A project of the International Peace Institute

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BUILDING STATE5
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TO BUlLO PEACE
EDITED BY
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Vanessa Wyeth

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Published in rhe United Stntes ofAmcrica in 2008 by
Lynne Ricnner Publishers, Inc.
1800 30th Street. Boulder. Colorado 80301
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anrlIn the Unired Kingdorn by
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Libraryof Congress Cataloglng-iu-PublicntiouDala
Buildingstatcs ro build peace/ edited by Charles T. CaJl with Vanessa
Wyeth.
p. cm.
"A proiect of the International Peace Institute."
lnclude bibllographical references and indexo
ISBN 978-/-58826-456-5(hardcover:ak. paper).:.. ISBN978-1-58826-480-0
(phk. :alk. papel")
l. Narion-building. 2. Peace-buikling. J. N;lIion-building-Case studies.
-l. Peace-huilding--Case studies. 1. Call, Charles. JI. \Vyeth. Vanessa.
IJI. Inremntional Peace lnstirute.
JZ6300B852008
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Brilish Cntaloguingin Puhllcation Data
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is available frorn(he Btitish Lihrary.
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5 -1 J
Contents
Fo reIVO ni, Terje RodLarsen
Acknowledglllents
vii
ix
Ending Wars, Building Statcs
Charles T Cal!
Part 1 Context
2 The Politics ofSecurity in Postconflict Statehuilding
Barnett R. Rubin
25
3 Participation and StateLegitimation
Katia Papagianni
49
4 Peacebuildingand Puhlic Finance
Michael Carnahan and CIare Lockhart
73
5 PostconfliclEconornic Policy
Paul Col!ier
103
6 Justice ano the Rule of Law
Erik G. Jensett
119
7 Bottom-UpStatebuilding?
wuu;. Reno
1.f.3
8 PracticalApproaches 10 BuildingState Instirutions
Sarali Cliffe aud Nicl: Manning
163
v
x Acknowledgments
University's Center on International Cooperation for their support in carry-
ing out joint activities related to the project on statebuilding.
Many thanks are also due to colleagues at IPI and elsewhere who re-
viewed chapters, provided comments, and offered guidance as the book de-
veloped, including Abiodun Alao, Markus Bouillon, Kaysie Brown, Matt
Bryden, James Cockayne, Rahul Chandran, Anthony Goldstone, Agnes Hur-
witz, Gordon Peake, Jenna Slotin, Astri Suhrke, Susan Woodward, and two
anonymous reviewers. Special thanks in particular to Amy Scott and Mada-
lene O'Donnell for their frank and thoughtful feedback. The volurne has
benefited enormously from their involvernent.
We are grateful to Clara Lee, ElIie Hearne, Alison Gurin, and Jeremy
Dell for editorial assistance and to IPI editor Adam Lupel for his able han-
dling of the entire publication process. Of course, we would al so like to
thank the staff at Lynne Rienner Publishers for their expert work, as well as
Lynne Rienner herself for stalwart support.
Finally, our thanks to Tracy Fitzsirnmons and John Wyeth, and Shayla,
Jag, Dash, and Nate.
- Charles T Call and
Fallessa Wyerh
1
Ending Wars, Bui Iding States
Charles T. Cal!
" cholars and practitioners have for centuries sought to irnprove our abil-
~ j t y to end wars. For a number of reasons, however, this challenge has re-
cently taken on new urgency. The classic peacekeeping model aimed ar
consolidating a cease-fire between the armies of two warring countries
today seems a distant mernory from simpler times. Civil wars-historically
more difficult to settle and to keep settled-now comprise 95 percent of the
world's armed conflicts. Even where countries go to war with one another
(witness recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), internal arrned conflicts and
external war making become intermingled in messy ways.
Success also seems more elusive than in the past. Early successes in se-
curing negotiated settlements after the Cold War-in El Salvador, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, and South Africa-gave way to several cases in Africa and
the Middle East where apparent peace failed and war returned with a ven-
geance. Repairing the torn social fabric in such countries and preventing
nurnerous and often inchoate forces from reigniting war are difficult endeav-
ors. The difficulty is compounded by people's rightful expectation that dis-
placed persons will be able to return without fear, that human rights atroci-
ties will be punished, and that infrastructure and economies will be rebuilt.
In addition, some postconflict countries experience high rates of criminal vio-
lence and host threats to transnational security.
The difficulty of ending wars today is matched by its urgency: the costs
of failing to secure peace are serious, Failed peacebuilding represents one of
the worst risk factors for new wars. Between one-quarter and one-third of
peace agreements ending civil wars collapse within five years.' In addition,
"backlash violence" after a failed peace agreement is often worse than be-
fore an accord was reached. If the implementation of only two peace agree-
ments-the 1991 Bicesse Accords for Angola and the 1993 Arusha Accords
for Rwanda-had not failed, some 2 million people, roughly one-third of all
2
3
Building States to Build Peace
civil war victims during the 1990s, would not have died in subsequent in-
ternal violence.? War's disruption of people, econornic production, and polit-
ical certainty combine to produce what is known as "reverse developrnent,"
or impoverishment that is difficult to staunch.'
Cornplicating the picture are war-torn countries where the institutions
of authorrty have been destroyed or disrupted. In places as varied as Haiti
in 1994, Kosovo and East Timor in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in
2003, military interventions dismantlcd the state. These interventions left
not only the usual human and material debris of warfare but also uncer-
tainty about how and by whom millions of people would be governed.
These international efforts, initially aimed at discrete objectives like encling
ethnic cleansing 01' toppling a dictator, uniforrnly got more than they bar-
gained for. Even in supposed peacekeeping success stories like Bosnia, East
Timor, and Sierra Leone, external actors found thernselves iIl-equipped to
foster a process that would result in a legitimare, sustainable authority.
Thus we come to a major concept ancl therne of this book: the state and
its relationship to peace. US-Ied interventions in Kosovo, Atghanistan. Haiti,
and Iraq suggested to those engaged in "postconflict" operations that re-
building the state was the logical implication. perhaps even the moral obliga-
tion, of external interventions. Implernenting peace agreements in places like
Bosnia also underscored how important cleveloping a viable state was for
consolidating peace-and for enabling international troops to depart, Other
factors-such as the specter of weak or "failed" states engaged in terrorism
and the development community's ernphasis on the nstitutional Ioundations
for sustainable development-also brought the state and statebuilding 10 the
fore of policy discussions. To quote the 2002 National Security Strategy 01
the United Sta fes 01Ainerica, "America is now threatened less by ccnquer-
ing states than we are by failing ones."!
Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate the clifficulties of building states after (and
during) war, as well as its importance for international peace and security. The
weIl-being of the peoples of these lands, ol' the regions where they are located,
and indirectly of the rest of the world depends on whether effective and legit-
imate states emerge in these war-torn societies. Yet the peacekeeping suc-
cesses listed aboye, as well as more problematic attempts to end wars as in
Palestine, Somalia, and East Ti mor, point to problems in the process of build-
ing sta tes in war-torn societies. Such experiences raise the question of liow
consolidating peace relates to recrafting the institutions 01' authority-or how
building peace relates to building states.
The Main Questions and Contributions of This Book
Given these chaIlenges, this book explores a number of questions. How does
the process of building states relate to the process of building peace' Is
Ending Wars, Building states
statebuilding somehow essential to postwar peacebuilding? Are there func-
tional priorities in fostering legitimate states in war-torn societies, and how
should they be advanced? What are the tensions between peacebuilding and
statebuilding? Where should policymakers look to identify and overcome the
trade-offs and the not-so-apparent tensions that may arise between strength-
ening srate institutions and seeking to address underlying causes of war?
The book seeks to address these questions. Academics and policy ana-
lysts have already written a good deal about both peacebuilding and state-
building. Much of this literature consists of case studies, lessons learned,
and advice for policymakers on building state institutions in postwar envi-
ronments. Herein we initially sought to explore further how to build states
more effectively in ways that sustain peace. Once cornpleted, however, the
chapters yielded different and more interesting results than anticipated. First,
we do find guidance on what sorts of measures are likely to yield sustainable
postconflict state institutions in different circumstances. The thernatic chap-
ters in Part 1 provide robust recommendations about which processes are
most likely to Ioster legitimare and effective state institutions-and which
processes are likely to be harmful.
Yet the most salient finding is that the relationship between peacebuild-
ing and statebuilding is cornplicated, contingent, and context-dependenl.
That is not to say that the specifics of each case prevent generalizations from
being drawn. However, peacebuilding cannot be boiled down to building
state institutions. Enhancing state institutional capacity may potentially harm
the chances for consolidating peace and vice Versa. A number of tensions
exist between the logic of building states and that of ensuring that war will
not recuro The contributors here add conceptual depth and nuance to how we
think about the relationship between strengthening states and consolidating
peace and provide contingent guidance on handling the tensions and Iink-
ages between state consolidation and peace consolidation. The chapters in
this book suggest that effective peacebuilding requires strategizing around
severallinkages (\) between negotiated deals and their consequences for a
sustainable state; (2) between capacity and legitirnacy; (3) between urgent
short-terrn measures and long-terrn sustainability; (4) between international
interests and recognition versus national interests and legitimacy; and (5) be-
tween the interests of elites, especially combatants, and of the population at
large. This volume comes on the heels of important reforms in the interna-
tional architecture for postconflict ancl statebuilding operations. In the early
2000s, a number of observers emphasized the serious limitations on external
efforts to reweave social fabrics and to rebuild state structures after wars.
Marina Ottaway, Roland Paris, and others criticized the overambitiolls "lib-
eral democratic" prescriptions of international actors in postwar peacebuild-
ing.
5
Successful peacekeeping (Le., maintenance of cease-fires and the com-
mencell1ent of recovery) in places like Liberia (1997), Kosovo and East Timor
4
5
Building States to Build Peace
(1999), and SierraLeone anclHairi (by 2000)liad not readily led 10 peace-
building successes whereby inrernational troops could leave behind self-
sustaining states. Frustraticns wirh persistent gaps in international civilian
capaciries, the short attention span ofdonors once crises have fallen from
the headlines, and problems of interagency coordination led bilateral
c1onorsancl the UN system lo restructure their organizations for such oper-
ations.fThe United Kingdom, Germany, Cariada, the European Union, and
otherdonors are adopting"joined-up" approaches involvingclosercollabo-
ration among theirdefense, foreign, and development ministries or offices.?
The World Bank, wliich had created a Post-Conflict Unit in 1997,8 opened
a Fragile States Unit in 2002
9
The debacle ofpostwar reconstruction in
Iraq helped stimulate the United States lo restructure its own institutions for
weaksrates ancl postconflict reconstruction in creating an Office of
the Coorclinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the State
Departrnenr.!"And with perhaps excessive fanfare, the UN created a new
Peacebuilding Couunission, a mcdcst Peacebuilding Fund, and a Peace-
building Support Office within the UN Secretariat aimed at strengthening
strategies, resources, and diploma tic support for selected postconlictcoun-
tries. AII these changes retlected an international community struggling 10
find answers to the problern ofcreating sustainable states in the wake of
war. We hope that this volume provides clarity and guidance on the rela-
tionship between enhancing state institutions and peacebuilding, including
how not lOdo harrn in trying to build states after war, that will "id in this
process ofinternational reflecrion.
Peacebuilding: What 15 it?
One 01' the c1ifficulties in analyzing peacebuilding is the reigning conceptual
confusionabout postconflictprocesses,A numberof related terrns, defined in
the box on p. S, differ slightly in theirdenotation and the values underlying
thern. The terrn peacebuilding entered public usage through the United Na-
tions. Drawing on work by Johan Galtung and others, Secretary-General
Boulros Boulros-Ghali'sAgendaJor Peoce in 1992 c!efinecl"peacebuilding"
largely in rela!ion loacontlicl conlinuum.
11
Passing from precontlict preven-
!ion lopeacemakingand Ihen peacekeeping, the AgendaJor Pureeassociated
peacebuilding wilh postconlicl societies, defining it as "action 10 identify
anc!support structures which will lend lo slrengthen and solidify peace in
order lO avoid a relapse inlo contlicl"(para. 21).12
By Ihe mid-1990s Ihe concept of peacebuilding had entered academic
ancl policy discourse and become more expansive, leading to confusion
even wilhin Ihe United Nalions. The "Supplement to an AgendaJor Pence"
(1995) emphasizedIhat Ihe termapplies not solely 10 postcontlictsituations
<
'1,;

,
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Ending Wars, Building States
I Related Concepts and Terms
Peacebuilding: actions undertaken by intematioual or national actors
toconsolidate orinstitutionalize peace.
Peace implementation: actions undertaken byinternational ornational
actors to uuplernent specific peace agreernents, usually in the short
termo Where operable, it usually defines-andeitherenables or con-
strains-theframework for peacebuilding.
Statebuilding: actions undertakenbyiuternational ornational actors to
establish, reform,orstrengthen theinstitutions ofthestateandtheirre-
lation to society (which mal' al' mal' notcontribute topeacebuilding).
Nation building: actionsundertaken, usuallybynationalactors,toJorge
a sense of common nationhood (1) to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or
communal differences; (2) tocounter alternare sources of identity and
loyalty:and(3) tomobilize apopulationbehind aparallelstatebuilding
project. It mal' or mal' not contri bute topeacebuilding. Confusingly,
thisterm isoftenequated witheither postconflict stabilization orstate-
building,especiallyinUSpolicyandjoumalisticcireles(asinPresident
GeorgeW.Bush's injunction:"no nationbuilding").
Stabilization: actions undertaken by interuational actors toreach ater-
minationofhostilitiesandconsolidarepeace,understoodastheabsence
of armed conflict. Aprevalent term in US policy usually associated
with military instruments, generally reflecting ashorter time horizon
than peacebuilding, and associated with a post-91l1 counterterrorism
agenda.
Reconstruction: actions undertaken by international ornarional actors
tosupport theeconomicand,tosomeexrent,socialdimensionsofpost-
cont1ictrecovery. Tt is also a familiar term in the WorldBank (whose
formalnameincludes theterm)andUSpolicycircles (e.g..UScoordi-
nator for reconstruction and stabilization) andreflects roots intheex-
perience ofpostwarassistance inEurope afterWorldWar11.
13
Peace operations: operations nndertaken byinternational actors in the
midstof01' afterarmedconflict, nsuallyconsistingofSecurityCouncil-
mandatedpeacekeepingthatusuallyencornpassesarangeofcivilianaud
politicaltasks("multidimensionalpeacekeeping"andpeacebuilding).
Source: Adapted trorn Charles T Cal! and Elizabeth M. Cousens, "Ending Wars and
BuildingPeace."Copingwith Clisis Working Papel'Series. New York:Intemational Peace
Acaderny, March2007, p. 4.
but to the contlictspectrum: precontlictprevention,actions during warfare,
and postcontlict measures. However, the Depanment ofPolitical Affairs
limited its analysis and work to "postconlict peacebuilding." Institutional
turf battles also fueled the divergent understandings of peacebuilding
within the UN system. Forexample, in 1997 the UN Economic and Social
6 7 Building States to Build Peace
Council (ECOSOC) stated that peacebuilding was "essentially a component
al' development activities," whereas the Department al' Political Affairs
defined it as "quintessentially a political task."14
In this volume peacebuilding refers to effarts at national, local, or inter-
national levels to consolidate peace in war-torn societies. Although peace-
building 01' ten refers to efforts to create less confIictual relationships among
different groups who have not taken up arrns, we refer herc to such efforts
only in wartime or postwar societies.I> As with other terms, such as crisis
numagetnent (used by the EU) and stablization (preferred by the United
States), peacebuilding (used especially by the UN) is a value-laden term that
privileges arder ayer other values such as justice, social equity, and basic
livelihood, In international operations, the degree and type 01' order consid-
ered sufficient 1'01' international resources and troops ro be withdrawn is gen-
erally determined by the worlds most powerful states, rather than by the
local population. Therefore, even where undertaken by national actors, peace-
building is not simply a neutral activity responding to the needs al' the popu-
lation at large. It privileges certain groups over othcrs.!v
Peacebuilding only ceases to be an ambiguous term wlien its standards 01'
success are clefined, and here even more confusion reigns. How do we know
peacebuilding success when we see it? Virtually all concepts 01' the tenn go
beyond what might be considered a traditional security studies approach, or a
"negative peace" standard: once a cease-fire is reached and holds. A sustain-
able cease-fire may be an acceptable standard for keepiug the peace (i.e.,
peacekeeping), but it is insufficient for having consolidated or institutional-
ized peace (i.e., peacebuildingj.!?
At the other end 01' the spcctrurn, sorne scholars and UN agencies advo-
cate what we regarcl as a laundry list concept 01'peacebuilding. This approach,
which al so refers to universal "root causes" 01' war, includes numerous
benchmarks such as the eradication 01' poverty ancl inequality, accountable
governance, democracy. respect for human rights, and a culture 01' nonvio-
lence.!" These standards, associated with "positi ve peace." would be consid-
ered ambitious even for pe aceful. industrialized societies.'? Although this
more ambitious concept admirably recognizes the cornplex, integrated nature
01' peacebuilding, it is too inclusive to be useful, It fails to distinguish be-
tween abject failures such as Rwanda and Liberia in the late 1990s and par-
tial successes such as El Salvador and Mozambique, where peace is consol-
idated but root causes remain.
Instead, our standard al' success strikes a middle grouncl that includcs the
lack 01' recurrence 01' warfare as well as S0l11e sustaiued, national mechanism
for the resolution 01' confIict-signified by participatory polines. Participa-
tory politics does not equate to liberal clemocracy, but refers to mechanisms
for aggrieved social groups to feel that thcy have both a voice and a stake in
I
Ending Wars, Building States
the national political system. This standard is admittedly difficult to rneasure
f
but cxcludes stable, authoritarian, and clearly illegitimate governments.
I States: What Are They?
The editors 01' this volume draw on Max Weber lo define the "stare" as the
collection 01' institutions that successfully claims the monopoly on legiti-
mate authority and use 01' force over a given territory.m Truthfully, different
contributors use the terrn "state" in differenl ways in the volume. Sorne em-
phasize the legitimate authoritv, as exercised and recognized o ver a terri-
tory either internally or extemally. Others emphasize the inst ituti on s al'
governmcnt, the administrative capacity 01' governance. Still others empha-
size the state as an entity that represents a territorial political conuuunitv
over and aboye the government.:" This entity includes the instilUtions 01'
government but goes beyond them, having its own character and (in sorne
minimal way) speaking for the political conununity,
Our definition ernphasizes the institutions 01' government, recognizing
the links to intcrnational recognition and resources but stressing the relation-
ship between the institutions 01' governance and the territory 's citizens or
population, also known as "ernpirical sovereignty'zr This inwarcl-Iooking ex-
ercise 01' authority is distinct from "juridical sovereignty.' which refers to the
external recognition accorded a state by other members 01' the international
system and presently emblemized by membership in the UN General Assern-
bly.23 Juridical sovereignty plays an important role in the wars 01' severa! 01'
the cases examined-Palestine, East Timar, Bosnia, and S0l11alia-and inter-
acts with the degree lo which states exercise authority internally. Neverthe-
less, the challenges 01' internal, or empirical, sovereignty seern to be espe-
cially important in peace processes and in the thematic chapters that follow.
Our emphasis on empirical sovereignty is consonant with a concept 01'
the state as an exercise and embodiment 01' power, not a neutral, benign col-
lection 01' executive agencies. Leon Trotsky once said, "Every state is
founded on force."24 Charles Tilly echoecl this with his famous assertion:
"War made the state and the state made war, "25 The state represents an arder
imposed on a territory by a particular class or group 01' elites, but one that
usually invol ves Sorne degree al' consent-hence the importance al' legiti-
macy both in the definition 01'a state and in the process 01' statebuilcling. The
accrua! 01' legitirnacy, ihrough various means and both internationally and
internally, is essential to conternporary state forrnation and a central theme
01' the contributions presented here. International actors, by recognizing cer-
tain actors diplomatically, by choosing to speak with or provide resources to
:P.
certain groups, and by occasionally using faree, are a salient interactive com-
ponent 01' this process. Althollgh some 01' the authors in this book at times
8
9
Building States to Build Peace
adopt a neutral vie w 01' the state, which is common in the discourse 01' in-
tergovernmental organizations, the cases presented and arguments made in
thematic chapters belie these notions.
Statebuilding: State Capacity and State Design
Francis Fukuyama defines "statebuilding" simply as "the creation of new
government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones."26 Yet in-
formed scholarship draws on different ideas about what the state s and what
dynamics are most important. It is useful to distinguish between two differ-
ent approaches to or aspects of the state. The chapters herein vary in the ex-
tent to which they implicitly assume, or draw upon, these two aspects.??
First, and most common, is a Weberian focus on institutional capacity:
statebuilding as instirutional capacity building.vf That concept emphasizes
formal state agencies. It subordinares informal or traditional institutions 01'
authority as well as suprastate authorities that operate across murky or atten-
uated borders. In this view, "stateness" is visible predominantly in two state
functions: (1) the institutions that can guarantee a monopoly on the coer-
cive use 01' force (see the discussion 01' security in Chapter 2 by Barnett R.
Rubin); and (2) those institutions that can collect revenues and govern ex-
penditures, among other functions (see the discussion of public finance by
Michael Carnahan and CIare Lockhart in Chapter 4)29 But beyond the army,
the police, and tax/customs collection agencies, the institutional understand-
ng 01' the state extends to the capacity and reach of all state ministries and
agencies, including those that formulare and administer policy in the arcas 01'
justice, finance, money, agriculture, tracle, and so on.
3
Fukuyama delineares
between two dimensions 01' stutebuilding: state capacity across territory
Cstrength") and institutional capacity across functions Cscope")}1 Both fall
into the concept of the state as institutional capacity.
One important element of state capacity is not simply service delivery
but institutionalization 01' its various organizations. "Insritutionalization" here
means the process by which a cluster 01' activities acquires a persistent set
of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles for
actors.v' Inslitutionalization means that sustainability does not depend on
any single individual but on a shared commitrnent lo the principles, proce-
dures, and goal s of the institution. The death or departure of an intluential
leader does not doorn the institution, for generalized patterns relate to the
expected roles played by all rather than roles assigned by one individual.
Institutionalization presumes that roles and rules are taken for granted by
those who execute them and are subject to them. 13 As discussed earlier, the
predominant approaches to peacebuilding, hurnanitarian aid, and develop-
ment have long neglected institutionalization 01' state agencies precisely be-
cause those agencies are deficient and thus ohstacles to effective outcomes.
Ending Wars, Building States
Instead, international actors often succumb to the temptation to shape strate-

1 gies around an influential leader or Western-educated "reformer" as the
I
shortest route toward capacity building. Unfortunately, although this ap-
proach may work in the short term as an exit strategy for internationals, it is
not a sustainable approach toward building the capacity of state institutions,
Second, apart from institutional capacity, the state can be understood in
relation to particular organizationa! arrangelllellts-what we refer to as "state
design." Whereas capacity refers to the ability 01' the police or the govern-
ment's tax collectors to discharge their responsibilities, state design refers to
where and how these state powers are allocated or arranged.s- States can ex-
hibit decisionmaking authorities at different le veIs, granting national author-
ities relatively reduced powers in a federal or confederal systern, more pow-
ers in a centralized system, or exceptions to their power through autonornous
regions. Such arrangements shape popular expectations 01' the role 01' the
state over time, as people come to expect the state to act, say, intrusively or
minimally, State design may also distribute power across different branches
of government (e.g., legislatures versus executives).
The design of sta tes is generally so historically rooted that the state 's
organizational arrangement seerns impervious to change. Indeed, changing
the design of the state-from a federal to a centralized structure, from one
with a strong executive to one rooted in parliamentary strength-is rareo
However, the extraordinary circumstances of war and its termination both
compel and provide windows 01' opportunity for national elites, or external
powers where their troops are involved, to revisit the state's organization for
better or worse.V The settlement of wars often requires that the state's insti-
tutional structure be redesigned to grant regional autonomy (or indepen-
dence, as in Bosnia) to the territory associated with a warring party,
In addition, state design issues are linked to questions 01' extrastate au-
thority-both "below" the state with regard to local or tribal authorities and
"above" the state in relation to regional or transnational arrangements that
usurp sorne state functions (e.g. the EU and the World Trade Organization).
In Chapter 7 William Reno confronts this challenge: How possible is it to
build siatelike structures below the nationallevel? He shows that governance
can be achieved without state institutions, something that discussions of state
design should take into account.
It is virtually impossible for decisions about state structures not to favor
certain social or political groups, as well as the process of selection of rulers,
thus influencing regime type. Robust approaches to state design cannot side-
step decisions and debate about regime type (e.g., democracy or authoritar-
ian? What sort 01' dernocracy or authoritarian regime?). Whereas "regirne"
generally refers to how those who govern are selected and their power vis-a-
i
vis other branches 01' government, the "state" refers to a broader set 01' instit-
utional rules and rnechanisms, generally embodied in part in constitutions,
l
10 Building States to Build Peace
Ending Wars, Building States 11
that define the institutions and powerofthe entre governmental apparatus identification with the state is no longer the sine qua non for successful
vis-a-vis society.wStatebuilding must minirnally grapple with regime form stateness. Modernizationtheory posited thatsuccessful statesrequireel acit-
and process, insofaras state structures and reforms provide the contourand
r
izenry thatidentified itselfwith thestateoverotherethnic or religious alle-
foundation for the forms ofdernocracy (e.g..parliamentary versus presiden- giances; in other words, that statebuileling required nation building. AI-
tial, consociational approaches versus majoritarian, electoral systerns, etc.). though social groups still aspire lo natiouhoorj and oftenindependence, the
All the case studes in this volumeimplicitlyillustrate the interface hetween
design issues of states and the character of the political regime, as does
Katia Papagianni's thernatic treatmentoflegitimacy in Chapter 3.
The chapters in this volurne each treat the interaction ofstate capacity
with state design and legitimacy, sorne moreexplicitly than others. At cer-
tain moments in a society's history, the institutional arrangernent of the
state takesspccial prccedence overcapacity,Thesemomentsgenerally occur
in the imrnediate aftennath ofstate 01' regirnecollapse (e.g., the great revo-
lutions that prompted the reanangeiuent ofstates and regimos in France,

I
1
I
powerofexternal neighbors anel the international systemhas maele the ielea
ofrnultinationalstates morecornmonandaccepted(and, ofcourse, very few
states come even clase to being a single-nation state). Second, the idea that
identity canbe deliberately manipulated through externalprograms or inter-
ventionhas lost the credibility itenjoyeel in the 1960s. Large-scaleprograrns
to redefine a society's allegiances anel identities seemsilly or self-defeating
in today's globalized world,
Nevertheless, the study ofstatebuilding is incomplete withoutexamin-
ing society's evolving image of and expectations al' the state. States are
China, Russia, and the United States, anelin 1979 in Nicaraguaand Iran, for
instance), In rece ni decades, external actors often haveplayed a crucialrole
in the overthrowof states andregimes, leading to constitutional conferences
or other processes to redes ign the state. We haveseen such processes in a
variety 01' postintervention territories: Haiti (1994, 2004), East Timol'and
Kosovo (1999), Aghanistan (2001), andIraq (2003))7
Even though international actor.'; exercise a role in statedesign in such
cases, national actors still playaeleterminant role in elecisions about state
structures. During tliese formative moruents, external ieleas anel interests
conjoin with historical and regional trajectories to craft parliamentarysys-
terns,judicial systems, security systel11S, electoralsystems, anelthe relation-
ships amonglocal ancl provincialpowers.Theseissues of stateelesign inter-
act with state capacity. Elites may replace weakor undesirable repressive
forces, as in Haiti. Or as in Afghanistan, the process ofcentral state elesign
and fonnation may reflect the weakness ofall national institutions anelthe
rclativepowerof provincialactors.Yet oncethese constituting moments of
state elesign pass. capacity once again becomes the fundamental character-
iSlic ofstateness and state power in the eyes ofinternational organizations.
State design ssues are profounelly poltical, not technical "constitu-
lional elesign" questions thatcan be mapped in somescientific fashion. This
bookdoes not contain a separatechapterelevoted to state elesign questions,
since they are intertwined with capacity anel Icgitimacy issues. Instead, the
case sludiestreat these Cjuestions in their social context, anel the thematic
chapters address suchdesign questions in conjunction with capacity. Chap-
ler 3 explicitly aelelresses the challenges involveel in institutional arrange-
menl.s of thestate at these crucialmomentsofdesigno as well as the broaeler
issueofthe cultural characterofthe state vis-a-vis social groups anelactors.
Olelieleas aboutreshaping society 01' citizens (Le., "nationbuileling") are
no longeras cOl11pelling as they once were, for t\Voreasons. First, citizen
often analyzedin a vaCUUI1l, withoutreferencelo the social groups they pur-
r
portedly rcprescnt and regulate. However, statebuilding involves the inter-
face ofstate institutions with society. As Joel S. Migelal and his colleagues
have pointed out, "States may help mold, but they are al so continually
moldeel by, the societies within which they are embedded,"}8 State capacty
necessarily involves the input and perceptions 01'citizens. Thedesign ofthe
state will in rnany ways shape and help define those interactions between
state anel society. The success ofstate designs ultimately depends on how
well they mediare state-society negotiations.
Why Should Statebuilding Contribute to Peacebuilding?
In the wakeofthe international response to the attackson Seplember 11,2001,
questions aboutpeacebuileling were conflated with, and largely eclipsed by,
the problems ofweak or "fragile" states. Despite early references to Soma-
lia and Bosnia as "faileel states" in the early 1990s, the termrose to promi-
nenceonlyin the twenty-firstcentury afterthe weaknessofthe Afghan state
uneler the Taliban was associateel with the ability ofAI-Qaiela to operate
freely.3
9
Yet the state is important for reasons completelyelistinct from the
potential Ihreatposeel by terrorismo Effective anelpopularly supported states
are necessary for the provisionofbasicgoods anelservices to the population
of a given territory.
Mostof today's political theoriesanelpolicy frameworks, anelevenmany
peaceagreel11ents, assume theexistence of a functioning state. The interna-
tional human rigbts regime, for example, assumes that states not only exist
but exercise full control over their agents anel theirterritory.4o In fields as
disparate as elevelopment, humanitarianassistance, anelconfliCI resolution,
states are often assumed 10 be capable ofdeve10ping policies anel imple-
menting thcl11.
,"}"
e
';c'
~ ~ -
.'
r
12 Building States to Build Peace
Nevertheless, states and stare institutions have been neglected."! The
very assumptions of statehood and states indicare that state institutions have
been presumed to e xist and function as designed on paper. The United Na-
tions was created by and for states; there is no provision for "decertifica-
tion" of states that fail to perform even minimal functions.t?
Stares have not only been neglected; they have been actively undermined
by intemational efforts at peace and development. Many humanitarians and
developrnent practitioners have tended to disdain the state as an impediment
to their well-intentioned work. Humanitarian agencies, for instance, prize the
delivery of aid to those most afflicted by natural 01' manmade disasters. They
understandably prefer to deliver their aid directly to those most in need,
rather than channel it through state agencies that rnay be corrupt, inefficient,
or pursuing partisan or ethnic agendas. Consequently, the state is bypassed
and atrophies as other entities assume its funcrions." In Afghanistan during
the 1990s, donors supplanted entire ministries throughout much of the coun-
iry. Finally, neoliberal economic policies contributed to the weakening of the
state during the 1980s and 1990s, when bilateral development agencies and
international financial institutions (lFIs) pushed aggressively to limit the state
in favor of the private sector.
Events in the late 1990s led peacebuilders to recognize that they had
neglected the state to the detriment of postcontlict societies. In places like
Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Haiti, where wars seerned to end, self-sustaining
peace proved elusi ve. External actors such as rnilitary peacekeepers, diplo-
mats, and development experts turned increasingly 10 the state as a needed
antidote 10 reversion to warfare. The weakness of state institutions proved
elemental in poor outcomes of peace processes in Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Haiti, and the Dernocratic Republic of Congo. Prevailing ideas about peace-
building require more attention to strengthening legitimate and effective
state institutions. Where peace processes involve security reforrns or new
human rights protections, it is necessary to creare or strengthen the state in-
stitutions needed to sustain these importan: changes. Many poor countries
emerging from warfare require greater human capacity and institutional
capacity to function with minimal effectiveness. As Fukuyama stated in 2004,
"State-building is one of the most importan! issues for the world community
because weak or failed states are the source of rnany of the world's most
serious problems."4-l
Theoretically, statebuilding should support the consolidation of peace in a
number of ways." First, it enhances sustainable rnechanisms for security and
conflict resolution at the national level that should carry legitimacy in the eyes
of the populace and of the outside world. Such meehanisms-be they justice
systerns, policing systems, or service delivery agencies-provide a credible
arena and framework (or at least a foundation for a framework) for social
groups to express their preferences and resol ve their conflicts nonviolently. If
,
Ending Wars, Building States 13
states function to provide these public goods, rather than contribute to pri-
vate gain, they reduce the incentives to seek basic goods outside established
channels or through violence. In postwar societies with an international
presence, statebuilding should also accelerate the orderly withdrawal of in-
ternational troops and civilians, ensuring stability and popular support for
an emergent regime. From the perspective of sustainable economies, func-
tioning and legitimate states also provide the infrastructure for sustainable
development with a diminishing role for external actors, AII of these factors
point to a complementary relationship between peacebuilding and state-
building, one that exists in many circumstances and should be nourished.
Yet the difference in values and emphasis between these two concepts
should al so be noted. Self-sustaining, legitimare, and effective states may be
seen as an important, even necessary comerstone of peacebuilding, but they
are the end goal 01' statebuilding, whereas self-sustaining peace is the ulti-
mate goal of peacebuilding. These overlapping concepts can diverge greatly
when programs and aid policies are designed around their respective end
goals, as we shall see.
What Are the Priorities in Statebuilding?
The Thematic Chapters
Are there certain priority state functions in the process of statebuilding in
war-torn societies? Experience shows that current models of statebuilding
are unlikely to fit local conditions. Many analysts suggest that the experi-
ence of the United Nations in setting up a transitional administration in
Kosovo unduly intluenced the UN strategy in East Timol', setting back the
sustainability of that new state upon independence in 2002. Public pro-
nouncernents and policies of the United Nations and of major bilateral actors
now embrace what scholars have insisted for years: there is no "one-size-
fits-all" model of statebuilding. Experienced practitioners and UN member
states repeated the call for attention to national and local context at the first
informal gathering of the UN Peacebuilcling Commission in May 2006
4 6
At the same time, experience has shown that certain state functions re-
peatedly prove to be essential to the viability of war-torn states. Unless a state
can deploy these goods, its internal power in all areas is likely to be limitecl.
even if it is propped up by external actors. In this volume, we draw upon and
adapt the three types of resources that Charles Tilly identifies as crucial for
statebuilders: coercion, capital, and charisma." Statebuilders historically re-
quired sorne combination of these resources to consolidate state power. Our
thernatic chapters largely eorrespond to these core responsibilities of the
state, including the provision of security and the accumulation and distribu-
tion of economic resources or capital. The third resource, charisma, is here
interpreted as a resource for broader legitimacy, especially in the eyes of the
l
14 Building States to Build Peace
internal population. Four thematic chapters address thesc three core issues.
In addition we add a rhernatic chapteron the provision 01' justice as a core
state function.r"A word about each 01' these areas is in order.
Security
One 01' the most salient lessons ofpeace operations is "security first."49 In
Chapter2, Barnett R. Rubin draws a distinction between the more conven-
tional "national" or "state" securit y and "human security." Both are irnpor-
tant, but especially the latter. Without security, other tasks 01' statebuilding
and postconflict reconstruction are irnpossible. At the same time, the pro-
vision 01'other staie goods like education. a regulatory environment for
foreign investment, and the ability to extract resources and tax citizcns all
impinge on (he state's ability to providesecurity. Each ofthese functions is
interrelated.A conceptual focus on one without attention to theirinteraction
with otherscan be disastrous. Similarlydisastrous is the concentrationofre-
sources ami attention solely on the provision 01' security, a rnistakc often
made by those in the security business. Even where privare actors are con-
tracted to pro vide security, the regulation and oversight 01' these actors re-
mains a core state function.
Legitimacy
Legitimacy is not so much a responsibility 01'the state as a necessary re-
source01' characteristic. Because its prcsence is interlaced with everyfunc-
tion 01' the stare, legitimacyhere is viewed as a resource thatcuts across all
1
1
state functions, ratherthan a role01' sector01' thestate.Theconceptis diffi-
r
cult to analyze meaningfully. Legitimacy is often assurned 01' defined in a
circular manner. By legititnacy, we herereferboth to the norrnative accept-
1
ance and expectation by a political community that the cluster01' rules and

institutions that compuse the state ought10 be obeyed, as wel! as the degree
t
to which the state is seen as the natural provider01'core goods and services.
Emergent states wil! rarely enjoyahigh degree 01' legitimacy, and new
1
state institutions \ViIIthus need to acquire such legitimacy unless they have
beenestabJished as a result ofa Sllccessful inSllrrection that toppled a regime
(in which case, the ne\Vregime may confera problematic excess, rather than
deficit. oflegitimacy on the state). Where stateshavehistorically not been the
natural providers01' core goods anc1 services (i.e., "weak"states), it is unre-
alistic to expect any ne\Vly recast state to acquire and effectively carry out
such services in the space 01' a few years. Given lhe COlllel11pOraryint1uence
01' external actors in legitimating transitional regimes, especially in armed
conflicts. national actors require legitimation not on!y internally but a1so ex-
ternally (the "clual legitimacy" problem referred to by Ghassan Salam, 01'
whatMichaeI Barnett anclChristophZuercherdescribe as the "peacebuilder's
Ending Wars, Building States 15
contract").50 KatiaPapagianni addresses the challengesinherent in establish-
ing legitimacy and participation in Chapter3.
Public Finance and Economic Policymaking
States require resources, and resourccs in turn rnake states. More specifi-
cally, the capacity to collect and distribute capital is one valid measure of
"statcness."The more the state is the focal point for the collection and dis-
tribution ofcapital Iorpublic goods, the more the statecarries weightvis-a-
vis otherquasi-publicinstitutions (e.g., niosques,churches, tribal chiefdoms,
neighborhood groups, etc.). International military and diplornatic actors
tencl to neglect the importance ofstate capacity for collecting, managing,
and distributing taxes, customs, and the like, although international finan-
cial institutions havepaid increasingattention to these starecapacities.
In Chapter 4, Michael Carnahan and Ciare Lockhart address the states
capacity to collectand expend rcvenues and the national budget process at
the coreofthesedecisions.As we will see, the casestudyon Libcria in Chap-
ter 14 describes an innovative experiment in international intrusion into a
corecomponent01' the state: the collection anddistribution 01'customsduties.
Distinct from the capacity 1'01' public finance, a country's econornic poli-
cies-andits capacities1'01' forrnulating such policies-affecttheconsolida-
tion ofpeace. Paul Collieranalyzes this issue in Chapter5, adding a global
level ofanaiysis to the riskfactors ofparticulareconomicpolicies in postcon-
flict societies
Justice and the Rule of Law
We have included a chapteron the rule oflaw in recognition 01'its inrpor-
tance as a state function in rnostconternporary postconflicrsocietics. His-
torically, scholars have not viewed the capacity ro administerjustice and
provide the rule 01' lawas a core state function. Charles Tiltys core fune-
tions rnake no mention 01' justice.Yet global standardsofjustice ancl glob-
alizedcornrnunicarions have made state legitimacy morecontingent on how
well it deliversjustice.
In Chapter 6, Erik G. Jenscn cites the example of Cambodia, where
everyday "miero"-injustices far outweighed KhmerRouge atrocities in aver-
age peorle'scOlllplaints abollt the rule 01'law. Although he conclmIes that
peace processescan survive a ueficit in the rule 01'law, Ollrcasestudies sug-
gestthat both legitimaey andsecurity hinge somewhat on whether the pop-
ulace is abIe tu see everyday couflicts resolved peaceably, either in the
statc's courtrooms or lhrough local mechanisms 01' justice. In cases where
past atrocitiesoccurred (as in Afghanistan, Libcria, Bosnia, and EastTimor),
importantethnic groups' views 01' state legitimacy 01'ten hinge on how past
injustices are addressed. Widely established human rights nonns, together
, g ~ ,
~ t
r,
~
~ . ""
16 Building States to Build Peace
with publicized trials of forrner heads of state, have created expectations for
justice that did not prevail in earlier generations. Yet overzealous "victor 's
justice" may set back legitimacy arnong losing social groups. In either case,
the state 's capacity to mete out justice is today of fundamental importance.
Not every state requires these core functions in equal measure. Sorne
state functions, such as meting out justice or providing health care, will as-
sume greater importance in sorne societies under certain historical conditions.
In sorne cases, external actors may opt to pro vide these resources. For exam-
pIe, the tacit commitment by the Organization of American States and the
United States to provide for Costa Rica's security from invasion enabled that
country to eliminate its armed forces in 1948. As a rule, however, these core
resources and state functions are the starting point for analyzing the process
of statebuilding, with appropriate attention to local and national context.
The intersection of peacebuilding and statebuilding poses special chal-
lenges. In most postwar societies, international actors deploy a high amount
of resources for a concentrated time period, and then these resources will be
diminished. The peculiar challenge of statebuilding in war-torn societies
lies mainly in the generation of core and other state functions, with the ex-
pectation that external provision of those resources (be it in the form of "as-
sistance" or occupation) will be withdrawn or dramatically reduced within
a few years. As a result, international agencies develop a range of strategies
that at times are self-defeating. In Chapter 8, Sarah Cliffe and Nick Manning
address four common mistakes made in the institution-building process and
offer clear, practical, and programmatic recommendations for avoiding these
l
common errors. The chapter acts as both a summary of the prior thernatic
chapters and as a transition to the case studies.

A related challenge is the relationship between those external provi-
sions of stateness and the emergent or extant providers of state goods and
f
services, be they national, provincial, local, or supranational. Many wars
take place in societies whose state functions have previously been carried
out at the substate or suprastate levels. As mentioned earlier, to address this
dimension of stateness and explore the concept of governance without state ,
I
institutions, we ha ve included Chapter 7 by William Reno, which explores
both the advantages and challenges confronting substate authorities in terms
of legitimacy and the provision of goods and services.
What Do the Case Studies Offer?
This volume contains not only the thematic chapters described aboye, but
also case studies of statebuilding efforts in the context of peace processes or

postwar societies. The case studies include rich and varied empirical material
I
that sheds hght on the relationship between statebuilding and peacebuilding
in war-torn societies. Unlike those found in other edited volumes, the case
Ending Wars, Building states 17
studies here focus specfically on peace processes and their relationship
with the trajectory of the state and its institutions. These exceptional stud-
ies raise new issues and point to interesting tensions in the relationship be-
tween statebuilding and peace consolidation. These findings are especially
important in an international policy environment where statebuilding has
become conflated with the promotion of peace.
The selection of the volume's cases-Somalia, Palestine, Bosnia, East
Timor, Afghanistan, and Liberia-reflects a simple logic: they all involved
interna1 (often internationalized) wars in which stateness-either juridical or
empirical-and international actors (including the United Nations) played a
crucial part in the war and the process of securing peace. Within this frame-
work defined by three factors (civil war, salient questions of statehood, and
prominent international roles), the cases exhibit important diversity along
two dimensions.
First, they reflect a range of experiences with war and peace. Interna-
lional actors were prominent direct combatants in the conflicts in Afghanistan
and East Timor. They acted as combatant third parlies in Bosnia and Somalia
and to a lesser extent Liberia, but they have played little military role in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some wars ended in outright victory (East Timor
and Afghanistan), whereas others produced peace agreements (the 1995
Dayton Accords for Bosnia, the 2003 Acera agreement for Liberia, and the
1993 Oslo Accords for Palestine). Sorne peace accords enjoyed success
(Bosnia and Liberia to date), and others failed (the Oslo Accords). Somalia
never experienced a formal peace, and East Timor and Afghanistan experi-
enced postwar violence, albeit at very different levels.
Second, the cases represent diversity in the role of the state in war and
peace. War centered on the creation of new juridical states in East Timor,
Bosnia, and Palestine. How powerful and regional states treat populations
in these territories depends greatly on whether they form part of another
state or have achieved independence. The occurrence or recurrence of war-
fare was largely ascribed to weak empirical states in Afghanistan, Somalia,
and Liberia (and, in 2006 after independence, East Timor). Indeecl, the no-
tion of "failed sta tes" posing threats to international security received its
greatest boost from the AI-Qaida presence in Afghanistan in 200 l. In Afghan-
istan (as in Kosovo ancl Iraq), peacebuilcling activities commenced not upon
a cease-fire throughout the territory, but upon the withdrawal of one side
from power and the collapse of state functions. In the case of Somalia, an
armed conflict in the 1990s led to the collapse of the state itself, and the
central poli tic al drama of the early twenty-first century centered on state-
building rather than consoliclating peace. The cases permit analysis not only
of the relationship between peace processes and statebuilding but also of
the relationship between renewed warfare (in the cases of Palestine, Soma-
ha, East Timor, Afghanistan) and state fonnation.
l
18 Building States to Build Peace
Fina1ly, powerful states and international organizations played an irnpor-
tant role in a1l the cases; conversely, these countries also played a significant
role in shaping the thinking and practice of international actors in postwar
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The United Nations was heavily involved in
each case, either with a peacekeeping troop deployment or through a diplo-
matic presence (as in the Middle East and, after the withdrawal of its UN
mission, Sornalia). The cases present the chance lo learn about the various
roles played by the UN mission, UN agencies, regional organizations (specif-
ically NATO in the context of Bosnia and Afghanistan), inremational finan-
cial institutions, donor countries, and nongovernmental and private actors in
addressing the cha1lenges of statebuilding in war-torn countries.
These case studies offer rich hypotheses about how processes of ending
wars interact with questions of statehcod and statebuilding. Because we ex-
elude cases in which questions of juridical or empirical sovereignty were
not salient (e.g., El Salvador) or in which international actors were not promi-
nently involved (e.g., Peru, Burrna, Costa Rica), the case studies yield neither
structured cornparisons nor confirrnation or testing of hypotheses. The cases
represent only a sample 01' the pool of cases in which issues of statehood and
peace involved UN missions, ancl we found it unnecessary to include other
recent cases that conformed to our criteria (e.g., Kosovo, Sudan, the Derno-
cratic Republic of Congo).
Four essential questions underlie our case study inquiries: Did state-
building help build peace? Did peacebuilding help build states? Ir so, how?
What can we conclude from these experiences? Each case study author was
asked to address several other issues in an effort to answer the aboye nter-
rogatories: If there was an agreernent to reach and sustain peace, then what
elements of statebuilding or state reform did it address? Which aspects or
functions of statebuilding were included and ornitted? What was the rela-
tionship of efforts to consolidate peace to efforts 10 design and consolidare
state institutions7 Were the same actors in volved in each? How did these
processes cohete, and how did they experience tensions or contradictions? If
the state failed or persisteel in weakness, how was the peace process affected?
How did the sllccess or failure of a peace process interact with efforts to
strengthen the state and its institutions') How diel efforts to build states or
builel peace involve and shape society and its salienl groups?
The contributors bring cliverse perspectives to bear on their analysis. A1I
have field experience in war-torn societies anel are relatively well-known in
either policy or academic circles. VirtuaHy aH have provicled expert advice on
the issues or countries of their expertise or have acted directly as policymak-
ers within international organizations such as the UN or the World Bank. Some
chapters are written in the tradition of critical analysis that presents both in-
sider anel outsider perspectives, whercas others are written morc from outside
institutional perspectivcs. Some grounel their analysis in the broacl literature
Ending Wars, Building States 19
(mainly the thernatic authors), whereas others concentrare on their findings
from the field. Although we have sought cornmon frameworks and questions,
some contributions are more structured than others, longer than others, anel
more practice-oricnted than others.
Processes of strengthening states and of consolidating peace rnay be
non linear and fraught with contradictions. The book is intended to identify
use fuI generalizations where possible and to highlight contradictions and
conceptual problerns where they are irnportant for avoiding mistakes. It seeks
to identify the tensions between ending wars and building states and to spec-
ify how policymakers can ease these tensions and deepen the mutua1ly pos-
itive interactions between these processes, Consolidating peace is especially
urgent in toclay's world. This book articulates how engaging in statebuilding
can help, rather than harrn, that endeavor,
Notes
l. Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Senlernents in Civil Wars
1945-93," AlIlericall Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995): 681-690; Paul Col-
lier et al., The Conjlict Trap (Washington, OC: World Bank and Oxforcl University
Press, 2003), p. 7; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom, "Post-Conflict
Risks," Working Papel' 2006-12 (Oxforcl: Centre for the Stucly of African Econo-
mies, Oxforcl University, August 2006); Astri Suhrke ancl Ingrid Samset, "What's in
a Figure: Estimating Recurrence of Civil War,' International Peacekeeping 14, no.
2 (April 2007): \98.
2. Stephen John Stedman, "Introduction,' in Stephen John Stedman, Donald
Rothchilcl, ancl Elizabetb M. Cousens, Ending Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
2002), p. l.
3. CoIlier et al., The Conflict Trap, p. 7.
4. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the Unit ed Srares of
America, Washington, OC, Septernber 2002, p. l.
5. See, among others, Marina Ottaway, "Nation Building." Foreign Policy
132 (September-October 2002): 16-24; Rolancl Paris, Ar War's End: Building Peace
After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Michael Bar-
nett, "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War,' International Se-
curiry 30, no. 4 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Unitecl Nations, Reporr of rhe Palie! 01/ Unired Narions Peace Op-
erarions (Brahimi Report), UN Doc. A/SS/30S-SI2000/809, August 21, 2000.
7. Stewart Patrick ancl Kaysie Brown, Crearer Than rhe SUIIl of [ts Parts? As-
sessillg "Whole of CovemlllelJr" Approaches ro Fragile Srares (New York: Interna
lional Peace Acaclemy, 2007).
8. It laler became tbe Bank's Contlict Prevention ancl Reconstrucion (CPR)
Unit.
9. The orfice was originally clllbbed the "Low-Income COllntries Uneler Stress"
(LICUS) initiative.
10. See Nora Bensabel, "Organising for Nation-Bllilding:' Surl'il'al (JlIne 2007).
Il. Johan Galtung, "Tbree Approacbes to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacell1aking,
ane! Peacebuilding," in bis Peace, Wal; and Defellse-Essays in Peace Resellrch,
Vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Christian Eljers, 1975), pp. 282-304.
I
'1
20 Building States to Build Peace
12. The US government has eschewed the terrn in favor of others like peace-
keeping and reconstruction and stabilization, although nationbuildtng still prevails
in popular discourse. See, e.g., James Dobbins et al., America 's Role in Nation-
Building: From Germany ID Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RANO, 2003).
13. See, e.g., Roben C. Orr, Winllillg the Peace: An American St rat egv for
Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington, OC: Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, 2004).
14. Quote frorn Margaret J. Antsee, "Strengthening the Role of the Departrnent
of Political Affairs as Focal Point for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding," repon for the
UN Depart ment of Poltical Affairs, Decernber 1998, para. 2. For a broader discus-
sion of different UN concepts, see Charles T. Call, "Institutlonalizing Peace: A Re-
view of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Concepts and Issues for OPA," review conducted
tor UN Department of Politica\ Affairs, New York, January 2005. See also United Na-
tions, "Supplement to AIl Agenda for Peace," Position Papel' of the Secretary-General
on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, UN. Doc. A/501
60, 1995.
15. See John Paul Lederach, The Moral lmagination: The Arr and Soul of
Building Peuce (Oxford: Oxford University PreSS, 2005).
16. Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar, and Karin Wermester, eds., Peace-
building as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2000).
17. See Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuild-
ing: A Theoretical and Quanrirarive Analysis," AmeriCllIl Political Science Review
94, no. 4(2000): 779-801.
18. "Staternent by the President of the Security Council," February 20, 200 1,
UN Doc. S/PRST/200Il5.
19. The "Annor.1ted Agenda" of the Founh UN Regional Organizations High-
Level Meering, "Meeting the Challenge of Long-Term Peace-Building: Preventing
the Outbreak and Recurrence of Violent Contlict," explicitly says, "The goal here is
ro promote a 'posirive peaCe'" (para. 17), June 20,2000. See al so Roland Paris, Al
\Var's End: Buildillg Peace Afia Civil CDllfliel (Cambridge: Cambridge University
t
PreSS, 2004). f
20. Max Weber, "Science as a Vocarion," in H. H. Genh and C. Wright Milis,
Frolll Max Weber: Essays in Soeiolog)' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946),
pp. 129-156. Originally a speech ar Munich University, 1918.
21. Amy Scott, "The Image of the Stare and the Expansion of the International
I
Sysrem," Ph.D. diss., New College, Oxford, 2006, Chapter 2.
22. Roben H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Afrca's Weak States Per-
si"t: The Empirical and the Juridica! in Statehood," lVorld Polilics 35, no. I (Oeto-
ber 1982): 1-24; Michael Barnett, "The New United Nations Politics of Peace:
From Juridical Sovereignry to Empirical Sovereignty," Global Govemance 1, no. 1 I
(Winter 1995): 79-97.
23. Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist"; Barnett, "The
New United Nations Polirics of Peace." AIso See Jeffrey Herbst, Slales alld Power
in Afriea: Comparalive Lessons in AUlhoril)' and Conlrol (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000).
24. Max Weber, "Scicnce as a Vocation."
25. Charles Tilly, "Retlections on the Hisrory of European Stare-Making," in
Charles Tilly, ed., The Formalion of Naliollal Slales in lVeslern ElIrope (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 42.
Ending Wars, Building States 21
26. Francis Fukuyama, Govenwl/ce and World in tlie State-building: Order
2/.1'1 Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). p. ix.
27. These approaches or concepts overlap with rhe four concepts described by
Katia Papagianni in Chapter 3. The "institutional capacity" and "organizatioual
arrangernent" approaches coincide Iargely with her concepts of states as bureaucra-
cies and administrations, and as institutional arrangements retlecring power balances.
28. Implicit in this definition is a distinction between institutional capacity and
the capacity of individuals within those iustiturions.
29. Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," p. 42; Weber,
"Science as a Vocation."
30. Ashraf Ghani, CIare Lockharr, and Michael Camahan, "An Agenda for
State-Building in the Twenty-first Century," Fletcher Forum [or lVorld Affairs, 30,
no. I (Winter 2006): 101-123. See a1so Chapter 8 in rhis volume.
31. Ghani, Lockhart, and Carnahan, "An Agenda," pp. 11-14.
32. Here I have adapted Robert O. Keohane's definition of institutious, "nter-
national Institutions: Two Approaches," tnternational Studies Quarterlv 32, no. 4
(Decernber 1988): 384. This definition encompasses informal rules as well as insti-
tutions that rnay not be specific organizations (e.g., the international human rights
regirne), though here formal rules will be most pertinent.
33. See John Rawls's discussion of the accretion of force of rules, "Two Concepts
of Rules," Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 3-32, described in ibid., pp. 384-385.
34. For various perspecti ves on what is here called state desian and its relation
to war termi nation, see Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism and the ~ ID Peace (Kinz-
ston: Institute of Intergovemrnental Relarions, 1994); Michael' Burton and Jo\;n
Higley, "Political Crises and Elite Settlements," in Eliles, Crises, and Ihe Origins of
Regimes, edited by Mattei Dogan and John Higley (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Lit-
tlefield, 1998); Donald L. Horowitz, Erhllic GrollpS in Conflicl (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1987); Nancy Berllleo, "What rhe Democratization Litera-
ture Says, and Doesn't Say, About Posr-\Var Democratization," Global GOl'emallce
9, no. 2 (April-June 2003): 159-177.
35. See Charles T. CaIl, "War Transirions and rhe New Civilian Securitv in
Latin America," COlllparalil'e Polilics 35, no. I (Ocrober 2002). For an analogous
view at the interstate sysremic level, see John Ikenberry's Afler Fie ror)'.
36. Although states are defined as distinct frol1l "regimes," it is difficult to dis-
entangle lhe two in the area of srate designo On rhe weIl-trodden distinction between
states, regimes, and governmenrs, see Srephanie Lawson, "Conceptual Issues in the
Comparalive Study of Regillle Change and Democratization," Comparalil'e POlilics
25, no. 2 (January 1993): 183-206; Munroe Eagles, Christopher Holol1lan, and
Larry Johnston, Polirics, IIllrodllclion lO DelllOcralic GOl'emlllelll, 2nd ed. (Peter-
borough, ONT: Broadview, 2004); Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schlllitter, and
Laurence Whitehead, eds., Trwlsilions fmm AlIlhorilarian RlIle (Balrimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins Universiry Press, 1986); Roben M. Fishl1lan, "Rerhinking State and
Regime in Southern Europe," World POlilics 42 (April 1990): 428.
37. Jamal Benomar, "Consrirution-Making After Contlicr: Lessons for Irag,"
fOllnwl of Democrac)' 15, no. 2 (April 2004): 81-95.
38. "Introduction," in Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds.,
Slale Power and Social Forces: Dominalion and TrallsforlllMioll in Ihe Third It"rld
(Cambridge: Cambridge Universiry Press, 1994).
39. Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign
Polic)' 89 (Winter 1993): 3-20.
22 Building States ta Build Peace
40. The emerging norrn of "responsibility ro protect." however, retlects a grow-
ing awareness that not all states are capable of providing for their populations. See
International Cornmission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Rcsponsibit-
ity lo Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).
41. Susan L. Woodward, "Fragile States." paper presented at the Peace and So-
cial Justice meeting of the Ford Foundation, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, November 29,
2004; and her "Peacebuilding and 'Failed States: Some lnitial Considerations."
paper presented at a conference in Coirnbra, Portugal, March/ April 2006.
42. Jeffrey Herbst proposes such deeertification in States and Power in Africa.
43. Ashraf Ghani and others have written wide!y on the ways in whieh aid del iv-
erv undermines state cffectiveness. See Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and Miebael
C;rnahan, "Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approaeh to State-Building," Working
Paper no. 253 (London: Overseas DeveJopment Institurc, September 2005); and
Ghani, Lockhart, and Carnahan, "An Agenda for State-Bilding in tbe Twenty-first
Ceniury."
44. Fukuvama, Stat e-building, p. l.
45. See Woodward, "Peacebuikling and 'Failed States'": and Sirnon Chester-
man, Michael lgnatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Making Stntes Work: State Foil-
ure and tlie Crisis ojGol'emollce (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005).
46. International Peace Academy and Center on International Cooperation.
"Next Steps Ior the Peacebuilding Commission: Serninar Report." June 2006.
47. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Cap ita 1, and European States, s.. 990-1992 (Ox-
Iord: Blackwell Publishers, 1992). These three resources were ernphasized by Bar-
nett Rubin during a workshop attended by the editors and a nurnber of seholars and
praetitioners who work on the state and statebuildiug, including Tilly. The workshop
was organized by the Center on International Cooperation and the lnternational
Peace Academy, Decernber 16, 2004, New York. See Chapter 2 of this book for
more by Rubn.
48. Others suggest more nurnerous state functions, such as Gbani et al., "Clos-
ing the Sovereignty Gap" and Chapter 8 herein.
49. Kofi Arman, "Learning the Lessons of Peacebuilding." speeeh at University
of Ulster, Londonderry, Oetober 18, 2004.
50. Ghassan SaJam, Appels d' elllpire: lngrences el rsistances al'ge de la
I1lOlldialisation (Paris: Fayard. 1996); Michael Barnett and Cbristoph Zuercher,
"The Pe acebnilderls Contraet: How External State-bllilding Reinforces Weak State-
hood," discussion draft for Research Partnership on Postwar State-BlIilding, www
.sta tebu i1d ing. org/resources/Barnett_Zeu rcher_ RPP S_ October2006. pd f, 2006.
PART 1
Context