Plunder in the Philippines

Get to know the origins of the Anti-Plunder Law, and the plunder cases that have been filed since 1997

MANILA, Philippines Plunder cases against 3 incumbent senators, alleged pork barrel scam mastermind Janet
Lim Napoles, and 5 others were filed before the anti-graft court Sandiganbayan on June 6, 2014.
Separate graft cases were filed against them and 45 more individuals. All in all, 54 have been charged before
the Sandiganbayan. (LIST: Defendants in PDAF scam cases)
They are all accused of pocketing kickbacks through an elaborate scheme to divert lawmakers' pork barrel to
either non-existent or incomplete government projects. (READ: 3 PH senators charged with plunder over PDAF
scam)
But did you know that the law penalizing plunder is only two decades old?
Republic Act 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos dictatorship, when
then-president Ferdinand Marcos, his wife Imelda, and their cronies allegedly amassed ill-gotten wealth.
After the 1986 People Power Revolution, the government found that existing laws like the Anti-Graft and
Corruption Practices Act "were clearly inadequate to cope with the magnitude of the corruption and thievery
committed during the Marcos years," said former Senator Jovito Salonga.
In response to this, anti-plunder bills were filed by Salonga in the Senate, and by then representative Lorna
Yap in the House of Representatives during the 9th Congress.
The bills were consolidated into Republic Act 7080, signed by President Corazon Aquino in 1991.
First plunder case
The first-ever plunder cases were filed on August 15, 1997, when then-Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) sued cashier Dominga Manalili and 6 others for two counts of plunder.
Manalili and her accomplices were accused of diverting a total of P260 million (or around $9.9 million at the
time) of withholding tax payments of government and private employees to unauthorized bank accounts in
1996.
Nearly 4 years later, in May 2001, Manalili became the first person to be convicted of plunder in the
Philippines. She was sentenced by Quezon City Regional Trial Court judge (now Supreme Court Associate
Justice) Diosdado Peralta to two life terms, and was ordered to return the money she stole plus all profits
earned.
Her accomplices fellow BIR officials Joel Marcelo and Gil Erencio, and two other individuals were also found
guilty of plunder. Meanwhile, charges against two other defendants were dismissed due to insufficient evidence.
Erap's plunder case
Manalili's conviction happened in the midst of a historic plunder case involving an ousted president.
On April 4, 2001, nearly 3 months after his removal from office, former President Joseph Ejercito-Estrada, his
son Jinggoy Estrada and 6 others, were charged with plunder.
The Estradas were the first elected officials to be so charged. Jinggoy Estrada was the first incumbent elected
official to be sued. He was the mayor of San Juan City at the time the plunder case was filed.
President Estrada was accused of amassing a combined P4 billion (or around $80 million in 2001), mainly from
jueteng payola (pay-offs) and misappropriation of tobacco excise tax funds.
Six years later, on September 12, 2007, Estrada was found guilty of plunder, and sentenced to life in prison.
His son Jinggoy and lawyer Edward Serapio were acquitted.
On October 26, 2007, however, Erap Estrada secured a pardon from then-president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
(READ: Cast in Erap plunder case: Where are they now?)
Dismissals
Since 2001, 8 plunder cases have been filed before the Sandiganbayan. Among them, two have been dismissed.
1) On March 5, 2004, an P82-million (or around $1.5-million) plunder case was filed against 20 public works
officials and 10 private individuals over alleged "ghost repairs" of Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) vehicles.
Their plunder case was dismissed in January 2005, but separate estafa charges have been filed against most of
them. (READ: What's the difference: Plunder vs graft)
2) On March 19, 2009, a P74-million plunder case (or approx. $1.55 million on that year) was filed against
former finance undersecretary Antonio Belicena, 3 members of the Chingkoe family, and 3 other finance officials
over a tax credit scam that took place from 1995 to 1997.
The Sandiganbayan for lack of probable cause dismissed the case in March 2011. The Office of the Ombudsman
has filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. In addition, the accused are still facing separate graft, estafa,
and falsification cases.
Pending cases
Besides the 3 plunder cases filed in connection with the pork barrel scam, there are 3 other pending plunder
cases at the Sandiganbayan:
1) April 6, 2005 - A P303-million ($5.5-million) plunder case was filed against Armed Forces of the
Philippines comptroller Maj. General Carlos Garcia and 4 family members over alleged ill-gotten wealth. Months
later, a court martial found him guilty of misdeclaration of his assets.
In 2010, Garcia posted bail and was released after securing a plea bargain agreement with the Office of the
Ombudsman, allowing Garcia to plead guilty to lesser offenses. (READ:Gen Garcia: How the big fish got away)
The following year, in September 2011, a general court martial ordered Garcia rearrested, and he was detained
at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa City upon the orders of President Benigno Aquino III.
Meanwhile, in July 2013, his 2010 plea bargain agreement was cancelled by the Supreme Court.
2) July 4, 2011 - A P266-million ($6.1-million) plunder case was filed against agriculture secretary Luis
Lorenzo, undersecretary Jocelyn "Jocjoc" Bolante, assistant secretary Ibarra Poliquit, and 6 others over the
fertilizer fund scam, which allegedly diverted P728 million of funds for fertilizers to the 2004 presidential
campaign of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
3) July 16, 2012 - Arroyo became the second former president to be charged with plunder. The Office of the
Ombudsman filed a P366-million ($8.7-million) plunder case against Arroyo, 7 Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) officials, and two Commissions on Audit officials over alleged misuse of PCSO intelligence funds.
In October 2013, another plunder complaint was filed against Arroyo, this time over the misuse of the
discretionary Malampaya fund. Included in the charge sheet are alleged pork barrel scam mastermind Janet Lim
Napoles, political liaison Ruby Tuason, and many others. The accused have yet to be indicted in connection with
Malampaya.
Death penalty
The crime of plunder was previously punishable by death, but nobody among those charged with plunder in the
country's history were handed down the death sentence.
In December 1993, Republic Act 7659 or "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes"
amended the Anti-Plunder Law to include the death penalty as a maximum punishment for the commission of
plunder.
But an accused can escape the death penalty if there are no aggravating circumstances that will warrant its
imposition.
After the abolition of the death penalty in 2006 through Republic Act 9346, the death sentence for plunder
was likewise struck down.
Currently, the punishments for plunder are as follows: reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment), forfeiture of ill-
gotten wealth in favor of the government, and perpetual disqualification from public office. Rappler.com
Sources: "A Journey of Struggle & Hope" by Jovito R. Salonga, Sandiganbayan database, various news websites
http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/60139-plunder-philippines-history

http://www.chanrobles.com/republicactno7080.htm#.VC6Xw2eSyGM


A. The Philippine Anti-Plunder Law

Republic Act No. 7080 (July 12, 1991) otherwise known as An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder as amended defines plunder as the amassing, accumulation or acquisition by any public officer by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons of ill-gotten wealth through a combination of overt or criminal acts in the
aggregate or total amount of at least seventy-five million Philippine pesos. (Section 2, Republic Act No. 7080,
as amended)

Ill-gotten wealth means any asset means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any
person acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;

(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

(c) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;

(d) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(f) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 7080, as amended)

Those found guilty of the crime of plunder shall be punished by life imprisonment with perpetual absolute
disqualification from holding any public office. Any person who participated with said public officer in the
commission of plunder shall likewise be punished. In imposing penalties, the court shall consider the guilty
parties degree of participation as well as attendant mitigating and extenuating circumstances. (Section 2,
Republic Act No. 7080, as amended)

The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including
the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited by the State.
(Section 2, Republic Act No. 7080, as amended)

B. Related Jurisprudence

1. Joseph E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001)

FACTS: On April 4, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight separate
Informations against former President Joseph E. Estrada for violation of the Anti-Plunder Law, as amended,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, for perjury under the Revised Penal Code and for illegal use of an alias under Commonwealth Act
No. 142 as amended by Republic Act No. 6085.

On April 11, 2001, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to remand the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation, reconsideration and/or reinvestigation of the respective offenses charged and to give
the accused the opportunity to file documents to prove lack of probable cause.

On June 14, 2001, the petitioner moved to quash the Information for the charge of violation of the Anti-
Plunder Law on the grounds that: (a) the facts alleged did not constitute an indictable offense and (b) the
said amended Information charged more than one offense.

ISSUES: (a) Whether the Anti-Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) whether the Anti-Plunder
Law violates the rights of an accused to due process by requiring less evidence to prove the predicate crimes of
plunder; and (c) whether plunder as defined in Republic Act No. 7080 is malum prohibitum and whether it is
within the power of Congress to classify it as such.

HELD: As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters, which
would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its
description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime
with reasonable certainty and particularity.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide
the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the
accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty
that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten
wealth of at least P50, 000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Section 1,
paragraph (d) of the Anti-Plunder Law.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
"combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Section
1, paragraph (d), and Section 2, and the word "pattern" in Section 4.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form
of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily
result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"

Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring
into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.

Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal
succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is
pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill, which eventually became Republic Act No. 7080
or the Anti-Plunder Law.

Thus, when the Anti-Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two acts falling under
different categories of enumeration provided in Section 1, paragraph (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in
Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National
Government under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a "series" there must be two or more overt or criminal acts falling under the
same category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids
on the public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1). Verily, had the
legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken
greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.

As for "pattern," that this term is sufficiently defined in Section 4, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (d),
and Section 2. A 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Section 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Section 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or
criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal that is to enable the public officer to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or
'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a
'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him,
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the
schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy
to attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what
it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is
manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the
effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified
either by a saving clause or by construction.

The second issue that petitioner advances is that Section 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of
plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or
conspiracy, thus:

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption
of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

Thus, in addition to proving the commission of the separate acts constitutive of plunder, the prosecution needs
to prove beyond reasonable doubt a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50, 000,000.00 (now P75, 000,000.00 under
RA 7080, as amended), viz.:

To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty
(50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient
to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted
to at least P50, 000,000.00 (now P75,000,000.00 under RA 7080, as amended).

Thus, the court explained that Section 4 of the Anti-Plunder Law is intended to be purely a procedural
measure and does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused and thus granting that
it is flawed it may simply be severed without necessarily affecting the validity of the remaining provisions of
the Anti-Plunder Law, viz.:

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of
the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive
law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that
Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of
the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence
can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.

As regards the third issue, plunder is malum in se, which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, the ponente
in Joseph E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan quoted the concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza, viz.:

Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the
Anti-Plunder Law indicates clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of
the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Further, any doubt as to whether plunder is mala in se or
merely mala in prohibita may be considered as to have been resolved in the affirmative when Congress included
it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in 1993.

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved
in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray.

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either
because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely
disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped,
tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving
minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor,
robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in, which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject
criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to
be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government
must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With
the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less
heinous are the effect and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and
drug offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed
to cause further destruction and damage to society." (Emphasis supplied.)

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in
se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not
matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere
prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking,
without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which
have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the
corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentless]y contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers
of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated,
extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder
Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked,
will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The
Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and
thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.

Thus, the Court clarified that plunder is inherently wrong and immoral. With the government in dire lack of
money to provide even the most basic services to the people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government and the survival of the
people and thus is no less heinous in effect than crimes such as destructive arson resulting in death. The
Congress in enacting the Anti-Plunder Law was simply mustering the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that has deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace.

2. Jose Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002)

FACTS: In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against the former President of
the Philippines Joseph Ejercito Estrada, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of
his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.

On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing with
the Sandiganbayan of several criminal charges against the former President and the other respondents therein.
One of the charges was for the plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was the
formers presidents son the petitioner in this case Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro
Manila.

The charge was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was
assigned to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on July 10, 2001.
No bail for petitioner's provisional liberty was fixed. On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or
Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, Republic Act No. 7080, is
unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.

On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its
basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law. On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a
"Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him
liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or
combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.

On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's "Motion to Quash and Suspend"
and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion." Petitioner's alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after
arraignment of all the accused.

The Amended Information is divided into three parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph
E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the
accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in
detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080,
and state the names of the accused who committed each act.

Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in subparagraph (a) of the Amended Information which
is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of
P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit" In this subparagraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the
act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million

ISSUES: (a) Whether the Anti-Plunder Law, Republic Act No. 7080, is unconstitutional; (b) whether
petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada may be tried for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in
one act or offense that is illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as
required in R.A. No. 7080; and (c) whether the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

RULING: Regarding the first issue, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7080 has already been settled in
the case of Joseph Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.

With respect to the second issue, while it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d)
thru their individual acts conspired with the former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17, as the Amended
Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused persons named in sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth.

In view of the lack of clarity in the Information, the Court held petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada cannot be
penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). Instead, the
petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts that he allegedly committed as related in sub-
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President
whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.

However, if the allegation should be proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It. will be no different
from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable
penalty is provided in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, viz.:

"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) (now
P75,000,000.00 under RA 7080, as amended) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of
an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court."

The Court added that it cannot fault the Ombudsman for including the predicate offenses alleged in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended information in one and not four separate Informations. The court
explained the history of the Anti-Plunder Law, thus:

A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly
of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where
charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government
prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly
committed' by the former President to acquire illegal wealth. They also found that under the then existing laws
such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts
involved different transactions, different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a
separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several
criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually,
thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically the same accused before the
Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address this procedural
problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz.:

"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes
the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but
in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which
touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve
simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an
entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet
exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the
possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination
to succumb to the corrupting influence of power.

Anent the third issue, on December 21, 2001, the Sandiganbayan submitted its Resolution (dated December
20, 2001) denying petitioner's motion for bail for "lack of factual basis." Basing its finding on the earlier
testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner "failed to submit sufficient evidence to
convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that
purpose that he be allowed to post bail."

The Court clarified that the crime of plunder is punished with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are
non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:

"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which reads:

"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."

Thus, the constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of
whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. The trial court is required to conduct bail
hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense will be afforded sufficient opportunity to present their
respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt is
strong.

The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of
medical evidence only and which evidence was given five months earlier in September 2001. The records do not
show that evidence on petitioner's guilt was presented before the lower court. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was
ordered to conduct hearings to ascertain whether evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong to determine whether
to grant bail to the latter.

3. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003)

FACTS: The case of Serapio v. Sandiganbayan is an offshoot of the case filed against former president Joseph
E. Estrada as the petitioner is one of the accused charged with plunder together with the former president and
Jose Jinggoy Estrada. It is a consolidation of three cases filed by petitioner with the Supreme Court against
the Sandiganbayan and other respondents.

ISSUE: As mentioned in the earlier cited case of Jose Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, according to the
accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges more than one offense, namely, bribery (Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation of public funds or property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and
violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (Republic Act No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713.

RULING: As likewise earlier mentioned, the court found the contention to be unmeritorious. The acts alleged in
the information are not charged as separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder. Thus:

It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section 1(d) thereof does not make any express
reference to any specific provision of laws, other than R.A. No. 7080, as amended, which coincidentally may
penalize as a separate crime any of the overt or criminal acts enumerated therein. The said acts which form
part of the combination or series of act are described in their generic sense. Thus, aside from 'malversation' of
public funds, the law also uses the generic terms 'misappropriation', 'conversion' or 'misuse' of said fund. The
fact that the acts involved may likewise be penalized under other laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned
only as predicate acts of the crime of plunder and the allegations relative thereto are not to be taken or to be
understood as allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished under the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees."

It is clear on the face of the amended Information that petitioner and his co-accused are charged only with
one crime of plunder and not with the predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that the
predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and independent of the crime of
plunder

Further, petitioner argues that his motion for reinvestigation is premised on the absolute lack of evidence to
support a finding of probable cause for plunder as against him. Hence, he should be spared from the
inconvenience, burden and expense of a public trial.

The Court explained that the settled rule that the Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion in
the conduct of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro v. Sandiganbayan (cf. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan), the
Court ruled:

" In the performance of his task to determine probable cause, the Ombudsman's discretion is paramount.
Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said:

[S]uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish 'probable cause' for filing of information
against the supposed offender."

Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
its resolution affirming the finding of probable cause against him by the Ombudsman. Petitioner failed to
discharge his burden and thus the Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan.

The Court elucidated that preliminary investigation is conducted only for the purpose of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime
is guilty thereof and should be held for trial. As the Court held in Webb v. De Leon (cf. Serapio v.
Sandiganbayan):

"A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.''

OTHER ISSUES: In one of the petitions the issues for resolution were: (a) Whether or not the petitioner
should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted; (b) whether the petitioner
may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail; (c) whether
a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused is mandatory; (d) whether
the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed
to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (e) whether the petitioner was
deprived of his right to due process and should thus be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.

RULING: Regarding the issue in (a) above, the arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct
of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his
liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing
a petition for bail. In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals (cf. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan) the Court held that "in cases
where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from
filing a motion to quash."

However, the foregoing pronouncement by the Court should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a
petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment. The ruling in Lavides v. Court of Appealsshould be
understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to
quash the informations filed against him. The Court elucidated thus:

[T]o condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where
he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his
motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to
quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge
him with a crime and his right to bail.

In fine, the Court found the Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the petitioners arraignment before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.

With regard to the issue in (b) above, filing a motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails the
validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or
for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. Generally, an accused may file a motion to
quash the Information against him before arraignment.

A motion to quash and a petition for bail do not preclude each other. Certainly, if a petition for bail is
granted to an accused charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment on
the ground that the evidence of his guilt is not strong, the accused may still file a motion to quash to
question the validity of the Information charging him with an offense. However, if a motion to quash a criminal
complaint is granted on the ground that the same does not charge an offense the petition for bail will become
moot and academic.

Concerning the issue in (c) above, the Court noted that there is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for
bail filed by different accused or requiring that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with
the trial of the case against the other accused. Thus, the matter is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. The Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Sandiganbayan except in case
proof of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction of the latter can be shown.

The Court pointed out that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe (cf. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan) it held that the court is to
conduct only a summary hearing in a petition for bail hearing. Summary means a brief and speedy method
of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. Thus, in a petition for bail hearing:

The court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the
evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may
be offered therein. It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose
of the hearing.

A joint hearing of separate petitions for bail by several accused may be a way to avoid duplication of time and
effort of the courts and the prosecution and minimize prejudice to accused persons, especially in cases where
the petitioners for bail are charged of having conspired in the commission of the same crime and the
prosecution will present essentially the same evidence against them.

However, the Court explained that due to the complexity of the case involving former president Estrada to
which the Sandiganbayan sought to join the petitioners petition for bail, the bail proceedings will no longer be
summary. As regards former president Estrada, the proceedings will involve a full-blown trial.

Further, in accordance the Courts ruling in the case of Jose Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan where it
stated that Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada can only be charged with conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-
paragraph (a) of the amended Information since it is not clear the accused persons conspired with each other
to assist Joseph Estrada to amass ill-gotten wealth in committing all the acts alleged in in sub-paragraphs (a)
to (d) thereof, the Court held that Serapio may only be charged with having conspired with the other co-
accused named in sub-paragraph (a) by "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances,
money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling.

Thus, the Court found the Sandiganbayan to have gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the petition for
bail of petitioner and the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. Thus:

In ordering that petitioner's petition for bail to be heard jointly with the trial of the case against his co-
accused former President Joseph E. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further and unnecessary delay
in the resolution thereof to the prejudice of petitioner. In fine then, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of its discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioner's petition for bail with the trial of the
case against former President Joseph E. Estrada on its merits.

Cooley in his treatise Constitutional Limitations (cf. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan) explained the rationale for the
speedy resolution of an application for bail, thus:

"For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would with reasonable certainty insure the attendance
of the accused to answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when
the effect is to subject him in a greater or lesser degree, to the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it
is not determined that he has not committed any crime."

With respect to the issue in (d) above on whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for
the crime charged, the Court found the petitioners claim to be unsupported by the cases records. The
Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for the petitioners application for bail but the same had
to be reset due to incidents raised in several other motions filed by the parties.

Thus, the Court ruled that the petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan has
conducted a hearing of his application for bail and resolved the same in his favor. Prior thereto, there must
first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong before he may be granted bail.

Anent the last issue raised in (e) above as to whether the petitioner was deprived of his right to due process
and should thus be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus, the Court found no basis for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of the petitioner.

The Court explained that, as a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to
do so. However, in exceptional circumstances, the courts may grant a writ of habeas corpus even when the
person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender.

The writ of liberty is recognized as "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes."
Thus, in previous cases, the Court issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under
the law, had later become invalid, and even though the persons praying for its issuance were not completely
deprived of their liberty.

The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies to
the petitioner because he is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on
April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner
and his co-accused. In fact, the petitioner voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001
upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.

Moreover, the court stated that a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one's
right to bail. It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the
discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even
exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal
case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.

http://anti-moneylaunderingjournal.blogspot.com/2006/06/philippine-anti-plunder-law-and.html


DECISION

Republic Act (RA) No. 7080 as amended was approved on July 12, 1991, creating and introducing
into our criminal legal system the crime of plunder. This law penalizes public officers who would amass
immense wealth through a series or combination of overt or criminal acts described in the statute in violation
of the public trust. RA No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was a consolidation of Senate Bill no. 733 and
House Bill No. 22752. The Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 733, quoted in the case of Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 555), explains the reason behind the
law as follows:

Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy
and economic treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed
thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of
time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states
and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve
simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but
constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus,
the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the
depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to
succumb to the corrupting influence of power.

The majority opinion in the above-cited case, penned by Honorable Justice Josue N. Bellosillo,
further explained the rationale behind the Anti-Plunder Law in this manner:

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of
officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and
corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to milk the coffers of the government.
Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated,
extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury.
Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-
scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately
consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a
living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus
secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try mens souls. In the checkered history of this nation,
few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated
by petitioners ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and
trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among
our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for
patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the
midst of ferment. [Emphasis Supplied]

The present case is the first of its kind to be filed charging the highest official of the land, a
former President, among others, of the offense of plunder. Needless to state, the resolution of this case shall
set significant historical and legal precedents.

Throughout the six years over which the court proceedings in this case unfolded, this Court
confronted numerous novel and complicated legal issues (including the constitutionality of the plunder law,
propriety of house arrest, among others), heard lengthy testimonies from several dozens of witnesses from
both sides and perused voluminous documentary evidence and pleadings from the parties. Considering the
personalities involved and the nature of the crime charged, the present case aroused particularly intense interest
from the public. Speculations on the probable outcome of the case received unparalleled attention from the
media and other sectors of society. Indeed, the factual and legal complexities of the case are further
compounded by attempts to sensationalize the proceedings for various ends.

However, this Court is ever mindful of its imperative duty to act as an impartial arbiter: (a) to
serve the interest of the State and the public in punishing those who would so severely abuse their public office
and those private individuals would aid them or conspire with them and (b) to protect the right of the
accused to be only convicted upon guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the decision of this Court
follows, upon no other consideration other than the law and a review of the evidence on record.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND THE PROCEEDINGS



http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/sandiganbayandecision.html

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/148560_panganiban.htm
http://en.wikipilipinas.org/index.php/Republic_Act_No._7080

http://www.lawstude.net/2005/12/ra-7080-plunder-law.html

http://jlp-law.com/blog/the-law-on-plunder/