Darvin v Court of Appeals

Facts:
Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed
from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to
recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of this
promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for US Visa and air fare.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.
Held:
Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:
...b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not: Provided, that any reason person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:
a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of the Labor
Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be
shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the
said person does not have a license or authority to do so.
In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to private
respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private
respondent work abroad. What is established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-
appellant P150,000.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more,
can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is
nothing to show that appellant engaged in recruitment activities.
At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that appellant
probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of
evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the Peoples evidence fail to indubitably prove the
accuseds authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the Courts duty, and the
accuseds right, to proclaim his innocence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonably doubt. The accused is ordered immediately
released from her confinement.
Chavez vs. Bonto-Perez
FACTS:
Chavez is a dancer who was contracted by Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation to perform in
Japan for 6 months. The contract was for $1.5k a month, which was approved by POEA. After the
approval of said contract, Chavez entered into a side contract reducing her salary with her Japanese
employer through her local manager-agency (Jaz Talents Promotion). The salary was reduced to $500
and $750 was to go to Jaz Talents. In February 1991 (two years after the expiration of her contract),
Chavez sued Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents for underpayment of wages before the POEA.
The POEA ruled against her. POEA stated that the side agreement entered into by Chavez with her
Japanese employer superseded the Standard Employment Contract; that POEA had no knowledge of
such side agreement being entered into; that Chavez is barred by laches for sleeping on her right for two
years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Chavez is entitled to relief.

HELD:
Yes. The SC ruled that the managerial commission agreement executed by Chavez to authorize her
Japanese Employer to deduct her salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public
policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract approved by the POEA with the following
stipulation appended thereto:
It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in conformance with
the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum Circular
No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part of this contract without prior approval
by the POEA shall be null and void;
The side agreement which reduced Chavezs basic wage is null and void for violating the POEAs
minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Here, both Centrum
Placement and Jaz Talents are solidarily liable.
Laches does not apply in the case at bar. In this case, Chavez filed her claim well within the three-year
prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code. For this
reason, laches is not applicable.









JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commissionand Ulpiano L. De
Los Santos
Facts:
1. Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petitioner, a recruiting agency,
made the following:
a. Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)
b. Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4)
c. Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec. 17)

2. The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) to the respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal because of failure of
the petitioner to post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules. The
decision being appealed involved a monetary award.

3. The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee, posting of cash bond and surety bond,
and placement of money in escrow are enough; posting an appeal bond is unnecessary. According to
Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the
conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. On the
other hand, according to Sec. 17, the escrow shall answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers
as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.

4. Sec. 6 reads:
In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond The bonds required here are different
from the bonds required in Sec. 4.

Issue:
Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact that it has posted bonds
of 150k and placed 200k in escrow before?

Held:
Yes. It is possible for the monetary reward in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of
350,000 because of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The reason for such is that
overseas employees are subjected to greater risks and hence, the money will be used to insure more
care on the part of the local recruiter in its choice of foreign principal to whom the worker will be sent.

Doctrine: Construction:
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this
case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as
an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.

The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided;
instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole. With regard to the present case, the doctrine can be applied when
the Court found that Sec. 6 complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.
In the POEA Rules, the bonds required in Sec. 4 Rule 2, Book 2 and the escrow required in Sec. 17
Rule 2, Book 2 have different purposes from the appeal bond required in Sec. 6, Rule 5 Book 7.

The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to answer for all claims against the employer, which is not limited
to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated. The
escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against the employer.

On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award. Indeed, this appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award. Also, it
is possible that the monetary award may exceed the bonds posted previously and the money placed in
escrow. If such a case happens, where will the excess be sourced? To solve such a dilemma, an appeal
bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award is required by Sec. 6.



















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 77279 April 15, 1988
MANUELA S. CATAN/M.S. CATAN PLACEMENT AGENCY, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION and FRANCISCO D. REYES, respondents.
CORTES, J .:
Petitioner, in this special civil action for certiorari, alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
National Labor Relations Commission in an effort to nullify the latters resolution and thus free petitioner
from liability for the disability suffered by a Filipino worker it recruited to work in Saudi Arabia. This Court,
however, is not persuaded that such an abuse of discretion was committed. This petition must fail.
The facts of the case are quite simple.
Petitioner, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and Fahd Shabokshi Group, a Saudi
Arabian firm, recruited private respondent to work in Saudi Arabia as a steelman.
The term of the contract was for one year, from May 15,1981 to May 14, 1982. However, the contract
provided for its automatic renewal:
FIFTH: The validity of this Contract is for ONE YEAR commencing from the date the
SECOND PARTY assumes hill port. This Contract is renewable automatically if neither of
the PARTIES notifies the other PARTY of his wishes to terminate the Contract by at least
ONE MONTH prior to the expiration of the contractual period. [Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp.
7-8].
The contract was automatically renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by his Saudi
employer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator. On March 30, 1983, while he was
working as a crusher plant operator, private respondent's right ankle was crushed under the machine he
was operating.
On May 15, 1983, after the expiration of the renewed term, private respondent returned to the Philippines.
His ankle was operated on at the Sta. Mesa Heights Medical Center for which he incurred expenses.
On September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi Arabia to resume his work. On May 15,1984, he was
repatriated.
Upon his return, he had his ankle treated for which he incurred further expenses.
On the basis of the provision in the employment contract that the employer shall compensate the
employee if he is injured or permanently disabled in the course of employment, private respondent filed a
claim, docketed as POEA Case No. 84-09847, against petitioner with respondent Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. On April 10, 1986, the POEA rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant and against the
respondent, ordering the latter to pay to the complainant:
1. SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS and 60/100
(P7,985.60), Philippine currency, representing disability benefits;
2. TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND NINETY-SIX Philippine pesos and 20/100 (29,096.20)
representing reimbursement for medical expenses;
3. Ten percent (10%) of the abovementioned amounts as and for attorney's fees. [NLRC
Resolution, p. 1; Rollo, p. 16].
On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA in a resolution dated December 12,
1986.
Not satisfied with the resolution of the POEA, petitioner instituted the instant special civil action for
certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
1. Petitioner claims that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that petitioner was liable to
private respondent for disability benefits since at the time he was injured his original employment
contract, which petitioner facilitated, had already expired. Further, petitioner disclaims liability on the
ground that its agency agreement with the Saudi principal had already expired when the injury was
sustained.
There is no merit in petitioner's contention.
Private respondents contract of employment can not be said to have expired on May 14, 1982 as it was
automatically renewed since no notice of its termination was given by either or both of the parties at least
a month before its expiration, as so provided in the contract itself. Therefore, private respondent's injury
was sustained during the lifetime of the contract.
A private employment agency may be sued jointly and solidarily with its foreign principal for violations of
the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment:
Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment. Before recruiting any worker, the private
employment agency shall submit to the Bureau the following documents:
(a) A formal appointment or agency contract executed by a foreign-based employer in
favor of the license holder to recruit and hire personnel for the former ...
xxx xxx xxx
2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the
principal or foreign-based employer for any of the violations of the
recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment. [Section 10(a)
(2) Rule V, Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code].
Thus, in the recent case of Ambraque International Placement & Services v. NLRC [G.R. No. 77970,
January 28,1988], the Court ruled that a recruitment agency was solidarily liable for the unpaid salaries of
a worker it recruited for employment in Saudi Arabia.
Even if indeed petitioner and the Saudi principal had already severed their agency agreement at the time
private respondent was injured, petitioner may still be sued for a violation of the employment contract
because no notice of the agency agreement's termination was given to the private respondent:
Art 1921. If the agency has been entrusted for the purpose of contra with specified
persons, its revocation shall not prejudice the latter if they were not given notice thereof.
[Civil Code].
In this connection the NLRC elaborated:
Suffice it to state that albeit local respondent M. S. Catan Agency was at the time of
complainant's accident resulting in his permanent partial disability was (sic) no longer the
accredited agent of its foreign principal, foreign respondent herein, yet its responsibility
over the proper implementation of complainant's employment/service contract and the
welfare of complainant himself in the foreign job site, still existed, the contract of
employment in question not having expired yet. This must be so, because the obligations
covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent
and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such agreement so that if
either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such
parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the
same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the
employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.
Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the
employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. [NLRC Resolution, p. 4;
Rollo, p. 18]. (Emphasis supplied).
2. Petitioner contends that even if it is liable for disability benefits, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
when it affirmed the award of medical expenses when the said expenses were the consequence of
private respondent's negligence in returning to work in Saudi Arabia when he knew that he was not yet
medically fit to do so.
Again, there is no merit in this contention.
No evidence was introduced to prove that private respondent was not medically fit to work when he
returned to Saudi Arabia. Exhibit "B", a certificate issued by Dr. Shafquat Niazi, the camp doctor, on
November 1, 1983, merely stated that private respondent was "unable to walk properly, moreover he is
still complaining [of] pain during walking and different lower limbs movement" [Annex "B", Reply; Rollo, p.
51]. Nowhere does it say that he was not medically fit to work.
Further, since petitioner even assisted private respondent in returning to work in Saudi Arabia by
purchasing his ticket for him [Exhibit "E"; Annex "A", Reply to Respondents' Comments], it is as if
petitioner had certified his fitness to work. Thus, the NLRC found:
Furthermore, it has remained unrefuted by respondent that complainant's subsequent
departure or return to Saudi Arabia on September 9, 1983 was with the full knowledge,
consent and assistance of the former. As shown in Exhibit "E" of the record, it was
respondent who facilitated the travel papers of complainant. [NLRC Resolution, p. 5;
Rollo, p. 19].
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Royal Crowne International vs. NLRC
FACTS:
Petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed private respondent
Virgilio for employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia. Service agreement
was executed by private respondent and ZAMEL whereby the former was to receive per month a salary
of US$500.00 plus US$100.00 as allowance for a period of one year commencing from the date of his
arrival in Saudi Arabia. However, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private respondent on the ground
that his performance was below par. For three successive days thereafter, he was detained at his
quarters and was not allowed to report to work until his exit papers were ready. On February 16, 1984, he
was made to board a plane bound for the Philippines. Private respondent then filed a complaint for illegal
termination against Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale and ZAMEL with the POEA.
Petitioner contends that there is no provision in the Labor Code, or the omnibus rules
implementing the same, which either provides for the "third-party liability" of an employment agency or
recruiting entity for violations of an employment agreement performed abroad, or designates it as the
agent of the foreign-based employer for purposes of enforcing against the latter claims arising out of an
employment agreement. Therefore, petitioner concludes, it cannot be held jointly and severally liable with
ZAMEL for violations, if any, of private respondent's service agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agencymay be held jointly and severally liable
with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may arise in connection with the implementation of
the employment contracts of the employees recruited and deployed abroad.
HELD:
Yes, Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily assumed solidary liability
under the various contractual undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. In
applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for overseas recruitment and placement,
petitioner was required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed
all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the implementation of the contracts of employment
with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment. It was also required to file with the
Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to
recruit and hire personnel for the former, which contained a provision empowering it to sue and be sued
jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and
the contracts of employment. Petitioner was required as well to post such cash and surety bonds as
determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures,
rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of employment as appropriate.
These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and other private
employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its principal, the foreign-based
employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which may arise in connection with the implementation
of the service agreements or employment contracts.


Facilities Management Corporation vs. De La Osa

Facts:
Facilities Management Corporation and J. S. Dreyer are domiciled in Wake Island while J. V.
Catuira is an employee of FMC stationed in Manila. Leonardo dela Osa was employed by FMC in Manila,
but rendered work in Wake Island, with the approval of the Department of Labor of the Philippines. De la
Osa was employed as (1) painter with an hourly rate of $1.25 from March 1964 to November 1964,
inclusive; (2) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1.26 from December 1964 to November 1965, inclusive;
(3) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1.33 from December 1965 to August 1966, inclusive; and (4) cashier
with an hourly rate of $1.40 from August 1966 to March 27 1967, inclusive. He further averred that from
December, 1965 to August, 1966, inclusive, he rendered overtime services daily, and that this entire
period was divided into swing and graveyard shifts to which he was assigned, but he was not paid both
overtime and night shift premiums despite his repeated demands from FMC, et al. In a petition filed on 1
July 1967, dela Osa sought his reinstatement with full backwages, as well as the recovery of his overtime
compensation, swing shift and graveyard shift differentials.

Subsequently on 3 May 1968, FMC, et al. filed a motion to dismiss the subject petition on the
ground that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case, and on 24 May 1968, de la Osa interposed an
opposition thereto. Said motion was denied by the Court in its Order issued on 12 July 1968.
Subsequently, after trial, the Court of Industrial Relations, in a decision dated 14 February 1972, ordered
FMC, et al. to pay de la Osa his overtime compensation, as well as his swing shift and graveyard shift
premiums at the rate of 50% per cent of his basic salary. FMC, et al. filed the petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue:
1. Whether the mere act by a non-resident foreign corporation of recruiting Filipino workers
for its own use abroad, in law doing business in the Philippines.
2. Whether FMC has been "doing business in the Philippines" so that the service of
summons upon its agent in the Philippines vested the Court of First Instance of Manila with
jurisdiction.
Held:

1. In its motion to dismiss, FMC admits that Mr. Catuira represented it in the Philippines "for the
purpose of making arrangements for the approval by the Department of Labor of the employment of
Filipinos who are recruited by the Company as its own employees for assignment abroad." In effect, Mr.
Catuira was alleged to be a liaison officer representing FMC in the Philippines. Under the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Board of Investments which took effect 3 February 1969, implementing
RA 5455, which took effect 30 September 1968, the phrase "doing business" has been exemplified with
illustrations, among them being as follows: ""(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts.
Concrete and specific solicitations by a foreign firm, not acting independently of the foreign firm,
amounting to negotiation or fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or service contracts, regardless of
whether the contracts are actually reduced to writing, shall constitute doing business even if the
enterprise has no office or fixed place of business in the Philippines; (2) appointing a representative or
distributor who is domiciled in the Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an
independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its own account, and not in the name or
for the account of the principal; xxx (4) Opening offices, whether called 'liaison' offices, agencies or
branches, unless proved otherwise. xxx (10) Any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial
dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the
exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, or in the progressive prosecution of, commercial
gain or of the purpose and objective of the business organization."

2. FMC may be considered as "doing business in the Philippines" within the scope of Section 14
(Service upon private foreign corporations), Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provides that "If the
defendant is a foreign corporation, or a non-resident joint stock company or association, doing business
in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that
purpose or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on
any of its officers or agents within the Philippines." Indeed, FMC, in compliance with Act 2486 as
implemented by Department of Labor Order IV dated 20 May 1968 had to appoint Jaime V. Catuira, 1322
A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila "as agent for FMC with authority to execute Employment Contracts and receive,
in behalf of that corporation, legal services from and be bound by processes of the Philippine Courts of
Justice, for as long as he remains an employee of FMC." It is a fact that when the summons for FMC was
served on Catuira he was still in the employ of the FMC. Hence, if a foreign corporation, not engaged in
business in the Philippines, is not barred from seeking redress from courts in the Philippines (such as in
earlier cases of Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, vs. Pacific Star Line, etc. [GR L-26809], In
Mentholatum vs. Mangaliman, and Eastboard Navigation vs. Juan Ysmael & Co.), a fortiori, that same
corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person
or persons in the Philippines.














Patricia Sto Tomas vs. Salac

This case is a consolidation of the following cases: G.R. No. 152642, G.R. No. 152710, G.R. No.
167590, G.R. Nos. 182978-79, and G.R. Nos. 184298-99.

G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710

In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers abroad, sought to
enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and TESDA, from regulating the activities
of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant
Workers Act which provides that recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be deregulated one year from
the passage of the said law; that 5 years thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042 was
passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as 2000, the aforementioned government
agencies should have stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the recruitment of workers
abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.

HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this case in 2007,
RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was passed which repealed
Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.

G.R. 167590

In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the validity of the
following provisions of RA 8042:
a. Section 6, which defines the term illegal recruitment. PASEI claims that the definition by the law is
vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;
b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the penalties for simple
violations against RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to render report or obstructing inspection are already
punishable for at least 6 years and 1 day imprisonment an a fine of at least P200k. PASEI argues that
such is unreasonable;
c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either file the criminal
case where he or she resides or at the place where the crime was committed. PASEI argues that this
provision is void for being contrary to the Rules of Court which provides that criminal cases must be
prosecuted in the placed where the crime or any of its essential elements were committed;
d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to be in violation of
RA 8042 shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the
aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI claims that this automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers
and directors is void for being violative of due process.
RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declraed the said provisions of RA
8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the RTC judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, and 9 of RA 8042 are void.

HELD: No, they are valid provisions.
a. Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between licensed and non-licensed
recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, or procuring workers without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal
recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand,
recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate
government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful
acts enumerated in Section 6.
b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed the said penalties.
Besides, it is not the duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind the law.
c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110, itself, provides that
the rule on venue when it comes to criminal cases is subject to existing laws. Therefore, there is nothing
arbitrary when Congress provided an alternative venue for violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.
d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make them jointly and
solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of
that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.

G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99

In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her parents received
insurance benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare Administration). But when they found out
based on an autopsy conducted in the Philippines that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her
parents (Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance benefits with damages from the
recruitment and placement agency which handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion,
Inc.).
The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since Becmen was negligent
in investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin (a violation of RA 8042), it shall be liable for damages.
The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to Section 10 of RA 8042, the directors and officers of
Becmen are themselves jointly and solidarily liable with Becmen.
Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to intervene. They aver that
Section 10 is invalid.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.

HELD: No. As earlier discussed, Section is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not automatic.
However, the SC reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily and jointly liable with
Becmen there being no evidence on record which shows that they were personally involved in their
companys particular actions or omissions in Jasmins case.






Salazar vs. Achacoso

Facts:
Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with
illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to
appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner
had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued
a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents
and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it
having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was
then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by media men and Mandaluyong
policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let
them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the
return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order
violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were
confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.


Issue:
Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor)
can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code


Held:
Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure
or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court
held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article
38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the
President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order
arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole
domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant.
The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be
seized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized
as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.