Cases in PALE- SET 1.

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent, Estanislao Bayot , an attorney-at-law, was charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune which reads as follows:
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicly avoided if desired, and
marriage arranged to wishes of the parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential
Respondent denied at first having published such advertisement but admitted the same afterwards, promised not to
repeat the same and alleged it was published in the Tribune only once.

Issue:
Whether the advertisement constituted a violation of the ethics of the respondents legal profession

Ruling
Yes. The advertisement in question was a flagrant violation of the ethics of his profession, t being a brazen solicitation
of business from the public. Sec 25 of Rule 127 provides that the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice
It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertizes his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practice of
mercantilism by advertising or offering his services to the public.
In In Re Tagorda, respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one month for
advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters repeatedly.
Respondent was, with his plea for leniency and promise not to repeat the misconduct, reprimanded.



Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)

Facts: Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent
judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He
commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent
Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion
to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.
Issue: Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a grave abuse of
discretion?
Held: No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He
ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of
service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.
Ratio:
The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other officials or employees of the
superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since he did not file a
motion to withdraw as defendant-appellants counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of
attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76,
February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a
constitutional right of the highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is fully
informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel de officio for such action as it
may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz Palma, L-15325, August 31,
1930)









JESUS CUI VS. ANTONIO CUI
G.R. No. L-18727

Facts:

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui, for the care and support,
free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons. Upon their death, administration passed to
Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem.

Upon death of Mauricio and Dionisio; Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the
spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio.
Antonio took his oath of office. Jesus however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or brother's assumption.

Plaintiff wrote a letter to demanding that the office be turned over to him. Not being heeded, he filed a complaint. Romulo Cui
intervened being a grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews mentioned by the founders in the deed of donation.

It is provided in the deed of donation that among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named; if not a lawyer,
the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, or failing all these, should be the one who pays the
highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.

The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws but is
not a member of the Bar, not having passed the bar examinations. Antonio on the other hand, is a member of the Bar although
disbarred was reinstated.

Issue:

Whether or not the titulo de abugado means merely the possession of a Bachelors of Law degree?


Ruling:

We are of the opinion, that the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of Bachelor of Laws degree, but
membership in the Bar. Bachelor's degree alone does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. Admission requires
passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court.

The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has
reference to persons who are licensed officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.


The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the test provided in the deed of donation that if not a
lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the
one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.

Hence, the plaintiff is not entitled. But it is argued that he is disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation,
providing that the administrator may be removed on the ground of lack of evident sound moral character. This is based on the
fact that the defendant was disbarred.

However, reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.




G.R. No. L-12817 April 29, 1960
JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and ENRIQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS: RA No. 1383 was passed creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) as a public corporation
and vesting in it the ownership and control over all existing government-owned waterworks systems. However, the municipal
council of Bauan, Batangas, passed Resolution No. 152 stating the desire of this municipality not to submit its local Waterworks
to the provisions of RA No. 1383." The municipal mayor transmitted a copy of the resolution to the Provincial Fiscal requesting
him to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle and
prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the legality of RA No. 1383 and to prevent
NAWASA from exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the municipality. The provincial fiscal held that RA No.
1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan. Thus, the municipality engaged the
services of petitioner in challenging the constitutionality of RA No. 1383.

Petitioner filed the necessary complaint and demanded the payment of P500 as initial attorney's fee. However, the Auditor
General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees because the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to
handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal council had no authority to engage
the services of a special counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality had the authority to engage the services of counsel.

HELD: The Revised Administrative Code provides:
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal shall represent
the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is
vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a
provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.

When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney
may be employed by its council.

The Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to
represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the
municipality, the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case
at bar was of the opinion that RA No. 1383 was valid and constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute
the case of the municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the
services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the
conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or
disqualification. And unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse the
performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among
others, "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is
about to enter. . . ." Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should have requested the
Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and
prosecute its case in court, pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law, the Auditor
General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees. The decision under review is
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-42992 August 8, 1935
FELIPE SALCEDO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, respondent-appellee.
In re contempt proceedings against Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO.
Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf.

Facts:
Attorney Vicente Francisco, representing the petitioner-appellant, inserted alleged contemptuous paragraph in his motion for
reconsideration read as follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for
reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means
within out power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not
want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to
denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our
utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the
public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his
thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice.

The court required him to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving him a period of ten days
for that purpose. In his answer Atty. Francisco, far from regretting having employed the phrases contained in said paragraph in
his motion, reiterated them several times contending that they did not constitute contempt because, according to him it is not
contempt to tell the truth.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent-appellee is guilty of contempt.

Held:
The SC ruled in the affirmative. This court is of the opinion and so holds that the act committed by Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco constitutes a contempt in the face of the court (in facie curiae) and, reiterating what this court said on another
occasion that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts in order that there be due administration of justice (In
re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944), and so that the institution of the courts of justice may be stable and said courts may not fail in their
mission, said attorney is ordered to pay a fine of P200 within the period of ten days, and to be reprimanded, and he is hereby
reprimanded; and it is ordered that the entire paragraph of his motion containing the phrases which as has been stated,
constitute contempt of court be stricken from the record de oficio.

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold
its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not right
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is. It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause
and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for
him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the
courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guarranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

ALAWI VS. ALAUYA
February 24, 1997
Narvasa, C.J.

FACTS:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd., a real estate and housing company.
Ashary M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4
Th
Judical Sharia District in Marawi City. It appears that
through Alawis agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units
belonging to Villarosa & Co.; and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). However, not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to Villarosa & Co. advising
the termination of his contract with the company on the grounds that his consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by Alawi which made the contract void ab initio. Aaluya also sent a letter to
NHMFC repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co. and asking for the cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith.
Sophia Alawi, upon learning of Alauyas letter to Villarosa & Co., filed a verified complaint, which includes accusing
Alauya of usurpation of the title of attorney which only a regular member of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, attorney, by the assertion that it is lexically synonymous with counselors-at-
law, a title to which Sharia lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title attorney because counselor is
ofthen mistaken for councilor, konsehal or the Maranao term, consial, connoting a local legislator beholden to the
mayor. Nevertheless, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the title attorney may be used by a person who is a member of the Sharia Bar
HELD:
NO. The title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examination, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing, and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. As regards Alauyas use of
the title of Attorney, the court has already had the occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-
fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted
to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney.


Santa Pangan vs. Atty. Dionisio Ramos
A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979

FACTS:
Santa Pangan, complainant, moved to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It was alleged that respondent, as
an attorney of record of the accused in a criminal case entitled People vs. Marieta M. Isip, used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos.
Respondent averred that his given name is Pedro Dionisio Ramos and his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, that
the D.D. in Pedro D.D. Ramos is but an abbreviation of Dionisio Dayaw, his other given name and maternal surname.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is correct in using the name Pedro D.D. Ramos

HELD:
No. the name appearing in the Roll of Attorneys is Dionisio D. Ramos. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other
than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear
that he will do no falsehood". As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness,
candor and frankness". Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to
be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In representing himself to the court as "Pedro
D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath.
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was authorized to practice
law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. The demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the
courts. The circumstance that this is his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and warned that a
repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspencion or disbarment from the practice of law.


Ui v. Bonifacio
A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000



Facts of the case:


Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on grounds of immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio
allegedly is having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui, husband of Leslie Ui, whom they begot two children. According to
petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted to him about the relationship between them and Atty. Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront
said respondent to stop their illicit affair but of to no avail. According however to respondent, she is avictim in the situation.
When respondent met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor but with children to an estranged Chinese woman who is
already in Amoy, China. Moreover, the two got married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their relationship. When
respondent knew of the real status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship. Respondent further claims that she and Carlos
Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually accept the situation. Respondent
however presented a misrepresented copy of her marriage contract.


Issue:


Did the respondent conduct herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law?




Held:

NO. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession
simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a
lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then
the continued possession of good moral character is also requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.


Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should
have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.


Circumstances existed which should have aroused respondents suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Ui,
and moved her to ask probing questions. Respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact
remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered as an immoral.
For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and to opinion of good and
respectable member of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be grossly
immoral, that is it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.

Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged
moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal
profession.
A.M. No. 598 March 28, 1969
AURORA SORIANO DELES, complainant,
vs.
VICENTE E. ARAGONA, JR., respondent.

Facts:
Aurora Soriano Deles filed a disbarment proceeding against Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. charging the latter with having made, under
oath, false and unfounded allegations against her in a motion for contempt filed in Court of Agrarian Relations cases 1254 and
1255 Iloilo, which allegedly caused her great mental, torture and moral suffering.
Issue:
Whether Aragona, Jr., should be disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed under oath the "Urgent Motion to
Declare Respondent (Aurora Soriano Deles) in Contempt of Court" in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255-Iloilo, which allegedly
contains false and libelous imputations injurious to the honor of the complainant.
Held:
No, said motion for contempt were privileged communications.
Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the view that the preparation and the filing of the questioned motion for contempt,
furnish sufficient basis for disciplinary action against the respondent.
In People vs. Aquino
3
this Court laid down the decisional authority that
[S]tatement made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged that is, privileged regardless of
defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand
or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view of this, the person who makes them such as a judge, lawyer, or witness
does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of
damages. (emphasis supplied)
Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the questioned motion for contempt are
statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 besides being relevant,
pertinent or material to the subject-matter of the said cases, they are absolutely privileged, thereby precluding any liability on
the part of the respondent.
In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever tending to prove unfitness of the respondent to continue in the practice of law
and remain an officer of the court.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

Blanza vs. Arcangel

Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion, both who are widows, filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Atty. Agustin Arcangel
for professional non-feasance. They alleged that respondent volunteered to help them in their pension claims in connection
with the death of their respective husbands who are PC soldiers. In connection with this, they submitted pertinent documents
with their affixed signatures on blank documents to respondent. When they noticed that respondent lost interest in their
claims, they demanded the return of the documents but respondent refused.
The respondent answered the complaint contending that it was due to complainants failure to advance the payments for the
photostat services which they agreed to pay. As a result, the documents remained in the possession of the photostat services.
Furthermore, respondent argued that since there was no agreement as to the compensation for his services, he is not obliged
to attend to their claims.

Issues: 1. Won respondent shall be subjected to disciplinary action 2. Won respondent is not obliged to attend to the
complainants pension claims.
Held:
1. No. The Court voted not to reprimand respondent. There was insufficiency of evidence to warrant the disciplinary action
against respondent. The complainants agreed to pay the photostat services but did not give any money for it. As a result, the
documents remained in the possession of the photostat services. Hence, complainants are partly to blame for the delay in their
pension claims.
2. Although the lawyer is not reprimanded in this case, the Court reminds respondent that as a lawyer, a member of the Bar,
his conduct must be perforce, par excellence, especially when he volunteers his professional services. Respondent has not
lived up to that standard. It was unnecessary for respondent to keep the complainants waiting for 6 years on their pension
claims and should have terminated their professional relationship instead of keeping the, hanging indefinitely.





Zoreta v. Simpliciano

Facts:

Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02 August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June
2001 due to the latters failure to honor SPACs Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor
G. Simpliciano was the latters counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a duly commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per
Certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization.

It was shown after careful examination that the commission of respondent expired on December 31, 2002. When the
respondent notarized the aforementioned documents, he was not commissioned as notary public, which was in violation of
the Notarial Law; for having notarized the 590 documents after the expiration of his commission as notary public without
having renewed said commission amounting to gross misconduct as a member of the legal profession.
Commissioner Navarro then recommended the suspension of the respondent of three months to six months.

Issue: Whether or Not the recommendation of Commissioner Navarro was proper.
Held:
The Court concurred in the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. Simpliciano did not have a
commission as notary public in 2002 when he notarized the assailed documents as evidenced by the two (2) certifications
issued by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated 04 October 2002 The evidence presented by
complainant conclusively establishes the misconduct imputed to respondent. it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not
a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A
lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading
any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend him, based
on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney, and
thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney.[20]
Elaborating on this, we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting[21] that [t]he bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency
as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing
any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity
of the legal profession.[22] Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred, or suspended for any violation of his oath or of
his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[27] the Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a
member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected
to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the
laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for
all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations
fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to
uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

1. In Flores v. Lozada,[28] the court disbarred a lawyer who notarized six documents such as the extrajudicial
partition of an estate, deed of sale with right of repurchase, and four (4) deeds of absolute sale - all involving
unregistered lands, after his commission as Notary Public expired;
2. In Joson v. Baltazar,[29] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) months since only one (1) instance of
unauthorized notarization of a deed of sale was involved.
3. In Nunga v. Viray,[30] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) years when he notarized an absolute deed of
sale of the buyer minor, who was his son and, at the same time, he was a stockholder and legal counsel of the
vendor bank, and when he entered in his notarial registry an annotation of the cancellation of the loan in favor
of a certain bank, at a time when he was not commissioned as a Notary Public. What aggravated respondents
unlawful notarization was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor of his son, who was then only
eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor.
4. In Buensuceso v. Barrera,[31] the lawyer was suspended for one (1) year when he notarized five (5) documents
such as a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale and a contract to sell, after
his commission as Notary Public expired.
Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and as a member of the
Philippine Bar. However, the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP must be increased. Respondent must
be barred from being commissioned as a notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.



A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. VS. ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO

Facts: In 2001, A-1 Financial Services, Inc. granted the loan application of Atty. Valerio amounting to P50,000.00. To secure the
payment of the loan obligation, Atty. Valerio issued a postdated check. However, upon presentation at the bank for payment
on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. A B.P. 22 case was then filed against Atty. Valerio.
However, she failed to appear in the scheduled arraignment despite due notice. Subsequently, a Warrant of Arrest was issued
but Atty. Valerio posted no bail. Complainant then sent a letter to Atty. Valerio calling her attention to the issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest against her and requested her to submit to the jurisdiction of the court by posting bail. The said letter was
received by Atty. Valerio, as evidenced by the postal registry return card but Atty. Valerio refused to abide. The complainant
then filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Valerio before IBP. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required Atty.
Valerio to file an answer, but she did not file any responsive pleading at all. However, in a letter, the respondents mother
explained that her daughter had been diagnosed with schizophrenia; thus, could not properly respond to the complaint against
her. IBP-CBD recommended Atty. Valerio be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, having found her
guilty of gross misconduct. IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification of the period of suspension to 1
year.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes. In the instant case, Atty. Valerios conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is a matter of serious
concern. She failed to answer the complaint against her despite due notice and failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by
the IBP. She also ignored the proceedings before the court as she likewise failed to both answer the complaint against her and
appear during her arraignment, despite orders and notices from the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty
to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court, likewise, finds unmeritorious Mrs. Valerios justification that
her daughter, Atty. Valerio, is suffering from a health condition, i.e. schizophrenia, which has prevented her from properly
answering the complaint against her. Indeed, we cannot take the medical certificate on its face, considering Mrs. Valerios
failure to prove the contents of the certificate or present the physician who issued it.