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Integrated Disaster Management Program

Assignment

Report on-26/11 Mumbai Terror attacks


Submitted by-Sneha Shah
PRN:10020741111
MBA:I year
SIOM

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Introduction

The unprecedented terror attacks in Mumbai by highly motivated militants armed with
sophisticated weapons on November 26, 2008 dramatically demonstrated the susceptibility of
modern cities to terrorist attacks.

Although terrorists have attacked New York (2001), Washington D.C (2001), Madrid
(2004), and London (2005), the Mumbai assault has proved that cities in the developing
world experience terrorist acts with greater frequency and often with more devastating effect
than in economically advanced countries. One major reason for this is the lack of effective
urban governance institutions in many developing countries.
There is a strong relationship between the quality of urban governance institutions and the
number of terrorist attacks and causalities. Therefore, there is a strong need to make urban
governance institutions more credible, worthy and smart in fighting terrorism against cities.
Understanding Terrorism:
Three main elements of terrorism: a) violent acts threatened or employed b) violent acts
directed against civilian targets and c) violent acts threatened or perpetrated for political
objectives.
Unlike some other characterizations, this definition embraces acts of terror committed by
states because although state terrorism and group terrorism have different features, their
effects on people and politics are similar and they are often closely related. The close
connection between the Pakistani Amy and its intelligence agency called the Inter-Services
Intelligence and the Pakistan based deadly terrorist organisations such as the Jaish-e-
Mohammad and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (widely believed to have masterminded the recent
Mumbai attacks) is a case in point.
It is also important to mention that while terrorism is not a new phenomenon; some aspects of
terrorist activity today are certainly new.
Following are the features of the New Age Terrorism.
Terrorism has become bloodier.
Terrorists have developed new financial resources so that they are less dependent on
state sponsors.
Terrorists have evolved new models of organization.
Tterrorists can now wage global campaigns.
Terrorists have effectively exploited new communication technologies.
Some terrorists have moved beyond tactics to strategy, although none of them have
achieved their stated long-range goals.
Terrorists ignore existing global norms, especially those intended to protect innocent
civilians.
New Age Terrorists are rational in the choice of their targets because urban landscape holds
significant advantages for them. Population is not only high in urban areas but also dense.
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Inhabitants in cities and towns are more heterogeneous that gives terrorists more space for
anonymity
New Age Terrorists are rational in the choice of their targets because urban landscape holds
significant advantages for them. Population is not only high in urban areas but also dense.
Inhabitants in cities and towns are more heterogeneous that gives terrorists more space for
anonymity
terrorists feed not on the deaths of their victims but also on the fear of those left
behind. Thus the urban landscape facilitates terrorists in realising their goals:
maximum damage with minimum risk, hyper media attention and subsequent
disappearances
Attack Overview

At approximately 9:30 p.m. local time on the evening of November 26, 2008, a
number of well trained militants came ashore from the Arabian Sea on small boats and
attacked numerous high profile targets in Mumbai, India, with automatic weapons and
explosives. By the time the episode ended some 62 hours later, about 174 people, including
nine terrorists, had been killed and hundreds more injured. Among the multiple sites attacked
in the peninsular city known as Indias business and entertainment capital were two luxury
hotelsthe Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi- Tridentalong with the main railway
terminal, a Jewish cultural centre, and a caf frequented by foreigners, a cinema house, and
two hospitals. Six American citizens were among the 26
Foreigners reported dead. Indian officials have concluded that the attackers numbered only
ten, one of whom was captured. Some reports indicate that several other gunmen escaped.

According to reports, the militants arrived in Mumbai from sea on dinghies launched
from a larger ship offshore, then fanned out in southern Mumbai in groups of two or three.
Each was carrying an assault rifle with 10-12 extra magazines of ammunition, a pistol,
several handgrenades, and about 18 pounds of military-grade explosives. They also employed
sophisticated technology including global positioning system handsets, satellite phones,
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone service, and high-resolution satellite photos of the
targets. The attackers were said to have demonstrated a keen familiarity with the Taj hotels
layout in particular, suggesting that careful advanced planning had been undertaken.

Home Minister Shivraj Patil (who resigned in the wake of the attacks) reportedly
ordered Indias elite National Security Guard commandos deployed 90 minutes after the
attacks began, but the mobilized units did not arrive on the scene until the next morning,
some ten hours after the initial shooting. The delay likely handed a tactical advantage to the
militants.4 According to a high ranking Mumbai police official, the militants made no
demands and had killed most of their hostage before being engaged by commandos on the
morning of November 27.5 Two full days passed between the time of that engagement and
the episodes conclusion when the two hotels were declared cleared of the several remaining
gunmen.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh apologized to the Indian people on behalf of
his government for being unable to prevent the attacks. He said his government will pursue a
three level response to include
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(1) Seeking to galvanize the international community to deal sternly with what Singh
labelled the epicentre of terrorism, which is located in Pakistan;

(2) Taking a strong posture toward the Islamabad government in pressing it to end the use of
Pakistani territory for staging terrorist attacks,

(3) Recognizing that self-help measures to improve Indias own domestic security are
required.

On December 11, the countrys new home minister, P.Chidambaram, announced major
reform efforts for the countrys security infrastructure to include the establishment of a new
national investigative agency, a new Coastal Command, 20 new counter terrorism schools,
and new regional commando bases.

Chronology of the Attack

November 26, 2008 (all times are local)
21:20 Gunfire outside the Hotel Oberoi at Nariman Point in south Mumbai.
21:20 Terrorists run into Nariman House, where they take control of the Chabad
Lubavich center.
21:30 Gunfire outside the Leopold Caf at Colaba in south Mumbai, about 100 meters
behind the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel.
21:40 Gunfire near the Bade Miyan Caf (behind the Taj Hotel in south Mumbai).
21:45 Terrorists enter Taj Hotel lobby and fire indiscriminately.
21:45 Gunfire inside the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST), Mumbais central train
station. There are ten fatalities there.
22:30 Gunfire at the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai headquarters gate 2,
opposite the CST.
22:35 Gunfire at Gokuldas Hospital, near the CST.
22:40 Gunfire at the Cama & Albless Hospital, near the CST.
22:50 Gunfire at the Metro Theatre (Metro Cinema Junction).
23:00 Explosion in a taxi in Vile Parle in north Mumbai. (This is one of the IEDs left
behind in the taxi.)
23:00 Explosion in a taxi in Mazgaonprobably the second IED left behind.
23:10 Two explosions at Napean Sea Road in south Mumbai.
23:30 Explosion at Dhobi Talao.
November 27, 2008
00:30 Gunfire after a police van was hijacked at Dhobi Talao.
01:00 Immense blast in the Taj Hotel, possibly caused by two grenades.
02:00 Army arrives at the Taj Hotel.
03:00 Large fire breaks out at the Taj Hotel.
09:15 Army arrives at Oberoi Hotel, storm hotel.
09:15 Security forces engage in first attempt to retake the Taj Hotel.
10:30 Security forces engage in room-to-room searches at the Taj Hotel.
17:30 NSG forces arrive at Nariman House. Helicopters begin surveillance.
24 The Lessons of Mumbai
November 28, 2008
07:30 NSG forces storm Nariman House.
11:00 Hostage siege ends at the Hotel Oberoi, hostages released.
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11:00 NSG forces report that they have cleared the new section of the Taj Hotel.
13:00 Indian security forces report 30 people dead in one Taj Hotel hall.
18:00 Operations reported to have ceased at Nariman House. However, NDTV
reports that one floor still has not been cleared.
19:45 All NSG forces emerge from Nariman House, stating that no one was found
alive.
November 29, 2008
04:30 Gunfire and explosions heard at the Taj Hotel.
07:30 Fire breaks out on the lower floors of the Taj Hotel.
08:50 Taj Hotel hostage siege declared over, according to Indian police.

The Mumbai attack reflected precise planning, detailed reconnaissance, and thorough
preparation, both physical and mental. It relied on surprise, creating confusion and
overwhelming the ability of the authorities to respond. And it required determined execution
by suicide attackers who nonetheless were able to operate effectively over an extended period
of time.

Terrorist Reconnaissance and Planning

The complexity of the operation demanded careful preparation. Eyewitness accounts from the
Taj Hotel indicate that the terrorists knew their way through hidden doors and back hallways
of the hotel. According to another report, the terrorists had a detailed diagram of the hotels
layout.
Indian authorities indicate that in February 2008, a suspected terrorist, arrested in northern
India, was found to possess drawings of various sites in Mumbai, some of which were targets
in the November 2008 attack. The targets included the Taj Hotel and the Bombay Stock
Exchange (which had been a terrorist target in 1993). The apprehended suspect indicated that
he had begun his reconnaissance in late 2007. It appears that the planning for the attack itself
began in mid-2007. This is consistent with the time line of other large-scale terrorist
operations.
To achieve success, the terrorists had to have preplanned routes through the city from the
point of their landing to their final objective and had to be very familiar with the terrain they
would traverse at night. Information provided by the surviving terrorist in custody indicates
that their trainers provided them with maps and CD images of their targets.

How Mumbai attack is different from other previous terrorist attacks
Although terror has stalked India all too often but the Mumbai attack was different for several
reasons. First, the Mumbai terrorist attack is described one of the deadliest and biggest terror
attacks India has ever seen and rightly dubbed as Indias 9/11. The bloody drama which
involved attacks in as many as 11 places in the city left 183 people, including 22 foreigners,
dead. It took a force of 477 National Security Guards personnel, six columns of the Army and
400 members of the Mumbai police to kill or conquer an estimated 10 men in a 60 hours
operation (Katakam, 2008, p.6). Secondly, for the first time, the terrorist attacked an Indian
urban centre by using the sea route starting from Karachi via Gujarat to Mumbai. This was
done to avoid Indian security check points at the frontier or at airports. Third, the attacks in
Mumbai are without precedent. For the past decade, terrorist attacks have either been large
scale coordinated attacks like the 9/11 or the London bombings or they have been single
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suicide bombings like the ones frequently seen in Israel. Mumbai attack straddles the line
between the two types of attacks. Finally, with the Mumbai attack, pan-Islamist forces have
brought their global jihad against the USA, Britain and Israel into the heart of India. This was
evident especially when they targeted the Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels that are the preferred
choice of many European, American and Israeli visitors and business travelers. Terrorists
now see India as part of the Crusaders (the USA and the West)-Zionists (Israel)-Hindu
(India) axis that they believe, have joined hands to destroy Islam.
What could be the possible motives of those who targeted Mumbai? A good hypothesis is
that the terrorists wanted to provoke India into a military retaliation, similar to its
Parliaments attack in 2001. This would furnish Pakistan with an excuse for redeploying its
troops currently stationed near the Afghan border easing pressure on Taliban/Al Qaida
militants and allowing them time to regroup. A second motive was to bring the dangerous
clash of civilization thesis to its denouement and create tension between Indias majority
Hindus and minority Muslims resulting in a deadly communal bloodshed between the two
communities. Finally, this kind of attack on Indias financial capital (the city contributes
about 40 % Indias GDP) is intended to send the message that India is not safe place to do
business. The Indian economy and its links with the world are under attack.
The Lessons of Mumbai
The Mumbai terror attacks have brought the short-comings inherent in most urban
governments in the developing countries: the gap between the promise of public service and
its delivery that lies at the root of their inability to respond swiftly and effectively to the
challenge of terrorism that has appeared in their cities with horrifying regularity. Mumbai is
the best case. The city as the countrys financial and business center has always been an
obvious target for terrorists and terrorist assaults have been occurring in the city with a
distressing frequency in the recent past. For instance, in March 1993, simultaneous attacks on
a number of targets resulted in over 270 fatal causalities. Similarly, the multiple bomb blasts
on Mumbai trains killed 200 people in July 2005. Yet the city administration has miserably
failed to develop the right kind of infrastructure or has any crisis management protocols in
place to deal with the frequent terrorist onslaught. This was demonstrated in the November
2008 terrorist attack.
The terrorists were able to inflict severe causalities in Mumbai because the city police,
the first responders, did not engage them. Their weapons were not sufficiently powerful and
they were not trained in that type of conflict. Moreover, the city firemen were slow to
respond. They failed to coordinate their actions with both the local police and national
paramilitary forces and suffered from inadequate equipment.
Similarly, Mumbai, with 18 million people and the fourth largest Metropolitan region
in the world, did not even have a single Special Weapons and Tactics Team nor a helicopter
to carry SWAT teams sent from New Delhi to Mumbai. The commandos who ended the siege
had to wait for hours to be transported from the Mumbai airport. The terrorists had hotel floor
plans, but the commandos did not; terrorists used GPS & Blackberries and monitored news
coverage, while the commandos did not have advanced communications. Terrorists even
monitored civilian cellphone and text message traffic to glean information about what the
police were doing.
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Sadly, during the attack, there was no powerful official representing Mumbai citys
administration simply because the administration has no power to speak of. The responses in
the immediate aftermath of the attacks---orders to the police and military, evacuation
operationsflowed from the above. An entire tier of the government at the local level was
non-existent (Nilekani, 2008).
Now compare that with America. New York City, like the rest of the USA, prides
itself that it has been able to prevent another terrorist attack after 9/11. A key factor that has
helped is the effort put in by its police force to anticipate threats and try and stay one step
ahead of potential attackers. Moreover, the way the city administration had responded to the
9/11 terrorist strike is also praiseworthy. Rudy Giuliani, the New York mayor, was highly
visible in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and coordinated the
response of various city departments while organizing the support of state and federal
authorities for the attack site, for city-wide anti-terrorist measures, and for restoration of
destroyed infrastructure. He made frequent appearances on radio and television on September
11 and afterwards and was hailed by many for his leadership role during the crisis.
Unlike New York, Mumbais problems are deeply structural. Although the 74th
constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 formally gave constitutional recognition to urban
governance in India, decision-making on financial and governance matters concerning the
city is split in a haphazard manner within the countrys three tiered structure of governance
(Federal, State and the City Government). This results in a diffused responsibility, lack of
coordinated action and disjointed planning as well as lack of financial autonomy for the city.
Ironically, even municipal services in cities are fragmented across many different
corporations, agencies and local government bodies resulting in what can be called too many
cooks in the urban kitchen scenario with conflicting lines of accountability. What is more
painful is that the city mayors in India largely hold ceremonial positions. Their indirect
election combined with short-one year tenure deprives them with any real authority. And all
this had repercussions in the speed and efficiency with which Mumbai responded to the
attacks.
Besides revealing the serious deficiencies of urban governance system in India, the
Mumbai attack also showed the larger mood of anger and disappointment of the public
against the political class whether they occupied governing slots in New Delhi or Mumbai
and remains satisfied with its minimalist performance. Within days of the terrorist attack,
billboards were set up in the city with messages that are worthy to mention; that the political
class has failed us, so please do not vote (those who come in through our vote are more
dangerous than those Pakistanis who came through the boat), no security, no taxes etc.
Some have even filled public interest litigation against the government charging that it failed
to discharge its constitutional duty to protect the countrys citizenry and uphold their right to
life.
It is understandable that the public that feels it deserves better insists on some
semblance of accountability and responsive governance from those who claim to represent
and speak for the masses. But it is also worth mentioning that the questioning of the process
of elections-the very exercise that is fundamental to democracy and the erosion of the
peoples faith in democratic institutions has serious implications. It could not only embolden
the authoritarian figures and their anti-democratic ambitions but might end up with no
institution retaining credibility or respectability to stand up to the practitioners of violence.
While anger can replace governments with another, it does not bring change. This can come
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through the democratic process. With all its distortions, there is no alternative to democracy
and elections.

Arrests

Ajmal Kasab was the only attacker captured alive by police and is currently under
arrest.Much of the information about the attackers' preparation, travel, and movements comes
from his confessions to the Mumbai police.
On 12 February 2009 Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik said that Pakistani national
Javed Iqbal, who acquired VoIP phones in Spain for the Mumbai attackers, and Hamad
Ameen Sadiq, who had facilitated money transfer for the attack, had been arrested. Two other
men known as Khan and Riaz, but whose full names were not given, were also arrested. Two
Pakistanis were arrested in Brescia, Italy on 21 November 2009, after being accused of
providing logistical support to the attacks.
In October 2009, two Chicago men were arrested and charged by the FBI for involvement in
terrorism abroad, David Coleman Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana. Headley, a
Pakistani-American, was charged in November 2009 with scouting locations for the 2008
Mumbai attacks.Headley is reported to have posed as an American Jew and is believed to
have links with terrorist outfits based in Bangladesh.On March 18, 2010, Headley plead
guilty to a dozen charges against him thereby avoiding going to trial.
In December 2009, the FBI charged Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed, a retired major in the
Pakistani army, for planning the terror attacks in association with Headley.
On January 15, 2010, in a successful snatch operation R&AW agents nabbed Sheikh Abdul
Khwaja, one of the handlers of the 26/11 attacks, chief of HuJI India operations and a most
wanted terror suspect in India, from Colombo, Sri Lanka and brought him over to Hyderabad,
India for formal arrest.
On May 6, 2010 Ajmal Kasab was sentenced to be hanged to death on charges of murder and
waging war on India.


Crisis Management at National Level

Crisis management is a critical organizational function. Failure can result in serious
harm to
Stakeholders, losses for an organization and its very existence. A crisis is defined as a
significant threat to operation that can have negative consequences if not handled properly. It
can create three related threats 1) Public safety 2) Financial loss 3) Reputation loss. It
damages the organization in terms of finance. The primary concern in a crisis has to be public
safety. If failure to address public safety intensifies the damage from crisis reputation and
financial concern are considered after public safety has been remedied.

In India, it is apparent that Crisis Management has never been given any serious thought
taking into consideration our knee jerk reactions to crises situations. There is therefore a
need to address impediments in the way of ensuring an effective crises management structure
in India and arrive at possible solutions.

Impediments such as over-centralisation in the decision making process, lack of political
will, poor policy formation and plan implementation, ill trained and ill equipped police force,
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inability to get actionable intelligence, poor coordination and slow response of multiple
agencies dealing with terrorism plague our country.

To counter the threat of terrorist attacks in cities and have an effective crises management
structure in place, it is recommend that a national counter terrorism plan is drawn to include
issues pertaining to preventive intelligence, preventive physical security and consequence
management. There is also an urgent need to establish a federal organisation such as a
Counter Terrorism Organisation (CTO) to deal with policy formulation, advising the
government, raising/equipping/training of CT forces, their deployment, co-ordination
amongst intelligence agencies and co-ordination of response in case of a strike.

The National Investigative Agency set up by the government should be made more
accountable and vested with powers to investigate a case based on suo motu cognisance of
the scheduled offence. It is recommended that a think tank is established to carry out in-depth
study of psychology and ideology of terror organisations and provide practical solutions .The
preventive physical security needs to be enhanced by improving physical security of
important installation, creation of integrated geospatial plan, implementation of police
reforms, setting up specialised counter terrorism training centres and creation of specialised
counter terrorist forces for each state.

Due to novel mechanisms used by terrorists in recent times, India's focus on coastal
and aerial security needs to be renewed. The employment of modern technological trends
such as biometric national identity (ID) card system, shoot around the corner weapons,
Kevlar bullet proof jackets, installation of CCTVs at vital areas and employment of spy
planes for increasing surveillance and neutralising terror threat must be given a serious
thought. A national data bank of all important installations to include schematics and
diagrammatic layouts needs to be compiled on priority. The consequence management
machinery of the country such as emergency response mechanism and synergy between
Army, Police and CTO needs further boost. A cool calculated and firm response along with
extra ordinary government and political arrangements will go a long way in achieving the
desired results.

Conclusion
From the above, following conclusions may be drawn.
Terrorism will for the foreseeable future be an urban phenomenon and big urban centres are
likely most at risk due to their locations and the high impact of targeting them.

The terrorist is a mercenary on a mission. His strategy is low tech with high impact. He will
always search for gaps in the system and cause mass causality. The Mumbai experience
shows that while weak urban institutions are a sure recipe for more terrorist attacks and
increasing causalities, strong and effective institutions have certainly a deterring effect both
on terrorist strikes and their consequent fatalities.

Little can be achieved unless every aspect of governance is brought up to par. For instance,
first rate commandos can not fight terrorism with a third-rate fire brigade. Similarly, the
national investigative and security agencies will not make any difference if ordinary city
policemen remain untrained and underequipped and if intelligence gathering at the level of
local police station remains abysmal. So it is vital to provide regular training to the city police
and equip them with right kind of weapons.
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The increasing frequency of terror attacks and the institutional inability to counter them
could seriously undermine the peoples faith in democratic institutions and those who run
those institutions. So in order to restore peoples faith in public institutions, the political class
should take urgent measures to increase their delivery capacity and to make these institutions
more credible, worthy and smart to successfully face the terrorist challenge.