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Arctic War

No arctic war cooperation overwhelms incentives for conflict

Virginia et al 8/8 [Ross, director of the Institute of Arctic Studies at Dartmouth University; James F. Collins is a senior
associate in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former U.S. ambassador to
the Russian Federation; Michael Sfraga is vice chancellor of the University of Alaska Fairbanks; and Kenneth S. Yalowitz is a global
fellow at the Wilson Center and a former U.S. ambassador to Belarus and Georgia, 2014, The US and a Peaceful Arctic Future,]
The United States is signaling welcome interest in the Arctic. This heightened attention to the region is reflected in the long-awaited
appointment of a Special Representative to the Arctic. And as the U. S. prepares to take on the chairmanship of
the Arctic Council in 2015, the appointment of an experienced, capable leader, Admiral Robert Papp,
former Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, has real potential to focus and unite U.S. Arctic
policy and give the Arctic Council the leadership it will need to preserve the Arctic as a zone of international
cooperation and peace during a period of rising global unrest.
The Arctic Council is the designated intergovernmental forum for cooperation and for development
of responsible policy to the challenges of this rapidly changing region. The council membership consists of the
eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States), permanent
participant organizations (the Inuit Circumpolar Council and others representing indigenous peoples), and states
with permanent observer status (China, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Italy and India).
The council works on a consensus basis and has demonstrated the capacity to initiate much
needed policies and projects to address jointly a diverse agenda of pressing Arctic
issues. Recent council actions have focused on safer navigation, improved health for the regions people
and adding observer nations to the councils deliberations. But perhaps most critically this unique body has
given purpose and substance to the idea of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation
at a time when Great Game geopolitical theorists and so-called realists foresee an
Arctic fractured among players competing for resources and pursuing ephemeral ideas of regional
As global warming accelerates the melting of glaciers, sea ice, and permafrost, all parties face complex decisions about adaptation to
a changing environment, the pace of development, extraction of increasingly accessible natural resources, and the movement of new
nations into the Arctic community. A year ago we assembled leading Arctic scholars, government officials,
industry leaders and representatives of indigenous peoples in Washington, DC to examine these real
issues facing the region Arctic energy, health, commercial shipping, security and governance, and environmental
protection. Our report, A Euro-Atlantic Action Plan for Cooperation and Enhanced Arctic Security, was on the whole
optimistic that negative forecasts about the Arctic were overdrawn and that the
Arctic states, working with the indigenous peoples and business interests of the region, remained committed to
an Arctic future marked by international cooperation and sustainable development.
Today, those conclusions remain the same. Even as new political concerns have complicated the
international environment, the Arctic Council has persevered. It has promoted scientific
research and important environmental protection measures; more recently it has concluded binding
agreements on maritime search and rescue and on managing oil spills. These council accomplishments have shown that council
members can balance their individual state interests in the Arctic with constructive cooperation
on broader Arctic issues. Likewise it has been shown repeatedly that although all states are
determined to protect their Arctic interests, solid cooperation is possible and the risk of
conflict remains very small. An important question now is whether this pattern of cooperation can survive a time of
growing tensions between Russia and the other key Arctic Council nations, in particular the United States.
The indigenous peoples organization of the Arctic, The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), recently met in Inuvik Canada under the
theme of One Arctic-One Future. The question is whether U.S. leadership of the council can advance that vision. We believe there
is substantial reason for optimism on this score. Cooperation among the councils major
participants is vital, and there are plenty of reasons to ask whether the current tensions between Russia and other state
members of the council will disrupt cooperation. This need not be the case. There are few areas where Russian
interests in this region are at variance with those of the U.S. or other Arctic states.
The primary issues facing the Arctic Council in the coming years are those where all the councils
members have more in common than not: safe navigation of the Arctic Ocean; environmental protection measures to
limit pollution and prevent oil spills; the application of business models for economic development that empower and meet the
needs of Arctic communities establishing new programs for improved healthcare and education; and prudent management of fishery
In addition, the councils Arctic nations face governance questions like the exact role and
involvement in decision making of the new observer states, whether classic security issues should be added to its
list of subjects for council discussion, and the nature of further binding agreements. In all these matters the
major Arctic Council players have strong interests in finding common cause to preserve
the constructive, consensual nature of council operations.

No impact humans can survive post-collapse and theres no relationship between
survival and biodiversity their authors use flawed data analysis
Hough 14 [Rupert, Environmental Scientist with Expertise in Risk Modelling and Exposure Assessment and PhD from
Nottingham University, February, Biodiversity and human health: evidence for causality? Biodiversity and Conservation, Vol. 23
No. 2, pg. 272-3/AKG]
Large country-level assessments (e.g. MEA 2005; Huynen et al. 2004; Sieswerda et al. 2001) must be interpreted
with some caution. Data measured at country-level are likely to mask regional and local-level effects.
Apart from the fact that there are limitations to regression analysis in providing any proof of
causality, least squares regression models assume linear relationships between reductions in biodiversity and
human health and thus imply a linear relationship between loss of biodiversity and the provision of relevant
ecosystem goods and services. A number of authors, however, have suggested that ecosystems can lose a
proportion of their biodiversity without adverse consequences to their functioning (e.g.
Schwartz et al. 2000). Only when a threshold in the losses of biodiversity is reached does the provision of ecosystem goods and
services become compromised. These models also tend to assume a positive relationship between socio-economic development and
loss of biodiversity. One problem with this expectation is that the loss in biodiversity in one country is not per
definition the result of socio-economic developments in that particular country, but could also be the
result of socio-economic developments in other parts of the world (Wackernagel and Rees 1996). Furthermore,
the use of existing data means researchers can only make use of available indicators. Unlike for
human health and socio-economic development, there are no broadly accepted core-set of indicators for
biodiversity (Soberon et al. 2000). The lack of correlation between biodiversity indicators (Huynen et al. 2004)
shows that the selected indicators do not measure the same thing, which hinders interpretation
of results. Finally, there is likely to be some sort of latency period between ecosystem imbalance and
any resulting health consequences. To date, this has not been investigated using regression approaches.
Finally, it is thought that provisioning services are more crucial for human health and well-being that other ecosystem services
(Raudsepp-Hearne et al. 2010). Trends in measures of human well-being are clearly correlated with food provisioning services, and
especially with meat consumption (Smil 2002). While *60 % of the ecosystem services assessed by the MEA
were found to be in decline, most of these were regulating and supporting services, whereas the
majority of expanding services were provisioning services such as crops, livestock and
aquaculture (MEA 2005). Raudsepp-Hearne et al. (2010) investigated the impacts on human well-being from decreases in non-
food ecosystem services using national-scale data in order to reveal human well-being trends at the global scale. At the global scale,
forest cover, biodiversity, and fish stocks are all decreasing; while water crowding (a measure of how many people shared the same
flow unit of water placing a clear emphasis on the social demands of water rather than physical stress (Falkenmark and Rockstrom
2004)), soil degradation, natural disasters, global temperatures, and carbon dioxide levels are all on the rise, and land is becoming
increasingly subject to salinization and desertification (Bennett and Balvanera 2007). However, across countries,
Raudsepp-Hearne et al. (2010) found no correlation between measures of wellbeing and the
available data for non-food ecosystem services, including forest cover and percentage of land
under protected-area status (proxies for many cultural and regulating services), organic pollutants (a proxy for air
and water quality), and water crowding index (a proxy for drinking water availability, Sieswerda et al. 2001; WRI 2009)
This suggests there is no direct causal link between biodiversity decline and health,
rather the relationship is a knock-on effect. I.e. if biodiversity decline affects mankinds ability to produce food, fuel and fibre, it will
therefore impact on human health and well-being. As discussed in the introduction, the fact that humans need food, water and air to
live is an obvious one. All these basic provisions can be produced in a diversity-poor
environment. Therefore, to understand whether there is a potential causality relationship between biodiversity in its own
right and human health, we need to move beyond the basic provisioning services.

China War
No US-China war
Peou 14 [Sorpong, Chair of the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Ryerson University, January 10, Why
China's Rise May Not Cause Major Power-Transition War: A Review Essay, Asian Politics & Policy, pg. 130-1/AKG]
Chinese leaders are no doubt well aware of how states in the region will respond if it chooses to pursue
hegemonic-power status aggressively. They made no substantial politico-strategic gains by supporting
communist insurgencies that threatened the security of political regimes in Asia during the Cold War, nor will its
current threatening behavior advance its future geostrategic interests. The fact that states in the region have
adopted multiple strategies to manage the rise of China as evident in the two publications under review shows how China has
been kept in check.
We are thus likely to see a rising China that wants to throw its weight around from time to time because of its need
to prove to the world that it is a power to be reckoned with. In the end, Beijing is most likely to take careful
steps toward preventing backlashes that undermine its interests and great-power status. If
war breaks out in the region, it will not be one between the United States and China, even if the former wants to
wage a preventive war against the latter. A series of proxy wars is more likely, as happened during the Cold War.2
But states in Asia seem to have grown more self-confident and more secure because of their economic
development and growing military strength. They are likely to maintain a multipronged strategy
toward China and the United States by engaging them on the economic and institutional fronts, but
getting the United States to help keep China at bay militarily. Future stability in the Asia-
Pacific will be based on neither a Sino-centric world order nor American
In short, the rise of China is likely to remain a great source of controversy and debate in the years and decades to come. Still,
evidence shows that the giant Asian state is likely to pursue its interests driven by certain hegemonic ambitions as its material power
grows and as it becomes more status-conscious. However, its rise has been, and will be, limited by various
constraints, one of which is a pattern of prudent responses from other states in the Asia-Pacific. The
region is thus bound to remain stable, China rising but without enjoying the luxury of providing
leadership for peaceful regional community building, at least not until it becomes a liberal democracy.4

China doesnt want to attack
Keck 13 [Zachary, Associate Editor of The Diplomat and former intern at the Center for a New American Security, December 24,
Why China Won't Attack Taiwan,]
Although the trend lines are undoubtedly working in Chinas favor, it is ultimately extremely unlikely that China will
try to seize Taiwan by force. Furthermore, should it try to do this, it is unlikely to succeed.
Even assuming Chinas military capabilities are great enough to prevent the U.S. from
intervening, there are two forces that would likely be sufficient to deter China from invading Taiwan. The first and least
important is the dramatic impact this would have on how countries in the region and around the world would view such a move.
Globally, China seizing Taiwan would result in it being permanently viewed as a malicious
nation. Regionally, Chinas invasion of Taiwan would diminish any lingering debate over how Beijing will use its growing power.
Every regional power would see its own fate in Taiwan. Although Beijing would try to reassure
countries by claiming that Taiwan was part of China already, and thus the operation was a domestic stability one, this
narrative would be convincing to none of Chinas neighbors. Consequently, Beijing would face an
environment in which each state was dedicated to cooperating with others to balance against Chinese
But the more important deterrent for China would be the uncertainty of success. To be sure, Chinas
military capabilities are growing to the point where it will soon be assured of its ability to quickly defeat Taiwans military forces. A
little longer down the road it will also likely be confident that it can prevent the U.S. from intervening in the conflict.
However, as recent U.S. military conflicts have adequately demonstrated, being able to defeat another
nations armed forces and being able to pacify the country are two different things altogether. It is
in this latter aim that Chinas strategy is likely to falter. Taiwanese are adamantly opposed to being
incorporated into a non-Democratic China. These feelings would only harden in the aftermath of
the invasion.
Thus, even if it quickly defeated Taiwans formal military forces, the PLA would continue to have to
contend with the remnants of resistance for years to come. Such a scenario would be deeply
unsettling for leaders in Beijing as this defiance would likely inspire similar resistance among various groups
on the mainland, starting first and foremost with ethnic minorities in the western China. Should the PLA resort to
harsh oppression to squash resistance in Taiwan, this would deeply unsettle even Han Chinese on the
mainland. In fact, the clear parallels with how Imperial Japan sought to pacify Taiwan and China would be lost on
no one in China and elsewhere.
The entire situation would be a nightmare for Chinese leaders. Consequently, they are nearly
certain to avoid provoking it by invading Taiwan. The only real scenario in which they would invade Taiwan is if the
island nation formally declared independence. But if Taiwanese leaders have avoided doing so to date, they are unlikely to think the
idea is very wise as China goes stronger.

No impact to China rise
Posen 14 [Barry, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program,
June 24, Restraint : A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, pg. 94-5/AKG]
Some aspects of the situation will likely make China a less potent competitor than the Soviet Union,
especially on a global scale.
First, China faces a geopolitically more problematic environment than did the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union after World War II faced immediate neighbors exhausted by war, and hence vulnerable. The opposite is the case today;
global prosperity has been growing since the end of the Cold War. China has two nuclear neighbors
India and Russia. One of them is potentially as dynamic economically as China. Two other neighbors, the
Republic of Korea and Japan could easily become nuclear weapons states. Chinas own population
near its land borders often consists of ethnic minorities, restless under governance from Beijing.
China cannot afford war on those borders. 50 Many neighboring countries are separated from China by
bodies of water, which would make it difficult for China to apply military pressure, if it ever
came to that. Finally, at least for the immediate future, Chinas economic prosperity is inextricably bound up
with global trade, which leaves it vulnerable in extremis to blockade. United States naval, air, and
space power allow it to dominate the open oceans. So long as this remains the case, in the event of hot war, the
independent nations on the edge of the East and South China Seas would all have access to the
outside world, while China would not.
Second, and related, Chinas geography makes it at most an Asian land power. The Soviet
Union spanned Eurasia and thus it had inherent potential to be a global power: it had ports and
airfields that allowed it to project at least some power in almost any direction, and it could move resources
from one theater to another overland or through its own controlled airspace. Chinas naval geography, even in Asia,
helps hem it in. Independent countries with their own nationalist sensibilities sit astride
Chinas route to open waters.
Third, China does not have ideology working for it. The colonial empires were collapsing as the Cold
War opened. In part due to resentment of the capitalist system of their former colonial masters, and in part due simply to the
moment in history, communism was an attractive ideology and social system in the early Cold War. It
served as a legitimating force for Soviet activities worldwide. Local nationalisms in the developing world were
more suspicious of the West than they were the Soviet Union, creating opportunities for Soviet political penetration in the emergent
countries. Nationalist sentiment today seems to be omnidirectionally suspicious, which would
make Chinese penetration difficult, and leave Chinese influence vulnerable to constant local
attack. China does not have an ideology or social system that travels, in any case. Authoritarian
capitalism with Chinese nationalist overtones and communist trappings is not much of a brand.

Economic decline doesnt cause war best and most recent data
Drezner 14 [Daniel, American Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University, April, The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression, Oxford University Press, pg. 37-
A closer look at the numbers, however, reveals more encouraging findings. What seemed to be an
inexorable increase in piracy, for example, turned out to be a blip. By September 2013, the total numbers of
piracy attacks had fallen to their lowest levels in seven years. Attacks near Somalia, in particular, declined
substantially; the total number of attacks fell by 70 percent in 2012 and an additional 86 percent in the first nine months of
2013. Actual hijackings were down 43 percent compared to 2008/9 levels. 47 The US Navys figures reveal similar declines in the
number and success rate of pirate attacks. 48 Security concerns have not dented the opening of the global
As for the effect of the Great Recession on political conflict, the aggregate effects were surprisingly modest. A
key conclusion of the Institute for Economics and Peace in its 2012 report was that the average level of peacefulness in
2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007. 49 The institutes concern in its 2013 report about a
decline in peace was grounded primarily in the increase in homicide rates a source of concern, to be sure,
but not exactly the province of global governance. Both interstate violence and global
military expenditures have declined since the start of the financial crisis. Other studies confirm
that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict. Looking at the post-crisis
years, Lotta Themnr and Peter Wallensteen conclude, The pattern is one of relative stability when we
consider the trend for the past five years. 50 The decline in secular violence that started with the end of the Cold
War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that the crisis has not to date generated the surge in
protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected. 51

Nuclear Terrorism
Zero risk of nuclear terrorism
Probability of success is 3.33 x 10
Mueller 13 [John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, November 27, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters,]
In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even
less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike
generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to
be successful.
The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic
device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task,
however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be
conquered and in sequence.
Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of
guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt
insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of
greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either
out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist
was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, have every incentive to cover their trail,
beginning with eliminating their confederates.
If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then
probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being
pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes,
but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border
personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in
their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably
be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered.
Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-
equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of
highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be
assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among
friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home.
Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing
to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably
become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation.
Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they
could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in
charge of nuclear issues at Switzerlands Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task could
hardly be accomplished by a subnational group. They point out that precise blueprints are
required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most
certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely
exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger,
former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument,
pointing out that uranium is exceptionally difficult to machine whereas plutonium is one of the
most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.
Stressing the daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues, Younger concludes, to
think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and
supplies could fabricate a bomb is farfetched at best.
Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more,
which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including
criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals.
If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would
then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be
received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling,
maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives.
The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There
would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of
utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and
opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible.
Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see
boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit
Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great
difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is not impossible. But although it may not
be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could
surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the
barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them,
would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when
they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or
even terminally dispiriting.
It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias
the case in the terrorists favorfor example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20
obstaclesthe chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a
million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that
they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion.
Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are
unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the
risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even
before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve,
including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence.
The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a loose nuke somewhere. However, it seems
probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on
their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished
bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is
tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component
parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple
codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, only
a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation
of a nuclear weapon.
There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is
frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons
would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their
own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be

Science Diplomacy
Science leadership is inevitable
Xie 14 [Yu, Otis Dudley Duncan Distinguished University Professor of Sociology, Statistics, and Public Policy at the University of
Michigan, May 2, Is U.S. Science in Decline?]
A more competitive environment on the international scene today does not necessarily mean that U.S.
science is in decline. Just because science is getting better in other countries, this does not
mean that its getting worse in the United States. One can imagine U.S. science as a racecar driver,
leading the pack and for the most part maintaining speed, but anxiously checking the rearview mirror as other
cars gain in the background, terrified of being overtaken. Science, however, is not an auto race with a clear
finish line, nor does it have only one winner. On the contrary, science has a long history as the collective
enterprise of the entire human race. In most areas, scientists around the world have learned from U.S.
scientists and vice versa. In some ways, U.S. science may have been too successful for its own good, as its advancements
have improved the lives of people in other nations, some of which have become competitors for scientific dominance.
Hence, globalization is not necessarily a threat to the wellbeing of the United States or its scientists. As
more individuals and countries participate in science, the scale of scientific work increases, leading
to possibilities for accelerated advancements. World science may also benefit from fruitful
collaborations of scientists in different environments and with different perspectives and areas of
expertise. In todays ever more competitive globalized science, the United States enjoys the particular advantage of
having a social environment that encourages innovation, values contributions to the public good, and lives up
to the ideal of equal opportunity for all. This is where the true U.S. advantage lies in the long run. This is also the reason why we
should remain optimistic about U.S. science in the future.

No leadership decline best study
Xie 14 [Yu, Otis Dudley Duncan Distinguished University Professor of Sociology, Statistics, and Public Policy at the University of
Michigan, May 2, Is U.S. Science in Decline?]
Between the 1960s and the present, U.S. science has fared reasonably well on most indicators that we can
construct. The following is a summary of the main findings reported in our book.
First, the U.S. scientific labor force, even excluding many occupations such as medicine that require
scientific training, has grown faster than the general labor force. Census data show that the scientific
labor force has increased steadily since the 1960s. In 1960, science and engineering constituted 1.3% of the total labor force of about
66 million. By 2007, it was 3.3% of a much larger labor force of about 146 million. Of course, between 1960 and 2007, the share
of immigrants among scientists increased, at a time when all Americans were becoming better
educated. As a result, the percentage of scientists among native-born Americans with at least a college degree has declined over
time. However, diversity has increased as women and non-Asian minorities have increased their representation
among U.S. scientists.
Second, despite perennial concerns about the performance of todays students in mathematics and
science, todays U.S. schoolchildren are performing in these areas as well as or better than
students in the 1970s. At the postsecondary level, there is no evidence of a decline in the share of
graduates receiving degrees in scientific fields. U.S. universities continue to graduate large
numbers of young adults well trained in science, and the majority of science graduates do find
science-related employment. At the graduate level, the share of foreign students among recipients of science degrees has
increased over time. More native-born women now receive science degrees than before, although native-born men have made no
gains. Taken together, education data suggest that Americans are doing well, or at least no worse than in the
past, at obtaining quality science education and completing science degrees.
Finally, we used a large number of indicators to track changes in societys general attitudes
toward science, including confidence in science, whether to fund basic science, scientists prestige, and freshmen interest in
science research careers. Those indicators all show that the U.S. public has remained overwhelmingly
positive toward scientists and science in general. About 80% of Americans endorse federal
funding for scientific research, even if it has no immediate benefits, and about 70% believe that the benefits
of science outweigh the costs. These numbers have stayed largely unchanged over recent decades.
Americans routinely express greater confidence in the leadership of the scientific
community than that of Congress, organized religion, or the press.

No warming, not anthropogenic, no impact, and cant solve other countries most
recent and qualified data analysis
Ridley 9/4 [Matt, Author of The Rational Optimist and Member of the British House of Lords, Citing Ross McKitrick,
Professor of Economics at the University of Guelph, Xianyao Chen, Researcher in the Key Laboratory of Physical Oceanography at
the Ocean University of China, and Ka-Kit Tung, Department of Mathematics at the University of Washington, 2014, Whatever
Happened to Global Warming?,
Note: Gender Modified/AKG]
On Sept. 23 the United Nations will host a party for world leaders in New York to pledge urgent action against
climate change. Yet leaders from China, India and Germany have already announced that they
won't attend the summit and others are likely to follow, leaving President Obama looking a bit lonely.
Could it be that they no longer regard it as an urgent threat that some time later in this century the air may get a bit
In effect, this is all that's left of the global-warming emergency the U.N. declared in its first report on the subject
in 1990. The U.N. no longer claims that there will be dangerous or rapid climate change in the next
two decades. Last September, between the second and final draft of its fifth assessment report, the U.N.'s Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change quietly downgraded the warming it expected in the 30 years following 1995, to
about 0.5 degrees Celsius from 0.7 (or, in Fahrenheit, to about 0.9 degrees, from 1.3).
Even that is likely to be too high. The climate-research establishment has finally admitted openly
what skeptic scientists have been saying for nearly a decade: Global warming has stopped since shortly
before this century began.
First the climate-research establishment denied that a pause existed, noting that if there was a pause, it would invalidate their
theories. Now they say there is a pause (or "hiatus"), but that it doesn't after all invalidate their theories.
Alas, their explanations have made their predicament worse by implying that man-made climate
change is so slow and tentative that it can be easily overwhelmed by natural variation in
temperaturea possibility that they had previously all but ruled out.
When the climate scientist and geologist Bob Carter of James Cook University in Australia wrote an article in
2006 saying that there had been no global warming since 1998 according to the most widely used measure of
average global air temperatures, there was an outcry. A year later, when David Whitehouse of the Global
Warming Policy Foundation in London made the same point, the environmentalist and journalist Mark Lynas
said in the New Statesman that Mr. Whitehouse was "wrong, completely wrong," and was "deliberately, or otherwise,
misleading the public."
We know now that it was Mr. Lynas who was wrong. Two years before Mr. Whitehouse's article, climate
scientists were already admitting in emails among themselves that there had been no warming
since the late 1990s. "The scientific community would come down on me in no uncertain terms if I said the world had cooled
from 1998," wrote Phil Jones of the University of East Anglia in Britain in 2005. He went on: "Okay it has but it
is only seven years of data and it isn't statistically significant."
If the pause lasted 15 years, they conceded, then it would be so significant that it would invalidate the
climate-change models upon which policy was being built. A report from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) written in 2008 made this clear: "The simulations rule out (at the 95% level)
zero trends for intervals of 15 yr or more."
Well, the pause has now lasted for 16, 19 or 26 yearsdepending on whether you choose the surface temperature
record or one of two satellite records of the lower atmosphere. That's according to a new statistical calculation by
Ross McKitrick, a professor of economics at the University of Guelph in Canada.
It has been roughly two decades since there was a trend in temperature significantly different from zero. The burst of
warming that preceded the millennium lasted about 20 years and was preceded by 30 years of
slight cooling after 1940.
This has taken me by surprise. I was among those who thought the pause was a blip. As a "lukewarmer," I've long
thought that man-made carbon-dioxide emissions will raise global temperatures, but that this effect will not be amplified much by
feedbacks from extra water vapor and clouds, so the world will probably be only a bit more than one degree Celsius warmer in 2100
than today. By contrast, the assumption built into the average climate model is that water-vapor feedback will treble the effect of
carbon dioxide.
But now I worry that I am exaggerating, rather than underplaying, the likely warming.
Most science journalists, who are strongly biased in favor of reporting alarming predictions,
rather than neutral facts, chose to ignore the pause until very recently, when there were explanations available for it.
Nearly 40 different excuses for the pause have been advanced, including Chinese economic
growth that supposedly pushed cooling sulfate particles into the air, the removal of ozone-eating chemicals, an
excess of volcanic emissions, and a slowdown in magnetic activity in the sun.
The favorite explanation earlier this year was that strong trade winds in the Pacific Ocean had been
taking warmth from the air and sequestering it in the ocean. This was based on a few sketchy observations,
suggesting a very tiny change in water temperaturea few hundredths of a degreeat depths of up to 200 meters.
Last month two scientists wrote in Science that they had instead found the explanation in natural
fluctuations in currents in the Atlantic Ocean. For the last 30 years of the 20th century, Xianyao Chen and Ka-
Kit Tung suggested, these currents had been boosting the warming by bringing heat to the surface,
then for the past 15 years the currents had been counteracting it by taking heat down deep.
The warming in the last three decades of the 20th century, to quote the news release that accompanied their
paper, "was roughly half due to global warming and half to the natural Atlantic Ocean cycle." In other
words, even the modest warming in the 1980s and 1990swhich never achieved the 0.3 degrees Celsius per decade
necessary to satisfy the feedback-enhanced models that predict about three degrees of warming by the end of the centuryhad
been exaggerated by natural causes. The man-made [anthropogenic] warming of the past 20
years has been so feeble that a shifting current in one ocean was enough to wipe it out altogether.
Putting the icing on the cake of good news, Xianyao Chen and Ka-Kit Tung think the Atlantic Ocean may
continue to prevent any warming for the next two decades. So in their quest to explain
the pause, scientists have made the future sound even less alarming than before. Let's hope that
the United Nations admits as much on day one of its coming jamboree and asks the delegates to
pack up, go home and concentrate on more pressing global problems like war, terror, disease, poverty,
habitat loss and the 1.3 billion people with no electricity.