ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Motivation in Behavior Analysis: A Critique

Linda J. Hayes & Mitch J. Fryling
#Association of Behavior Analysis International 2014
Abstract In this article we consider the concept of motivation
in behavior analysis from a unique, radical monistic perspec-
tive derived from interbehaviorism and interbehavioral psy-
chology. In considering this concept, a number of logical and
conceptual issues with the behavior-analytic treatment of mo-
tivation are discovered. We describe an alternative means by
which the issues typically addressed under the concept of
motivation might be approached and reconciled with our
monistic, interbehavioral perspective. We argue that motivat-
ed and nonmotivated events differ only by the extent to which
they involve particular setting factors, substitute stimulation,
and implicit responding.
Keywords Establishing operations
.
Interbehaviorism
.
Motivation
.
Motivating operations
.
Setting factors
Most philosophies in psychology attempt to deal with the
concept of motivation. Historically, behavior analysts have
had relatively little to say about the topic, however, opting to
focus primarily on three-term contingencies of reinforcement.
Because of several key scholarly works on the topic (e.g., see
Klatt and Morris 2001; Michael 1982, 1993), behavior ana-
lysts now regularly consider the concept of motivation. We
critique the concept of motivation, and in particular the con-
cept of establishing operations in behavior analysis, from a
radical monistic perspective, largely derived from
interbehavioral thinking. In doing so, we discover logical
problems with the concept of establishing operations and
propose an alternative. It is important to note that we do not
pursue such an analysis to prove one way of thinking to be
more or less right or wrong than another (Hayes 1993). We
will begin by describing our radical monistic perspective,
including its relationship to interbehaviorism and
interbehavioral psychology, before considering the topic of
motivation more specifically.
Radical Monism
The term monism often refers to oneness, the idea that there is
only one, one whole, rather than various parts (Monism2007).
In this article we embrace a monistic position in the sense that
we assume that there is only one stuff of which all is made
that there is only one type of event. As for what sort of stuff it
is, in reference to the historical dichotomy of matter and spirit,
it is neither of these. It is rather an event, an action, or, more
precisely, an interactiona field of interaction (also see
Kantor 1958; Smith 2006). Our perspective is a logical exten-
sion and elaboration upon interbehavioral thinking, especially
the interbehavioral field orientation and the interbehavioral
distinction between constructs and events. We will first elab-
orate upon radical monism, followed by interbehaviorism.
Our position is monistic in another sense as well. Not only
does it assume one type of event but, in fact, only one event
one indivisible event occurring in this moment (Hayes 1992).
It assumes no other time or space (Hayes 1997a). This should
not be taken to mean that there have been no other moments,
as the concept of the psychological present has sometimes
been misinterpreted. There have been other moments, but
when they occurred, they too were this moment. In other
words, when the past was, it was the present. There are no
other moments nowonly this moment and all that has been
is, if it is, in this moment. This moment, in other words, has
always been ongoing. It has no beginning and no end. Given
this, there is no time in which this moment has begun, and no
L. J. Hayes (*)
Department of Psychology/296, University of Nevada, Reno,
NV 89557, USA
e-mail: lhayes@unr.edu
M. J. Fryling
California State University, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Psychol Rec
DOI 10.1007/s40732-014-0025-z
time in which it will end. Rather, time is seen as a construct,
and not an event, and therefore certainly not a defining feature
of events, such as this moment. In our experience, however,
this concept can be difficult to grasp. Specifically, it is difficult
to talk about time and to dismiss time in the same breath.
Hayes (1992) explained this more succinctly:
From the standpoint of the events themselves, the past
interactions of a given individual exist in the current
interactions of the individual. Current interactions con-
stitute an end point in the evolution of interactions with
the environment, which have continuously evolved over
the lifetime of the individual organism. In other words,
past interactions exist as current interactions. They have
no other existence. The past is the present. (p. 143)
The position is a radical monism in that all dichotomies are
eschewed. As already discussed, this includes the here and
there dichotomy of space and the then and now of time
(Hayes 1997a). Beyond these are two dichotomies of some
significance to ordinary science, namely, cause-effect and
form-function (Hayes 1993). Obviously, the uses to which
the understandings expressed in these dichotomies are put are
neither necessary nor even meaningful in a universe compris-
ing one event. Further, radical monism attempts to more
closely examine the subject matter as it is, with as little
influence as possible from existing constructs. The subject
matter is then articulated as a single event, continuously
ongoing in the present moment, wherein space and time may
be seen to be illusory, causality is superfluous, and reality is
gratuitous. Plainly, from the perspective of the event, there is
only the event, and nothing else.
1
It might seem at this point that radical monism has nothing
to contribute (or at least no way of contributing to an under-
standing of our place in this world and our well-being in it),
but this is not so. The aim of radical monism in this regard is
the articulation of the factors and their participation in the
ongoing present. In our view, this is all that scientists ever do,
regardless of their philosophical underpinnings; hence, what-
ever failure to contribute or lack of usefulness that may be
charged against radical monism must be shared by all who
hold themselves to be engaged in making such a contribution.
Furthermore, what one does or does not do with an articula-
tion of the factors participating in the ongoing present is not a
matter of the utility of the approach, per se, but with the
manner in which the approach is being utilized by scientists.
In other words, understanding is an aim central to all scientific
work, and whether or not this understanding is then used in
efforts to influence the world in particular ways is another
matter.
That said, we must make one confession, and it is signifi-
cant enough to make much of what we have just said about
scientific understandings suspect. As described, radical mo-
nism eschews all dichotomies. Among them is the dichotomy
of speaking and things spoken of. Even this dichotomy is
disallowed. In short, radical monismis radical enough to deny
the legitimacy of its own description: Radical monismtakes as
its task the conceptualization of an event in the moment,
assuming this event to constitute the all, while, at the same
time, it recognizes that the conceptualization achieved is
something other than the event conceptualized, thereby vio-
lating its own premise of the event in this moment being the
all. In other words, fromthe perspective of the event, there are
no constructs to speak of, and, furthermore, all constructs fall
short of capturing the event whereby no adequate description
of the event may ever be achieved (Hayes 1993, 1997a).
By way of explanation, a thoroughgoing radical monist
says nothing. We are not rushing toward this conclusion,
needless to say. So, for now, we will just acknowledge the
inconsistency of holding the position of radical monism and
talking about it at the same time. This has been the uncom-
fortable solution of many others before us, among whom may
be counted the existential, various, and sundry religious mys-
tics as well as some otherwise respectable technical philoso-
phers (e.g., D. T. Suzuki 1964, S. Suzuki 1970; Watts 1999).
So, at least we can find comfort in the company of fellow
travelers.
Still, as we have mentioned, we are not rushing toward the
inevitable conclusion of saying nothing. While our monistic
position is an extension of interbehaviorism, we have also
found interbehaviorism and interbehavioral psychology to be
the only way to continue speaking about the world in a way
t hat i s consi st ent wi t h radi cal moni sm. That i s,
interbehaviorism and interbehavioral psychology provide us
with a means to continue speaking about the world without
violating our monistic assumptions.
Interbehaviorism and Interbehavioral Psychology
As we have suggested, our perspective is grounded in
interbehaviorism and i nt erbehavioral psychology.
Interbehaviorism may be somewhat unconventional and un-
known to some readers, however. In this section we describe
some core features of interbehaviorism (Kantor 1953) and
interbehavioral psychology (Kantor 1958), which are funda-
mental to our monistic position and analysis of motivation.
Interbehaviorists make the explicit distinction between
constructs and events, especially as there is a tendency to
confuse the former with the latter in the sciences (Fryling
and Hayes 2009; Kantor 1953, 1957; Smith 2007). While
interbehaviorists do not suggest that constructs be avoided
altogether, specific emphasis is placed on the use of constructs
1
Several of these ideas have been described in more detail elsewhere
(Hayes 1992, 1993, 1997a, 1997b).
Psychol Rec
that are derived from events and, even then, to maintain the
distinction between those constructs and events. Given this,
events are approached as they are, with constructs later being
derived from them. This is in stark contrast to the more
common practice of imposing constructs on events. This
perspective, moreover, seems to be one that those who em-
brace a thoroughgoing natural science approach would favor.
Specifically, it reduces the likelihood of employing constructs
derived from cultural folklore and increases the likelihood of
developing constructs that are more directly derived from
events (see Hayes et al. 1997; Parrott 1983, for more on
constructs and behavior analysis, specifically). Indeed, con-
structs are analytical tools, and not to be confused with events
themselves. In this way, our monistic position is preserved,
while at the same time we are permitted to speak about the
world. This aspect of our perspective perhaps makes us espe-
cially careful about the use of constructs in science, providing
us with a unique perspective from which the analysis of
psychological concepts might be pursued.
Interbehaviorists conceptualize the subject matter of
psychology as an integrated field event, whereby the par-
t i ci pat i ng fact ors are consi dered i nt erdependent .
Specifically, the psychological event (PE) is described by
the following formula: PE=C(k, sf, rf, hi, md, st), where C
refers to the interdependency of participating factors; that
there is one event, one whole. K refers to the uniqueness of
each and every event, sf the stimulus function, rf the re-
sponse function, hi the interbehavioral history, md the me-
dium of contact, and st setting factors (Kantor 1958, p. 14;
Smith 2006). Altering one of these factors changes the
entire event, whereby none of the above factors are consid-
ered more or less important, dependent, or independent
from others. The distinction between constructs and events
is important here. The above-mentioned participating fac-
tors are constructs and are developed for analytical pur-
poses. There is no actual distinction between the factors
participating in the psychological event; rather, the partic-
ipating factors are constructs developed for the purposes of
analyzing the psychological event. Again, this seems to be
well aligned with our monistic position.
Of particular relevance to our analysis of motivation are the
factors of interbehavioral history and setting factors. Each and
every event is conceptualized as one evolving whole, whereby
the interbehavioral history is occurring in the present, and
therefore considered a feature of present happenings. As such,
the past and the present are not seen as distinct things that
influence the psychological event; they are features of the
event itself. There is no past and no future that can be spoken
of or otherwise contacted as distinct from present happenings.
Setting factors are also central to our analysis of motivation.
From the perspective of an interbehaviorist, setting factors
might have their primary impact on (a) stimulus objects, (b)
the reacting individual, or (c) the entire interaction (see Kantor
and Smith 1975, p. 47), and participate in psychological
events as all participants do, by altering the entire event. In
other words, the presence or absence of specific setting factors
alters the entire psychological event, whereby stimulus and
response functions are impacted, various interbehavioral his-
tories are made present, and more. Importantly, setting factors
participate in the current psychological event rather than in
some other event.
Finally, interbehavioral psychologists conceptualize be-
havior as an interaction, and therefore prefer to use the term
interbehavior, to explicitly acknowledge this reciprocal func-
tion. Moreover, interbehaviorists distinguish between the
responding organism and psychological responding, and sim-
ilarly between stimulus objects and psychological stimulation.
These distinctions are not trivial, as they permit the under-
standing of a wide range of complex and socially important
behavior. For example, behavior analysts struggle to concep-
tualize remembering without referring to unobservable events
and likewise continue to argue over the status of private,
unseen behavior. For the interbehaviorist, remembering
and other complex behavior is readily conceptualized as an
interaction with physical stimulus objects that have particular
substitute stimulus functions, by virtue of their historical
participation in spatiotemporal proximity to the stimuli being
substituted for, and an individuals responding with respect to
this historical relationship. For example, if someone hears a
song on the radio on Monday while talking to a colleague
from work about a meeting, upon hearing that same song on
Wednesday they may again hear the conversation in the ab-
sence of the actual conversation itself. In other words, the song
might substitute for the conversation. Likewise, a subtle facial
expression might substitute for previous thoughts that have
been articulated in the presence of that facial expression,
whereby an experienced observer might hear another persons
thoughts in the physical environment, even when those
thoughts are not currently being articulated (see Hayes and
Fryling 2009). In other words, stimulus and response substi-
tution permit all behavior to be articulated in the current event
field and not in some other historical or dualistic location.
Now that we have articulated the relevant features of
interbehaviorism and interbehavioral psychology, let us con-
tinue to discuss events from our radical monistic,
interbehavioral perspective. Our plan is to conduct an analysis
of the concept of motivation, and motivation in behavior
analysis specifically, for the purpose of evaluating its logical
and conceptual adequacy from our perspective. Motivation is
a central category in the psychological domain, having been
implicated in explanations of psychological events since the
very beginning of the discipline. Motivation is also a concept
that appears to have gained in popularity within the behavioral
subdivision of the discipline of psychology, largely due to the
popularity of the establishing operation and subsequent re-
finements of that concept. We now move on to discuss the
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topic of motivation. We will return to the subject of radical
monism in our concluding remarks.
Motivation
Psychologists, like scientists of many other varieties, have
always felt a need to explain their subject matter by reference
to its causes (Skinner 1953). For most psychologies, motiva-
tion is the name for this aspect of their domains. That is,
motives, if not the only class of concepts in the causal cate-
gory, are at least significant among those that are. But what are
motives? Further, what distinguishes a motivated from a
nonmotivated event?
Unfortunately, the literature on motivation is not helpful
toward answering these questions because just about every-
thing psychological is discussed under this heading. Among
the referents for the termmotivation are every type and variety
of action, causes of action, forces and powers responsible for
action, stimuli, incentives, ends of action, and so on. For
example, when looking through a textbook on the topic, one
encounters topics such as the motivated brain, intrinsic versus
extrinsic motivation, personality, emotion, unconscious mo-
tives, cognition, and more (Reeve 2008). As may be obvious
from this partial list, motivational events are sometimes inter-
nally localized (e.g., intrinsic, unconscious psychic forces)
and sometimes externally localized (e.g., environmental
events).
In the internal case, individuals are held to possess or
display motives. Various needs, drives, and emotions are
invoked to explain the origination of action in these cases.
Behaviorists have avoided constructions of this sort (Skinner
1953, 1974), preferring to localize motivational events in the
external environment. From this perspective, motivation re-
fers to activities performed by experimenters or operators who
arrange conditions so as to produce behavior changes on the
parts of those operated upon. For example, an experimenter
withholds an animals food, or a worker is offered a bonus, or
a childs arithmetic problems are phrased in the language of
baseball (see Iwata et al. 2000; McGill 1999).
As Michael (1993) pointed out, the topic of motivation has
historically received relatively little attention in the behavior-
analytic literature, and what has been discussed in this context
has been articulated in categorical concepts appropriate to
sciences other than psychology, namely physiology and ecol-
ogy (p. 192). While these treatments may have merit in their
own right, they do not address the problem of motivation at a
psychological level of analysis. At the psychological level,
there is little to comment on. More often than not, motivation
has been neglected as a separate or distinct category of inde-
pendent variable. Instead, the concept of reinforcement has
been made to do double dutyto explain both how it is that
organisms know how to do things and, furthermore, how it is
that they want to do them (also see Parrott 1983). More
plainly, reinforcement has been made to explain both learning
and motivation.
The aforementioned reinforcement solution to the problem
of motivation has not been entirely satisfactory according to
Michael (1993), however. For example, Michael cites
Skinners recognition of the need for a motivation-like con-
cept in his identification of deprivation and satiation as some-
thing other than stimulus variables, and in his treatment of
these concepts and aversive stimulation in the analysis of
verbal behavior in particular (pp. 191192). From Michaels
perspective, an additional construct would decrease the like-
lihood of overlooking or misclassifying motivational variables
as discriminative stimuli (Michael 1982).
Hence, it would appear that a categorical concept of the
motivational sort is needed for a thoroughgoing behavior-
analytic account. In behavior analysis, the categorical concept
proposed and developed has been the establishing operation
(EO; Michael 1982, 1993), a concept first introduced by
Keller and Schoenfeld in 1950, now more commonly referred
to as the motivating operation (MO; Laraway et al. 2003).
While the MO refinement of the EO concept has been wel-
comed and certainly extends upon the multiple ways in which
motivational variables impact behavior (specifically, by
distinguishing between establishing operations [EOs] and
abolishing operations [AOs] as types of MOs), our analysis
pertains to features of the EO concept that are unchanged by
the MO refinement. Moreover, relational frame theorists
(Hayes et al. 2001; Hayes et al. 1989) have proposed a verbal,
EO-like concept, namely, the augmental, which involves lan-
guage used to increase or decrease the reinforcing value of
following rules and is especially relevant to the treatment of
rule following (and central to the authors behavior-analytic
approach to psychotherapy). However, like the MO, the addi-
tion of the augmental does not change our analysis of moti-
vation in behavior analysis more generally. That is, our anal-
ysis pertains equally to the initial conceptualization of the EO
and the MO refinement, as well as the augmental. Therefore,
as we primarily examine motivation in behavior analysis by
analyzing key scholarly work on the EO, we will use the more
traditional term EO throughout.
Establishing Operations
To begin our analysis, we consider the definition of EOs as
proposed by Michael (1993). An EO, according to Michael,
is an environmental event, operation, or stimulus condition
that affects an organism by momentarily altering (a) the rein-
forcing effectiveness of other events and (b) the frequency of
occurrence of that part of the organisms repertoire relevant to
those events as consequences (p. 192). Given that the EO is
invoked to account for momentary effects, we may assume
Psychol Rec
that it serves as an explanation for the occurrence of a type of
response at a particular point in timemore technically, for
the occurrence of a member of an operant classthough not
for the strength of an operant, as the latter is neither
established nor observed in any particular moment. The
strength of an operant is assumed, rather, to be a product of
reinforcement, or, more specifically, reinforcement history.
Furthermore, despite bearing responsibility for the occur-
rence of a type of response at a particular point in time, as does
a discriminative stimulus, an EO is not thereby taken to be a
discriminative stimulus, the distinction between them having
to do with certain dynamic characteristics of a forthcoming
event. More specifically, a discriminative stimulus evokes a
response at a particular time marked by an increased avail-
ability of reinforcement for that response, should it occur at
that time. An EO, by contrast, is responsible for the occur-
rence of a response at a particular time due to an increase in the
reinforcing effectiveness of a forthcoming event, should it
take place (Michael 1982).
In summary, an EO has two momentary effects: First, it
increases the reinforcing effectiveness of future events, to be
observed when and if they occur (called the reinforcer estab-
lishing effect); second, it alters the frequency of occurrence of
behaviors previously consequated by those events, observed
in the present situation (called the evocative effect; Michael
1993, p. 192).
The contention that an EO changes the character of some-
thing that has not happened yet is somewhat problematic in
this definition of an EO, at least in the reinforcer-establishing
aspect of it. From our perspective, something that has not
happened yet has no character to change. In fact, to our way
of thinking, there is no such thing as something that has not
happened. For this reason, to identify and characterize an EO
by reference to the effectiveness of future events is illogical.
Bear in mind that talk of the future is not about events in the
future, as one might argue that a tact is about events in the
present. Talk of the future occurs as a form of metaphorical
extension based on talk about events of the past and present.
Talk of the future is not referential in this sense. As such, it
does not seem reasonable to define current events as though
they were in some way constituted of events that have not yet
happenedas though they were constituted of future events.
It seems far more reasonable to define events in terms of their
actual participants, and these are found in the present
circumstance.
There may be some objection to this notion, so let us
elaborate on this point just a little further. The future figures
prominently in explanations for behavior arising from many
different quarters in psychology, although not typically from
within behavior analysis. For example, from a behavior-
analytic perspective, rats are not said to press levers in order
to get food but rather because lever pressing has produced
food in the past. The rat acts as she does in this moment
because of events that have taken place in the past (namely,
reinforcement) and because of those that are now present
(namely, discriminative stimuli).
While the concepts of reinforcement and discrimination
may occasionally be articulated in purposeful language as a
means of contacting ordinary talk about behavior, they do not
require reference to the future to have utility in the explanation
of behavior. On the contrary, reference to the future in expla-
nations of behavior is considered not only to be nontechnical
but also to constitute a fundamental misunderstanding of the
behavior-analytic position. So, why do we find ourselves
falling into this trap in the explication of motivational con-
cepts, such as the EO?
We do not know why behavior analysts have adopted this
approach with respect to EOs, but we have some suspicions,
to which we will return. For now, let us consider how the
concept of the EO might be reinterpreted to eliminate its
objectionable features.
Eliminating the Reinforcer-Establishing Function
Eliminating the objectionable features of the EO concept
amounts to the abandonment of the reinforcer-establishing
aspect of the EO definition or, more precisely, the reconcep-
tualization of this aspect as a feature of the evocative effect.
2
Recall Michaels (1993) conceptualization of the evocative
effect, the altering of the frequency of occurrence of that part
of the organisms repertoire relevant to those events as conse-
quences (p. 192). In his analysis, EOs affect organisms by
momentarily altering the frequency of the types of behavior
that have been previously reinforced by a particular stimulus,
such as food.
This evocative effect is further understood as the result of
1) a direct effect of the establishing operation on such be-
havior; 2) an indirect effect of an increase in the evocative
effect of all discriminative stimuli for behavior that has previ-
ously been followed by food; and 3) an increase in the fre-
quency of behavior that has been followed by conditioned
reinforcers whose effectiveness depends on food deprivation
(Michael 1993, pp. 192193). This third specific case of
conditioned reinforcement is not different in principle from
the general case of the evocative effect, so it will not be
considered in detail here. Instead, we will concentrate on the
other two means by which the evocative effect is assumed to
take place, namely, as a direct effect on behavior and indirectly
by increasing the evocative effect of discriminative stimuli for
behavior.
2
Cherpas (1993) also expressed concern with the establishing operation
construct, specifically, with the reinforcer-establishing aspect of it, sug-
gesting that all we ever see is the evocation of behavior. Cherpas then
questioned the EO concept itself, as the term seems to emphasize the
reinforcer-establishing aspect.
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Concerns About the Direct Effect
First, it is not clear what it means to suggest that an event, such
as food deprivation, which is not regarded as a stimulus event,
has a direct effect on behavior. While the case has sometimes
been made that operations such as food deprivation and aver-
sive stimulation increase the general activity of organisms
(e.g., Finger 1951), this is not a common view among behav-
ior analysts. A behavior-analytic approach more typically
articulates changes in behavior as a function of changes in
stimulation. Specifically, individual instances of behavior are
said to be evoked or elicited, and classes of behavior are said
to be strengthened by reinforcers. Little is said about possible
direct effects, such as general activity in behavior-analytic
circles and, at least to our way of thinking, for good reason.
After all, what exactly is general activity? Is it not just an
unanalyzed collection of specific actions? And do we not
regard specific actions as standing in relation to specific
stimuli from a behavior-analytic perspective? Surely, we
would not take the position that there can be responses without
stimulationor stimulation without responses.
3
Given this, it
is not clear why we would argue that EOs alter the frequency
of behavior by direct action. How and in what manner does
food deprivation, for example, directly move the organism?
This argument does not seem sensible to us.
Salvaging the Indirect Effect
The indirect means by which the evocative effect of an EO
takes place is much more promising, in our view. In this case,
the evocative effect of an EO is a result of an increase in the
evocative effect of all discriminative stimuli for the behavior
in question. This analysis avoids the problem of responses
occurring without stimulation, suggesting that responses do
occur with respect to stimuli but that the effects or functions of
those stimuli vary with the contexts in which they appear.
For example, a lever may have a number of stimulus
functions coordinated with a number of different responses,
such as seeing the lever, touching it, pressing it, and so on. The
lever, furthermore, may be present in a context of food depri-
vation as well as in a context of food satiation. When food
deprivation is present, the discriminative effect of the lever on
pressing responses may be increased. Likewise, when food
satiation is present, other functions of the lever may be in-
creased, such as those coordinated with merely seeing the
lever. This account is similar to Skinners description of the
operation of audience variables, as articulated in his book,
Verbal Behavior (1957). It is also very similar to Kantors
(1938, 1958; Kantor and Smith 1975) views as to the
nature and participation of setting factors in event fields.
From Kantors standpoint, setting factors of an organismic
sort, such as food deprivation, as well as those having
more of an environmental character participate in psycho-
logical events, and thus are interrelated with particular
functions of stimulating and responding at specific points
in time.
At this juncture it may be worth elaborating on the concep-
tual differences between the traditional behavior-analytic ap-
proach to motivation (i.e., the EO and related constructs) and
Kantors conceptualization of the setting factor. As we have
described, EOs have two primary effects: changing the value
of consequences and changing the frequency of behavior with
respect to those consequences. Thus, the EOapproach rests on
a contingency analysis whereby the consequences of behavior
are what are changed and therefore ultimately continue to
control behavior. By contrast, setting factors do not alter the
value of consequences. Furthermore, from the perspective of
the psychological event, there are no consequences to alter.
Psychological events are integrated fields, not linear contin-
gencies, and as such participants in such fields are held to be
part of one integrative event. Specifically, from the perspec-
tive of the psychological event, setting factors are participants
in this multifactored field and therefore alter the entire event of
interest, including both stimulus and response functions.
Importantly, setting factors operate as constituents of the
present event. They have no role in events in which they are
not present.
Summary
In summary, Michael (1993) has articulated two effects of
EOs: a reinforcer-establishing effect and an evocative effect.
We have objected to the reinforcer-establishing effect on the
grounds that this analysis appeals to events that have yet to
happen as aspects of the definition of current operations;
specifically, that future reinforcers control current happenings.
We have argued that the effect of the EO be limited to the
evocative effect for this reason. Upon closer scrutiny of the
evocative effect, however, we have further suggested that only
one of the means by which this effect of an EO is articulated
from within the general framework of a behavior-analytic
account, namely the indirect means of increasing the effec-
tiveness of discriminative stimuli, is plausible. Hence, we
have salvaged this indirect effect and rejected the account of
direct effects of EOs.
The end result has been to suggest that EOs constitute
contextual variables, the role of which is to participate in all
psychological events, whereby particular functions of stimu-
lus objects from among those they harbor at particular points
3
It is sometimes the case that behavior analysts do fall into the trap of
suggesting that responding could occur without stimulation (e.g., Skinner
1974, pp. 9192), but this is, of course, a problem, as the subject matter of
behavior science involves relations between the responding organismand
the stimulating environment.
Psychol Rec
in time are made psychologically present.
4
This interpretation
renders EOs similar to the general case of audience control
(Skinner 1957) or conditional discrimination, as understood in
behavior analysis, and to the Kantorian analysis of setting
factors.
Distinguishing Motivated From Nonmotivated Events
Thus far, through a process of logical elimination and reinter-
pretation, we have arrived at a concept of motivation that is
indistinguishable from the psychological event in general.
That is, if an EO is to be understood as a setting factor, its
role being participatory in nature, in which one of possibly
several potential functions of a stimulus along with its coor-
dinated response occur, then it may be argued that EOs par-
ticipate in all psychological occurrences, because all psycho-
logical events take place in the context of setting factors and
this is how they operate.
Given this conclusion, what are we to make of the concept
of motivation? How does a motivated event differ from a
nonmotivated event? For example, how does wanting food,
in traditional terms, differ from not wanting food? The short
answer is that there is only one type of eventno one any
more or less motivated than another. All psychological events
involve setting factors, and thus all psychological events
might be considered motivated in traditional terms.
Nevertheless, the topic of motivation seems important, and
we will attempt some semblance of an answer to the question
above: What distinguishes motivated from nonmotivated
events? From our radical monistic perspective, the question
may be better phrased as, Are there factors participating in
what are considered to be motivated segments of behavior that
are not participating in what are considered to be
nonmotivated segments? We think, in fact, that there are such
factors and that they involve implicit actions with respect to
the consequences of behavior, occurring by way of the past
consequences of behavior being present substitutively in cur-
rently available stimulus objects. For example, the lever, as a
stimulus object, might involve the stimulus functions of food
delivery, given a history of the lever and food delivery occur-
ring in spatiotemporal proximity to one another. This seems to
be related to what Michael (1993) referred to as the reinforcer-
establishing effect, although his interpretation of this circum-
stance is not useful from our perspective. Specifically,
Michael believed that something happens to future events.
Alternatively, we believe that we are responding to past
eventspast consequences of behavioras though they were
future consequences of behavior, and that this responding is
occurring in the present moment, the only time and space in
which responding can occur.
Central to the distinction between motivated and
nonmotivated events is the interbehavioral construct of stim-
ulus substitution. As we have mentioned, motivated events
involve responding to future consequences of behavior in
the present moment, and this necessarily involves stimulus
substitution because future consequences of behavior do not
actually exist. However, through a history of an organism
responding to specific spatiotemporal association conditions,
particular stimulus objects come to develop the functions of
other objects even when those other objects are absent. For
example, if a visit to the ocean had always occurred with a
particular friend, you might see that friend when you are at the
ocean even if the friend is not physically present. Likewise, if
a lever had always occurred with respect to the delivery of
food, an animal might behave with respect to food (e.g.,
salivate) in the presence of the lever alone. In these examples,
the ocean and lever are substitute stimuli, and the seeing of the
friend and salivation are implicit responses. This sort of sub-
stitute stimulusresponse function is necessarily involved in
events typically classified as motivated. Again, we do not
believe that it is useful to talk about changes taking place in
the character of future events because these events have not
yet happened, and they thereby have no character to change.
Rather, from the perspective of the event, motivated events
appear to constitute specific setting factors, substitute stimulus
functions, and implicit responses with respect to those stimu-
lus functions.
Thus, it may prove useful to distinguish motivated from
nonmotivated events simply on the basis of number and types
of functions operating in current event fields. For example,
wanting food may be regarded as a circumstance in which
stimulation, ordinarily inhering in food, is occurring in the
absence of food by way of other immediately present stimuli,
such as a lever. That is, when we want food or are motivated to
find food, food functions in the absence of food forms are
present in the event field. When we want food, the olfactory,
gustatory, or visual functions of food may be actualized such
that we may smell, taste, or see food when only talk of food is
present as a stimulus. When we do not want food, these
functions may not be actualized by such talk.
The difference between motivated and nonmotivated be-
havior may then be understood as the degree to which these
substitutional or implicit functions of stimuli are operating in
event fields, and this, in turn, may be massively influenced by
verbal activity and its stimulus products. In other words, while
an animal may want sex in the sense of being able to feel it
in its absence under certain conditions, an animal may never
yearn for sex, be obsessed with it, be heartsick over it, and
so on. These are verbal elaborations of which animals appear
to be incapable. In other words, while animals engage in
4
Morris (1992) has also suggested that EOs be considered contextual
variables, though the author maintains a contingency, rather than a field
analysis, and is thus required to unpack Skinnerian constructs. The
outcome of this exercise is close to Kantors field orientation.
Psychol Rec
implicit behavior with respect to substitute stimuli, those
substitute stimuli never involve the future or other arbitrary
stimulus forms such as words, constructs that are specifically
verbal in nature. While this issue is important, it is not so much
the subject of motivation as is language, so we will not deal
with it in detail here (see Hayes and Hayes 1992).
Return to Radical Monism
As previously mentioned, psychologists have always felt a
need to explain their subject matter by reference to its causes.
In behavior analysis, the principal causal variable is reinforce-
ment, and the category of reinforcement has undergone some
changes since it was first introduced. Early interpretations of
reinforcement were rather mechanical in nature. Reinforcers
did things. They made things happen. They strengthened
operants. Mechanical conceptions of this sort were eventually
replaced with the notion of selection (Skinner 1971, 1981).
The capacity for behavior to be reinforced was held to be a
product of biological evolution (e.g. Skinner 1971, 1974). It
was argued that this was why reinforcers worked; this is why
they could do what they did.
Selection is an outcome or product concept rather than a
process concept. What continues to occur or exist is a product
of unspecified events that eliminated what has not continued to
exist. To find the process or the operative variable in a selection
analysis, one must look to the circumstances that led to the
extinction of what is no longer here. In other words, what
continues to exist or occur needs no explanation, and for this
reason reinforcement interpreted as selection may be said to be
simply a descriptive, as opposed to an explanatory, concept.
Unfortunately, for many scientists and lay person alike,
descriptive concepts are not quite so satisfying as explanatory
concepts, and there is always some pressure to give descrip-
tive concepts more powerto make them more explanatory
(e.g., Tonneau 2008). Behavior analysts seem to vacillate on
this point, and they always have. The interest in motivation
may reflect this longing for explanation in behavior analysis.
The EO concept is a process concept. EOs do things, they
operate on things, they make things happen. The irony of this
situation is that one of the things that they do is turn stimuli
into reinforcers, the implication being that these stimuli are
then able to do something to responding. In short, the EO
concept is not only explanatory in its own right, but it gives
reinforcement its explanatory character as well.
The attraction to causality is common in behavior analysis,
and the EO construct is by no means alone in this regard (see
Hayes et al. 1997). But we must ask, of what use are causal
concepts? How do they help us understand behavior? What is
there to understand? From a radical monistic perspective, the
concept of causality is superfluous. When it is held that there
is only one eventone event with no partsas claimed by
radical monism, there is no need for a concept of causality.
There is no event other than this onenone of any sort
let alone one serving as the cause of this one. Moreover,
causality is never actually observed, and is therefore imposed
by scientists, presumably as a result of cultural folklore.
Therefore, there is no need for a causal interpretation
of motivation. The concept of EOs as setting factors
need not imply causality. It is not necessary to suggest
that setting factors such as food deprivation make any-
thing happenthey do not have to actualize anything or
determine anything to be a useful psychological category.
It is every bit as informative to speak of them merely as
other participants in the event field as it has evolved to
this moment as it is to invent causal properties for them.
In short, motivational variables, be they called EOs or
setting factors, do not determine psychological events but
rather constitute them.
5
It was our goal to consider the concept of motivation,
especially as it is conceptualized in behavior analysis, from
our radical monistic, interbehavioral perspective. Importantly,
we did not pursue such an analysis to prove any one way of
looking at the world to be more right or wrong than others.
Furthermore, this article is not about empirical facts per se
but rather about the interpretation of those facts. In other
words, we are not denying that the sort of manipulations that
fall under the purview of motivation in behavior analysis
participate in the evolution of psychological events. Rather,
we are questioning the way in which those manipulations are
interpreted. In pursuing this analysis we have exposed some
concerns with the behavior-analytic approach and offered a
means by which motivation might be reconciled with our
perspective. In doing so, we have suggested that EOs are
better conceptualized as setting factors, which participate as
contextual variables in which particular substitute stimulation
and implicit responding occur. In our view, this approach
lends itself to a more comprehensive and coherent analysis
of psychological happenings and is more consistent with a
natural science of behavior.
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