ARGENTE vs.

WEST COAST LIFE

W/N Bernardo is barred from recovery on the basis of the misrepresentations made by Vicenta.
One ground for the rescission of a contract of insurance under the Insurance Act is "a concealment,"
which in section 25 is defined as "A neglect to communicate that which a party knows and ought to
communicate." Appellant argues that the alleged concealment was immaterial and insufficient to avoid
the policy. We cannot agree. In an action on a life insurance policy where the evidence conclusively shows
that the answers to questions concerning diseases were untrue, the truth or falsity of the answers
becomes the determining factor. In the policy was procured by fraudulent representations, the contract
of insurance apparently set forth therein was never legally existent. It can fairly be assumed that had the
true facts been disclosed by the assured, the insurance would never have been granted.

The basis of the rule vitiating the contract in case of concealment is that it misleads or deceives the
insurer into accepting the risk, or accepting it at the rate of premium agreed upon. The insurer, relying
upon the belief that the assured will disclose every material within his actual or presumed knowledge, is
misled into a belief that the circumstance withheld does not exist, and he is thereby induced to estimate
the risk upon a false basis that it does not exist. The principal question, therefore, must be, Was the
assurer misled or deceived into entering a contract obligation or in fixing the premium of insurance by a
withholding of material information of facts within the assured's knowledge or presumed knowledge?

YU PANG vs. CA
W/N the policy is void due to the concealment made by Yu Pang.
Our Insurance law provides that "A neglect to communicate that which a party knows and ought to
communicate, is called concealment" (Section 25, Act No. 2427). Whether intentional or unintentional,
the concealment entitles the insurer to rescind the contract of insurance (Section 26). Our law even
requires the insured to communicate to the insurer all facts within his knowledge which are material to
the contract and which the other party has not the means of ascertaining (Section 27), and the materiality
is to be determined not by the event but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts
upon the party to whom the communication is due (Section 30).

It also cited the ruling in the case of Argente vs. West Coast life.
SATURNINO vs. PHILAMLIFE
W/N the insured made such false representation of material facts as to avoid the policy.
The question at issue is whether or not the insured made such false representations of material facts as to
avoid the policy. There can be no dispute that the information given by her in her application for
insurance was false, namely, that she had never had cancer or tumors, or consulted any physician or
undergone any operation within the preceding period of five years. Are the facts then falsely represented
material? The Insurance Law (Section 30) provides that "materiality is to be determined not by the event,
but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the
communication is due, in forming his estimate of the proposed contract, or in making his inquiries." It
seems to be the contention of appellants that the facts subject of the representation were not material in
view of the "non-medical" nature of the insurance applied for, which does away with the usual
requirement of medical examination before the policy is issued. The contention is without merit. If
anything, the waiver of medical examination renders even more material the information required of the
applicant concerning previous condition of health and diseases suffered, for such information necessarily
constitutes an important factor which the insurer takes into consideration in deciding whether to issue
the policy or not. It is logical to assume that if appellee had been properly apprised of the insured's
medical history she would at least have been made to undergo medical examination in order to
determine her insurability.
In this jurisdiction a concealment, whether intentional or unintentional, entitles the insurer to rescind the
contract of insurance, concealment being defined as "negligence to communicate that which a party
knows and ought to communicate" (Sections 24 & 26, Act No. 2427). In the case of Argente v. West Coast
Life Insurance Co., 51 Phil. 725, 732, this Court said, quoting from Joyce, The Law of Insurance, 2nd ed.,
Vol. 3:
"The basis of the rule vitiating the contract in cases of concealment is that it misleads or deceives
the insurer into accepting the risk, or accepting it at the rate of premium agreed upon. The
insurer, relying upon the belief that the assured will disclose every material fact within his actual
or presumed knowledge, is misled into a belief that the circumstance withheld does not exist,
and he is thereby induced to estimate the risk upon a false basis that it does not exist."
GREPALIFE vs. CA
W/N Grepalife is liable to Hing.
The SC was of the firm belief that Ngo Hing had deliberately concealed the state of health and physical
condition of his daughter Helen. When he supplied the required essential data for the insurance form, he
was fully aware that Helen was a mongoloid. Such a congenital defect could not be ensconced or
disguised. Nonetheless, Ngo Hing, in apparent bad faith, withheld such fact which is material to the risk to
be assumed by the insurance company. Had he divulged said significant fact in the insurance form,
Grepalife would have verified the same and would have had no obvious choice but to disapprove the
application outright. Concealment entitles the insurer to resolve the contract of insurance.

The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith uberrimae fidei meaning utmost good faith,
absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty. Concealment is a neglect to communicate that
which a party knows and ought to communicate (Section 25, Act No. 2427). Whether intentional or
unintentional the concealment entitles the insurer to rescind the contract of insurance (Section 26, Id.: Yu
Pang Cheng vs. Court of Appeals, et al, 105 Phil 930; Saturnino vs. Philippine American Life Insurance
Company, 7 SCRA 316). Private respondent appears guilty thereof.

SOLIMAN vs. US LIFE
W/N the policy can be rescinded.
The spouses in allowing the agent to answer some of the blanks in the certificates and afterwards
stamping their signature thereon are presumed to have at least acquiesced in and approved all that had
been stated therein in their behalf.

GENERAL INSURANCE vs. NG HUA
W/N General Insurance can refuse to pay the proceeds.
Violation of the statement which is to be considered a warranty entitles the insurer to rescind the
contract of insurance. Such misrepresentation is fatal.

VDA. DE CANILANG vs. CA
W/N Grepalife is liable.
The information concealed must be information which the concealing party knew and "ought to [have]
communicate[d]," that is to say, information which was "material to the contract.
The information which Jaime Canilang failed to disclose was material to the ability of Great Pacific to
estimate the probable risk he presented as a subject of life insurance. Had Canilang disclosed his visits to
his doctor, the diagnosis made and medicines prescribed by such doctor, in the insurance application, it
may be reasonably assumed that Great Pacific would have made further inquiries and would have
probably refused to issue a non-medical insurance policy or, at the very least, required a higher premium
for the same coverage.
SUN LIFE vs. CA
W/N the beneficiary can claim despite the concealment.
Section 26 of The Insurance Code is explicit in requiring a party to a contract of insurance to communicate
to the other, in good faith, all facts within his knowledge which are material to the contract and as to
which he makes no warranty, and which the other has no means of ascertaining. Said Section provides:
A neglect to communicate that which a party knows and ought to communicate, is called
concealment.
Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of
the facts upon the party to whom communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of
the proposed contract or in making his inquiries (The Insurance Code, Sec. 31).
The terms of the contract are clear. The insured is specifically required to disclose to the insurer matters
relating to his health.
The information which the insured failed to disclose were material and relevant to the approval and
issuance of the insurance policy. The matters concealed would have definitely affected petitioner's action
on his application, either by approving it with the corresponding adjustment for a higher premium or
rejecting the same. Moreover, a disclosure may have warranted a medical examination of the insured by
petitioner in order for it to reasonably assess the risk involved in accepting the application.
In Vda. de Canilang v. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 443 (1993), we held that materiality of the information
withheld does not depend on the state of mind of the insured. Neither does it depend on the actual or
physical events which ensue.
Thus, "goad faith" is no defense in concealment. The insured's failure to disclose the fact that he was
hospitalized for two weeks prior to filing his application for insurance, raises grave doubts about
his bonafides. It appears that such concealment was deliberate on his part.
The argument, that petitioner's waiver of the medical examination of the insured debunks the materiality
of the facts concealed, is untenable. We reiterate our ruling in Saturnino v. Philippine American Life
Insurance Company, 7 SCRA 316 (1963), that " . . . the waiver of a medical examination [in a non-medical
insurance contract] renders even more material the information required of the applicant concerning
previous condition of health and diseases suffered, for such information necessarily constitutes an
important factor which the insurer takes into consideration in deciding whether to issue the policy or not .
. . "
Moreover, such argument of private respondents would make Section 27 of the Insurance Code, which
allows the injured party to rescind a contract of insurance where there is concealment, ineffective
(See Vda. de Canilang v. Court of Appeals, supra).
Anent the finding that the facts concealed had no bearing to the cause of death of the insured, it is well
settled that the insured need not die of the disease he had failed to disclose to the insurer. It is sufficient
that his non-disclosure misled the insurer in forming his estimates of the risks of the proposed insurance
policy or in making inquiries (Henson v. The Philippine American Life Insurance Co., 56 O.G. No. 48
[1960]).
FIELDMANS INSURANCE vs. VDA. DE SONGCO
W/N the Songcos can claim the insurance proceeds despite the fact that the vehicle concerned was an owner
and not a common carrier.
The company is estopped from asserting that the vehicle was not covered. After it had led Federico
Songco to believe that he could qualify under the common carrier liability insurance policy, and to enter
into a contract of insurance paying the premiums due, it could not thereafter be permitted to change its
stand to the detriment of the heirs of the insured. It knew all along that Federico owned a private vehicle.
Its agent twice exerted the utmost pressure on the insured, a man of scant education, and the company
did not object to this.
INSULAR LIFE vs. FELICIANO (73 PHIL 201)
W/N Insular Life was bound by their agents acts.
In the case at bar, the true state of health of the insured was concealed by the agents of the insurer. The
insurers medical examiner approved the application knowing fully well that the applicant was sick. The
situation is one in which of two innocent parties must bear a loss for his reliance upon a third person. In
this case, it is the one who drafted and accepted the policy and consummated the contract. It seems
reasonable that as between the two of them, the one who employed and gave character to the third
person as its agent should be the one to bear the loss. Hence, insular is liable to the beneficiaries.
INSULAR LIFE vs. FELICIANO (74 PHIL 4681)
W/N Insular Life was bound by their agents acts.
There was collusion between Evaristo and the agent and the medical examiner in making it appear that
Evaristo was a fit subject for insurance. When Evaristo authorized them to write the answers for him, he
made them his own agents for that purpose and he was responsible for their acts in that connection.
If they falsified the answers for him, he could not evade liability for the falsification. He was not supposed
to sign the application in blank. He knew that his answers would be the basis for the policy, and was
required with his signature to vouch for their truth. The judgement rendered therefore in the preceding
case is thus reversed and insular life is absolved from liability.

NG GAN ZEE vs. ASIAN CRUSADER LIFE
W/N the contract may be rescinded on the ground of the imperfection in the application form of the insured.
Kwong did not have sufficient knowledge as to distinguish between a tumor and a peptic ulcer. His
statement therefore was made in good faith. Asian should have made an inquiry as to the illness and
operation of Kwong when it appeared on the face of the application that a question appeared to be
imperfectly answered. Asians failure to inquire constituted a waiver of the imperfection in the answer.