound in molecules.
2. How does an unintended explosion occur?
2.1 Explosive definition
In the environment of explosives manufacturing an explosive or a substance with explosive
properties is defined as a substance/mixture that under the conditions in which it is present can
react violently to produce an explosive effect. These substances include (non-exhaustive)
- Detonating explosives lead azide, lead styphnate, PETN (pentaerythrite tetranitrate),
nitroglycol, nitroglycerine, emulsion and watergel explosives
- Pyrotechnics delay composition, fuse head dips (in detonators)
- Reactive mixtures wastes, raw materials
- Ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate emulsion matrix
Explosives are designed to rapidly liberate vast amounts of energy. This energy is released by a
shock wave which can travel up to 8,000 meters per second through the explosive material.
To avoid an explosion and with this the release of the stored energy, we need to understand what
is happening and required to lead to it.
Application of BOS principles is not a separate exercise, but does complement existing safety
management and QC systems.
2.2 Sequence of events - BOS hierarchy
To characterize and be able to control ignition sources and with this an explosion hazard, we
need to understand what is happening. These are the conditions for an ignition or the sequence of
events.
2.2.1 Presence of explosive material
All explosives have the oxygen and the fuel necessary for a reaction contained either on a
molecular level or in a chemical mixture. An explosion once initiated will travel through all the
material present leaving the products of explosion and a destructive and expanding high pressure
wave or air blast.
Thus, looking at the sequence of events, this means, if there is no explosive material present then
there won't be an explosion. So, if these materials can be prevented at early stages in a
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production process (technology) or be kept to a minimum (inventory, batch size, reactor size) it
should be done. From a plant design perspective, this could be a change from a batch to a
continuous process.
2.2.2 Sources of ignition
In the sequence of events, adding any energy to explosive materials can potentially trigger an
initiation leading to ignition. Preventing of ignition is the best place to intervene to stop the chain
of events leading to an explosion. Ignition sources in the explosives industry can be summarized
as F.I.S.H. which are Friction (between surfaces), Impact (between impacting or colliding
surfaces, increase of pressure and temperature), Static (electrostatic discharge) and Heat (fire,
decomposition, adiabatic compression, radiant heat, prolonged friction) as illustrated in Figure 1.
Most explosive substances are well characterized regarding their sensitivity towards ignition
sources.

Figure 1: Sources of Ignition (Friction, Impact, Static, Heat)
However, they can behave differently under slightly changing process or operating conditions
and may become unpredictable. Therefore, the process design has to take a very conservative
approach.

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2.2.3 Decomposition
Once an ignition triggered by one of the above mentioned ignition sources has started, the
decomposition of an explosive material may be local and only consume a small quantity of
material.
But it could propagate and spread rapidly (this may be immediately for highly sensitive
explosives up to minutes for less sensitive material). Eventually, this may lead to deflagration or
burning or at worst case to an explosion.
The actual behavior of an explosive material after an ignition depends on several factors that
include the chemical properties of the material, the temperature and pressure, the confinement,
the amount of solvents, the shape (solid material), impurities etc.

Figure 2: Sequence of events leading to an explosion
[1]

3. Hazards with explosives
Explosives are designed to explode when used in a specific application such as breaking rocks in
a mining operation. Most of the explosives in todays world are very well characterized in their
physical and chemical properties, thermo-chemistry, stability, minimum ignition sources, and
compatibilities. However, it needs to be kept in mind that the properties have been determined
under exactly defined conditions that in general are not entirely transferable to manufacturing
process conditions.
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The actual processing environment from design of equipment, control systems integrity over
maintenance conditions, raw material quality towards people at any given time is not
characterized as quite as exactly and much smaller deviations (lower threshold levels) as
compared to the non-explosives chemical process industry can trigger a step change in system
entropy and make it impossible to regain containment and control (normal operation) at a very
early stage.

Figure 3: Step change in system entropy
[2]

The explosives behavior under even small deviations may become unpredictable. Therefore, the
safety systems applied have to be conservative.
As a consequence, process design and safeguards as applied in a wide area of the chemical
process industry may not be sufficient for the explosives manufacturing industry. Consequences
of a loss event (explosion) are massive very often.
Shift
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Picture 1: Explosion aftermath
4. BOS principles
BOS is based on the principles of using lines of defences to block hazards from turning into
incidents.

Figure 4: Line of defences
[3]

These lines could be:
- Learning from the past
-Inherent Design (e.g. remote operation, process equipment), plant layout (e.g. inventory,
separation of processes, safety barriers), Hazard Studies
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- Workplace controls
- Individual operator controls
- Organizational controls
BOS principles are intended to assist all personnel involved in designing explosives
manufacturing operations, working in these and handling explosives and sensitive (raw)
materials to understand:
- The hazards associated with those materials
- How hazardous conditions can arise under normal and abnormal situations/process conditions
- How to avoid those hazardous conditions arising (prevention of ignition sources)
- How to minimize the consequences in the event of an incident (not covered in this paper)
4.1 Principles for safe operation
The principles for safe explosives operation to warrant a manufacturing process without sources
of ignition can be summarized as follows:
- Slow
- Soft
- Light
- Low
- Gentle
- Cool
- Grounded
- In the correct place
- Under control
4.2 Inherent design
4.2.1 Quantity/Distance (Q/D) approach
From a historical perspective, one of the first principles applied in the explosives manufacturing
industry is the Q/D approach, i.e. quantity and distance.
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Basically, the required distance to separation one explosives operation from another or towards
non-explosives operations and to the public (roads, railways, inhabited buildings) is calculated
by
D = k * M
1/3
[Eq. 1]
With D = distance (m)
M = net quantity of explosives (kg)
k = constant, number depending on target of an explosion
Calculating overpressure effects and the distribution of debris after simple physical equations
lead to a design to physically separate hazardous operations at comparatively large distances to
prevent the transmission of an explosion from one manufacturing process to the others, such as
separating mixing/chemical batch reaction from cartridging and packaging.

Figure 5: Q/D violated due to managing of operations (explosion chain reaction, inventory
control)
[1]

This is also valid to separate explosives manufacturing operations from public life activities.
The Q/D principle was considered for the European chemical industry after the explosion of a
large quantity of ammonium nitrate at the Tolouse/F incident in 2001 and a couple of major
releases of hazardous substances at other occasions.
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The explosives industry had observed a shift to apply less stringent Q/D principles inside an
explosives operation after the introduction of safer industrial explosives such as watergels and
emulsions while keeping those principles to protect third parties and the public. However,
incidents in the past recent years have changed this trend to become more conservative and/or to
apply the approach of QRA (quantified risk assessment) by applying mathematical methods.
4.2.2 Remotely controlled operations
There are operational processes where despite of all measures taken rare events of explosions are
unavoidable depending on ambient conditions (e.g. detonator manufacturing). In this case,
processes have been designed to be operated remotely, i.e. the operator is protected by blast
walls that can withstand the effect of an explosion and, in addition, the amounts capable to
detonate are limited to one piece (detonator) or to a small amount of explosives.
Another reason for remote or robotic controlled operations is to avoid human failure in
mechanical operations. As an example, operating a drying oven with trays carrying pyrotechnic
mixtures sensitive to impact and friction to be moved in and out under robotic control would
prevent an incident if an operator slipped and dropped a tray with the consequence of the mixture
to ignite when the tray hits the floor.
4.2.3 Type of process, conveying by gravity and desensitizing prior to transfer
Batch nitration processes in manufacturing of nitroglycol and nitroglycerin (NG), where
operators had to attend the nitration process and monitor temperature, have been replaced by
continuous nitration processes under remote control.

Figure 6: Batch nitrator for nitroglycerine
[4]

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Another principle is to not apply mechanical energy to convey sensitive explosive material, but
to apply gravity. This today is always the case in the manufacturing of NG where flow induced
by gravity is used to convey the material and density effect are used to separate the product from
the reaction mixture. This is the reason why dynamite plants have always been placed in a region
with mountains or hills and the process following the slope of a valley.
Furthermore, in todays manufacturing processes NG is transferred as an emulsion mixed with
water which is much less sensitive to effects of friction and impact. The NG/water emulsion is
then separated for further processing of the NG. In addition, mixing processes for dynamite
down the line to cartridging the final product are more and more transferred to remote
operations.
4.2.4 Inventory control, confinement, pump selection, sealings and bearings, stage of process
where explosives are present, detonation traps
Emulsion explosives (water-in-oil type emulsion containing an oversaturated, highly
concentrated (ammonium) nitrate solution dispersed in a fuel phase consisting of oil/paraffin and
an emulsifier)) are insensitive to static, friction and impact during normal process conditions
compared to classical explosives. Emulsion explosives are sensitive to heat (overheating, fire,
thermal effect from prolonged friction), especially under confinement.
The reduced sensitivity in manufacturing processes lead to the introduction of more standard
equipment as being used in the chemical process industry (pumps, mixers etc.), higher
inventories and different process steps taking place in one building. However, still having a
material with explosives properties in the process was sometimes neglected and the explosives
industry learnt this lesson after a number of severe incidents.
After these incidents until recently, much more attention has been paid towards plant design
(separation of processes) and the selection of equipment from the chemical process industry.
New emulsion plant designs are almost all continuous processes where the amount of hazardous
material present is kept to a minimum (e.g. size of hoppers, volume of emulsion mixers,
explosives limits in packaging areas) for inventory control. A similarity from the chemical
process industry would be minimizing the amount of hazardous process intermediates such as the
very toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC) in the production of carbamate pestizides.
Even though an ammonium nitrate based emulsion is a hazardous material (class 5.1, UN 3375),
it is not an explosive until it is sensitized (this is done by introducing tiny gas bubbles either by
chemical reaction or with glass or plastic microspheres). The stage of sensitization can be taken
to the very end of material confinement in pipework during processing just before cartridging
(into plastic film) or filling into containers.
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Another option is to build in detonation traps (these could be reducing the pipe diameter into an
array of (non-metal) pipes of much smaller diameter below the so-called critical diameter for
detonation (a detonation would not be sustainable below this diameter and stop) or to convey
explosives cartridges on belts at high speed to generate a large distance between those cartridges)
to prevent the transmission of a potential detonation from the main process area to further
process steps. An analogy in the chemical process industry would be flame arrestors.
Very important is the selection and the control of pumps to convey emulsion and emulsion
explosives. Progressive cavity pumps (PC pumps) are very common because of an almost
pulsation free flow. However, in a dry running or dead heading (blocked flow in line) PC pump
heat induced to continuous input of energy by friction can lead to high temperatures with the
emulsion matrix starting to decompose with the potential of a pump explosion. There have been
a number of incidents in the past with unattended PC pumps continuing to operate and eventually
exploding. Depending on the application the safety devices for PC pumps comprise pressure and
temperature trips and alarms with automatic shutoff, rupture discs, no flow detection and timeout
devices (dead man handling).


Figure 7: Progressive cavity pump (operating principle)
For transfer only application where no accuracy of flow is required, diaphragm are in use very
often as the maximum pressure is limited to the air pressure applied to the pump and dry running
conditions with heat generated by friction as with a PC pump do not exist.
In todays world, packing glands for pump and mixer shaft sealing are almost entirely out of use
and have been replaced with lip seals. The contact surface between the rotating shaft and the seal
is under permanent friction. With a lip seal worn out, the emulsion matrix would leak to the
outside and the seal would be replaced. In case of packing glands that are often retightened
within maintenance intervals, the emulsion starts to migrate into the sealing material and to
crystallize between the shaft and the packing glands. The crystals start to groove the shaft and
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with the enhanced friction the temperature in that contact area starts to rise and eventually may
lead to a decomposition of the ammonium nitrate with the risk of fire and explosion.
In addition, it is good practice and very often standard to keep a certain distance between sealing
and bearing that explosive material cannot migrate into the bearing and mix with grease and be
exposed to friction. Also, the space between sealing and bearing should not be entirely
encapsuled to allow visual control for leaking material and to avoid it to accumulate and reach
the bearing.


Figure 8: Lip seal and packing glands
It is also common to limit the number of revolutions (rpm) when using a PC type pump and not
to operate the pump towards its limit to avoid the entry of too much energy into friction.
4.2.5 Other controls of ignition sources
Static mixers are common in continuous nitration processes and in mixing and sensitizing of
water-based explosives (emulsions and watergels) versus the application of motor driven mixers
that are transferring dynamic energy into the system.
When agitators and impellers are used in batch mixers or crystallizers, it has to be ensured that a
safe clearance between the moving equipment and the inner walls of the tank/kettle is warranted
to avoid metal/metal contact and with this friction and impact. Precautions have also to be taken
to prevent distortion and the agitator or parts of it to become loose and drop into the tank when
explosive material sensitive to friction and impact is present (primary explosives such as lead
azide (PbN
3
) are very sensitive to any kind of friction and impact).
Crystallized ammonium nitrate here can start
to decompose under enhanced friction and
rising temperature
Emulsion would visibly leak prior to considerable
crystallization due to reduced contact surface
between seal and shaft and less friction
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Ball valves are a source for friction when the valve is actuated and this can be can ignition source
when processing dissolved explosives. Pinch valves in this case are a safer alternative, but it has
to be taken care that explosive material cannot migrate into fissures aging over time and
becoming more sensitive than the original substance. Friction/impact effects when closing a
valve could then also trigger decomposition that propagates into an explosion.
Screws, nuts and bolts becoming loose with the potential to fall into openings of equipment
where explosive material is processed are a major concern when explosive material sensitive to
friction and impact is present. Therefore, drilling and lacing of screws and bolts, gluing or self-
securing nuts are very suitable in prevention of ignition sources and this can be taken care of at
the design phase (definition of zones for securing).
Explosives dust and sublimate accumulate in threads (e.g. sublimed TNT in cast booster melting)
over time even when good housekeeping is applied. When loosening a thread by unscrewing,
friction is applied to entrapped material and could start an ignition. Control devices plugged into
a lid rather than screwed in or caps on nuts after equipment has been fixed are good explosives
practice.
4.3 Safe operation principles
The use of shadow boards to identify and control permitted articles and lanyards to prevent tools
from falling into the process environment are very common in the explosives manufacturing
industry. The correct use of permitted tools only (e.g. spatula from soft material instead of metal,
brass vs stainless steel to prevent sparks, conductive shovels) is a main factor to prevent ignition
sources from manual operation.

Picture 2: Shadow board for control of permitted articles
Consequent sealing of wall joints and cracks prevents explosives material to become entrapped
and accumulate and also to migrate behind light wall constructions. This eases and prevents
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hidden material to be ignited especially during maintenance work and dismantling and when hot
work is applied.





Picture 3: Sealing of cracks and wall joints
Clean floor policies, wet mats in entry areas and soft floors prevent spilt explosives material and
dust to mix with grit and the risk of ignition by friction when personnel is walking over floors.
Soft bumpers on trolleys and around corners at room entries significantly reduce the effect from
impact (shock) when material is transported on walk-/driveways from one location to another.

Picture 4: Soft bumpers on trolleys and containers

5. References
[1] Begg A.H., Principles of BOS and GEP, Lecture, XVII SAFEX Congress 2011,
Istanbul/Turkey.
[2] Johnson R.W., The Anatomy of Process Safety Incidents, Unit 1, Lecture 2, AIChE
eLearning Course ELS 104 (accessed Aug. 23, 2012).
[3] Swiss Cheese Model by James Reason published in 2000 (Human error models and
management, British Medical Journal, 320, pp. 768 770).
[4] Picture from ICI.