An ontological argument is an argument based not on observation of the world, bu

t rather on reason alone. Specifically, the ontological argument reasons from th

e study of being (ontology).
The first and most popular form of this argument goes back to St. Anselm in the
11th century A.D.
Therefore, O Lord, You who give understanding to faith, grant me to understand to
the degree You know to be advantageous that You exist, as we believe, and that Y
ou are what we believe [You to be].
Indeed, we believe You to be something than which nothing greater can be thought
. Or is there, then, no such nature [as You], for the Fool has said in his heart
that God does not exist? (Psalms 13:1 & 52:1(14:1 & 53:1)).
But surely when this very same Fool hears my words something than which nothing g
reater can be thought, he understands what he hears. And what he understands is i
n his understanding, even if he does not understand [i.e., judge] it to exist. F
or that a thing is in the understanding is distinct from understanding that [thi
s] thing exists. For example, when a painter envisions what he is about to paint
: he indeed has in his understanding that which he has not yet made, but he does
not yet understand that it exists. But after he has painted [it]: he has in his
understanding that which he has made, and he understands that it exists. So eve
n the Fool is convinced that something than which nothing greater can be thought
is at least in his understanding; for when he hears of this [being], he underst
ands [what he hears], and whatever is understood is in the understanding.
But surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be only in the und
erstanding. For if it were only in the understanding, it could be thought to exi
st also in reality something which is greater [than existing only in the understa
nding]. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought were only in
the understanding, then that than which a greater cannot be thought would be tha
t than which a greater can be thought! But surely this [conclusion] is impossibl
e.
Hence, without doubt, something than which a greater cannot be thought exists bo
th in the understanding and in reality.
This can be restructured in the form of a formal argument as follows.
Premise 1: Either God exists in the understanding but not in realit
y, or God exists in the understanding and in rea
lity.
Premise 2: If God exists in the understanding but not in reality, t
hen we can conceive of a thing greater than God (
a thing different in virtue of existing in the
understanding and in reality, but otherwise like God).
Premise 3: It is not the case that we can conceive of a thing great
er than God.
Conclusion: God exists in the undersatnding and in reality.
The first test for the argument is that of validity. In order to evaluate this,
we must consider the logical form of the argument, which can be made simpler by
replacing some of the key phrases with symbols.
Premise 1: X or Y
Premise 2: If X, then Z
Premise 3: Not Z
Conclusion: Y
Certainly, it is impossible that the premises be true and the conclusion false.
If it is not the case that Z (premise 3), then it must also must not be the case
that X (premise 2), so it must be the case that Y (premise 1).Hence the argumen
t is valid.
Whether the argument is sound and potentialy convincing is a more difficult matt
er to determine, and requires careful analysis of each premise in turn.
The statement in premise 1
"God exists in the understanding but not in reality"
can be interpreted as
"God can be conceived of, or imagined to exist, but he doesn't exist".
Interpreted this way, the argument becomes.
Premise 1: Either we can conceive of God existing, but he doesn't e
xist. Or we can conceive of God existing, and he does exist.
Premise 2: If we can conceive of God existing but he doesn't exist,
then we can conceive of a thing greater than him,
a thing just like him, but existing.
Premise 3: It's not the case that we can conceive of a thing greate
r than God.
Conclusion: We can conceive of God existing, and he does exist.
Premise 1 must be true, provided we can accept that it is possible to conceive o
f God existing. However, premise 2 seems to be manifestly false by suggesting th
at God both does not exist amd does exist. So, in this form, the argument is uns
ound and certainly not persuasive to the reasonable agnostic.
Another way of interpreting the statement in premise 1 is
"there is a God and he has the property of existing in the understanding
, but he lacks the property of existing in reality."
Interpreted this way, the argument becomes.
Premise 1: Either there's a God with the property of existing in th
e understanding, but lacking the property of
existing in reality. Or there's a God with both properties.
Premise 2: If there is a God with the property of existing in the u
nderstanding, but lacking the property of existing
in reality, then we can conceive of a thing greater than
him, a thing with the property of existing in reality, but otherwise just like h
im.
Premise 3: It's not the case that we can conceive of a thing greate
r than God.
Conclusion: There is a God with the property of existing in the unde
rstanding and, crucially, the property of existing in real
ity.
In this case, Premise 2 certainly seems true. However, Premise 1 must be false,
since the reasonable agnostic must consider the possibility that God does not ex
ist. So, in this form also, the argument is unsound and certainly not persuasive
to the reasonable agnostic.