Hylas begins by saying his problem is when men "who are supposed to have spent their whole time

in the pursuits of knowledge" (ie. Descartes), "profess an

entire ignorance of all things" (start by doubting everything) or conceive fantastical 'truths'. Philonous says that the method of discarding all metaphysical notions
to rely solely on nature and common sense, has given him a sort of 'enlightenment'. He also believes that there is no such thing as what philosophers call
'material substance', to which Hylas calls him a sceptic. Philonous shuts him down by getting him to admit the definition of a sceptic is one who doubts
everything, and does not have a certain opinion about any particular point.

Hylas then redefines sceptism to include the denial of reality and the 'truth of sensible things'. They then define sensible things to be those perceived by the
senses immediately, rather than mediately (eg. letters in a book rather than the concepts they represent). Philonous explains that the only sensible things are
concepts, and nothing material can actually be a sensible thing (As the things perceived immediately include light and colour and sound, but not the source of
these or objects one is looking at/hearing).

They define real existence as being able to exist without the mind. They discuss heat, and Hylas says that being able to differentiate between degrees of heat
(and being able to sense greater heat more easily) makes us more certain of its existence. Philonous then shows that there is no distinction between intense heat
and pain, one sensation is felt - but it appears to be both heat and pain - and these are both perceived immediately by the senses. They then agree that you
cannot experience any intense sensation without there also being attached a feeling of pain or pleasure. But also, one cannot ponder a general idea of pain or
pleasure, without associating it with another feeling (heat, taste, smell etc). They discover that intense heat then cannot exist without the mind, and also any
degree of heat (for warmth can be associated with pleasure, as intense heat can be with pain).

Philonous shows that an absurdity can be believed - that something can be both hot and cold at the same time - by considering what happens when one of your
hands is cold, the other hot, and they are both placed into the same container of water. They talk about how different types of pain are experienced the same
way, thus concluding that pain is a separate thing from that which causes it (?). In this manner, they show that all sensible qualities cannot exist without the
mind, as everything can be related to either pleasure or pain. Philonous argues that taste cannot be inherent in food, as different people have different opinions
of the food; similarly for odours.

Sound is shown to be an obscure idea in that it is caused by motion in the air (motion is usually sensed by sight or touch) and yet we cannot see or feel sound,
nor can we heard motion. They then show that sound also cannot exist without the mind.
Of colours, Hylas says "each visible object hath the colour we see in it", implying that visible objects are corporeal, but since they are perceived by sight - are
also sensible qualities - therefore making no distinction between corporeal substance and sensible qualities (thus corporeal substances do not exist without the
mind). They try to make a distinction between apparent colours and real colours, and Hylas defines apparent as those that vanish as one gets closer to them. So
microscopes show the true colour of objects - but this is always different to that which is seen by the naked eye - colour is now an obscured and confused
concept. Also, animals perceive colour differently to humans.

Hylas classes all those previously mentioned concepts as 'secondary' sensible qualities, while 'primary' ones are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and
Rest - and claims these have separate existence in bodies without the mind. Philonous then proves these to be of existence only within the mind. Extension- for it
is perceived differently by smaller and larger animals, and also because our perception of an object's extension changes as we move closer or further from it.
Philonous adds that it is hard to imagine any sort of material substance existing without inherent extension. Motion - for swiftness/slowness is differently
measured for different bodies. Solidity - hardness/resistance are also relative to our senses (different for different bodies). Motion, solidity and Gravity/Rest are
all denied existence as they suppose extension (which has already been proved to have no real existence).

They then insinuate that Descartes is incorrect in doubting secondary sensible qualities' existence, yet accepting primary sensible qualities' existence. But say
that his reason for believing so may be due to the connection of pleasure and pain to secondary, but not primary. He relates that the primary indifferent (to
pleasure/pain) sensations having real existence while secondary don't - to the idea previously that moderate heat has real existence while intense heat doesn't.

Now they discuss absolute extension (as opposed to sensible extension - with the range of great to small) likewise with absolute motion (disregarding
swiftness/slowness). But there is a universal maxim that 'everything which exists is particular' - ie. has a particular measurement of motion or extension etc. and
these cannot be claimed to exist if other measurements of it don't. Philonous shows that you cannot conceive motion or extension without assigning to it a
measurement. For this reason Philonous claims that one cannot frame abstract ideas at all (even by pure intellect).

Hylas now tries to see whether an object can have existence without the mind (even though the sensations caused by it may not have existence). This existence
would be in some unthinking substance. Philonous shuts this idea down. He says the mind is said to be active if there is volition coupled with its perceptions. He
separates the idea of 'smelling' an object from the actions (breathing air in) done to achieve that.
One 'sees' passively - by perceiving lights and colours, rather than actively - by opening and shutting ones eyes.
Hylas tries to conceive a tree existing unperceived and unthought of.

Philonous revisits Descartes argument of dreaming vs reality. He also explains the reason visible objects change size as you get closer - suggesting that you are
in fact seeing a continual stream of multiple objects (?). Since distance is perceived and does not exist out of the mind, Philonous asks whether any idea can exist
outside the mind. Hylas wants to make a distinction between the 'ideas' of objects, and the 'real, external' objects that these ideas represent. He does this by
saying he can perceive real things immediately eg. Julius Caesar, by looking at a 'picture' (ie. idea) of him. Philonous explains why this is erroneous (I don't really
get it), and concludes that since he has gotten Hylas to deny the reality of sensible things, Hylas must admit that he is a downright sceptic.