Plato's Cratylus addresses philosophical questions about language

The Significance of Plato's "Cratylus"
Author(s): Georgios Anagnostopoulos

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Dec., 1973), pp. 318-345
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PLATO'S CRATYLUS
GEORGIOS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
JLn
the introduction to his translation of the
Cratylus
H. N.
Fowler
explains
the nature and assesses the
significance
of the dia
logue
in the
following
words :
The
Cratylus
cannot be said to be of
great importance
in the
develop
ment of the Platonic
system,
as it treats of a
special subject
somewhat
apart
from
general philosophic theory;
its interest lies rather in its
technical
perfection
and in the fact that it is the earliest extant
attempt
to discuss the
origin
of
language. Linguistic
science was in Plato's
day
little more than a
priori speculation,
not a real science based
upon
wide
knowledge
of
facts;
but this
dialogue
exhibits such
speculation
conducted with
great brilliancy
and remarkable common sense.1
Fowler's view that the
Cratylus
is concerned with the
origin
of lan
guage
and that it is not of
great philosophical significance
is shared
by many
other schoars
among
whom we
may
include A. E.
Taylor,
Paul
Shorey,
W.
Lutoslawski,
U.
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,
and Paul
Friedl?nder.2 It is
undoubtedly
true that the
Cratylus
deals with
a
problem?what
Fowler calls "a
special subject"?which
is not dis
cussed in
any
other of Plato's
dialogues.
And it is
perhaps
this fact
1
Plato,
"The Loeb Classical
Library,"
Vol. VI
(Cambridge:
Harvard
University Press, 1953),
p.
4.
2
Cf. A. E.
Taylor,
Plato: The Man and his Work
(New
York: Meridian
Books, 1956), p. 78;
Paul
Shorey,
What Plato Said
(Chicago: University
of
Chicago Press, 1933), p. 259;
W.
Lutoslawski,
The
Origin
and Growth
of
Plato1 s
Logic (London: Longmans, 1897), p. 228;
U. Wilamowitz-Moelen
dorff,
Platon
(Berlin, 1959), pp. 220-29;
G. S.
Kirk,
"The Problem of
Cratylus,"
American Journal
of Philology, LXXII, 1951, p. 226;
Paul Fried
l?nder, Plato,
An Introduction
(New
York:
Harper
and
Row, 1964), p. 32,
writes
: "The
Cratylus
is much more like a
medley
of
merry pranks
than
a
scientific treatise in
linguistics;" also,
Max
Leky,
Plato als
Sprachphilosoph
(Paderhorn, 1919).
For other views about the
scope
of the
Cratylus,
cf.
Proclus,
In Platonis
Cratylum Comment;
K. Lorenz and J.
Mittelstrass,
"On
Rational
Philosophy
of
Language
: The
Programme
in Plato's
Cratylus
Re
considered," Mind, LXXVI;
R. H.
Weingartner, "Making
Sense of the
Cratylus,11 Phronesis, XV, I, 1970;
Norman
Kretzmann,
"Plato
on the
Correctness of
Names,"
American
Philosophical Quarterly, 8, April, 1971;
and the
works,
which I think contain
some of the most
perceptive
discussion
of the
dialogue, by George Grote, Plato,
II and Richard
Robinson,
"The
Theory
of Names in Plato's
Cratylus,17
"A Criticism of Plato's
Cratylus,11
in
his
Essays
in Greek
Philosophy (Oxford:
Oxford
University Press, 1969).
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 319
coupled
with the claim that the
"special subject"
with which the
dialogue
deals is the
origin
of
language
that has led
many
scholars to
the conclusion that the
Cratylus
is of no
philosophical significance.
Although
it is not
altogether
clear how this conclusion follows from
the
premises, logical validity
will not be
our concern here.
Instead,
I will
argue
here that neither the
premise
that the
dialogue
is con
cerned with the
origin
of
language,
nor
the conclusion that it is of
no
philosophical significance,
is true in the
case of the
Cratylus.
In section I of what
follows,
I will
briefly
discuss the reasons for
taking
the
Cratylus
to be concerned with the
origin
of
language
and
explain
what the
question
is which concerns Plato in the
Cratylus,
viz.,
what is the correctness of names? I will then state the two
answers to this
question
he
considers, i.e.,
conventional and natural
correctness
; finally,
I will
explain
the criticisms that Plato advances
against
the two answers
and,
in
particular,
the sense in which he
"believed" the
theory
of the natural correctness of names. In sec
tion
II,
I will turn to the
question
of the
significance
of the
dialogue.
By
this I mean to
try
to answer the
following
two
questions
:
1) Why
does Plato raise the
question
of the correctness of names in the first
place? i.e.,
What
philosophical problem
is he
trying
to solve
by
seeking
a
theory
about the correctness of names? and
2)
How would
each of the two theories about the correctness of names examined in
the
Cratylus
solve Plato's
problem?
We shall then see that the
importance
of the
dialogue
for us is not so much that it is the first
attempt
at
providing
an
empirical linguistic theory,
nor that it is
the earliest extant
attempt
to discuss the
origin
of
language;
but
rather that it is
perhaps
the earliest
attempt
to solve
a
perennial
about the relation between the nature and
structure of
language
and the nature and structure of the world in
order to use our
knowledge
of the nature and structure of the former
to arrive at
knowledge
of the nature and structure of the latter.
I
Is the
Cratylus
concerned with the
origin
of
language?
This
question
is difficult to
answer, partly
because it is not
altogether
clear what we are
supposed
to understand
by
"the
origin
of
language,"
and
partly
because it is not obvious what kind of evidence would
show that the
Cratylus is,
or is
not,
concerned with the
origin
of
language. Depending
on
what we
understand
by
"the
origin
of
320 GEORGIOS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
language"
we
might
find some remarks in the
dialogue
that seem to
say something
about the
"origin"
of
language, but,
I will
argue here,
to take these remarks as
evidence that the
dialogue
is about
(or
is
concerned
with)
the
origin
of
language
is a
mistake.
We cannot however here deal with all the
possible ways
of under
standing
"the
origin
of
language."3
Let us
focus on
the most im
portant
ones or on
those for which we can find some
relevant remarks
in the
dialogue.
For our
purposes
then we
might say
that when ask
ing
about the
origin
of
language
one
might
be
asking
for an
empirical
theory (or account)
of :
(a)
the conditions that
give
rise to
language
;
(b)
the function of
language;
or
(c)
the
"history"
of
language:
that
is,
its
original
form and how it
developed
into its
present form,
or
the
way?e.g., by
an act in contrast to a
natural
development?
language
came into
being,
or
the
beings
that created
language.
Though (a)
seems
intuitively
to be what one
concerned with the
origin
of
language
should be
seeking, hardly any
philosophers
have
tried to find the conditions that
give
rise to
language.
Plato in the
Cratylus
is not
searching
for the conditions that
give
rise to
language
:
this is not what Socrates and his interlocutors
discuss,
and he
produces
no
empirical (or
any
other kind
of) theory
as a
potential
answer to
such a
question.
Now there is
a sense in which what satisfies
(a)
might
be
an account
describing
the
need(s)
which
give
rise to lan
guage,
and this is often the
way
philosophers
have
interpreted (a).
Interpreting (a)
this
way
brings
out
clearly why philosophers
have
almost
always
taken it to be connected with
(b)
:
they
take the need
that
gives
rise to X to be the function that X
has, performs,
or
fulfills.
Thus Locke
speaks
of our
need to communicate our ideas as
giving
rise to
language,
where
communicating
our
ideas is the function of
language
;
and Russell
thought
at some
point
that our
need for com
manding
others is what
gives
rise to
language, commanding
others
being
the function of
language
at least in the
early stage
of its
develop
ment.4 One
might question
the
sense or
explanatory power
of such
accounts,
but this is not our concern
here. Our concern is with
3
For a useful discussion of the
problem
of the
origin
of
language
see
J.
Diamond, History
and
Origin of Language (New
York:
Philosophical
Society, 1959).
4
Cf.
Locke,
An
Essay Concerning
Human
Understanding;
Book
III,
ch.
2;
and B.
Russell,
An
Inquiry
into
Meaning
and Truth
(Baltimore:
Penguin Brooks, 1965),
ch. 1.
settling
the
question
whether Plato in the
Cratylus
was
searching
for,
or
gives,
such an account of the
origin
of
language.
It is true
that at one
point (423A-C)
Plato discusses some
possible ways,
or
means,
we
might employ
if we wished or
needed to
represent (?rj\ovv)
the nature of
things, e.g., by
means of
gestures, signs.
One such
way
is with
language
or names. It is
clear, however,
that what he is
searching
for is not the need that
gives
rise to
language (names),
but
the
necessary
and sufficient conditions that a
phonetic unit,
and
specifically
a
simple
one,
must fulfill in order to do what it is
supposed
to do: to
represent
or
reveal
(?rjXovv)
the nature of
things.
That
this is what Plato is
searching
for is clear from the statement of the
problem by
Socrates at 422E :
Well, then,
how can the earliest
names,
which are not as
yet
based
upon any others,
make clear to us the nature of
things,
so
far as
that
is
possible,
which
they
must do if
they
are to be names at all ?
And it is also clear from the conclusion of this
part
of the
discussion,
a
conclusion
concerning
the
necessary
and sufficient conditions for
naming,
and not
concerning
the need that
gives
rise to
language
(names)
:
A
name, then,
it
appears,
is a
vocal imitation of that which is
imitated,
and he who imitates with his voice names that which he imitates
(423B).
Let us now
consider the second
possible interpretation
of "the
origin
of
language,"
that
is,
our
interpretation (b).
Is
giving
the
function of
something giving
an account of its
origin? Intuitively
this seems not to be so in
many
cases.5 But let us assume that it
is so
since
philosophers
have
always
been concerned with the function
of
language.
Is the
Cratylus
then
a
search
for,
or
concerned
with,
the function of
language?
It is true that at one
point (388B)
Plato
(or Socrates)
raises
a
question
about the function of
language (names)
and offers
a
ready
answer to it. But it is clear from the
argument
5
E.g.,
an
account of the function of the heart need not be an account
of its
origin.
More
importantly
some
philosophers
have claimed that
giving
the function of
something
is
giving
an
essential attribute of
it,
whereas
the
origin
of
something
is an
empirical
account. This is
certainly
the view
of both Plato and Aristotle who
gave
a
metaphysical interpretation
to the
problem
of essence
;
for a recent more
linguistic
or
conceptual interpretation
of
this,
cf.
Philippa Foot,
"Goodness and
Choice," Proceedings of
the Aristo
telian
Society, Supl.
Vol. XXXV
(1961),
where it is claimed that the
function of some
things
is
part
of the
meaning
of their names.
that the
reason this
question
is raised is that an answer to it can also
be used for
answering
the main
question
of the
dialogue: i.e.,
the
question
of the correctness of names. This is clear
again
from the
conclusion the
argument
reaches at
389C-390, i.e.,
the conclusion
that certain conditions
(Plato
terms them "natural
correctness")
are
necessary
in order that a
phonetic
unit
perform
the function of
naming.
We
might
say
then that an account of the function of names
is needed for
solving
some other
problems,
and Plato does offer
a
brief account which is indeed difficult to understand. But this is
not what the
participants
in the
dialogue
are
primarily
concerned
with
:
Socrates and his interlocutors do not
discuss, debate,
or
examine
the
question
of the function of
language
and
they
do not consider
alternative theories of the function of
language.
The
quest
for the
origin
of
language
in sense
(c),
the
"history"
of
language,
sometimes takes the form of a
question
about its
original
form and its
development
into its
present
form from the
original
one :
Russell,
for
example,
considers the
possibility
that
language
in its
original
form consisted of
imperatives,
from which its
present
diver
sity
of forms
developed.
There seem to be two sets of remarks that
might
lead
someone to
suppose
that the
Cratylus
is concerned with
the
origin
of
language
in the above sense. The first consists of
Socrates' remarks in the later
part
of the
dialogue
about the
changes
language
has
undergone, mostly
for the worst from an
earlier more
perfect
state. These remarks have
not,
and I think
correctly,
been
taken
seriously by many;
but even if
they
are taken
seriously they
hardly provide
any
evidence that the aim of the
dialogue
is to
give
an account of the
origin
of
language by discovering
its
original
state and
showing
how its
present
form
emerged
from that
original
state. The other set of remarks that
might
lead one to
suppose
that
Plato is concerned with the
origin
of
language
as the
original
form of
language
and its
subsequent development
consists in Socrates' dis
cussion of
simple
names :
the
particles (elements)
out of which the
rest of the
names are made. Plato himself calls these
simple
names
"first"
or
"earliest"
(xpc?ra)
names in contrast to the
complex
ones
which he calls "latest"
(Cerrara) (422C, D). This, however,
should
not mislead
us. For
although
Plato talks about the "first"
(simple)
names out of which
language might
be
constructed,
he thinks of
"first" names here in the
logical
sense and not in the
temporal
sense?
although they might
be
temporally
first also. This
point
is clear
from the
passage
where he embarks
upon
the discussion of
simple
names,
where he calls these basic
particles
of
language
not
"first,"
or "earliest"
names,
but the "elements"
(aroLxela)
and
goes
on to
make clear what he understands
by
"element."
But let us bear in mind that if a
person
asks about the words
by
means
of which names are
formed,
and
again
about those
by
means of which
those words were
formed,
and
keeps
on
doing
this
indefinitely,
he
who answers his
questions
will at last
give up ;
will he not?.
. .
Now at
what
point
will he be
right
in
giving up
and
stopping?
Will it not
be when he reaches the names which are the elements
(aroixela)
of
the other names and words? For
these,
if
they
are
the
elements,
can no
longer rightly appear
to be
composed
of other names. For
instance,
we said
just
now that
?Ya#??>
was
composed
of
ayaarap
and
?obv,
and
perhaps
we
might say
that ?obv was
composed
of other
words,
and those still others
;
but if we ever
get
hold of a word which is
no
longer composed
of other
words,
we should be
right
in
saying
that
we had at last reached an element
(orrouxelov),
and that we must
no
longer
refer to other words for its derivation
(421E-422B).
It is clear from the above that Plato's concern here is with the
ques
tion of
analysis
or definition of names
by analysis,
which is a
logical
question
and
procedure,
and not with the
development
of
language
from
an
earlier and
simpler
state.
There
are two other
ways
of
understanding (c),
the
origin
of
language
as its
"history" (which
have been more
influential in the
traditional
interpretations
of the
Cratylus
and for which the textual
evidence for
taking
the
dialogue
to be about the
origin
of
language
seems to be
stronger
than
anything
we have discussed so
far).
The
first is to take
(c)
to be a
quest
for the
way(s) language
came into
being.
Thus Plato talks about "conventions"
(^vv?rjxrj)
and
"agree
ments"
(ofjidkoyia) by
which names are
given
and contrasts this view
to another that claims that names have some
particular relationship,
described
as a "natural
correctness,"
to what
they
name.
And
many
have taken this as evidence that the
dialogue
is about the
origin
of
language
since it tries to determine whether names are
posited,
or
come into
being, by
an act of convention and
agreement.6 This,
how
ever,
is a total
misunderstanding
of what Plato is
doing
here. In the
first
place
the distinction between names
by
convention and
agree
ment on
the one hand and natural names on
the other is not a distinc
6
Cf. R.
Robinson,
"The
Theory
of Names in Plato's
Cratylus,11 op.
cit.,
pp.
110-16 for an excellent discussion and criticism of the views of
Proclus,
Leky, Steinthal,
A. E.
Taylor
and others
who,
claim that Plato's
problem
is
to find whether
language (names)
has been
posited
or
is natural.
tion between names that are
posited by
an act
(convention
or
agree
ment)
and names that are not
posited.
For
clearly
the
theory
which
Plato contrasts to conventionalism does not claim that names are not
posited
in some
way
or other. Plato often talks about the
name
maker or
lawgiver
that makes or
gives
the
naturally
correct names.
Moreover,
actual acts of
agreement
or
convention are not even nec
essary
for what Plato calls "names
by
convention
or
agreement."
When he
comes to
explain
at 435A-B what convention and
agreement
amount
to,
he
clearly
states that custom or
habit would do as well
for his
purposes?and
no one would want to call these acts. This
is
not,
of
course, surprising
at all.
For,
in the second
place, questions
about convention
or
agreement
and natural relation in names are not
questions
about the
way
names come into
existence,
but
questions
about the
way
names are correct
(see below), although
an answer
to this
question might imply
an answer to the
question
about the
way
names came about. We
can
say
then that when Plato is
trying
to determine whether names are conventional or
natural his concern
is not so much
a concern with the
"history"
of
names,
as with the
necessary
naming?and determining
the
latter is not an
empirical question.
The last
way
of
understanding (c)
is as a
question
about the
beings
that created
language.
And this
way
of
understanding
it
has
undoubtedly
been the most influential in
advancing
the claim
that the
Cratylus
is about the
origin
of
language.
Here one would
cite
as
support
of his claim Plato's remarks about the
"namemaker,"
"lawgiver,"
"the ancient wise men who made names." As Richard
Robinson
says,
these
remarks, presenting
a
picture
of a man
(or men)
who created
language,
have led some scholars to claim "that Plato
is
trying
to write
a
history here, trying
to describe what
happened
when
men
began
to talk."7 Robinson seems to me to be
right
when
he
argues
that the
figure
of the "namemaker" has been misconstrued
as an actual historical
figure.
Yet he
goes
to the other extreme him
self when he claims that the namemaker
or
lawgiver
is a
myth
for
Plato.
Something
which is not
history
need not be
myth
:
it
might
be
something
of much
greater importance
than either
history
or
myth
in relation to certain
philosophical questions.
Robinson seems to
see this himself when he writes that "he
[the
namemaker
or
lawgiver]
7
Ibid., pp.
105-06.
is someone who
ought
to exist if names are to be
correct,
rather than
someone who has existed."8 But if Plato
argued
that the
lawgiver,
or
namegiver, ought
to exist if names are to be
(naturally) correct,
it is not
simply
a
myth
for him?it is a
consequence
of some other
views
or
claims. It
seems,
as it will be
explained later,
that the
figure
of
a
lawgiver,
or
namemaker,
is an
important
element in one
view of what Plato calls "the correctness of names"?as
important
as social contracts or
non-deceiving gods
are for some
other
philo
sophical positions.
In
any
case Plato's remarks about namemakers
and
lawgivers
are not to be taken
as
evidence that the aim of the
dialogue
is to find what
beings
created
language,
since Plato's remarks
are not meant to be about
any
such historical
beings.
What then is the
question
of the
Cratylus?
The
question
of the
dialogue
is about the correctness
(?p?brns)
of names. It is stated at
the
opening
of the
dialogue
:
this is what
Hermogenes
and
Cratylus
are
discussing,
and
they
then invite Socrates to take
part
in their
dispute. Indeed,
almost the whole of the
dialogue
is an
attempt
to
find
an answer to the above
question
or to examine some answers to
it and their
consequences.9
But what is this
question?
A name
for Plato is a
certain
sound, phonetic
unit or
segment ;
it
is,
as Plato
calls it
(383B),
a
part
of our voice
(?x?piov
(p
vijs)
that is used to name
something.
The
question
of the
dialogue
is then this: What is the
relation
(the necessary
and sufficient
conditions)
between
a
phonetic
unit P and a
"thing" (entity)
T in order that P be the name of T?
Or,
as Plato sometimes
puts
it :
What is the relation between P and T
such that P means what it names
(T)
? It is in
response
to this
ques
8
Ibid.
9
It
might
be useful at this
point
to
give
a brief outline of the structure
of the
dialogue.
The Bound with
Hermogenes:
A. Statement of the various
claims of conventionalism and natural correctness
(383-385B) ;
B. Criticism
of one form of conventionalism :
naming by
fiat
(385-386E) ;
C. Criticism
of the main thesis of conventionalism and
development
of an
argument
in
terms of the function of names in
support
of natural correctness
(386E-391) ;
D.
Etymological
accounts of
many
names and an account of what the rela
tion of natural correctness is
(391-428).
The Bound with
Cratylus:
E. A
consequence
of the
theory
of natural correctness: true-false and correct
incorrect names
(428-434C) ;
F. An
argument against
the claim that natural
correctness is a
necessary
condition for
naming (434C-435D);
G. The
problem
of
acquiring knowledge
of
things:
whether it
can
and should be
acquired through
the names of
things
or
the
things
themselves
(435D-439C) ;
H. The nature of the
objects
of
knowledge:
can
they
be in flux?
(439C
end).
tion that the two theories about the correctness of names are
given
in
the
Cratylus:
conventionalism
(propounded by Hermogenes)
and
natural correctness
(propounded by Cratylus).
The two theories in brief are as
follows.10
Hermogenes
claims
that convention or
agreement
to use P to name T is a
sufficient condi
tion for P to be the name of
T;
that
is,
no
particular relationship
between the
phonetic
unit P and
thing
T is
necessary
in order that P
be the name of T: convention to use P for
naming
T is sufficient.
Cratylus,
on
the other
hand,
claims that a
certain relation between
P and T is
necessary,
as well
as
sufficient,
in order that P be the
name of T. P must reveal
(?rj\ovp)
the nature of T in order to be its
name. And P reveals the nature of T if and
only
if the elements of
P
correspond
to and imitate
(ixiix?cr&ai) phonetically
the nature of T.
The
analysis
of P into its elements
stops
at the smallest
phonetic
units,
the
letters,
which are
taken to be the elemental names.
These
elemental names reveal the nature of what
they
name
by being pho
netic imitations
(?ja/jLelcraai)
of the nature
(ova?a)
of what
they
name
(423E).
Thus Socrates and
Hermogenes
agree
that the sound
p
imitates motion and that it
"appeared
to be
a
fine instrument
expres
sive of motion to the
namegiver
who wished to imitate
rapidity,
and
he often
applies
it to motion"
(425D). Similarly,
it is claimed that
the sounds
r
and ? imitate
binding
and rest
;
that the sounds a and
77
imitate
greatness ;
that
o
imitates
roundness,
etc. There is no doubt
that this notion of
phonetic
imitation is obscure. Plato and Socrates
seem to be aware of this. But
they
also seem to be clear about its
importance
for the
theory
of natural correctness. Thus at 425D
Socrates
says,
"It
will,
I
imagine,
seem ridiculous that
things
are
made manifest
(xar??rjXa) through
imitation in letters and
syllables
;
nevertheless it cannot be otherwise." He
goes
on to
argue
that the
relation of the elemental
names to what
they
name is the foundation
of the
theory
and unless it is
explained
what the relation
is,
no com
plete
account of the correctness of names would have been
given.
101
give
here
only
the most
important
claims of each
theory.
Plato
presents
each
theory
as
consisting
of three
different, though related,
claims.
I have discussed these in detail in
my paper,
"Plato's
Cratylus:
The Two
Theories of the Correctness of
Names,"
The Beview
of Metaphysics,
June
1972, pp.
691-736
(hereafter
referred to as "Two Theories of
Correctness").
Moreover,
if the elemental
names were found not to be
naturally
correct,
the
theory
of natural correctness would lose its
significance.
What then is the
picture
of
language
that
emerges
from Plato's
discussion of
naturally
correct names? At 424C Socrates
attempts
to
give
an account of
a
language consisting
of
naturally
correct names.
He
says
:
When we have
properly
examined all these
points,
we must know how
to
apply
each letter with reference to its fitness
(?/xot?r^ra),
whether
one letter is to be
applied
to one
thing
or
many
are to be combined
;
just
as
painters,
when
they
wish to
produce
an
imitation,
sometimes
use
only red,
sometimes some other
color,
and sometimes mix
many
colors,
as when
they
are
making
a
picture
of a man or
something
of
that
sort, employing
each
color,
I
suppose,
as
they
think the
par
ticular
picture
demands it. In
just
this
way, we, too,
shall
apply
letters to
things using
#
one
letter for one
thing,
when that seems
to be
required,
or
many
letters
together, forming syllables,
as
they
are
called,
and in turn
combining syllables,
and
by
their combination
forming
nouns and verbs. And from nouns and verbs
again
we shall
finally
construct
something great
and fair and
complete.
We
might
view the above
as a
vision of an ideal
language.
In such
a
language
its constituents and structure would
correspond
to the
constituents and structure of the world. This one-to-one
correspon
dence between
language
and the world would even be
pushed
down to
the smallest
phonetic
unit of
language,
the letter. Here then
one
would have
a
language
which is
completely isomorphic
with the
world,
its nature and structure
reflecting
the nature and structure of
the world.
Language
would
be,
as Socrates
says
in so
many
places,
an
imitation
(?i^rnia)
or
picture (e?x?p, ?^o?co/xa)
of the world. In
such
a
language
each term would wear its semantic
import
on its
sleeve. The elemental constituents would be
phonetic
imitations of
what
they
name and the semantic
import
of the
complex
ones would
be determined
by
that of their
components.
If the main
question
of the
dialogue
and the two answers to it
that Plato considers
are what we described
above,
we
might
want
to ask
:
What is the result of the discussions in the
dialogue regarding
this
question
and the two theories considered? We must answer
this
question
before we
attempt
to examine the
problem
of the
sig
nificance of the
dialogue. Although
there are minor differences of
scholarly opinion
as to what the result of the discussion about the
two theories
are,
most scholars concur that Plato refutes the natural
correctness
theory
and sides with a modified version of
Hermogenes'
conventionalism.11 For
our
purposes
it will be
enough
to consider
Richard Robinson's
position,
since it is the most forceful statement
of,
and also
gives
some evidence in
support of,
the claim that Plato
refutes the
theory
of natural correctness and
accepts
the convention
theory
of names. Robinson
argues
that Plato did not believe the
nature-theory
of names which Socrates
develops
in the
dialogue,
because
we find that the
arguments
he advances in
support
of the
theory
are weak
or
bad,
whereas those
against
it are
unchallengeable
ones :
The above evidence
suggests
that Plato believed that there is
no
natural
Tightness
of names. The
Cratylus
itself
suggests
the same
after we have
critically
examined and
weighed
the
arguments
which
his "Socrates" there
produces.
...
I conclude that the
appearance
of Plato's
distributing
himself
equally
on both sides of the
question
is
deceptive.
In favour of the
nature-theory
he
produces only argu
ments that
are weak
or
bad; against
it he
produces unchallengeable
arguments;
and he
probably
felt this himself.12
It is not
altogether
clear what it
means to believe in a
theory
of the
type
under discussion here and what kind of
arguments
can
be ad
vanced
against
such
a
theory.
So let us first see how the
theory
can
be criticized and then consider the
arguments
that
supposedly
are
brought against
it in the
dialogue
and what
they
show. We will
then be in a
position
to make some sense
of,
or even
determine,
whether Plato believed the
theory.
Now if one were to claim that X is
a
necessary
and sufficient
condition for
Y, provide
some
arguments
to
support
his
claim,
and
spell
out what X is?and this is what Plato does in
advancing
the
nature-theory?the
way
to criticize such
a
theory
would be to show
that the
arguments
advanced to
support
the claim are
inconclusive,
weak,
or bad
;
or to
show, by providing counter-examples,
that X is
neither
a sufficient
nor a
necessary
condition. We will first consider
Robinson's claims about the
supposed arguments
Plato advances in
support
of the
theory,
which Robinson finds "weak
or
bad." The
11
K. Lorenz and J.
Mittelstrass, op.
cit.
;
R. H.
Weingartner, op.
cit.
;
Paul
Friedl?nder, op. cit.;
A. E.
Taylor,
op. cit.;
U. Wilamowitz-Moellen
dorff, op.
cit. An
exception
is Norman
Kretzmann, op.
cit.
12
R.
Robinson,
Cratylus,11 op. cit., pp. 121,
125;
Robinson
goes
even to the
point
of
writing
that "His
[Plato's] writing
of the
Cratylus
may
have been
a sort of a
purgation
of the
nature-theory
from his
mind,"
ibid.
p.
122.
arguments
for the
theory are, according
to
Robinson,13
the
argument
from 385 to 386D
(i.e., part
B of our
outline,
cf. fn. 9
above)
and
the
argument
from 386E to 390E
(i.e., part
C of our
outline).
It is
not
surprising
that Robinson finds B a
bad and
a
vague argument
for
the
theory
of natural correctness since the
argument
is not at all an
argument
for the
theory.
B
is,
as Robinson is
aware,
two
arguments
:
from 385-385D Socrates attacks one of
Hermogenes'
claims
on
behalf
of
conventionalism,
that one can name
by fiat, by showing
that this
claim is inconsistent with the
position
that truth and
falsity
are
applicable
to names
;
and from 385D-386C he continues his attack
on
Hermogenes'
claim
by considering
the
consequences
of
giving
up
the
position
that truth and
falsity
are
applicable
to names and
showing,
to Socrates'
satisfaction,
that this last move leads into the doctrines
of
Protagoras
and
Euthydemus,
doctrines which
Hermogenes
is not
eager
to embrace.14 These
arguments
then
are not bad or
weak
arguments
for the
theory
of natural
correctness, they
are not
argu
ments
for
it at all
; they
are criticisms of one form of conventionalism.
C however is
an
argument
in
support
of the
theory
of natural
correctness. There Plato
argues
that a name is a kind of instrument
with a certain
function;
that in order to
perform
this function the
material
(sounds)
of names must bear
a
certain
relationship
to the
things named;
and that
names must be made
according
to certain
principles, by
the
man who has the
skill,
in order that this relation
ship
be realized. Now what is the
problem
with this
argument?
Robinson
writes,
This
argument
is not so much an
argument
as a free
development
of
the
nature-theory
on the
assumption
that
a name is a tool like
a
shuttle. It contains
no
undeniable observations like those which
attack the
nature-theory
at the end of the
dialogue.
It all rests on
the
easily
deniable
assumption
that a name is a tool like
a
shuttle.
. .
,15
There is
no doubt that there
are
problems
with Plato's
argument,
although
Robinson's account and criticism seem to be unfair to
13
Ibid., pp.
123-25.
141 have
explained
what
naming by
fiat is and how it is related to
conventionalism
in "Two Theories of Correctness" and have examined in
detail the
arguments given against
it in a
forthcoming paper
on
"False
names in the
Cratylus."
15
R.
Robinson,
Cratylus,11
op. cit., pp.
124-25.
Plato.16 But it is
questionable
that we can draw
any
conclusions
about Plato's beliefs
concerning
the
nature-theory
even if Robinson
were correct in
claiming
that the
argument
is
really
"a free
develop
ment" of the
theory
itself and "it all rests on
the
easily
deniable
assumption
that a name is a tool like
a
shuttle."
For, suppose
that Plato's discussion rests on
the
assumption
that names have
a
function and are instruments
(tools),
like shuttles
or
other instruments
;
what can we conclude from this about Plato's
"beliefs"
concerning
the
theory
of natural correctness of names?
The fact is that the
assumption
that some
things
have a
definite,
often a
single, function,
and that certain conditions are
necessary
and sufficient for
performing
these
functions,
is such a
pervasive
assumption?if
it can be called so?in Greek
thought
that one is
justified
in
drawing
a conclusion
opposite
to Robinson's
concerning
Plato's beliefs. Plato uses the model of function
constantly
and
where one would
hardly expect
it.
Aristotle, using
the same
model,
commits the
fallacy
of
composition
in
arguing
from the fact that
eyes, ears,
etc. have
a function to the conclusion that man has
a
function
;
and he sees no
difficulty
in
answering negatively
the
ques
tion: "Are
we then to
suppose that,
while the
carpenter
and the
shoemaker have definite function
or
business
belonging
to
them,
man
as such has
none,
and is not
designed by
nature to fulfill
any
func
tion?"17 If this then is their
way (model)
of
thinking, although
perhaps
a
wrong one,
we should conclude that Plato took the
argu
ment under discussion
very seriously.
But what are the
arguments
that Plato
brings against
the
theory
of natural correctness and what do
they
show? Robinson writes:
The considerations which "Socrates"
finally brings
forward
against
the
theory (434-39)
are
upon
reflection undeniable truths. The
pas
sage
is as adamantine
an
argument
as
you
can find
anywhere
in Plato.
(i)
It
certainly
is custom that enables
us to understand each other
when we do
;
and the
power
of custom is
wholly independent
of whether
the name we use resembles its nominate or
not;
and
(ii)
however
much names
might
resemble
things,
it
certainly
must be
possible
to
learn about
things
otherwise than from their
names;
and it must be
better to do so. I feel
sure that
every
reasonable
man who reflects
on these matters to the extent of
writing
or
studying
the
Cratylus
becomes convinced of them.18
le
?f "Two Theories of
Correctness,"
section III.
17
Nicomachean
Ethics,
1097b29-1098a.
18
R.
Robinson,
Cratylus,11
op.
cit., pp.
121-22.
To consider
(ii)
first
:
the
argument
from 435E-439B is
presented
against Cratylus'
claim that the
only way
of
learning
and
teaching
about
things
is
through
their names. Socrates in this
argument
denies that
learning
and
teaching
about
things
is
possible only
through
names. And this is not an
argument against
the
theory
of
natural
correctness,
but
against
a
different claim. Robinson's
(i),
part
F of our
outline, however,
is an
argument against
the
theory.
Plato here
gives
a
counter-example by presenting
a name
(axXnp?rris)
where the relation between the name and what it
names, though
a
necessary
condition
according
to the
theory
of natural
correctness,
does not
obtain,
and
yet
the name is a name. This then is a counter
example
to the claim of the
theory
that the relation of natural correct
ness is a
necessary
condition for
naming.
There is nowhere
an
argu
ment that the relation is not a
sufficient
condition. The
passage
then
is an
"adamantine
argument" only against
one claim of the
theory.
It does not
prove
that custom
(or convention)
is a
necessary
condition
for
naming,
as
Robinson
seems to
imply.19
Rather it
simply
states
that in the case of
axXrjpOTrjs
and
many,
or even
most,
other cases it
is custom
(or convention)
that enables us to understand each
other,
i.e.,
that custom
(or convention)
is
a
sufficient condition.
What we can conclude then is that Plato thinks that both the
natural correctness relation and custom
(or convention)
are sufficient
conditions for
naming.
But what does this mean for
Plato,
who
sees names as a kind of instrument with a
certain function? In the
Republic
he defines the function F of X as
that which X alone
can
do or can do better than
any
other
thing.20
In the first case X would
be the
necessary
condition for
(performing) F,
whereas in the second
it need not
be;
X
simply
does F better
(or best).
A natural name
19
In
fact,
there is no
argument
at all to
prove
that convention is a
necessary
condition. I have discussed this in detail in "Two Theories of
Correctness,"
but
briefly
Plato's discussion at this
point
could be taken as
showing: (a)
natural correctness is not a
necessary condition; (b)
natural
correctness is not a
sufficient condition
; (c)
convention is a
sufficient condi
tion; (d)
convention is a
necessary
condition. Plato
really gives
a counter
example
to show
(a)
and
none to show
(b) ;
he
gives
no
argument
to
support
(d);
and
although
he thinks he has shown
(c),
there is
really
no
argument
to show that it is
convention,
and not
something else,
that accounts for the
counter-example
he
gives.
20
Cf.
Bepublic 352E;
I have
argued
in "Two Theories of
Correctness,"
section
III,
that Plato
uses
"function" in the
Cratylus
in the sense he uses
it in the
Bepublic.
then,
even if not a
necessary
condition for
performing
the function
names
perform, might
be what
performs
this function better than
anything
else.
Indeed,
after Socrates advances the
argument
that
the relation of natural correctness is not a
necessary
condition,
Plato
not
only gives
no
argument
to show that some other kind of names is
better than natural
names,
but even
goes
on to
say
that natural names
would be
preferable?they
would be better instruments
:
I
myself prefer
the
theory
that names
are,
so far as
possible,
like the
things
named.
. . .
Probably language
would
be,
wTithin the bounds
of
possibility,
most excellent when all its
terms,
or as
many
as
pos
sible,
were based
on
likeness,
that is to
say,
were
appropriate,
and
most deficient under
opposite
conditions
(435C-D).
We
may
conclude then that no fatal
arguments
are
advanced
against
the
theory
of natural correctness. Robinson is in error
when
he claims that Plato advances conclusive
arguments against
the
theory
and that we can conclude from this that he did not believe
the
theory.
Our account has
shown, contrary
to Wilamowitz and
in
agreement
with
Grote,21
that at the end of the discussion of the
two theories in the
Cratylus
Plato
(and Socrates)
still thinks that
natural
names are
preferable
to names
by
custom
(or convention).
The account of Grote that Robinson criticizes and
rejects
is the
cor
rect account of Plato's
position regarding
the two theories :
George Grote, however,
who was a
perceptive
and
judicious interpreter
of
Plato, thought
that Plato at the end of his
Cratylus
was still
believing
that names
having
natural rectitude
were
possible
and
desirable,
though
not actual.22
Our
question
is then to find
why
Plato
thought
that natural
names,
or a
naturally
correct
language,
were
preferable
and
why
he raised
the
question
of the correctness of names at all.
II
When the criticism of the
theory
of natural correctness is
con
cluded at 435D and Socrates
expresses
his
preference
for a
language
consisting
of natural
names,
he
says
to
Cratylus:
"But
now answer
the next
question.
What is the function of
names,
and what
good
21
U.
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, op.
cit.,
p. 223; George Grote,
op. cit.,
p.
543.
22
R.
Robinson,
Cratylus,11
op. cit., p.
125.
do
they accomplish?"
The discussion then moves to a new
topic
and
proceeds
as follows
:
CRA. I
think, Socrates,
their function is to
instruct,
and this is the
simple truth,
that he who knows the names knows also the
things
named. SOC. I
suppose, Cratylus, you
mean that when
anyone
knows the nature of the name?and its nature is that of the
thing?
he will know the
thing also,
since it is like the
name,
and the science
of all
things
which are like each other is one and the same. It
is,
I
fancy,
on this
ground
that
you say
whoever knows names will knowr
things
also. CRA. You are
perfectly right.
The
above,
I
think,
can be taken
as a
clue to
seeing
the
significance
of the
dialogue,
that
is,
to
seeing
what
Plato
thought might
be resolved
by finding
what the correctness of names
is.23 I want to
provide
some evidence for the
suggestion
that the
search for the correctness of names is related to Plato's search for a
method
(or way)
of
inquiring
after and
discovering
the nature of
things.
These
problems
seem to have concerned Plato from the
earlier
dialogues through
some of the late ones. In this sense then
the
Cratylus
does not
merely
treat "of a
special subject
somewhat
apart
from
general philosophic theory,"
as
Fowler and others
claim;
but is
intimately
connected with the
epistemological
and
metaphysical
problems
Plato raises and discusses in other
dialogues.
The reasons for
raising
the
question
of the correctness of names
are, briefly,
these
:
The main concern of Socrates and
Plato,
as
pre
sented in most of the earlier
dialogues,
is to
give
definitions or
accounts
of the nature of various
things.
Certain
assumptions
which underlie
the Socratic
conception
of definition and the
procedure
of
obtaining
23
Professor D. J. Allan has
suggested
that in the
Cratylus
Plato is
concerned with
refuting
a view which
Cratylus (and perhaps
some other
Heracliteans)
seems to have
held,
that the aim of human wisdom is to learn
the
(naturally correct, true) names,
"The Problem of
Cratylus,"
American
Journal
of Philology, LXXV, 1954, pp.
283-84.
Although
some elements
of Plato's
thought
could
perhaps
be found in some current views?and this
is
quite
true with some
dialogues?it
wrould be too
strong
a claim if one were
to
say
that the
only point
of the
Cratylus
is to criticize such current views.
For, (a)
The
theory
of natural correctness is
developed
in the
dialogue by
Socrates
(and
not
by Cratylus)
; (b) Although
Plato
puts
in the mouth of
Cratylus
that the
only way
to
acquire knowledge
is
by
investigating
names,
it is Socrates who
analyzes
and
gives
substance to this view
;
and
(c)
Plato
does not in the end refute the view that
knowledge
of
things
can
be arrived
at from
knowledge
of
(the
laws
of) names, though
he does raise some
prob
lems about the
availability
of a
naturally
correct
language
and our
knowing
that it is a
naturally
correct one
(see below).
definitions
give
rise to certain
problems
about the method of
inquiring
after and
discovering
the nature of
things.
In the
Cratylus
Plato
explores
the
possibility
of
using
the name
(phonetic unit)
of a
thing
in order to
inquire
after and discover the nature of that
thing.
But
in order to do
that,
one would have to know the relation between
a
name and what it names
;
that
is,
one would have to know what the
necessary
and sufficient conditons are for
a
phonetic
unit to be
a
name. And this is the
question
of the correctness of names that
Plato raises in the
Cratylus.
Now of the two theories he considers
as
possible
accounts of the correctness of
names,
one would not solve
his
problem regarding
the method of
inquiry
and
discovery,
but the
other would. If conventionalism were the true account of the cor
rectness of
names,
then the name could not be used to
inquire
after
and discover the nature of that which it names. But if the natural
correctness
theory
Avere the true account of the relation between
names and
things,
then he would have solved his
problem
about
inquiry
and
discovery.
Plato
sees, however,
that natural correct
ness need not be the
way
names are
correct,
and also that there are
other
problems
with
using
the name as a means of
discovering
the
nature of what it names.
Nonetheless,
it is instructive for us to see
how the two theories of the correctness of names
would,
or
would
not,
have solved his
problem
about
inquiry
and
discovery,
and
why
in
the end neither could be used for
inquiring
after and
discovering
the
nature of
things.
What then
was the context in which Plato's
problem
about in
quiry
and
discovery arose,
and how would
an account of the correct
ness of names have
provided
an answer to it? When Socrates and
Plato are
searching
for the definition of
piety, temperance, courage,
figure, color, etc., they
assume that
"piety," "temperance," "figure,"
etc.,
are names.24 The basic
(primitive)
relation between
language
and world is that of
naming.
We
might represent
this relation
schematically
as follows
:
L
(Language
:
names)
a
? y
. . .
R
(Relation
between L & W
:
naming)
R R R
W
(World: things)
A B C
. . .
24
This view of the relation of words to
things
is to be found in all the
early dialogues;
cf.
some
explicit
statements of it in Laches
(192B),
Meno
(74D-E),
Charmides
(163D, 175B).
The nature of
A, B, C,
. . .
,
which is to be
given
in the
definitions,
is taken to be
independent
of
language, opinion,
and
something
that
can be known
prior
to
any language.25
In
summary
then the two
assumptions
of Socratic definition that we need for
our
purposes
here
are :
(1)
In Socrates' search for the definition of
a,
"a" is taken as the
name of
something (A) ;
(2)
The definition of a is an account of the nature of what "a" names
(A) ;
the nature of A is
independent of,
and can be known
prior
to
any language.
Now Socrates'
attempts
to arrive at definitions end in failure.
The reasons for this failure are
many
and
complex,
and cannot be
discussed here.26 It is nonetheless true that after the
repeated
failures to obtain
definitions,
the
participants
of the Socratic
dialogues
find themselves
preplexed
about their
inability
to arrive at a
defini
tion of A or
their
apparent ignorance
of the nature of what "a"
names.
Indeed,
in the Meno Plato came to see that the
repeated
failures to obtain
definitions, coupled
with certain
assumptions
about
the nature of
knowledge
and
definition,
lead one to a
difficulty
as to
how to
proceed
to
inquire
after and discover the nature of
something
about which he
apparently
knows
nothing, except
its name.27 Plato
attempts
to solve this
problem
in the Meno
by denying
that we know
nothing
about what we are
trying
to define and
by claiming
that
we
have
"knowledge"
of
things through prior
direct
acquaintance.
Therefore, inquiry
after the nature of a
thing
could
proceed
on
the
basis of what we
already "know;" by appropriate
and
persistent
questioning
one would
come to recollect that of which he once had
direct
acquaintance,
and
one would thus come to know the nature
of what he was
trying
to define.
Although
it seems
probable
that
25
That the nature of the world is
independent
of
any language
is not
even
questioned anywhere
in Plato. That it is
independent
of
opinion,
Plato tries to
prove
sometimes
against
the
sophists (cf. Cratylus, Theaetetus).
Plato
gives
an
argument
in the
Cratylus (see below)
to
prove
that
knowledge
of
things
must be
prior
to
knowledge
of
any
language,
but it is taken for
granted
in all the
early dialogues.
26
They
have been discussed
recently by
P.
Geach,
"Plato's
Euthy
phro,11
The
Monist,
L
(July, 1966) ;
and G.
Santas,
"The Socratic
Fallacy,"
Journal
of
the
History of Philosophy, X,
2
(April, 1972).
271 cannot discuss these
questions
here. I have
attempted
to
explain
these
assumptions,
the
problems
that result from
them,
and Plato's at
tempts
to solve these
problems
in an
unpublished manuscript dealing
with
some
epistemological
and
metaphysical problems
in the
Early Dialogues.
Plato never
gave up
the
theory
of recollection
altogether,
there is
no
doubt that he felt that as a
method for
inquiry
and
discovery,
it
does not amount to much. One
clearly
wants to know what the
appropriate
line of
questioning is,
and how
persistent
one should be
in order to succeed in
recollecting.
Yet the element of
prior
direct
acquaintance
seems to him to be unavoidable
and,
as we
shall
see,
it is seen as
unavoidable in the
Cratylus.
Now,
if one were to find oneself in the situation in which Socrates
and Plato find themselves at the end of
many
of the
early dialogues,
unable to
produce
a
definition and
perplexed
as to how to
proceed
with the
inquiry
after the nature of
something they
know
nothing
about;
and if one were to hold at the same
time?as Socrates and
Plato did?that what
they
are
trying
to define is what a term names
;
then it
might appear
that in these circumstances the
plausible
move
to make is to
investigate
whether the name itself of the
thing
one is
trying
to define
can be used as a means of
inquiring
after the nature
of the
thing.
And it is clear that such
investigation
must
proceed
by trying
to determine what the relation between
a name and what
it names is. This is
precisely
what Plato
attempts
to do in the
Cratylus
: to find the
necessary
naming.
In
fact,
the two extreme accounts of the
necessary
and sufficient
conditions for
naming
that he
investigates
in the
Cratylus
are the
accounts that
can
give
him a
definite answer?the one
negative
and
the other
positive?to
his
question
of whether it is
possible
to use the
name to
inquire
after and discover the nature of that which it names.
Clearly,
if the
name of the
thing
one was
trying
to define were
conventional,
there would be
no
necessary
relation between the
nature and structure of the
name and that of the
thing.
And there
fore one could not use the
name of the
thing
to
inquire
after and dis
cover its nature. There
is, however,
a
problem
here: How is it
possible
that
a user of a conventional name does not know what it
names? How would convention have been established in such
a
case? If we take "convention" here in the
strong
sense of
"making
agreements"
or
"setting conventions,"
then Plato seems to think
that
knowledge
of
things
is
prior
to
establishing
the conventions
:
Or do
you prefer
the
theory
advanced
by Hermogenes
and
many
others,
who claim that names are conventional and
represent things
to those who established the convention and knew
things
before
hand.
. .
(433E).
A conventional
language
then
presupposes
that those who established
it knew the
things beforehand, i.e.,
knew what the terms
name,
other
wise the convention could not have been set
up.
But what is it
that one
needs to know beforehand? Sometimes Plato
speaks
about
a
direct
acquaintance
with the
things
the terms name.
More often
though
he
speaks
about the
knowledge
of the nature of the
things
the
terms name.
It is
clear, however,
that direct
acquaintance
is a
weaker
requirement
than
knowledge
of the nature of what a
term
names. One
can
be
directly acquainted
with what "horse"
names
without
knowing
what the nature of a
horse is.
Plato, however,
seems to take these two
requirements
as
being equivalent.
He takes
the direct
acquaintance
of X to be some
kind of
transparent
knowl
edge whereby
to be
directly acquainted
with X is to know the nature
of X. It seems then that in order for a
convention to be established
between names
(sounds)
and what
they
name one must know the
nature of
things.
But does the
use
of a
conventional name
presup
pose
knowledge
of what the name names?
Nowadays,
we
usually make,
after
Ryle,
the distinction between
knowing
how and
knowing that, implying
that one can
know how to
use a term without
necessarily knowing explicitly
that it means so
and so or even
knowing implicitly
what its definition is.28
Plato,
however,
seems to have
thought
that there are
problems here,29
and
his
language
at times
suggests
that one cannot use a term without
knowing,
in some sense or
other,
what the term means.
When he
attempts
in the Meno to deal with the
problem
of how we can use a
term without
apparently knowing
its
definition,
or
the nature of
what the term
names,
he insists that we
implicity
know
through
some
prior
direct
acquaintance
the nature of what the term
names,
although
we do not
necessarily
know
explicitly
what the term means.
It is
possible then,
even if we assume
Plato's
own
solution of the
problem
28
Cf. G.
Ryle,
The
Concept of
Mind
(New
York: Barnes and
Noble,
1949). Ryle
seems to have held
that, although
we know what
a term
means,
we
might
be unable to
give
an
explicit
account of what it means?
conceptual analysis
would
presumably
make
explicit
what the term means
or
what our
concept
is.
Recently
however some
philosophers (Hilary
Putnam,
J. J. C.
Smart,
and
others)
have claimed
that,
in the case of
psychological
terms at
least,
we need not assume that we
implicitly
know
what the definitions of them
are,
but that
by
inductive evidence we will
discover what
they
are.
29
Cf. G.
Santas,
op.
cit.
of use without
knowledge,
that we do not
explicitly
know what a
term means : we cannot
give
an
explicit
definition of it even
though
we
implicitly
know what the term means.
Indeed,
Socrates finds
himself
using
a
conventional
name without
knowing
what it
names,
without
knowing
the definition of the nature of the
thing
to wrhich
the term
applies.
Now,
if the name of the
thing
one was
trying
to define
was a
naturally
correct
one,
one could use it to
inquire
after and discover
the nature of the
thing.
For
clearly,
such a name would be a
picture
(eix?v),
likeness
(?/xo?co/xa),
or
imitation
(/?/x^/xa)
thing.
Its nature and structure would be
isomorphic
with that of
the
thing.
If one had such
a
name,
one would have the
definition
thing.
We can understand then
why Cratylus
says
"that he who knows the names knows also the
things
named"
(435D).
The reasons are made clear
by
the remarks of Socrates
that follow those of
Cratylus
:
I
suppose, Cratylus, you
mean that when
anyone
knows the nature
of the name?and its nature is that of the
thing?he
will know the
thing also,
since it is like
(o?jlolou)
the
name,
and the science of all
things
which are like each other is one and the same. It
is,
I
fancy,
on this
ground
that
you say
whoever knows names will know
things
also
(453E).
Here then
we would have a
method for
inquiry
and
discovery:
the
science of the nature of names is the science of the nature of
things.
Assuming
that
knowledge
of such
science, i.e., knowledge
of the laws
of the correctness of
names,30
was
available,
it would
give
us knowl
edge
of the nature of the world.
Here,
to borrow
a
phrase
from
Wittgenstein, "giving
the essence of
language
is
giving
the essence
of the world."31 We
can understand then
why Socrates,
who was
seeking
definitions of the nature of
things,
would
say,
even after
30
"Knowing"?kiriaraaaai,
elhkvai, yiyv
axew?as
applied
to names
means,
as
has been
pointed
out
by
John
Lyons,
Structural Semantics
(Oxford:
B.
Blackwell, 1963), pp. 221-22, knowing
how names work
(their
nature, function, meaning, etc.)?and
this is a kind of art
or
science
(ikxvn).
But the same terms are used when it is claimed that we can know
things
without the use of names.
31
Cf. L.
Wittgenstein,
Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicous,
5.4711: "To
give
the essence of a
proposition
means to
give
the essence of all
description,
and thus the essence of the world"?but whereas
Wittgenstein
wras con
cerned with the
essence of the
proposition,
Plato was concerned with the
essence of
naming.
he had shown that natural correctness is not a
necessary
condition
for
naming,
that :
I
myself prefer
the
theory
that names
are,
so far as is
possible,
like
the
things
named.
. . .
Probably language
would
be,
within the
bounds of
possibility,
most excellent when all its
terms,
or as
many
as
possible,
were based
on a
likeness,
that is to
say,
were
appropriate,
and most deficient under
opposite
conditions
(435).
The
problem
is of course that natural correctness is not a neces
sary
condition for
naming. Although any
name
might
be
naturally
correct,
it need not be. Given
any
particular
name one cannot
assume that it is
naturally correct,
and therefore cannot use it as a
matter of course for
inquiry
and
discovery.
One must first know
that it is
naturally
correct before
using
it for
inquiry
and
discovery.
And it is
precisely
to these
problems
that Socrates turns the discussion
as soon as he
explains why
it is that one would know the nature of
things
if he knew their names :
that
is,
the
problem
of how we can
have
knowledge
that
a name is
naturally
correct. Does this knowl
edge presuppose
that we know what the nature of
things
is?
And,
if it
does, why
be concerned with names at all? It is nonetheless
important
to see that if one
knew,
in whatever
way,
that a name was
naturally correct,
then one would have a
method for
inquiry
and
discovery.
Cratylus,
who is
eager
to defend the natural correctness
theory
at all
costs,
insists that the method of
inquiry (^rrjaLs)
and
discovery
(evpeais)
of the nature of
things
is the same as the method of
inquiry
and
discovery
of the nature of their names
(436). Socrates, however,
sees that there are
problems
with
trying
to arrive at the nature of
things by examining
their names :
SOC. Let us consider the
matter, Cratylus.
Do
you
not see that
he who in his
inquiry
after
things
follows names and examines into
the
meaning
of each one runs
great
risks of
being
deceived? CRA.
How so? SOG
Clearly
he who first
gave names, gave
such names
as
agreed
with his
conception
of the nature of
things.
That is our
view,
is it not? CRA. Yes. SOC. Then if his
conception
was
incorrect,
and he
gave
the names
according
to his
conception,
what
do
you suppose
will
happen
to us
wrho follow him? Can we
help
being
deceived?
(436B).
Taking
for
granted
his second
assumption
that the nature of the
world is
independent
of
opinion
and
language
and that it can
be
known
prior
to
any
language
and his refutation of one claim of the
natural correctness
theory (that
natural correctness is
a
necessary
condition for
naming),
Socrates is
right
in
insisting
that he who in
340
his
inquiry
after
things
follows names runs
great
risks of
being
deceived. For
clearly
it is not
necessary
that the name be a
likeness
of the
thing,
even
though
the intention of those who made the names
was to
picture
the nature of
things.
We
might
view this as
probably
the first
critique
of
ordinary language philosophy.32
Cratylus attempts
to save his claim that the best and
only
method
of
inquiry
and
discovery
of the nature of
things
is
through
their
names
by insisting
that:
(a)
"He who
gives
the names must neces
sarily
have known
[the
nature of
things] ;
otherwise, they
would not
be names at all"
(436C) ;
(b)
"There is
a
decisive
proof
that the
name-giver
did not miss the
truth;
for otherwise his names
would
not be
so
universally
consistent"
(436C) ;
and the last ditch
effort,
(c)
"The
power
which
gave
the first names to
things
is more than
human,
and therefore the names must
necessarily
be correct"
(438C).
Socrates, making
some
assumptions acceptable
to
Cratylus,
has
no
difficulty showing
that none of the above
can save
Cratylus'
claim
about the method for
inquiry
and
discovery.
He first attacks
(b)
in
order to show that
consistency
is not
enough
and that in fact names
are not consistent. He then moves to
(a)
and first
points
out that
the claim that the
name-giver
must have known the nature of
things
implies
that there is
a
way
of
knowing
the nature of
things
other
than
through
their names.
Turning
to
(c),
he
points
out that we
cannot assume
the
name-giver
was an
unerring power,
more than
human?for the evidence shows that names are
really
inconsistent
and
badly given.
To
begin,
as
Socrates
does,
with
(b)
:
suppose
that names are
consistent
among
themselves. Socrates
argues
that this will not do
as a
proof
that the method for
inquiry
and
discovery
is
through
names.
Names
might
be consistent
among themselves, i.e., represent
the
world as
being
one
way,
and
yet they might
not be like the
things
they
name. Here then we have an
argument against
formalism?
consistency
is not
enough
:
But
that, Cratylus,
is no
counter-argument.
For if the
giver
of
names
erred in the
beginning
and thenceforth forced all other names
into
agreement
with his own initial
error,
there is
nothing strange
about that. It is
just
so
sometimes in
geometrical diagrams;
the
32
Ordinary language philosophers, however,
have abandoned Plato's
assumption (2) ;
as it is often
put,
no
conflict between our
language (con
ceptual schema)
and the world is
possible.
initial error is small and
unnoticed,
but all the numerous
deductions
are
wrong, though
consistent.
Everyone
must therefore
give great
care and
great
attention to the
beginning
of
any
undertaking,
to see
whether his foundation is
right
or not. If that has been considered
with
proper care, everything
else will follow.
However,
I should be
surprised
if names are
really
consistent
(436D).
But are names
really
consistent? Socrates reminds
Cratylus
what
has been shown
so far: "Let us review our
previous
discussion.
Names,
we
said,
indicate nature to
us, assuming
that all
things
are
in motion and flux. Do
you
not think
they
do so?"
(436E).
Now
Cratylus
would be the last to
disagree
with the
previous
conclusion
;
it was
there shown
(426C-427D)
that most names are
derived from
a few elemental names which
express motion?they represent things
as
being
in motion. But
turning
now to an
investigation
of another
set of
names, they
find that the elemental
names from which these
are
derived
express rest?they represent things
as
being
at rest
(437).
Assuming,
as the
participants
of the
dialogue do,
that
things
are
in motion or
rest,
but not
both,
one would arrive
by investigating
their names at a contradiction. Names then are
inconsistent.
Cratylus
is
ready
to dismiss one set of names on
the basis of their
being
in the
minority.
But Socrates insists that the
principle
of
democracy
does not
apply
to truth
:
CRA.
But, Socrates, you
see that most of the names
indicate motion.
SOC. What of
that, Cratylus?
Are we to count names like
votes,
and shall correctness rest with the
majority?
Are those to be the
true names which are found to have that one of the two
meanings
which is
expressed by
the
greater
number?
(437D).
Names are
inconsistent, then,
and we have no
way
of
selecting
those
which
represent things
in order to use them for
investigating
and
discovering
the nature of the world
(but
see the
argument
for
(c)
below).
Socrates then turns to an
investigation
of
(a).
The
problem
is
with
holding
both that the
only way
to learn and know
things
is
through
their names and that the
name-giver
must have known the
things
to which he
gave
names.
Cratylus clearly
needs the latter to
support
the former. The
question is,
How did the
name-giver
learn
and know
things?
SOC. But from what names had he
[the name-giver]
learned
or dis
covered the
things,
if the first names had not
yet
been
given,
and if
we
declare that it is
impossible
to learn or
discover
things except by
learning
or
ourselves
discovering
the names?
. . .
How can we
assert that
they
gave
names or were
lawgivers
with
knowledge,
before
any
name whatsoever had been
given,
and before
they
knew
any
342
names,
if
things
cannot be learned
except through
their names?
(438B).
Learning through
names then cannot be the
only way
to learn about
things.
But is it the best
way?
And so we come to the
arguments
against (c). Cratylus
makes the last ditch effort to show that the
name-giver
could not have made
any
mistakes in
giving
names since
he
was a
power greater
than human
:
I think the truest
theory
of the
matter, Socrates,
is that the
power
which
gave
the first names to
things
is more than
human,
and there
fore the names must
necessarily
be correct
(438C).
The move of
Cratylus
is clear. In order to make the correctness of
names certain
beyond doubt,
he claims that he who made them
was
an
unerring power.
All
along Cratylus
has been
saying
that
(d)
If
some
unerring power
has
given
the
names, they
are correct. And
Socrates does not
dispute
this claim. It is clear
that,
if the antecedent
of
(d)
were
shown to be true of some
names,
then one would know
that these names are
naturally
correct and could use
these to
inquire
after and discover the nature of
things.
These divine
beings,
or
ancient wise
men,
are
then not a mere
myth,
as
Robinson claims.
For,
if one could show that
a name was
given by
one of these
unerring
powers,
one
would then
proceed
to discover
through
the name the
definition of the
thing. Clearly, however, they
cannot assume
that
the antecedent of
(d)
is true of the names
they
are
concerned with.
Socrates reminds
Cratylus
what was shown above at
(b),
that
names
are
inconsistent
;
and this shows that the
consequent
of
(d)
is
false,
and therefore its antecedent also is false of the
names
they
are in
vestigating.33
At
438C,
in
response
to
Cratylus'
claim that a
super
human
power
made the
names,
Socrates
says
:
Then in
your opinion,
he who
gave
the
names; though
he
was a
spirit
or a
god,
would have
given
names wrhich made him contradict
himself? Or do
you
think there is
no sense in what we were
saying
just
now?
33
That Socrates has not much confidence in the "ancient wise men"
and
philosophers
comes out at 41 IB where we read:
"By dog,
I believe I
have
a fine intuition which has
just
come to
me,
that the
very
ancient men
who invented names were
quite
like most of the
present philosophers
who
always get dizzy
as
they
turn round and round in their search for the nature
of
things,
and then the
things
seem to them to turn round and round and
be in motion."
Cratylus again
wants to dismiss
one of the two classes of names in
order to avoid
having
names that contradict each other:
"But,
Socrates,
those that make
up
one of these two classes are not
really
names." And so the discussion
again
reaches the conclusion of
(b),
in that we have two inconsistent classes of names and the
problem
is how to decide which class is the class of correct names :
wdiich of the
two, my
excellent friend
;
the class of those which
point
towards rest or of those that
point
towards motion? We
agreed just
now that the matter is not to be determined
by
mere numbers
(438C).
How then are we to decide which names are
correct,
which
names are like the
things they
name? And we must be able to do
that in order to discover the nature of
things through
their names.
It
seems,
Socrates
thinks,
that in the end names are not of much
help
in
trying
to find the nature of
things. For,
Since the names are in conflict
. . .
how can we decide and
upon
what shall we base our
decision?
Certainly
not
upon
other names
differing
from
these,
for there are none.
No,
it is
plain
that we must
look for
something else,
not
names,
which shall show us which of
these two kinds are the true
names,
which of
them,
that is to
say,
show the truth of
things (438D).
And since what we want to decide is whether a name is like the
thing
it
names,
it seems that the
way
to do that is to
compare
the name
with the
thing
:
SOC.
Stop
for Heaven's sake! Did we not more than once
agree
that names which are
rightly given
are like the
things
named and are
images (eix&v)
of them? CRA. Yes. SOC. Then if it be
really
true that
things
can be learned either
through
names or
through
themselves which would be the better and surer
way
of
learning
? To
learn from the
image
whether it is itself
a
good
imitation and also to
learn the truth which it
imitates,
or to learn from the truth both the
truth itself and whether the
image
is
properly
made ? CRA. I think
it is
certainly
better to learn from the truth
(439).
Clearly, then,
if we must determine whether the name is correct
prior
to
using
it to discover the nature of what it
names,
and
we
can do this
only
if we
already
know what the nature of the
thing is,
names cannot be of
any help
in
discovering
the nature of
things.34
34
Though
Socrates here claims that the
only way
to test whether
a
name is true or
false is
by comparing
it with what it
names,
at the end of
the
dialogue (when
he recounts his
"dream")
he does
give
another
way
of
showing
that some names are not like the
things they purport
to name.
We
may
sum
up
then
by stating again
that if natural correctness
were a
necessary
condition for
naming,
then Socrates' and Plato's
problems concerning
the
inquiry
after and
discovery
of the nature
of
things
would have been solved. But once it is shown that natural
correctness is not a
necessary
condition,
then
any
particular
name
cannot be used for
inquiring
after and
discovering
the nature of
what it names
unless it is known that it is
a
naturally
correct name.
If one could know this without
having
to know the nature of
things
first,
then
again
one would have
a
way
of
discovering
the nature of
things.
Plato seems to have
thought
this cannot be done since we
should not have too much confidence in
unerring powers,
divine
beings,
or
ancient
philosophers
;
and therefore
one is forced back to
the
things
themselves.
Inquiry
and
discovery
must
proceed through things
themselves
and not
through
their names. It is hard to see what
"learning through
the
things
themselves"
or
"knowing
the
things
themselves" means
exactly,
and Plato
says very
little about it. Most
probably
he has
in mind some kind of direct
acquaintance,
a
model of
perception
and
knowledge
to be found in
many
dialogues.
It is true that Plato
comes to examine this model in the Theaetetus where he
argues
that
knowledge
is not
only by acquaintance,
but it does not seem that he
rejects
it as a
component
of
knowledge altogether.
At the end of
the
Cratylus then,
as in the
Meno,
we find that some kind of
prior
direct
acquaintance
with the nature of
things
is
a
necessary
condition
for
inquiry
and
discovery.
The
possibility
of
using
the
name to
investigate
the nature of what it names did not
prove
a
fruitful one.
And therefore
no
method of
inquiry
and
discovery
was
found. But
it is not
always
a minor achievement to show that one
possible
road
to
inquiry
and
discovery
is not a
fruitful
one. As Socrates
puts
it:
How realities
are to be learned
or
discovered is
perhaps
too
great
a
question
for
you
or me to
determine;
but it is worth while to have
reached even this
conclusion,
that
they
are to be learned and
sought
for,
not from names but much better
through
themselves than
through
names
(439B).
That Socrates and Plato found the
problem concerning
the method
of
inquiring
after and
discovering
the nature of
things
difficult to
That
is, arguing
from the conditions for the
possibility
of
knowledge,
he
concludes that
knowledge,
its
objects,
and knower cannot be the
way
some
actual names
represent
them to
be?they
cannot be in flux.
answer should not be
surprising;
for even the
attempt
to formulate
the
problem precisely,
let alone to answer
it,
was to dominate
philo
sophical thought
for the next two millenia.35
University of California,
San
Diego.
351 would like to thank Professors Gerasimos Santas and Avrum Stroll
for some
helpful
criticisms of an earlier version of this
paper ;
also
Myrtali
Anagnostopoulos,
David
Cole,
and
Aloysius
Martinich for
discussing
several
points
of the
paper
with me and
suggesting
some
stylistic changes.

Plato's Cratylus addresses philosophical questions about language

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Plato's Cratylus addresses philosophical questions about language

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The Significance of Plato's "Cratylus"

Author(s): Georgios Anagnostopoulos

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