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Social Norms

Social norms, the customary rules that govern behavior in groups and societies, have been extensively
studied in the social sciences. Anthropologists have described how social norms function in different
cultures (Geertz !"#$, sociologists have focused on their social functions and how they motivate
people to act (%ur&heim !'() *arsons !#", *arsons and Shils !') +oleman !!() ,echter and -pp
.(($, and economists have explored how adherence to norms influences mar&et behavior (A&erlof
!"/) 0oung !!1$. 2ore recently, also legal scholars have touted social norms as efficient alternatives
to legal rules, as they may internalize negative externalities and provide signaling mechanisms at little
or no cost (3llic&son !!) *osner .((($.
4ith a few exceptions, the social science literature conceives of norms as exogenous variables. Since
norms are mainly seen as constraining behavior, some of the important differences between moral,
social and legal norms, as well as differences between norms and conventions, have been blurred.
2uch attention instead has been paid to the conditions under which norms will be obeyed. 5ecause of
that, the issue of sanctions has been paramount in the social science literature. 2oreover, since social
norms are seen as central to the production of social order or social coordination, research on norms has
been focused on the functions they perform, and whether they do so efficiently. 0et even if a norm may
fulfill important social functions such as welfare maximization or the elimination of externalities, it
cannot be explained solely or mainly on the basis of the functions it performs. 6he simplistic
functionalist perspective has been re7ected on several accounts since, even if a given norm can be
conceived as a means to achieve some social goal, this is usually not the reason why it emerged in the
first place (3lster !1!$. 2oreover, though a particular norm may persist (as opposed to emerge$
because of some positive social function it fulfills, there are many others that are inefficient and even
widely unpopular.
*hilosophers have ta&en a different approach to norms. 8n the literature on norms and conventions, both
social constructs are seen as the endogenous product of individuals9 interactions (:ewis !/!) ;llmann<
2argalit !"") =andershraaf !!') 5icchieri .((/$. Norms are represented as e>uilibria of games of
strategy, and as such they are supported by a cluster of self<fulfilling expectations. 5eliefs,
expectations, group &nowledge and common &nowledge have thus become central concepts in the
development of a philosophical view of social norms. *aying attention to the role played by
expectations in supporting social norms has helped differentiate between social norms, conventions,
and descriptive norms, an important distinction often overloo&ed in the social science accounts.
. 8ntroduction
Social norms, li&e many other social phenomena, are the unplanned, unexpected result of individuals9
interactions. 8t has been argued (5icchieri .((/$ that social norms ought to be understood as a &ind of
grammar of social interactions. :i&e a grammar, a system of norms specifies what is acceptable and
what is not in a society or group. And analogously to a grammar, it is not the product of human design
and planning. 6his view suggests that a study of the conditions under which norms come into being, as
opposed to one stressing the functions fulfilled by social norms, is important in order to understand the
differences between social norms and other types of in7unction, such as hypothetical imperatives, moral
codes or legal rules.
Another important issue often blurred in the literature on norms is the relationship between normative
beliefs and behavior. Some authors identify norms with observable, recurrent patterns of behavior.
-thers only focus on normative beliefs and expectations. All find it difficult to explain the observed
variance in norm<induced behavior, and each offers an explanation of conformity that is at best partial.
6hough a purely behavioral account of norms is difficult to support, it is also true that normative beliefs
alone cannot support a norm.
6here are three main canonical theories of conformity? socialization, social identity and rational choice.
Since all these theories ma&e testable statements about conforming behavior, they should be evaluated
in light of a large body of experimental evidence on whether and how normative beliefs affect behavior.
Such evidence, however, shows that all three theories are deficient) their definitions of what is a norm
are too rigid and limited to account for the rich landscape of norm<induced behavior. Alternative views
ta&e a different approach, considering norms as clusters of self<fulfilling expectations (Schelling !//$.
Such expectations result in behavior that reinforces them, but a crucial element in sustaining the norm
is the presence of conditional preferences for conformity. -nly the 7oint presence of a conditional
preference for conformity and the belief that other people will conform will produce an agreement
between normative beliefs and behavior (5icchieri .((/$
Since the norms that are interesting to study are those that emerge without planning or design from
individuals9 interactions (Schelling !"1$, one important theoretical tas& is to analyze the conditions
under which such norms come into being. 5ecause norms are so often meant to represent a solution to
the problem of attaining and maintaining social order, and social order re>uires cooperation, the main
focus of studies trying to model the emergence and dynamics of norms has focused on norms of
cooperation. Norms of honesty, loyalty, reciprocity and promise &eeping, to name but a few cooperative
norms, are crucial to the smooth functioning of social groups. -ne hypothesis is that they emerge in
small, close<&nit groups in which people have ongoing interactions with each other (,ardin !1.,
5icchieri !!#$. 3volutionary game theory ma&es possible a more rigorous statement of this
hypothesis, since repeated games are a useful if simplistic approximation of life in a close<&nit group
(Axelrod !1@, !1/) S&yrms !!/) Gintis .((($. 6he traditional game<theoretic framewor& has been
expanded with an account of learning in repeated games. 8n repeated encounters, people have an
opportunity to learn from each other9s behavior, and to secure a pattern of reciprocity that minimizes
the li&elihood of misperception. 6o be effective, norms of reciprocity, li&e other cooperative norms,
must be simple. %elayed and disproportionate punishment, as well as belated reward, are difficult to
understand and, for this very reason, often ineffective. 6he cooperative norms that are li&ely to develop
in close<&nit groups are simple ones, and this prediction is easily put to test (Alexander .(((, .((',
.(("$.
6hough norms develop in small, close<&nit groups, they often spread well beyond the narrow
boundaries of the original group. 6he challenge thus becomes one of explaining the dynamics of the
propagation of norms from small groups to populations. 3volutionary models have been introduced to
account for the propagation of norms (S&yrms !!/, .((@) Alexander .((") Gintis .((($.
8f norms can thrive and spread, they can also die out. A poorly understood phenomenon is the sudden
and unexpected change of well<established patterns of behavior (2ac&ie !!/$. Aor example, smo&ing
in public without as&ing for permission is >uic&ly becoming unacceptable, and only a few years ago
nobody would have worried about using gender<laden language. -ne would expect inefficient norms
(such as discriminatory norms against women and minorities$ to disappear more rapidly and with
greater fre>uency than more efficient ones. ,owever, 5icchieri (.((/$ points out that inefficiency is
not a sufficient condition for a norm9s demise? instead, it is only a necessary condition. 6his can best be
seen by the study of corruption. 6here are many examples, past and present, of uniformly corrupt
societies. +orruption fosters huge social costs, but costsBeven when they ta&e a society to the brin& of
collapseBare not enough to generate an overhaul of the system. 5icchieri and Covelli (!!'$ have
demonstrated that corruption can be an unstable e>uilibrium in a fixed population. 8n more realistic
settings, in which the population is variable, 5icchieri and %uffy (!!"$ show that a society can cycle
between DhonestE and corrupt social norms, without a single stable state.
.. Norms and efficiency
Some popular accounts of why social norms exist are the following? Norms are efficient means to
achieve social welfare (Arrow !", A&erlof !"/$, prevent mar&et failures (+oleman !1!$ or cut
social costs (6hibaut and Felley !'!, ,omans !/$) norms are either Nash e>uilibria of coordination
games or cooperative e>uilibria of prisoner9s dilemma<type games (:ewis !/!, ;llmann<2argalit
!""$, and as such they solve collective action problems.
Ac&erlof9s analysis of the norms that regulate land systems and of the evolution of sharecropping is a
good example of the tenet that norms are efficient means to achieve social welfare. Since the
sharecropper is much poorer and less li>uid than the landlord (he does not own land to be mortgaged$,
it would be more natural for the landlord rather than the tenant to bear the ris& of crop failure. 6his
would be the case if the landlord paid the tenant a wage and sold the crops. 6here are two components
to the sharecropper9s input? the time he puts in and the effort expended. 6ime put in is easy to observe
and can be paid a fixed wage. 3ffort cannot be observed without careful supervision of labor. Suppose
effort (e$ can be measured. 4ith a wage system, the wage would be w G w (e, t$, since the
sharecropper9s output depends on his effort and the time he puts in. 5ut without supervision, effort
cannot be determined. So the wage paid will depend on the average effort of the average wor&er, i.e., w
G w (e9, t$. 6his leaves no incentive to the wor&er for any effort beyond the minimum necessary to be
paid for his time. 8f he disli&es effort, he will minimize it. 8n sharecropping, on the contrary, the wor&er
is paid both for the effort and the time he puts in. 6ime and effort are imperfectly estimated from an
indicator? the output produced. 4henever supervision is needed for other reasons (as in capital<
intensive plantation crops$, we can expect a wage system to emerge.
6hibaut and Felley9s view of norms as substitutes for informal influence has a similar functionalist
flavor. As an example, they consider a repeated battle of the sexes game. 8n this game some bargaining
is necessary for each party to obtain, at least occasionally, the preferred outcome. 6he parties can
engage in a costly se>uence of threats and promises, but it seems better to agree beforehand upon some
rule for trading, such as alternating between the respectively preferred outcomes. Cules emerge because
they reduce the costs involved in face<to<face personal influence. :i&ewise, ;llman<2argalit (!""$
uses game theory to show that norms solve collective action problems, such as prisoner9s dilemma<type
situations) in her own words, HI a norm solving the problem inherent in a situation of this type is
generated by itJ (p. ..$. 8n a collective action problem, rational choices produce a *areto<inefficient
outcome. *areto<efficiency is restored by means of norms bac&ed by sanctions. +oleman, too, believes
that norms emerge in situations in which there are externalities, i.e., in all those cases in which an
activity produces positive or negative effects on other people that typically have no legal means to
enforce the continuationKcessation of the activity. 6hus the producer of the externality pays no
costKreaps no benefit for the additional effect of his activity. A norm solves the problem by prescribing
or proscribing the externality<producing action. 6he simplest example is a repeated prisoner9s dilemma,
in which the cooperative action of one player produces a positive externality for the other. 6hus each
has an incentive to induce cooperation in the other player by establishing a cooperative norm, i.e., a set
of sanctions punishing defection and rewarding cooperation.
All of the above are examples of a functionalist explanation of norms. Aunctionalists ma&e a typical
post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, since the mere presence of a social norm does not 7ustify inferring
that it is there to accomplish some social function. 6his view of norms does not account for the fact that
many social norms are highly inefficient, as in the case of discriminatory norms against women or
norms of racial segregation, or are so rigid as to prevent the fine<tuning that would be necessary to
accommodate new cases successfully. 5esides, many norms that increase the welfare of the members of
a certain group simultaneously damage outsiders to that group, as is the case with norms of loyalty
among the 2afia.
3ven if a norm is a means to achieve a social end, such as cooperation, retribution, or fairness, usually
it is not the sole means. 2any social norms are underdetermined with respect to the collective
ob7ectives they may serve, nor can they be ordered according to a criterion of greater or lesser
efficiency in meeting these goals. Such an ordering would be feasible only if it were possible to show
that one norm among others is the best means to attain a given social ob7ective. 6he problem is that the
ob7ectives themselves are defined by means of some norm, as is the case, for example, with norms of
revenge and fairness criteria. 6hough norms have many social functions, one should not confuse
function and cause. Aunction and cause can be identified only in those cases in which an institution has
been planned and designed to perform a given function. Social norms (as opposed to, say, legal rules$,
however, are the unintentional and unplanned outcome of human interaction. 4e can explain their
emergence without any reference to the functions they eventually come to perform.
#. 6heories of norms and their force
8n almost all the literature on norms, it is un>uestionably assumed that norms elicit conformity, and that
there is a strong correlation between people9s normative beliefs and their behavior. 5y normative
beliefs is usually meant individual or collective beliefs about what sort of behavior is prescribed (or
proscribed$ in a given social context. Normative beliefs are habitually accompanied by the expectation
that other people will follow the prescribed behavior and avoid the proscribed one. 0et it is not obvious
that having normative beliefs will induce people to act in a way consistent with them. 4hether there
can be normative beliefs at variance with behavior, and if so, why, is a >uestion we need to answer in
order to provide a satisfactory account of norms.
A norm cannot simply be identified with a recurrent, collective behavioral pattern. 8f we were to adopt
a purely behavioral account of norms, nothing would distinguish shared fairness criteria from, say, the
collective morning habit of tooth cleaning. Avoiding a purely behavioral definition means focusing on
the role expectations play in supporting those &inds of collective behaviors we ta&e to be norms. After
all, one cleans her teeth whether or not she expects others to do the same, but she would not even try to
as& for a salary proportionate to her education if she expected her cowor&ers to go by the rule of giving
to each proportionately to seniority. Aurthermore, there are behaviors that can only be explained by the
existence of norms, even if the behavior prescribed by the norm in >uestion is never observed. 8n his
study of the 8&, 6urnbull (!".$ reports that these starved hunters<gatherers tried hard to avoid
situations where their compliance with norms of reciprocity was expected. 6hus they would go out of
their way not to be in the position of gift<ta&er, and hunted alone and in secret not to be forced to share
their prey with anyone they encountered as they hunted. 2uch of 8&9s behavior could be explained as a
successful attempt at eluding existing reciprocity norms. Norms can hold a great amount of sway in a
population, even when we never see the corresponding behaviors that the norm is meant to elicit.
As 6urnbull9s example shows, having normative beliefs and expecting others to behave according to a
given norm does not always result in norm<abiding behavior. Simply focusing on norms as clusters of
expectations might thus be misleading, as there are many examples of discrepancies between normative
expectations and behavior. 6a&e the widely ac&nowledged norm of self<interest (2iller and Catner
!!/$) it is remar&able to observe how often people expect others to act selfishly, even when they are
prepared to act altruistically themselves. Aor example, studies show that people9s willingness to give
blood is not altered by monetary incentives, but typically those very people who are willing to donate
blood for free expect others to donate blood only in the presence of a sufficient monetary reward.
Similarly, when as&ed whether they would rent an apartment to an unmarried couple, all landlords
interviewed answered positively, but they estimated that only '(L of other landlords would accept an
unmarried couple as tenants (%awes !"@$. Such cases of pluralistic ignorance are rather common)
what is puzzling is that people may expect a given norm to be upheld in the absence of information
about other people9s conforming behavior and in the face of personal evidence to the contrary
(5icchieri and Au&ui !!!$. -ne might suspect that in all the cases mentioned the individuals involved
Bthough believing in the existence of a normBwere not themselves Hin its gripJ. ,owever, there is
much evidence showing that people who donate blood, tip on a foreign trip, give money to beggars or
return a lost wallet full of cash often attempt to underplay their altruistic behavior by supplying selfish
motives that ma&e their actions acceptable as conforming to a self<interest norm (4uthnow !!$.
8f a purely behavioral definition of norms is deficient, and one solely based upon expectations is
>uestionable, what are we left withM 4e must realize that the semantic vagueness surrounding the
concept of norm is common to all social constructs. 6here is no necessary and sufficient condition for
being a norm, 7ust a cluster of characteristics that any norm can display to a greater or lesser extent.
Norms refer to behavior, to actions over which people have control, and are supported by shared
expectations about what should or should not be done in different types of social situations. Norms,
however, cannot be 7ust identified with observable behavior, nor can they be e>uated with normative
beliefs, as normative beliefs may or may not result in appropriate action.
6he varying degrees of correlation between normative expectations and actions are an important factor
to differentiate among various types of norms, and to critically assess three ma7or theories about the
relationship between normative beliefs and actions. 6hese theories are? ($ the socialized actor theory,
(.$ the social identity theory, and (#$ the rational choice model of conformity.
@. Socialization
8n the theory of the socialized actor (*arsons !'$, an individual action is e>uated with a choice
among several alternatives. ,uman action is understood within a utilitarian framewor& as
instrumentally oriented and utility maximizing. 6hough a utilitarian setting does not necessarily imply
a view of human motives as essentially egoistic, this is the preferred interpretation of utilitarianism
adopted by 6alcott *arsons and much contemporary sociology. 8t then becomes crucial to explain by
which mechanisms social order and stability are attained in a society that would naturally be in a
permanent ,obbesian state of nature. -rder and stability are essentially socially derived phenomena,
brought about by a common value systemBthe HcementJ of society. 6he common values of a society
are embodied in norms that, when conformed to, guarantee the orderly functioning and reproduction of
the social system. 8n the *arsonian framewor&, norms are exogenous? how is a common value system
created, and how it may change and why, are issues left unexplored. 6he most important >uestion is
rather how norms get to be followed, and what prompts rational egoists to abide by them. 6he theory of
the socialized actor9s answer is that people voluntarily adhere to the shared value system because it is
intro7ected to form a constitutive element of the personality itself (*arsons !'$.
8n *arsons9 own words, a norm is Ha verbal description of a concrete course of action, I , regarded as
desirable, combined with an in7unction to ma&e certain future actions conform to this courseJ (!#"?
"'$. Norms play a crucial role in individual choice sinceBby shaping individual needs and preferences
Bthey serve as criteria for selecting among alternatives. Such criteria are shared by a given
community, and embody a common value system. *eople may choose what they prefer, but what they
prefer in turn conforms to social expectations. Norms influence behavior because, through a process of
socialization that starts in infancy, they become part of one9s motives for action? conformity to standing
norms is a stable ac>uired disposition that is independent of the conse>uences of conforming. Such
lasting dispositions are formed by long<term interactions with significant others (usually parents$)
through repeated socialization, individuals come to learn and internalize the common values embodied
in the norms. 8nternalization is conceived as the process by which people develop a psychological need
or motive to conform to a set of shared norms. 4hen norms are internalized, norm<abiding behavior
will be perceived as good or appropriate, and people will typically feel guilt or shame at the prospect of
behaving in a deviant way. 8f internalization is successful, external sanctions will play no role in
eliciting conformity, and since individuals are motivated to conform, it follows that normative beliefs
and actions will be consistent.
6hough *arsons9 analysis of social systems starts with a theory of individual action, he views social
actors as acting according to roles that defineBthrough internalization and socializationBtheir self<
identities and behaviors. 6he end of individual actions is to reach maximum satisfaction, which is
defined in terms of see&ing approval and avoiding disapproval. 5y ma&ing the common value system
prior to and constraining the social actor, the potential conflict between individual desires and
collective goals is resolved. 6he price of this solution is the disappearance of the individual actor as the
basic unit of analysis. 8nsofar as individuals are role<bearers, in *arsons9 theory it is social entities that
act, entities that are completely detached from the individual actions that created them. 6his
consideration forms the basis for most of the criticisms raised against the theory of the socialized actor
(4rong !/$. Such criticisms are typically rather abstract, as they are cast in the framewor& of the
holismKindividualism controversy. As far as we are aware, none of the critics has ever tried to control
whether the main empirical conclusions about behavior that can be drawn from the socialized actor9s
theoryBin particular, from the theory of how a normative orientation is ac>uiredBare in fact supported
by evidence.
*arsons9 theory is still used by sociologists to explain recurrent social behavioral patterns as due to
socialization, which produces motives or dispositions to act in the observed way. Given the widespread
explanatory use of the theory, one is 7ustified in treating it as a set of testable empirical assertions.
6here are a several such statements we can infer from the theory of the socialized actor, e.g., (a$ Norms
will change very slowly and only through intensive social interaction) (b$ Normative beliefs are
positively correlated to actions. 4henever such beliefs will change, behavior will follow) (c$ 8f a norm
is successfully internalized, expectations of others9 conformity will have no effect on an individual9s
choice to conform.
Some of the above statements are not supported by evidence drawn from social psychology. Aor
example, studies of co<variation of normative beliefsKattitudes and behavior show that there may not be
a relation between what people claim they should or would do, and what they in fact do. 8n general,
these studies have examined a large class of attitudes, where by HattitudeJ is meant Hevaluative feelings
of pro or con, favorable or unfavorable, with regard to particular ob7ectsJ) the ob7ects may be Hconcrete
representations of things or actions, or abstract conceptsJ (8ns&o and Schopler !/"? #/N#/.$. 6he
concept of attitude is >uite broad? it includes normative beliefs about how people should behave in
given situations and what counts as goodKacceptable behavior, but it also comprises personal opinions
and preferences. 6he psychological assumption of many such studies is that since attitudes are
evaluative predispositions, they have conse>uences for the way people act, especially in social
situations.
,owever, a series of prominent field experiments, dating bac& to !#@, provided evidence contrary to
the assumption that attitudes and behaviors are closely related. :a*iere (!#@$ famously reported a
sharp divergence between the widespread anti<+hinese attitudes in the ;nited States and the tolerant
behavior he witnessed. 2any other studies have pointed to inconsistencies between an individual9s
stated normative beliefs and her actions (4ic&er !/!$. Several reasons may account for the
discrepancy. Aor example, studies about ethnic pre7udice indicate that normative beliefs are more li&ely
to determine behavior in close and long<lasting relationships and least li&ely to determine behavior in
the transient situations typical of experimental studies (,arding et al. !/!) Gaertner and %ovidio
!1/$. 4arner and %eAleur (!/!$ report that when overt behaviors involving blac&s were highly
visible to a community opposing integration, low<pre7udice sub7ects were much more willing to engage
in behaviors that maintained social status differences between whites and blac&s than to engage in
behaviors that reduced status differences. 8n this study, it seems that the main variable affecting
behavior is not what an individual personally feels he should do, but rather his belief about what
HsocietyJ (i.e., most other people, his reference group, etc.$ says he should do.
4hen the results of social psychologists9 research on attitudes and behavior are lumped together, we are
left with little evidence to support the claim that an individual9s normative beliefs influence his actions.
Such studies, however, do not discriminate among different types of normative beliefs, whereas a
careful differentiation might help to determine which normative beliefsBif anyBpresent a positive
correlation with behavior. Aor example, when a distinction is made between personal normative beliefs
and social normative beliefs, it becomes apparent that only the second group of beliefs positively
correlates with behavior (Aishbein !/"$. 8n experimental wor& on norm<compliance (5icchieri and
Oiao .((!, 5icchieri and +havez .(($, it appears that individuals9 actions tend to be at odds with what
are understood as shared norms only when (a$ other people are not expected to follow the norm, andKor
(b$ the normative beliefs are not perceived to be collectively shared in the present situation. -n the
contrary, whenever individuals believe they are expected by their group (or society at large$ to behave
according to a given standard, and also expect the norm to be generally followed, they usually comply.
-nly those normative beliefs that people perceive to be collectively shared and put into practice seem
to matter to behavior.
Note that the above<mentioned studies presuppose that norms, as beliefs about what behavior ought to
be followed, can be measured independently of action by as&ing people to state their normative beliefs.
6his idea has its merits, but it should be >ualified. 6o assess the existence of a norm, it is important to
as& people not 7ust what their personal normative beliefs are, but what they expect other9s normative
beliefs to be. 6here is indeed a difference between personal normative beliefs such as HPohn believes
that he ought to divide the money e>uallyJ, and normative expectations, such as HPohn believes that
others thin& he ought to divide the money fairly and may punish him if he does notJ. -nly when we
observe widespread convergence of normative expectations can we say a norm is in place (5icchieri
and +havez .(($. 0et the fact that a norm exists does not mean it will be followed. Normative
expectations, per se, are not sufficient to induce compliance. 8f one observes widespread transgressions,
the force of normative expectations will be greatly diminished, as experimental evidence demonstrates
(5icchieri and Oiao .((!$. 6o be effective, normative expectations must be accompanied by the belief
that most people in fact obey the norm. 6here is extensive experimental evidence that individuals prefer
to conform to a norm on condition that both these expectations, empirical and normative, are met
(5icchieri .((/$.
4hat we 7ust said represents an important criticism of the socialization view. 8f norms were to directly
affect behavior, as *arsons would have it, we should observe a high correlation between all types of
normative beliefs and behavior, independently of whether other group members are expected to
conform or whether the norm is perceived to be collectively shared. According to *arsons, once a norm
is internalized people are motivated to conform by an internal sanctioning system, irrespective of the
external conse>uences that conforming behavior may bring about. ,owever, we only observe a
correlation between people9s choices and (a$ what they thin& other people believe ought to be done
(normative expectations$ and (b$ what they expect others in the same situation to do (empirical
expectations$. 8n other words, a verbal assessment of an individual9s personal normative beliefs has
little predictive value regarding his choices. -nly when personal normative beliefs coincide with what
one thin&s others will do and believe should be done we have a strong correlation with actual choices.
Another interpretation of *arsonian norms is, however, possible. -ne cannot deny that there exist
norms that our society has internalized to the point that almost no variance exists in norm<induced
behaviors. Such norms are typically proscriptive, and as such not li&ely to be correlated with
observable behavior. Aor example, a norm against &illing someone who stomps over one9s foot in a
crowded bus is never observed precisely because people usually do not engage in that sort of behavior.
2oreover, such behavior is not even conceived as an option, as the mere thought of it would spawn
feelings of anguish and guilt in most of us. *arsonian norms are internalized to the point that their
existence can be elicited only when the norm is violated, and conformity to such norms is clearly
unconditional. 8n this sense, such norms seem to coincide with moral norms, insofar as we understand
moral norms to be internalized, unconditional imperatives. Social norms instead are conditional, and
compliance crucially depends on having the right &ind of expectations in the appropriate situation.
Another indication that the socialization theory lac&s generality is the observation that norms can
change rather >uic&ly, and that new norms often emerge in a short period of time among complete
strangers (2ac&ie !!/$. :ong<term, intensive and close interaction does not seem to be necessary for
a person to ac>uire a given normative disposition, as is testified by the relative ease with which
individuals learn new norms when they change status or social group (e.g., from single to married, from
student to faculty, etc.$. 2oreover, studies of emergent social and political groups show that in such
groups new norms form rather rapidly and that the demise of old patterns of behavior is often sudden
and unexpected. Studies as disparate as the analysis of *rohibition support (Cobinson !#.$, racial
integration (-9Gorman !1/$, the sexual revolution in the !/(s (Flassen et al. !1!$, alcohol use on
campus (*rentice and 2iller !!#$ and the behavior of gang members (2atza !/@$ all lend credibility
to a model of norms grounded on individuals9 empirical and normative expectations of what others will
do and believe should be done. -nce these expectations are no longer met, the norm >uic&ly decays
(2ac&ie !!/) 5icchieri !!!, .((/$. -ne is compelled to conclude that there is little empirical support
for the theory of the socialized actor and the view of social norms that accompanies it, at least if we
ta&e it to be a general, all<encompassing theory of norms.
'. Social identity
6he theory of the socialized actor assumes that norms affect action by becoming part of an individual9
preferences and goals. 8n this case, ongoing social relationships such as group memberships can have
only marginal effect on behavior. Against this tendency towards over<socializing human action, it has
been argued that most behavior is closely embedded in a networ& of personal relations, and that a
theory of norms cannot leave the specific social context out of consideration (Granovetter !1'$.
+ritics of the socialization view call therefore for an alternative conception of norms capable, among
other things, to account for the often<wea& relation between beliefs and behavior (%eutscher !"#$.
6his alternative approach ta&es social relations to be crucial in explaining social action and views
social identity as a &ey motivating factor. A strong support for this view among anthropologists is to be
found in the wor& of +ancian (!"'$ on the normative beliefs that are held by the Qinacanteco 8ndians,
and how such beliefs correlate with behavior.
Since the concept of social identity is inextricably lin&ed to that of group behavior, it is important to
clarify the relation between these concepts. 5y Dsocial identityE we refer, in 6a7fel9s own words, to Hthat
part of an individual9s self<concept which derives from his &nowledge of his membership of a social
group (or groups$ together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membershipJ
(6a7fel !1, p. .''$. Note that a crucial feature of the concept of social identity is that identification
with a group is in some sense a conscious choice? one may accidentally belong to a group, but it is only
when being a group member becomes at least partly constitutive of who one is that we can
meaningfully tal& of social identifications.
According to 6a7fel9s theory, when we categorize ourselves as belonging to a particular group, the
perception and definition of the self, as well as our motives, change. 4e start perceiving ourselves and
our fellow group<members along impersonal, DtypicalE dimensions that characterize the group to which
we belong. Such dimensions include specific roles, and the beliefsKactions that accompany them.
6urner9s Dself<categorization theoryE (!1"$ provided a more specific characterization of self<
perception, or self<definition, as a system of cognitive self<schemata that filter and process information,
and output a representation of the social situation that guides the choice of appropriate behavior. 6his
system has at least two ma7or components, social and personal identity. Social identity refers to self<
descriptions related to group memberships. *ersonal identity refers to more personal self<descriptions,
such as individual character traits, abilities and tastes. 6hough personal and social identities are
mutually exclusive levels of self<definition, this distinction must be ta&en as an approximation. 6here
are many interconnections between social and personal identity, and even personal identity has a social
component. 8t is, however, important to recognize that sometimes we perceive ourselves primarily in
terms of our relevant group memberships rather than as differentiated, uni>ue individuals. %epending
on the situation, personal or group identity will become salient (5rewer !!$. Aor example, when one
ma&es interpersonal comparisons between self and other group members, personal identity will become
salient, whereas group identity will be salient in situations in which one9s group is compared to another
group. 4ithin a group, all those factors that lead members to categorize themselves as different and
endowed with special characteristics and traits are enhancing personal identity. 8f a group is solving a
common tas&, but each member will be rewarded according to his contribution, personal abilities are
highlighted and individuals will perceive themselves as uni>ue and different from the rest of the group.
+onversely, if all group members e>ually share the reward for a 7ointly performed tas&, group
identification is going to be enhanced. 4hen the difference between self and fellow group members is
accentuated, we are li&ely to observe selfish motives and self<favoritism against other group members.
4hen instead group identification is enhanced, in<group favoritism against out<group members will be
activated, as well as behavior contrary to self<interest.
According to 6urner, social identity is basically a cognitive mechanism whose adaptive function is to
ma&e group behavior possible. 4henever social identification becomes salient, a cognitive mechanism
of categorization is activated that produces perceptual and behavioral changes. Such categorization is
called a stereotype, the prototypical description of what members of a given category are (or are
believed to be$. 8t is a cluster of physical, mental and psychological characteristics attributed to a
DtypicalE member of a given group. Stereotyping, li&e any other categorization process, activates scripts
or schemata, and what we call group behavior is nothing but scripted behavior. Aor example, the
category HAsian studentJ is associated with a cluster of behaviors, personality traits and values. 4e
often thin& of Asian students as respectful, diligent, disciplined, and especially good with technical
sub7ects. 4hen thin&ing of an Asian student solely in terms of her group membership, we attribute her
the stereotypical characteristics associated with her group, so she becomes interchangeable with other
group members. 4hen we perceive people in terms of stereotypes, we depersonalize them and see them
as DtypicalE members of their group. 6he same process is at wor& when we perceive ourselves as group
members. Self<stereotyping is a cognitive shift from perceiving oneself as uni>ue and differentiated to
perceiving oneself in terms of the attributes that characterize the group. 8t is this cognitive shift that
mediates group behavior.
Group behavior, as opposed to individual behavior, is characterized by distinctive features such as
perceived similarity between group members, cohesiveness, the tendency to cooperate to achieve
common goals, shared attitudes and beliefs and conformity to group norms. -nce an individual self<
categorizes as member of a group, she will perceive herself as DdepersonalizedE and similar to other
group members in the stereotypical dimensions lin&ed to the relevant social categorization. 8nsofar as
group members perceive their interests and goals as identicalBbecause such interests and goals are
stereotypical attributes of the groupBself<stereotyping will induce a group member to embrace such
interests and goals as her own, and act to further them. 8t is thus predicted that pro<social behavior will
be enhanced by group membership, and diluted when people act in an individualistic mode (5rewer
!"!$.
6he groups with which we happen to identify ourselves may be very large, as when one self<defines as
2uslim or Arench, or as small as a friends9 group. Some very general group identities may not involve
specific norms, but there are many cases in which group identification and social norms are
inextricably connected, as often groups develop their own special norms. 8n that case, group members
believe that certain patterns of behavior are uni>ue to them, and use their distinctive norms to define
group membership. 2any close<&nit groups, such as the Amish or the ,asidic Pews, enforce norms of
separation proscribing marriage and intimate relationships with outsiders, as well as specific dress
codes and a host of other prescriptive and proscriptive norms that ma&e the group uni>ue and
differentiate it from out<groups. 8n this case, once an individual perceives herself as a group member,
she will adhere to the group prototype and behave in accordance with it. ,ogg and 6urner (!1"$ called
the process through which individuals come to conform to such group norms referent informational
influence. Group<specific norms have, among other things, the twofold function of minimizing
perceived differences among group members and maximizing differences between the group and
outsiders. -nce formed, such norms become stable cognitive representations of appropriate behavior as
a group member. Social identity is built around group characteristics and behavioral standards, hence
any perceived lac& of conformity to group norms is seen as a threat to the legitimacy of the group. Self<
categorization accentuates the similarities between one9s behavior and that prescribed by the group
norm, thus causing conformity as well as the disposition to control and punish in<group members that
transgress group norms. 8n this view, group norms are obeyed because one identifies with the group,
and conformity is mediated by self<categorization as an in<group member. A telling (but not
uncommon$ historical example of the relationship between norms and group<membership was the
division of 3ngland into the two parties of the Coundheads and +avaliers. +harles 2ac&ay reports that
H8n those days every species of vice and ini>uity was thought by the *uritans to lur& in the long curly
tresses of the monarchists, while the latter imagined that their opponents were as destitute of wit, of
wisdom, and of virtue, as they were of hair. A man9s loc&s were a symbol of his creed, both in politics
and religion. 6he more abundant the hair, the more scant the faith) and the balder the head, the more
sincere the pietyJ (3xtraordinary popular delusions, 1@? #'$.
8n the social identity framewor&, norms are defined as collective (as opposed to personal$ beliefs about
what actions are appropriate in a group<membership context. As ,omans stated, norms are 7ust shared
beliefs) they are not behavior itself, but what people thin& behavior ought to be (,omans !'(, !/$.
8n this sense, this definition of norms is much closer to the normativeKempirical expectations view
adopted by 5icchieri (.((/$. 6he difference lies in the account of motivation) in the social identity
version, people conform to norms to validate their identity as group members. Note that Dwanting to
validate one9s identityE may mean several things. -n the one hand, identifying with a particular ethnic
or geographical group might hold the promise of future tangible rewards) membership can thus be seen
as a rational choice, strictly motivated by self<interested considerations. -beying group norms thus
becomes the outward sign of one9s good standing as a group member, and a crucial step in reclaiming
the rewards provided by group membership. At other times, however, group memberships9 benefits are
more elusive? 6a7fel9s study of Hminimal groupsJ (6a7fel !"#$ suggest that social identity effects may
occur even in the absence of the tangible or intangible rewards that membership in an established group
affords. 6here is a difference between motives ultimately derived from self<interest and those derived
from concern for the interests and outcomes of a group. 8dentification with a valued group may thus
stem from individual or collective welfare considerations? one may want to belong to a group because
of the prospect of future personal rewards, or 7ust because one values the group and ta&es the group9s
goals and interests as one9s own, even at the cost of overloo&ing or restricting individual gains.
5e it as it may, it follows that norms do not need to be internalized in order to affect action. +onformity
to norms is conditional? people would stop conforming to a norm if there were doubts or disagreements
about a particular group9s identifying characteristics, thus >uestioning the group9s ability to validate a
particular identity, or when a group is abandoned for a new one. 6he fierce disputes common to the first
+hristian groups are an example of the first challenge to conformity (*agel .((#$, whereas changes in
social status, such as the passage from student to faculty, are an example of the second.
A criticism of the socialization model consisted in showing that only socially shared normative beliefs
(or normative expectations$ are usually associated with behavior, whereas personal ones may not. 6he
social identity model underscores this point, as it claims that only beliefs that are perceived to be shared
by a relevant group will affect action, whereas personal normative beliefs may fail to do so. So if an
individual believes it is a good thing to live in a racially mixed neighborhood, he may or may not act on
his belief. ,owever, if that same individual perceives that his friends will frown on him if he does not
choose to live in a racially integrated neighborhood, he will act consistently with his belief (+ancian
!"'$. Norms thus tend to be consistent with action, but within the framewor& of acts that are defined
as meaningful, appropriate, or desirable by a group of reference.
8f people are motivated to conform by their desire to ac>uire or maintain a given social identity, it
follows that they are not committed to any given norm, but to the identity that a norm supports.
Suppose that one9s identity as a teacher is defined by what the relevant reference group expects a
teacher to do. A person who cares about that particular role will then act in conformity to the group9s
expectations because she wants the group to validate her identity. Again, what remains to be explained
is the desire attributed to people to ac>uire and maintain a social identity. Such desire might not be
primitive, as one may desire instead the rewards that accompany performance according to a certain
role. Aor example, wanting to be identified as a good employee may 7ust mean that one wants to obtain
all the material and psychological rewards that accompany good wor& performance. -n the other hand,
there are situations in which there are no tangible, foreseeable rewards, and still people act in
conformity with group norms, as is the case with emergent political movements (,irschman !1.$.
Given the commitment to an identity, conformity to a norm does not involve internalization. 6hus a
new norm can be >uic&ly adopted without much interaction, and beliefs about identity validation may
change very rapidly under the pressure of external circumstances. +onsider what being a successful,
competent male meant in the fifties. 8n those years a popular icon was a ,umphrey 5ogart type that,
among other things, was never observed without a cigarette in his mouth. Now it means leading a
healthy lifestyle that may include running, vegetarianism, and abstinence from drin&ing and smo&ing.
6here are several conse>uences one can draw from the social identity theory of norms. 8nsofar as
norms are shared, collective beliefs of what actions are appropriate in what class of situations, they will
be consistent with actions, at least until the individual wants to belong and be identified with a
particular group that adopts the norms in >uestion. 0et a change in social status andKor group
membership will bring about a change in the norms relevant to the new statusKgroup. 8n this sense, not
7ust norm compliance, but norms themselves are potentially unstable.
Cesults from social psychology and behavioral experiments support the hypothesis that only
collectively shared normative beliefs, and not personal ones, matter to behavior (+ialdini et al. !!)
5icchieri and Oiao, .((!$. 8n this sense, the social identity view rightly highlights the importance of
shared beliefs. 6here are, however, several difficulties inherent in the use of the concept of social
identity to explain conformity to norms. Such difficulties become apparent in the experimental
literature on cooperative behavior in social dilemmas.
8n a typical social dilemma, a group of people attempts to obtain a common good in the absence of
central authority (-lson !"$. 3ach individual has two choices? either to contribute to the common
good, or to free<ride on the wor& of others. All individuals share e>ually in the common good,
regardless of their actions. ,owever, each cooperator increases the amount of the common good by a
fixed amount, but receives only a fraction of that amount in return. Since the cost of cooperating is
greater than the marginal benefit, it is rational for each individual to defect. 3veryone faces the same
choice, therefore all rational agents will defect and the common good will not be produced. 6he
individually rational strategy of weighing costs against benefits results in an inferior outcome for all.
3nvironmental pollution, population explosion, nuclear arm proliferation, conservation of electricity
and giving to charity are all examples of situations where an individual benefits by not contributing to
the common cause, but if all individuals free ride, everyone is worse off.
8n the experimental literature on social dilemmas, the search for mechanisms that elicit cooperative
behavior has included the use of the concept of social identity (%awes !1() 5rewer and Schneider
!!($. 8n these studies it is argued that, once identification with a group has been established through
pre<play communication, cooperation and the willingness to sacrifice one9s selfish goals for the sa&e of
the group will characterize intra<group behavior. Aor example, it has been shown that the cooperation
rate averaged /!L when discussion among group members was allowed, but it declined to a meager
#@L in the absence of discussion (%awes !!$. 6he hypothesis was that group discussion would
induce identification with the group, and thus elicit cooperative behavior. Aace to face group
discussion, however, may help group members to gather important information about each other, and
this very information may induce them to trust each other and thus to cooperate, without the need to
assume group identity has been created (5icchieri and :ev<-n .(("$. Aurthermore, it has been
conclusively shown that the topic of conversation matters to subse>uent cooperation. -nly when
participants are allowed to discuss the game, and ma&e public promises to cooperate, do we observe a
high degree of subse>uent cooperation. +ollective promising, and the resulting focus on a norm of
promise<&eeping, seems to be the crucial factor in eliciting cooperation (5icchieri .((.$.
+ooperative outcomes can thus be explained without ma&ing use of the social identity concept. A social
identity explanation would ma&e more sense in a relatively stable context in which individuals have
had time to ma&e emotional investments or, at least, can expect repeated future interactions with the
same group. 8n artificial lab settings, where there are no expectations of future interactions, the concept
of social identity seems less persuasive as an explanation of the observed rates of cooperation. Social
identity, however, does play a role in experimental settings in which participants are divided into
separate groups. 8n that case, it has been shown that participants start categorizing the situation as HweJ
versus HthemJ, activating in<group loyalty and trust, and an e>ual degree of mistrust toward the out<
group (Framer and 5rewer !1@) 5ornstein and 5en<0ossef !!@$.
3ven with stable environments and repeated interactions, however, an explanation of norm compliance
in terms of social identity cannot avoid the difficulty of explaining what happens when one is
simultaneously committed to different identities. 4e may concurrently be wor&ers, parents, spouses
and friends, club members and party affiliates, to name but a few of the possible identities we embrace.
Aor each of them, there are rules that define what is appropriate, acceptable or good behavior. 8n the
social identity view, however, it is not clear what happens when one is committed to different identities
that may involve conflicting behaviors. 4ill one identity override all othersM -r is it not the case that
often norms are negotiated precisely to avoid a conflict of loyaltiesM Aor example, rules that have
traditionally defined good performance in the wor&place may be modified when a sufficient number of
women enter a firm. 6he flexibility and negotiation potential of norms, however, are not ta&en into
consideration by the social identity theorists.
Ainally, there is ample evidence that people9s perceptions may change very rapidly. Since in the social
identity framewor& group norms are defined as shared perceptions about group beliefs, one would
expect thatBwhenever all members of a group happen to believe that others have changed their beliefs
about, say, core membership rulesBthe very norms that define membership will change. 6he study of
fashion, fads and speculative bubbles shows >uite clearly that there are areas of social interaction in
which rapid (and possibly disruptive$ changes of collective expectations may occur. 8t is, however,
much less clear what sort of norms are more li&ely to be sub7ect to rapid changes. %ress codes may
change rather swiftly, but what about the codes of honor or the norms of revenge that survived for
centuries in 2editerranean countriesM ;nfortunately the social identity view does not offer a theoretical
framewor& for differentiating these cases.
6hough some norms are clearly related to group membership, and thus compliance may be explained
through identity<validation mechanisms, there are many limits to the social identity explanation. Aor
example, what sort of rewards (in terms of identity validation$ accrue to those individuals who ta&e part
in new, emergent groups or movementsM 8n this case, it seems that a new identity and a new set of
norms are forged at the same time. Aurthermore, normsBbeing shared beliefs about what sort of
behavior validates an identityBare expected to be consistent with behavior, at least insofar as an
individual9s group membership is maintained. 5ut, as was discussed earlier, individuals are usually
committed to different social identities, and their commitments may also vary with time, so that
consistency between normative beliefs and behavior, though explainable, is hardly predictable in all but
the simplest group contexts.
/. Cational choice
6he rational choice model of conformity maintains that, since norms are upheld by sanctions,
compliance is a utility<maximizing strategy. *rovided that conformity to a norm attracts approval and
transgression disapproval, conforming is the rational thing to do, since nobody willfully attracts
discredit and punishment (Commetveit !'', 6hibaut and Felley !'!$. 8f others9 approval and
disapproval act as external sanctions, we have a cost<benefit model of compliance (Axelrod !1/,
+oleman !1!$. 8n this framewor&, one cannot say that norms motivate behavior. +onforming behavior
is rationally chosen in order to avoid negative sanctions or to attract positive sanctions. 6he rational
choice model typically defines norms behaviorally, e>uating them with patterns of behavior as opposed
to expectations or values. Such approach relies heavily on sanctions. According to Axelrod (!1/$, for
example, if we observe individuals to follow a regular pattern of behavior and to be punished if they act
otherwise, then we have a norm. Similarly, +oleman (!1!$ argues that a norm coincides with a set of
sanctions that act to direct a given behavior.
,owever, not all social norms involve sanctions, as is indicated by studies of the differences among
societies as to the proportion and &ind of norms that are sub7ect to organized sanctions (%iamond !#',
,oebel !'@$. 2oreover, sanctioning generally wor&s well in small<groups and in the context of
repeated interactions, where the identity of the participants is &nown and monitoring behavior is
relatively easy. 3ven in such cases, though, it remains to be explained how the so<called second<order
public good problem gets to be solved. 8mposing negative sanctions on transgressors is in everybody9s
interest, but the individual who observes a transgression faces a dilemma. She will have to decide
whether or not to punish the transgressor, where punishing involves costs and there is no guarantee that
other individuals, when faced with the same dilemma, will also impose a penalty on the transgressor. 8n
this case, upholding a norm depends on the previous solution of a so<called Hpunisher9s dilemmaJ. An
answer to this problem has been to assume that there exist Hmeta<normsJ that tell people to punish
transgressors of lower<level norms (Axelrod !1/$. 6his solution, however, only shifts the problem one
level up? upholding the meta<norm itself re>uires the existence of a higher<level sanctioning system.
Another problem with sanctions is the following? A sanction, to be effective, must be recognized as
such. +oleman and Axelrod typically ta&e the repeated prisoner9s dilemma game as an example of the
wor&ing of sanctions. ,owever, in a repeated prisoner9s dilemma the same action (+ or %$ must serve
as both the sanctioning action and the target action. 5y simply loo&ing at behavior, it is unclear whether
the action is a function of a sanction or a sanction itself. 8t becomes thus very difficult to determine the
presence of a norm, much less to assess its effect on choice as distinct from the individual strategies of
the players.
A further consideration wea&ens the credibility of the view that norms are upheld only because of
external sanctions. -ften we &eep conforming to a norm even in situations of complete anonymity,
where the probability of being caught transgressing is almost zero. 8n this case, fear of sanctions cannot
be a motivating force. 8t is often argued that all cases of HspontaneousJ compliance with norms are the
result of internalization (Scott !"$. *eople who have developed an internal sanctioning system, for
example, feel guilt and shame at behaving in a deviant way. ,owever, we have seen that the *arsonian
view of internalization and socialization is inade>uate, as it leads to predictions about norms and
compliance that run counter to much evidence, at least insofar as prescriptive (as opposed to
proscriptive$ norms are concerned.
8n order to offer a better explanation of internalization, proponents of the rational choice model
maintain that it is rational to internalize a norm. Aor example, +oleman (!1!$ has argued in favor of
reducing internalization to rational choice, insofar as it is in the interest of a group to get another group
to internalize certain norms. 8n this case, internalization would still be the result of some form of
socialization. 6his theory faces some of the same ob7ections raised against *arsons9 theory. Norms that
are passed from parents to children, for example, should be extremely resistant to change and one
would expect a high degree of correlation between such norms and behavior, especially in all those
cases in which norms prescribe specific &inds of actions. ,owever, studies of normative beliefs about
honesty (that one typically ac>uires during childhood$ show that they are often uncorrelated with
behavior (Areeman and Aatov !/($.
5icchieri (!!(, !!"$ has presented a third, alternative view about internalization. 6his view of
internalization is cognitive, and is grounded on the assumption that social norms develop in small,
close<&nit groups where ongoing interactions are the rule. -nce an individual has learned to behave in a
way consistent with the group9s interests, she will tend to persist in the learned behavior unless it
becomes evident that, on average, the cost of upholding the behavior significantly outweighs the
benefits. Small groups can typically monitor the members9 behavior, and successfully employ
retaliation whenever free riding is observed. 8n such groups, an individual will learn, maybe at some
personal cost, to cooperate. And he will uphold the cooperative norm as a Hdefault ruleJ in any new
encounter, unless and until it becomes evident that the cost of conformity has become excessive. 6he
idea that norms may be HsluggishJ is in line with well<&nown results from cognitive psychology
showing that, once a norm has emerged in a group, it will tend to persist and guide the behavior of
group members even when they are facing a new situation and are isolated from the original group
(Sherif !#/$.
5y and large, norm<abiding behavior is not, as the rational choice model would have it, a matter of
costKbenefit calculation. ;pholding a norm that has led one to fare reasonably well in the past is a way
of economizing on the calculation costs that one would have to sustain whenever facing a new
situation. 6his &ind of Hbounded rationalityJ approach explains why people tend to obey norms that
sometimes put them at a disadvantage, as is the case with norms of honesty. 6his does not mean,
however, that external sanctions never play a role in compliance. 8n the initial development of a norm,
as well as when individuals do not particularly care about what a norm stands for, sanctions may play
an important role in supporting a norm.
-nce a norm is established, there are several mechanisms that may account for conformity.
Aurthermore, to say that one conforms only because of the negative sanctions involved in
nonconformity does not distinguish norm<abiding behavior from an obsession, in which one feels an
inner constraint to repeat the same action in order to >uiet some HbadJ thought, or from an entrenched
habit that cannot be shed without great unease. Nor does it distinguish norms from hypothetical
imperatives enforced by sanctions, such as the rule that prohibits na&ed sunbathing on public beaches.
8n all these cases, avoidance of the sanctions involved in transgression constitutes a decisive reason to
conform, independently of what others do. 8n the traditional rational choice perspective, the only
expectations that matter are those about the sanctions that follow compliance or non<compliance.
5eliefs about how other people will act, as opposed to what they expect us to do are not, in this view,
an important explanatory variable. ,owever, as we shall see in the next section, theoretical and
empirical evidence weigh heavily in favor of empirical and normative expectations playing a crucial
role in eliciting conformity to social norms.
". 3>uilibria and self<fulfilling expectations
6he traditional rational choice model of compliance depicts the individual as facing a decision problem
in isolation? 8f there are sanctions for non<compliance, the individual will calculate the benefit of
transgression against the cost of norm compliance, and choose so as to maximize his expected utility.
8ndividuals, however, seldom choose in isolation. 6hey &now the outcome of their choice will depend
on the actions and beliefs of other individuals, so a rational choice in such interactive context is
contingent on what everyone else does and what each expects the others to do. Game theory provides a
formal framewor& for modeling such interactions.
6homas Schelling (!//$, %avid :ewis (!/!$, 3dna ;llmann<2argalit (!""$ Cobert Sugden (!1/$
and, more recently, *eyton 0oung (!!#$, *eter =andrshraaf (!!'$ and +ristina 5icchieri (!!#, .((/$
have proposed a game<theoretic account of norms and conventions according to which a norm is
broadly defined as a Nash equilibrium. A Nash e>uilibrium is a combination of strategies, one for each
individual, such that each individual9s strategy is a best reply to the others9 strategies, were one to ta&e
them as given. Since it is an e>uilibrium, a norm is supported by self<fulfilling expectations, in the
sense that in e>uilibrium players9 beliefs are consistent, and thus the actions that follow from those
beliefs will validate them. +haracterizing social norms as e>uilibria has the advantage of emphasizing
the role that expectations play in upholding norms. -n the other hand, this interpretation of social
norms does not prima facie explain why people prefer to conform if they expect others to conform.
6a&e for example conventions such as putting the for& to the left of the plate, adopting a particular
dress code, using a particular sign language, or using a hand&erchief to blow one9s nose. 8n all these
cases, my choice to follow a certain rule is conditional upon expecting most other people to follow it.
-nce my expectation is met, 8 have every reason to adopt the rule in >uestion. 8f 8 do not use the sign
language everybody else uses, 8 will not be able to communicate, and if 8 blow my nose in my hands, 8
will send out the wrong signal about who 8 am. 8t is in my immediate interest to follow the convention,
since my main goal is to coordinate with other people. 8n the case of conventions, there is a continuity
between individual9s self interest and the interests of the community that support the convention. 6his is
the reason why %avid :ewis models conventions as e>uilibria of coordination games. Such games have
multiple e>uilibria, but once one of them has been established, players will have every incentive to
&eep playing it, as any deviation will be costly.
6a&e instead a norm of cooperation. 8n this case, the expectation that almost everyone abides by it may
not be sufficient to induce compliance. 8f everyone is expected to cooperate, one may be tempted, if
unmonitored, to behave in the opposite way. 6he point is that conforming to social norms, as opposed
to conventions, is almost never in the immediate interest of the individual who has to conform. -ften
there is a discontinuity between individual9s self interest and the interests of the community that support
the social norm. 6he typical game that represents a state of affairs in which following a norm would
provide a better solution than the one attained by a rational, selfish choice, is a mixed-motive game. 8n
such games the uni>ue Nash e>uilibrium represents a suboptimal outcome, but there is no way to do
better within the confines of the game.
5icchieri (.((/$ has argued that social norms, as opposed to conventions, are never born as e>uilibria
of the mixed<motive games they ultimately transform. 4hereas a convention is one among several
e>uilibria of a coordination game, a norm can never be an e>uilibrium of a mixed<motive game (such
as, for example, a prisoner9s dilemma or a trust game$. 4hen a norm exists, however, it transforms the
original mixed<motive game into a coordination one. As an example, consider the following prisoner9s
dilemma game (Aigure $, where the payoffs are 5G5est, SGSecond, 6G 6hird, and 4G 4orst. +learly
the only Nash e>uilibrium is to defect (%$, in which case both players get (6,6$, a suboptimal outcome.
Suppose, however, that society has develop a norm of cooperation) that is, whenever a social dilemma
occurs, it is commonly understood that the parties should privilege a cooperative attitude. Should,
however, does not imply HwillJ, therefore the new game generated by the existence of the cooperative
norm has two e>uilibria? either both players defect or both cooperate.
Aigure
Note that in the new coordination game created by the existence of a cooperative norm, the payoffs are
>uite different from those of the original prisoner9s dilemma. Now there are two e>uilibria? 8f both
players follow the cooperative norm they will play an optimal e>uilibrium and get (5,5$, whereas if
they both choose to defect they get (S,S$, which is worse than (5,5$. *layers9 payoffs in the new
coordination game differ from the original payoffs because their preferences and beliefs will reflect the
existence of the norm. 2ore specifically, if a player &nows that a cooperative norm exists and has the
right &ind of expectations, then she will have a preference to conform to the norm in a situation in
which she can choose to cooperate or to defect. 8n the new game generated by the norm9s existence,
choosing to defect when others cooperate is not a good choice anymore (6,4$. 6o understand why, let
us loo& more closely to the preferences and expectations that underlie the conditional choice to
conform to a social norm.
5icchieri (.((/$ has thus defined the expectations that underlie norm compliance?
(a$
Empirical expectations: individuals believe that a sufficiently large subset of the relevant
groupKpopulation conforms to the norm in situations of type S and either
(b$
Normative expectations: individuals believe that a sufficiently large subset of the relevant
groupKpopulation expects them to conform to the norm in situations of type S) or
(bR$
Normative expectations with sanctions? individuals believe that a sufficiently large subset of the
relevant groupKpopulation expects them to conform to the norm in situations of type S, prefers
them to conform and may sanction behavior.
Note that universal compliance is not usually needed for a norm to exist. ,owever, how much deviance
is socially tolerable will depend upon the norm in >uestion. Group norms and well<entrenched social
norms will typically be followed by almost all members of a group or population, whereas greater
deviance is usually accepted when norms are new, or when norms are not deemed to be socially
important. Aurthermore, as it is usually unclear how many people follow a norm, different individuals
may have different beliefs about the size of the group of followers, and may also have different
thresholds for what Dsufficiently largeE means. 4hat matters to conformity is that an individual believes
that her threshold has been reached or surpassed.
8f we go bac& to the players in the new coordination game of Aigure , for them to obey the norm, and
thus choose +, it must be the case that each expects the other to follow it. 8n the original prisoner9s
dilemma, a player9s empirical expectations would not be sufficient to induce cooperative behavior.
4hen a norm exists, however, players also believe that others believe they should obey the norm, and
may even punish them if they do not. 6he combined force of normative and empirical expectations
ma&es norm compliance a superior choice and ma&es defection, in case the others are expected to
cooperate, a bad choice indeed, be it because punishment may follow, or 7ust because one recognizes
the legitimacy of other9s expectations (Sugden .((($.
8t is important to understand that conformity to a social norm is always conditional upon the
expectations of what the relevant otherKs will do. 4e prefer to comply with the norm on the basis of
having certain expectations. 6o ma&e this point clear, thin& of the player who is facing a typical one<
shot prisoner9s dilemma with an un&nown opponent. Suppose the player &nows a norm of cooperation
exists and is generally followed, but is uncertain as to whether the opponent is a norm<follower. 8n this
case, the player is facing the following situation (Aigure .$?
Aigure .
4ith probability p, the opponent is a norm<following type, and with probability Np he is not (it is
usually assumed that nature pic&s such types with a given probability, but the probability may also be a
sub7ective one$. %epending upon his assessment of p, a player will decide which game he is playing,
and act accordingly. +onditional preferences imply that having a reason to be fair, reciprocate or
cooperate in a given situation does not entail having any general motive or disposition to be fair,
reciprocate or cooperate as such. ,aving conditional preferences means that one may follow a norm in
the presence of the relevant expectations, but disregard it in its absence. 4hether a norm is followed at
a given time depends on the actual proportion of followers, on the expectations of conditional followers
about such proportion, and on the combination of individual thresholds.
As an example, consider a community that abides by strict norms of honesty. A person who, upon
entering the community, systematically violates these norms will be certainly met with hostility, if not
utterly excluded from the group. 5ut suppose a large group of, say, thieves ma&es its way into this
community. 8n due time, people would cease to expect honesty on the part of others, and would find no
reason to be honest themselves in a world overta&en by theft. *robably the norms of honesty would
cease to exist, since the strength of a norm lies in its being followed by almost all the members of the
relevant group or population, which in turn reinforces people9s expectation of conformity.
4hat we are discussing here is a rational reconstruction of what a social norm is. Such reconstruction
is meant to capture some essential features of social norms, as well as help us distinguish social norms
from other constructs, such as conventions or personal norms. A good rational reconstruction, though
>uite abstract, will also provide its own constraints? if we have a beliefKdesire model of norms, we must
specify how behavior will change if beliefs change, and be able to ma&e testable predictions. Note that
a rational reconstruction is not in conflict with a heuristic account of how we comply with social
norms. 8ndeed, most people9s experience of conformity to a norm would seem to be beyond rational
calculation. 2ost of the time, we are not aware of our expectation, and compliance may loo& li&e a
habit, thoughtless and automatic, or it may be driven by feelings of anxiety at the thought of what
would happen if one transgresses the norm. ;pholding a norm is not a matter of conscious costKbenefit
calculations) rather, people tend to repeat patterns of behavior that they have learned and, on average,
wor& well in a variety of situations. 0et we may still claim that conformity to a norm is rational, and
explain it in terms of one9s beliefs and desires, even though one does not conform out of a conscious
rational calculation. As %avid :ewis himself pointed out in his analysis of habits, a habit may be under
an agent9s rational control in the sense that should that habit ever cease to serve the agent9s desires
according to his beliefs, it would at once be overridden and abandoned (:ewis !"'a, !"'b$.
Similarly, an explanation in terms of norms does not compete with one that refers to expectations and
preferences, since a norm persists precisely because of certain expectations and preferences. 8f we ever
wanted to be different, or if we expected others to do something different, we would probably
overcome the force of the norm. 4e are not constantly aware of our beliefs, preferences and desires,
which we ta&e to be dispositions to act in a certain way in the appropriate circumstances. 4hat is
re>uired in a dispositional account of belief, preference and desire is that such motives be ready to
manifest themselves in the relevant circumstances.
6he advantage of an account of social norms in terms of e>uilibria is that it underscores the importance
of expectations and conditional conformity. A limit of this account, however, is that it does not indicate
how such e>uilibria are attained or, in other terms, how expectations become self<fulfilling.
1. 3volution
6hus far we have examined accounts of social norms that ta&e for granted that a particular norm exists
in a population. ,owever, for a full account of social norms, we must answer two >uestions related to
the dynamics of norms. Airst, we must as& how a norm can emerge. Norms re>uire a set of
corresponding beliefs and expectations to support them, and so there must be an account of how these
arise. Second, we must investigate the conditions under which a norm is stable under some competitive
pressure from other norms. Sometimes, multiple candidate norms vie for dominance in a population.
3ven if one norm has come to dominate the population, new norms can try to HinvadeJ the existing
norm9s population of adherents.
:et us now turn to the >uestion of norm emergence. ,ere we can see three classes of models? first, a
purely biological approach, second, a more cognitive approach, and third, a structured interactions
approach. 6he most famous of the biological approaches to norms see& to explain cooperative behavior.
6he simplest models are Fin selection models (,amilton !/@$. 6hese models see& to explain altruistic
tendencies in animals by claiming that, as selection acts on genes, those genes have an incentive to
promote the reproductive success of other identical sets of genes found in other animals. 6his mode of
explanation can provide an account of why we see cooperative behaviors within families, but being
gene<centered, cannot explain cooperative behavior toward strangers, as strangers should not be
sufficiently genetically related to merit altruistic behavior.
2odels of Hreciprocal altruismJ(6rivers !", !1'$, on the other hand, tell us that cooperative
behavior has no chance of evolving in random pairings, but will evolve in a social framewor& in which
individuals can benefit from building reputations for being nice guys. Ceciprocal altruism, however,
does not re>uire an evolutionary argument) a simple model of learning in ongoing close<&nit groups
will do, and has the further advantage of explaining why certain types of cooperative behavior are more
li&ely to emerge than others. All that matters in these models is that agents can properly identify other
agents, such that they can maintain a record of their past behavior. 6his allows for the possibility of
reputations? people who have the reputation of being cooperative will be treated cooperatively, and
those who have a reputation of being unfair will be treated unfairly.
A variation on the idea of reciprocal altruism can be seen in Axelrod (!1/$. Axelrod presents a Hnorms
gameJ in which agents probabilistically choose to comply with the norm, or deviate from it, and then
other agents can probabilistically choose to punish any deviations at some cost to them. Agents can
choose over time to be more or less Hbold,J which determines the rate at which they attempt defections,
and they can li&ewise choose to be more or less HvengefulJ, which determines how often they punish.
Axelrod noted that if the game is left li&e this, we find that the stable state is constant defection and no
punishment. ,owever, if we introduce a meta<norm N one that punishes people who fail to punish
defectors, then we arrive at a stable norm in which there is no boldness, but very high levels of
vengefulness. 8t is under these conditions that we find a norm emerge and remain stable. Axelrod9s
model aims to illustrate that norms re>uire meta<norms. 6hat is, failure to retaliate against a defection
must be seen as e>uivalent to a defection itself. 4hat Axelrod does not analyze is whether there is some
cost to being vigilant. Namely, watching both defectors and non<punishers may have a cost that, though
nominal, might encourage some to abandon vigilance once there has been no punishment for some
time.
5icchieri, %uffy and 6olle (.((@$ present an alternative model of norm emergence to explain how a
norm of impersonal trustKreciprocity can emerge and survive in an heterogeneous population. 6his
model does not rely on a meta<norm of punishment N instead, it is purely driven by repeated
interactions of conditional strategies. 8n their model, agents play anywhere from to #( rounds of a
trust game for ,((( iterations, relying on the @ unconditional strategies, and the / conditional
strategies that are standard for the trust game. After each round, agents update their strategies based on
the replicator dynamic. As the number of rounds grows, a norm of impersonal trustKreciprocity emerges
in the population. 2ost interestingly, however, the norm is not associated with a single strategy, but it is
supported by several strategies behaving in similar ways. 6his model suggests that 6rivers9 basic model
wor&s well in normal social contexts, but we can further enrich the story by allowing a social norm to
supervene on several behavioral strategies.
6he third prominent model of norm emergence comes from 5rian S&yrms (!!/, .((@$ and Pason
Alexander (.(("$. 8n this approach, two different features are emphasized? relatively simple cognitive
processes, and structured interactions. 5oth have explored a variety of games, such as the *risoner9s
%ilemma, the Stag ,unt, %ivide the %ollar, and the ;ltimatum Game as exemplars of situations that
offer the possibility of the emergence of a moral norm. 6hough S&yrms occasionally uses the replicator
dynamic, both tend to emphasize simpler mechanisms in an agent<based learning context. 8n particular,
learning rules li&e Simitate the bestS or best response are used, as they are much less cognitively
demanding. Alexander 7ustifies the use of these simpler rules on the grounds that, rather than fully
rational agents, we are cognitively limited beings who rely on fairly simple heuristics for our decision<
ma&ing. Cules li&e imitation are extremely simple to follow. 5est response re>uires a bit more
cognitive sophistication, but is still simpler than a fully 5ayesian model with unlimited memory and
computational power. 6hese simpler learning rules provide the same function as the replicator dynamic?
in between rounds of play, agents rely on their learning rule to decide what strategy to employ. ;nli&e
in the model of 5icchieri, %uffy, and 6olle, both S&yrms and Alexander tend to treat norms as single
strategies.
6he largest contribution of this strain of modeling comes not from the assumption of boundedly
rational agents, but rather the careful investigation of the effects of particular social structures on the
e>uilibrium outcomes of various games. 2uch of the previous literature on evolutionary games has
focused on the assumptions of infinite populations of agents playing games against randomly<assigned
partners. S&yrms and Alexander both rightly emphasize the importance of structured interaction. As it
is difficult to uncover and represent real<world networ& structures, both tend to rely on examining
different classes of networ&s that have different properties, and from there investigate the robustness of
particular norms against these alternative networ& structures. Alexander (.(("$ in particular has done a
very careful study of the different classical networ& structures, where he examines lattices, small world
networ&s, bounded degree networ&s, and dynamic networ&s for each game and learning rule he
considers. A final feature of S&yrms and Alexander9s wor& is a refinement on this structural approach?
they separate out two different &inds of networ&s. Airst, there is the interaction network, which
represents the set of agents that any given agent can actively play a game with. Second is the update
network, which is the set of agents that an agent can HseeJ when applying her learning rule. 6he
interaction networ& is thus one9s immediate community, whereas the update networ& is all that the
agent can see. 6o see why this is useful, we can imagine a case not too different from how we live, in
which there is a fairly limited set of other people we may interact with, but than&s to a plethora of
media options, we can see much more widely how others might act. 6his &ind of situation can only be
represented by clearly separating the two networ&s.
6hus, what ma&es the model of norm emergence of S&yrms and Alexander so interesting is its
enriching the set of idealizations that one must ma&e in building a model. 6he addition of structured
interaction and structured updates to a model of norm emergence can help ma&e clear how certain
&inds of norms tend to emerge in certain &inds of situation and not others, which is difficult or
impossible to capture in random interaction models.
Now that we have examined norm emergence, we must examine what happens when a population is
exposed to more than one social norm. 8n this instance, social norms must then compete with each
other for adherents. 6his lends itself to investigations about the competitive dynamics of norms over
long time horizons. 8n particular, we can investigate the features of norms and of their environments,
such as the populations themselves, which help facilitate one norm becoming dominant over others, or
becoming prone to elimination by its competitors. An evolutionary model provides a description of the
conditions under which social norms may spread. -ne may thin& of several environments to start with.
A population can be represented as entirely homogeneous, in the sense that everybody is adopting the
same type of behavior, or heterogeneous to various degrees. 8n the former case, it is important to &now
whether the commonly adopted behavior is stable against mutations. 6he relevant concept here is that
of an evolutionarily stable strategy (2aynard Smith and *rice !"#) 6aylor and Pon&er !"1$) when a
population of individuals adopts such a strategy, it cannot be successfully invaded by isolated mutants,
since the mutants will be at a disadvantage with respect to reproductive success. An evolutionarily
stable strategy is a refinement of the Nash e>uilibrium in game theory. ;nli&e standard Nash e>uilibria,
evolutionarily stable strategies must either be strict equilibria, or have an advantage when playing
against mutant strategies. Since strict e>uilibria are always superior to any unilateral deviations, and the
second condition re>uires that the 3SS have an advantage in playing against mutants, the strategy will
remain resistant to any mutant invasion. 6his is a difficult criterion to meet, however. Aor example, a
classic 6it<Aor<6at strategy in the *risoner9s %ilemma is not an 3SS. 2any strategies perform e>ually
well against it, including the very simple HAlways +ooperateJ strategy, let alone 6it<Aor<6wo<6ats, and
any number of variations. 6it<Aor<6at is merely an evolutionarily neutral strategy relative to these
others. 8f we only consider strategies that are defection<oriented, then 6it<Aor<6at is an 3SS, since it
will do better against itself, and no worse than defection strategies when paired with them.
A more interesting case, and one relevant to a study of the reproduction of norms of cooperation, is that
of a population in which several competing strategies are present at any given time. 4hat we want to
&now is whether the strategy fre>uencies that exist at a time are stable, or if there is a tendency for one
strategy to become dominant over time. 8f we continue to rely on the 3SS solution concept, we see a
classic example in the ,aw&<%ove game. 8f we assume that there is no uncorrelated asymmetry
between the players, then the mixed Nash e>uilibrium is the 3SS. 8f we further assume that there is no
structure to how agents interact with each other, this can be interpreted in two ways? either each player
randomizes his or her strategy in each round of play, or we have a stable polymorphism in the
population, in which the proportion of each strategy in the population corresponds to the fre>uency
with which each strategy would be played in a randomizing approach. So, in those cases where we can
assume that players randomly encounter each other, whenever there is a mixed solution 3SS we can
expect to find polymorphic populations.
8f we wish to avoid the interpretive challenge of a mixed solution 3SS, there is an alternative analytic
solution concept that we can employ? the evolutionarily stable state. An evolutionarily stable state is a
distribution of (one or more$ strategies that is robust against perturbations, whether they are exogenous
shoc&s or mutant invasions, provided the perturbations are not overly large. 3volutionarily stable states
are solutions to a replicator dynamic. Since evolutionarily stable states are naturally able to describe
polymorphic or monomorphic populations, there is no difficulty with introducing population<oriented
interpretations of mixed strategies. 6his is particularly important when random matching does not
occur, as under those conditions, the mixed strategy can no longer be thought of as a description of
population polymorphism.
Now that we have seen the prominent approaches to both norm emergence and norm stability, we can
turn to some general interpretive considerations of evolutionary models. An evolutionary approach is
based on the principle that strategies with higher current payoffs will be retained, while strategies that
lead to failure will be abandoned. 6he success of a strategy is measured by its relative fre>uency in the
population at any given time. 6his is most easily seen in a game theoretic framewor&. A game is
repeated a finite number of times with randomly selected opponents. After each round of the game, the
actual payoffs and strategies of the players become public &nowledge) on the basis of this information,
each player ad7usts his strategy for the next round. 6he payoff to an individual player depends on her
choice as well as on the choices of the other players in the game, and players are rational in the sense
that they are payoff<maximizers. 8n an evolutionary model, however, players learn and adapt in a non<
5ayesian way, that is, they do not condition on past experience using 5ayes9 Cule. 8n this sense, they
are not typical rational learners (Nachbar !!(, 5inmore and Samuelson !!.$.
8n an evolutionary approach behavior is adaptive, so that a strategy that did wor& well in the past is
retained, and one that fared poorly will be changed. 6his can be interpreted in two ways? either the
evolution of strategies is the conse>uence of adaptation by individual agents, or the evolution of
strategies is understood as the differential reproduction of agents based on their success rates in their
interactions. 6he former interpretation assumes short timescales for interactions? many iterations of the
game over time thus represent no more than a few decades in time in total. 6he latter interpretation
assumes rather longer timescales? each instance of strategy ad7ustment represents a new generation of
agents coming into the population, with the old generation dying simultaneously. :et us consider the
ramifications of each interpretation in turn.
8n the first interpretation, we have agents who employ learning rules that are less than fully rational, as
defined by what a 5ayesian agent would have, both in terms of computational ability and memory. As
such, these rules tend to be classified as adaptive strategies? they are reacting to a more limited set of
data, with lower cognitive resources than what a fully rational learner would possess. ,owever, there
are many different adaptive mechanisms we may attribute to the players. -ne realistic adaptive
mechanism is learning by trial and error) another plausible mechanism is imitation? those who do best
are observed by others who subse>uently emulate their behavior (,ardin !1.$. Ceinforcement
learning is another class of adaptive behavior, in which agents twea& their probabilities of choosing one
strategy over another based on the payoffs they 7ust received.
8n the second interpretation, agents themselves do not learn, but rather the strategies grow or shrin& in
the population according to the reproductive advantages that they bestow upon the agents that adhere to
them. 6his interpretation re>uires very long timescales, as it re>uires many generations of agents before
e>uilibrium is reached. 6he typical dynamics that are considered in such circumstances come from
biology. A standard approach is something li&e the replicator dynamic. Norms grow or shrin& in
proportion to both how many agents adhere to them at a given time, and their relative payoffs. 2ore
successful strategies gain adherents at the expense of less<successful ones. 6his evolutionary process
assumes a constant<sized (or infinite$ population over time. 6his interpretation of an evolutionary
dynamic, which re>uires long timescales, raises the >uestion of whether norms themselves evolve
slowly. As 5icchieri (.((/$ has argued, norms can rapidly collapse in a very short amount of time. 6his
phenomenon could not be represented within a model whose interpretation is generational in nature. 8t
remains an open >uestion, however, as to whether such timescales can be appropriate for examining the
emergence of certain &inds of norms. 4hile it is &nown that many norms can >uic&ly come into being,
it is not clear if this is true of all norms.
Another challenge in using evolutionary models to study social norms is that there is a potential
problem of representation. 8n evolutionary models, there is no rigorous way to represent innovation or
novelty. 4hether we loo& at an agent<based simulation approach, or a straightforward game<theoretic
approach, the strategy set open to the players, as well as their payoffs, must be defined in advance. 5ut
many social norms rely on innovations, whether they are technological or social. 4earing mini<s&irts
was not an option until they were invented. 2arxist attitudes were largely not possible until 2arx. 6he
age at which one gets married and how many children one has are highly lin&ed to availability of and
education about birth control technologies. 4hile much of the study of norms has focused on more
generic concepts such as fairness, trust, or cooperation, the full breadth of social norms covers many of
these more specific norms that re>uire some account of social innovation.
6his representational challenge has broad implications. 3ven when we can analytically identify
evolutionarily stable states in a particular game, which is suggestive of norms that will be converged
upon, we now have a problem of claiming that this norm has prospects for long<term stability. 3vents
li&e the publication of the Finsey report can dramatically shift seemingly stable norms >uite rapidly. As
the underlying game changes in the representation, our previous results no longer apply. 8n the face of
this representational problem, we can either attempt to develop some metric of the robustness of a
given norm in the space of similar games, or more carefully scope the claims that we can ma&e about
the social norms that we study with this methodology.
6hough some >uestions of interpretation and challenges of representation exist, an important advantage
of the evolutionary approach is that it does not re>uire sophisticated strategic reasoning in
circumstances, such as large<group interactions, in which it would be unrealistic to assume it. *eople
are very unli&ely to engage in full 5ayesian calculations in ma&ing decisions about norm adherence. As
5icchieri (.((/$ has argued, agents often rely on cognitive shortcuts to determine when norms ought to
be in effect given a certain context, and whether or not they should adhere to them. 3volutionary
models that employ adaptive learning strategies capture these &inds of cognitive constraints, and allow
the theorist to explore how these constraints influence the emergence and stability of norms.
!. +onclusions
6he study of social norms can help us understand a wide variety of seemingly puzzling human
behavior. As 5icchieri (.((/$ has argued, norm existence and compliance can be best understood in
terms of conditional preferences for following behavioral rules that apply to classes of social
interactions. *references are conditional on two different &inds of expectations? the empirical
expectation that a sufficient number of people adhere to the behavioral rule, and the normative
expectation that other people expect one to follow the behavioral rule as well, and possibly enact
positiveKnegative sanctions for conformityKtransgression.
6his account of social norms, and others li&e it, still leave much to be investigated. 4hile there are
several available models of norm emergence, there has not been one that does not presuppose the
existence of some norm in the population. 5oth Axelrod (!1/, !!.$ and 5icchieri (.((/$ present
models of norm emergence, but these models either do not address normative expectations, or assume
that normative expectations are already present in the population. 3xplaining how normative
expectations come to exist remains an open problem. Still another open >uestion is how social norms
relate to the literature on signaling. 2any social norms, li&e 4estern brides wearing white on their
wedding day, serve a signaling function as well. 5ut there has not been much wor& comparing how
norms evolve this signaling component, nor how it may reinforce or inhibit convergence to a norm or
set of norms. A final >uestion to consider is how one might be able to productively intervene to change
socially harmful norms. 8f social norms convert mixed<motive games into coordination games, and then
supply an e>uilibrium to the coordination game, then they are going to be fairly robust against
interventions. 0et many public policy >uestions revolve around precisely this >uestion? how do we
change norms once they are already entrenched in a populationM As the ;nited States has experienced
with rapid shifts away from finding smo&ing socially acceptable, these shifts are possible, but there is
not yet a general account of how populations can be shifted away from harmful norms and toward more
socially beneficial norms.
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