TRANSITIONING

TOWARD A GLOBAL LBO MARKET

By Armanno Andrea Pappalardo

The U.S. and European Union LBO markets traditionally have functioned in very
different ways. Because of sophisticated debt and equity markets, American financial
buyers have pursued investment strategies based on financing structures with multiple
layers of securities and arbitrages between private and public markets. The European
LBO market, by contrast, long has been regarded as an area of promise land but too
immature to be really interesting, as demonstrated by the preponderance of small size
deals.
However, according to the results of extensive research into trends, deal flows,
and views of LBO professionals in both geographical areas, several developments have
changed the picture. The U.S. LBO market has evolved from a deal business to an
investment business with partnerships of business and financial professionals becoming
increasingly critical. In Europe, much larger deals have been taking place as financial
buyers and capital markets have become more experienced and sophisticated.
Changes in the U.S. have been driven by an increased number of competitors,
importance of auctions of subsidiaries and divisions by public companies, and the
competition offered by strategic buyers. Together, they made the American LBO market
more difficult.
In the 1980s, capital and financial skills were the key success factors for private
equity firms, especially in larger deals. But in the 1990s, a number of additional factors
are needed to gain competitive advantage, including the capabilities to:
escape the auction trap and create a flow of proprietary deals
run the decision-making process at portfolio companies more effectively than
competitors,
add value through acting as a sounding board for the management of the investee
companies and assisting actively in the definition of growth strategies.
To gain a competitive edge successful PE firms have embraced investment strategies
based on industry specialization and development of in-house top management expertise
This has enabled them to better manage the investment risk and close deals of greater
complexity.

Deal profile evolution: from standard LBOs to deep restructuring LBOs
Companies offering both established Companies with strong development Companies needing extensive
profitability and restructuring/cost prospects due to internal or external restructuring efforts and/or
cutting opportunities growth (add on acquisitions) but with financial problems
exposed to "growing pains"
Examples of
- Peabody Coal - Knoll - Lexmark
transactions
- Duracell - International Home Food - Gucci
- Simmons - Bridge Information Systems - Pinnacle Foods
Typical active LBO
- Kelso & Company - Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe - Clayton, Dubilier & Rice
investors
- Leonard Green & Partners - Willis Stein - Thomas H Lee
- Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking - Hicks Muse Tate & Furst - Texas Pacific Group
Difficulty to raise High
debt capital based
on projected cash flow
generation
High
Changing nature
Financial Risk
of the investment
risk (financial vs
operating risk)
Operating Risk
Low
Necessity to operate in depth changes to managent systems ,
strategies and operating policies
Low


By contrast, PE firms that belong to investment banking groups have established
competitive advantage through strategies that take advantage of the existing in-house
resources. That would include financial and transaction execution know-how and the
deal-flow generation synergies with investment banking affiliates. They have chosen to
focus on highly complex deals in terms of execution and structuring while keeping a
generalist investment approach in terms of targeted industries.
While it is widely recognized that the targets management team is the key
element in a successful investment, a common flaw in many turned sour deals is the bad
assessment of the competitive situation and prospects of the industry in which the target
company operates.
As a result, industry specialization offers these advantages to PE investors:
faster initial screening of an investment proposal;
better understanding of the key issues of a deal resulting in more focused due
diligence;
easier assessment of the management team;
greater credibility with the management team and the seller;
better relationships with lending institutions that are more willing to support
investors with track records in a specific industry, proving easier access to financing, less
restrictive covenants and faster approval times,
stronger ability to assist target management after the buyout and recruit additional
talented professionals,
quicker reactions to combat problems.
Industry specialization also provides access to a flow of proprietary deals in the
targeted field, such as Carlyle in the defense industry. Although it is always difficult to
completely escape the auction trap, recognition as a leading investor in the industry can
offer a preferential position in auctions and status as the preferred buyer in the sale of
family owned companies, smaller companies, and businesses presenting unorthodox
situations.
Top executives at Welsh Carson Anderson & Stowe have pointed out that their
reputation as the specialists in information technology and healthcare gives them
preferred position in complex deals such as divestitures of corporate subsidiaries that
mainly were captive suppliers to their parents.
. The approaches towards industry specialization adopted by US LBO firms have so
far widely differed. Alongside highly specialized firms such as First Reserve Corporation
(exclusively oil industry), Silver Lake Partners (tech buyouts) or Welsh Carson Anderson
& Stowe (IT, Tlc and healthcare), there are such firms as Warburg Pincus, Blackstone or
KKR active in several different industries. Many general partners think that excessive
specialization can be counterproductive, resulting in vulnerability to business cycles.
Firms that over-invested in sectors of telecommunications offer sobering testimony to the
downside risk. However, only the largest funds can afford multiple industry teams active
on an international basis. LBO firms affiliated with investment banks tend to rely on the
banks industry expertise. Overall, the medium-sized LBO funds seem to function better
by focusing on and operating actively in a limited number of industries that enjoy
positive long-term growth prospects, consolidation opportunities, and good profitability,
and offer opportunities that may be off the screen of most investors.
Investing in LBOs with high business risk, such as turnaround LBOs, has required PE
firms to have top management skills in-house. If the target is a company with operating
and competitive positioning problems, fast, in-depth changes in several areas, such as
new organizational structures, production systems, R&D policies and distribution policies
are necessary and their introduction leaves little room for mistakes.
In leveraged build-ups, effective management of the integration process has assumed
paramount importance for the generation of value. Enthusiasm over build- ups has cooled
since many sponsors failed to integrate properly and suffered the penalties of negative
synergies in many roll-ups of the 1990s. As a result, PE investors must assess the
changes promoted by the management, provide advice based on experience gained in
similar investments, understand the symptoms of possible problems, and stimulate
appropriate corrective actions.
Two alternative approaches have been adopted to develop in-house top management
expertise.
Partnerships with operators
Many firms have forged alliances with successful business managers such as former
CEOs and COOs who typically participate in investment partnerships or similar
structures. Welsh Carson affiliates Information Partners and Healthcare Partners are
example of these units.
Besides sourcing deals and assisting in negotiations, the executives may take seats on
the board of the portfolio company, handle consulting assignments, and, if necessary,
take top management positions.
I n-house executive corps
The alternate approach is to create a team of general partners with experience in
different areas, thus having financial GPs alongside operating GPs. Both financial
and operating professionals work together on new deals. Leadership tends to be in the
hands of the financial specialists in the deal structuring and negotiation phase, while the
operating GPs take charge after buyout closes.
The partnership approach seems to create fewer conflicts between the managerial side
and the financial side, but requires the financial experts to have considerable
understanding of managerial problems. The GP model has proven to be effective with
investments in companies requiring turnarounds. But supporters of both models
emphasize that day-to-day operations of portfolio companies must be left to the business
managers.
General managerial capabilities cannot substitute for industry expertise. Even PE
firms with the strongest operating experience had serious problems when investing in
sectors outside their traditionalarea of industry expertise. For example, one sponsor
highly regarded for its turnaround skills, incurred great difficulty in buying a high tech
company mainly it did not understand the complexity of the industry. As one of its
partners explained: Even the most detailed due diligence does not allow you to fully
grasp the reality of an industry where you have no previous experience.
Alliances with corporate partners (JV LBOs) can provide valuable industry and top
management know how but aligning the objectives of corporate partners and financial
sponsors bent on maximizing value and exiting the investment in three to five years has
proved not easy to get. Sophisticated legal agreements have not always helped mitigate
the conflicts. Partnerships have been effective mainly when there was a clear mutual
definition of deal objectives and there were long relationships of mutual trust between the
corporate partner and the financial sponsor.
The following LBOs are transactions in which specialization and operating expertise
were instrumental to create successful investments
Peabody Coal: how deal execution skills can create value
In April 1998, Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking Group was approached by the
firms M&A Group with an opportunity to acquire Peabody Coal as part of a larger
transaction involving Texas Utilities and U.K-based Energy Group. Peabody Coal, a
unit of Energy Group, looked like an ideal buyout candidate because it was the worlds
largest private sector coal producer with sales in fiscal 1997 of $2.2 billion and EBIT-DA
of $457 million. The industry faced a positive demand outlook and Peabody had
guaranteed its revenues through long-term coal supply contracts. Peabody also had
experienced managers with a proven record of improving profitability and successfully
shifting production to low-sulfur coal. Non-core assets could be sold to recover some of
the price and pay down debt.
The transaction, however, appeared extremely difficult to execute. Energy Group was
the target of several competing takeover bids, including one by Texas Utilities, which
was advised by Lehman Brothers. TU did not want Peabody Coal because of time issues
related to needed regulatory approvals in the U.S. Besides the very limited deal
completion times, one key problem to overcome was that U.K. takeover rules require a
level playing field for all the bidders and, as a result, due diligence on Peabody had to be
restricted to a three-week period. Moreover TU insisted on limited recourse back to them
in case of sale of the Peabody business to Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking.
The merchant banking group expedited the examination by assembling a due
diligence task force composed of lawyers, accountants, investment bankers experienced
in the coal industry, actuaries to assess health liabilities, and engineers to analyze the
feasibility of the mining plans and value of the coal reserves that were to be used as loan
collateral. The fully financed condition posed by the U.K. takeover rules was met
through a $900 million bridge financing, arranged by Lehman Brothers, which was never
drawn on because debt financing was raised well within the compressed time schedule.
Peabody was acquired for $2.5 billion in a deal financed by $480 million in equity; $900
million in high yield bonds, and $920 million in senior bank loans. Peabodys energy
trading unit, Citizens Power, was recapitalized for $50 million so trading business could
be run despite the high level of debt at the mother company.
LBMB involvement in the post buyout life of Peadoby Coal was instrumental in
creating greater focus on cash flow measures as performance control instruments rather
than traditional measures such as EPS. In 2001, both Citizens Power and the Australian
subsidiary were sold for a total of $680 million with the proceeds used to accelerate
deleveraging of the company and later that year, Peabody was taken public. Based on the
IPO price, Lehmans merchant banking unit had doubled the value of its investment.
International Home Food: a valuable platform difficult to appreciate
American Home Products Corp. decided in 1996 to sell its food subsidiary,
American Home Foods, and concentrate on pharmaceuticals. The food business later was
renamed International Home Foods. The varied product portfolio made IHF
unappealing for a strategic buyer, while financial buyers were scared by 1995 decline in
operating profits to $69 million from $159 million, although the drop resulted from the
decision to stop year-end or channel stuffing, which dressed up results by excess
shipments to customers. Indeed, sales and profits rose in 1996.
Hicks Muse, Tate & Furst, with substantial food industry expertise, met with the
sales force and clients and was able to determine the reasons behind the1995 slide and
determine the potential of IHF. The company held important positions in food market
niches and could be an effective platform for add-on acquisitions. Moreover there was
room to improve operations and marketing policies. After obtaining an exclusivity
arrangement, Hicks Muse spent about three months crafting a deal structure that
maximized tax benefits for the seller and mapping an aggressive restructuring business
plan. The firm acquired an 80% stake in January 1997 for $1.2 billion.
Dean Metropoulos, Hicks Muses leading operating partner for the food industry,
was installed as CEO. All members of the top management team received incentive
stock options based on achievement of performance targets. Financing included equity
capital of $264 million along with a senior bank loan of $670 million and high yield debt
of $400 million.
Over the following two years and a half, IHF completed 10 acquisitions, including
tuna producer Bumble Bee with annual sales of $300 million. Dean Metropouloss role
was essential in spearheading a combination of integration and a cost savings programs to
achieve the projected synergies. ConAgra Inc. bought IHF in 2000 when sales reached
$2.3 billion and Hicks Muse recorded an internal rate of return (IRR) on the investment
of 45%.

Knoll: a PE investor as a cure for growing pains
In fall 1995, Westinghouse Electric decided to sell its office system and business
furniture manufacturing unit Knoll to help finance its acquisition of broadcaster CBS Inc.
Although Knoll had sales for $621 million, manufacturing facilities in the U.S. and Italy,
and prestigious brands, it was not performing well.
Knoll was formed by the merger of four companies but the integration process did
not go smoothly. A newly appointed CEO was implementing a drastic restructuring plan
but the European subsidiaries had just barely reached break even. Both financial and
trade buyers were worried about the final outcome of the restructuring plan.
Warburg Pincus was an exception. It established good relationships with Knoll
management, had experience in helping companies to grow, and had investments in
business product and service companies, all of which helped expose Knolls hidden
growth potential. Despite some problems including the lack of audited financial data for
1995 and possible environmental liabilities, Warburg Pincus went ahead with a $565
million acquisition. Financing included a senior term loan of $260 million, high yield
debt of $165 million, and equity capital of $160 million, including $5 million from Knoll
management.
Warburg Pincus was an activist investor, participating in all major strategic
decisions. It worked closely with the managementweekly meetings were held over the
first two years after completionto develop the company, improve operational
efficiency, exploit synergies with the other companies in the portfolio, and create a more
cohesive culture focused on customers needs. With the help of new products and
reorganization of the sales force, sale posted a 12% compounded annual growth rate over
the next four years EBIT increased from $55 to $184 mln. The company was taken public
ahead of schedule in early 1997 with Warburg Pincus showing an IRR in the 40-50%
range.

Lexmark: a textbook restructuring LBO
At the end of 1990 International Business Machines Corp. selected Clayton
Dubilier & Rice (CDR) to buy its keyboards, typewriters, and printers division. The deal
was highly risky and complex. The IBM division did not actually exist from a legal point
of view, so audited financial data were not available. Its management was accustomed to
the being part of a large company and producing outmoded but cash generating products
such as typewriters. Moreover, Lexmark was facing tough competition in its core printers
business form much larger competitors like Hewlett-Packard and Canon.
Only trust between IBM and CDR allowed them to solve several critical technical
issues from the definition of the assets, liabilities, patents, and personnel being
transferred to the new company to the contracts that covered IT and administration
services supplied by IBM headquarters and the supply of keyboards to IBM by the new
firm. In the end, the deal required 70 different subcontracts.
A critical element of the transaction was the choice for the newly named Lexmark of
the new CEO who had to be an entrepreneurial spirit capable of managing a turnaround
but well within IBM peculiar culture. IBM and CDR had to run several meetings and
interviews to identify the candidates among existing IBM top officers. CDR had to
prepare a highly detailed business plan defining key milestones for Lexmark and
estimating future cash flows as well as investments needed to strengthen marketing and
R&D.
The acquisition of a majority interest was completed in March 1991 for $1.51 billion,
including $470 million financed by equity capital.
CDRs operating partners collaborated closely with Lexmark management to
transform the firm and impressive achievements included:
reorientation of R&D towards greater reactivity to market needs and reduction of
the product development time from 30 to 15 months;
outsourcing of non-strategic manufacturing activities;
formation of development-driven organizational structure and control systems,
worldwide restructuring of the sales force, including creation of a direct sales force
that could target specific industries and establish the Lexmark brand.
When the LBO was completed, Lexmark had only one model of laser printer, no
networked laser printers, and no inkjet or color laser printers. By the IPO in November
1995, a dozen monochrome laser printers, eight network printers, one color, and six
inkjet printers had been introduced. Revenues in 1999 reached $2.16 billion and EBIT-
DA was $200 million.

The European LBO market: Big deals have arrived!
The European market was dominated by deals involving small and middle size
companies until the mid 1990s. The market turned because of:
an increasing number of large PE funds (Cinven, CVC Capital Partners, BC
Partners, Doughty Hanson, Morgan Grenfell, Industri Kapital);
changes in the cultural attitude toward financial buyers and LBOs;
development of a European high yield bond market;
adoption, mainly in the U.K, of asset-backed securities to finance and refinance
LBOs,
greater focus by European public companies on value creation.
These factors led to a rise in deals exceeding $500 million in key European countries.
According to CMBOR, the Centre for MBO research of the Manchester Business School,
all of the 20 deals with a value higher than $1 billion that closed in the 90s decade were
completed after 1996, with 16 of them closed between 1999 and 2001. The development
of the European market has been accompanied by the growing presence of U.S. LBO
firms, which opened offices in London or on the continent.

Average European LBO size since 1991










Overall LBO transaction value was negatively affected in 2001 by the economic
downturn, just like in the U.S., but several large size transactions were closed in that
same year, especially in Continental Europe, due to the need of public companies with
large debt loads to raise cash and to the decline in stock prices. Some of 2001 most
remarkable LBOs were Yell (the former BT yellow pages subsidiary bought by Apax and
Hicks Muse Tate & Furst for US$ 3.5 bln), Messer Griesheim (a German industrial gases
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
US$
mln
26
43
36
80
156
139
236
213
248
317
Source : Capital Data Loanware
company sold by Aventis to Goldman Sachs and Allianz Capital Partners for US$ 2.5
bln) and Cognis (a Dutch chemical company bought by Goldman Sachs and Permira for
US$ 2.2bln). Several other major LBO transactions have been closed in 2002.

Most significant European LBOs in the first seven nine of 2002
Target Deal Value (US$ mln) Industry Investors
UK
Pub Co 2866 retail trade eating and drinking places Cinven, Legal & General Ventures
Southern Water 2928 electricity, gas and water distribution JV LBO: Vivendi Environment and a
syndicate of financial investors
Coral Eurobet 1345 gaming Charterhouse
NCP 1195 car parks management Cinven
Brake Brothers 819 food wholesale Clayton Dubilier & Rice
Halfords 667 car and bike accessoriers retail sales CVC Capital Partners
Kiwi-Fit Holdings 500 car repair and maintenance services CVC Capital Partners
Priority Healthcare 419 healthcare services and facilities Doughty Hanson
Germany
Group of seven Siemens 1898 gas spring, heater meter manufacturing, KKR
subsidiaries ceramics products, etc
Haarmann & Reimer 1640 flavor and fragrance manufacturing EQT
Viatris 360 pharmaceuticals Advent
Atu Auto Group n.d. car part retail sales and auto repair Doughty Hanson
France
Legrand 4320 electrical equipment manufacturing KKR
TDF 1824 broadcast services for radio and TV Charterhouse/CDC Equity Capital
channels
Elis Group 1510 hotel and restaurant linen and uniforms PAI (secondary buyout)
manufacturing
VUP - Vivendi professional 1152 healthcare and business publishing Cinven/Carlyle/Apax
publishing operations
Provimi 1056 animal nutrition CVC Capital Partners/PAI
Italy
Galbani 970 food manufacturing and distribution BC Partners
Ferretti 647 luxury boats and yacht manufacturing Permira (Public to Private)
Azimut 401 asset management Apax
Other Countries
Jefferson Smurfit 3552 paper and packaging manufacturing Madison Dearborn
(Ireland)
Iberdrola high tension 581 electricity distribution CVC Capital Partners
electricity network
(Spain)
Swissport 340 airport ground handling business Candover
(Switzerland)
Source : Privateequity International, Acquisitions Monthly, CMBOR - Centre for Management Buyout Research

Except for the largest deals, auctions in Europe are still less competitive than in
the U.S. despite the increasing number of active PE firms. European buyout funds
specializing in large transactions historically have outperformed other types of venture
capital and PE funds. The middle market, especially in Continental Europe, is rather
opaque. It suffers in such countries as Germany from the lack of an extensive network of
experience intermediaries and is dominated by informal auctions where personal
connections heavily matter.
European debt markets are becoming increasingly sophisticated, thanks to the
introduction of the single euro currency. Recent deals introduced new types of securities
for Europe such as zero coupon subordinated bonds, which were used in the LBO of
Yell, and securities backed by branded whisky inventories. The growing popularity
among investors of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) is making B and C tranches of
senior loans easier to raise. The presence of a wide number of international lenders, such
as Royal Bank of Scotland (U.K.), Barclays Capital (U.K.), Bank of Scotland (UK), UBS
(Switzerland), and Deutsche Bank (Germany), and strong regional players such as BNP
Paribas (France), Intesa (Italy), ABN AMRO (Netherlands), West LB (Germany), results
in greater competition for financing LBOs.
Investors have shown considerable appetite for high yield bonds backing LBOs.
In 2001, two deals, Yell and Messer Greisheim, raised more than $500 million each. Two
unprecedented high yield jumbo issues are expected by the end of 2002 to finance
acquisitions by American LBO firms They are 600 million Euros in the Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts deal for French electrical equipment manufacturer Legrand and 700 million in
the Madison Dearborn Partners deal for Ireland-based packaging and paper
manufacturing firm Jefferson Smurfit PLC.
The financial strength of the European mezzanine debt industry has increased
over the last few years. New players such as Goldman Sachs have entered the market.
Mezzanine debt providers have been able to underwrite substantial amount of capital in
recent deals (i.e. US$ 160 mln for the LBO of the French frozen food manufacturer and
retailer Picard Surgeles) and it is considered feasible at present to arrange debt syndicates
to raise up to US$ 200-250 mln for a single LBO.
Even if Continental Europe stock markets are not and will not be receptive in the
short term to IPOs, they have become more efficient and liquid. Before the last two
years crisis, they proved to be a viable exit especially for large LBOs (i.e. Ducati in
Italy, Generale de Sante in France, Nutreco in the Netherlands, Geberit in Germany).
All European countries show a ratio of LBO investments to GDP lower than that
of the U.S. The U.K. market is undoubtedly the most developed in Europe, even if it is
still far from being as mature as the U.S. In Continental Europe, Germany, France, and
the Nordic Countries are considered to have the best development prospects.
Germany so far has been partially disappointing despite the various LBOs closed
on the subsidiaries of large public companies. Cultural barriers such as the lack of
entrepreneurially oriented managers and the preference towards trade buyers have
prevented the huge number of local family-owned medium-sized companies to generate a
high flow of deals. The introduction of a new legislation about corporate capital gain
taxes and the Basle rules about banks lending is expected to stimulate greater activity.
Market practitioners are anyway skeptical about the short term effects. Italy and Spain
saw some large deals in the past, but their fragmented industrial bases suggest that they
will continue to be characterized by small and medium-sized deals.
While English-based middle market LBO houses long have run Europe-wide
networks of offices, several PE firms focusing on large deals have opened offices inn
Continental Europe only recently, after realizing that it was increasingly difficult to
manage their business exclusively from London. The need to monitor local investments
and create a network of connections and the differences in tax and legal legislation
support the use of local professionals to manage operations outside the U.K. It is likely
that U.S. LBO firms with London offices will follow this model, as they expand their
activity on the Continent.
Only a few European PE firms, such as Apax, Permira, and Cinven, have
embraced organizational structures and investment strategies based on industry
specialization. The smaller size and lower level of competition in the European market
have historically justified generalization. As the European market grows and becomes
more integrated and crowded, it is very likely, say PE firms that have adopted a generalist
approach so far, that there will be increasing specialization. Some European PE investors
regard recruiting and training professionals with the right mix of industry know how and
the financial discipline required for LBO investments as a key challenge for the next
future.
European LBO investors long have followed buy-and-build strategies. Examples
are Advent Internationals use of French catering company Elior or CVCs use of Italian
paper manufacturer Cartiere Del Garda as platforms. But the integration problems
typical of cross-border acquisitions make the aggressive U.S. build-up approach difficult
to implement in Europe. The major European PE investors have developed in-house
expertise and resources (i.e. Permira, Alchemy and Terrafirma) to support complex
turnarounds and have proved their capabilities in managing deep restructuring LBOs of
large companies (such as Doughty Hanson with the English food manufacturer RHM).
Compared to U.S. PE houses, many European firms lag still behind in terms of
consolidated expertise in the use of deal structures with multiple layers of securities.
Over the next few years, market practitioners expect to see, beyond a flow of
major disposals by public companies focusing on the core business, substantial growth in
the following categories of deals:
Going private transactions. European stock markets tend to undervalue old
economy small and medium sized companies. Once the current turmoil is over, most of
these companies, including the ones IPOed in the mid and late 1990s frenzy, are ripe to
be taken private and involved in consolidation strategies,
Joint venture LBOs. These transactions will be aimed at carving out and
restructuring non-core divisions of public companies, as with the Lexmark deal, or
financing strategic acquisitions by family-owned or entrepreneurial companies to create
European giants.

The U.S. and European LBO markets have become increasingly similar over the
last five years in terms of the financial and business complexity of the deals. While
leverage ratios were drastically different in the 1980s, they have now become
substantially comparable. The convergence is going to increase.
Despite the current economic uncertainties, the fragmentation of many European
industries, the evolution of the legislation in favor of PE investments, and the increasing
sophistication of financial markets underscore the further potential for LBO investments
in Europe.


Acknowledgments
This article would not have been possible without the cooperation and active support of :
Russell Carson (Welsh Carson Anderson & Stowe), Charles Ames (Clayton Dubilier &
Rice), Jeffrey Harris (Warburg Pincus), Lou Pellicano and Andrew Rosen (Hicks Muse
Tate & Furst), Felix Herlihy (Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking), Giancarlo Aliberti
(APAX Partners), Paolo Colonna (Permira), Stephen Marquardt (Doughty Hanson) and
Neil Richardson (KKR). The author must be anyway regarded as the exclusive
responsible for all the opinions and information described in the article.