A Peace To End All Peace The Fall of The Ottoman Empire and The Creation of The Modern Middle East

A L S O BY D A V I D F R O M K I N
The Independence of Nations

The Question of Government
DAVID FROMKI N
A PEACE TO
END ALL PEACE
T H E F A L L O F T H E O T T O M A N E M P I R E
A N D T H E C R E A T I O N O F T H E M O D E R N
M I D D L E E A S T
AN OWL B OOK
HENRY H O L T AND COMP ANY
NEW YORK
Henry Holt and Company, L L C
Publishers since 1866
115 West 18th Street
New York, New York 10011
Henry Holt is a registered trademark
of Henry Holt and Company, L L C .
Copyri ght 1989 by Davi d Fromki n
All rights reserved.
Di stri buted i n Canada by H. B. Fenn and Company Lt d.
Li brary of Congress Catal ogi ng-i n-Publ i cati on Dat a
Fromki n, Davi d.
A peace to end all peace.
Bibliography : p.
Includes index.
I S BN 0-8050-6884-8
1. Great Bri tai nForei gn rel ati onsMi ddl e East. 2. Mi ddl e East Forei gn
rel ati onsGreat Britain. 3. Mi ddl e EastPol i ti cs and government1914-1945.
I. Ti tl e.
DS63. 2. G7F76 1989 327. 41056 88-34727
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Fi rst publ i shed in hardcover in 1989 by Henry Holt and Company
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13 15 16 14
"After 'the war to end war' they seem
to have been pretty successful in Pari s
at maki ng a 'Peace to end Peace. ' "
Archi bal d Wavell (later Fi el d Marshal Earl
Wavel l ), an officer who served under Al l enby
i n the Pal esti ne campai gn, comment i ng on
the treaties bri ngi ng the Fi rst World War
to an end
C O N T E N T S
List of Illustrations and Maps 10
Photo Credits 11
Acknowledgments 12
A Note on Spelling 14
Introduction 15
P ART I At the Cros s roads of Hi story
1 T HE L AS T DAYS OF OLD EUROPE 23
2 T HE LEGACY OF T HE GREAT GAME I N ASI A 26
3 T HE MI DDLE EAS T BEFORE T HE WAR 33
4 T HE YOUNG T U R KS URGENTLY S E E K AN ALLY 4 5
5 WI NSTON CHURCHI LL ON T HE EVE OF WAR 51
6 CHURCHI LL S EI ZES TURKEY' S WARSHI PS 54
7 AN I NTRI GUE AT T HE S UBLI ME PORTE 62
P A R T I I Ki t chener of Khar t oum Looks Ahead
8 KI TCHENER T AKE S COMMAND
9 KI TCHENER' S LI EUTENANTS
1 0 KI TCHENER S E T S OUT TO CAPTURE I SLAM
11 I NDI A P ROTES TS
1 2 T HE MAN I N T HE MI DDLE
P ART I I I Bri tai n i s Drawn into the
Mi ddl e East ern Quagmi re
1 3 T HE T URKI S H COMMANDERS ALMOS T LOS E T HE WAR
1 4 KI TCHENER ALLOWS BRI TAI N TO ATTACK TURKEY
1 5 ON TO VI CTORY AT T HE DARDANELLES
16 RUSSI A' S GRAB FOR TURKEY
17 DEFI NI NG BRI TAI N' S GOALS I N T HE MI DDLE EAS T
18 AT T HE NARROWS OF FORTUNE
19 T HE WARRI ORS
2 0 T HE POLI TI CI ANS
2 1 T HE L I GHT THAT FAI LED
79
88
96
106
111
119
124
130
137
146
150
155
159
163
8 C O N T E N T S
22 CREATI NG T HE ARAB BUREAU 168
23 MAKI NG PROMI SES TO T HE ARABS 173
24 MAKI NG PROMI SES TO T HE EUROPEAN ALLI ES 188
2 5 TURKEY' S TRI UMPH AT T HE T I GRI S 200
P ART I V Subversi on
26 BEHI ND ENEMY LI NES 207
27 KI TCHENER' S L AS T MI SSI ON 216
28 HUSSEI N' S REVOLT 218
P ART V Th e Allies at the Nadi r of Thei r Fort unes
29 T HE FALL OF THE ALLI ED GOVERNMENTS: BRI TAI N AND FRANCE 231
30 T HE OVERTHROW OF T HE CZAR 239
P ART VI New Worl ds and Promi sed La nds
31 T HE NEW WORLD 253
32 LLOYD GEORGE' S ZI ONI SM 263
33 TOWARD T HE BALFOUR DECLARATI ON 276
34 T HE PROMI SED LAND 284
P A R T VI I Invadi ng the Mi ddl e Eas t
35 J ERUS ALEM FOR CHRI S TMAS 305
36 T HE ROAD TO DAMASCUS 315
37 T HE B AT T L E FOR SYRI A 332
P ART VI I I The Spoi l s of Victory
38 T HE PARTI NG OF T HE WAYS 351
39 BY T HE SHORES OF TROY ' 363
P ART I X The Ti de Goe s Out
4 0 T HE T I CKI NG CLOCK 383
41 BETRAYAL 389
42 T HE UNREAL WORLD OF T HE PEACE CONFERENCES 403
P A R T X St or m over Asi a
43 T HE TROUBLES BEGI N: 19191921 415
44 EGYPT: T HE WI NTER OF 19181919 417
45 AFGHANI STAN: T HE SPRI NG OF 1919 421
46 ARABIA: T HE SPRI NG OF 1919 424
47 TURKEY: JANUARY 1920 427
C O N T E N T S 9
48 SYRI A AND LEBANON: T HE S PRI NG AND SUMMER OF 1920 435
49 EAS TERN PALES TI NE ( TRANSJ ORDAN) : 1920 441
50 PALES TI NEARABS AND J EWS: 1920 4 45
51 MESOPOTAMI A ( IRAQ) : 1920 449
52 PERSI A ( I RAN) : 1920 4 5 5
P A R T XI Rus s i a Ret urns t o the Mi ddl e East
53 UNMAS KI NG BRI TAI N' S ENEMI ES 465
5 4 T HE S OVI ET CHALLENGE I N T HE MI DDLE EAS T 471
55 MOSCOW' S GOALS 475
56 A DEATH IN BUKHARA 480
P A R T XI I Th e Mi ddl e East ern Settl ement of 1922
57 WI NSTON CHURCHI LL T AKE S CHARGE 493
58 CHURCHI LL AND T HE QUES TI ON OF P ALES TI NE 515
59 T HE ALLI ANCES COME APART 530
60 A GRE E K TRAGEDY 540
6 1 T HE S E T T L E ME N T OF T HE MI DDLE EASTERN QUES TI ON 558
Notes 569
Bibliography 607
Index 621
L I S T O F I L L U S T R A T I O N S A N D M A P S
1 Lord Kitchener
2 Sir Mark Sykes
3 Enver
4 Talaat
5 Djemal
6 Crowds gather outside the Sublime Porte, 1913
7 Turkish soldiers at Dardanelles fort, 1915
8 Allied fleet at entrance to Dardanelles
9 Pictorial map of the Dardanelles
10 H. M. S. Cornwallis
11 Anzac beach
12 Australian troops at Gallipoli
13 Winston Churchill
14 Russian troop column
15 Russian advance-guard in Turkey, 1916
16 Russian occupation of Erzerum
17 Russian troops in Trebizond
18 British camel column in the Jordan Valley
19 British survey party in Palestine
20 Transport camels
21 View of Beersheba
22 The Hejaz flag
23 Prince Feisal
24 Ki ng Hussein of the Hejaz
25 T. E. Lawrence with Lowell Thomas
26 David Ben-Gurion
27 Vladimir Jabotinsky
28 Chaim Weizmann with Lord Balfour
29 Union Jack hoisted above Basra
30 Street scene in Baghdad
31 Reading of General Allenby's proclamation of martial law, 1917
32 Australian Light Horse entering Damascus, 1918
33 General Allenby enters Aleppo, 1919
34 Ottoman soldiers surrender, November 1918
35 British sentry, Constantinople, 1920
36 Admiral Calthorpe's flagship, 1918
10
L I S T O F I L L U S T R A T I O N S A N D MA P S
11
37 Woodrow Wilson
38 Lloyd George
39 Signing of the Treaty of Sevres, 1920
40 British bluejackets in Constantinople, 1920
41 French quarter of Smyrna after the fall of the city, 1922
42 French troops enter Damascus, 1920
43 Bodies of Greek soldiers in a Turkish field, 1922
44 Mustapha Kemal
45 Reza Khan
46 Amanullah Khan
47 Ki ng Fuad of Egypt
48 Zaghlul Pasha
49 Sons of King Hussein of the Hejaz: Feisal, King of Iraq; Abdullah,
Emir of Transjordan; and Ali, later briefly to be Ki ng of the Hejaz
50 Ibn Saud with Sir Percy Cox and Gertrude Bell
Photo Credits
1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 80 are
reproduced courtesy of The Illustrated London News Picture Library,
London.
2, 5, 25 , 45 , 49 are reproduced courtesy of UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos,
New York.
26 is reproduced courtesy of the Bettmann Archive, New York.
27 and 28 are reproduced courtesy of the Zionist Archives and Library.
Maps (Between pages 20 and 21)
The Middle East in 1914
The Campaign in Central Asia
The Greek-Turkish War
The Middle East in the 1920s
Cartography by Sue Lawes
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
The idea of wri ti ng this book came to me in the course of a conver-
sation with Ti mot hy Di cki nson i n whi ch he asked my views about
the history of the Mi ddl e Eas t . Lat er I put my i deas in written f orm.
Jas on Epst ei n suggest ed that the book be st ruct ured around a per-
sonality. I took his suggest i on and chose Winston Churchi l l . Now I
cannot think of how the book coul d have been st ruct ured any other
way.
As books on my subject appeared i n London, my friend and
col l eague Robert L. Si gmon woul d buy t hem for me and send t hem
to me by ai rmai l . And Professor St anl ey Mal l ach of the Uni versi ty
of Wi sconsi n-Mi l waukee hel ped me find books I coul d not find
el sewhere.
Alain Si l vera, Professor of Hi st ory at Bryn Mawr Col l ege and a
lifelong fri end, kept me abreast of the latest schol arshi p by suppl yi ng
me with articles from l earned j ournal s as well as val uabl e i deas,
i nformati on, and suggest i ons. He read and re-read the manuscri pt
and offered detai l ed margi nal correcti ons and comment s. He showed
the manuscri pt al so t o hi s Ph. D. student Kay Patterson, who offered
extensi ve and careful comment s . At my request, Professor Ernest
Gel l ner of Cambri dge Uni versi ty kindly arranged for me to meet
Professor El i e Kedouri e, whom I wanted to persuade to be the other
academi c reader of my manuscri pt . Professor Kedouri e read the
manuscri pt and gave me the benefit of his i mmense erudi ti on and
authori tati ve comment s. I am grateful to hi m, and to Mrs Kedouri e
for her ki ndness and pati ence i n put t i ng up with my demands on her
husband' s ti me. Dr Ni chol as Ri zopoul os read the Greek- Turki s h
epi sodes and offered val uabl e suggest i ons. I hope I need not add
that Professor Kedouri e, Professor Si l vera, Dr Ri zopoul os, and Mrs
Patterson are not responsi bl e in any way for the opi ni ons and con-
cl usi ons I express in the book. Moreover, the manuscri pt has been
extensively rewritten si nce they saw it, so there may well be factual
or other st at ement s in it they woul d have advised me to change.
Academi c readers, in parti cul ar, will observe in readi ng the book
12
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S 13
that I owe an i mmense intellectual debt to the books and essays of
many other s chol ars more, i ndeed, than there i s space to name
here. Chi ef among those to whom I am thus i ndebted are El i e
Kedouri e, for his masterful st udi es of Mi ddl e East ern and Bri ti sh
history and pol i ti cs, and Mart i n Gi l bert , whose great life of Wi nston
Churchi l l is essential to anyone wri ti ng about this peri od. I have
leaned heavily on Gi l bert ' s vol umes as everyone now must . And I
was i nspi red by the exampl e of Howard Sachar to believe that a
history of the Mi ddl e Eas t can be wri t t enas I was at t empt i ng to
doon a very broad scal e.
Samuel Cl ayt on, the son of Si r Gi l bert Cl ayton, was kind enough
to spend the best part of an afternoon talking to me about his father.
My thanks to hi m, and to his wife, the La dy Mary, for their hospi -
tality i n havi ng me to tea at Kens i ngt on Pal ace.
In the course of my research i n archi ves i n Bri tai n and el sewhere
over the years, I have benefited f rom the ki ndness and pati ence of
such unfailingly helpful l i brari ans as Les l ey Forbes of the Uni versi ty
of Dur ham, Cl i ve Hughes of the Imperi al War Mus e um, Nor man
Hi gson of the Uni versi ty of Hul l , Al an Bell of Rhodes Hous e,
Oxf ord, and Gi l l i an Grant of the Mi ddl e East Cent re, St Antony' s
Col l ege, Oxf ord. My heartfelt thanks to t hem all.
I owe an i mmense debt of grat i t ude to Rob Cowl ey, my editor at
Henry Hol t and an authority on the Fi rst World War, for his knowl-
edgeabl e and helpful suggest i ons and for his constant encouragement
and ent husi asm. Mari an Wood at Henry Hol t and Sara Mengug at
Andre Deut sch saw me through the publ i cati on process with unfail-
ing cheer and awesome efficiency.
For permi ssi on to reproduce quot at i ons from document s I am
i ndebted to the fol l owi ng:
Th e Cl erk of the Records , Hous e of Lo r ds Record Office, for
permission to quote from the Ll oyd George Papers in the Beaverbrook
Col l ecti on in the custody of the Hous e of Lor ds Record Office;
t he Sudan Archi ve of the Uni versi ty of Dur ham, on whose
extensi ve collection I have drawn freely;
Mr s Theres a Seari ght , and the Rhodes Hous e Li brary, for
permi ssi on to quot e from the di ari es of Ri chard Mei nert zhagen;
t he Brynmor Jones Li brary of the Uni versi ty of Hul l and Si r
Tat t on Sykes, Bart . , for permi ssi on to quot e from the papers of Si r
Mark Sykes ;
t he Mi ddl e Eas t Cent re, St Antony' s Col l ege, Oxf ord, for per-
mi ssi on to quot e from their extensi ve collection, i ncl udi ng the papers
of Si r Hubert Young, T. E. Lawrence, Lor d Al l enby, William Yal e,
F. R. Somerset , C. D. Brunt on, and the Ki ng Fei sal and Bal four
Decl arati on fi l es;
t he Warden and Fel l ows of New Col l ege, Oxf ord, for per-
14 A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
mi ssi on t o quot e from Lo r d Mi l ner' s f i l es;
t he Trus t ees of the Li ddel l Hart Cent re for Mi l i tary Archi ves at
Ki ng' s Col l ege, London, for permi ssi on t o quot e f rom Lo r d Al l enby' s
papers.
Trans cri pt s / Trans l at i ons of Crown copyri ght records i n the Publ i c
Record Office appear by permi ssi on of the Control l er of H. M.
Stati onery Office.
For access to document ary materi al , I wish also to thank the
Bri ti sh Li brary, London; Camel l i a Invest ment s, Pi c, London; the
Wei zmann Archi ves, Rehovot , Israel ; the Bodl ei an Li brary, Oxf ord;
the Imperi al War Mus e um, London; the Hought on Li brary of
Harvard Uni versi t y; and the New York Publ i c Li brary.
A Note on Spelling
In spel l i ng Turki s h, Arabi c, and Persi an names and titles, I have
used whatever form of spel l i ng I am most familiar with f rom my
readi ng over the years. So there i s no syst em or consi stency i n it; but
I woul d gues s that the spel l i ngs most fami l i ar to me will be the most
fami l i ar to the general reader as well.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Th e Mi ddl e Eas t , as we know i t f rom today' s headl i nes, emerged
f rom deci si ons made by the Allies duri ng and after the Fi rst Worl d
War. In the pages that follow I set out to tell in one vol ume the
wi de-rangi ng story of how and whyand out of what hopes and
fears, loves and hat reds, mi stakes and mi sunderst andi ngst hese
deci si ons were made.
Russi an and French official account s of what they were doi ng i n
the Mi ddl e Eas t at that ti me were, not unnatural l y, works of propa-
ganda; Bri ti sh official account s and even the later memoi rs of the
officials concernedwere untruthful too. Bri ti sh officials who pl ayed
a major role in the maki ng of these deci si ons provi ded a versi on of
events that was, at best, edi ted and, at worst, fictitious. The y sought
to hi de their meddl i ng i n Mos l em rel i gi ous affairs ( pages 96105)
and to pretend that they had entered the Mi ddl e Eas t as pat rons of
Arab i ndependencea cause in whi ch they di d not in fact bel i eve.
Moreover, the Arab Revol t that f ormed the centerpi ece of their narra-
tive occurred not so much in reality as in the wonderful i magi nati on
of T. E. Lawrence, a teller of fantasti c tales whom the Ameri can
showman Lowel l Tho ma s t ransf ormed into "Lawrence of Arabi a. "
Th e truth has come out over the course of decades i n bi ts and
pi eces, and now, toward the end, i n one great heap, with the openi ng
of archi ves of hitherto secret official document s and pri vate papers.
It seemed to mei n 1979, when I started my researcht hat we had
arri ved at a point where at last it woul d be possi bl e to tell the real
story of what happened; hence this book.
Duri ng the past decade I have worked in the archi ves, st udi ed the
literature, and put together the fi ndi ngs of modern schol arshi p to
show the pi cture that is f ormed when the pi eces of the puzzl e are
assembl ed. Th e aut hors whose works I cite in the Not es at the end of
the book made most of the new di scoveri es, t hough I have made
some too: what the Young Tur k l eaders may have done i n order to
persuade the Germans to ally with t hem on 1 Augus t 1914 ( pages
606), for exampl e, and why the Arab negoti ator al - Faruqi may
15
16
I N T R O D U C T I O N
have drawn a line t hrough inland Syri a as the frontier of Arab
national i ndependence ( page 178).
The n, too, I may be the first to di sentangl e, or at any rate to draw
attention to, the many mi sunderst andi ngs which in 1916 set off a
hi dden tug-of-war within the Bri ti sh bureaucracy between Si r Mark
Sykes, London' s desk man i n charge of the Mi ddl e Eas t , and his
friend Gi l bert Cl ayt on, the head of intelligence i n Cai ro ( page
193). I found that neither Sykes nor Cl ayton ever realized that
Sykes, i n the 1916 negoti ati ons with France, mi sunderst ood what
Cl ayton had asked hi m to do. Sykes di d the exact opposi t e, bel i evi ng
in all i nnocence that he was carryi ng out Cl ayton' s wishes, while
Cl ayt on felt sure that Sykes had knowingly let hi m down. Si nce
Cl ayton never menti oned the mat t er to hi m, Sykes remai ned unaware
that differences had ari sen between hi m and his col l eague. So i n the
mont hs and years that followed, Sykes mi stakenl y as s umed that he
and Cl ayton were still at one, when in fact within the bureaucracy
Cl ayton had become an adversary of his pol i cyand perhaps the
most dangerous one.
Get t i ng the bureaucrat i c pol i ti cs ri ght and I hope that is what I
have donehas been one of my chief endeavors. But I have tried to
do more than clarify specific processes and epi sodes. Th e book i s
meant to gi ve a panorami c view of what was happeni ng to the Mi ddl e
East as a whole, and to show that its reshapi ng was a function of
Great Power pol i ti cs at a uni que t i me: the exact moment when the
waves of western European i mperi al expansi oni sm fl owed forward to
hit their hi gh-water mark, and then felt the first powerful t ugs of
the tide that was goi ng to pull t hem back.
Th e Mi ddl e Eas t , as I concei ve it, means not only Egypt , Israel ,
Iran, Turkey, and the Arab states of Asi a, but also Sovi et Central
Asi a and Af ghani st an: the entire arena i n which Bri tai n, from the
Napol eoni c Wars onward, fought to shield the road to Indi a from
the onsl aught s fi rst of France and t hen of Russi a i n what came to be
known as "the Great Ga me . "
Other studi es of the Fi rst Worl d War and its aftermath in the
regi on have t ended to deal with a si ngl e country or area. Even those
deal i ng with European policy i n the Arab or Turki s h Eas t as a whole
have focused solely, for exampl e, on the role of Bri tai n, or of Bri tai n
and France. But I pl ace the creati on of the modern Mi ddl e East in a
wi der f ramework: I see what happened as the cul mi nati on of the
ni neteenth-century Great Ga me , and therefore show Russi a, too,
pl ayi ng a l eadi ng role in the story. It was in whole or in part because
of Rus s i a that Ki t chener initiated a Bri ti sh alliance with the Arab
Mos l em worl d ( pages 978) ; that Bri tai n and France, though they
woul d have preferred to preserve the Turki s h Empi re i n the regi on,
deci ded i nstead to occupy and parti ti on the Mi ddl e East ( pages
13742); that the Forei gn Office publ i cl y procl ai med Bri ti sh support
I N T R O D U C T I O N 17
for the establ i shment of a Jewi s h Nati onal Home in Pal esti ne ( pages
18493); and that, after the war, a number of Bri ti sh officials felt
that Bri tai n was obl i ged to hold the line i n the Mi ddl e Eas t agai nst
crusadi ng Bol shevi sm ( pages 4658) . Yet, so far as I know, this i s
the first book to tell the story as that of the Mi ddl e Eas t in the wi dest
sense: the Great Ga me sense, i n whi ch Rus s i a pl ays a central rol e.
As you will see when you read the book, Mi ddl e East ern person-
alities, ci rcumst ances, and political cul tures do not figure a great deal
in the narrati ve that follows, except when I suggest the outl i nes and
di mensi ons of what European pol i ti ci ans were i gnori ng when they
made their deci si ons. Thi s i s a book about the deci si on-maki ng
process, and i n the 191422 peri od, Europeans and Ameri cans were
the only ones seated around the tabl e when the deci si ons were made.
It was an era i n whi ch Mi ddl e East ern countri es and frontiers were
fabri cated i n Europe. I raq and what we now call Jor dan, for exampl e,
were Bri ti sh i nventi ons, lines drawn on an empt y map by Bri ti sh
politicians after the Fi rst Worl d War; while the boundari es of Saudi
Arabi a, Kuwai t , and Iraq were establ i shed by a Bri ti sh civil servant
i n 1922, and the frontiers between Mos l ems and Chri st i ans were
drawn by France i n Syri a- Lebanon and by Rus s i a on the borders of
Armeni a and Sovi et Azerbai j an.
Th e European powers at that ti me bel i eved they coul d change
Mosl em Asi a in the very f undament al s of its political exi stence, and
in their at t empt to do so i nt roduced an artificial state syst em into the
Mi ddl e Eas t that has made it into a region of countri es that have not
become nati ons even t oday. Th e basi s of political life i n t he Mi ddl e
Eas t rel i gi onwas called into questi on by the Rus s i ans , who pro-
posed communi s m, and by the Bri ti sh, who proposed nati onal i sm or
dynasti c loyalty, in its pl ace. Khomei ni ' s Iran in the Shi ' i te worl d
and the Mosl em Brot herhood i n Egypt , Syri a, and el sewhere i n the
Sunni worl d keep that i ssue alive. Th e French government , which i n
the Mi ddl e Eas t did allow religion to be the basi s of pol i ti cseven of
its ownchampi oned one sect agai nst the others; and that, too, is an
i ssue kept alive, notabl y in the communal strife that has ravaged
Lebanon i n the 1970s and 1980s.
Th e year 1922 seems to me to have been the point of no return in
setting the vari ous cl ans of the Mi ddl e Eas t on their collision courses,
so that the especi al interest and exci tement of the years with which
this book is concerned, 1914 t hrough 1922, is that they were the
creative, formati ve years, i n whi ch everythi ng seemed (and may
i ndeed have been) possi bl e. It was a ti me when Europeans , not
i mpl ausi bl y, bel i eved Arab and Jewi s h nati onal i sm to be natural
allies; when the French, not the Arabs , were the dangerous enemi es
of the Zionist movement ; and when oil was not an i mportant factor
in the politics of the Mi ddl e Eas t .
By 1922, however, the choices had narrowed and the courses had
18 I N T R O D U C T I O N
been set; the Mi ddl e Eas t had started al ong a road that was to l ead to
the endl ess wars (between Israel and her nei ghbors, among others,
and between rival mi l i ti as i n Le banon) and to the al ways-escal ati ng
acts of terrori sm (hi jacki ng, assassi nati on, and random massacre)
that have been a characteri sti c feature of international life in the
1970s and 1980s. The s e are a part of the legacy of the history
recounted in the pages that follow.
Two stori es are told i n the book and then merge into one. Th e
first begi ns with Lo r d Ki t chener' s deci si on at the outset of the Fi rst
Worl d War to partition the Mi ddl e Eas t after the war between
Bri tai n, France, and Rus s i a, and with his appoi nt ment of Si r Mark
Sykes to work out the detai l s. Th e book then follows Sykes duri ng
the wart i me years, as he worked out Bri tai n' s bl uepri nt for the
Mi ddl e East ' s future. It goes on to show that, i n l arge part, the
program Sykes had formul ated was realized after the war, and was
embodi ed i n document s formally adopt ed (for the most part) i n
1922.
Thi s was the story that I originally set out to wri te. It was meant
to show that if you put together a number of the document s and
deci si ons of 1922the Al l enby Decl arat i on establ i shi ng nomi nal in-
dependence for Egypt , the Pal esti ne Mandat e and the Churchi l l
White Paper for Pal esti ne (from which Israel and Jor dan s pri ng) , the
Bri ti sh treaty establ i shi ng the st at us of I raq, the French Mandat e for
Syri a and Lebanon, Bri tai n' s pl aci ng new monarchs on the thrones
of Egypt and I raq and sponsori ng a new princely ruler for (what was
to become) Jor dan, the Russi an procl amati on of a Sovi et Uni on in
which Rus s i a woul d re-establ i sh her rul e i n Mosl em Central As i a
you woul d see that when taken together they amount ed to an overall
settl ement of the Mi ddl e East ern Quest i on. Moreover, this settl ement
of 1922 (as I call it, because most of its el ements cl uster in and
around that year) fl owed from the warti me negoti ati ons whi ch Si r
Mark Sykes had conduct ed with France and Russi a to agree upon a
parti ti on of the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t between them. Th e French
recei ved a bit less than had been agreed, and the Russi ans were only
al l owed to keep what they had al ready taken before the war, but
the pri nci pl e of al l owi ng t hem to share with Bri tai n in the parti ti on
and rule of Mosl em Asi a was respect ed. Within the Bri ti sh sphere,
all went accordi ng to the Sykes pl an: Bri tai n ruled for the most
part indirectly, as protector of nomi nal l y i ndependent Arab mon-
archi es, and procl ai med herself the sponsor of both Arab and Jewi sh
nati onal i sm.
In addi ti on to establ i shi ng that there had been a settlement of 1922
in the Mi ddl e East , I show that our quarrel with that settlement (to
the extent that with hi ndsi ght we woul d have desi gned the new
Mi ddl e East differently) is not what we somet i mes believe it to be. It
I N T R O D U C T I O N 19
is not even that the Bri t i sh government at that ti me failed to devi se a
settl ement that woul d satisfy the needs and desi res of the peopl es of
the Mi ddl e Eas t ; i t i s that they were tryi ng to do somet hi ng al together
different. For Lo r d Ki t chener and his del egated agent Mark Sykes
the Mi ddl e East ern Quest i on was what it had been for more than a
century: where woul d the French frontier i n the Mi ddl e Eas t be
drawn and, more i mport ant , where woul d the Russi an frontier i n the
Mi ddl e Eas t be drawn?
That , as I say, is the story which I set out to tell. But in the telling
of it, another emerged: the story of how, between 1914 and 1922,
Bri tai n changed, and Bri ti sh officials and politicians changed their
mi nds, so that by 1922when they formal l y commi t t ed themsel ves
to their program for remaki ng the Mi ddl e Eas t t hey no l onger
believed in it. In the course of the narrati ve we see the Bri ti sh
government of 1914, 1915, and 1916, whi ch wel comed a Rus s i an and
a French presence in the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t , turn into a postwar
government that regarded Rus s i a i n the Mi ddl e East as a danger and
France in the regi on as a di saster. We see the pro- Zi oni st s of 1917
turn into the anti -Zi oni sts of 1921 and 1922; and the enthusi asts for
Fei sal ' s Arab Movement turn agai nst Fei sal as unt rust wort hy and
agai nst his brother Abdul l ah as hopel essl y ineffectual. Above all, we
see Bri tai n embarki ng on a vast new imperial enterpri se in the
Mi ddl e Eas t one that woul d take generati ons to achi eve, i f its object
were to remake the Mi ddl e Eas t as Indi a had been remadeat the
very ti me that the Bri ti sh publ i c was t urni ng to a policy of scal i ng
down overseas commi t ment s and was deci di ng i t wanted no more
i mperi al advent ures.
It may well be that the crisis of political civilization that the
Mi ddl e Eas t endures today st ems not merel y from Bri tai n' s dest ruc-
tion of the ol d order in the region in 1918, and her deci si ons in 1922
about how it shoul d be repl aced, but al so from the lack of convi cti on
she brought i n subsequent years to the program of i mposi ng the
settl ement of 1922 to which she was pl edged.
Th e book I i ntended to write was only about how Eur ope went
about changi ng the Mi ddl e Eas t ; the book that emerged was also
about how Europe changed at the s ame ti me, and about how the two
movement s i nteracted.
Ll oyd George, Woodrow Wi l son, Ki t chener of Khar t oum,
Lawrence of Arabi a, Leni n, St al i n, and Mussol i ni men who hel ped
shape the twentieth cent uryare among those who pl ayed l eadi ng
roles in the drama that unfol ds in A Peace to End All Peace, stri vi ng
to remake the worl d in the light of their own vi si on. Wi nston
Churchi l l , above all, presi des over the pages of this book: a domi -
nating figure whose geni us ani mat ed events and whose l arger-than-
life personality colored and enl i vened t hem.
20 I N T R O D U C T I O N
For Churchi l l , as for Ll oyd George, Wilson, Leni n, St al i n, and
the ot hersand for such men as J a n Chri sti an Smut s , Le o Amery,
and Lo r d Mi l nert he Mi ddl e Eas t was an essential component or a
testi ng area of their worl dvi ew. Thei r vision of the future of the
Mi ddl e Eas t was central to their i dea of the sort of twentieth century
they passi onatel y bel i eved woul d or shoul d emerge as a phoeni x from
the ashes of the Fi rst Worl d War. In that sense, the history recounted
in the pages that follow is the story of how the twentieth century was
created, as well as the modern Mi ddl e Eas t .
P ART I
AT THE
CROSSROADS OF
HISTORY
1
THE LAST DAYS OF OLD EUROPE
i
In the late spri ng of 1912, the graceful yacht Enchantress put out to
sea from rainy Genoa for a Medi t erranean pl easure cruise-a carefree
crui se wi thout itinerary or t i me- schedul e. Th e ski es bri ghtened as
she st eamed sout h. Soon she was bat hed i n sunshi ne.
Enchantress bel onged to the Bri ti sh Admi ral t y. Th e accommo-
dati on aboard was as grand as that on the Ki ng' s own yacht. Th e
crew numbered nearly a hundred and served a dozen or so guest s,
who had come from Bri tai n via Pari s, where they had stayed at the
Ri t z. Among t hem were the Bri ti sh Pri me Mi ni ster, Herbert As qui t h;
his brilliant 25-year-ol d daught er Vi ol et; the civilian head of the
Admi ral t y, Wi nston Churchi l l ; and Churchi l l ' s smal l party of family
members and cl ose col l eagues. In the final enchanted years before
the Fi rst World War brought their worl d to an end, they were as
pri vi l eged a group as any the worl d has known.
Violet Asqui t h kept a di ary of her j ourney. In Pompei i she and her
fri ends wandered "down the l ong lovely silent streets" that once had
pul sat ed with the life of Imperi al Rome ; now, she noted, those once
lively streets were overgrown with grass and veget at i on.
1
In Si ci l y
her party cl i mbed to the rui ns of an ancient Greek fortress and,
ami dst wild l avender and herbs, had a picnic l unch, sitting on bl ocks
of stone f rom the fallen wal l s. Lat er they went hi gher still to watch
the sunset over the sea f rom what remai ned of the old Greek theater
on the hei ghts. The r e they lay "among wild t hyme and hummi ng
bees and watched the sea changi ng from bl ue to flame and then to
cool j ade green as the sun dropped into i t and the st ars came out . "
2
Rotati ons and revol uti onsthe heavenly movement s that cause
day to become ni ght and spri ng/ summer to become aut umn/ wi nt er
were reflected in her observati ons of the l andscape and its l i ghti ng;
but a sense of the mortal i ty of civilizations and of political powers
and domi nati ons di d not overshadow Violet's cheerful vision of her
youthful voyage to the l ands of anti qui ty. Her father presi ded over
23
24 A T T H E C R O S S R O A D S O F H I S T O R Y
an empi re roughl y twice as l arge as the Roman Empi re at its zeni th;
she may well have t hought that her father's empi re woul d last twice
as l ong too.
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster, an enthusi asti c si ghtseer, was i nseparabl e
from his Baedeker gui debook. An ardent classicist, he read and
wrote with ease and pl easure i n cl assi cal Greek and Lat i n. Wi nston
Churchi l l , no schol ar of anci ent l anguages or literature, was as jeal ous
as a child. "Thos e Greeks and Romans , " he protested, "they are so
overrated. The y only sai d everythi ng first. I've sai d just as good
thi ngs myself. But they got i n before me. "
3
Violet noted that, "It was in vai n that my father poi nted out that
the worl d had been goi ng on for qui t e a l ong ti me before the Greeks
and Romans appeared upon the scene. "
4
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster was an
intellectual, aware that the trend among hi stori ans of the ancient
worl d was away f rom an excl usi ve concern with the European cul-
tures of the Greeks and Romans . Th e Ameri can professor J a me s
Henry Breast ed had won wi de accept ance for the thesi s that modern
ci vi l i zati onthat is, European ci vi l i zati onhad its begi nni ngs not
i n Greece and Rome , but i n the Mi ddl e Eas t : i n Egypt and Judae a,
Babyl oni a and Assyri a, Sume r and Akkad. Ci vi l i zati onwhose roots
stretched t housands of years into the past, into the soil of those
Mi ddl e East ern monarchi es that l ong ago had crumbl ed into dus t
was seen to have cul mi nat ed i n the gl obal supremacy of the Euro-
pean peopl es, their i deal s, and their way of life.
In the early years of the twentieth century, when Churchi l l and his
guest s voyaged aboard the Enchantress, it was usual to as s ume that
the European peopl es woul d conti nue to play a domi nat i ng role in
worl d affairs for as far ahead in ti me as the mi nd' s eye coul d see. It
was also not uncommon to s uppos e that, havi ng al ready accompl i shed
most of what many regarded as the West' s historical mi ssi onshapi ng
the political desti ni es of the other peopl es of the gl obet hey woul d
eventually compl et e it. Cons pi cuous among the domai ns still to be
dealt with were those of the Mi ddl e Eas t , one of the few regi ons left
on the pl anet that had not yet been socially, culturally, and politically
reshaped in the i mage of Eur ope .
I I
Th e Mi ddl e Eas t , al though i t had been of great interest to western
di pl omat s and pol i ti ci ans duri ng the nineteenth century as an arena
i n which Great Ga me rivalries were pl ayed out, was of only margi nal
concern to t hem in the early years of the twentieth century when
those rivalries were apparent l y resol ved. The region had become a
political backwater. It was as s umed that the European powers woul d
T H E L A S T D A Y S O F O L D E U R O P E 25
one day take the region in hand, but there was no longer a sense of
urgency about their doing so.
Few Europeans of Churchi l l ' s generati on knew or cared what went
on i n the l angui d empi res of the Ot t oman Sul t an or the Persi an
Shah. An occasi onal Turki s h mas s acre of Armeni ans woul d lead to a
publ i c outcry i n the West, but woul d evoke no more l asti ng concern
than Rus s i an massacres of Je ws . Worl dl y statesmen who pri vatel y
believed there was nothi ng to be done woul d go t hrough the publ i c
mot i ons of urgi ng the Sul t an to ref orm; there the matter woul d end.
Petty i ntri gues at court, a corrupt officialdom, shi fti ng tribal al-
liances, and a sl uggi sh, apatheti c popul ati on composed the pi cture
that Europeans formed of the region's affai rs. The r e was little in
the pi cture to cause ordi nary peopl e living i n London, or Pari s, or
New York to believe that it affected their lives or i nterests. In Berl i n,
it is t rue, pl anners l ooked to the openi ng up of rai l roads and new
markets i n the regi on; but these were commerci al ventures. Th e
passi ons that now dri ve t roops and terrori sts to kill and be ki l l edand
that compel gl obal at t ent i onhad not yet been aroused.
At the t i me, the political l andscape of the Mi ddl e Eas t looked
different f rom that of today. Israel , Jor dan, Syri a, I raq, and Saudi
Arabi a di d not exist then. Mos t of the Mi ddl e Eas t still rested, as i t
had for centuri es, under the drowsy and negligent sway of the
Ot t oman Empi re, a relatively tranqui l domai n in which hi story, like
everythi ng else, moved slowly.
Today, toward the close of the twentieth century, the pol i ti cs
of the Mi ddl e Eas t present a compl etel y different aspect : they are
expl osi ve. No man pl ayed a more cruci al rol eat ti mes uni nten-
ti onal l yi n gi vi ng bi rth to the Mi ddl e Eas t we live with today than
di d Wi nston Churchi l l , who before the Fi rst World War was a ri si ng
but widely di st rust ed young Engl i sh politician with no parti cul ar
interest in Mos l em Asi a. A curi ous desti ny drove Churchi l l and the
Mi ddl e Eas t to interfere repeatedl y in one another's political lives.
Thi s left its marks ; there are frontier lines now runni ng across the
face of the Mi ddl e Eas t that are scar-l i nes from those encounters with
hi m.
* The Baghdad Railway project remains the best-known example of German
economic penetration of the region. The story is a tangled one and often misunder-
stood, but the British originally encouraged and supported the project, little aware
at the outset of the dangers it might pose. Eventually the project became a source of
discord between Britain and Germany which, however, was resolved by an agree-
ment reached between the two countries in 1914.
THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT
GAME IN ASIA
i
Churchi l l , Asqui t h, and such Cabi net col l eagues as the Forei gn
Secretary, Si r Edward Grey, the Chancel l or of the Exchequer, Davi d
Ll oyd George, and, later, the War Mi ni ster, Lo r d Ki t chener, were
to pl ay a deci si ve role in creati ng the modern Mi ddl e Eas t ; but in
doi ng so they were unabl e to escape f rom a Vi ctori an political legacy
that Asqui t h' s Li beral government thought i t had rejected. Asqui t h
and Grey, havi ng turned their backs on the ni neteenth-century rivalry
with France and Rus s i a i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , believed that they coul d
walk away from it; but events were to prove t hem wrong.
I I
Th e st ruggl e for the Mi ddl e Eas t , pi tti ng Engl and agai nst European
ri val s, was a result of the i mperi al expansi on ushered in by the
voyages of Col umbus , Vasco da Ga ma , Magel l an, and Drake. Havi ng
di scovered the sea routes in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuri es, the
European powers went on to vie with one another for control of the
rest of the worl d. Engl and was a relatively late starter in the race, but
eventually s urpas s ed the others.
Duri ng the eighteenth century the Bri ti sh Isl es, despi te their smal l
si ze, fi nal l y establ i shed an empi re that encircled the gl obe. Li ke the
Spani ards and the Dut ch before t hem, the Bri ti sh boast ed that their
monarch now rei gned over domi ni ons on which the sun never set. By
1912, when Wi nston Churchi l l and Herbert Asqui t h crui sed aboard
the Enchantress, their monarch, George V, rul ed a quart er of the
land surface of the pl anet.
Of none of their conquest s were the Bri ti sh more proud than those
in the stori ed Eas t . Yet there was irony in these t ri umphs; for in
besti ng France i n Asi a and the Pacific, and i n crowni ng that achieve-
ment by wi nni ng Indi a, Bri tai n had stretched her line of transport
26
T H E L E G A C Y O F T H E G R E A T G A ME I N A S I A 2 7
and communi cat i ons so far that it coul d be cut at rnany poi nts.
Napol eon Bonapart e exposed this vul nerabi l i ty i n 1798, when
he i nvaded Egypt and marched on Syri ai nt endi ng, he later mai n-
tai ned, from there to follow the pat h of l egend and gl ory, past
Babyl on, to Indi a. Tho ug h checked i n his own pl ans, Napol eon
afterwards pers uaded the mad Czar Paul to launch the Russi an army
on the same pat h.
Bri tai n' s response was to support the native regi mes of the Mi ddl e
Eas t agai nst European expansi on. She di d not desi re to control the
regi on, but to keep any other European power from doi ng so.
Throughout the nineteenth century, successi ve Bri ti sh govern-
ment s therefore purs ued a policy of proppi ng up the totteri ng Isl ami c
real ms i n Asi a agai nst European i nterference, subversi on, and in-
vasi on. In doi ng so their pri nci pal opponent soon became the Russi an
Empi re. Def eat i ng Rus s i an desi gns i n Asi a emerged as the obsessi ve
goal of generati ons of Bri ti sh civilian and military officials. Thei r
at t empt to do so was, for t hem, "the Great Ga me , "
1
i n which the
stakes ran hi gh. George Curzon, the future Vi ceroy of Indi a, defined
the stakes cl earl y: "Turkes t an, Af ghani st an, Trans cas pi a, Persi at o
many these names breathe only a sense of utter remot eness . . . To
me, I confess, they are the pi eces on a chessboard upon which is
bei ng pl ayed out a game for the domi ni on of the worl d. "
2
Queen
Victoria put it even more clearly: it was, she sai d, "a quest i on of
Rus s i an or Bri ti sh supremacy i n the worl d. "
3
Ill
It appears to have been a Bri ti sh officer named Art hur Conol l y who
fi rst called i t "the Great Ga me . " He pl ayed i t gal l antl y, al ong the
Hi mal ayan frontier and i n the deserts and oases of Central Asi a, and
lost in a terrible way: an Uzbek emi r cast hi m for two mont hs into
a well whi ch was filled with vermi n and reptiles, and then what re-
mai ned of hi m was brought up and beheaded. Th e phrase "the Great
Ga me " was found i n his papers and quot ed by a historian of the Fi rst
Af ghan War .
4
Rudyard Ki pl i ng made i t f amous i n his novel Kim, the
story of an Angl o- Indi an boy and his Af ghan mentor foiling Rus s i an
i ntri gues al ong the hi ghways to Indi a. *
Th e game had begun even before 1829, when the Duke of
Wellington, then Pri me Mi ni ster, entered into official correspon-
dence on the subject of how best to protect Indi a agai nst a Russi an
* These activities of the rival intelligence services are what some writers mean by
the Great Game; others use the phrase in the broader sense in which it is used in
this book.
2 8 A T T H E C R O S S R O A D S OF H I S T O R Y
I V
There were vital mat t ers at stake i n Bri tai n' s long st ruggl e agai nst
Rus s i a; and while some of these eventually fell by the waysi de,
others remai ned, al ongsi de newer ones that emerged.
In 1791 Bri tai n' s Pri me Mi ni ster, William Pitt, expressed fear that
the Rus s i an Empi re mi ght be abl e to overthrow the European bal ance
of power. That fear revived after Rus s i a played a crucial role in the
final defeat of Napol eon in 1 8 1 4 - 1 5 , but di mi ni shed agai n after
1856, when Rus s i a was defeated i n the Cri mean War.
Fr o m 1830 onward, Lo r d Pal merst on and his successors feared
attack through Af ghani st an. Th e best way, i t was agreed, was by
keepi ng Rus s i a out of Af ghani st an. Bri ti sh strategy thereafter was to
empl oy the decayi ng regi mes of Isl ami c Asi a as a gi ganti c buffer
between Bri ti sh Indi a and its route to Egypt , and the threateni ng
Russi ans. Thi s policy was associ ated especially with the name of
Lor d Pal merst on, who devel oped i t duri ng his many years as Forei gn
Mi ni ster ( 1 8 3 0 - 4 , 1 8 3 6 - 4 1 , and 1 8 4 6 - 5 1 ) and Pri me Mi ni ster
( 1 8 5 5 - 8 and 1 8 5 9 - 6 5 ) .
Th e battle to s upport friendly buffer regi mes raged with parti cul ar
intensity at the western and eastern ends of the Asi an conti nent,
where the control of domi nat i ng strategi c posi ti ons was at stake.
In western Asi a the locus of strategi c concern was Const ant i nopl e
( I s t anbul ) , the ancient Byzant i um, whi ch for centuri es had domi nat ed
the crossroads of worl d pol i ti cs. Si t uat ed above the narrow strai ts
of the Dardanel l es, i t commanded both the east/west pas s age be-
tween Europe and Asi a and the north/ south passage between the
Medi t erranean and the Bl ack Se a. So l ong as Const ant i nopl e was not
in unfri endl y hands, the powerful Bri ti sh navy coul d sail t hrough the
Dardanel l es into the Bl ack Sea to domi nat e the Russi an coastl i ne.
But if the Rus s i ans were to conquer the straits they coul d not merel y
keep the Bri ti sh fleet from comi ng in; they coul d also send their own
fleet out, into the Medi t erranean, where its presence coul d threaten
the Bri ti sh lifeline.
Towar d the far si de of the Asi an continent, the locus of strategi c
concern was the stretch of hi gh mount ai n ranges i n and adjoi ni ng
Af ghani st an, f rom whi ch i nvaders coul d pour down into the pl ai ns of
Bri ti sh Indi a. Bri tai n' s ai m i n eastern Asi a was to keep Rus s i a from
establ i shi ng any sort of presence on those domi nat i ng hei ghts.
Somet i mes as a col d war, somet i mes as a hot one, the struggl e
between Bri tai n and Rus s i a raged f rom the Dardanel l es to the
Hi mal ayas for al most a hundred years. Its out come was somet hi ng of
a draw.
T H E L E G A C Y O F T H E G R E A T G A ME I N A S I A 29
that i f Rus s i a dest royed the Ot t oman Empi r e the scrambl e to pi ck up
the pi eces mi ght lead to a maj or war between the European powers.
That al ways remai ned a concern.
By the mi ddl e of the nineteenth century, Bri ti sh t rade with the
Ot t oman Empi r e began to as s ume a maj or i mport ance, and economi c
i ssues were added to the controversy, pi tti ng free trade Bri tai n agai nst
protecti oni st Rus s i a. Th e deep financial i nvol vement of France and
Italy i n Ot t oman affai rs, followed by Ge r man economi c penetrati on,
turned the area i n whi ch Rus s i a and Bri tai n conduct ed their st ruggl e
into a minefield of national economi c i nterests.
Oil entered the pi cture only in the early twentieth century. But it
di d not play a maj or role i n the Great Ga me even then, both because
there were few pol i ti ci ans who foresaw the comi ng i mport ance of oil,
and because it was not then known that oil exi sted in the Mi ddl e Eas t
in such a great quanti ty. Most of Bri tai n' s oil ( more than 80 percent,
before and duri ng the Fi rst Worl d War) came from the Uni t ed
St at es. At the t i me, Persi a was the only significant Mi ddl e East ern
producer other than Rus s i a, and even Persi a' s out put was insignificant
i n terms of worl d product i on. In 1913, for exampl e, the Uni t ed
St at es produced 140 t i mes more oil than di d Pers i a.
s
Fr om the begi nni ng of the Great Ga me until far into the twentieth
century, the most deepl y felt concern of Bri ti sh l eaders was for the
safety of the road to the Eas t . When Queen Vi ctori a as s umed the title
of Empr e s s of Indi a in 1877 formal recogni ti on was gi ven to the
evolution of Bri tai n into a speci es of dual monarchyt he Bri ti sh
Empi re and the Empi r e of Indi a. Th e line between them was t hus a
lifeline, but over it, and casti ng a l ong shadow, hung the sword of
the czars.
Bri ti sh l eaders seemed not to take into account the possi bi l i ty that,
i n expandi ng sout hwards and east wards, the Russi ans were i mpel l ed
by internal historical i mperati ves of their own which had nothi ng to
do with Indi a or Bri tai n. Th e czars and their mi ni sters bel i eved that
i t was their country' s desti ny to conquer the south and the east, j ust
as the Ameri cans at the ti me bel i eved it their mani fest desti ny to
conquer the west. In each case, the dream was to fi l l out an entire
continent f rom ocean t o ocean. Th e Russi an Imperi al Chancel l or,
Pri nce Gorchakov, put it more or less in those t erms in 1864 in a
memorandum i n whi ch he set forth his goal s for his country. He
argued that the need for secure fronti ers obl i ged the Rus s i ans to go
on devouri ng the rotti ng regi mes to their sout h. He poi nted out that
"the Uni t ed St at es i n Ameri ca, France i n Al gi ers, Hol l and i n her
col oni esal l have been drawn into a course where ambi ti on pl ays a
smal l er role than i mperi ous necessi ty, and the greatest difficulty i s
knowi ng where to s t op. "
6
Th e Bri ti sh feared that Russi a di d not know where to s t op; and, as
30
A T T H E C R O S S R O A D S O F H I S T O R Y
an increasingly democrat i c society engaged generati on after generati on
in the conflict with despoti c Russi a, they eventually devel oped a
hatred of Russi a that went beyond the parti cul ar political and econ-
omi c differences that di vi ded the two countri es. Bri tons grew to
object to Russi ans not merel y for what they did but for who they
were.
At the same ti me, however, Li beral s in and out of Parl i ament
began to express their abhorrence of the corrupt and despoti c Mi ddl e
East ern regi mes that their own government support ed agai nst the
Russi an threat. In doi ng so, they struck a responsi ve chord in the
country' s el ectorate. Atroci ti es commi t t ed by the Ot t oman Empi re
agai nst Chri sti an mi nori ti es were thunderi ngl y denounced by the
Li beral l eader, William Ewart Gl ads t one, i n the 1880 election cam-
pai gn in which he overthrew and repl aced the Conservat i ve Pri me
Mi ni ster, Benj ami n Di srael i , Earl of Beaconsfi el d.
Cl ai mi ng that the Sul tan' s regi me was "a bot t oml ess pit of fraud
and f al sehood, "
7
Gl ads t one, i n his 18805 admi ni strati on, washed
Bri tai n' s hands of the Ot t oman i nvol vement, and the Bri ti sh govern-
ment wi thdrew its protecti on and influence from Const ant i nopl e.
Th e Tur ks , unabl e to stand on their own, turned therefore for
support to another power, Bi smarck' s Germany; and Germany took
Bri tai n' s pl ace at the Subl i me Port e.
When the Conservat i ves returned to office, it was too late to go
back. Robert Ceci l , 3rd Mar que s s of Sal i sbury ( Pri me Mi ni ster:
1 8 8 5 - 6 , 1 8 8 6 - 9 2 , 1 8 9 5 - 1 9 0 0 , 1 9 0 0 - 2 ) , aware that the Ot t oman
rul ers were j eopardi zi ng their own soverei gnty through mi smanage-
ment, had thought of usi ng such influence as Bri tai n coul d exert to
gui de and, to some extent, reform the regi me. Of Gl adst one' s havi ng
di ssi pated that influence, he l ament ed: "They have just thrown it
away into the sea, wi thout getti ng anythi ng whatever in exchange. "
8
V
Germany' s entry on the scene, at Constanti nopl e and el sewhere,
marked the begi nni ng of a new age in world politics. Th e Ge r man
Empi re, formally created on 18 January 1871, within decades had
repl aced Russi a as the pri nci pal threat to British i nterests.
In part this was because of Bri tai n' s relative industrial decl i ne. In
the mi ddl e of the nineteenth century, Bri tai n produced about two-
thi rds of the world's coal, about half of its iron, and more than 70
percent of its steel ; i ndeed over 40 percent of the entire world output
of t raded manuf act ured goods was produced within the Bri ti sh Isl es
at that ti me. Hal f the world's i ndustri al producti on was then Bri ti sh-
owned, but by 1870 the figure had sunk to 32 percent, and by 1910,
T H E L E G A C Y O F T H E G R E A T G A ME I N A S I A 31
to 15 percent .
9
In newer and i ncreasi ngl y more i mportant i ndustri es,
such as chemi cal s and machi ne-tool s, Germany took the lead. Even
Britain's pre-emi nent position in worl d financein 1914 she held 41
percent of gross international i nves t ment
1 0
was a facet of decl i ne;
British i nvestors preferred to pl ace their money in dynami c economi es
in the Ameri cas and el sewhere abroad.
Military factors were al so i nvol ved. Th e devel opment of rai l roads
radically altered the strategi c bal ance between land power and sea
power to the detri ment of the latter. Si r Hal ford Macki nder, the
prophet of geopol i ti cs, underl i ned the realities of a new situation in
which enemy rai l road trai ns woul d speed troops and muni ti ons di-
rectly to their desti nati on by the strai ght line which consti tutes the
shortest di stance between two poi nts, while the British navy woul d
sail slowly around the ci rcumference of a continent and arri ve too
late. Th e rai l road network of the Ge r man Empi re made the Kai ser' s
real m the most advanced military power in the worl d, and Britain's
precari ous naval supremacy began to seem less relevant than it had
been.
Walter Bagehot , editor of the influential London magazi ne, The
Economist, drew the concl usi on that, because of Germany, Russi an
expansi on no longer needed to be feared: " . . . the old idea that
Russi a is al ready so great a power that Europe needs to be afraid of
her . . . bel ongs t o the pre- Germani c age . "
1 1
Russi a' s di sast rous
defeat by Japan ( 19045) , followed by revolutionary upri si ngs i n St
Pet ersburg and throughout the country in 1905, suggest ed that, in
any event, the Czar' s armi es were no longer strong enough to remai n
a cause for concern.
The Conservat i ve government of Art hur Jame s Bal four (19025)
nonetheless conti nued to pursue the old rivalry as well as the new
one, allying Bri tai n not only with Japan agai nst Russi a, but also
with France agai nst Germany. But Si r Edward Grey, Forei gn Sec-
retary in the successor Li beral admi ni strati on of Henry Campbel l -
Bannerman (1905 8) , pi ctured the two policies as contradi ctory.
"Russi a was the ally of France, " he wrote, "we coul d not pursue at
one and the s ame ti me a policy of agreement with France and a
policy of counteral l i ances agai nst Rus s i a . "
1 2
Grey therefore negoti ated a treaty with Russi a, executed in 1907,
that reconciled the differences between the two countri es in Asi a.
Ti bet was neutral i zed; Russi a gave up her interest i n Af ghani st an,
and left control of that country' s foreign policy in Bri tai n' s hands;
and Persi a was di vi ded into a Russi an zone, a neutral zone, and a
British zone. Th e Great Game had seemi ngl y been brought to an
end.
It coul d have been anti ci pated that the settlement of 1907 woul d
arouse fears in Const ant i nopl e that Bri tai n woul d no longer protect
Turkey agai nst Russi a. A Pal merst on or a St rat f ord Canni ng mi ght
have allayed such fears, but neither Si r Edward Grey nor his am-
bassador in Const ant i nopl e took the troubl e to do so.
VI
There was an intellectual ti me lag between London and the out post s
of empi re. Grey, Asqui t h, and their Li beral col l eagues saw Bri tai n' s
traditional ri val s, France and Russi a, as Bri ti sh fri ends and allies i n
the post-Vi ctori an age. But British officers, agents, and civil servants
stati oned al ong the great arc that swung from Egypt and the Sudan
to Indi a failed in many cases to adopt the new outlook. Havi ng spent
a lifetime counteri ng Russi an and French i ntri gues in the Mi ddl e
East , they conti nued to regard Russi a and France as their country' s
enemi es. Event s in 1914 and the succeedi ng years were to bri ng their
Victorian political views back into unexpected promi nence.
In one respect officers in the field and mi ni sters in London were in
agreement : both shared the assumpt i on that what remai ned of the
i ndependent Mi ddl e East woul d eventually fall under European
influence and gui dance. Asqui t h and Grey had no desi re for Bri tai n
to expand further into the Mi ddl e Eas t , while juni or British officers
i n Cai ro and Khar t oum harbored desi gns on the Arab- speaki ng prov-
inces to their east. Both groups bel i eved, however, that the Ot t oman
Empi re in the Mi ddl e East woul d col l apse one day and that one or
more of the European powers woul d have to pick up the pi eces. Thi s
assumpt i ont hat when the Ot t oman Empi re di sappeared, Europe
woul d have to take its pl aceproved to be one of those mot ors that
dri ve history.
3
THE MI DDLE EAST BEFORE
THE WAR
i
For decades and i ndeed centuri es before the outbreak of the Fi rst
World War in 1914, the native regi mes of the Mi ddl e East had been,
i n every sense, l osi ng ground to Europe. Th e khanates of Central
Asi a, i ncl udi ng Khi va and Bukhara, had fallen to Russi a, as had
porti ons of the Persi an Empi re. Th e Arab shei khdoms al ong the
Gul f coast route from Suez to Indi a had been brought under Bri ti sh
sway; and Cyprus and Egypt , though formally still attached to
Turkey, were i n fact occupi ed and admi ni stered by Bri tai n. The
Angl o- Russi an Agreement of 1907 brought Afghani stan into the
Bri ti sh sphere, and di vi ded most of Persi a between Bri tai n and
Russi a. In the Mosl em Mi ddl e Eas t , only the Ot t oman Empi re
effectively retai ned its i ndependencet hough precari ousl y, as its
frontiers came under pressure.
Indeed, the sti l l -i ndependent Turki s h Sul t anat e looked out of
pl ace in the modern worl d. Li ke a rui ned templ e of classical anti-
qui ty, with some of its shattered col umns still erect and visible to
touri sts such as those aboard the Enchantress, the Ot t oman Empi re
was a st ruct ure that had survi ved the bygone era to which it be-
l onged. It was a relic of i nvasi ons from the east a mi l l enni um ago:
begi nni ng around AD 1,000, waves of nomad horsemen st reamed
forth from the st eppes and deserts of central and northeast Asi a,
conqueri ng the peopl es and l ands in their path as they rode west.
Pagan or ani mi st in rel i gi ous belief, and speaki ng one or other of the
Mongol i an or Turki s h l anguages, they carved out a variety of pri n-
cipalities and ki ngdoms for themsel ves, among them the empi res of
Genghi s Khan and Tamerl ane. Th e Ot t oman (or Osmanl i ) Empi re,
founded by Turki sh- speaki ng horsemen who had converted to Isl am,
was another such empi re; it took its name from Os man, a borderl and
ghazi (warrior for the Mosl em faith) born in the thirteenth century,
who campai gned on the outski rts of the East ern Roman (or
Byzanti ne) Empi re i n Anatol i a.
In the fi fteenth century Osman' s successors conquered and re-
placed the Byzanti ne Empi re. Ri di ng on to new conquest s, the
Ot t oman Tur ks expanded in all di recti ons: north to the Cri mea, east
to Baghdad and Basra, south to the coasts of Arabi a and the Gul f,
west to Egypt and Nort h Af ri caand into Europe. At its peak, in
the sixteenth century, the Ot t oman Empi re i ncl uded most of the
Mi ddl e Eas t , Nort h Afri ca, and what are now the Bal kan countri es of
Eur ope Gr e e c e , Yugosl avi a, Al bani a, Rumani a, and Bul gari aas
well as much of Hungary. It stretched from the Persi an Gul f to the
river Danube ; its armi es st opped only at the gat es of Vi enna. Its
popul ati on was esti mated at between thirty and fifty million at a ti me
when Engl and' s popul ati on was perhaps four mi l l i on; and it ruled
more than twenty nati onal i ti es.
1
The Ot t omans never entirely outgrew their ori gi ns as a maraudi ng
war band. They enri ched themsel ves by capt uri ng wealth and sl aves;
the sl aves, conscri pted into the Ot t oman ranks, rose to repl ace the
commanders who reti red, and went on to capt ure wealth and sl aves
in their turn. Invadi ng new terri tori es was the only path they knew
to economi c growt h. In the si xteenth and seventeenth centuri es,
when the conquest s turned into defeats and retreats, the dynami c of
Ot t oman exi stence was lost; the Tur ks had mast ered the arts of war
but not those of government .
Ot t oman l eaders in the nineteenth century attempted programs of
sweepi ng reform. Thei r goal s were the centralization of government ;
the establ i shment of an executi ve branch under the Sul t an' s chief
mi ni ster, the Grand Vizier; the rationalization of taxation and con-
scri pti on; the establ i shment of constitutional guarant ees; the found-
ing of secul ar publ i c school s offeri ng technical, vocational, and other
trai ni ng; and the like. A st art but not much morewas made al ong
these lines. Most of the reforms took pl ace only on paper; and as an
anachroni sm i n the modern worl d, the ramshackl e Ot t oman regi me
seemed doomed to di sappear.
The empi re was incoherent. Its Ot t oman rulers were not an ethnic
group; though they spoke Turki s h, many were descendants of once-
Chri sti an sl aves from Bal kan Europe and elsewhere. The empi re' s
subj ect s (a wi de variety of peopl es, speaki ng Turki s h, Semi t i c,
Kurdi s h, Sl avi c, Armeni an, Greek, and other l anguages) had little i n
common with, and in many cases little love for, one another.
Though European observers later were to generalize about , for
exampl e, "Arabs , " i n fact Egypt i ans and Arabi ans, Svri ans and
Iraqi s were peopl es of different hi story, ethnic background, and
outlook. The mul ti nati onal , mul ti l i ngual empi re was a mosai c of
peopl es who di d not mi x; i n the towns, Armeni ans, Greeks, Jews ,
and others each lived in their own separate quart ers.
Religion had some sort of unifying effect, for the empi re was a
T H E M I D D L E E A S T B E F O R E T H E WAR 35
t heocracya Mosl em rather than a Turki s h st at eand most of its
subj ect s were Mosl ems. Th e Ot t oman Sul t an was regarded as caliph
(temporal and spi ri tual successor to the Prophet, Mohammed) by the
majori ty group within Isl am, the Sunni s . But among others of the
seventy-one sects of Isl am, especially the numerous Shi ' i tes, there
was doctrinal opposi ti on to the Sul tan' s Sunni faith and to his cl ai ms
to the cal i phate. And for those who were not Mosl em ( perhaps 25
percent of the popul ati on at the begi nni ng of the twentieth cent ury) ,
but Greek Ort hodox, Roman Cat hol i c, Armeni an Cathol i c, Armeni an
Gregori an, Jewi sh, Protestant, Maroni t e, Samari t an, Nestori an
Chri sti an, Syri an Uni t ed Ort hodox, Monophysi t e, or any one of a
number of others, religion was a di vi si ve rather than a unifying
political factor.
Th e extent to which religion governed everyday life in the Mi ddl e
East was somet hi ng that European visitors i n the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuri es found remarkabl e; for religion had pl ayed
no such role in Europe for centuri es. Indeed, Europeans visited the
Mi ddl e East largely to see the past. The y came to see Biblical sites,
or excavated wonders of the ancient worl d, or nomads who lived as
they had in the ti me of Abraham.
Th e Porte, too, appeared to live i n the past . Ot t oman officials
conti nued to pretend, for exampl e, that Bul gari a formed part of the
empi re l ong after l osi ng control of that territory in 1878, and counted
Egypt i ans as among its subj ect s even after Bri tai n occupi ed Egypt i n
1882. For this and other reasons, Ot t oman statistics were unrel i abl e,
and it is only in the roughest sense that we can say that the empi re' s
popul ati on in the early twentieth century may have been about
twenty to twenty-five million, in a t erri t orydependi ng on how it is
def i nedabout six ti mes the size of Te xas . It compri sed, broadl y
speaki ng, most of the Arabi an peni nsul a and what is now Turkey,
Israel , Lebanon, Jor dan, Syri a, and I raq.
Unti l the early twentieth century, the Ot t oman Empi re was for
most of the ti me under the absol ute personal rule of the Sul t an. In at
least one respect he was qui te unlike a European monarch: as the son
of a woman of the harem, he was al ways half-slave by bi rth. Under
his rule civil, mi l i tary, and Hol y Law admi ni strati ons coul d be
di scerned in an empi re carefully di vi ded into provi nces and cantons.
But the appearance of orderly admi ni st rat i oni ndeed of effective
admi ni strati on of any s ort was chi meri cal . As Gert rude Bell, an
experi enced Engl i sh traveler in Mi ddl e East ern l ands, was later to
write, "No country which turned to the eye of the world an appear-
ance of establ i shed rule and central i zed Government was, to a greater
extent than the Ot t oman Empi re, a land of make- bel i eve. "
2
The r e
were army garri sons, it is t rue, scattered about the empi re, but
otherwise power was di ffuse and the centralized authori ty was more
36
myth than reality. Gert rude Bell, in the course of her travel s, found
that outsi de the towns, Ot t oman admi ni strati on vani shed and the
local sheikh or headman rul ed i nstead. The r e were di stri cts, too,
where bri gands roamed at will. Th e rickety Turki s h government was
even i ncapabl e of col l ecti ng its own taxes, the most basi c act of
imperial admi ni strati on. On the eve of the Fi rst Worl d War, only
about 5 percent of taxes was collected by the government ; the other
95 percent was collected by i ndependent tax f armers .
3
Forei gn countri es exerci sed varyi ng degrees of influence and con-
trol within the empi re. It was not only that Egypt and Cyprus were
in fact governed by Bri tai n, whi ch had occupi ed them in the late
nineteenth century; and that the shei khdoms al ong the Gul f coast
were under Bri ti sh control . Le banon, a separat e canton under ar-
rangement s establ i shed in 1864, was governed by a Chri sti an military
governor directly servi ng under the Porte which, however, was ob-
liged to act only i n consul tati on with si x European powers. Rus s i a
and France reserved to themsel ves the right to protect, respecti vel y,
the Ort hodox and Cathol i c popul at i ons of the empi re; and other
powers al so asserted a right to i ntervene in Turki s h affai rs on behalf
of the groups they sponsored.
What was more than a little unreal , then, was the cl ai m that the
Sul t an and his government rul ed their domai ns i n the sense i n which
Europeans underst ood government and admi ni st rat i on. What was
real in the Ot t oman Empi r e t ended to be local: a tri be, a cl an, a sect,
or a town was the true political unit to which loyalties adhered.
Thi s confused European observers, whose modern noti ons of citizen-
shi p and nationality were i nappl i cabl e to the crazy qui l t of Ot t oman
politics. Europeans as s umed that eventual l y they themsel ves woul d
take control of the Ot t oman domai ns and organi ze them on a more
rational basi s. In the early years of the twentieth century it was
reasonabl e to believe that the days of Turki s h domi ni on were
numbered.
By 1914 the much- di mi ni shed Ot t oman Empi re no l onger rul ed
Nort h Afri ca or Hungary or most of southeastern Europe. It had
been in a retreat si nce the ei ghteenth century that finally looked like
a rout. For decades, in the Ot t oman army and in the school s,
di scontented men had told one another i n the course of cl andesti ne
meet i ngs that the empi re had to be rapi dl y changed to meet the
intellectual, i ndustri al , and mi l i tary chal l enges of modern Europe.
St i mul at ed but confused by the nati onal i sm that had become Europe' s
creed, intellectuals amongst the di verse Turki sh- speaki ng and Arabi c-
speaki ng peopl es of the empi re sought to di scover or to forge some
sense of their own political identity.
In the fi nal years before the out break of the Fi rst Worl d War,
obscure but ambi t i ous new men took power i n the Ot t oman Empi re,
rel egati ng the Sul t an to a fi gurehead posi ti on. Th e new men, l eaders
of the Young Turkey Party, were at once the result and the cause of
ferment in Const ant i nopl e, the Ot t oman capi tal , as they tried to
meet the chal l enge of bri ngi ng Turkey' s empi re into the twentieth
century before the modern worl d had t i me to destroy it.
I I
Const ant i nopl et he city originally called Byzant i um and today
known as I s t anbul was for more than eleven centuri es the capi tal
of the Roman Empi r e i n the Eas t , and then for more than four
centuri es the capi tal of its successor, the Ot t oman Empi r e . Li ke
Rome, Const ant i nopl e was bui l t on seven hills and, like Rome , i t was
an eternal city: its strategi c location gave it an abi di ng i mport ance in
the worl d' s affai rs.
Const ant i nopl e is a collection of towns located pri nci pal l y on the
European si de of the great waterway that links the Medi t erranean to
the Bl ack Se a, at a poi nt where the channel separati ng Europe from
Asi a narrows to wi dt hs of as little as a hal f-mi l e. Th e site is a natural
fortress, difficult to conquer or even to attack. A bay s ome four mi l es
l ong, known as the Gol den Horn, f orms a magnificent natural harbor
that provi des shelter and protecti on for a defendi ng fleet.
In 1914 the popul at i on of Const ant i nopl e stood at about a million.
It was a cosmopol i t an and pol ygl ot popul at i on: most resi dents of the
city were Mos l em, Greek, or Armeni an, but there was al so a con-
si derabl e col ony of European and other forei gners. A European
influence was evi dent in the archi tectural style of the newer bui l di ngs,
in the style of dress, and in such i nnovati ons as street l i ghts.
Rudi ment ary moderni zati on had only just begun. In 1912 electric
l i ghti ng had been i nt roduced into Const ant i nopl e for the first t i me .
4
A start had been made toward constructi ng a drai nage syst em for the
city's narrow, fi l thy streets; and the packs of wild dogs that for
centuri es had patrol l ed the city were, by deci si on of the muni ci pal
counci l , shi pped to a waterl ess i sl and to di e .
5
Some work had been
done on the pavi ng of roads, but not much; most streets still turned
to mud i n the frequent rai nst orms, or coughed dry dust into the air
as wi nds bl ew t hrough the city.
Violent al ternati ng north and south wi nds domi nat ed the city's
cl i mate, bri ngi ng s udden changes of ext reme heat or col d. Th e
political cl i mate, too, was subject to sudden and ext reme changes at
the begi nni ng of the twentieth century; and for many years pri or to
1914 Bri ti sh observers had shown that they had no i dea where the
wi nds were comi ng from or which way they were bl owi ng. Political
maneuveri ngs at the Subl i me Porte, the gat e to the Gr and Vizier's
3 8 A T T H E C R O S S R O A D S O F H I S T O R Y
offices from whi ch the Ot t oman government took its name, were
conduct ed behi nd a veil of mystery that the Bri ti sh embas s y ti me and
agai n had failed to penetrate.
I l l
The Bri ti sh embassy, like those of the other Great Powers, was
l ocated in Pera, the European quart er of the city, which lay to the
north of the Gol den Horn. Forei gn communi t i es had grown up i n
proxi mi ty to their embassi es, and lived their own lives, separatel y
f rom that of the city. In Pera, French was the l anguage of l egati on
parti es and entertai nments; Greek, not Turki s h, was the l anguage of
the streets. Thr e e theaters offered revues and pl ays i mport ed from
Pari s. Th e Pera Pal ace Hotel offered physi cal facilities comparabl e
with those avai l abl e in the palatial hotels of the maj or cities of
Europe.
Most Europeans s uccumbed to the temptati on to live in the iso-
lation of their own encl ave. Few were at home in the narrow, di rty
lanes of St amboul , the old section of the city south of the Gol den
Horn, with its walls and fortifications crumbl i ng into rui n. One of
the few who felt at ease on either si de of the Gol den Horn was an
Engl i shman named Wyndham Deedes , who had come t o pl ay an
i mportant role i n the new Young Tur ke y admi ni strati on.
Deedes was from a county fami l y of Ke nt : four centuri es of
Engl i sh country gentl emen had preceded hi m. After Et on, he took a
commi ssi on i n the Ki ng' s Own Rifles, and for twenty-two years
thereafter he remai ned a Bri ti sh officer. (When asked once about the
horrors of the Boer War, he repl i ed, "Well, anythi ng was better than
Et on. ")
6
Earl y i n his mi l i tary career, Deedes vol unteered to serve
in the Ot t oman Gendarmeri e, a newly created Turki s h police force
commanded by European officers. Its creation was a reform forced
upon the Sul t an by the European powers, for the old police force
had become i ndi sti ngui shabl e from the robber bands i t was s uppos ed
to s uppres s . Deedes and his European col l eagues were commi ssi oned
as officers of the new force while, at the s ame time, retai ni ng their
commi ssi ons i n their respecti ve national armi es.
As viewed i n old phot ographs, Deedes looked an oddi ty i n the
oriental surroundi ngs in which servi ce in the Gendarmeri e pl aced
hi m. Smal l , painfully thin, and l i ght-compl exi oned, he di d not bl end
into the Ot t oman l andscape. Asceti c and deeply Chri sti an, he had
little use for sl eep, rest, or food. He worked fifteen hours a day,
indifferent to comfort and carel ess of danger; nobody coul d have
been more unlike the Tur ki s h officers who, i f European accounts
were to be bel i eved, were i n many cases corrupt and cowardl y. He
made a success of his chal l engi ng assi gnment , and won popul ari ty
with the Tur ks .
Deedes was an unknown figure when he entered the Gendarmeri e
i n 1910. Four years later he had achi eved such high st andi ng that he
was co-opted by the l eadi ng figure in the new Ot t oman government
to hel p run the Mi ni stry of the Interi or. By the ti me of his thirty-first
bi rthday i n 1914, Deedes , who had l earned to speak Tur ki s h fl uentl y,
was one of the few Engl i shmen who underst ood Turki s h affai rs. Yet
his government di d not make real use of his experi ence and knowl-
edge. One of the cont i nuous t hemes of the years to come was that
Deedes was a Cas s andra: his government chose to di sregard his
warni ngs and to i gnore his accurate anal yses of Tur ki s h political
moti ves.
Th e mi ni ster under whom Deedes served i n the Ot t oman govern-
ment i n 1914 was Mehmed Tal aat . Most of what the Bri ti sh govern-
ment thought i t knew at the ti me about Tal aat and about the political
party that Tal aat led was erroneous; and at least some of it coul d have
been corrected by Deedes . But the Bri ti sh embas s y i n Const ant i nopl e
believed that it knew the truth about Ot t oman politics al ready, and
therefore that it di d not have to i nqui re further.
IV
Mehmed Tal aat , the Mi ni ster of the Interi or and the leader of the
largest faction within the governi ng political party, was a figure
whom Bri ti sh di pl omat s di d not regard as a gent l eman. The y bel i eved
that he lacked race and breedi ng; they scornfully reported that he
was of gypsy ori gi n. He had thick bl ack hair, heavy bl ack eyebrows,
a hawk-like nose, and what one of the few sympat het i c Bri ti sh
observers descri bed as "a light in his eyes, rarely seen in men but
somet i mes i n ani mal s at dus k. "
7
Tal aat was the si ngl e most i mport ant figure i n Tur ki s h pol i ti cs.
He was very much a sel f-made man. Li ttl e is known of his ori gi ns
and background except that they were humbl e. He began life as a
minor empl oyee of the Post and Tel egraph Office and i s bel i eved
to have been a Bektashi, that is, a member of the largest of the
Turki s h Dervi sh orders. ( The Dervi shes were Mos l em rel i gi ous
brot herhoods. ) He is bel i eved to have joi ned a Freemas on l odge, is
known to have organi zed a secret political society, and to have been
i mpri soned for a ti me for his underground activities.
Joi ni ng a secret organi zati on was a common activity in the Ot t oman
Empi re of Tal aat ' s youth. Under the autocrati c Sul t an Abdul Hami d,
who rei gned f rom 1876 to 1909, open political activity was dangerous.
Th e Sul t an, who s us pended the consti tuti on and di s banded Parl i a-
ment , was intolerant of di ssent and empl oyed a secret pol i ce force to
deal with it. Th e political life of the empi re was dri ven underground,
where secret soci eti es prol i ferated. Th e earliest ones took their i nspi -
ration f rom ni neteenth-century European revol uti onary groups ,
especially the Italian carbonari, and organi zed themsel ves into cells
of a handful of members , only one of whom, typically, woul d know a
member of another cell. Many of t hem, i ncl udi ng the forerunner of
the Young Tur ke y Party, were f ounded by uni versi ty and military
academy st udent s. Th e army, too, was an especially fertile breedi ng
ground for such soci eti es; its younger members were s hamed by
their empi re' s di sast rous showi ng on one battlefield after another.
Abdul Hami d' s police forces succeeded i n s mas hi ng the secret
societies i n Const ant i nopl e and el sewhere. Beyond their gras p, how-
ever, was Sal oni ka, the bust l i ng and un- Turki s h Macedoni an port i n
what is now Greece. Sal oni ka is where a number of the secret
societies establ i shed their headquart ers, devel opi ng cl ose rel ati onshi ps
with members of the Ot t oman Thi r d Army, which had its head-
quart ers there. Th e di sorder and di si ntegrati on with which the Thi r d
Army had to deal i n Macedoni aa frontier region of the empi rei n
itself was a formati ve experi ence that hel ped the secret societies to
enlist recrui ts within the ranks of the army.
Tal aat , who lived and worked i n Sal oni ka, was one of the founders
of one such secret soci ety whi ch eventual l y became the pri nci pal
faction within a merged group that called itself the Commi t t ee of
Uni on and Progresst he C. U. P . as i t will be called hereafter. It was
known, too, as the Young Turkey Party, and later its members were
called the Young Tur ks . Upon joi ni ng it, initiates swore an oath on
the Kor an and a gun. Dj emal Bey, a staff officer who later pl ayed a
major role i n Mi ddl e East ern pol i ti cs, was Tal aat ' s initial recruit
among the l eadershi p of the Thi r d Army.
One day in 1908 a juni or army officer named Enver, who was
stati oned i n Sal oni ka and who had al so joined Tal aat ' s group, was
ordered to return to Const ant i nopl e. Afrai d that his membershi p had
been di scovered by the secret pol i ce, he sl i pped out of Sal oni ka and
took to the hills, to which another Young Turkey army col l eague had
al ready escaped. The n another army officer followed his exampl e,
taki ng t roops and ammuni t i on with hi m. Th e Sul t an sent t roops
agai nst t hem, but the troops joi ned the rebel s. There was a spon-
taneous combust i on of a bl oodl ess revol uti on in Sal oni ka: the C. U. P.
took control. Th e Young Tur ks sei zed control of the Tel egraph
Officeit may have been no coi nci dence that Tal aat was one of
its offi ci al sand establ i shed contact with C. U. P. cells that honey-
combed the army and the empi re. When the smoke had cl eared the
consti tuti on had been restored, parl i amentary and party politics had
resumed, and the following year the Sul t an abdi cat ed i n favor of hi s
brother.
Th e old politicians took office, while the Young Tur ks remai ned
i n the . background. But the C. U. P. had become a force with which
to reckon, and not merel y because of its st rong representati on in the
officer corps of the army. In a di sorgani zed society, the strength of
the C. U. P. was that i t had branches everywhere, cri ss- crossi ng the
empi re.
Th e l eaders of the successful upri si ng at first enjoyed a good-
enough pres s i n the western worl d so that i n common parl ance
"Young Tur ks " came to mean any brash group of young peopl e with
dynami c i deas who rebel agai nst an out moded l eadershi p. The y were
viewed with sympat hy by the Forei gn Office i n London, but were
disliked and di sdai ned i n the Bri ti sh embas s y i n Const ant i nopl e. Th e
ambas s ador, Si r Ge r ar d Lowt her, seems t o have fallen compl etel y
under the influence of Geral d Fi t zMauri ce, his Fi rst Dr agoman, or
official i nterpreter and advi ser on oriental affai rs; and Fi t zMauri ce
detested the C. U. P. al most f rom the very outset.
Fi t zMauri ce' s i nterpretati on of the events of 1908 was col ored by
the fact that they had occurred in Sal oni ka, about half of whose
130, 000 i nhabi tants were either Je ws or Dunme hs ( members of a
Jewi sh sect that had converted to I s l am i n the seventeenth cent ury) .
Sal oni ka was al so a city in whi ch there were Freemas on l odges.
Emmanuel Caras s o (or Ka r a s u) , a Jewi sh lawyer, had f ounded an
Italian Freemas on l odge i n whi ch he apparentl y al l owed Tal aat ' s
secret society to meet when it was in hi di ng from the Sul tan' s secret
pol i ce. Fi t zMauri ce concl uded that the C. U. P. was a Lati n-i nfl uenced
international Jewi sh Freemas on conspi racy; and Lowt her dul y re-
ported this to the Forei gn Office i n London. Lowt her referred to the
C. U. P. as "the Je w Commi t t ee of Uni on and Progres s . "
8
Fi t zMauri ce later conduct ed an i nvesti gati on of the C. U. P. , the
results of which were reflected in a confidential report sent by Lowther
under his own name on 29 May 1910, to the official head of the
Forei gn Office, Si r Charl es Hardi nge. In his report, Lowt her poi nted
out that "liberie, egalite, fraternite" (liberty, equal i ty, fraterni ty),
words drawn f rom the French Revol uti on, were both the sl ogan of
the Italian Freemas ons (hence Karas u' s l odge) and of the Young
Turkey movement . Th e Young Tur ks , he cl ai med, were "imitating
the French Revol uti on and its godl ess and levelling met hods. Th e
devel opment s of the French Revol uti on led to ant agoni sm between
Engl and and France, and shoul d the Turki s h revolution devel op on
the same lines, it may find itself si mi l arl y in ant agoni sm with Bri ti sh
ideals and i nt erest s. "
9
In his detai l ed report of more than 5, 000 words, Lowt her al l eged
that Jews had taken over a Freemas on network ( "The Oriental Jew
42
i s an adept at mani pul at i ng occul t forces . . . " ) and t hrough i t had
taken control of the Ot t oman Empi r e . Amongs t the ri ngl eaders of
the Jewi s h Freemas on conspi racy, accordi ng to Lowt her, was the
U. S . ambas s ador t o Turkey, Oscar St raus , whose brot hers owned
the New York depart ment stores Macy' s and Abraham & St raus .
Th e danger t o Engl and, wrote Lowt her, i s that "The Je w hates
Rus s i a and its Government , and the fact that Engl and i s now friendly
to Rus s i a has the effect of maki ng the Je w to a certain extent anti-
Bri ti sh . . . a consi derati on to which the Germans are, I think,
al i ve. "
1 0
Indeed, Lowt her concl uded, "I have reason to believe that
my Ge r man col l eague i s aware of the extent to which Jewi s h and
Lat i n Mas onry i nspi res the Commi t t ee, and that he has confidentially
kept his Government i nformed as to thi s feature of Young Turkey
pol i t i cs. "
1 1
However, when the 288- man Ot t oman Parl i ament was elected i n
1908, only four Je ws were elected to it, and when the C. U. P. created
a Central Commi t t ee in 1909, Ka r a s u was not elected to member-
shi p on it, nor di d he ever rise to a l eadershi p position either in the
party or in the government ; he was never the influential figure that
forei gners s uppos ed hi m t o be. As deput i es i n Parl i ament, Ka r a s u
and the three other Je ws bent over backwards to prove that they
were Tur ks f i rst and Je ws only second; i ndeed, they support ed the
C. U. P. ' s measures agai nst Zi oni st settl ement i n Pal esti ne. Lowt her
expl ai ned this away by cl ai mi ng that the new goal of Zi oni sm was to
create a Jewi sh homel and not in Pal esti ne but i nstead in a secti on of
what i s now I raq.
Th e Fi t zMauri ce and Lowt her report won wi de acceptance among
Bri ti sh officials and led the Bri ti sh government into at least three
prof ound mi sconcept i ons that had i mportant consequences.
Th e fi rst of these concerned the inner worki ngs of the C. U. P .
Fi t zMauri ce and Lowt her mi sl ed their government into bel i evi ng
that the Young Tur ks were controlled by two men. Tal aat and
Dj avi d ("who is a Crypt o- Jew") were, accordi ng to Fi t zMauri ce and
Lowt her, "the official mani festati ons of the occult power of the
Commi t t ee. The y are the only members of the Cabi net who really
count, and are also the apex of Freemasonry in Tur ke y . "
1 2
In fact
the C. U. P. was split into facti onsfacti ons with which the Bri ti sh
government coul d have i ntri gued, had i t known that they exi s t ed.
1 3
It was an ironic coi nci dence that Dj avi d, whom Fi t zMauri ce and
Lowt her feared as a Crypt o- Jew, was the leader of the pro-Bri ti sh
facti on; but Fi t zMauri ce and Lowt her di d not know that.
A second mi sconcepti on was that a group of Jews wielded political
Karasu, however, did attempt at various times to reconcile the aims of Zionism
with those of C. U. P. nationalism.
power i n the Ot t oman Empi r e or i ndeed anywhere else i n the worl d
at that t i me. A few years later Fi t zMauri ce drew an obvi ous con-
clusion from his mi sconcept i on: that the worl d war (in which Bri tai n
was by then engaged) coul d be won by buyi ng the s upport of this
powerful group. It s s upport coul d be bought , he deci ded, by promi s-
ing to s upport the establ i shment of a Jewi s h homel and in Pal esti ne
(he had by then determi ned that the Zi oni st movement desi red to
return to Zi on, not to I r aq) . Thi s reasoni ng hel ped to persuade the
Forei gn Office that i t ought to pl edge Bri ti sh support to the Zi oni st
programwhi ch it eventual l y di d in 1917.
Fi t zMauri ce' s mi si nformati on led to yet another concl usi on
with i mportant consequences: that the Young Tur k l eaders were
forei gners, not Tur ks , and that they served foreign i nterests. Thi s
was the opposi t e of the truth, and led Bri ti sh observers to mi scal cu-
late what the Young Tur k government woul d do. In fact, as even
Fi t zMauri ce and Lowt her saw, a pri nci pal failing of the C. U. P . was
its Turki s h chauvi ni sm. It di scri mi nat ed agai nst Je ws , Armeni ans,
Greeks , Ar abs , and others. Its st rengt h was that i t was oppos ed to all
foreign i nterests; its ant i - European bi as attracted wi de popul ar
support .
The British government never learned that Lowther and Fi tzMauri ce
had suppl i ed it with a warped view of Ot t oman politics. John
Buchan, who became wart i me Di rect or of Informati on for the Bri ti sh
government , descri bed the C. U. P. l eaders as "a collection of Je ws
and gi psi es, " pi ct ured the Ot t oman government as the tool of worl d
Jewry, and called Enver Pasha "a Pol i sh advent urer"conf usi ng hi m
with another Turki s h officer whose name was si mi l ar and whose
father was Pol i sh t hough not J e wi s h .
1 4
V
Th e years after 1908 proved to be a di saster for the Ot t oman Empi re,
in a war agai nst Italy and in another agai nst a Bal kan coal i ti on; and,
in 1913, it was in the process of l osi ng a second Bal kan War when the
C. U. P. suddenl y sei zed control of the government . Young Enve r
the same officer who had preci pi tated the events of 1908 in Sal oni ka
i mpet uousl y led a rai d on the Subl i me Porte; his rai di ng party killed
the Mi ni ster of War. Enver and his fri ends took office; he was
promot ed to a field command in which he covered himself with
gl ory, and on 4 January 1914, he took over the War Mi ni st ry for
himself. Thi rt y- one years ol d, Enver marri ed the niece of the Sul t an,
moved into a pal ace, and became the center of attention in Turki s h
politics.
Dj emal Pasha became Mi l i tary Governor of Const ant i nopl e, and
in that posi ti on consol i dated the C. U. P. ' s hold on the seat of govern-
ment. Halil Bey, Presi dent of the Chamber of Deput i es, al so as s umed
an i mportant role, as di d Mehmed Dj avi d, an economi cs teacher who
was appoi nt ed Mi ni ster of Fi nance. Tal aat , the pri nci pal C. U. P.
l eader, became Mi ni ster of the Interi or and the real leader of the
government . Th e courtly Pri nce Sai d Hal i m provi ded respectabi l i ty
as Gr and Vizier and Forei gn Mi ni ster.
Th e British government sent out a new ambas s ador, Si r Loui s
Mal l et, who was sympat het i c t o the Young Tur ks . He too, however,
was uni nformed about what was happeni ng i n Const ant i nopl e. Where
his predecessor had detected Jewi s h and German control , Mal l et sent
di spat ches to London that radi ated a mi sl eadi ng opt i mi sm about the
Porte's i ntenti ons. Li ke the previ ous ambassador, Mal l et failed to
underst and what the C. U. P. l eaders believed Turkey' s i nterests to
be.
In London the Cabi net persi sted i n accepti ng Lowt her and
Fi t zMauri ce' s mi staken notion that the C. U. P. was a monol i thi c
body. Lowt her and Fi t zMauri ce had reported that i t was controlled
by Tal aat and Dj avi d, while accordi ng to later reportsfol l owed by
most hi stori ansi t was rul ed by a dictatorial tri umvi rate of Enver,
Tal aat , and Dj emal . In fact, as the German archi ves now show,
power was wi el ded by the C. U. P. ' s Central Commi t t ee of about
forty members , and especi al l y by its general di rectorate of about
twelve members who functi oned as a sort of pol i tburo, in which
personal rivalries abounded. Deci si ons of the Central Commi t t ee
were reflected in the posi ti ons taken by party members in the Cabi net
and in the Chamber of Deput i es .
Th e C. U. P. encompassed a variety of opi ni ons, and was rife with
faction and i ntri gue. There was, however, a consensus about the
nature of the threat that the Ot t oman Empi re faced and about the
nature of the policy that ought to be adopt ed to counter it.
4
THE YOUNG TURKS URGENTLY
SEEK AN ALLY
i
Th e Young Tur k outl ook on current affairs was col ored by the
t rauma of conti nui ng territorial di si ntegrati on. Th e provi nces of
Bosni a and Hercegovi na (in what is now Yugosl avi a) , nomi nal l y still
Turki s h, were formal l y annexed by Aus t ro- Hungary i n 1908a
troubl i ng move that provi ded the background in 1914 to the as-
sassi nati on of the Archduke Franci s Ferdi nand and the out break of
the Fi rst World War. Ital y, a l atecomer to imperial expansi on, made
no secret of her desi gns on Ot t oman territory and, on a flimsy
pretext, attacked Turkey and in 1911 12 capt ured the coast of what
is now Li bya, as well as Rhodes and other i sl ands off the Turki s h
coast. At about the s ame ti me, Al bani a revolted agai nst Ot t oman
rul e, rai si ng a seri ous questi on as to whether the empi re coul d hold
the loyalties of its non- Turki sh subj ect s.
Meanwhi l e, i n the Fi rst Bal kan War (191213) the Bal kan Le ague
( Bul gari a, Greece, Mont enegro, and Serbi a) defeated Turkey and
annexed al most all of the territory the Ot t oman Empi re still held in
Europe. In the Second Bal kan War ( 1913) , the Ot t oman Empi re
managed to regain some territory i n Thrace, i mmedi atel y across the
water from Asi ati c Tur ke y; but that looked to offer merely a brief
respite in the empi re' s conti nui ng di si ntegrati on. In Const ant i nopl e,
the band of Young Tur k advent urers who had seized power and who
rul ed the empi re as the Sul t an' s mi ni sters, feared that their domai ns
were in mortal danger and that the European predat ors were cl osi ng
in for the kill.
Only a short ti me before, the nati ons of Europe had di vi ded up the
Afri can continent among themsel ves. Some of them were now hungry
for new conquest s. The r e were not many di recti ons in which they
coul d look. Much of the surface of the gl obe was al ready taken: a
quarter by the Bri ti sh Empi re and a sixth by the Russi an Empi re.
The western hemi sphere fell within the ambi t of the Monroe Doctri ne
and thus was shi el ded by the Uni t ed St at es. The Mi ddl e East was
45
the only vul nerabl e regi on left. The r e were rumors of French am-
bi t i ons i n Syri a; of Ital i an and Rus s i an desi gns further north; and of
rival Gr eek, Bul gari an, and Aust ri an cl ai ms to the west. Beyond the
eampfi res, the C. U. P . l eaders coul d sense the ani mal s i n the dark
movi ng in for t he attack.
I I
Th e C. U. P . l eadershi p was convi nced that its program of freei ng
the empi re from European cont rol a program that Bri ti sh states-
men, among ot hers, either di d not know about or di d not under-
st andwoul d preci pi t at e the attack. Ambi val ent i n its atti tude t oward
Eur opescorni ng i t as non- Mosl em, while admi ri ng its modern ways
and achi evement st he C. U. P . i ntended to throw off the shackl es of
Eur ope i n order t o i mi t at e Europe more closely. Th e Young Tur ks
seem to have had no coherent pl an for bri ngi ng European economi c
domi nati on to an end, but they want ed, somehow, to do it.
A vital item on the C. LT. P. ' s internal agenda was the moderni zati on
of transport and communi cat i ons. European interests were willing to
suppl y the networks and syst ems whi ch the Ot t oman Empi re l acked,
but of course want ed to own them, preferabl y on the basi s of excl u-
sive concessi ons. Th e C. U. P. l eaders, like other Ot t oman l eaders
before them, want ed the European technol ogi es to be i ntroduced but
were determi ned t o avoi d European ownershi p or control. Duri ng
the nineteenth century, Turkey had created her own postal servi ce,
even t hough it coexi sted within the empi re al ongsi de postal ser-
vices mai ntai ned for themsel ves by vari ous European powers .
1
Re-
jecti ng an offer from a Bri ti sh company, the Ot t oman Empi re also
created its own tel egraph net work.
2
A few tel ephones were in use in
Const ant i nopl e and Smyrna in 1914; a foreign group had been gi ven
a concessi on to install a tel ephone syst em in Const ant i nopl e in 1911,
but had not made much pr ogr e s s .
3
Th e comi ng of the st eamshi p had put Ot t oman mari t i me traffic
largely in the hands of foreign i nt erest s.
4
Such as they were, the
empi re' s few railway lines were also in foreign hands. * The r e were
few roads and still fewer aut omobi l es to make use of t hem: 110 in
Const ant i nopl e and 77 elsewhere by 1914. Th e traditional f orm of
transportati on was the caravan of camel s, horses, mul es, and ani mal -
drawn cart sand it coul d not compet e agai nst the forei gn-owned
"It is a measure of the iow degree of development of the Ottoman Empire that
in 1914, its 1,900,000 square kilometers had only 5,991 kilometers of railways," all
of it single-track.
3
T H E Y O U N G T U R K S U R G E N T L Y S E E K A N A L L Y 47
rai l roads. Th e usual speed of a mi xed caravan was between two and
three mi l es an hour, and its daily st age was only between fifteen and
twenty mi l e s .
6
Rai l road speeds were at least ten ti mes greater, and
the rai l road cost of t ransport i ng goods was perhaps only 10 percent
of the caravan cos t .
7
Th e C. U. P. di l emma lay i n wanti ng to swi tch from caravan to
rai l road wi thout al l owi ng the empi re to pass into the control of the
Europeans who owned the rai l roads. Europeans al ready exerci sed an
economi c preponderance whi ch the C. U. P. resented but coul d do
nothi ng about . Tur ke y was i n the unequal posi ti on of bei ng abl e
to suppl y only natural resources and havi ng to i mport her manu-
factured needs. Industri al i zati on was necessary i n order to redress
the bal ance; but the Porte had no program to achi eve it. Th e empi re
coul d suppl y onl y unski l l ed l abor; as the Europeans constructed
rai l roads and other types of machi nery, they brought al ong Euro-
peans to mai ntai n t hem. Techni cal trai ni ng for the local popul ati on
was what was needed; agai n the Porte had no program to provi de it.
Europeans al so shared in the control of what is at the heart of a
political entity: its finances. Because the Porte had defaul ted on a
publ i c debt of more than a t housand million dol l ars in 1875, the
Sul t an was obl i ged to i ssue a decree in 1881 that pl aced admi ni st rat i on
of the Ot t oman publ i c debt in European hands. A counci l was
created for the purpose and was gi ven control of al most one-quarter
of the Ot t oman Empi re' s revenues. It wielded excl usi ve authori ty
over the cus t oms duti es on such basi c i tems as alcoholic spi ri ts,
s t amps , salt, and f i sh.
8
Th e Subl i me Porte was no l onger master
even of its own Tr e as ur y or Cus t oms Hous e. Th e C. U. P . wanted t o
take back control in these areas, t hough it had no refinancing program
to propose.
Bitterly resented by all Ot t oman l eaders were the Capi t ul at i ons,
the concessi ons that provi ded Europeans with a pri vi l eged economi c
position within the empi re and whi ch pl aced them for many purposes
under the juri sdi cti on of their own consul s rather than of the
Ot t oman court s. No Tur ki s h pol i ceman coul d enter the premi ses of a
European or Ameri can wi thout the permi ssi on of the latter's consul .
Th e C. U. P. wanted t o cancel these Capi tul ati on pri vi l eges.
Anot her ground for C. U. P. resentment was that the European
powers had, on occasi on, vi ol ated Ot t oman soverei gnty i n inter-
veni ng i n defense of Chri sti an mi nori ti es and Chri sti an ri ghts. The
European di sposi ti on to do so posed a threat to the C. U. P. ' s secret
agenda, for the Young Tur ks proposed to assert their power not only
agai nst forei gners but also agai nst other groups i nhabi ti ng the empi re.
Thi s ran contrary to what they had pl edged i n 1908. The publ i c
program of the C. U. P. had called for equal ri ghts for all the many
rel i gi ous, ethnic, and l i ngui sti c groups that resi ded within the empi re.
Once i n power the C. U. P. showed the dark si de of its nati onal i sm by
asserti ng i nstead the hegemony of Turki s h- s peaki ng Mos l ems over
all others. Th e Turki s h- s peaki ng and Arabi c- speaki ng popul at i ons of
the empi re were roughl y equal each about 10 million peopl e, or
about 40 percent of the total popul at i on api eceyet in the Ot t oman
Chamber of Deput i es there were perhaps 150 Tur ks as agai nst only
about 60 Arabs . ( The fi gures are not exact because i t i s not clear i n
every case who was Ar ab and who was Tur k. ) Th e remai ni ng 20
percent of the popul ati on, i ncl udi ng the i mportant Greek, Armeni an,
Kur di s h, and Jewi sh communi t i es, was di scri mi nated agai nst even
more severely than were the Ar abs . Accordi ng to the eleventh edition
of the Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 191011) , the Ot t oman Empi re at
the ti me was i nhabi ted by twenty-two different "races", yet "no such
thi ng as an Ot t oman nation has ever been creat ed. " If ever there
were a chance of creati ng one, the C. U. P . l eaders threw it away by
excl udi ng 60 percent of the popul ati on from its purvi ew.
Tal aat , Enver, and their col l eagues were nationalists without a
nati on. Within the empi re (as di sti nct from the st eppes to its east ) ,
even those who spoke Tur ki s h were often of non- Turki s h ori gi n. Si r
Mark Sykes, a Bri ti sh Member of' Parl i ament who had travel ed
extensively i n Asi a, began one of hi s books by aski ng: "How many
peopl e realize, when they speak of Tur ke y and the Tur ks , that there
is no such pl ace and no such peopl e . . . ?"
9
Th e ancient homel and of
the Turki s h peopl es, Turkes t an, was i n the possessi on of Rus s i a and
Chi na. More than half the Turki s h peopl es of Asi a lived either there
or el sewhere outsi de the Ot t oman Empi re, so that the Czar coul d lay
greater cl ai m to speak for the ethnic Tur ks than coul d the Sul t an.
Enver Pasha was later associ ated with the dream of reuni ti ng all the
Turki s h- s peaki ng peopl es and domai ns of Asi a, and certainly the
i dea was fami l i ar to hi m in 1914i ntel l ectual l y it was in the ai rbut ,
as of then, it di d not enter into his pl ans. A smal l man, much
addi ct ed to theatrical gest ures and to l arge programs that began with
the prefix "pan-, " Enver was also s uppos ed to harbor pan- Isl ami c
ambi t i ons. Hi s treatment of Ar ab fel l ow-Mosl ems shows that this,
too, was a sl ogan that he di d not transl ate into policy.
In the view of the C. U. P. l eadershi p, Europe woul d not let the
empi re survi ve i n any event and certainly woul d not allow the
C. U. P. to carry t hrough its programunl es s one of the Great Powers
coul d be i nduced to become Turkey' s protector. Th u s the search for
a European ally was the urgent and overri di ng item on the C. U. P .
agenda. Dj emal Pasha was pro- French, but when eventual l y he heard
that Enver had proposed an alliance with Germany, he approvi ngl y
comment ed that "I shoul d not hesi tate to accept any alliance which
rescued Turkey f rom her present posi ti on of i sol at i on. "
1 0
T H E Y O U N G T U R K S U R G E N T L Y S E E K A N A L L Y 4 9
I I I
All shades of opi ni on within the C. U. P . were i n agreement that the
most urgent i tem on Turkey' s agenda was to secure a powerful
European ally. Th e Young Tur ks bel i eved that one of the European
bl ocs or i ndeed any one of the l eadi ng Great PowersBri t ai n,
France, or Germanycoul d protect the Ot t oman Empi r e agai nst
further encroachment s on its terri tory. Other than Rus s i a, the
countri es that were most likely to i nvade the Ot t oman Empi r e were
powers of l esser st rengt h: Ital y, Aus t ri a- Hungary, Greece, or
Bul gari a.
Dj avi d, the pro- Bri t i sh C. U. P. Mi ni ster of Fi nance, had al ready
appeal ed to Bri tai n. Hi s appeal had been made i n 1911, at the ti me
of the initial Ital i an attack on Tur ke y. Churchi l l was the only seni or
Cabi net mi ni ster who had wanted to respond positively. Argui ng
that Turkey' s fri endshi p was more i mport ant than Italy's, Churchi l l
wrote to the Forei gn Secretary that Turkey "is the greatest l and
weapon wh the Ge r mans cd use agai nst us."
11
At the end of 1911,
when Dj avi d wrote to propose a permanent alliance with Bri tai n,
Churchi l l wanted to send an encouragi ng repl y, but the Forei gn
Office woul d not agree to his doi ng s o .
1 2
Between May and Jul y 1914, with i ncreasi ng urgency the C. U. P.
l eaders secretly approached three other European Great Powers i n
search of an al l y.
1 3
Dj emal , the Mi ni ster of Mari ne, who was pro-
French, made overtures t o France but was rebuffed. Tal aat , i n
desperati on, approached Rus s i awhi ch was like aski ng the chief
burgl ar to become chief of pol i ceand his proposal , too, was
rebuffed. Fi nal l y, the C. U. P. l eaders conferred together at the villa
of the Gr a nd Vizier and authori zed Enver, who had served i n Berl i n,
to approach Ge r many with a request for an alliance. Enver made his
approach on 22 Jul y 1914. Hi s proposal was turned down by Hans
von Wangenhei m, Germany' s ambas s ador i n Const ant i nopl e. Th e
Ot t oman Empi re' s di pl omat i c isolation was compl et e; no Great Power
woul d agree to protect it.
Th e Ot t oman War Mi ni ster was qui t e open i n expl ai ni ng to the
Ge r man ambas s ador why the Young Tur ks were seeki ng an ally.
Enver expl ai ned to von Wangenhei m that the domest i c ref orms
pl anned by the C. U. P. coul d be carri ed out only i f the Ot t oman
Empi re were "secured agai nst attacks f rom a br o a d. "
1 4
He expressed
his belief that the empi re coul d be secured agai nst such attacks only
by "the s upport of one of the groups of Great Powers . "
1 0
Apparent l y
he was unabl e to pers uade the Ge r man ambas s ador that the Ot t oman
Empi re had anythi ng of sufficient val ue to gi ve in return.
Th e government of Bri tai n, meanwhi l e, was unaware of the flurry
of Turki s h di pl omat i c activity and di d not realize that the Porte was
urgentl y seeki ng a Great Power al l i ance. A few days after the Ge r man
ambas s ador i n Const ant i nopl e rejected the Ot t oman proposal , Bri ti sh
mi ni sters recei ved their first i nti mati on that a war crisis mi ght
arise in Europe that coul d involve Bri tai n. Between 23 Jul y 1914,
when Aust ri a- Hungary sent an ul t i mat um to Serbi a, and 4 August ,
when Bri tai n unexpectedl y f ound herself at war al ongsi de the
Entente Powers ( France and Rus s i a) and agai nst the Central Powers
( Germany and Aus t ri a- Hungary) , few thoughts were spared for the
Ot t oman Empi r e ; but to the extent that they were, the common
assumpt i on was that Ge r many mi ght at t empt to entice the Ot t oman
Empi re into an al l i ance.
Bri ti sh l eaders at the t i me never suspect ed that it was the other
way around: that Tur ke y was seeki ng an alliance with Germany, and
that Ge r many was rel uctant to grant it. Even after the war was over,
when i t was di scovered that Tal aat and Enver had sought the al l i ance,
details of how the Ot t oman Empi re and Germany forged their al-
liance remai ned obscure. Cont emporari es and a number of hi stori ans
bl amed Wi nston Churchi l l , who was sai d to have dri ven the Tur ks
into Germany' s arms ; but the sti l l -emergi ng evi dence f rom di pl omat i c
archi ves tells a different and more compl ex storywhi ch began in
1914, on the eve of a s udden war cri si s that neither Churchi l l nor his
Cabi net col l eagues had foreseen.
5
WINSTON CHURCHI LL ON THE
EVE OF WAR
i
In 1914, at the age of thirty-nine, Wi nston Churchi l l was about to
begi n his fourth year as Fi rst Lo r d of the Admi ral t y i n the Li beral
government of Pri me Mi ni ster Herbert Asqui t h. Though he admi n-
istered his i mport ant depart ment al office ably and vi gorousl y, he was
not then the i mposi ng figure the worl d later came to know. Hi s
energy and t al ent and his gift for publ i ci zi ng his own expl oi t shad
brought hi m forward at an early age; but i t was largely the amus ed
i ndul gence of the Pri me Mi ni ster and the powerful sponsorshi p of
Davi d Ll oyd George, the Chancel l or of the Exchequer, that sustai ned
hi m i n his governmental posi ti on. He was a decade or more younger
than the other members of the Cabi net , and the opi ni on was wi de-
spread that he was not sufficiently steady or mat ure to have been
entrusted with high office.
He still spoke with the trace of a school boy l i sp. Hi s face had just
begun to lose its last hi nts of adol escence. Onl y recently had the
belligerent tilt of the head, the broodi ng scowl, and the thrusti ng
ci gar started to take c ommand; and his sandy hair had begun to thin
a bi t. He had put on some wei ght i n recent years, but was not yet
portly. Of ruddy compl exi on, medi um height, and with a hint of
rounded lines, he was physi cal l y unprepossessi ng; only with hind-
sight coul d it have been seen that he woul d one day appear f ormi dabl e.
It was not his person but his dri vi ng personal i ty that fasci nated
those who encountered hi m. He was a mercuri al fi gure, haunt ed by
the specter of his brilliant, di seased father who had di ed a political
failure at the age of forty-five. Feari ng that he, too, woul d die young,
Churchi l l had shamel essl y el bowed friend and foe asi de i n his dash to
the top in the short ti me that he bel i eved still remai ned to hi m. Some
suspect ed that, like his father, he was emotionally unbal anced, while
others regarded hi m as merel y too young. He combi ned aspect s of
greatness with those of chi l di shness; but his col l eagues recogni zed
the chi l di shness more readily than they di d the great ness. He was
51
moody; he took thi ngs personal l y; and he often embarked on lengthy
ti rades when i nstead he shoul d have been listening or observi ng.
Though generous and warm- heart ed, he was not sensi ti ve to the
thoughts and feelings of others, and often was unaware of the effect
produced by his own words and behavi or. He was noi sy; he brought
passi on into everythi ng he undert ook. Col l eagues who ai med at
det achment and underst at ement f ound hi m t i resome.
He often changed his vi ews; and si nce he al ways hel d his vi ews
passi onatel y, his changes of mi nd were as violent and ext reme as they
were frequent. He had been a To r y and now was a Li beral . He had
been the most pro- German of mi ni sters and had become the most
ant i - German. He had been the l eadi ng pr o- Tur k i n the Cabi net and
was t o become the most ant i - Turk. To his enemi es he appeared
dangerousl y foolish, and even his fri ends remarked that he al l owed
himself to be too easily carri ed away.
Unl i ke the others, he di sdai ned to pl ay it safe. He had sol di ered in
Indi a, seen war i n Cuba and the Sudan, and become a hero by
escapi ng from a pri soner-of-war c amp i n Sout h Afri ca. Taki ng ri sks
had brought hi m f ame and had cat apul t ed hi m to the top i n politics.
He was happy i n hi s marri age and i n his high government office, but
his t emperament was restl ess: he sought worl ds to conquer.
Thr e e years beforei n the s umme r of 1911an unexpect ed op-
portuni ty had opened up for hi m to fulfill some of his ambi t i ons. At
that t i me, duri ng the course of a brief international cri si s, the Asqui t h
government had been shocked to learn that the Admi ral t y was not
prepared to carry out wart i me mi ssi ons i n support of the army. To
their amazement , Cabi net mi ni sters at the ti me were told that the
Royal Navy was unabl e to t ransport a Bri ti sh Expedi t i onary Force
across the Engl i sh Channel . The y al so learned that the Admi ral t y
was unwilling to create a Naval War Staff. It became clear to Asqui t h
and his col l eagues that a new Fi rst Lo r d of the Admi ral t y had to be
appoi nt ed to institute basi c ref orms.
Churchi l l , then Home Secret ary, angl ed for the j ob, and his
mentor, Ll oyd George, proposed hi m for it. Predi ctabl y, his candi -
dacy was hampered by his youth. At thirty-six he was al ready, with a
solitary excepti on, the youngest person ever to serve as Home Sec-
retary; and his many enemi es, who cl ai med that he had pushed
himself forward with unseeml y haste, argued that he had run ahead
of himself. To t hem he appeared to possess i n excess the characteri sti c
faul ts of yout h: obsti nacy, i nexperi ence, poor j udgment , and i mpul -
si veness. Th e other l eadi ng contender for the posi ti on of Fi rst Lo r d
expressed warm admi rat i on for Churchi l l ' s energy and courage, but
echoed the usual accusati on that the young Home Secretary was too
apt to act first and think af t erward.
1
For whatever reason, the Pri me Mi ni ster deci ded to take a chance
WI N S T O N C H U R C H I L L O N T H E E V E O F WAR 53
on Churchi l l ; and the record of the Admi ral t y from the s ummer of
1911 to the s ummer of 1914 showed that he had won his wager.
Inspi red by Lo r d Fi sher, the retired but still controversi al Admi ral
of the Fl eet, Churchi l l had t ransf ormed the coal - burni ng nineteenth-
century fl eet into an oi l -burni ng twenti eth-century navy.
I I
El ected to Parl i ament for the first ti me in 1900, Churchi l l took his
seat (in 1901) as a member of the Conservati ve Part y: a Uni oni st
(the term usual l y used at this peri od) , or a Conservat i ve, or ( usi ng
the older word) a Tor y. But on the bitterly di sput ed i ssue of free
t rade, i n 1904, he crossed the fl oor of the Hous e and joi ned the
Li beral s .
As a political renegade, Churchi l l was di st rust ed by both
part i esnot entirely without reason, for his political instincts were
never wholly at one with either of t hem. He tended toward Li beral i s m
on social and economi c i ssues, but on quest i ons of foreign and
defense policy his i nsti ncts were To r y . Churchi l l was bel l i gerent
by nature and out of sympat hy with the streak of idealistic paci fi sm
that ran through the Li beral Part y. He i nheri ted a geni us for war-
fare f rom Bri tai n' s greatest general , his ancestor the Duke of
Marl borough; he had been school ed at a military academy rather
than at a uni versi ty; he had served on active duty as an army officer;
and he was enthral l ed by the professi on of arms . When Violet
Asqui t h, aboard the Enchantress in 1912, looked out at the lovely
Medi t erranean coastl i ne and excl ai med, "How perfect!", he repl i ed,
"Yes range perfectvi si bi l i ty perf ect If we had got some si x-i nch
guns on board how easily we coul d bombard . . . "
2
As war cl ouds suddenl y gat hered over the s ummert i me ski es of
1914, Li beral pacifists seemed to be out of touch with events while
Churchi l l at the Admi ral t y seemed to be the right man at the right
pl ace at the right t i me.
CHURCHI LL SEIZES TURKEY' S
WARSHIPS
i
On the out break of war, Wi nston Churchi l l briefly became a national
hero i n Bri tai n. Al t hough the Cabi net had refused hi m permi ssi on to
do so, he had mobi l i zed the fleet on hi s own responsi bi l i ty in the last
days of peaceti me and had sent i t north to Scapa Fl ow, where i t
woul d not be vul nerabl e to a Ge r man surpri se attack. What he had
done was probabl y illegal, but events had justified his acti ons, whi ch
in Bri tai n were appl auded on all si des.
Margot Asqui t h, the Pri me Mi ni ster' s wife, once wondered i n her
di ary what i t was that made Wi nston Churchi l l pre-emi nent. "It
certainly i s not his mi nd, " she wrote. "Certai nl y not his j udgment he
i s constantl y very wrong i ndeed . . . " She concl uded that: "It i s of
course his courage and col ourhi s amazi ng mi xt ure of i ndustry and
enterpri se. He can and does al waysal l ways put s himself i n the
pool . He never shi rks, hedges, or protects hi msel f t hough he thi nks
of himself perpetual l y. He takes huge risks [original emphas i s ] . "
1
Mobi l i zi ng the fl eet despi te the Cabi net' s decision not to do so was
a huge risk that ended in t ri umph. In the days following Bri tai n' s
entry into the war even his bi tterest political enemi es wrote to
Churchi l l to express their admi rat i on of hi m. For much of the rest of
his life, his proudest boast was that when war came, the fl eet was ready.
At the t i me, his commandeeri ng of Turki s h battl eshi ps for the
Royal Navy was appl auded al most as much. An i l l ustrated page
in the Taller of 12 Augus t 1914 reproduced a phot ograph of a
determi ned-l ooki ng Churchi l l , with an inset of his wife, under the
headi ng " BRAVO WI N S T ON ! Th e Rapi d Mobi l i sati on and Purchase of
the Two Forei gn Dreadnought s Spoke Vol umes for your Work and
Wi s dom. "
2
Th e battl eshi ps were the Reshadieh and the l arger Sultan Osman I.
Bot h had been built i n Bri ti sh shi pyards and were i mmensel y power-
ful; the Osman mount ed more heavy guns than any battl eshi p ever
bui l t bef ore.
3
Each originally had been ordered by Brazi l , but then
54
C H U R C H I L L S E I Z E S T U R K E Y ' S WA R S H I P S 55
had been built i nstead for the Ot t oman Empi re. Th e Reshadieh,
though l aunched i n 1913, had not been delivered because the Tur ks
had lacked adequat e modern docki ng facilities to accommodat e her.
With Churchi l l ' s support , Rear- Admi ral Si r Art hur H. Li mpus ,
head of the Bri ti sh naval mi ssi on, had l obbi ed successful l y with
the Ot t oman authori ti es to secure the contract to bui l d docki ng
facilities for two Bri ti sh f i rmsVi ckers, and Armst rong Whi tworth.
The docki ng facilities havi ng been compl et ed, the Reshadieh was
schedul ed to leave Bri tai n soon after the Sultan Osman I, which was
to be compl et ed i n Augus t 1914.
Churchi l l was aware that these vessel s meant a great deal to the
Ottoman Empi r e . The y were i ntended to be the maki ng of the
modern Ot t oman navy, and i t was as s umed that they woul d enabl e
the empi re to face Greece i n the Aegean and Russi a i n the Bl ack Sea.
Thei r purchase had been made possi bl e by patriotic publ i c subscri p-
tion throughout the empi re. Th e tales may have been i mproved i n
the telling, but it was sai d that women had sol d their jewelry and
school chi l dren had gi ven up their pocket - money to contri bute to the
popul ar s ubs cri pt i on.
4
Admi ral Li mpus had put out to sea from
Const ant i nopl e on 27 Jul y 1914, with shi ps of the Turki s h navy,
wai ti ng to greet the Sultan Osman I and escort her back t hrough the
strai ts of the Dardanel l es to the Ot t oman capi tal , where a "navy
week" had been schedul ed with lavish ceremoni es for the Mi ni ster
of Mari ne, Ahmed Dj emal , and for the cause of Bri t i sh- Ot t oman
fri endshi p.
Churchi l l , who was reckoned the most pro- Turk member of the
Asqui t h Cabi net , had followed with care, and had support ed with
ent husi asm, the mi ssi on of Admi ral Li mpus i n Turkey ever since its
inception years before. The Bri ti sh advi sory mi ssi on to the Ot t oman
navy was al most as l arge as the si mi l ar German mi ssi on to the
Ot t oman army, led by the Prussi an General of Caval ry, Ot t o Li man
von Sanders . Th e two mi ssi ons t o some extent count erbal anced
each other. Bri ti sh influence was thought to be st rong in the Mari ne
Mi ni stry. Ge r man influence was strongest i n the War Mi ni stry. In
London little was known of Mi ddl e East ern politics, but Churchi l l
enjoyed the rare advant age of havi ng personal l y met three of the five
l eadi ng figures i n the Ot t oman government : Tal aat , Enver, and the
Mi ni ster of Fi nance, Dj avi d. He therefore had been gi ven an oppor-
tunity to learn that Britain's conduct as naval suppl i er and advi ser
coul d have political repercussi ons in Const ant i nopl e.
Th e European war cri si s, however, propel l ed the newly built
Turki s h vessel s into significance i n both London and Berl i n. Th e
Reshadieh and Sultan Osman I were battl eshi ps of the new
Dreadnought cl ass. As such, they overshadowed other surface vessel s
and, in a sense, rendered them obsol ete. By the s ummer of 1914 the
Royal Navy had taken del i very of onl y enough to gi ve Bri t ai n a mar -
gi n over Ge r many of seven Dreadnought s . Si nce the Eur ope an war
was expect ed to be a short one, there s eemed to be no t i me to bui l d
more of t hem before battl e was j oi ned and deci ded. Th e addi t i on of
the two Dreadnought s bui l t for Tur ke y woul d i ncrease the power of
the Royal Navy significantly. Conversel y, their acqui si t i on by the
Ge r ma n Empi r e or its allies coul d deci si vel y shift the bal ance of
forces agai nst Bri tai n. It was not fanciful to s uppos e that the
Reshadieh and Sultan Osman I coul d pl ay a materi al role in det ermi n-
i ng the out come of what was to become the Fi rs t Worl d War.
Earl y in the week of 27 Jul y 1914, as the Fi rst Lo r d of the
Admi ral t y took precauti onary measures i n the war cri si s, he rai sed
the i ssue of whether the two Turki s h battl eshi ps coul d be taken by
the Royal Navy. Th e chain of events which apparentl y flowed from
Churchi l l ' s initiative in this matter eventually led to hi m bei ng bl amed
for the tragi c out break of war in the Mi ddl e East . In turn he later
at t empt ed to defend himself by pret endi ng that he had done no more
than to carry into effect s t andi ng orders. The history of these matters
has been confused ever si nce because both Churchi l l ' s story and the
story told by his detractors were fal se.
Accordi ng to Churchi l l ' s history of the Fi rst Worl d War, Bri ti sh
conti ngency pl ans adopt ed in 1912 provi ded for the taki ng of all
foreign warshi ps bei ng built in Bri t i sh yards in the event that war
shoul d ever occur. When the war broke out i n 1914, warshi ps were
bei ng built i n Bri ti sh yards for Turkey, Chi l e, Greece, Brazi l , and
Hol l and. Accordi ng to Churchi l l , he di d nothi ng more than follow
the regul ati ons adopt ed in 1912. Hi s version of the matter i mpl i ed
that he di d not si ngl e out the Ot t oman vessel s, but i nstead i ssued
orders appl i cabl e to all foreign warshi ps then under constructi on; he
wrote that the arrangement s for the taki ng of such vessel s "compri sed
an el aborate scheme" that had been devi sed years before and had
been brought up to date i n 1912.
s
Thi s account was not t rue. Sei zi ng the Turki s h warshi ps was an
original i dea of Churchi l l ' s and it came to hi m in the s ummer of
1914.
Duri ng the week before the war, the questi on of taki ng foreign
vessel s was rai sed for the first ti me on Tue s day, 28 Jul y 1914, in an
i nqui ry that Churchi l l di rected to the Fi rst Sea Lo r d, Pri nce Loui s
of Bat t enberg, and t o the Thi r d Sea Lo r d, Si r Archi bal d Moore.
"In case it may become necessary to acqui re the 2 Turki s h battl e-
shi ps that are neari ng compl eti on in British yards , " he wrote,
"please formul ate pl ans i n detail showi ng exactly the admi ni strati ve
action involved in their acqui si ti on and the prospect i ve financial
t ransact i ons. "
6
Admi ral Moore l ooked into the matter, and found no admi ni strati ve
or legal procedure that woul d justify sei zi ng the Turki s h shi ps. He
consul ted one of the legal officers of the Forei gn Office, who told
hi m that there was no precedent for taki ng any such acti on. Th e
Forei gn Office lawyer sai d that if Bri tai n were at war it coul d be
argued that national i nterests take precedence over legal ri ghts, but
that si nce Bri tai n was not at war it woul d be illegal for Churchi l l to
take the forei gn-owned vessel s. Th e lawyer advi sed the Admi ral t y
that, if it really needed the shi ps, it shoul d try to pers uade the
Ot t oman government to sell t he m.
7
Th e Tur ks suspect ed what Churchi l l had i n mi nd, for on 29 Jul y
the Forei gn Office warned the Admi ral t y that the Sultan Osman I
was taki ng on fuel and was under orders to depart for Const ant i nopl e
i mmedi atel y, even t hough unf i ni shed.
8
Churchi l l i mmedi atel y
ordered the bui l ders of both battl eshi ps to detain t hem. He also
ordered Bri ti sh securi ty forces to guard the vessel s and to prevent
Turki s h crews from boardi ng them or from rai si ng the Ot t oman fl ag
over t hem (which woul d have converted them, under prevai l i ng
international law, into Ot t oman terri tory).
Th e following day the At t orney- General advi sed Churchi l l that
what he was doi ng was not justified by statute, but that the welfare
of the Commonweal t h took precedence over other consi derati ons and
mi ght excuse his temporari l y detai ni ng the ves s el s .
9
A hi gh-ranki ng
permanent official in the Forei gn Office took the s ame poi nt of view
that day but pl aced it in a broader and more practi cal political
perspecti ve. "I think we mus t let the Admi ral t y deal with this ques-
tion as they consi der necessary, " he mi nut ed, "and afterwards make
such defence of our action to Turkey as we c an. "
1 0
On 31 Jul y the Cabi net accepted Churchi l l ' s view that he ought to
take both Turki s h vessels for the Royal Navy for possi bl e use agai nst
Germany i n the event of war; whereupon Bri ti sh sai l ors boarded the
Sultan Osman I. Th e Ot t oman ambas s ador called at the Forei gn
Office to ask for an expl anati on, but was told only that the battl eshi p
was bei ng detai ned for the ti me be i ng.
1 1
Towar d mi dni ght on 1 Augus t Churchi l l wrote i nstructi ons to
Admi ral Moore, in connecti on with the mobi l i zati on of the fleet, to
notify both Vi ckers and Arms t rong that the Ot t oman warshi ps were
to be detai ned and that the Admi ral t y proposed to enter into nego-
tiations for their pur c ha s e .
1 2
For the first ti me Churchi l l noted that warshi ps were also bei ng
built i n Bri ti sh shi pyards for countri es other than Turkey. Admi ral
Moore had brought this to the Fi rst Lord' s attention several days
before, but Churchi l l had not res ponded; nowal t hough the other
* Thi s opinion was rendered a week before, the outbreak of war between Britain
and Germany.
foreign vessel s were not of equal i mport ancehe ordered them to be
detai ned, too, for compl eti on and eventual purchase.
On 3 August the Admi ral t y entered into arrangement s with
Arms t rong for taki ng the Sultan Osman I into the Royal Navy
i mmedi at el y.
1 3
That eveni ng the Forei gn Office cabl ed the Bri ti sh
embassy i n Const ant i nopl e with i nstructi ons to i nform the Ot t oman
government that Bri tai n desi red to have the contract for the purchase
of the Osman transferred to Hi s Majesty' s Gove r nme nt .
1 4
Th e fol-
lowing day Si r Edward Grey sent a further cabl e to Const ant i nopl e,
sayi ng that he was sure the Turki s h government woul d underst and
Bri tai n' s posi ti on, and that "financial & other loss to Turkey will
receive all due consi derat i on. "
1 5
A key, but overl ooked, poi nt is that the Ot t oman government did
not learn for the first ti me of Churchi l l ' s sei zure of the battl eshi p
when officially i nformed of it in the 3 Augus t cabl e. Th e Tur ks knew
that the battl eshi ps were bei ng taken on 31 Jul y, and on or before 29
Jul y strongl y suspect ed that they were goi ng to be taken. Th e signifi-
cance of these dates will become clear presentl y.
II
In Berl i n the onset of the war cri si s on 23 Jul y led to some second
t hought s about the val ue of Turkey as an ally. On 24 Jul y 1914,
Kai s er Wi l hel m II personal l y overrul ed the negati ve deci si on of his
ambas s ador to Const ant i nopl e, and ordered that Enver' s offer of an
alliance shoul d be expl ored. An Austri an ul t i mat um to Serbi at he
ul t i mat um that initiated the war cri si s i n Eur ope had been de-
livered the previ ous eveni ng, and the Kai ser deci ded that "at the
present moment " Ot t oman interest i n contracti ng an alliance shoul d
be taken advant age of "for reasons of expedi ency. "'
6
Secret talks began at once i n Const ant i nopl e. On the Ot t oman
si de, the negoti ators were Pri nce Sai d Hal i m, the Gr and Vizier and
Forei gn Mi ni ster; Tal aat Bey, Mi ni ster of the Interi or; and Enver
Pasha, Mi ni ster of War. Al t hough Enver had told the Ge r man am-
bassador that a majori ty of the members of the C. U. P. Central
Commi t t ee were in favor of an alliance with Germany, the three
Ot t oman l eaders kept their negoti ati ons secret from the Central
Commi t t ee and even from their powerful col l eague Dj emal Pasha,
Mi ni ster of the Ma r i ne .
1 7
On 28 Jul y the Ot t oman l eaders forwarded their draft of a proposed
treaty of alliance to Berl i n. Des pi t e the Kai ser' s views, the Ge r man
Pri me Mi ni ster, Chancel l or Theobal d von Bet hmann Hol l weg, re-
mai ned unenthusi asti c about the potential entangl ement. On 31 Jul y,
the day the General Staff told hi m to i ssue the order to go to war,
Bet hmann Hol l weg sent a wire to his ambassador in Const ant i nopl e,
i nstructi ng hi m not to si gn a treaty of alliance with the Ot t oman
Empi re unl ess he was certain that "Tur key either can or will under-
take some action agai nst Rus s i a worthy of the na me . "
1 8
Augus t 1 was the crucial day in the negot i at i ons. Det ai l s of what
was sai d in the course of the bargai ni ng are still not known. On the
Ge r man si de, von Wangenhei m was operat i ng under direct instruc-
tions from the head of his government : the Chancel l or in Berl i n had
made i t qui te clear that the Ot t oman proposal shoul d be rejected
unl ess the Tur ks had somet hi ng unexpectedl y significant t o cont ri but e
to the Ge r man cause i n the war. In fact, the Tur ks di d not want t o
join in the fighting at all. As later events were to show, the Gr and
Vizier and his associ ates hoped that they woul d not be dr agged into
the war. Th u s on the face of it they had little to offer. Yet by the end
of the day the three Young Tur ks had wr ung an alliance agreement
from the Ge r mans , which both si des si gned the following afternoon.
Not merel y had the negoti ati ons been conduct ed i n secret, but
Arti cl e 8 of the treaty provi ded that the agreement shoul d cont i nue
to be kept secret. Arti cl e 4 was what the C. U. P . l eaders had chiefly
sought : "Germany obl i gates itself, by force of ar ms if need be,
to defend Ot t oman terri tory i n case i t shoul d be t hr eat ened. "
1 9
Germany' s obl i gati on was a conti nui ng one for the length of the
treaty, which was schedul ed to expi re on 31 December 1918.
Th e Ot t oman Empi re i n turn undertook t o observe strict neutrality
i n the then current conflict between Serbi a and Aust r i a- Hungar y and
to go to war only if Germany were requi red to enter the fighting by
the t erms of her treaty with Aust ri a. In such ci rcumst ances, and in
such ci rcumst ances only, the Ot t oman Empi r e pl edged that i t too
woul d i ntervene, and woul d allow the Ger man military mi ssi on i n
Const ant i nopl e to exerci se "effective influence" over the conduct of
its armi es.
Th e day after the treaty was si gned, the Porte ordered general
mobi l i zati on to begi n, but al so procl ai med neutrality i n the Eur opean
conflict. Th e treaty remai ned a secret ; and Enver and his co-
conspi rators cl ai med that the program of mobi l i zati on was not di-
rected agai nst the Al l i ed Powers. Th e Ot t oman l eaders went out of
their way in conversati ons with Al l i ed representati ves to st ress the
possi bi l i ty of friendly rel ati onshi ps, and Enver went so far as to
suggest that Tur ke y mi ght join the Al l i es.
* The treaty was signed the day after Germany had declared war on Russia.
Germany had not been required to declare war by the terms of her treaty with
Austri a; as it happened, Germany declared war several days before Austria-Hungary
did. The oddly drawn treaty with the Ottoman Empire therefore did notif read
literallyobligate the Turks to enter the war.
6 0 A T T H E C R O S S R O A D S OF H I S T O R Y
Berl i n, hitherto skepti cal of what the Ot t oman Empi re coul d con-
tri bute, now became anxi ous t o obtai n Turki s h assi st ance. On
5 Augus t the Chi ef of the Ge r man General Staff, who only weeks
before had sai d that the Ot t oman Empi re at Germany' s si de woul d
not be an "asset, " began to press for Turki s h aid agai nst Bri tai n as
well as Rus s i a ;
2 0
but the Tur ks refused to be hurri ed into taki ng
acti on. Indeed the lack of t ransport at i on facilities made it i mpossi bl e
for the empi re to mobi l i ze swiftly.
Th e army had been gui ded for several years by a Ge r man mi l i tary
mi ssi on, so the Ge r man ambas s ador presumabl y had been i nf ormed
that i t woul d be physi cal l y i mpossi bl e for the Ot t oman Empi re to
enter the war until the late aut umn or the winter. Si nce al most
everybody' s assumpt i on on 1 Augus t was that the war woul d be
over within a few mont hs, von Wangenhei m had grant ed the
Young Tur ks an alliance even t hough he mus t have bel i eved that the
Ot t oman Empi re woul d not be ready to fight until the war was
al most over. Yet his i nstructi ons from Berl i n were that he shoul d not
concl ude an alliance unl ess the Young Tur ks coul d prove to hi m that
they had somet hi ng meani ngful to contri bute to the Ge r man war
effort. What was that "somethi ng meani ngful "?
Th e common assumpt i on of hi stori ans seems t o be that the Tur ks
offered nothi ng new that dayt hat , in effect, von Wangenhei m
i gnored his i nstructi ons f rom Berl i n. If so, he may have been seeki ng
to pl ease the Kai s er; or it may be that the threatened out break of a
general European war led hi m to view the Ot t oman Empi re as more
significant militarily than he had bel i eved ten days bef ore. If, how-
ever, von Wangenhei m did at t empt to follow the i nstructi ons he had
received from Berl i n, then the quest i on which hi stori ans have not
asked becomes i ntri gui ng: what di d Enver offer Germany on 1 Augus t
that was so i mport ant that the Ge r man ambas s ador changed his
mi nd and agreed that, i n ret urn, Ge r many woul d protect the Ot t oman
Empi re?
Ill
A coupl e of decades ago, a curi ous fact came to light. A student of
the Ge r man di pl omat i c archi ves di scl osed that they showed that on
1 August 1914 Enver and Tal aat , in a meeti ng with Ambas s ador
von Wangenhei m, s uddenl y offered to t urn over to Ge r many one of
the mos t powerful warshi ps in the worl d: the Sultan Osman.
21
Von
Wangenhei m accept ed the offer; and Bri t i sh Intel l i gence report s
from behi nd Ge r man lines two weeks later showed that officers of
the Ge r man fl eet had eagerl y expect ed to receive the vitally i mportant
new wars hi pand apparent l y were bitterly di sappoi nt ed when
Churchi l l sei zed the vessel i ns t e ad.
2 2
Hi st ori ans have not exami ned this epi sode i n any great detail,
possi bl y because on the surf ace i t seems so difficult to expl ai n. Enver
and Tal aat coul d not possi bl y have i ntended to gi ve away Turkey' s
pri ze battl eshi p, i n which the popul ace had i nvested so much emoti on
as well as money; and i n which the empi re took such pri de; i t woul d
have been political sui ci de for any Ot t oman leader to even propose to
do so. Yet the evi dence cannot be di s put ed; i n secret, they made von
Wangenhei m the offer.
In another connecti on, some twenty years ago a student of the
Ot t oman archi ves ment i oned, in passi ng, a conversati on that mi ght
provi de an expl anati on. On the s ame day that Enver and Tal aat
made their offer to Ge r ma ny 1 Augus t 1914Enver reveal ed to
fellow Young Tur k l eaders that Bri tai n had seized the Osman.
21
Thus on 1 Augus t he al ready knew! Indeedsi nce it is now known
that, i n London, the Tur ks suspect ed on 29 Jul y that Churchi l l was
about to seize the Osman, and on 31 Jul y protested that he had
al ready done soi t is entirely possi bl e that even before 1 Augus t
Enver knew that the battl eshi p had been taken by Bri t ai n.
Mi ght thi s not provi de the answer to an earlier questi on? Von
Wangenhei m was not s uppos ed to grant the Ot t oman Empi r e an
alliance unl ess the Tur ks coul d show that they woul d make a materi al
contri buti on to the defeat of the Al l i es. But nonethel ess he agreed to
an alliance on 1 Augus t , when the week before he had not bel i eved
that the Ot t oman armed forces coul d make such a contri buti on. Was
not the offer of the Osman on 1 Augus t , therefore, the materi al
contri buti on that bought Enver and Tal aat their Ge r man alliance?
If Enver and Tal aat knew before maki ng their secret offer that
they had al ready lost the Osman to Bri t ai nt hat it was therefore no
longer thei rs to di spose ofthey could have made the offer; they
coul d have made i t with i mpuni ty. In fact the Ge r mans never di s-
covered that they had been duped. The y seem to have as s umed that
Enver and Tal aat meant to keep their si de of the bargai n, and only
learned they coul d not do so when they received official notification
of Churchi l l ' s action several days laterafter Germany had al ready
si gned a pl edge to protect the Ot t oman Empi re agai nst its enemi es,
largely i n return (it i s specul at ed here) for Enver' s and Tal aat ' s
worthl ess promi se.
7
AN I NTRI GUE AT THE SUBLI ME
PORTE
i
In the course of the secret negoti ati ons between Germany and the
Young Tur ks i n Const ant i nopl e on 1 August , Enver, the Mi ni ster
of War, held a pri vate meet i ng in the Ge r man embas s y in Const an-
ti nopl e with the Ge r man ambas s ador, Hans von Wangenhei m, and
with the head of the Ge r man mi l i tary mi ssi on, Otto Li man von
Sande r s .
1
Th e three men di scussed the form that mi l i tary col l abora-
tion between their countri es mi ght take i f Turkey and Bul gari a
shoul d contract with each other to join in a war agai nst Rus s i a on
Germany' s si de. It seemed to t hem that naval mast ery was essential
if a successful campai gn were to be mount ed. The y concl uded that
the Ge r man Medi t erranean fleet, consi sti ng of the powerful Goeben
and its sister shi p, the Breslau, shoul d come to Const ant i nopl e to
strengthen the Ot t oman fleet i n the Bl ack Sea so as to gi ve the
Turki s h- Bul gari an armi es a free hand in i nvadi ng Rus s i a. Signifi-
cantly, none of the three men appears to have bel i eved that the
Osman mi ght be avai l abl e to fulfill that functi on. Presumabl y Enver
al ready knew that he had lost the battl eshi p to Bri t ai n; while the
Germans believed that the vessel under orders from Enverwas
goi ng to join the Ge r man fl eet at a Nort h Sea port, so that the
Goeben and the Breslau, which al ready were in the Medi t erranean,
coul d more conveni entl y come t o Const ant i nopl e.
After the conference, Li man and von Wangenhei m request ed their
government to send the Ge r man shi ps to Turkey. On 3 Augus t the
German Admi ral t y di spat ched orders to that effect to Rear- Admi ral
Wilhelm Souchon, commander of the Medi t erranean Squadr on. Th e
wireless message reached Souchon in the early morni ng of 4 Augus t ,
when he was cl ose to the coast of Al geri a where he i ntended to
di srupt the fl ow of t roops f rom French Nort h Afri ca to the mai nl and
of France. Deci di ng not to turn back i mmedi atel y, Souchon fi rst
shelled two port cities of Al geri a, and only then t urned back to refuel
in the neutral Ital i an port of Messi na in Si ci l y, where Ge r man
62
A N I N T R I G U E A T T H E S U B L I M E P O R T E 63
coal i ng-stati ons awai ted hi m. Sl owed down by defective boi l ers on
the Goeben, the s quadron di d not reach Messi na until the morni ng of
5 Augus t .
At his refuel i ng st op, Souchon received a tel egram from Berl i n
apparentl y changi ng his orders agai n. Enver had not consul ted his
col l eagues before inviting the Ge r man warshi ps to Const ant i nopl e;
they were by no means anxi ous to be drawn into the fighting, and
when the Ot t oman government l earned that the shi ps were en route,
i t warned Berl i n not to let t hem come. Berlin cabl ed Souchon that
his call on the Ot t oman capi tal was "not possi bl e"; but Souchon
chose to i nterpret this merel y as a warni ng rather than as an order,
and determi ned to proceed to Turkey to force the i ssue. Thi s per-
sonal deci si on of the Ge r man admi ral was a t urni ng poi nt in events.
Meanwhi l e, the Bri t i sh, whom Churchi l l had ordered to shadow
the Goeben, had lost si ght of her under cover of night on 4 Augus t ;
but on the 5th she was si ghted agai n, and the commandi ng Engl i sh
admi ral posi ti oned his naval s quadron to intercept her when she
shoul d come out of the strai ts of Mes s i na after refuel i ng. He pl aced
his squadron west of Si ci l y, to meet her as she returned to attack
Nort h Afri ca agai n, which i s what he s uppos ed she woul d do. A
much smal l er force was al ready stati oned i n the Adri ati c Sea, far to
the northeast, to bl ock her shoul d she attempt to return to her home
port of Pol a (in what "was then Aust ri a, but is now Yugos l avi a) .
On the Bri ti sh si de there was as massi ve a failure of political
i magi nati on in London, as there was of military compet ence at sea.
It seems never to have occurred to the Forei gn Office, the War
Office, or the Admi ral t y that the Ot t oman Empi re ought to figure i n
strategi c cal cul ati ons. Nei ther i n London nor i n the field di d anybody
i n command consi der the possi bi l i ty that Admi ral Souchon mi ght be
headed toward Const ant i nopl e. The y as s umed that when he headed
east i t was i n order to el ude t hem and doubl e back t oward the west.
When the Goeben and her sister shi p, the Breslau, emerged from
the strai ts of Messi na on 6 Augus t , Admi ral Souchon expected to
find his way bl ocked by a superi or Bri ti sh force. Inst ead he f ound
the way clear, and set his course toward the Aegean.
"It was all the Admi ral s' faul t, " the Pri me Mi ni ster' s daughter
later told Churchi l l . "Who but an Admi ral woul d not have put a
battl e-crui ser at both ends of the Messi na St rai t s, i nstead of put t i ng
two at one end and none at the ot her?"
2
She advi sed hi m to retire all
his admi ral s and promot e capt ai ns i n their pl ace.
Souchon di d encounter a Bri ti sh naval contingent as he st eamed
eastward, but it wi thdrew rather than risk battl e with the f ormi dabl e
Goeben. After prodi gi es of exertion on the part of the Ge r mans , and
of bl underi ng on the part of the Engl i sh pursuers, Souchon' s force
arri ved at the entrance to the strai ts of the Dardanel l es.
I I
At 1:00 in the morni ng on 6 Augus t , the Grand Vizier di scussed the
fate of the Goeben and Breslau with the German ambas s ador. Th e
Bri ti sh Medi t erranean Squadr on was following close behi nd the two
German shi ps, so that i f Turkey refused t hem admi t t ance to the
strai ts, they woul d be t rapped between the Turki s h forts in front of
t hem and the Bri ti sh s quadron behi nd t hem. Th e Gr and Vizier, Sai d
Hal i m, announced that his government had deci ded to allow the
German shi ps to enter the strai ts so that they coul d make good their
escape. But , he sai d, condi ti ons were attached to this permi ssi on;
and when he announced what they were, it became clear that his
t erms were st eep. The y showed t hat cont rary to what Bri ti sh ob-
servers bel i evedthe Young Tur k government i ntended t o escape
domi nati on by the Ge r mans , as well as other Europeans . Th e Porte
demanded that Germany accept six far-reachi ng proposal s, the first
of which was high on the list of C. U. P. pri ori ti esabol i ti on of
the Capi t ul at i ons, and thus of pri vi l eges hitherto accorded to the
Ge r mans and other Europeans . Other proposal s guaranteed Tur ke y
a share of the spoi l s of victory if Germany won the war. Fr om a
Ge r man poi nt of view these proposal s were out rageous, but unl ess
von Wangenhei m wanted to abandon the Goeben and Breslau to the
l ong-range guns of the Bri ti sh navy, he had no choi ce but to agree.
Th e Tur ks had hi m at gun poi nt.
At the Admi ral t y i n London, Turkey' s deci si on to admi t the
German warshi ps looked like col l usi on between Const ant i nopl e and
Berl i n. Churchi l l and his col l eagues had no i dea that what really was
goi ng on was extorti on; and Churchi l l angrily dashed off a tel egram
to his forces orderi ng t hem to institute a bl ockade of the Dardanel l es .
3
He had no authori ty to i ssue such an order on his own and, had
the order been carri ed out, it coul d have been const rued in
Const ant i nopl e as an act of war. In reply to a request for clarification,
the Admi ral t y cabl ed back that there had been a "mi stake in
wordi ng" and "no bl ockade i nt ended. "
4
Instead the Bri ti sh shi ps
were to wait in international waters for the German shi ps to come
out.
Bri tai n protested to the Sul t an' s government that under accepted
conventi ons of international law Turkey, as a neutral, was obl i ged
either to send the Ge r man shi ps back out or to intern t hem. Th e
Ot t oman government di d neither. Inst ead, the legal situation
prompt ed the Porte to extract further concessi ons from the Ge r mans .
Von Wangenhei m had barel y recovered from the extorti onate
demands of 6 Augus t when, on 9 Augus t , the Gr and Vizier had more
news for the Ge r man ambas s ador. Sai d Hal i m announced that the
Ot t oman Empi re mi ght join with Greece and Rumani a i n a publ i c
pact of neutral i ty in the European conflict. If so, somet hi ng woul d
have to be done about the conti nui ng presence of the Goeben and the
Breslau i n Tur ki s h waters so as not to compromi s e Tur ki s h neu-
trality. Th e Porte proposed a fictitious purchase of the two warshi ps:
the Tur ks woul d take over ownershi p of the vessel s, and woul d
pretend to have pai d for t hem. In that way there coul d be no
objecti on to the shi ps remai ni ng i n Tur ke y; there woul d be no
breachi ng of the l aws of neutral i ty.
On 10 Augus t the Ge r man Chancel l or cabl ed von Wangenhei m
from Berl i n rejecti ng thi s Turki s h proposal and urgi ng i mmedi at e
Turki s h entry into the war. Th e Young Tur k l eaders, however,
were reluctant to involve the empi re in the European conflict. Von
Wangenhei m was s ummoned that day to the Subl i me Porte, where
the Gr and Vizier angri l y reproached hi m for the premat ure arrival of
the Goeben and the Breslau. Ignori ng his own government' s com-
plicity i n the affair of the Ge r man warshi ps, Sai d Hal i m repeated his
proposal that the shi ps shoul d be transferred to Turki s h ownershi p.
Von Wangenhei m refused the proposal .
Th e Ot t oman government t hereupon unilaterally i ssued a publ i c
decl arati on falsely cl ai mi ng that i t had bought the two Ge r man
crui sers and had pai d eighty million marks for t hem. Publ i c opi ni on
t hroughout the empi re was el ated, and on 14 Augus t a frustrated von
Wangenhei m advi sed Berl i n that there was no choice but to go al ong
with the "sale"; to di savow it ri sked turni ng local senti ment violently
around agai nst the Ge r man cause. Hi s advi ce was heeded, and at a
ceremony on 16 Augus t the Mi ni ster of the Mari ne, Dj emal Pasha,
formally recei ved the vessel s into the Ot t oman navy.
Th e Tur ks di d not have the trai ned officers and crews that were
needed to operate and mai ntai n such sophi sti cated vessel s, and de-
ci ded that, for the ti me bei ng, the Ge r mans shoul d do it for t hem.
Admi ral Souchon was appoi nt ed commander of the Ot t oman Bl ack
Sea Fl eet, while his sai l ors were gi ven fezzes and Ot t oman uni f orms,
and went t hrough the f orms of enl i sti ng i n the Sul t an' s navy.
5
In
London the entire epi sode was vi ewed as a cal cul ated Ge r man
maneuver desi gned to show that Ge r many was generousl y restori ng
to the Ot t oman Empi re the type of modern warshi ps that Churchi l l
had wrongful l y taken away; and, even today, hi stori ans conti nue to
repeat that account of the affair.
It was little more than a week since angry school chi l dren had
poured into the streets of Const ant i nopl e to protest at Churchi l l ' s
sei zure of the battl eshi ps that had been purchased with their money.
6
Bri ti sh government l eaders were certain that there was a connec-
tion between the two events. Th e Pri me Mi ni ster' s comment about
Turkey' s "purchase" of the Ge r man shi ps was that "The Tur ks are
very angrynot unnat ural l yat Wi nston' s sei zure of their battl eshi ps
here. "
7
In turn, Churchi l l became angry at the Tur ks . On 17 Augus t the
Pri me Mi ni ster noted that "Wi nston, in his most bel l i cose mood all
for sendi ng a t orpedo flotilla thro' the Dardanel l est o threaten & if
necessary to sink the Goeben & her consort . "
8
Cabi net opi ni on,
however, was swayed by the views of the Secretary of St at e for War
and the Secretary of St at e for Indi a, who argued that i t woul d be
damagi ng for Bri tai n to appear to be the aggressor agai nst the
Ot t oman Empi re.
It appeared, however, that the Ot t oman Empi re was movi ng toward
the enemy camp, and the pl ausi bl e expl anati on commonl y accept ed
in London was that it was Churchi l l ' s sei zure of the Turki s h battl e-
shi ps which had caused that to happen. Wyndham Deedes , who had
returned from Turkey to Engl and in a dari ng journey via Berl i n,
went to see his fri end, the Ot t oman ambas s ador, i n London and
di scovered that, in fact, that expl anati on was unt rue: the battl eshi ps
were not at the heart of the probl em. Of course the Porte was upset
about the sei zure of the shi ps, but woul d not change its pro- German
policy even if the shi ps were ret urned.
Fear of Rus s i an expansi oni sm was at the heart of the Porte' s
policy. The Turki s h ambas s ador told Deedes that i f the Allies won
the war, they woul d cause or allow the Ot t oman Empi re to be
parti ti oned, while i f Germany won the war, no such partition woul d
be allowed to occur.
9
That was why the Porte had become pro-
Ge r man. Deedes deni ed that the Al l i es woul d allow the Ot t oman
Empi re to be parti ti oned, but the ambas s ador had been told by
Enver that the Al l i ed Powers had gi ven similar assurances years
before but had not kept their word. ( Enver di d not menti on that, i n
addi ti on, Germany had gi ven a wri tten guarant ee to protect Ot t oman
territory. He and his col l eagues conti nued to keep their treaty of
alliance with Germany a secret, and its exi stence was not revealed
until many years l ater. )
Deedes was al armed by his conversati on with the Turki s h am-
bassador, and warned the new Bri ti sh War Mi ni ster, Lo r d Ki t chener,
that Turkey was dri fti ng into the enemy camp because of her fears of
Al l i ed i ntenti ons. Si nce Bri tai n had allied herself with Rus s i aRus s i a,
which had been at t empt i ng to di s member the Ot t oman Empi re for a
century and a halfit woul d be no easy task to reassure the Porte,
but Deedes urged that the effort shoul d be made .
Churchi l l , meanwhi l e, was i ncreasi ngl y belligerent toward the
Ot t oman Empi re, whi ch he regarded as becomi ng enemy terri tory.
Informati on reachi ng hi m in the last half of Augus t i ndi cated that
Ge r man officers and men were movi ng overl and, through neutral
Bul gari a, to as s ume posi ti ons i n the Ot t oman armed forces. As
early as 26 Augus t Admi ral Li mpus had reported to Churchi l l that
"Constanti nopl e is al most compl etel y in German hands at this
mome nt . "
1 0
f:
Churchi l l conti nued to press for acti on. On 1 Sept ember he ini-
tiated staff talks between the Admi ral t y and the War Office to
plan an attack on Tur ke y i n the event of war. Th e following day
he recei ved authori ty f rom the Cabi net to sink Turki s h vessel s if
they i ssued from the Dardanel l es in company with the Goeben and
Breslau. Lat er he authori zed his Dardanel l es s quadron commander
to use his own di screti on as to whether to turn back Tur ki s h vessel s
attempti ng t o come out from the Dardanel l es by themsel ves. Thi s
was a bl under: i t drove the Tur ks to strike back with st unni ng
effectiveness.
Pursuant to Churchi l l ' s authori zati on, the s quadron st opped a
Turki s h t orpedo boat on 27 Sept ember and turned i t back; for,
i n violation of Ot t oman neutral i ty, i t had Ge r man sai l ors aboard. In
retaliation, Enver Pasha authori zed the Ge r man officer commandi ng
the Turki s h defenses of the Dardanel l es to order the strai ts to be
seal ed off and to compl et e the l ayi ng of minefields across t hem. Thi s
cut off the flow of Al l i ed merchant shi ppi ng and thus struck a
cri ppl i ng bl ow. Th e Dardanel l es had been Russi a' s one ice-free
mari t i me passageway to the west. Thr ough t hem she sent 50 percent
of her export t rade, notabl y her wheat crop whi ch, i n t urn, enabl ed
her to buy arms and ammuni t i on for the wa r .
1 1
Ha d the Al l i ed
l eaders realized that the Fi rst Worl d War was goi ng to devel op into a
l ong war of attrition, they coul d have seen that Turkey' s mi ni ng of
the strai ts threatened to bri ng down Czari st Rus s i a and, with her,
the Al l i ed cause.
Free pas s age t hrough the Dardanel l es had been assured by treaty;
once agai n the Ot t oman authori ti es were violating their obl i gati ons
under i nternati onal law, and once agai n they appeared to have been
provoked to do so by the acti ons of Wi nston Churchi l l .
Yet the Ot t oman Empi r e made no move to decl are war. Its posi ti on
of passi ve hostility left Churchi l l baffled and f r us t r at e d.
1 2
Ill
Though Churchi l l di d not know it, f rom the poi nt of view of the
German government , too, the si tuati on was baffling and f rust rat i ng;
German mi l i tary officers at t empt i ng to bri ng Turkey into the war
found themsel ves dri ven to anger and despai r.
Berlin was bitterly di sappoi nt ed that the conti nui ng presence
of the Goeben and Breslau di d not provoke Bri tai n into decl ari ng
war; and the Ge r man and Aust ri an ambas s adors recei ved repeated
demands f rom their home government s t o push the Tur ks into
taki ng acti on. Bot h ambas s adors recogni zed, however, that whatever
the Young Tur ks ' ul ti mate i ntenti ons mi ght be, the Gr and Vizier
A N I N T R I G U E A T T H E S U B L I M E P O R T E 6 7
and his col l eagues had val i d reasons for not movi ng toward inter-
vention in the European conflict i mmedi atel y. Mobi l i zati on of the
armed forces was not yet compl et ed; and i t was not clear, once
mobi l i zati on had been compl et ed, how the fragile Ot t oman exchequer
coul d conti nue to s upport it. Moreover, Turki s h negoti ati ons with
nei ghbori ng Bal kan countri es, and parti cul arl y with Bul gari a, had
not yet come to frui ti on.
Fr om the begi nni ng, the Porte had made clear its view that Tur ke y
coul d intervene i n the war only i n part nershi p with Bul gari a. Indeed,
the campai gn pl an that had been worked out on 1 Augus t by Enver,
Wangenhei m, and Li man von Sanders pres uppos ed that Bul gari a
and the Ot t oman Empi re woul d combi ne forces. Bul gari a sat astri de
Turkey' s pri nci pal l and route to the rest of Eur ope andof more
i mmedi at e i mport ancewas a nei ghbor who coveted addi ti onal terri-
tory. Were Bul gari a to i nvade Tur ke y while the Ot t oman armi es
were away fighting the Russi ans, the empi re woul d be hel pl ess.
"Surel y, " the Gr and Vizier remarked t o the Ge r man ambas s ador,
"Germany woul d not want Turkey t o commi t s ui ci de. "
1 3
Th e Bul gari ans, however, were reluctant t o commi t themsel ves,
and while Tal aat succeeded in negoti ati ng a defensi ve treaty with
Bul gari a, si gned on 19 Augus t , whi ch provi ded for mut ual assi stance
in certai n ci rcumst ances in case either country was attacked by a
thi rd party, the t erms of the treaty were i nappl i cabl e to the si tuati on
that woul d arise if Turkey shoul d join Germany in the war agai nst
Rus s i a. Bul gari a was not prepared to intervene i n the Rus s o- Ge r man
conflict; and, as the Ge r mans i n Const ant i nopl e had been made to
underst and, thi s meant that the Ot t oman Empi re, too, woul d con-
ti nue to mai ntai n its neutral i ty.
Berl i n and London bot h vi ewed Const ant i nopl e with despondency.
Churchi l l , it will be recal l ed, no l onger believed in Tur ki s h neu-
trality and had proposed to the Cabi net that a fl oti l l a be sent
up to the Dardanel l es to sink the Goeben and Breslau. But
i n Const ant i nopl e only two days later, General Li ma n von
Sande r s f r om the opposi t e poi nt of vi ewdespai red of bri ngi ng
Turkey into the war and sent a request to the Kai s er that he and his
military mi ssi on be al l owed to return home. Li ke Churchi l l , he raged
agai nst the Young Tu r k s ; he spoke of chal l engi ng Enver and Dj emal
to due l s .
1 4
In his request to the Kai s er, Li man poi nted out that
Enver' s recent st at ement s and mi l i tary di sposi ti ons i ndi cated that the
C. U. P. i ntended to keep Turkey on the sidelines until the war was
over, or at least until it became cl ear beyond a doubt that Germany
was goi ng to win it. He al so poi nt ed out that the Ot t oman armi es
mi ght col l apse even before enteri ng the war, for lack of money and
food, if the Porte conti nued to keep t hem in a state of mobi l i zat i on.
1 5
At roughl y the s ame t i me that Admi ral Li mpus was report i ng t o
Wi nston Churchi l l that Const ant i nopl e was al most compl etel y i n
Ge r man hands, General Li ma n von Sanders was reporti ng t o the
Kai s er that the whole at mosphere of Const ant i nopl e made i t al most
unbearabl e for Ge r man officers to conti nue their servi ce t he r e .
1 6
Th e Kai s er, however, refused Li man' s request that he shoul d be
allowed to return to Germany. Germany' s pl an to win the war
qui ckl y by a rapi d victory i n western Europe had col l apsed at the
fi rst Battl e of the Marne i n early Sept ember; and thereafter Berl i n
st epped up the pressure t o bri ng Tur ke y into the war. Th e Ge r man
ambas s ador, von Wangenhei m, was unabl e to expl ai n to his home
government how unreal i sti c, at least for the ti me bei ng, that project
appeared to be i n Const ant i nopl e. Even Enver, whom the ambas s ador
had once descri bed as st andi ng "like a rock for Ge r ma ny , "
1 7
bel i eved
that the ti me for acti on had not yet come: Turkey was not ready
militarily and, i n any event, Enver' s col l eagues were still oppos ed to
intervention.
Th e di fference between the ul ti mate objecti ves of the two govern-
ment s became vividly evi dent on 8 Sept ember 1914, when the Porte
suddenl y announced its unilateral abrogat i on of the Capi t ul at i ons
pri vi l eges of all forei gn powersi ncl udi ng Germany. Th e Ge r man
ambas s ador flew into a rage upon recei vi ng the news, and threatened
that he and the mi l i tary mi ssi on woul d pack up and leave for home
i mmedi atel y. In the event, however, neither he nor the mi ssi on left.
That they stayed i l l ustrated the i mprovement i n the Tur ki s h bar-
gai ni ng posi ti on si nce late Jul y.
In an extraordi nary maneuver, the Ge r man and Aust ri an am-
bassadors joi ned with their enemi es i n the war, the Bri ti sh, French,
and Russi an ambas s adors , i n present i ng a joint European protest to
the Porte, whereupon i t became evi dent how skillful the Turki s h
l eaders had been i n flirting without commi t t i ng themsel ves. For the
Ge r man and Aust ri an ambas s adors pri vatel y i nti mated to the Porte
that they woul d not press the i ssue for the ti me bei ng, while the
Al l i ed ambas s adors , i n t urn, i nti mated that they woul d accept the
Turki s h deci si on i f Turkey conti nued to remai n neutral .
Th e Porte went ahead to put its deci si on into effect. In early
Oct ober all foreign post offices i n the empi re were cl osed; forei gners
were made subj ect t o Turki s h l aws and court s; and cust oms dut i es
on foreign i mport s not only were taken over, but were al so rai sed.
I V
Consi deri ng the tangi bl e benefits that had begun to flow f rom the
policy of non-i nterventi on, it seems astoni shi ng that at about this
ti me Enver Pasha began to pl ot agai nst that policy and agai nst its
l eadi ng proponent , the Gr a nd Vi zi er. Th e substanti al Ge r man mili-
tary presence in Const ant i nopl e, support ed by the Goeben and
Breslau, may have pl ayed a role in his cal cul ati ons; but what Enver
had i n mi nd i s more likely to have been the course of the Rus s o-
Ge r man war. In Jul y and Augus t his policy had been moti vated by
fear of Rus s i an sei zures of Tur ki s h terri tory; but i n Sept ember, i n
the wake of the Russi an col l apse, he seems to have turned to t hought s
of Tur ke y sei zi ng Rus s i an terri tory. He swi tched f rom a defensi ve to
an aggressi ve pol i cy. Hi s swi tch was a t urni ng poi nt i n Ot t oman and
Mi ddl e East ern affai rs.
It may be surmi sed that the spect acul ar Ge r man mi l i tary t ri umphs
over the Russi ans at the battl e of Tanne nbe r g at the end of Augus t ,
and i n the ongoi ng battl e of the Mas uri an Lake s that began i n
Sept ember, persuaded Enver that, if Turkey wanted to win a share
of Russi an terri tory, she woul d have to intervene soon, before
Germany had won an unai ded vi ctory. Hundreds of t housands of
Rus s i an t roops had been killed or capt ured by the Ge r mans , and
even a l ess i mpet uous observer than Enver mi ght have concl uded
that Rus s i a was about t o lose the war. Th e Ge r man victory train was
l eavi ng the stati on, and the opport uni st i c Enver seems to have been
jol ted into bel i evi ng that i t was his last chance to j ump aboard. On
26 Sept ember Enver personal l y ordered the cl osi ng of the Dardanel l es
to all foreign shi ps (in effect, to Al l i ed shi ppi ng) without consul ti ng
his col l eagues. A week later he told von Wangenhei m that the Gr and
Vizier was no l onger in control of the si tuati on.
A bi d for power was taki ng pl ace in Const ant i nopl e behi nd cl osed
doors. Th e Bri ti sh Forei gn Office, which knew next to nothi ng about
the internal politics of the C. U. P. , took a si mpl i sti c view of the
affair. Si r Edwar d Grey, the Forei gn Secretary, later remembered
remarki ng that "nothing but the assassi nati on of Enver woul d keep
Turkey from joi ni ng Germany, " and addi ng "that, i n ti mes of crisis
and violence i n Turkey, there were apt to be two cl asses of pers on
assassi ns and assassi nat ed, and that the Gr and Vizier was more likely
than his opponent to bel ong to the latter c l as s . "
1 8
Woul d it have been possi bl e for a wel l -i nformed Bri t i sh am-
bassador to have exerted some influence on the evolution of events in
Const ant i nopl e? Hi st ori ans conti nue to debate the questi on, and of
course there i s now no way to put the matter to the t e s t .
1 9
Obs cure t hough the detai l s remai n, what was goi ng on i n the
aut umn of 1914 was a process in which rival factions and personal i ti es
maneuvered for s upport within the C. U. P. Central Commi t t ee.
Enver' s growi ng influence came from wi nni ng over Tal aat Bey to his
poi nt of view, for Tal aat headed the pri nci pal faction in the party.
Other C. U. P. l eaders, while shari ng Enver' s belief that Germany
woul d probabl y win the war, until now had seen no reason to hazard
their empi re' s future on the accuracy of that predi cti on. The y were
pol i ti ci ans, while Enver was a warri or, younger and more i mpet uous
than Churchi l l but filled with much the same passi on for gl ory. As
War Mi ni ster and Germany' s best fri end, he stood to benefit per-
sonally from the many opport uni t i es to i ncrease his f ame and posi ti on
that war at Germany' s si de woul d offer. A dashi ng figure who had
enjoyed al most unl i mi ted luck but had demonst rat ed only l i mi ted
ability, he failed to see that bets can be lost as well as won. In
put t i ng his chi ps on Germany, he t hought he was maki ng an invest-
ment when he was doi ng no more than pl aci ng a wager.
On 9 Oct ober, Enver i nformed von Wangenhei m that he had won
the s upport of Tal aat and of Halil Bey, Presi dent of the Chambe r of
Deput i es . Th e next move, he sai d, woul d be to try to gai n the
support of Dj emal Pasha, Mi ni ster of the Mari ne. Fai l i ng that, he
sai d, he pl anned to provoke a Cabi net cri si s; he cl ai med, on the basi s
of his following in the Central Commi t t eewhi ch, in reality, was
Tal aat ' s fol l owi ngthat he coul d install a new pro-i nterventi oni st
government . Overst at i ng his political strength, Enver assured the
Germans that he coul d bri ng Turkey into the war by mi d- Oct ober.
All he needed, he told t hem, was Ge r man gol d to s upport the
a r my .
2 0
Th e Ge r mans , of course, were al ready aware that the
Ot t oman forces woul d need money; Li man had report ed to the
Kai ser that they woul d be i n i mmi nent danger of col l apse wi thout it.
On 10 Oct ober, Dj emal joi ned the conspi racy. On 11 Oct ober,
Enver, Tal aat , Hal i l , and Dj emal conferred, and i nformed the
Germans that their faction was now commi t t ed to war and woul d
authori ze Admi ral Souchon to attack Rus s i a as soon as Germany
deposi ted two million Turki s h pounds i n gol d i n Const ant i nopl e to
support the armed forces. Th e Ge r mans responded by sendi ng a
million pounds on 12 Oct ober and a further million on 17 Oct ober,
shi ppi ng the gol d by rail t hrough neutral Rumani a. Th e second
shi pment arri ved i n Const ant i nopl e on 21 October.
Tal aat and Halil then changed their mi nds : they proposed to keep
the gol d but , nonethel ess, to remai n neutral i n the war. Enver
reported this to the Ge r mans on 23 Oct ober, but cl ai med that it di d
not matter as l ong as he coul d still count on the other military servi ce
mi ni ster, Dj emal . Though he later announced that Tal aat had swung
back agai n to the pro-i nterventi oni st cause, Enver gave up at t empt i ng
to persuade his part y and his government to intervene i n the war. He
coul d not get Tur ke y to decl are war on the Allies so he pi nned his
hopes on a pl an to provoke the Al l i ed government s to decl are war on
Turkey.
Enver and Dj emal i ssued secret orders allowing Admi ral Souchon
to lead the Goeben and Breslau into the Bl ack Sea to attack Russi an
vessel s. Enver' s pl an was to cl ai m that the warshi ps had been attacked
by the Russi ans and had been forced to defend themsel ves. Admi ral
Souchon, however, di sobeyed Enver' s orders and openl y started the
fighting by bombardi ng the Rus s i an coast. Once agai n the Ge r man
admi ral gave hi story a push. Hi s purpos e, he stated later, was "to
force the Tur ks , even agai nst their will, to spread the war . "
2 1
As a
result of his acti ons, it was all too clear that the Goeben and Breslau
had struck a premedi t at ed bl ow; there was now no lie behi nd whi ch
Enver coul d conceal what he had al l owed to happen.
Th e incident led to an open showdown i n Const ant i nopl e. Th e
Gr and Vizier and the Cabi net forced Enver to cabl e an order to
Admi ral Souchon to cease fire. A political cri si s ensued that l asted
for nearly two days, the detai l s of which were veiled even f rom
the normal l y wel l -i nformed Ge r mans and Aust ri ans. The r e were
meet i ngs of the Ot t oman Cabi net and of the C. U. P. Central
Commi t t ee. Debat e was joi ned, threats were i ssued, coalitions were
f ormed, resi gnati ons were tendered, and resi gnati ons were with-
drawn. Apparent l y the consensus approxi mat ed the thi nki ng of
Asqui t h in Bri tai n j ust before the out break of war: that the first
priority was to mai ntai n party uni ty. Even t hough a majori ty in
the Central Commi t t ee support ed the newly f ormed tri umvi rate of
Tal aat , Enver, and Dj emal i n the view that the Ot t oman Empi re
now ought to enter the war, it deferred to the views of the mi nori ty,
led by the Gr and Vizier and the Mi ni ster of Fi nance, rather than
allow a party split to occur.
On 31 Oct ober Enver reported to the Ge r mans that his col l eagues
in the Cabi net i nsi sted on di spat chi ng a note of apol ogy to the
Rus s i ans . Fr om the Ge r man poi nt of view this was a dangerous
proposal , but Enver sai d that, havi ng "duped" his col l eagues about
the attack on Rus s i a, he now f ound hi msel f isolated i n the Cabi net ;
his hands, he sai d, were t i e d.
2 2
Though Enver and his Ge r man co-conspi rators di d not yet know
it, there was no need for al arm: i n London the Bri ti sh Cabi net had
al ready risen to the bai t. Th e Bri ti sh were unaware of the deep split
i n Young Tur k ranks and bel i eved the Porte to have been i n col l usi on
with Germany all al ong. Respondi ng to Souchon' s attack even before
the Porte drafted its apol ogy, the Cabi net authori zed the sendi ng of
an ul t i mat um requi ri ng the Tur ks i mmedi atel y to expel the Ge r man
military mi ssi on and to remove the Ge r man officers and men from
the Goeben and Breslau. When the Tur ks di d not compl y, Churchi l l
di d not bother to refer the matter back to the Cabi net ; on his own
initiative he di spat ched an order to his forces in the Medi t erranean
on the afternoon of 31 Oct ober to "Commence hostilities at once
agai nst Tur ke y . "
2 3
Th e Bri ti sh admi ral who recei ved Churchi l l ' s order di d not carry i t
out i mmedi atel y and, i n consequence, Turkey was unaware that
A N I N T R I G U E A T T H E S U B L I M E P O R T E 7 3
Bri tai n had gone to war agai nst her. In Const ant i nopl e, Enver still
feared that the Tur ki s h apol ogy t o Rus s i a mi ght be accept ed. To
prevent that f rom happeni ng, he agai n foiled the i ntenti ons of his
Cabi net col l eagues by i nserti ng into the Turki s h note an out rageous
allegation that Rus s i a had provoked the at t ac k.
2 4
Predi ctabl y the
Czar' s government rejected the al l egati on, i ssued an ul t i mat um to the
Porte, and on 2 November decl ared war.
Bri ti sh naval forces commenced hostile operati ons agai nst the
Ot t oman Empi re on 1 November. At a dramat i c meet i ng of the
Ot t oman Cabi net on the night of November 12, even the Grand
Vizier's peace faction was obl i ged to recogni ze that the empi re was
now at war, like it or not. Yet no decl arati on of war was i ssued from
London.
On 3 November, on i nstructi ons f rom Churchi l l , Bri ti sh warshi ps
bombarded the outer forts of the Dardanel l es. Cri ti cs later charged
that this was a pi ece of childish petul ance on Churchi l l ' s part which
alerted Turkey to the vul nerabi l i ty of the forts. There i s no evi dence,
however, that Turkey responded to the warni ng. At the t i me, the
chief significance of the bombardment seemed to be its demonst rat i on
that hostilities had commenced.
On 4 November, Asqui t h confided that "we are now frankly at war
with Tur ke y . "
2 5
Th e formal i ti es, however, were negl ected. It was
not until the morni ng of 5 November that, at a meet i ng with the
Privy Counci l , the procl amat i ons of war agai nst the Hohenzol l ern
and Habs bur g empi res were amended t o i ncl ude the Ot t oman
Empi r e .
Th e relative casual ness with whi ch the Bri ti sh dri fted into the
Ot t oman war reflected the atti tudes of Bri ti sh Cabi net mi ni sters at
the t i me: it was not a war to whi ch they attached much i mport ance,
and they made no great effort to prevent it. The y di d not regard
Turkey as an especi al l y dangerous enemy.
V
In London it was still not knowni ndeed it woul d not be known
until years l at ert hat Enver had taken the initiative i n proposi ng,
negoti ati ng, and executi ng a secret treaty of alliance with Germany
before the Admi ral t y had sei zed the Turki s h battl eshi ps. It also was
not known that it was the Porte that had seized the Goeben and
Breslau, and that it had done so over Ge r man protest. In Downi ng
Street the official account was bel i eved, accordi ng to whi ch the
Kai s er had initiated the transfer to Tur ke y of the Ge r man vessel s to
repl ace the Osman and Reshadieh in order to win over to Germany
the Tur ks whom Churchi l l had al i enated.
It was the common view, therefore, that i t was Churchi l l who had
brought about the war with Turkey. Indeed, Ll oyd George conti nued
to level the charge agai nst hi m as late as 1 9 2 1 .
2 6
Souchon and Enver
had i n fact started the war between Tur ke y and the Al l i es, but i n the
publ i c i magi nati on of the Bri ti sh i t was Churchi l l who had done so.
Churchi l l , for his part , began to poi nt out in Augus t 1914and
conti nued to poi nt out thereafterthat havi ng the Ot t oman Empi re
for an enemy had its advant ages. Free at last to cut up the Ot t oman
Empi re and to offer porti ons of its terri tory to other countri es at the
eventual peace settl ement, Bri tai n coul d now hold out the l ure of
territorial gai ns i n order to bri ng Ital y and the Bal kan countri es into
the war on her si de.
Ital y, a l atecomer to the pursui t of colonial empi re, had come to
see the vul nerabl e Ot t oman domai ns as the pri nci pal terri tori es still
avai l abl e for acqui si ti on. She remai ned anxi ous to acqui re even more
Ot t oman territory. Eventual l y, the l ure of acqui si ti on hel ped to bri ng
her into the war on the Al l i ed si de.
Th e Bal kan countri es, too, coveted addi ti onal territorial gai ns. For
Bri tai n to forge an alliance with all the Bal kan countri es by the
promi se of Ot t oman territory requi red the reconciliation of s ome of
their rival ambi t i ons; but if this coul d be achi eved, such a combi -
nation woul d bri ng powerful forces to bear agai nst the Ot t oman and
Habs bur g empi res, and offered the prospect of hel pi ng bri ng the war
agai nst Germany to a swift and successful concl usi on.
Al ready on 14 Augus t , Asqui t h noted that "Venizelos, the Greek
Pri me Mi ni ster, has a great scheme on foot for a federation of Bal kan
St at es agai nst Germany and Aust ri a . . . "
2 7
On 21 Augus t , Asqui t h
characteri zed a number of his mi ni sters as l ooki ng to Ital y, Rumani a,
or Bul gari a as potential allies of i mport ance; Ll oyd George as
bei ng "keen for Bal kan confederati on"; and "Winston violently anti-
Tur k. " He himself, however, was "very much agai nst any aggressi ve
action vis-a-vis Turkey wh. wd. excite our Mus s ul mans in Indi a &
Eg y pt . "
2 8
Churchi l l was not so i mpet uous as that made hi m s ound.
In fact he had taken the ti me and troubl e to communi cat e personal l y
with Enver and other Ot t oman l eaders who were hopi ng to keep
their country neutral . He had gi ven up on them two mont hs too
soon; but i t was only when he had become convi nced that there was
no chance of keepi ng Turkey out of the war that he had swung
around to poi nti ng out the advant ages of havi ng her in it.
By the end of Augus t , Churchi l l and Ll oyd George were enthusi -
asti c advocates of the Bal kan approach. On 31 Augus t Churchi l l
wrote a pri vate letter to Bal kan l eaders urgi ng the creation of a
confederati on of Bul gari a, Serbi a, Rumani a, Mont enegro, and Greece
to join the Al l i es. On 2 Sept ember he initiated pri vate talks with the
Greek government to di scuss the form that military cooperati on
between their two countri es mi ght take i n an offensive operati on
agai nst the Ot t oman Empi r e .
At the end of Sept ember, Churchi l l wrote to Si r Edward Grey
that "in our at t empt to pl acate Tur ke y we are cri ppl i ng our pol i cy in
the Bal kans. I am not suggest i ng that we shoul d take aggressi ve
action agai nst Turkey or decl are war on her oursel ves, but we ought
from now to make arrangement s wi th the Bal kan St at es, parti cul arl y
Bul gari a, wi thout regard to the i nterests or integrity of Tur ke y. " He
concl uded his addi ti onal remarks by addi ng that "All I am aski ng i s
that the interests and integrity of Tur ke y shall no l onger be consi dered
by you i n any efforts which are made to secure common acti on
among the Chri st i an Bal kan St a t e s . "
2 9
Grey and As qui t h were more caut i ous i n their approach, and l ess
enthusi asti c about the propos ed Bal kan Confederati on than were
Churchi l l and Ll oyd George, but i n at least one respect their thi nki ng
evolved in a parallel way. In order to persuade Turkey to remai n
neutral , the representati ves of the Bri ti sh government eventual l y had
been i nstructed to gi ve assurances that, i f she di d so, Ot t oman terri-
torial integrity woul d be respect ed. Fr o m this there followed a con-
verse proposi ti on, that Grey had made explicit as early as 15 Augus t ,
"that, on the other hand, i f Turkey si ded with Germany and Aust ri a,
and they were defeated, of course we coul d not answer for what
mi ght be taken from Tur ke y i n Asi a Mi nor . "
3 0
When the Ot t oman Empi re entered the warpul l ed into i t by
Churchi l l as i t seemed then, pus hed into i t by Enver and Souchon as
i t seems nowt he concl usi on that Bri ti sh pol i cy-makers drew there-
fore seemed to be i nescapabl e. In a speech del i vered i n London on
9 November 1914, the Pri me Mi ni ster predi cted that the war had
"rung the death-knel l of Ot t oman domi ni on, not only i n Europe, but
i n As i a . "
3 1
Earl i er i n 1914, Si r Mark Sykes, the Tor y M. P. who was his
party' s l eadi ng expert on Turki s h affai rs, had warned the Hous e of
Commons that "the di sappearance of the Ot t oman Empi re mus t be
the fi rst step t owards the di sappearance of our own. "
3
Wel l i ngton,
Canni ng, Pal merst on, and Di srael i had all felt that preservi ng the
integrity of the Ot t oman Empi re was of i mport ance to Bri tai n and to
Europe. Yet in a little l ess than a hundred days the Bri ti sh govern-
ment had compl etel y reversed the pol i cy of more than a hundred
years, and now sought to destroy the great buffer empi re that i n ti mes
past Bri ti sh government s had ri sked and waged wars to saf eguard.
Th e Cabi net' s new pol i cy was predi cat ed on the theory that Turkey
had forfeited any cl ai m to enjoy the protecti on of Bri tai n. In the
turmoi l of war the Asqui t h government had lost si ght of one of the
most i mportant truths about tradi ti onal Bri ti sh foreign pol i cy: that
the integrity of the Ot t oman Empi r e was to be protected not i n order
to serve the best i nterests of Tur ke y but i n order to serve the best
i nterests of Bri tai n.
In t urn, the Bri ti sh deci si on to di smant l e the Ot t oman Empi re
finally brought into pl ay the as s umpt i on that Europeans had shared
about the Mi ddl e Eas t for cent uri es: that its post - Ot t oman political
desti ni es woul d be taken i n hand by one or more of the European
powers.
Th u s the one thi ng whi ch Bri t i sh l eaders foresaw i n 1914 with
perfect clarity was that Ot t oman entry into the war marked the fi rst
step on the road to a remaki ng of the Mi ddl e Eas t : to the creati on,
i ndeed, of the modern Mi ddl e Eas t .
P ART I I
KITCHENER OF
KHARTOUM LOOKS
AHEAD
8
KI TCHENER TAKES COMMAND
i
Duri ng the s umme r and aut umn of 1914, as the Ot t oman Empi r e
was dri fti ng into the war, an i mport ant new government al appoi nt-
ment i n London was begi nni ng to affect Bri ti sh pol i cy i n the Mi ddl e
Eas t . It began, as so many thi ngs di d, with Wi nston Churchi l l .
On 28 Jul y 1914, the s ame day that he initiated the sei zure of the
Turki s h vessel s, Churchi l l held a l uncheon meeti ng with Fi el d
Marshal Horat i o Herbert Ki t chener to di scuss the deepeni ng inter-
national cri si s. As proconsul i n Egypt , the veteran commander of
Bri tai n' s i mperi al armi es was responsi bl e for the securi ty of the Suez
Canal and of the t roops f rom Indi a who were to be t ransport ed
through it in the event of war. Churchi l l , the Fi rst Lo r d of the
Admi ral t y, was responsi bl e for the naval escort of the t roopshi ps on
their l ong voyage to Eur ope ; and over l unch the young politician and
the ol d sol di er exchanged vi ews.
Churchi l l told Ki t chener that "If war comes, you will not go back
to Eur ope . "
1
It was not what the field marshal wanted to hear.
Ki t chener had come to Bri tai n i ntendi ng to stay only l ong enough to
attend the 17 Jul y ceremoni es el evati ng hi m to the rank and title of
Earl Ki t chener of Khar t oum; he was anxi ous to return to his post as
Bri ti sh Agent and Consul - General i n Egypt as soon as possi bl e. Hi s
eyes had al ways been t urned t oward the Eas t ; he told Ki ng George
that he wanted to be appoi nt ed Vi ceroy of Indi a when that post
became avai l abl e as schedul ed in 1915, t hough he feared that "the
politicians" woul d bl ock his appoi nt ment .
2
Th e crust y, bad- t empered
Ki t chener l oathed pol i ti ci ans.
Even the di si ntegrati ng international situation coul d not keep hi m
i n London. Earl y i n Augus t he travel ed to Dover to catch a Channel
st eamer; the pl an was that he woul d take the train f rom Cal ai s to
Marsei l l es, and there woul d board a crui ser for Egypt . Short l y before
noon on 3 Augus t , he boarded the st eamer at Dover, and compl ai ned
79
80 K I T C H E N E R O F K H A R T O U M L O O K S A H E A D
i mpati entl y when it failed to set off for Cal ai s at the schedul ed
depart ure t i me.
As i t happened, his depart ure was about to be cancel l ed rather
than del ayed. Th e previ ous eveni ng, i n the smoki ng room of Brooks' s,
a London cl ub, someone who fell into conversati on with a Conserva-
tive Member of Parl i ament remarked that the War Office was in an
absol utel y chaoti c state and that it was a pity that Ki t chener had not
been asked to take i t over. Lat er that eveni ng, the M. P. report ed his
conversati on to two of his party' s l eaders who were in a semi - pri vat e
room of the cl ub di scussi ng the international si tuati on. Andrew
Bonar La w and Si r Edward Cars ont he l eaders t o whom the conver-
sati on was report edt ook the matter up with Art hur Bal four, the
former Conservati ve Pri me Mi ni ster, who passed the suggest i on on
to Churchi l l , with whom he was on good t erms.
On the morni ng of 3 Augus t t he day Germany decl ared war on
Fr anc e an article appeared in The Times, written by its mi l i tary
correspondent , urgi ng the appoi nt ment of Ki t chener to head the War
Office. That s ame morni ng, Churchi l l saw the Pri me Mi ni ster and
propos ed Ki t chener' s appoi nt ment , t hough apparentl y wi thout i ndi -
cati ng that the proposal came from the Conservati ves as well as from
himself. Churchi l l ' s notes i ndi cate that he thought that Asqui t h had
accepted the proposal at the t i me; but in fact the Pri me Mi ni ster was
reluctant to make the appoi nt ment , and deci ded i nstead to keep
Ki t chener i n Bri tai n merel y i n an advi sory posi ti on.
On board the Channel st eamer, which had not yet left Dover,
Ki t chener recei ved a message f rom the Pri me Mi ni ster aski ng hi m to
return i mmedi atel y to London. Th e field marshal at first ref used;
and it was with difficulty that he was persuaded to di sembark. Hi s
fears were justi fi ed; back i n London he found that Asqui t h di d not
seem to be thi nki ng of a regul ar posi ti on for hi m, let alone one with
clearly defined powers and responsi bi l i ti es. Ur ge d on by his col-
l eagues, Ki t chener deci ded to force the i ssue; he went to see the
Pri me Mi ni ster for a one-hour meet i ng on the eveni ng of 4 Augus t
the night Bri tai n deci ded to go to war, by which ti me Ge r man armi es
were al ready overrunni ng Bel gi umand stated that, i f obl i ged to
remai n i n London, he woul d accept no posi ti on less than Secret ary
of St at e for War.
Pushed by pol i ti ci ans and the press, the Pri me Mi ni ster gave way
the next day, and Ki t chener was appoi nt ed War Mi ni ster. As he
wrot e: " K. was (to do hi m justi ce) not at all anxi ous to come in, but
when it was present ed to hi m as a dut y he agreed. It is clearly
underst ood that he has no pol i ti cs, & that his pl ace at Cai ro is kept
opens o that he can return to it when peace comes. It is a hazardous
experi ment, but the best in the ci rcumst ances, I thi nk. "
3
As s umi ng,
as di d nearly everybody else, that the war woul d last no more than a
K I T C H E N E R T A K E S C O MMA N D 81
few mont hs, As qui t h di d not repl ace Ki t chener as Agent and Consul -
General i n Egypt ; he thought that the field marshal woul d be re-
turni ng to his post there shortl y. On 6 Augus t Ki t chener took up his
new duti es in the War Office in Whi tehal l .
Lo r d Ki t chener lived in a borrowed house in London, maki ng it
plain that he di d not i ntend to stay. It was located just off the
intersection of Carl t on Hous e Terrace and Carl t on Gar de ns , less
than a five-minute walk from the War Office, which meant that he
coul d spend al most every waki ng moment on the j ob. He arose at
6:00 a. m. , arri ved at his office at 9: 00 a. m. , generally took a col d
lunch there, returned to his t emporary home at 6:00 p. m. to read the
eveni ng papers and nap, and then after di nner woul d read official
cabl es until late at ni ght .
4
Th e gl ass or two of wine with di nner and
the nightly scotch and soda that had been his comf ort s i n Egypt were
forsworn; at the request of George V he had pl edged to set a national
exampl e by dri nki ng no alcoholic beverages duri ng the war.
Asqui th' s rel uctance to bri ng the f amous soldier into the Cabi net
seems to have been prompt ed by the fear that, as Secret ary for War,
Ki t chener, rather than the Pri me Mi ni ster, woul d emerge as Bri tai n' s
wart i me l eader. No great sol di er had served in a maj or office of state
since the Duke of Wellington's mi ni stry nearly a century bef ore; and
no servi ng army officer had been i ncl uded in a Cabi net si nce General
George Monk, who i n 1660 restored the monarchy and then was
rewarded with hi gh office. Th e pri nci pl e of civilian authori ty had
been uphel d jeal ousl y si nce then; but Asqui t h felt obl i ged to subordi -
nate it to hi s urgent need for Fi el d Marshal Ki tchener' s servi ces.
Ki t chener was a figure of l egenda national myt h whose photo
hung on walls t hroughout the ki ngdom. After he took up his Cabi net
appoi nt ment , l arge crowds woul d gather to watch hi m enter and
leave the War Office each day. As the Pri me Mi ni ster' s daught er later
wrote:
He was an al most symbol i c fi gure and what he symbol i zed, I
think, was st rengt h, deci si on, and above all success . . . [Every-
thing that he touched ' came of f . The r e was a feeling that
Ki t chener coul d not fail. Th e psychol ogi cal effect of his appoi nt -
ment, the tonic to publ i c confi dence, were i nstantaneous and
overwhel mi ng. And he at once gave, in his own ri ght, a national
status to the government .
5
The publ i c, i t was sai d, di d not reason about Ki t chener, but si mpl y
trusted hi m compl etel y, sayi ng "Ki t chener is there; it is all ri ght . "
6
In the past he had al ways brought thi ngs to a successful concl usi on.
In March 1915 he moved into York House, St James' s Palace, a residence
provided for him by Ki ng George.
He had avenged the murder of General Charl es George Gor don i n
the fall of Khar t oum by dest royi ng the empi re of the Dervi shes and
reconqueri ng the Sudan. Th e French had then at t empt ed t o i ntrude
upon Bri tai n' s i mperi al domai ns, but i n 1898 Ki t chener firmly con-
fronted t hem at the fort of Fas hoda i n the Sudan, and the French
conti ngent backed down and wi thdrew from the fort. In Sout h
Afri ca the Boer War had begun badl y; then Ki t chener came to take
charge and brought it to a vi ctori ous concl usi on. As commander of
the armi es of Indi a in the early twentieth century, he had i mposed
his will as decisively as he had done i n Egypt .
Th e far-off out post s of empi re i n which he won his brilliant
victories lent hi m their gl amor. Di st ance made hi m seem at once
magi cal and l arger-than-l i fe, like a sphi nx presi di ng over the desert.
A lone, i nsecure, and secretive figure who used a smal l group of
ai des as a wall agai nst the worl d, he appeared instead to be the st rong
and silent hero of popul ar myt hol ogy. Hi s painful shyness was not
seen as s uch; his fear of his political col l eagues appeared to be
di sdai n. A young Forei gn Office clerk who watched the field marshal
at a gat heri ng with the Pri me Mi ni ster, Si r Edward Grey, and Davi d
Ll oyd George, recorded i n hi s di ary that "Ki t chener l ooked like an
officer who has got mi xed up with a lot of strol l i ng pl ayers and is
tryi ng to pret end he doesn't know t hem. "
7
Tal l , broad- shoul dered, square- j awed, with bushy eyebrows, bri st-
ling moust ache, cold bl ue eyes set wi del y apart , and an i nti mi dati ng
gl ower, he towered physi cal l y over his fellows and looked the part for
which desti ny and the popul ar press had cast hi m. Fr o m his earliest
campai gns , he was fortunate i n the journal i sts who followed his
career and who created his publ i c i mage. He was fortunate, too, i n
the ti mi ng of his career, whi ch coi nci ded with the rise of i mperi al
senti ment, l i terature, and i deol ogy i n Bri tai n. Di srael i , Ki pl i ng,
A. E. W. Mas on (author of Four Feathers), Li onel Curt i s (a founder
of the Round Table, the i mperi al i st quart erl y) , John Buchan, and
others created the tidal wave of feeling on the crest of which he rode.
George St eevens of the Daily Mail, who was perhaps the l eadi ng
war correspondent of his t i me, told his readers in 1900 that
Ki t chener' s "precision is so unhumanl y unerri ng he is more like a
machi ne than a man. "
8
St eevens wrote a book about the Sudan
campai gn, telling how Ki t chener (then si rdar, or commander, of the
Egypt i an army) led his armi es south over nearly a t housand mi l es of
rock and sand, from the waters of the Ni l e Valley to l ands where rain
never falls, to conquer a country of a million square mi l es. Ignori ng
the epi sodes i n which Ki t chener' s general shi p was open to cri ti ci sm,
the book dwelt at length on the characteri sti c organi zati onal ability
that deri ved from the si rdar' s background as an engi neeri ng officer.
Accordi ng to St eevens, Ki t chener prepared his movement s with such
care that "he has never gi ven battl e wi thout maki ng certai n of an
anni hi l ati ng victory . . . " St eevens wrote that "the man has di sap-
peared . . . there i s no man Herbert Ki t chener, but only the Si rdar,
neither aski ng affection nor gi vi ng it. Hi s officers and men are
wheel s i n the machi ne: he feeds t hem enough to make t hem efficient,
and works t hem as merci l essl y as he works hi msel f . "
1 0
When he joi ned the Cabi net , and i ndeed for many mont hs after-
ward, its other members t o most of whom he was a st rangerwere
in awe of hi m. Al t hough they were jol ted by his military pronounce-
ment s, whi ch ran counter to everythi ng whi ch they had been led to
believe, they accept ed his j udgment s wi thout demur. The y had
believed the professi onal Bri ti sh army to be of adequat e si ze, but
duri ng his first day at the War Office, Ki t chener remarked, "There
i s no ar my. "
1 1
Th e accepted view was that the war woul d be a short
one, but Ki t chener with unerri ng foresi ght told an astoni shed ( and,
accordi ng to Churchi l l , a skepti cal ) Cabi net that Bri tai n woul d have
to mai ntai n an army of mi l l i ons of men in the field; that the war
woul d last at least three years; and that i t woul d only be deci ded by
bl oody battl es on the conti nent of Eur ope and not at s e a .
1 2
Def yi ng
the conventi onal view that a l arge army coul d be created only by
conscri pti on, Ki t chener i nstead rai sed his mas s army by a vol unteer
recrui tment campai gn, which surpri sed his cont emporari es as much
as it has amazed posteri ty.
Ki t chener proposed to win the war by organi zi ng his forces as
thoroughl y as he had done i n advance of the Khar t oum campai gn.
He woul d spend the first years methodi cal l y creati ng, trai ni ng, and
equi ppi ng an army of overwhel mi ng strength, and woul d concentrate
his forces, not di ssi pat e t hem i n si deshows. Th e i mpendi ng Ot t oman
war, he felt, woul d be a si deshow; it woul d be a waste of resources to
send addi ti onal t roops to fight the Tur ks . He feared a Turki s h attack
on the Suez Canal hi s only mi l i tary concern i n the Mi ddl e Ea s t
but he bel i eved that the Bri ti sh forces in Egypt coul d deal with it.
Th e Mi ddl e Eas t pl ayed no role i n his pl ans for wi nni ng the war.
But that di d not mean that Ki t chener had no Mi ddl e East ern pol i cy;
as will be seen presentl y, he held st rong views about what role
Bri tai n shoul d pl ay i n the region once the European war was won.
I I
It was pure acci dent that the mi l i tary hero brought into the govern-
ment to presi de over the war effort shoul d have been one who
regarded himself, and was regarded by others, as havi ng the Eas t for
his special provi nce. Fr o m that acci dent came the di sti ncti ve outl i nes
of the policy that emerged.
Mos t recently, Ki t chener had governed Egypt , a country officially
still part of the Ot t oman Empi re, but which had in effect been an
i ndependent country until the Bri ti sh had occupi ed it in 1882, with
the stated ai m of restori ng order and then l eavi ng. Inst ead of l eavi ng,
the Bri ti sh stayed on. As of 1914, Egypt was a relatively recent
addi ti on to the Bri ti sh sphere of influence, and Bri ti sh officers who
served there with Ki t chener had begun to devel op a di sti ncti ve
outl ook on events. St at i oned as they were i n an Arabi c- speaki ng
country, they had come to regard themsel ves, mi stakenl y, as expert s
on Arab affai rs, and were all the more frustrated to be excl uded from
foreign policy maki ng by the Forei gn Office and by the Government
of Indi at he two bodi es that tradi ti onal l y dealt with the Arabi c-
speaki ng porti ons of the Ot t oman Empi r e . Nei ther Ki t chener nor his
ai des demonst rat ed any real awareness of the great di fferences be-
tween the many communi t i es i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . Arabi ans and
Egypt i ans, for exampl e, t hough both Arabi c- speaki ng, were otherwi se
di fferenti n popul ati on mi x, hi story, cul ture, outl ook, and ci rcum-
stances. Even had they been the expert s on Egypt whi ch they bel i eved
themsel ves to be, that woul d not necessari l y have made Ki t chener' s
ai des the experts on Arabi a they cl ai med to be.
In the Sudan campai gn, undert aken i n the face of mi sgi vi ngs within
both the Forei gn Office and Lo r d Cromer' s Egypt i an admi ni st rat i on,
Ki t chener had greatl y expanded the area of Bri tai n' s control of the
Arabi c- speaki ng worl d. It may have been duri ng the Sudan campai gn
that Ki t chener first began to dream of carvi ng out a great new
i mperi al domai n for Bri tai n i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , i n whi ch he woul d
serve as her viceroy.
As early as the end of the nineteenth century, Bri ti sh officials were
aware that the Khedi vet he native pri nce from behi nd whose throne
Bri tai n rul ed Egypt was ambi t i ous to expand his authori ty. Al-
t hough in theory he was the Ot t oman Sul tan' s viceroy in Egypt ,
there were persi stent rumors that he consi dered the possi bi l i ty of
taki ng the Sul t an' s pl ace as temporal and spi ri tual l ordSul t an and
Cal i phof the Arabi c- speaki ng provi nces of the empi re, thereby
spl i tti ng the empi re in half. A vari ant was the rumor that he pl anned
to annex the Mos l em Hol y Pl aces in Arabi a and establ i sh a cal i ph
there under his prot ect i on.
1 3
Th e Bri ti sh and Egypt i an officers
attached to hi m woul d underst and that the achi evement of any such
pl an woul d bri ng greatl y enl arged authori ty to themsel ves.
At the t i met he end of the nineteenth cent uryt he Great Power
pri nci pal l y opposed to the expansi on of Bri ti sh Egypt was France,
which had al i gned herself with Rus s i a. As viewed from Bri tai n' s
out post s borderi ng the Medi t erranean, the alliance seemed to be
di rected agai nst Bri tai n. But Rus s i a was far away; and i n Egypt and
the Sudan, France was the enemy whose threateni ng presence was
felt cl ose at hand. Ri val ry with France for posi ti on and influence in
the Arabi c- speaki ng worl d: that was the policy in the service of
which Ki t chener' s officers had been reared.
Lar ge r combi nat i ons and consi derati ons i n worl d pol i ti cs were
beyond the range of the typical officer in Bri ti sh Cai ro, an enclave
that pos s es s ed (wrote one of Ki t chener' s ai des) "all the narrowness
and provi nci al i sm of an Engl i s h garri son t own . . . "
1 4
Th e local
communi t y of Bri t i sh officials and their fami l i es was ti ght and homo-
geneous. It s life centered around the Sport i ng Cl ub, the Tur f Cl ub,
and the bal l s gi ven at a l eadi ng hotel si x ni ghts out of seven.
It was from this provi nci al garri son communi t yi t s views on Arab
policy hitherto i gnored by the makers of Bri ti sh world pol i cythat
Lo r d Ki t chener emerged.
Ill
The outbreak of the war agai nst the Ot t oman Empi re made i t neces-
sary to clarify the nature of Bri tai n' s presence in Egypt and Cyprus ,
for both were nomi nal l y still part of the Sul t an' s empi re. Th e Cabi net
was i n favor of annexi ng both countri es and, i ndeed, accordi ng to
what officials i n Cai ro were tol d, had al ready made the deci si on.
Ronal d St orrs , the Oriental Secret ary (whi ch i s to say, the staff
specialist i n East ern affai rs) to Lo r d Ki t chener i n Cai ro, protested
that, in the case of Egypt , such a deci si on violated forty years of
promi ses by Bri ti sh government s that the Bri ti sh occupati on was
merely t emporary. Th e Agency (that is, the office of the Bri ti sh
Agent i n Egypt , Lo r d Ki t chener) advocat ed a protectorate st at us for
Egypt , with at least token reference to, eventual i ndependencea
case argued effectively by Mi l ne Cheet ham (acti ng chief of the Agency
i n Ki t chener' s abs ence) . Th e Cabi net abandoned its own views i n
deference to those of the Agency, and thus showed the di recti on of
thi ngs to come.
The Cabi net , i n this i nstance, al l owed Ki tchener' s Agency to
establ i sh the prot ot ype of the form of rul e that the field marshal and
his staff eventual l y wanted Bri tai n to exerci se throughout the Arabi c-
speaki ng worl d. It was not to be direct rul e, such as was practi ced i n
part s of Indi a. In Ki t chener' s Egypt a heredi tary pri nce and native
Cabi net mi ni sters and governors went t hrough the moti ons of govern-
ing. The y promul gat ed under their own name deci si ons rec-
ommended to t hem by the Bri ti sh advi sers attached to their respecti ve
offices; that was the form of protectorate government favored by the
Ki t chener group. In the artful words of Ronal d St orrs : "We dep-
recated the Imperat i ve, preferri ng the Subj unct i ve, even the wistful,
Optati ve mood. "
1 5
Th e Egypt i an deci si on was the forerunner of others i n whi ch
St orrs and other members of Ki t chener' s entourage made policy
deci si ons for the Mi ddl e Eas t under cover of the recl usi ve field
marshal ' s authori ty. When the vi ews of the government about the
Eas t came into conflict with those of Lo r d Ki t chener, i t was the
latter that were likely to prevai l . Deci si ons that normal l y woul d have
been made by the Pri me Mi ni ster, the Forei gn Secret ary, the Vi ceroy
of Indi a, or the Cabi net were i nstead made by relatively juni or
officials who represented Ki t chener and purport ed to represent his
views. Onl y the fi el d marshal ' s uni que presti ge made this possi bl e.
On one t el egram f rom Cai ro, Si r Edward Grey, the Forei gn
Secretary, mi nut ed "Does Lo r d Ki t chener agree? If so, I will ap-
pr ove . "
1 6
He coul d have written the s ame i nscri pti on on t hem all.
Ki t chener was scrupul ous i n cl eari ng forei gn-pol i cy deci si ons with
Grey, but Grey deferred t o hi m, and approved even those proposal s
of the War Mi ni ster with whi ch he di sagreed.
One reason that Members of Parl i ament and the Cabi net left
eastern questi ons so much to Ki t chener and his ent ourage was that
they themsel ves knew little about t hem. To a government official in
the 1980s, accust omed to bul gi ng reference l i brari es, to worl dwi de
press coverage, and to the overwhel mi ng suppl y of detai l ed infor-
mati on about foreign countri es gat hered by the maj or government s,
Bri ti sh i gnorance of the Mi ddl e Eas t duri ng the 1914 war woul d be
uni magi nabl e. Shortl y after Bri tai n f ound herself at war with the
Porte, Si r Mark Sykes, one of the few M. P. s who had travel ed i n the
Eas t , compl ai ned that i n the Engl i sh l anguage there was not so much
as one authenti c history of the Ot t oman Emp i r e .
1 7
Of the histories
then current, none was based on ori gi nal research, and all were based
on a Ge r man work that left off in the year 1744, and were therefore
l ong out of da t e .
1 8
As late as 1917, when Bri ti sh armi es were poi sed
to i nvade northward toward Syri a, Bri ti sh Intelligence, asked by the
army to provi de a gui de to condi ti ons there, reported that there was
no book in any European l anguage that provi ded a survey of the
social and political condi ti ons of the area.
9
The Bri ti sh government l acked even the most el ementary type of
i nf ormat i oni ncl udi ng maps of the empi re with which it was at
war. In 1913 14, one of Ki t chener' s intelligence officers had secretly
surveyed and mapped a wi l derness area close to Bri ti sh Egypt ' s
Si nai frontier; it was one of a mere handful of surveys gat hered by
Bri ti sh Int el l i gence.
2 0
For the most part, Bri ti sh officers conduct i ng
operati ons in Ot t oman territory in the first years of the war were
operati ng in the dark. One of the many reasons for the failure of
Bri tai n' s i nvasi on of Turkey in 1915 was that the Bri ti sh i nvasi on
force was suppl i ed with only one map of the peni nsul a it was to
at t ackand that map, i t turned out, was i naccurate. When i t came to
the Mi ddl e Eas t , the pol i ti ci ans, like the sol di ers, were aware that
they were movi ng in areas that were literally unchart ed.
But the Cabi net mi ni sters who deferred to Ki t chener i n Mi ddl e
East ern matters were unaware of how little was really underst ood
about the Mi ddl e Eas t either by the War Mi ni ster or by the ai des i n
Cai ro and Khar t oum on whom he relied for advi ce and i nformati on.
9
KI TCHENER' S LI EUTENANTS
i
Avoi di ng not merel y women (as he had al ways done) but the outsi de
worl d as a whol e, the War Mi ni ster lived in a mascul i ne preserve
with his personal Mi l i tary Secret ary, Li eut enant - Col onel Oswal d
Fi t zGeral d, as his al most sol e and constant compani on. Fi t zGeral d
corresponded and conversed on Ki t chener' s behalf; when peopl e sai d
they had written to or heard f rom Ki t chener, they meant that they
had written to or heard from Fi t zGeral d.
Ki t chener had al ways relied heavily on his staff. Now that he had
moved into the center of power in London, not only Fi t zGeral d, but
also the staff remai ni ng i n Egypt and the Sudan moved toward the
center of power with hi m. Th u s Lo r d Ki t chener i mposed his desi gn
on policy not merel y by shapi ng a new approach toward the Mi ddl e
Eas t , but also by del egati ng power to chosen officers i n the field who
woul d gui de and execute that pol i cy. Instead of bei ng i gnored or
negl ected, as they felt they had been in the past , Bri ti sh officials in
Egypt and the Sudan were gi ven a chance to make their wei ght felt.
Ki t chener' s old l i eutenants i n the Arabi c- speaki ng worl d rose with
hi m to pre-emi nence i n East ern pol i cy-maki ng. What was conspi cuous
at the end of 1914 was that Ki t chener had st amped his personal
brand on the government' s pol i ci es, but what turned out to be of
more l asti ng i mport ance was that he had chosen the peopl e who were
to i nform and to advi se the Bri ti sh government about the Mi ddl e
Eas t throughout the warand afterward. By tranferri ng authori ty to
them, Ki t chener moved much of the evaluation of i nformati on and
the maki ng of policy from the capi tal city of a world empi re, where
officialseven t hough not specifically knowl edgeabl e about Mi ddl e
East ern af f ai rst ended toward a broad and cosmopol i t an view of
matters, to the colonial capi tal s of Egypt and the Sudan, where the
prejudi ces of old hands went unchal l enged and unchecked. The
British encl aves i n Cai ro and Khar t oum were the envi ronment to
88
K I T C H E N E R ' S L I E U T E N A N T S 89
which the War Mi ni ster l onged to return and f rom whi ch spi ri tual l y
he had never depart ed.
Th e War Mi ni ster' s weakness, accordi ng t o one observer, was that
"He i s more or less a foreigner" i n Engl and.
1
To hi m, London was
more alien than Cai ro or Cal cut t a. Th e fi el d marshal was profoundl y
ill at ease with unfami l i ar faces. Inst ead of relying on the War Office
and the Forei gn Office i n London for i nformati on and advi ce about
the Mi ddl e Eas t , he conti nued to fall back on his staff i n Egypt .
When he was appoi nt ed War Mi ni ster, he asked Ronal d St orrs , his
Oriental Secret ary, to stay on i n London with hi m. St orrs poi nted
out that government al regul ati ons woul d not allow it but, when
St orrs returned to Egypt , Ki t chener conti nued to be i nspi red by his
suggest i ons. St orrs , the son of an Angl i can cl ergyman, was an
intellectually el egant graduat e of Pembroke Col l ege, Cambri dge,
then in his mi d-thi rti es. Al t hough he had no more than an under-
graduat e educati on i n East ern l anguages and l i terature, servi ce as
Oriental Secret ary of the Agency in Cai ro for more than a decade
had establ i shed hi m as a speci al i st i n Mi ddl e East ern affai rs. Hi s
lowly rankaf t er the out break of war, he finally obtai ned di pl omati c
st andi ng, t hough only as a second secret arygave no i ndi cati on of
his high posi ti on in the field marshal ' s esteem.
I I
By the end of 1914, it was clear that the war was not comi ng to a
qui ck concl usi on, that the field marshal woul d not be abl e to return
to Cai ro for s ome ti me, and that therefore a new Bri ti sh proconsul
had to be sel ected for Egypt . Ki t chener, i n order to keep the posi ti on
i n Cai ro vacant for his return, personal l y sel ected Si r Henry
McMahon to serve as his repl acement ( under the-new title of Hi gh
Commi ssi oner, rather than Agent ) ; Mc Mahon was a col orl ess official
from Indi a, on the verge of reti rement.
Despi t e McMahon' s appoi nt ment , Ronal d St orrs and his col l eagues
i n Egypt and the Sudan conti nued to look upon the War Mi ni ster as
their real chief. Si r John Maxwel l , commandi ng general of the Bri ti sh
forces in Egypt , report ed directly to Ki t chener at the War Office
rather than to, or t hrough, the new Hi gh Commi ssi oner.
Th e seni or fi gure i n the War Mi ni ster' s following i n the Mi ddl e
East was Li eut enant - General Si r Franci s Regi nal d Wi ngate, who had
succeeded Ki t chener as si rdar of the Egypt i an army and Governor-
General of the Sudan. Wi ngate' s entire career had been one of
mi l i tary servi ce i n the Eas t , pri nci pal l y i n Mi l i tary Intel l i gence. He
passed for a mast er of Arabi c. Of his role in Ki t chener' s Khar t oum
campai gn, the journal i st George St eevens wrote that "Whatever there
was to know, Col onel Wi ngate surel y knew it, for he makes it his
busi ness to know everythi ng . . . As for that myst eri ous child of lies,
the Arab, Col onel Wi ngate can converse with hi m for hours, and at
the end know not only how much truth he has tol d, but exactl y what
truth he has s uppres s ed . . . Not hi ng i s hid f rom Col onel Wi ngat e. "
2
Wi ngate governed the Sudan f rom Khar t oum, a sun- scorched
capi tal city of some 70, 000 i nhabi tants that had been compl etel y
rebui l t to the specifications of Lo r d Ki t chener. By st eamer and
rai l road, it was 1,345 mi l es away f rom Cai ro, and Wi ngate felt cut off
and negl ected. On 18 February 1915, he sent a letter marked Very
Private to his Agent in the Egypt i an capi tal that cri ed out with his
sense of hurt:
Th e more that I think over the Arabi an Policy questi on &
the pecul i ar si tuati on into whi ch it has dri fted owi ng to the
number of "cooks" concerned in its concocti onthe less I con-
si der i t desi rabl e we shoul d show our hands unl ess we are
officially called upon for a st at ement of our views.
Speaki ng for mysel f you mus t remember that i n spi te of my
posi ti on in Egypt & the Sudan & the number of years I have
been i n the country, little use has been made of my experi ence
in this, or in other mat t ers connected with the si tuati on.
As I have often sai d before, I think that our geopol i ti cal
posi ti on & our connecti on with the Arabi an Provi nces nearest to
us, has gi ven us opportuni ti es for underst andi ng the si tuati on
t hereand the vi ews of the Mos l ems of the Hol y Pl acesbet t er
than many others; but clearly that view i s not shared by either
the Home or Indi an authori ti es & therefore, I prefer to keep
silent for the ti me bei ng.
3
In fact Wi ngate coul d not bear to keep silent, and only twelve days
later he wrote that he had changed his mi nd and had deci ded "that
we ought not to keep entirely to oursel ves i nformati on & views which
may be helpful" to those responsi bl e for maki ng pol i cy.
4
Wi ngate' s Agent in Cai rot he official representati ve in Egypt of
the Sudan government was Gi l bert Cl ayt on, who had al so served
under Lor d Ki t chener i n the Sudan campai gn. After recei vi ng his
commi ssi on in the Royal Artillery in 1895, Cl ayton went out to
Egypt and had been stati oned there or i n the Sudan ever si nce.
Fr o m 1908 to 1913 he served as Pri vate Secretary to Wi ngate. Fr o m
1913 onward he served as Sudan Agent i n Cai ro and, at the same
ti me, as Di rect or of Intel l i gence of the Egypt i an army. Cl ayt on
moved into a central posi ti on in maki ng Bri tai n' s Arab policy on 31
October 1914, when, by deci si on of the Commandi ng General i n
Egypt , Si r John Maxwel l , who report ed directly to Ki t chener, he
became head of all intelligence servi ces in Cai roof the Bri ti sh
civil authori ty and the Bri ti sh army, as well as the Egypt i an army.
Th u s London heard only one versi on of intelligence data from
Egypt Cl ayt on' s i ns t ead of three. A former army captai n, Cl ayton
rapi dl y moved up the ranks duri ng' the war and by the end of it was a
general .
In this fatherly way, Cl ayt on served as mentor to the advent urous
young archaeol ogi sts and ori ental i sts who flocked to Cai ro to serve in
the intelligence servi ces duri ng the war. He mus t have had out st and-
ing human qual i ti es, for his young men, though di verse i n other
regards, all liked and respect ed hi m. The y saw hi m as shrewd, sober,
sensi bl e, and steady. He was about ten years ol der than most of them
and, whether or not they took it, they listened to his advi ce. For
t hem he was the i ncarnati on of the old hand.
Ill
Al t hough the Forei gn Office and the Indi a Office often di sput ed the
views or propos al s that Wi ngate and Cl ayton espoused, nobody duri ng
the war quest i oned their professi onal ability or their expert knowl-
edge based on l ong experi ence i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . It was not until
years after the war had ended that Davi d Ll oyd George, usi ng
i nformati on that became avai l abl e f rom the Ge r man si de, made a
case for the proposi ti on that they were dangerousl y i ncompet ent .
Accordi ng to Ll oyd George, the Bri ti sh authori ti es i n Cai ro were
bl i nd to what was happeni ng behi nd enemy lines. In parti cul ar, he
wrote, there was a poi nt in 1916 when the Ot t oman Empi re was too
exhausted to conti nue fi ghti ng. If the Bri ti sh forces i n Egypt had
l aunched an attack on Si nai and Pal esti ne t henor even i n 1915
little effort woul d have been needed, accordi ng to Ll oyd George, to
"have crumpl ed . . . up" the Tur ks , which i n turn woul d have
allowed Bri tai n to move t hrough the Bal kans to defeat Ge r ma ny .
5
Th e opport uni t y was mi ssed, accordi ng to hi m, because the intelli-
gence servi ces either di d not know, or failed to report, what was
goi ng on i nsi de the Ot t oman Empi r e . As a resul t, he cl ai med, the
Bri ti sh government failed to win the war duri ng the years when the
war still coul d have been won on Bri ti sh t erms.
A more easily proved failing of Cai ro Intel l i gence was that it was
unaware of the extent to which the Egypt i an government had been
infiltrated by enemy agent s. It was not until that expert on Ot t oman
affai rs, Wyndham Deedes , went to work in Cai ro in 1916, and
i
9 2 K I T C H E N E R O F K H A R T O U M L O O K S A H E A D
di scovered that the Egypt i an police forces were honeycombed with
spi es, that the Turki s h network was s mas hed.
An early si gn of the i nadequacy of Cai ro' s intelligence apparat us
that ought to have sent up a warni ng si gnal , but di d not, appeared i n
the aut umn of 1914, about a mont h before the Ot t oman war began,
when the local Bri ti sh army commander, General Maxwel l , wrote
from Egypt to Lo r d Ki t chener that "It i s very difficult to put a
true val ue on all the report s f rom Const ant i nopl e, Asi a Mi nor and
Syri a . . . I can get no i nformati on direct as the Tur ks guard the
frontier very cl osel your agents cannot get t hrought hose we had
on the other si de have been bagged. " He added a di squi et i ng note
about the intelligence i mbal ance: "The Eas t i s full of Ge r man spi es
and they get fairly good i nf ormat i on. "
6
At least Maxwel l was aware that he di d not know what was goi ng
on in Const ant i nopl e. Wi ngate and Cl ayt on fell into the t rap of
bel i evi ng that they di d. The y accept ed Geral d Fi t zMauri ce' s mi staken
theory that the Ot t oman government was in the hands of a group of
pro- German Je ws . At the end of 1914 General Wi ngate bl amed the
war on "a syndi cate of Je ws , financiers, and l ow-born i ntri guers" in
Cons t ant i nopl e.
7
He and his col l eagues compounded the error by linking i t to
mi sl eadi ng i nformati on about the state of Mosl em opi ni on. J us t after
the war began, St orrs sent Maxwel l a report of remarks made by a
Syri an i nformant about publ i c opi ni on behi nd enemy lines. Accordi ng
to the i nformant, the i nhabi tants of Syri a were filled with hatred of
the Ot t oman government because they bel i eved i t woul d s upport
Zi oni sm. "Thes e Zi oni sts are closely connected with Berl i n and
Const ant i nopl e and are the most i mport ant factor i n the pol i cy of
Pal esti ne, " the i nformant s t at ed.
8
Th e false rumor that Berl i n and
Const ant i nopl e were about to back Zi oni sm echoed back and forth
through the years, and later i n the war mi sl ed the Bri ti sh Cabi net into
bel i evi ng that it had to i ssue a pro- Zi oni st Decl arati on i mmedi atel y.
St orrs wrote to Ki t chener (whi ch i s to say, to his personal mi l i tary
secretary, Li eut enant - Col onel Oswal d Fi t zGeral d) at the end of the
year. He comment ed on pl ans for the postwar Mi ddl e East , and
cl ai med that Mos l ems woul d oppos e a Jewi sh Pal esti ne because they
bl amed Jews for the war. "Agai n woul d not Isl am be extremel y
i ndi gnant at the i dea of handi ng over our conquest s to a peopl e
which has taken no part as a nation in the war, and a section of
which has undoubt edl y hel ped to thrust the Tur ks over the preci -
pi ce. "
9
In fact, as Forei gn Office and Arab Bureau reports later were
to show, Mos l em opi ni on, even i n non- Turki sh areas, general l y
support ed the Ot t oman Empi r e and its alliance with Germany. St orrs
was wrong, too, i n s uppos i ng that Mos l ems were opposed to a Jewi sh
Pal esti ne because of the war; Mos l em opposi ti on to a Jewi sh Pal esti ne
had arisen l ong before the war, in the wake of Zi oni st colonization at
the end of the nineteenth century.
A characteri sti c flaw in the i nformati on-gatheri ng conduct ed by
Cl ayton and St orrs was that they frequentl y accepted i nformati on
suppl i ed by a si ngl e i nformant wi thout testi ng and checki ng it.
Inst ead they seemi ngl y relied on the sort of intuitive ability that
St eevens had ascri bed to Wi ngat e: the gift of bei ng abl e to di vi ne the
extent to whi ch any native i s telling the truth. John Buchan, who
later became wart i me Di rect or of Inf ormat i on i n London, wrote i n
the second chapter of his advent ure novel Greenmantle that "the
truth i s that we are the only race on earth that can produce men
capabl e of getti ng i nsi de the skin of remot e peopl es. Perhaps the
Scot s are better than the Engl i sh, but we're all a t housand percent
better than anybody el se. " Wi ngate, Cl ayt on, and St orrs acted as
t hough they underst ood the natives of the Ot t oman Empi re as well as
di d the Scot s hero of Buchan' s novel. As i t t ranspi red, their ability to
underst and the nati ves was qui te l i mi ted.
In eval uati ng report s that there was di ssati sfacti on with Ot t oman
rule i n some secti ons of the empi re, Bri ti sh Cai ro parti cul arl y mi s-
underst ood one of the salient characteri sti cs of the Mos l em Mi ddl e
Eas t : to the extent that it was politically consci ous, it was not willing
to be rul ed by non- Mos l ems . Behi nd enemy lines there were Mos l ems
who were di ssati sfi ed with the Young Tu r k government , but they
proposed to repl ace it with a different Turki s h government , or at any
rate a different Isl ami c government . The y regarded rul e by a Chri s-
tian European power, such as Bri tai n, as i ntol erabl e.
St orrs apparent l y bel i eved that he coul d get around that by pre-
tendi ng that i t was Egypt i an rul e that woul d be subst i t ut ed for
Turki s h rul e. He proposed to create what woul d appear to be a new
Egypt i an empi re to repl ace the Ot t oman Empi re i n the Arabi c-
speaki ng Mi ddl e Eas t ; i t was behi nd that facade that Lo r d Ki t chener
woul d rule as Bri tai n' s viceroy. St orrs deri ved parti cul ar sati sfacti on
from reports that Ot t oman rule had become unpopul ar i n Syri a; he
believed thai he coul d offer the Syri ans a popul ar al ternati ve. Accu-
rate report s, recei ved with some frequency, i ndi cated t hat ot her
than the Maroni t es, a Chri st i an sect with ties to the Fr e nc hmos t
Syri ans who held political views objected to the prospect of bei ng
rul ed i n the postwar worl d by France, and since St orrs and his
col l eagues took it for grant ed that the Arabi c- speaki ng peopl es coul d
not govern t hemsel ves, the only possi bi l i ty left was the one advocated
by St orrs : the i ncorporati on of Syri a into Bri ti sh Egypt .
Seen i n that light, reports that Syri ans consi dered the Ge r mans
and Tur ks to be Zi oni sts and the French to be detestabl e meant that
the Syri ans mus t be pro- Bri t i sh. Summari zi ng a memorandum s ub-
mi tted by a Syri an l eader who called for Arab i ndependence, Cl ayt on
stated that "it is to Engl and, and to Engl and al one, that both Syri an
Chri st i ans and Pan- Arabs are t ur ni ng. "
1 0
On 2 February 1915, St orrs
wrote to Fi t zGeral d/ Ki t chener that "There i s no doubt that local
Syri an feeling, bot h Chri st i an and Mus l i m, i s strongl y i n favor of our
addi ng that country t o the Egypt i an Sul t anat e . . . "
1
Th e questi on
was whether actively to promot e that feeling. Th e newly arri ved
Hi gh Commi s s i oner i n Cai ro, Mc Mahon, wri ti ng the s ame day to
Fi t zGeral d/ Ki t chener to seek gui dance, outl i ned the al ternati ves as
they had undoubt edl y been descri bed to hi m by St orrs and Cl ayt on:
"The Syri ans want our intervention and say that unl ess we can gi ve
t hem s ome assurance of s upport they will have to turn to the French
altho they woul d prefer us to the Fr e nc h. "
1 2
Wrong- headed and professi onal l y ambi t i ous, Bri tai n' s men on the
spot s uppos ed that Arabs want ed t o be rul ed by Europeans , and
buoyed by this mi staken belief, Ki t chener' s l i eutenants ai med at
taki ng control of Syri a. France' s men on the spot were wrong- headed
and ambi t i ous t oo; and they also ai med to take Syri a.
I V
Duri ng the Crus ades , French kni ghts won ki ngdoms and built castl es
i n Syri a; and i n 1914a mi l l enni um l aterthere were still French-
men who regarded Syri a as properl y part of France. France mai n-
tai ned cl ose ties with one of the Chri st i an communi t i es al ong the
Mount Lebanon coast of Syri a, and French shi ppi ng, silk, and other
interests eyed commerci al possi bi l i ti es i n the area. Th u s for re-
l i gi ous, economi c, and historical reasons, France saw herself as
havi ng a role to play in Syri a' s affai rs.
Th e moment that the Ot t oman Empi r e entered the war, French
officials i n the Mi ddl e Eas t (like their Bri ti sh count erpart s, Wi ngate,
Cl ayt on, and St orrs ) therefore f ormul at ed pl ans t o annex Turkey' s
Syri an provi nces. France' s mi ni ster i n Cai ro and Consul - General i n
Bei rut i mmedi atel y joi ned i n urgi ng their government to i nvade the
Lebanes e coast. Thei r qui xoti c pl an called for a l andi ng of only
about 2, 000 French t roops, who woul d be j oi nedt hey bel i evedby
30, 000 local vol unteers. Speed was of the essence, i n their view;
France woul d have to stri ke before Tur ke y coul d rai se an army and
before Bri tai n coul d stri ke f i rs t .
1 3
Thei r proposal coul d hardl y have been more i nopport une. It
reached the French government i n November 1914, when i t was still
in exile in Bordeaux, havi ng fled from Pari s in the face of the
Ge r man advance to the Marne. While there were powerful colonialist
fi gures i n Parl i ament , the Forei gn Mi ni stry, and the Cabi net ,
November was a mont h in whi ch everyone's attention was still f ocused
on the mortal st ruggl e i n northern France and Bel gi um. Th e proposal
to di spat ch troops to Syri a was rejected.
Th e following mont h, howevert he contendi ng armi es i n Europe
havi ng settled down i n their trenches, and the government havi ng
returned to Pari st he proposal to i nvade Syri a di d receive attenti on.
A del egati on of colonialist politicians secured the agreement, in pri n-
ci pl e, of Al exandre Mi l l erand, the Mi ni ster of War, to s upport a
Syri an expedi ti on. Forei gn Mi ni ster Theophi l e Del casse, however,
remai ned vehementl y oppos ed: "Not hi ng appears less desi rabl e than
intervention i n Syri a, " he s a i d .
1 4
Del cas s e was one of the many
French officials who bel i eved that annexi ng Syri a woul d be of much
less val ue to his country than preservi ng the Ot t oman Empi re woul d
be. As of 1914 France suppl i ed 45 percent of the foreign capi tal i n
the pri vate sector of the Ot t oman economy and 60 percent of the
Ot t oman publ i c debt, and thus had an enormous stake i n the empi re' s
conti nued exi stence and vi t al i t y.
1 5
On 3031 December 1914, Si r Henry McMahon, who was about
to take up his duti es as Ki t chener' s repl acement i n Cai ro, vi si ted
Pari s. He met with officials of the Forei gn Mi ni stry and War Mi ni stry
but failed to repl y coherently to their quest i ons about Bri tai n' s Mi ddl e
East ern policy. Mc Mahon was notori ousl y dul l -wi tted and ineffectual,
but the French, who di d not know hi m, as s umed he mus t be clever
and ast ut e: his i ncompet ent repl i es were i nterpreted by Mi l l erand,
the War Mi ni ster, as del i berate and subt l e evasi ons, maski ng a secret
Bri ti sh pl an to i nvade and occupy Syri a by t hems el ves .
1 6
Mi l l erand i mmedi atel y report ed these conversati ons to the French
Cabi net , which authori zed hi m to create an expedi ti onary force to
i nvade Syri a whenever Bri tai n di d, whether invited by her to par-
ticipate or not. In February 1915, Del casse went over to London and
took up the mat t er of Syri a with Si r Edward Grey. Th e French
Forei gn Mi ni ster was reassured that Bri tai n woul d not i nvade Syri a
without gi vi ng pri or noti ce. Th e two foreign mi ni sters appear to
have agreed that i f the Ot t oman Empi r e were to be parti ti oned,
Bri tai n woul d not oppos e France' s desi gns on Syri a, but that i t
woul d be far preferabl e for the empi re not to be broken up.
Thus the foreign mi ni sters settl ed the di fferences between their
two count ri est emporari l y. But their men on the spot i n the Mi ddl e
East conti nued to stir up troubl e between Bri tai n and France; and,
mi sunderst andi ng the regi on, Ki t chener and his l i eutenants al so went
on to purs ue other dangerous desi gns there.
10
KI TCHENER SETS OUT TO
CAPTURE ISLAM
i
Th e West and the Mi ddl e Eas t have mi sunderst ood each other
throughout most of the twentieth century; and much of that mi s-
underst andi ng can be traced back to Lo r d Ki t chener' s initiatives i n
the early years of the Fi rst Worl d War. Th e pecul i ari ti es of his
character, the deficiencies of his underst andi ng of the Mosl em worl d,
the mi si nformati on regul arl y suppl i ed to hi m by his l i eutenants in
Cai ro and Khar t oum, and his choi ce of Arab pol i ti ci ans with whom
to deal have col ored the course of political events ever si nce.
To appreci at e the novelty of Ki t chener' s approach to the Mi ddl e
Eas t , i t mus t be remembered that when the Ot t oman Empi re entered
the Fi rst Worl d War, As qui t h, Grey, and Churchi l l di d not i ntend to
retaliate by sei zi ng any of its domai ns for Bri tai n. The y di d propose
to allow Bri tai n' s allies to make territorial gai ns i n Europe and Asi a
Mi nor at Turkey' s expense; but Asqui t h' s Bri tai n had no territorial
desi gns of her own on Ot t oman l ands, either i n the Mi ddl e Eas t or
el sewhere. Ki t chener, however, mai ntai ned that when the war was
over, it was in Bri tai n' s vital interest to seize much of the Ot t oman
Empi re for herself: the Arabi c- speaki ng part. Thi s woul d mean a
total reversal of Bri tai n' s tradi ti onal policy.
Ki t chener, like most Bri t ons who had lived i n the Eas t , believed
that i n the Mos l em worl d religion counts for everythi ng. But the
fi el d marshal and his col l eagues i n Cai ro and Khar t oum mi stakenl y
seemed to believe that Mohamme dani s m was a central i zed, authori -
tarian st ruct ure. The y regarded Isl am as a si ngl e entity: as an "it," as
an organi zati on. The y bel i eved that i t obeyed its l eaders. Cent uri es
before, Cort ez had won control of Mexi co by sei zi ng the Aztec
emperor; and medi eval French ki ngs had tri ed to control Chri st endom
by keepi ng the pope capti ve i n Avi gnon. In much the s ame spi ri t,
Ki t chener and his col l eagues bel i eved that Isl am coul d be bought ,
mani pul at ed, or capt ured by buyi ng, mani pul at i ng, or capt uri ng its
96
K I T C H E N E R S E T S O U T T O C A P T U R E I S L A M 97
rel i gi ous l eadershi p. The y were i nt ri gued by the notion that whoever
controlled the person of the Cal i phMohammed' s successorcon-
trolled I s l am.
Central to Ki t chener' s anal ysi s was the contenti on that the Cal i ph
mi ght hurl Isl am agai nst Bri tai n. Si nce Sunni Mos l ems (who pre-
domi nat ed i n Mohamme dan Indi a) regarded the Turki s h Sul t an as a
Cal i ph, Ki t chener percei ved this as a conti nui ng threat. In Cai ro and
Khar t oum i t was bel i eved that, as of 1914, the Cal i ph had fallen into
the hands of Je ws and Ge r mans ; the War Mi ni ster worri ed that once
the world war was won, the Cal i ph mi ght become a tool in the hands
of Bri tai n' s Mi ddl e Eas t rivals, parti cul arl y Rus s i a.
In enemy hands, the cal i phate coul d be used ( Ki t chener bel i eved)
to undermi ne Bri tai n' s posi ti on i n Jndi a, Egypt , and the Sudan.
Bri tai n rul ed over half of the worl d' s Mos l e ms .
1
In Indi a al one there
were al most seventy million of t hem, and Mohammedans consti tuted
a di sproporti onatel y l arge part of the Indi an Army. In Egypt and the
Sudan, Bri tai n rul ed mi l l i ons more, who lived al ongsi de the Suez
Canal sea road to Indi a. Ti ny Bri ti sh garri sons pol i ced these tens of
mi l l i ons of nati ves, but Ki t chener knew that they coul d not even
begi n to deal with a revolt.
Th e Bri ti sh i magi nati on was haunt ed by the Indi an Mut i ny
(18579), the myst eri ous upri si ng, incited by religion, that had
brought down the rul e of the Eas t Indi a Company. More recently
the upri si ng i n the Sudan, whi ch Ki t chener had so brilliantly
avenged, was i nspi red by a new rel i gi ous leader who called himself
the Mahdi , a title Europeans transl ated as "Messi ah. " Pan- Isl ami c
unrest i n Egypt i n 19056 had caused Bri tai n deep concern. For
Ki t chener and his ent ourage, the possi bi l i ty of a Mos l em Hol y War
agai nst Bri tai n was a recurri ng ni ght mare.
Th e Di rect or of Inf ormat i on, John Buchan, dramat i zed these fears
in his 1916 novel Greenmantle, in which Germany makes use of a
Mos l em prophet i n a plot to destroy Bri tai n' s empi re. Th e prophet
appears in Tur ke y; there are portents of his comi ng; there is an
ancient prophecy; there is a modern revel ati on; and the regi on in
which he i ntends to ignite a rebellion is made explicit. "There is a
dry wi nd bl owi ng t hrough the Eas t , and the parched grasses wait the
spark. And the wi nd i s bl owi ng t owards the Indi an border. "
2
Ki t chener bel i eved that a call to arms by the Cal i ph agai nst Bri tai n
duri ng the 1914 war coul d perhaps be offset by the words or acti ons
of other Mos l em rel i gi ous l eaders. After Bri tai n had won the war,
however, more deci si ve action woul d be necessary. Th e reason was
that when the war had been won, Rus s i a was sure to take possessi on
of Const ant i nopl e andunl es s somet hi ng were done about i tof
the Cal i ph. Ki t chener saw a German- cont rol l ed Cal i ph as merel y
dangerous he woul d at t empt to foment unrest i n Indi a to throw
Bri tai n off bal ance in the European war. But he saw a Russi an-
control l ed Cal i ph as a mortal danger to the Bri ti sh Empi r e ; for
(unlike Asqui t h and Grey) . Ki t chener believed that Rus s i a still har-
bored ambi t i ons of taki ng Indi a away from Bri tai n. In Ki t chener' s
view, Ge r many was an enemy i n Eur ope and Rus s i a was an enemy i n
Asi a: the paradox of the 1914 war i n whi ch Bri tai n and Rus s i a were
allied was t hat by wi nni ng i n Eur ope , Bri tai n ri sked l osi ng i n Asi a.
The only compl etel y sati sfactory out come of the war, from
Ki t chener' s poi nt of view, was for Germany to lose it without Rus s i a
wi nni ng i t and in 1914 it was not clear how that coul d be ac-
compl i shed. So the War Mi ni ster pl anned to strike first i n the comi ng
postwar st ruggl e with Rus s i a for control of the road to and into
Indi a.
Ki t chener' s proposal was that, after the war, Bri tai n shoul d arrange
for her own nomi nee to become Cal i ph. Mohamme d had been an
Arabi an; Ki t chener proposed to encourage the view that Mohammed' s
successors as Cal i ph shoul d be Arabi an, too. Th e advant age of this
was that the coastl i ne of the Arabi an peni nsul a coul d easily be
controlled by the Bri ti sh navy; Bri tai n woul d be abl e to i nsul ate the
Cal i ph f rom the influence of Bri tai n' s European ri val s. Once Bri tai n
coul d install the Cal i ph within her sphere of influence in Arabi a,
Ki t chener bel i eved she coul d gai n control of Isl am. And even before
the Ot t oman Empi re entered the war, Ki t chener' s l i eutenants i n
Cai ro remi nded the War Mi ni ster that an obvi ous candi dat e to be the
Arabi an cal i pht he ruler of Meccahad al ready been in touch with
hi m.
I I
Towar d the end of the s ummer of 1914, as the Ot t oman war ap-
proached, Gi l bert Cl ayton recalled that Abdul l ah, the favorite son of
Hussei n, the ruler of Mecca, had visited Cai ro some mont hs earlier
and had suggest ed that Arabi a mi ght be ri pe for revolt. At the ti me,
Abdul l ah had been afrai d that the Young Tur ks were about to move
agai nst his father; and Abdul l ah, whose indolent di sposi ti on hi d a
bol d intelligence, looked about for possi bl e support from abroad. But
shortly afterward his father and the Porte composed their di fferences,
so that Bri ti sh assi stance was no l onger needed.
Even now, it is not certain what Abdul l ah sai d in Cai ro and what
was sai d to hi m. Abdul l ah apparent l y fi rst met Lo r d Ki t chener there
i n 1912 or 1913. He met Ki t chener i n Cai ro agai n i n February and
Apri l 1914, and also met with Ronal d St orrs . Abdul l ah seems to
have sought assurances of Bri ti sh hel p if the Porte were to seek to
K I T C H E N E R S E T S O U T T O C A P T U R E I S L A M 9 9
depose his father. At the t i me, Ki t chener, who i nqui red i n detail
about the difficulties i n Arabi a, seems to have di scl ai med any interest
i n i nterferi ng i n internal Ot t oman affai rs. Abdul l ah may have been
less i mpressed by the di scl ai mer of interest than by the expressi on of
concern.
3
To St orrs , Abdul l ah apparent l y cl ai medf al sel yt hat the rival
chiefs of the Arabi an peni nsul a were prepared to follow his father in
opposi ng the Porte' s desi gns. He suggest ed a future rel ati onshi p
between Arabi a and Bri tai n si mi l ar to that between Af ghani st an and
Bri tai n, i n whi ch the former exerci sed internal self-rule and the latter
admi ni st ered all forei gn rel ati ons. Tho ug h the i dea was attracti ve to
hi m, St orrs , like his chief, was unabl e to offer Abdul l ah the encour-
agement that he s ought .
4
Several Arabi an emi rs had i ndeed been in conflict for years with
the Young Tur k l eadershi p i n Const ant i nopl e. But Gi l bert Cl ayton
failed to appreci ate the extent to which rel i gi ous, dynasti c, and other
di fferences di vi ded t hem. Arabi c- speaki ng emi gres i n Cai ro, with
whom he met, may have mi sl ed hi m i n this connecti on. In fact none
of the Arabi an emi rs was willing to accept one of the others as a
l eader.
Promi nent among the Arabi c- speaki ng exiles living i n Cai ro with
whom Cl ayton spoke was a colorful former Ot t oman army officer and
C. U. P. politician named Azi z Ali al - Masri . Al - Masri , of Ci rcassi an
ancestry, * was born and brought up i n Egypt ; he had at t ended
military school in the Ot t oman Empi r e . After mi l i tary servi ce in the
field, he had emerged as a leader of the Young Turkey Party. Yet he
was a mere major attached to the General Staff at a t i me when
Enver, a cl assmat e of whom he held a low opi ni on, had become
Mi ni ster of War. Di scont ent ed, al - Masri responded by organi zi ng al-
'Ahd, a smal l secret society of army officers who objected to the
C. U. P. ' s central i zi ng policies and its failure to give those who spoke
Arabi c their fair share of hi gh office. Th e officers of al -' Ahd were
uni ted i n their opposi t i on to the Turki f yi ng policies adopt ed by the
C. U. P. The y advocated either admi t t i ng the Arabi c- speaki ng popu-
lations to a greater share of power in the central government , or else
decentral i zi ng and al l owi ng them great er aut onomy at the local level,
or perhaps bot h.
5
Enver Pasha was responsi bl e for havi ng had Maj or al - Masri arrested
and convi cted on t rumped- up charges i n early 1914. Th u s al - Masri
unwillingly f ound himself cast in the role of an Arab revol ut i onary
unwillingly, because he aspi red to l eadershi p of the Ot t oman Empi r e
as a whole, not a mere section of it. Res pondi ng to opi ni on in Cai ro,
* The Circassians were a people from the Caucasus, once ruled by Turkey and
later by Russi a.
Lo r d Ki t chener i ntervened on his behal f; and Dj emal Pasha arranged
to have hi m pardoned and exiled to his native Egypt . An opponent ,
si nce his chi l dhood, of Bri ti sh rule i n Egypt , anti -Bri ti sh, pro- German,
a support er of the Ot t oman Empi r e who was opposed only to its
government , a mi l i tary politician who numbered a mere handful of
col l eagues among his support ers, al - Masri was mi sunderst ood by the
Bri ti sh intelligence officers who wrongl y regarded hi m both as power-
ful and as a potential ally.
In early Sept ember 1914, i t appears that al - Masri visited the
Bri ti sh Agency i n Cai ro, and met with Cl ayt on.
6
Al - Masri knew that
Abdul Azi z Ibn Sa ud and other Arabi an l eaders had i n the past
consi dered ri si ng agai nst the Port e. Perhaps he told Cl ayt on so.
Perhaps Cl ayton was remi nded of Abdul l ah' s visit and of what he
had said to St orrs and Ki t chener.
After seei ng al - Masri , Cl ayton met with Ronal d St orrs and made
arrangement s for hi m to forward a secret memorandum to Lo r d
Ki t chener. Th e Cl ayton me mor andum was encl osed i n a letter that
St orrs was to send to his old chief on the relatively i nnocuous subject
of camel s.
Ill
It was a common Bri ti sh concern in 1914 that the Ot t oman Empi re,
if it entered the war, mi ght l aunch an attack agai nst the Suez Canal ;
and, like officials in the war mi ni stri es of Europe who anal yzed the
mi l i tary potential of nei ghbori ng enemy countri es in t erms of rai l road
facilities, Ronal d St orrs focused attenti on on the suppl y of camel s
avai l abl e to the Ot t oman forces. Th e Ot t oman army, he wrote i n his
letter to Ki t chener, woul d count on obtai ni ng its ani mal s from the
camel - breeders of the western district of Arabi a, the Hej az, and what
St orrs proposed was to encourage the local rul ert he Emi r of
Meccanot to deliver t hem.
Th e message about camel s served as his cover: with i t St orrs
forwarded Cl ayton' s secret me mor andum of 6 Sept ember 1914 to
Ki t chener which urged hi m to enter into conversati ons with the ruler
of Mecca for other purpos es . One of the i ssues rai sed in Cl ayton' s
memorandum was whether the Ot t oman Sul t an coul d be repl aced as
Cal i ph of Isl am by an Arabi an l eader friendly to Bri tai n. If so, the
Emi r of Mecca, the guardi an of the Mosl em Hol y Pl aces, was an
obvi ous candi dat e, the more so as he was in a posi ti on to provi de
Bri tai n with i mportant assi stance in the matter of pi l gri mages.
In the rhyt hm of life in the Isl ami c Eas t , no activity was more
i mportant than the mas s pi l gri mage each year to the Hol y Pl aces of
Ar abi aa pi l gri mage that every Mos l em abl e to do so i s commanded
to make at least once in his lifetime. Th e worl d war i nterfered,
parti cul arl y in 1915. Even if Indi an Mos l ems were to forgive Bri tai n
for goi ng to war agai nst the only significant i ndependent Isl ami c
power, there was a questi on as to whether they woul d forgi ve the
di srupti on of the pi l gri mage that pl ayed so l arge a role in their lives.
Th e Hol y Pl aces of Arabi a, Mecca, and Medi na are l ocated i n the
Hej az, whose ruler therefore was in a posi ti on to saf eguard the right
of Bri ti sh Mos l ems to conti nue vi si ti ng their shri nes despi te the war.
Cl ai mi ng descent f rom the Prophet' s fami l y, the Emi r of Meccai n
addi ti on to bei ng ruler of the Hej azwas in a posi ti on to as s ume the
mantl e of the Cal i ph.
In his secret me mor andum, Cl ayt on made the erroneous asserti on
that the rival regional l eaders of the Arabi an peni nsul at he rul ers of
Asi r and the Yemen, as well as I bn Sa ud and perhaps Ibn Ras hi d of
Nej dwere comi ng together with the rul er of Mecca to work for "an
Arabi a for the Ar a bs . "
7
Accordi ng to Cl ayton' s me mor andum, the
movement was encouraged by the Khedi ve, the nomi nal rul er of
Egypt under the Sul t an, who al so regarded himself as a candi dat e to
succeed the Sul t an as Cal i ph of I s l am. It i s not clear how Cl ayton
i ntended to reconcile the conflicting ambi t i ons of this di verse group.
Th e cl ai m that the other rival l eaders woul d uni te behi nd the Emi r
of Mecca was one that Abdul l ah had advanced on his father's behal f
some fi ve mont hs before i n conversati ons with Ronal d St orrs . In
presenti ng i t as fresh i nformati on, Cl ayt on may have been i ndi cati ng
that the i nformati on had been recently confi rmed to hi m by al - Masri
or by some other exi l ed Ot t oman fi gure. Th e novelty of the memo-
randum lay in the suggesti on that the Arabi ans coul d be of servi ce to
Bri tai n duri ng the war, and not merel y afterward.
Ki t chener responded i mmedi atel y. He sent a cabl e to Cai ro on 24
Sept ember 1914, in which he ordered that St orrs be told to send a
trusted messenger to Abdul l ah to ask a quest i on in confi dence: in the
event of war, woul d the Hej az be for or agai nst Bri tai n? Before
sendi ng his cabl e, Ki t chener cl eared i t with Si r Edward Grey, who
was i mpressed by Cl ayton' s me mor andum, which he t ermed "very
i mport ant . "
8
A few weeks later the messenger returned from his undercover
j ourney to Ot t oman Arabi a with a vague but encouragi ng repl y. It
invited the War Mi ni ster to spel l out what he had i n mi nd. Cai ro
cabl ed Ki t chener that "Communi cat i on i s guarded, but friendly and
f avourabl e. "
9
Meanwhi l e the Agency had agai n been i n communi cat i on with
Maj or al - Masri and al so other Arabi c emi gres i n Cai ro. The s e exiles
from the Ot t oman Empi re conti nued to carry on the decades- ol d
di scussi on of who the vari ous and di verse Arabi c- speaki ng peopl es of
the empi re were, or ought to be. Thi s questi on of national identity
was one which had been rai sed i n the coffee houses of Damas c us and
Bei rut, and in the student quart ers of Pari s from the nineteenth
century onward, and had gi ven rise to a variety of literary cl ubs and
secret societies within the Ot t oman Empi r e .
In the context of Ot t oman pol i ti cs, the Arabi c- speaki ng exiles i n
Cai ro were respondi ng to those pol i ci es of the Young Tu r k govern-
ment whi ch subj ect ed the majori ty of the i nhabi tants of the Ot t oman
Empi re to the hegemony of the roughl y 40 percent of the popul ati on
who spoke Tur ki s h. In one way or another, what the exiles advocated
was a greater say i n government al matters, and more and hi gher
official posi ti ons for those who spoke Arabi cabout the s ame per-
centage as spoke Tur ki s h.
Though often referred to as nati onal i sts, these men are more
accuratel y descri bed as s e par at i s t s .
1 0
The y di d not ask for i ndepen-
dence; they asked for a greater meas ure of parti ci pati on and local
rul e. The y were willing to be rul ed largely by Tur ks because the
Tur ks were fel l ow-Mosl ems. Unl i ke European nati onal i sts, they were
peopl e whose beliefs exi sted in a rel i gi ous rather than secul ar frame-
work. The y lived within the walls of the city of I s l am in a sense in
whi ch Europe had not lived within Chri st endom si nce the early
Mi ddl e Ages ; for, like the cities bui l t in the Arab worl d in medi eval
ti mes, the lives of Mos l ems circle around a central mos que. The y di d
not represent an ethnic group, for historically, the only ethnic or
"true" Ar abs were the i nhabi tants of Arabi a, while the Arabi c- speaki ng
popul at i ons of such provi nces as Baghdad or Damas c us , or of such
cities as Al gi ers or Cai ro, were of mi xed ethnic stock and background,
spanni ng the vast range of ancient peopl es and cul tures that ext ended
from the Atl anti c Ocean to the Persi an Gul f .
The r e were only a few dozen peopl e who were active parti sans of
Arabi c nati onal i sm ( separat i sm) i n Oct ober 1914, as members of one
or more of the secret societies, such as al - Fat at and al -' Ahd, of which
the Bri ti sh Agency i n Cai ro was becomi ng i ncreasi ngl y a wa r e .
1 1
A
great deal more i s now known about these men and what they
represented than was known to the Bri ti sh at the t i me. In l arge part
they were members of the Arabi c- speaki ng elites who had been well
connected with the regi me which had been overthrown by the Young
Tur ks and who felt threatened by the pro- Turki s h and central i zi ng
t rends i n C. U. P. pol i c y.
1 2
Mi l ne Cheet ham, the acti ng Agent and
Consul - General i n Cai ro, cabl ed an intelligence memorandum about
the secret soci eti es to Ki t chener on 26 October 1914, as the field
marshal pondered the t erms of his next message to Arabi a.
I V
Ki tchener' s t el egram, whi ch was cl eared and sent by Grey at the
Forei gn Office, told the Agency that St orrs shoul d repl y to Abdul l ah
that "If the Arab nati on assi st Engl and in this war that has been
forced upon us by Tur ke y, Engl and will guarant ee that no internal
intervention take pl ace i n Arabi a, and will gi ve Arabs every assi stance
agai nst foreign aggressi on. " ( By "Arabs , " Ki t chener here meant those
who lived in Arabi a. ) In other words, if the Arabi an l eaders freed
their peni nsul a f rom the Sul t an and decl ared their i ndependence,
Bri tai n woul d hel p to protect t hem agai nst any i nvasi on from abroad.
At the Agency, Cheet ham and St orrs were responsi bl e for super-
vi si ng the transl ati on of this message into Arabi c. Apparent l y with
the encouragement of Cl ayt on, they broadened its l anguage to pl edge
Bri ti sh support for "the emanci pat i on of the Ar a bs . "
1 3
Thi s went far
i n the di recti on poi nted out by Regi nal d Wi ngate. Wi ngate believed
i n sti rri ng up the tri bes of Arabi a on Bri tai n' s behalf. Unl i ke
Ki t chener, who proposed to deal with Arabi a at the end of the war,
the i mpati ent Wi ngate urged i mmedi at e action at the begi nni ng of
the war. Hi s goal was to l ure the Arabs away from the Ot t oman
Empi re and as early as 14 January 1915 he wrote to Cl ayt on that "I
fear Bri ti sh action has been so l ong del ayed that it is doubtful if we
shall now succeed i n detachi ng the Arabs . . . "
1 4
Hi s fami l i ar com-
plaint was that his superi ors had not heeded his advi ce i n t i me.
As the Ki t chener message was bei ng sent out i n Arabi c transl ati on,
the emi gre groups with whi ch Cl ayt on kept i n contact i n Cai ro seem
to have told hi m that Arabs in the Hej az woul d be suspi ci ous of
Bri ti sh i ntenti ons, and that s ome sort of clarification of what was
bei ng promi sed woul d be i n order. Ki t chener, with Grey' s approval ,
i mmedi atel y authori zed the Agency to i ssue a further statement.
Agai n the Agency went beyond its i nstructi ons, and i ssued procl a-
mat i ons di rected not merel y to Arabi a, but to practically all of
Arabi c- speaki ng Asi a ("Palestine, Syri a and Mesopot ami a") , promi s-
ing that if their i nhabi tants threw off the Tur ks , Bri tai n woul d
recogni ze and guarant ee their i ndependence.
1 5
Al t hough the Agency exceeded its i nstructi ons i n maki ng this
publ i c offer, the pl edge itself was a reasonabl e one. Bri tai n had not
yet made any conflicting commi t ment to the Allied Powers regardi ng
the future of Arabi c- speaki ng Asi a. If the Arabi c- speaki ng provi nces,
in defiance of all the probabi l i ti es, had struck a maj or bl ow for the
Allied cause by secedi ng from the Ot t oman Empi re and by successful l y
wi nni ng their f reedom by their own exerti ons, there was no reason
why Bri tai n shoul d not have guarant eed help in protecti ng their
future i ndependence. It woul d have been in Bri tai n' s national interest,
with respect bot h to wart i me and to postwar rivalries, to do so.
It was rather the message that Ki t chener had authori zed that was
troubl i ng, forrefl ecti ng his belief that Arabi a was i mportant not for
the role it coul d play in the war but for the role it coul d play after the
warhe had cl osed his message to Mecca with his bombshel l : "It
may be that an Arab of true race will as s ume the Khal i f at e at Mecca
or Medi na, and so good may come by the hel p of Go d out of all the
evil that i s now occurri ng. "
1 6
Rest ori ng the cal i phate to Arabi a,
where i t and Mohamme d were born thirteen centuri es before, was
Ki t chener' s strategy for prepari ng for the rivalry with Rus s i a whi ch
was bound to follow the concl usi on of the war agai nst Germany. But
Arabi ans, living within the political confines of their own peni nsul a,
were not likely to underst and what he had i n mi nd. The y woul d not
know that at the outset of one great conflict between European
powers he was al ready thi nki ng ahead to the next. The y woul d be
even less likely to recogni ze that Ki t chener, Wi ngate, Cl ayt on, and
St orrs di d not underst and the nature of the cal i phate.
Schol ars have been kept busy ever si nce expl ai ni ng to western
st udent s of the Mi ddl e Eas t that the split between t emporal and
spi ri tual authori ty, that i n medi eval Eur ope pitted pope agai nst em-
peror, di d not occur i n the worl d of I s l am. Ki t chener, Wi ngate,
Cl ayt on, and St orrs were mi staken i n bel i evi ng that the Cal i ph coul d
be a spi ri tual l eader only. In I s l am, all of life, i ncl udi ng government
and politics, falls within the governance of the Hol y La w; so that i n
the eyes of Sunni Mos l ems , such as the Ot t oman Sul t an and the
Emi r of Mecca, the domi ni on of the Cal i ph as uphol der of the Hol y
La w i s pervasi ve. What Bri t i sh Cai ro di d not see i s that the Cal i ph i s
also a pri nce: a governor and a l eader in battl e as well as a leader in
prayer.
Ki t chener' s followers, for all their s uppos ed knowl edge of the
Isl ami c worl d, mi ssed the i mport ance of another poi nt: they i gnored
the extent of Isl ami c di suni ty and f ragment at i on. Th u s the Ki t chener
pl an called for I bn Saud, l eader of the fi erce puri tani cal Wahhabi
sect, to recogni ze the spi ri tual authori ty of the Sunni ruler of Mecca;
but that was not a realistic possi bi l i ty, for like so many of the dozens
of cont endi ng sects into whi ch I s l am is di vi ded, theirs were at
daggers drawn.
Th e proposal which Ki t chener and his followers sent off to Mecca
mi sl ed its reci pi ent, who read it as an offer to make hi m rul er of a
vast ki ngdom; for that, of course, is what the new Cal i ph of Isl am
woul d have been. As will be seen, when the ruler of Mecca opened
the di scussi on of what the boundari es of his new ki ngdom were to
be, St orrs was appal l ed; for he and Ki t chener had not i ntended that
the area rul ed by the Emi r shoul d be expanded. In the s umme r of
1915, St orrs wrote to Fi t zGeral d/ Ki t chener that if the ruler of Mecca
coul d conciliate the other rul i ng emi rs and chieftains of the Arabi an
peni nsul a, and i mpress upon t hem that "he has no i dea of pret endi ng
to any temporal ri ghts within their terri tori es, his chances of a
general t hough hardl y yet of a uni versal recogni ti on as Cal i ph will
be g o o d. "
1 7
Th e Bri ti sh i ntended to support the candi dacy of Hussei n for the
posi ti on of "Pope" of I s l ama posi ti on that ( unbeknown to t hem)
di d not exi st; while ( unbeknown to t hem too) the l anguage they used
encouraged hi m to at t empt to become ruler of the entire Arab
worl dt hough in fact St orrs bel i eved that it was a mi stake for
Hussei n to ai m at ext endi ng his rule at all. Ki t chener and his lieuten-
ants woul d have been astoni shed to learn what their communi cat i on
signified to Mos l ems i n Arabi a.
11
INDIA PROTESTS
i
Art hur Hi rtzel , Secret ary to the Political Depart ment of the Indi a
Office, was not shown the Ki t chener messages to Hussei n until 12
December 1914after they had reached Mecca. He was aghast .
Hirtzel qui ckl y criticized "a very dangerous correspondence" which,
in hi nti ng at an Arab cal i phate, "does the very thi ng which this
Office has al ways underst ood that H. M. G. woul d not do. "
1
Th e
Secret ary of St at e for Indi a, Lo r d Crewe, pri vatel y told the Viceroy
that Ki t chener refused to see that the spi ri tual presti ge of the exi sti ng
Cal i pht he Turki s h Sul t anremai ned intact, and that Mos l ems i n
Indi a, who held hi m in hi gh regard, even if they accepted his bei ng
repl aced woul d never accept his bei ng repl aced as a result of foreign
me ddl i ng.
2
When he saw Ki t chener' s pl edge t o protect Arabi an i ndependence,
Hi rt zel prot est ed that i t was "a startl i ng document , " "a guarant ee
gi ven . . . i n wri ti ng wi t hout the authori ty of H. M. G. "
3
Hi rtzel ' s
protest was but t ressed by an earlier memorandum from the Forei gn
Depart ment of the Government of Indi a, forwarded to the Indi a
Office with s upport from the governors of Aden, Bombay, and
el sewhere, which expl ai ned that, "What we want is not a Uni t ed
Arabi a: but a weak and di suni ted Arabi a, split up into little pri nci -
palities so far as possi bl e under our suzerai nt ybut i ncapabl e of
coordi nated action agai nst us, f ormi ng a buffer agai nst the Powers in
the West . "
4
Thi s mi sunderst ood Bri ti sh Cai ro' s i ntenti ons: as Cl ayton
later wrote to Wi ngate, "Indi a seems obsessed with the fear of a
powerful and uni ted Arab state, which can never exist unl ess we are
fool enough to create i t. "
5
At t empt i ng to soothe feelings in the Indi a Office and in the
Government of Indi a, Lo r d Crewe expl ai ned that there had been no
pri or consul tati on about the Ki t chener pl edge because "this was a
pri vate communi cat i on of Lo r d Ki t chener' s" rather than an official
106
I N D I A P R O T E S T S 107
communi cat i on f rom Hi s Majesty' s Gove r nme nt .
6
But the j uri sdi c-
tional di sput e that had fl ared up was not exti ngui shed by such
assurances; i t fl amed on heatedl y t hroughout the war and afterward.
I I
Indi a' s institutional outl ook was that of a bel eaguered garri son s pread
too thin al ong an overextended line. Her instinct was to avoi d new
i nvol vements. Her strategy for the Mi ddl e Eas t was to hold the bare
mi ni mumt he coastl i ne of the Gul f , to keep open the sea road to
and f rom Bri t ai nand to refuse to be drawn i nl and.
Nonet hel ess the unwant ed war agai nst the Ot t oman Empi re opened
up the possi bi l i ty of annexi ng nearby Bas ra and Baghdad. Col oni -
zation and economi c devel opment of these provi nces woul d bri ng
great ri ches, i t was bel i eved; and the Government of Indi a was
t empt ed, even t hough i n the past its officials had often warned
agai nst as s umi ng further territorial responsi bi l i ti es. Whatever she
di d, Bri ti sh Indi a was det ermi ned to identify her interests with those
of her subj ect s, many of whom were Mos l e m; and Lo r d Ki t chener' s
Isl ami c policy posed a threat to this vital interest.
Ki t chener' s initiatives also i nt ruded into a foreign pol i cy sphere in
which the Government of Indi a jeal ousl y guarded its ri ghts agai nst
compet i t ors within the Bri ti sh government . Th e Forei gn Depart ment
of the Government of Indi a exerci sed responsi bi l i ty for rel ati ons
with such nei ghbori ng areas as Ti be t , Af ghani st an, Persi a, and
eastern Arabi a; and the Government of Indi a also admi ni st ered
Bri tai n' s protectorate over Aden and the Gul f shei khdoms t hrough a
network of governors and resi dent agent s. Th u s when Ki t chener
entered into di scussi ons with the rul er of Mecca, he i ntervened in an
area of Indi an concern and activity.
Though the Government of Indi a had l ong followed a policy of
hol di ng the coastal port s al ong the Persi an Gul f sea route to Sue z , i t
had avoi ded i nvol vement in the pol i ti cs of the interior. Even so,
Capt ai n William Henry Shakespear, an officer i n the Indi an Political
Servi ce, had, as Political Agent i n Kuwai t , entered into relations of
political and personal fri endshi p with Abdul Azi z Ibn Saud, an
emi r and a ri si ng power in central Arabi a, in the years i mmedi atel y
precedi ng the out break of war .
7
Li ke Abdul l ah i n Cai ro, I bn Saud
had expressed a wi l l i ngness for his domai n to become a Bri ti sh client
st at e; and like Ki t chener and St orrs , Shakespear was obl i ged to
indicate that his government was unwi l l i ng to interfere in mat t ers of
purel y domest i c Ot t oman concern. Thi s was even more true at the
ti me because the Forei gn Office backed the pro- Turki s h Hous e of
Rashi d, the paramount rul ers of central Arabi a and the Hous e of
Saud' s heredi tary enemy. But wi th the out break of war, Indi a was
free to back her prot ege Ibn Sa ud, only to find Cai ro backi ng a rival
i n Mecca.
Cai ro, i n turn, found its own projects thwarted by Indi a. In
November 1914, the mont h that the Ot t oman Empi re entered the
war, Cai ro proposed (with the approval of Si r Edward Grey) to send
Maj or al - Masri on an expedi ti on to organi ze agi tati on and perhaps
revol uti on in Mes opot ami a. Ever fearful of i gni ti ng a confl agrati on
that coul d bl aze out of control , Indi a bl ocked the proposal .
Indi a bel i eved that if the Arabs ever were to turn agai nst the
Tur ki s h government , I bn Sa ud shoul d lead this revol t; but as of
December 1914, the Vi ceroy argued that action al ong these lines
woul d be pr e mat ur e .
8
Taki ng a contrary view, Ki t chener and his
followers i n Cai ro and Khar t oum l ooked to Sheri f Hussei n as Bri tai n' s
i mportant Arabi an ally, and i ssued procl amat i ons urgi ng Arabs t o
revolt. Apart f rom this di fference i n overall strategy, Si ml a, on the
basi s of prewar deal i ngs, was aware of others in the Arabi c- speaki ng
worl d who mi ght be al i enated by Bri ti sh s upport for the Emi r of
Mecca' s pretensi ons. The r e was Shei kh Mubarak of Kuwai t , l ong a
friend of Bri t ai n; there was the friendly ruler of the Persi an port of
Muhammar a; there was even Sayyi d Tal i b, the magnat e of Bas ra,
"dangerous scoundrel " t hough Hi rtzel believed hi m to b e .
9
A Forei gn
Office official, in warni ng of repercussi ons in Arabi a, noted that the
Emi r of Mecca' s two enemi es t hereI bn Sa ud and Seyyi d
Mohamme d al - Idri si , the ruler of As i rwere, i n his view, Bri tai n' s
f r i e nds .
1 0
Indi an officials made the poi nt that Cai ro' s policies were reckl ess;
worse, they woul d not work. Bri tai n' s sponsorshi p of an Arab cal i ph-
ate woul d not only adversel y affect Mos l em opi ni on i n Indi a ( and
Mos l em opi ni on i n Indi a was, f rom the Bri ti sh poi nt of view, what
the cal i phate i ssue was pri nci pal l y about ) ; i t woul d al so do no good
i n the Arab worl d. Percy Cox, of the Indi an Political Servi ce, re-
ported i n December 1915 that he had held meeti ngs with the Shei kh
of Kuwai t and Ibn Saud, and that he had f ound the cal i phate
questi on to be of no interest to t hem. I bn Saud sai d that among the
Arabi an chiefs "no one cared in the least who called hi msel f Cal i ph, "
and cl ai med that his Wahhabi sect di d not recogni ze any cal i phs after
the first four (the last of whom had di ed more than a t housand years
be f or e ) .
1 1
* "Simla" is often used to mean the Government of India, whose summer capital
it was.
I N D I A P R O T E S T S 109
I I I
Oddl y, nobody i n London or i n Si ml a seems to have drawn the
appropri at e concl usi on f rom art epi sode at the end of 1914 that
showed the power of the Cal i ph had been put to the test and had
been shown to be i l l usory.
In November 1914, upon enteri ng the Fi rst Worl d War, the Sul t an/
Cal i ph procl ai med a jihad, or Hol y War, agai nst Bri tai n, ami dst
wel l -pl anned demonst rat i ons i n Const ant i nopl e. The r e were crowds,
bands , and speeches. Th e Wi l hemst rasse ordered copi es of the proc-
l amati on to be forwarded i mmedi atel y to Berl i n for transl ati on into
"Arabi c and Indi an" (sic) for leaflet propaganda among Mos l em
t roops i n enemy a r mi e s .
1 2
Th e staff of the Ge r man Forei gn Mi ni stry
predi cted that the Sul t an' s acti ons woul d "awaken the fanati ci sm of
Isl am" and mi ght l ead to a l arge-scal e revol uti on i n I ndi a .
1 3
Th e Ge r man military attache i n Const ant i nopl e bel i eved that the
procl amat i on woul d influence Mos l em sol di ers i n the Bri ti sh and
French armi es not to fire on Ge r man t roops. However, the skepti cal
Ge r man ambas s ador proved a better prophet : he wrote in a pri vate
letter that the procl amat i on woul d "coax only a few Mos l e ms "
1 4
to
come over to the si de of the Central Powers. He was ri ght. The jihad
proved to be, in a coi nage of the Fi rst World War, a "dud": a shell
that was fired, but failed to expl ode. *
Ent hus i as m for a Hol y War was low, even i n Const ant i nopl e. Th e
jihad was procl ai med, but nothi ng happened. Th e Bri t i sh, however,
conti nued to be wary and feared that any jolt mi ght cause the unex-
pl oded shell suddenl y to go off. In Oct ober 1915 Gi l bert Cl ayt on
wrote a me mor andum argui ng that al though the jihad until then had
been a fai l ure, i t still mi ght come al i ve .
1 5
Accordi ng to Lo r d Crewe,
Secretary of St at e for Indi a, the only reason it had not worked was
because the Porte di d not control the Hol y Pl aces of the Hej az: "If
the Commi t t ee of Uni on and Progress get control of Mecca, they
mi ght be abl e to decl are a regul ar Je had [sic], probabl y affecting
Af ghani st an, and gi vi ng seri ous t roubl e i n I ndi a. "
1 6
Meanwhi l e Wi ngate, Cl ayt on, and St orrs were actively pursui ng
the Ki t chener pl an that called for an associ ati on in the postwar worl d
with Arabi a and with an Arabi an rel i gi ous pri mat e. Th e cauti ous
Cl ayton warned that the Arab cal i phate was a delicate matter and
shoul d be proposed by Arabs t hems el ves ;
1 7
but Wi ngate, as al ways
i mpati ent to move forward, assured Fi t zGeral d/ Ki t chener that "We
shall do what we can to pus h the Arab movement & I have got
vari ous i rons in the fire in this connect i on. "
1 8
* Troubl es caused by groups such as the nomadic Senussi on Egypt's Li byan
frontier were minor, and might well have occurred in any event.
But the Indi a Office conti nued to fear that, as a result of these
activities, Mecca woul d be drawn into the vortex of worl d pol i t i csan
eventuality that mi ght di st urb opi ni on in Indi a at a ti me when any
di st urbance coul d prove fatal. Dur i ng the course of the war, Si ml a
was goi ng to send many of its European sol di ers to Europe, and l arge
numbers of Indi an t roops as well. For the durati on of the war i t was
in a weak posi ti on to quel l whatever upri si ngs mi ght occur. Cai ro
and Const ant i nopl e both seemed to Si ml a to be purs ui ng policies
that threatened to inflame Mos l em passi ons i n Indi a and t hus to
i mperi l the Indi an Empi re.
As the war progressed, Bri ti sh officials who rul ed Indi a i ncreasi ngl y
came to believe that their most dangerous adversari es were neither
the Tur ks nor the Ge r mans , but the Bri ti sh officials governi ng
Egypt ; for despi te Indi a' s prot est s, Bri t i sh Cai ro went ahead with its
i ntri gues in Mecca.
12
THE MAN IN THE MI DDLE
i
Mecca, where Mohamme d was born, and Medi na, t o which he
emi grat ed, are the holy cities that for Mos l ems everywhere gi ve
uni que i mport ance to the mount ai nous Hej az, the l ong and narrow
western secti on of the Arabi an peni nsul a borderi ng the Red Sea.
Hej az means "separat i ng"a reference to the hi ghl ands that di vi de i t
f rom the pl ateau to the east. In the early twentieth century Arabi a
was an empt y and desol ate l and, and the Hej az, i n the words of the
1910 Encyclopaedia Britannica, was "physically the most desol ate
and uni nvi ti ng provi nce in Arabi a. " Whol e secti ons of it were un-
watered and uni nhabi t ed wi l derness. About 750 mi l es l ong and, at its
wi dest, about 200 mi l es across, the Hej az precari ousl y s upport ed a
popul ati on esti mated at 300, 000, hal f-Bedoui n and hal f-townsmen.
Al t hough i t f ormed part of the Ot t oman Empi re, its di stance f rom
Const ant i nopl e, magni fi ed by the pri mi ti ve state of transportati on
and communi cat i ons, had al ways lent i t consi derabl e aut onomy.
Dat es , of whi ch a hundred varieties were sai d to grow, were the
stapl e crop; but the real i ndustry of the provi nce was the annual
pi l gri mage. About 70, 000 pi l gri ms made the journey t o Mecca each
year. Protecti ng the pi l gri ms from maraudi ng Bedoui n tri bes was a
pri nci pal functi on of the local representati ve of the Ot t oman govern-
ment ; and the authori ti es made a practi ce of offering subsi di es to the
tri bes i n the hope of persuadi ng t hem that there was better pay i n
saf eguardi ng than i n mol esti ng the vi si tors.
Mecca was a two-day camel j ourney, or about forty-five mi l es,
f rom the nearest coastal port . It lay in a hot and barren valley, and
controlled the passages t hrough the surroundi ng hills. Its popul ati on
was esti mated at 60, 000. Ent rance into its preci ncts was prohi bi ted
to non- Mosl ems, and exerci sed the powerful lure of the f orbi dden.
Onl y a few European travel ers had succeeded in penetrati ng the city
in di sgui se and bri ngi ng back detai l ed descri pti ons of it.
Il l
The s e Europeans reported that even i n the holy city certain dark
practi ces l i ngered from a pri mi ti ve past . Accordi ng to the Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, "The unspeakabl e vi ces of Mecca are a scandal to
all Isl am, and a constant source of wonder to pi ous pi l gri ms. Th e
sl ave trade has connexi ons with the pi l gri mage which are not
thoroughl y cl ear; but under cover of the pi l gri mage a great deal of
i mportati on and exportati on of sl aves goes on. "
Yet European travel ers al so report ed that the peopl e of the Hej az,
and i ndeed of all Arabi a, were among nature' s ari stocrats. Accordi ng
to the Britannica:
Physi cal l y the Arabs are one of the strongest and nobl est races
of the worl d . . . Thus , physi cal l y, they yield to few races, if
any, of manki nd; mental l y, they s urpas s most , and are only
kept back in the march of progress by the remarkabl e defect of
organi zi ng power and i ncapaci ty for combi ned action. La x and
i mperfect as are their f orms of government , it is with i mpati ence
that even these are borne . . .
The j ob of the Emi r of Mecca, if the Britannica was to be bel i eved,
was not an easy one.
For Mos l ems , Mecca had al ways been the center of the worl d. Now,
the ambi t i ons of Ki t chener' s Cai ro and of the C. U. P. ' s Const ant i nopl e
brought the ari d Hej az into the center of twenti eth-century pol i ti cs.
Th e new attenti ons that Mecca recei ved in the 1914 war brought it
into the center in other ways, less wel come to its Emi r; he found
himself caught in the mi ddl e.
Hussei n ibn Al i , who rul ed the Hej az on behalf of the Ot t oman
Sul t an, was styled the Sheri f of Mecca and its Emi r. To be a sherif,
or notabl e, was to be a descendant of Mohamme d; and Hussei n, like
Mohamme d himself, was a member of the Hous e of Has hem. For
some ti me i t had been the practi ce of the Ot t oman regi me to appoi nt
the Emi r of Mecca from among rival sheri fs. In 1908 Hussei n, of the
Dhawu- ' Awn cl an, was personal l y sel ected by the Sul t an, over the
opposi ti on of the C. U. P. , which backed the candi date of a rival cl an.
Hussei n, like his courtl y friend the Gr and Vizier and like the
Sul t an himself, was a man of ol d-fashi oned breedi ng and l earni ng
whose style of expressi on was ornat e. Of medi um height, with a
white beard, and about sixty years of age in 1914, he had spent
much of his life in glorified capti vi ty at the court in Const ant i nopl e.
There, even the pryi ng eyes of enemi es were unabl e to detect hi m in
any i mproper conduct ; he spent his ti me in medi tati on.
Hussei n continually expressed st rong personal loyalty to the Sul t an.
Th e Sul t an, however, was a fi gurehead. Real power at the Porte was
Hussein referred to himself and his family as "Hashemites."
T H E MA N I N T H E M I D D L E
113
wi el ded by the Young Tur ks , new men wi thout family background,
with whom he was out of sympat hy. Though loyal to the Sul t an, he
found himself i ncreasi ngl y at odds with the Sul tan' s government ,
and in parti cul ar with its policy of central i zati on.
Hussei n' s ambi t i on was to make his posi ti on as Emi r secure for
himself and, in perpetui ty, for his fami l y. He strove to i ncrease his
i ndependence, while the central i zi ng C. U. P. government conspi red
to decrease it. Th e government pushed forward with constructi on of
the Hej az rai l road, ai med, among other thi ngs, at curtai l i ng the
Emi r' s aut onomy. Th e rai l road al ready ran from Damas c us , capi tal
of what is now Syri a, to Medi na in the Hej az. What the government
proposed was to extend the line to Mecca and to the port of Je ddah.
Thi s was a threat to the camel - owni ng Bedoui n tri bes of the Hej az
and to their l ucrati ve control of the pi l gri m routes to the Hol y
Pl aces. Us i ng the rai l road and also the t el egraph, the C. U. P. threat-
ened to exerci se di rect rul e over Medi na, Mecca, and the rest of the
Hej az. If carri ed into effect, the Tur ki s h government' s pl an woul d
make Hussei n into a mere subordi nat e functi onary. Hus s ei n re-
sponded by i nspi ri ng civil di st urbances.
For Hussei n, who had begun his admi ni strati on of affai rs by usi ng
Turki s h t roops agai nst the Arabi an tri bes, this represented a change
in policy, but not a change in al l egi ance. He remai ned in the ambi gu-
ous posi ti on of s upport i ng the Ot t oman Empi re while oppos i ng its
government .
In the years just before the begi nni ng of the European war, the
secret societies i n Damas c us and the vari ous rival l ords of Arabi a
were in frequent touch with one another; they expl ored the possi bi l i ty
of uni ti ng agai nst the Young Tur ks in support of greater ri ghts for
the Arabi c- speaki ng half of the empi re. At one ti me or another most
of the pri nci pal Arabi an chiefs were i nvol ved in such conversati ons.
In 1911, the Arab deput i es i n the Ot t oman Parl i ament asked Hussei n
to lead the Arabi c- speaki ng peopl es in throwi ng off the Turki s h
yoke; he ref used. A year later the secret societies seem to have
approached his ri val s, but not Hus s ei n. By 1913 Arab nati onal i sts
apparentl y regarded hi m as "a tool in the hands of the Tur ks for
stri ki ng the Ar abs . "
1
Yet the Turki s h government also strongl y di s-
trusted hi m, and expl ored the possi bi l i ty of deposi ng hi m.
Two of Hussei n' s sons were active politically. Abdul l ah, his
favorite, was a deput y from Mecca in the Ot t oman Parl i ament,
while Fei sal was a deput y from Je ddah. Abdul l ah counsel l ed his
father to resist the government ; he believed that with the support of
the secret societies and of Bri tai n it coul d be done. Fei sal advi sed
agai nst oppos i ng the government . Abdul l ah, a short, heavy-set, astute
man with a politician's conci l i ati ng manner, was for bol dness. Fei sal ,
tall, qui ck, and nervous, was for cauti on.
Hussei n, who had pl ayed off his enemi es agai nst one another for
years, was inclined to t empori ze and del ay. With each year in office
as Emi r he had i ncreased his presti ge and his mast ery over the
compl ex web of personal , fami l y, and tribal rel ati onshi ps that made
for authori ty i n the Hej az. He had reduced the political influence of
the local C. U. P. l odges i n Mecca and Medi na. Hi s pri macy within
his own emi rate was establ i shed firmly.
In 1913 and 1914, however, he found himself surrounded by
external enemi es. The r e were hi s nei ghbors and traditional ri val s,
the Arabi an l ords to his south and east, whom he had threatened and
who threatened hi m. The r e were the Arab nati onal i sts, some of
whom regarded hi m as an essentially Turki s h official. The r e were
the Bri ti sh, whose navy coul d easily domi nat e the l ong coastl i ne of
the Hej az once they went to war agai nst the Ot t oman Empi r e and
he knew that they woul d become his enemi es if he threw in his lot
with the empi re. Fi nal l y, there was the Ot t oman government which
threatened a showdown on the i ssue of the Emi r' s aut onomy.
Now, for the durati on of the war, the C. U. P. post poned compl eti on
of the rai l road and the adopt i on of its new governmental regul ati ons,
as well as its secret pl an to appoi nt a new emi r in Hussei n' s pl ace.
But i t ordered Hussei n to suppl y manpower for the army. Hussei n
and Abdul l ah may well have suspect ed a C. U. P. pl ot : the men of the
Hej az woul d be sent as sol di ers to di stant battlefields, while regul ar
Tur ki s h t roops woul d be sent to take their pl ace i n garri soni ng the
Hej az, and woul d then seize control of it.
Hussei n assured all his dangerous nei ghbors that he woul d act i n
accordance with their wi shesbut put off doi ng so until s ome ti me
i n the f ut ure. He asked the advi ce of Abdul Azi z Ibn Saud, his rival
and a powerful warl ord to the east, as to whether or not he shoul d
associ ate Mecca with the Sul t an' s call for a Hol y War agai nst Bri tai n
and her allies; and he di scussed with Arabi c nationalist l eaders from
Damas c us the possi bi l i ty of joi nt action agai nst the Porte. In reply to
request s and demands from the Porte, he asked for money to rai se
t roops and suppl i es for the Ot t oman Empi re, but conti nued to post-
pone sendi ng any conti ngents to the Turki s h army.
He gave Ki t chener' s messages and promi ses a warm response. At
the s ame t i meat the end of 1914when Dj emal Pasha prepared to
attack the Bri ti sh at the Suez Canal , Hussei n wrote to hi m, promi si ng
to send t roops to join in the attack; while Abdul l ah repl i ed to St orrs
i n Bri ti sh Cai ro that the Hej az had deci ded to si de with Bri tai n i n the
war. Abdul l ah expl ai ned, however, that this woul d have to be kept a
secret. For the moment , i t was not possi bl e for the Emi r to reveal his
intention of allying with Bri tai n, nor coul d he take acti on. Accordi ng
to Abdul l ah and Hussei n, the ti me was not yet ri pe.
T H E MA N I N T H E M I D D L E 115
I I
St orrs was pl eased that hi s correspondence had pl aced the Resi dency,
the office of the Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi ssi oner, on t erms of cl ose
cordiality with Mecca. On 27 Januar y 1915, he wrote Fi t zGeral d/
Ki t chener that "I am still i n very friendly and i nti mate contact with
the Sheri f of Mecca, and am firmly convi nced that he is a more
payi ng proposi ti on for our care and attention than any purel y local
Chi eftai n (however powerful i n hi msel f) who cannot enjoy the pres-
ti ge of recei vi ng the annual homage of the representati ves of Isl am
t hroughout the worl d. "
2
For the moment all that Ki t chener and the Resi dency really asked
of Hussei n was neutral i ty. Si nce Hussei n' s desi re was to avoid bei ng
drawn into the peri l ous war, the two parti es to the correspondence
were i n accord. Hus s ei n di d nothi ng to associ ate hi msel f or Mecca
with the procl amat i on of a Hol y War. For the Resi dency, the corre-
spondence therefore had accompl i shed everythi ng that coul d reason-
ably have been desi red. Th e Hi gh Commi ssi oner, Si r Henry
McMahon, report ed to Ki t chener on 2 February 1915, that "there i s
no need for i mmedi at e action . . . as all that i s necessary for the
moment , with the Sheri f of Me c c ahad been done. "
3
Th e War Mi ni ster was satisfied. He di d not share Wi ngate' s belief
that a tribal revolt in Arabi a coul d affect Bri tai n' s fortunes in the
war; he gave no si gn of di sappoi nt ment when Hus s ei n di d not
propose to l ead such a revolt. Ki t chener believed that Ge r many was
the enemy that mattered and that Europe was the only battlefield
that count ed. Hi s l ong-term pl an to capt ure the cal i phate was de-
si gned for the post war worl d. In his view, he and i t and the Mi ddl e
Eas t coul d wait until the war was over.
PART I I I
BRITAIN IS DRAWN
INTO THE MIDDLE
EASTERN QUAGMIRE
13
THE TURKI SH COMMANDERS
ALMOST LOSE THE WAR
i
At the ti me of his appoi nt ment as War Mi ni ster, Ki t chener di d not
i ntend Bri tai n to be drawn into any i nvol vement i n the Mi ddl e Eas t
duri ng the war. When he started al ong the road that led to such an
i nvol vement, he was not aware that this was what he was doi ng.
Lat er, in 191516, when he found his country fully engaged in the
Mi ddl e Eas t , he mus t have wondered how he had al l owed such a
situation to come about . Fr om the outset of the war, i t had been his
unwaveri ng doctri ne to di sregard the Eas t while focusi ng on the
western front.
Ki t chener' s opi ni on that Tur ke y and the Mi ddl e Eas t coul d safely
be i gnored for the durati on of the European conflict deri ved in part
from the assumpt i on that the Ot t oman Empi re di d not pose a si g-
nificant mi l i tary threat. Thi s was an assumpt i on that was widely
shared.
Bri ti sh officials vi ewed Ot t oman mi l i tary capabi l i ty with cont empt ;
and the record of the first si x mont hs of warfare in the Eas t confi rmed
them in their view. Fr o m Oct ober 1914, when the Goeben and
Breslau opened fi re on the Russi an coast, until February 1915, when
an avengi ng Bri t i sh fleet began its bombardment of the strai ts of the
Dardanel l es and then st eamed t oward Const ant i nopl e, the Ot t oman
armi es bl undered f rom one defeat to another.
Th e Supr e me Commande r of the Tur ki s h armed forces was Enver
Pasha, who a week before the war began had procl ai med himself
"vi ce-general i ssi mo. " In theory this pl aced hi m second only to the
figurehead Sul t an. In practi ce i t pl aced hi m second to none.
Enver had the qual i ti es of a lone adventurer, not those of a
general . Though audaci ous and cunni ng, he was an i ncompetent
commander. Li ma n von Sanders , the Prussi an army advi ser with
whom he frequentl y f ound himself at odds , regarded Enver as a
buffoon in mi l i tary mat t ers.
Enver, however, pi ctured himself as a leader of a wholly different
119
120 T H E M I D D L E E A S T E R N Q U A G M I R E
character. He port rayed himself as an heir to the founders of the
Ot t oman Empi r e : the band of ghaziscrusading warri ors for the
Isl ami c fai thwho i n the fourteenth century had gal l oped f rom the
obscuri ty of the Byzanti ne frontier onto the center stage of hi story.
At the outset of the war, he hastened to attack the Rus s i an Empi r e .
1
The r e was an obstacl e i n his pat h: the f orbi ddi ng Caucas us mount ai n
range, which formed the l and frontier between the two empi res.
Agai nst the advi ce of Li man von Sanders , he det ermi ned to l aunch
a frontal attack across that daunt i ng natural frontier, whi ch the
Rus s i ans , i n secure possessi on of the high ground, had heavily forti-
f i edand to do so in the dept hs of winter. He proposed initially to
group his forces al ong an enormous territory within Turkey, 600
mi l es l ong and 300 mi l es wi de, t hrough which there was no rai l road
to t ransport t roops or suppl i es. Th e few roads were steep and narrow.
Th e rivers coul d be crossed only by fordi ng, the bri dges havi ng
col l apsed l ong before and havi ng never been repai red. Because the
nearest rai l head was over 600 mi l es away, every bul l et, every shell,
had to be t ransport ed by camel a j ourney of six weeks. Much of the
territory was wi thout track or habi tati on, unexpl ored and unchart ed.
Lo ng wi nters and mount ai n snowst orms made whole secti ons of i t
unpassabl e much of the year.
Enver' s pl an, as he expl ai ned i t to Li man von Sanders , was to
then move out of this st agi ng area, cross the frontier into Czari st
territory, and attack the fortified Rus s i an posi ti on on the Caucas us
pl ateau by the sort of orchestrated movement pi ctured in military
textbooks, with some col umns attacki ng directly, and others movi ng
out at an angl e and then wheel i ng about to flank or enci rcl e. He was
unmoved by the remi nder that, wi thout rai l roads or other t ransport ,
the strategi c mobi l i ty requi red for the mi l i tary movement s that he
envi saged woul d be unavai l abl e. He entertai ned no doubt s of his
success. Havi ng crushed the Rus s i ans , sai d Enver, he woul d then
march via Af ghani st an to the conquest of Indi a.
On 6 December 1914, Enver left Const ant i nopl e and on 21
December took command of the Ot t oman Thi rd Army. He led the
attack on the Caucas us pl ateau i n person. Th e Russi ans were terrified
and appeal ed to Bri tai n to hel p somehow; they had no idea they
faced a foe who was utterly i nept.
Enver left his artillery behi nd because of the deep snow. Hi s
troops were forced to bi vouac in the bitter cold (as low as mi nus
thirty degrees Fahrenhei t wi thout t ent s) . The y ran short of food. An
epi demi c of t yphus broke out. With routes bl ocked by the winter
snows, they lost their way i n the tangl ed mountai n passes. Enver' s
plan was for his forces to l aunch a coordi nated surpri se attack on the
Russi an base called Sari kami sh, whi ch bl ocked the i nvasi on hi ghway;
T H E T U R K I S H C O M M A N D E R S 121
but, havi ng lost touch with one another, the vari ous Turki s h corps
arri ved at different ti mes at Sari kami sh to attack and to be destroyed
pi ecemeal .
Th e remnant s of what had once been an army st raggl ed back into
eastern Turkey i n January 1915. Of the perhaps 100, 000 men who
took part in the at t ack,
2
86 percent were lost. A Ge r man officer
attached to the Ot t oman General Staff descri bed what happened to
the Thi r d Army by sayi ng that it had "suffered a di saster which for
rapi di ty and compl et eness is wi thout parallel in military hi story. "
3
Yet even as he rode back f rom the catastrophe i n the northeast,
Enver ordered another ill-conceived offensive. In command was
Dj emal Pasha, the Mi ni ster of the Mari ne. Jeal ous of Enver, whose
presti ge and power had begun to overshadow those of the other
Young Tur ks , Dj emal took the field as commander of the Ot t oman
Fourt h Army, bas ed i n Syri a and Pal esti ne. On 15 January 1915, he
began his march toward Egypt to l aunch a surpri se attack across the
Suez Canal .
Agai n, the logistical probl ems were i gnored. Th e roads of Syri a
and Pal esti ne were so bad that not even horse-drawn carts coul d
move al ong many of t he m;
4
and the wastes of the 130-mile wi de
Si nai desert were trackl ess. Th e Ot t oman sol di ery nonethel ess per-
f ormed prodi gi es of endurance and val or. Somehow they t ransport ed
themsel ves and their equi pment f rom Syri a t o Suez. Kr e s s von
Kressenst ei n, a Ge r man engi neeri ng officer, dug wells al ong the
route, which enabl ed t hem to survi ve the march through the desert.
Th e ti me of year, for once, was well chosen: January i s the best
mont h i n Egypt for avoi di ng the terri bl e heat.
But when the Fourt h Army reached the banks of the Sue z Canal ,
Dj emal di scovered that most of his t roops coul d not use the bri dgi ng
pont oons that were meant to t ransport t hem to the other si de. Th e
Ge r man engi neers had brought the pont oons from Germany, but the
troops had not been trai ned i n their use. Dj emal ordered the attack
to commence nonethel ess. Earl y in the morni ng of 3 February, while
the sky was still hal f-dark, i t began. Th e Bri ti sh, from behi nd their
fortifications, awoke to di scover an Ot t oman army on the opposi t e
bank of the enormous di t ch; and with their superi or weaponry they
opened fi re upon it. In the battl e and the subsequent rout, 2, 000
Ot t oman t roops about 10 percent of Dj emal ' s forceswere killed.
Dj emal ordered a retreat; and kept on goi ng all the way back to
Syr i a.
5
Turki s h general shi p became a j oke. Aubrey Herbert wrote from
Shepheard' s Hotel i n Cai ro to his friend Mark Sykes that the latest
Ot t oman pl an was "that the Tur ks are to bri ng t housands of camel s
down to the Canal and then set a light to their hair. Th e camel ,
I I
Enver had as s umed that the war woul d be short, and that i t woul d
be deci ded in a few l i ghtni ng campai gns . He had neither a pl an for a
war of attrition nor an underst andi ng of what such a war mi ght
entail. He had no gift for organi zati on, no head for l ogi sti cs, and no
pati ence for admi ni st rat i on. As War Mi ni ster he thoughtl essl y led his
country into c haos .
8
He began by orderi ng all eligible men throughout the i mperi al
domai ns to report for i nducti on into the army i mmedi atel y, bri ngi ng
with t hem enough food for three days. When they report ed as
orderedwhi ch i s to say, all at the same ti methei r numbers
dwarfed the conscri pti on offices, whi ch coul d not deal with so many
at once. Havi ng fl ooded i n from the count rysi de, the draftees ate up
their three days' suppl y of food and then had nothi ng to eat. Soon
they began to drift away, l abel ed as deserters, afraid to return either
to the conscri pti on offices or to their homes.
Bri ngi ng i n the manpower f rom the countrysi de rui ned what woul d
have been the bounti ful harvest of 1914. It set a terri bl e pat t ern:
t hroughout the war, the draft of men and pack ani mal s brought
fami ne i n good years as well as bad. Duri ng the war years, the
suppl y of draft ani mal s fell, horses to 40 percent and oxen and
buffal oes to 15 percent of what they had been. Th e shri nkage in
agri cul tural activity was equal l y dramat i c: cereal acreage was cut
in half, and cotton fell to 8 percent of its prewar product i on
level. Control of the scarce suppl i es of food and other goods became
the key to wealth and power. In the sprawl i ng metropol i s of
Const ant i nopl e, a Chi cago-styl e political boss with gangl and con-
necti ons fought agai nst Enver' s General Di rector of the Commi ssari at
for effective control of the economy.
Th e transportati on syst em of the empi re was also shattered by the
war. In the absence of rai l roads and usabl e roads, i n the past goods
had been mostl y shi pped by sea. Now the empi re' s 5, 000 mi l es of
coastl i ne were under the guns of the Al l i ed navi es. In the north the
Germans and Tur ks pul l ed back the Goeben and Breslau for the
usi ng its well known reasoni ng powers, will dash to the Canal to put
the fire out. When they have done this in sufficient quanti ti es the
Tur ks will march over t hem. "
6
In London the Pri me Mi ni ster lightly di smi ssed the Ot t oman
i nvasi on by sayi ng that "The Tur ks have been tryi ng to throw a
bri dge across the Suez Canal & in that i ngeni ous fashi on to find a
way into Egypt . Th e poor thi ngs & their woul d- be bri dge were
bl own into smi thereens, and they have retired into the desert . "
7
T H E T U R K I S H C O M M A N D E R S 123
defense of the Dardanel l es, abandoni ng the Bl ack Sea to the newly
built battl eshi ps of the Rus s i ans . Th e Medi t erranean was domi nat ed
by the French and Bri ti sh navi es. Al l i ed shi ps cut off the Ot t oman
coal s uppl y; thereafter the empi re depended for its fuel on the
meagre suppl i es that coul d be brought overl and from Ge r many.
On the eve of war, there were only about 17, 000 i ndustri al workers
in an empi re of 25 million peopl e; for practi cal purpos es , the country
had no i ndus t ry.
9
All that i t had was agri cul ture, which was now
rui ned. By the end of the war, the export trade was down to a
quart er and the i mport trade down to a tenth of what they had been.
Th e Porte ran up huge budget deficits duri ng the warti me years,
and helplessly ran paper money off the pri nti ng presses to pay for
t hem. Dur i ng the war pri ces rose 1,675 percent.
Before l ong, the war had brought the Ot t oman economy al most to
its knees; and the Young Tur k government had no i dea what to do
about it.
14
KI TCHENER ALLOWS BRITAIN
TO ATTACK TURKEY
i
Th e Bri ti sh government , too, encount ered unexpect ed probl ems with
which it had no i dea how to deal . At the outset of war nobody in
Bri tai n had foreseen that the warri ng armi es woul d di g trenches
across western Europe. Now that they had done so, nobody i n
Bri tai n had any i dea of how to break t hrough enemy lines.
As 1914 turned into 1915, the Bri ti sh Cabi net became i ncreasi ngl y
unhappy about the direction of the war. Lo r d Ki tchener' s strategy of
concentrati ng all forces i n western Eur ope seemed to offer no hope
of victory in the foreseeabl e f ut ure. Th e wiliest politician in the
Cabi net Davi d Ll oyd Ge or ge was conspi cuous among those who
l ooked for a way out.
Ll oyd George, after As qui t h the most powerful politician i n the
Li beral Party and i n the Cabi net , was not one who willingly goes
down with a si nki ng shi p. He was, above all, a survi vor: years later it
coul d be seen that he was the only Bri t i sh minister who succeeded i n
stayi ng i n the Cabi net from the out break of the Fi rst Worl d War
until its end.
Th e gl owi ng, dynami c political wi zard from Wal es was the s upreme
st rat egi st or, some woul d say, opport uni st of his ti me. "To Ll oyd
George no pol i cy was permanent , no pl edge final," wrote one of his
cont emporari es; the zi g-zags in his policy forced hi m to seek s upport
first f rom one group then from another, so that "He became like a
trick ri der at the ci rcus, as he was compel l ed to leap from one back to
another Hi s devi ousness was a byword, so that even an
admi rer sai d that his truth was not a strai ght line but "more of a
curve. "
2
Th e way he hi msel f put i t was that, "I never bel i eved i n
costly frontal attacks either in war or politics, if there were a way
round. "
3
No mi ni ster felt more greatl y frustrated than he di d by the way
Al l i ed commanders were fighting the war i n France and Fl anders :
hopel ess direct assaul ts on entrenched enemy posi ti ons. Every ti me
124
B R I T A I N T O A T T A C K T U R K E Y 125
that he sought a way out or a way around, he f ound the route
bl ocked either by the War Office on behal f of Bri tai n' s general s, or
by the Forei gn Office on behalf of Bri tai n' s allies.
Fr o m the begi nni ng, Ll oyd Ge or ge l ooked for a sol uti on i n the
Eas t . He was among those who favored enteri ng into Bal kan alliances,
notabl y with Greece, i n order to defeat the Ot t oman Empi re and to
turn the Ge r man flank. Other Cabi net mi ni sters agreed. So di d
Mauri ce Hankey, Secretary of the War Cabi net and most influential
of the civil servant s. Hankey' s me mor andum of 28 December 1914,
proposi ng an assaul t on the Dardanel l es i n col l aborati on with Bal kan
allies, cogentl y outl i ned the argument s underl i ni ng the Cabi net' s
belief that "Germany can perhaps be struck most effectively, and
with the most l asti ng resul ts on the peace of the worl d through her
allies, and parti cul arl y through Tur ke y. "
4
Th e Forei gn Secret ary, Si r Edward Grey, bl ocked this approach.
It was Grey, accordi ng to Ll oyd George' s associ ates i n the left wi ng
of the Li beral Party, who had cl osed off Bri tai n' s al ternati ve of
remai ni ng neutral i n the war; he had done thi s, they cl ai med, by his
secret prewar arrangement s with France. ( The phi l osopher Bert rand
Russel l later wrot e: "I had noti ced duri ng previ ous years how care-
fully Si r Edward Grey lied i n order to prevent the publ i c from
knowi ng the met hods by which he was commi t t i ng us to the support
of France i n the event of war . ")
6
Now agai n i t was Grey, who had
entered into secret prewar arrangement s with Russi a regardi ng the
Dardanel l es, who argued that Allied cl ai ms to postwar territorial
gai ns precl uded bri ngi ng the Bal kan states into the war. It was the
Forei gn Office's view not only that Bul gari a' s rivalry with Rumani a
and Greece rendered an alliance that i ncl uded all three states un-
feasi bl e, but that Greek hel p i n capt uri ng Const ant i nopl e was un-
acceptabl e because i t woul d offend the Rus s i ans .
Yet i t was agreed by the Admi ral t y, the War Office, and "the
Cabi net alike that Const ant i nopl e coul d not be capt ured by the Royal
Navy al one. An army, they argued, was needed as well. If the Greek
army or another Bal kan army were not to be al l owed to hel p, then
the Bri ti sh army woul d be needed; but Lo r d Ki t chener support ed
those Al l i ed field commanders who decreed that no t roops shoul d be
di verted f rom the trenches of the western front until the war in
Europe was won.
Yet, notwi thstandi ng the hopeful views of Al l i ed commanders i n
the field, nothi ng in the first mont hs and years of the war suggest ed
to the l eadi ng members of the Cabi net that on the western front the
war was bei ng won or even coul d be won. As early as 7 Oct ober
* The historical evidence now shows that this was not t rue.
5
But the left wing of
the Liberal Party continued to believe that it was.
1914, Asqui t h noted that Ki t chener "thinks it is not i mprobabl e that
. . . the bi g opposi ng armi es may i n some months' t i me come t o
somet hi ng like st al emat e. "
7
By the end of December, Wi nston
Churchi l l (as he i nformed the Pri me Mi ni st er) thought it "quite
possi bl e that neither si de will have the strength to penetrate the
other's lines i n the Western theatre"; while, at the s ame ti me, Ll oyd
George, i n a me mor andum to Cabi net col l eagues, di smi ssed the
prospect s of a breakt hrough on the western front as an "i mpossi bi l i ty. "
8
Hi story had seen nothi ng like the trench warfare that spont aneousl y
emerged i n the aut umn of 1914; and Ki t chener, t hough he qui ckl y
di vi ned the probl em, admi t t ed that he saw no sol uti on. Th e Ent ent e
Powers and the Central Powers manned parallel lines of fortifications
that soon stretched all the way f rom the Atl anti c Ocean to the Al ps .
Each si de thus decisively barred the way to the other.
Trench warfare began as an endurance contest and ended as a
survival contest. Beneat h the ground, i n the perhaps 35, 000 mi l es of
trenches that they eventual l y dug, the opposi ng armi es lived i n
bl oody squal or and subj ect ed one another to puni shi ng and al most
ceasel ess artillery barrages, punct uat ed by sui ci dal l y futile charges
agai nst the other side's barbed wire and machi ne guns . Al ternatel y
executi oners and executed, one si de pl ayed the role of the firing
s quad whenever the other si de l aunched one of its frequent attacks.
No ground was gai ned. It was a deadl ock.
Th e civilian mi ni sters turned for gui dance to the mi l i tary oracl e i n
their mi dst , but the oracl e somet i mes was awkwardl y silent and at
other ti mes spoke a gi bberi sh that undermi ned belief in his powers of
di vi nati on. In the Cabi net , unfortunatel y, Fi t zGeral d was not avail-
abl e to speak and listen for hi m. Fi el d Marshal Ki t chener al ways had
f ound it i mmensel y difficult to explain his military vi ews, even to
cl ose col l eagues; i n the company of those whom he f earedst rangers,
civilians, pol i ti ci anshe was st ruck dumb. To break the silence, he
somet i mes l aunched into l ong di scourses on nonmi l i tary subj ect s of
which he knew little or nothi ng. He spoke of Irel and to the Iri sh
l eader, Cars on, and of Wal es to Ll oyd George; both men were
surpri sed to fi nd hi m i gnorant and foolish.
The r e was geni us within hi m, but i t mani fested itself only on
occasi on. Years after the war, havi ng remarked that Ki t chener "talked
t waddl e, " Ll oyd George took i t back by addi ng:
No! He was like a great revol vi ng l i ghthouse. Somet i mes the
beam of his mi nd used to shoot out, showi ng one Eur ope and
the assembl ed armi es in a vast and illimitable perspecti ve, till
one felt that one was l ooki ng al ong it into the heart of real i ty
and then the shutter woul d turn and for weeks there woul d be
nothi ng but a bl ank dar kne s s .
9
Ki t chener' s failure to show t hem a way out of the deadl ock on the
western front led the country' s civilian l eaders to devi se pl ans of their
own. The pl ans resembl ed one another i n proposi ng to swi ng around
the fortified western front in order to attack from the north, the
south, or the east. Th e doctri ne of the general s was to attack the
enemy at his strongest poi nt; that of the politicians was to attack at
his weakest.
Ll oyd George' s mi nd inclined t oward col l aborati on with Greece i n
the vul nerabl e southeast of Eur ope . Churchi l l , i nspi red by Admi ral
Lo r d Fi sher ( whom he had brought back f rom retirement to serve as
Fi rst Sea Lo r d) , proposed a l andi ng i n the northwest of Europe, on
an i sl and off Germany' s Baltic Se a coast. Mauri ce Hankey, how-
ever, carri ed all before hi m with his persuasi ve memorandum of 28
December 1914.
Hankey proposed that Bri tai n shoul d move three army corps to
parti ci pate with Greece, Bul gari a, and Rumani a i n an attack on
Turkey at the Dardanel l es that woul d l ead to the occupati on of
Const ant i nopl e and the subsequent defeat of Germany' s two allies,
the Ot t oman and Habs bur g empi res. Th e political probl em of rec-
onciling Bul gari a with Greece and Rumani a, he poi nted out, woul d
have to be overcome; but he bel i eved that this coul d be done as a
result of Al l i ed military parti ci pati on in the campai gn and Al l i ed
guarant ees that all three states woul d receive a fair share of the spoi l s
of victory.
When shown the memorandum, Churchi l l comment ed that he
himself had advocat ed an attack at the Dardanel l es two mont hs
earlier, but that Ki t chener had refused to suppl y the needed man-
power; and that such an action woul d be much more difficult to
mount i n January than i t woul d have been i n November. Churchi l l
conti nued to believe that the Bal ti c Se a project was a more promi si ng
move, but recogni zed that he and Hankey thought alike i n espousi ng
some sort of flanking attack.
Hankey' s pl an, however, was never put to the test. It foundered
on the usual shoal s: Ki t chener' s unwi l l i ngness to di vert t roops from
the west, and Si r Edward Grey' s worry that a Greek march
on Const ant i nopl e mi ght be t roubl i ng to Rus s i a. Grey was not hope-
ful of reconci l i ng Bul gari an cl ai ms with those of the other Bal kan
states but , above all, what led hi m to oppos e a Greek attack at the
Dardanel l es was the fear that it mi ght succeed; for if the Greeks
were to conquer their old i mperi al capi tal , Const ant i nopl e, the
Byzant i um of their great days, they woul d be unlikely to gi ve it up;
while Russi a, rather than let any other country seize it, mi ght well
(in Grey' s view) change si des i n the war.
Th e si tuati on i n At hens was that the Pri me Mi ni ster, Veni zel os,
who at the outset of the worl d war had offered to enter into a war
with Turkey, was still inclined to joi n the Al l i es, while his politi-
cal adversary, the Kai ser' s brother-i n-l aw, pro- German Ki ng
Const ant i ne, acted to prevent hi m f rom doi ng so. Inst ead of throwi ng
its wei ght behi nd Veni zel os, the Bri ti sh Forei gn Office, like Ki ng
Const ant i ne, opposed Greek entry into the war.
In retrospect i t seems clear that i f the Greek army had marched
on Const ant i nopl e in early 1915, al ongsi de the Bri ti sh navy, the
Ot t oman capi tal woul d have been defensel ess. Th e angui sh of Wi nston
Churchi l l when this was not al l owed to happen is evident in the
phrases of a letter that he wrote to Grey in the winter of 1915 but
never sent:
I beseech you . . . Hal f-hearted measures will ruin al l & a
million men will di e t hrough the prol ongati on of the war . . .
[ N] o i mpedi ment mus t be pl aced i n the way of Greek
cooperat i onI am so afrai d of your l osi ng Greece, & yet payi ng
all the future into Rus s i an hands. If Russi a prevents Greece
hel pi ng, I will do my ut most t o oppos e her havi ng Cpl e . . . PS
If you don't back up this Greecet he Greece of Veni zel osyou
will have another who will cl eave to Ge r ma ny .
1 0
I I
When 1915 began, Lo r d Ki t chener suddenl y changed his mi nd and
proposed that Bri tai n shoul d attack the Dardanel l es. Th e Rus s i an
high command had urgentl y asked hi m to stage a di versi onary attack
there, and he was fearful that i f he di d not compl y Rus s i a mi ght be
dri ven out of the warwhi ch at that poi nt woul d have been fatal for
Bri tai n and France, for i t woul d have allowed the Ge r mans to
concentrate all their forces in the west. Ki t chener i nsi sted, however,
that the attack had to be mount ed by the Royal Navy on its own: he
woul d make no troops avai l abl e. No mat t er; civilian members of the
Cabi net l eaped at the chance to escape f rom the western front strategy
which they (unlike the Al l i ed general s) regarded as hopel ess.
Enver' s attack on the Caucas us was responsi bl e for the Russi an
pl ea and hence for Ki t chener' s change of mi nd. Russi a' s cry for hel p
came before her qui ck, easy, and deci si ve victory over Enver' s Tur ks
i n January 1915. Logi cal l y, after crushi ng the Ot t oman i nvaders
that mont h, the Russi ans shoul d have told Lo r d Ki t chener that i t
was no l onger necessary for hi m to l aunch a di versi onary attack on
Const ant i nopl eor Ki t chener shoul d have drawn that concl usi on for
himself. Inst ead, t hroughout January and February, Bri tai n' s l eaders
consi dered how best to attack Const ant i nopl e in order to relieve
Rus s i a from a Turki s h threat that no longer exi sted.
Th u s began the Dardanel l es campai gn, which was to so alter the
fortunes of Churchi l l and Ki t chener, As qui t h and Ll oyd George,
Bri tai n and the Mi ddl e Eas t .
15
ON TO VICTORY AT THE
DARDANELLES
i
When Lo r d Ki t chener proposed that an expedi ti on to the Dardanel l es
shoul d be mount ed by the Royal Navy al one, Churchi l l ' s repl y from
the Admi ral t y echoed what every i nformed person in the mi l i tary
and i n government s ai d: that the Dardanel l es coul d be forced only
by a combi ned operati on in whi ch the navy was joi ned by the army.
A gl ance at the map woul d show why. Th e 38-mi l e-l ong strai ts are at
no point more than 4 mi l es wi de. Warshi ps at t empt i ng to force their
passage agai nst the st rong current woul d face lines of mi nes in front
of t hem and a crossfire of cannon barrages from the European and
Asi an shores. Thi rt een mi l es after enteri ng the waterway, shi ps
reach the Narrows , a mere 1,600 yards across, which can be domi -
nated by the guns of the forts on shore. Onl y if an attacki ng army
took possessi on of the coastl i ne coul d it silence the artillery on shore
and gi ve its fleet a chance to sweep the mi nes ahead of it; the forts,
i n other words, had to be st ormed or destroyed to allow the navy to
get t hrough.
Ki t chener met with his advi sers at the War Office to ask t hem to
reconsi der their posi ti on about the openi ng of the new front, but
they were adamant i n rei terati ng that no troops coul d be made
avai l abl e. In t urn, Churchi l l , on the morni ng of 3 January 1915, met
with his War Gr o up at the Admi ral t y to reconsi der whether, gi ven
the i mport ance of keepi ng Rus s i a in the war, it really woul d be out of
the questi on to mount a wholly naval operati on. Th e i dea of empl oy-
ing only warshi ps that were ol d and expendabl e was rai sed; and the
War Gr oup deci ded to ask the commander on the spot for his vi ews.
Soon after the meet i ng adj ourned, Churchi l l sent an i nqui ry to the
commander of the Bri ti sh naval s quadron off the Dardanel l es, Admi ral
Sackvi l l e Carden. In his cabl e Churchi l l asked: "Do you consi der the
forci ng of the Dardanel l es by shi ps al one a practi cabl e operat i on?"
addi ng that ol der shi ps woul d be used, and that the i mport ance of
the operati on woul d justi fy severe l os s es .
1
130
O N T O V I C T O R Y A T T H E D A R D A N E L L E S 131
To everybody' s surpri se, Admi ral Carden repl i ed t o Churchi l l
that, while the Dardanel l es coul d not be "rushed"i n other words,
coul d not be sei zed i n a si ngl e at t ack"They mi ght be forced by
extended operati ons with a l arge number of s hi ps . "
2
Carden had
been i n c ommand at the Dardanel l es for mont hs, and his vi ews
carri ed the day.
Th e Cabi net overrul ed Churchi l l who argued in favor of a naval
strike i n the Bal ti c i nst eadand authori zed hi m to put Carden' s
Dardanel l es pl an into operati on. Churchi l l was not opposed to the
Dardanel l es pl an; i t was si mpl y that he preferred his Bal ti c pl an.
Once the Dardanel l es decision had been taken, he moved to carry
it out with all of hi s energy and ent husi asm.
I I
Though gifted i n many other ways, Churchi l l was i nsensi ti ve to
the moods and reacti ons of his col l eagues, and obl i vi ous to the effect
he produced upon others. When he gave orders that naval officers
felt ought properl y to have been i ssued by one of t hemsel ves, he
i nspi red a collegia] and institutional hostility of which he was un-
aware; he di d not know that they vi ewed hi m as an i nterferi ng
amat eur, and that his i mpreci si on in the use of their technical
l anguage fueled their resentment.
He also di d not know (for they di d not tell hi m) how much his
col l eagues i n the Cabi net were al i enated by his other trai ts. He
bubbl ed over with i deas for their depart ment s, which they regarded
as meddl i ng. He talked at such length that they coul d not endure it.
Nei ther subordi nat es nor col l eagues dared to tell hi m to hi s face that
he was often i mpossi bl e to work wi th. Even Fi sher, his naval idol
and mentor, whom he had chosen as Fi rst Sea Lo r d, found i t
difficult to communi cat e with hi m; t hough, it shoul d be sai d, the
probl em was mut ual .
Lo r d Fi sher, whose intuitive geni us and extreme eccentricity were
rather like Ki t chener' s, had a s udden hunch, on or before 19 January,
that sendi ng a naval expedi ti on to the Dardanel l es was a mi st ake. But
he was never abl e to arti cul ate the basi s for his forebodi ng, so he
coul d not pers uade Churchi l l to change course.
Support for the Dardanel l es expedi ti on initially had been unani -
mous , but from that ri si ng hi gh ti de of ent husi asm there had been a
turn, an ebbi ng, so that within days the ti de had reversed direction
and was fl owi ng swiftly the other way.
Mauri ce Hankey, to whom Fi sher had compl ai ned of Churchi l l i n
January, began establ i shi ng a record that he, too, was oppos ed to the
expedi ti on unl ess the army parti ci pated i n it. As the most skillful
bureaucrat of his t i me, Hankey was more sensitive to the currents of
opi ni on that prevai l ed i n Churchi l l ' s Admi ral t y than was Churchi l l
himself. He was aware that by the mi ddl e of February, Admi ral t y
opi ni on had t urned agai nst the i dea of a purel y naval venture,
al though the attack was schedul ed to begi n in a matter of days. * On
15 February, Si r Henry Jacks on, who a mont h earlier had urged
Churchi l l to i mpl ement Carden' s pl ans i mmedi atel y, ci rcul ated a
memorandum in whi ch he sai d that the purel y naval plan "is not
recommended as a s ound mi l i tary operat i on. "
6
Capt ai n Herbert
William Ri chmond, Assi stant Di rect or of Operat i ons, was al so as-
soci ated with this cri ti ci sm, havi ng written a memorandum of his
own al ong si mi l ar lines the day before, a copy of which he had
forwarded to Hankey.
Earl y in the morni ng of 16 February Fi sher sent a si mi l ar warni ng
to Churchi l l , who was t hunderst ruck: he was dri ven to seek an
i mmedi at e emergency sessi on with whatever members of the War
Counci l of the Cabi net were avai l abl e. Th e di re si tuati on was thi s:
the Bri ti sh naval armada off the Tur ki s h coast was due to commence
its attack within forty-eight to seventy-two hours; the armada coul d
not post pone its attack while remai ni ng in the area, for enemy
submari nes mi ght soon be sent to si nk i t ;
7
but i f the armada proceeded
to attack, it woul d fail, accordi ng to this suddenl y revi sed opi ni on of
the naval l eadershi p of the Admi ral t y, unl ess a substanti al body of
troops was sent to s upport i t t roops that Ki t chener had repeatedl y
refused to send and whi ch, i n any event, coul d hardl y be expected to
arri ve in ti me even if di spat ched i mmedi atel y.
Before attendi ng the War Counci l , Ki t chener spoke with Wyndham
Deedes , the officer who had served i n the Ot t oman Gendarmeri e
before the war, now a captai n in intelligence servi ng in London, and
asked his opi ni on of a naval attack on the Dardanel l es. Deedes
replied that in his view such a pl an woul d be fundamental l y uns ound.
As he began to expl ai n why that woul d be so, an enraged Ki t chener
cut hi m short, told hi m he di d not know what he was tal ki ng about ,
and abrupt l y di smi ssed hi m.
* He told the Cabinet so; he told the Prime Minister so; and he recorded his
opinion in letters and memoranda. In a diary entry for 19 March he recorded that
"On the first day proposal was made I warned P. M. , Lord K, Chief of Staff, L.
George and Balfour that Fleet could not effect passage and that all naval officers
thought so. "
3
Hankey indeed had issued such warnings, but a month later than he
claimed. It was not on 13 January (when the Cabinet committee decided on the
Dardanelles expedition) but on 10 February that he wrote to Balfour along those
l i nes.
4
Later still he spoke to Asquith. On 13 February, the Prime Minister noted
that "I have just been having a talk with Hankey, whose views are always worth
hearing. He thinks very strongly that the naval operations . . . should be supported
by landing a fairly strong military force. I have been for some time coming to the
same opinion .. . "
5
O N T O V I C T O R Y A T T H E D A R D A N E L L E S 133
Yet the interview with Deedes changed Ki t chener' s mi nd. A few
hours later, Ki t chener tol d members of the War Counci l that he
woul d agree to send the 29th Di vi si ont he only regul ar army
division that remai ned i n Bri t ai nt o the Aegean to s upport the
navy's attack. In addi ti on, the new Aust ral i an and New Zeal and
t roops who had arri ved i n Egypt coul d be di spat ched i f necessary.
The pl an, whi ch now met the requi rement s of Fi sher, Jacks on,
Ri chmond, and the others, was that once the navy's shi ps had won
the battle for the strai ts, the t roops woul d come i n behi nd t hem to
occupy the adjacent shore and, thereafter, Const ant i nopl e. Accordi ng
to a di ary entry, "Lor d K' s words to Wi nston were: ' You get t hrough!
I will find the men. ' "
8
Th e pl an was f l awed. If the Tur ki s h defenders had compet ent
l eadershi p and adequat e ammuni t i on, a combi ned assaul t was called
for. Inst ead of wai ti ng for the navy to win the battl e, the army ought
to have hel ped by attacki ng the Dardanel l es forts. Th e civilian
Mauri ce Hankey saw thi s cl earl y; the admi ral s and general s di d not.
On 22 February, the Admi ral t y i ssued a publ i c communi que an-
nounci ng that the Dardanel l es attack had begun and descri bi ng i t i n
detail. Th e newspapers took up the story, focusi ng attention on the
attack and arousi ng publ i c expectati ons. The Times noted that
"bombardment f rom the sea will not carry such a project very far
unl ess i t i s combi ned with troops"; and warned that "The one thi ng
the Allies dare not risk in a persi stent attack on the Dardanel l es is
f ai l ure. "
9
Ki t chener i ssued a si mi l ar warni ng of his own to Cabi net col-
l eagues. Al t hough he had originally propos ed to "leave off the bom-
bardment i f i t were i neffecti ve, "
1
when Ll oyd George argued i n
favor of adheri ng to that pl an ("If we failed at the Dardanel l es we
ought to be i mmedi atel y ready to try somet hi ng el se"), Ki t chener
changed his mi nd. At a meet i ng of the War Counci l on 24 February,
the War Mi ni ster cited the Admi ral t y' s publ i c communi que as his
reason for the change. "The effect of a defeat in the Ori ent woul d be
very seri ous. The r e coul d be no goi ng back. Th e publ i ci ty of the
announcement had commi t t ed us . " If the fl eet failed, he sai d, "the
army ought to see the busi ness t hrough. "
1 1
Fi rst he had suggest ed sendi ng i n the navy. Now he had deci ded
to send i n the army. St ep by st ep, wi thout meani ng to, Ki t chener
was al l owi ng Bri tai n to be drawn into a major engagement in the
Mi ddl e Eas t .
Ill
Th e Tur ks expected Churchi l l ' s attack on the Dardanel l es; but for
the moment they had no means to defend agai nst it. Not even
Wyndham Deedesusual l y so well i nformed on Ot t oman af f ai rs
knew this secret, al though the Ge r mans were well aware of it. At the
outset of the war, the Ot t oman forces and their Ge r man advi sers had
begun to strengthen the forts on bot h si des of the strai ts of the
Dardanel l es, but saw their efforts nullified by the lack of ammuni t i on.
At the end of 1914 and at the begi nni ng of 1915, Berlin l earned that
the suppl y of ammuni t i on at the strai ts was enough to fi ght only
about one engagement , and that s ome of the Ot t oman gunboat s had
enough shells to fi re for about one mi nut e each.
Duri ng the next si x weeks, the Ot t oman high command recei ved a
number of intelligence report s i ndi cati ng that an Al l i ed naval attack
on the strai ts was i mmi nent . On 15 February 1915, detai l ed infor-
mati on was received on a concentrati on of Bri ti sh and French war
vessel s in the eastern Medi t erranean.
On the morni ng of 19 February, Admi ral Carden' s Bri ti sh warshi ps
fired the openi ng shots i n the Dardanel l es campai gn. Th e U. S .
ambas s ador to Turkey noted that the success of the Al l i ed forces
seemed i nevi tabl e, and the i nhabi tants of Const ant i nopl e thought
that their city woul d fall within d a y s .
1 2
It was a meas ure of the Porte' s despai r that it even consi dered
seeki ng hel p f rom Russi a, its age-ol d enemy. Th e day after the
Bri ti sh attack began, the Turki s h ambas s ador t o Germany suggest ed
the creati on of a Rus s i an- Turki s h- German al l i ance: Russi a, he pro-
posed, shoul d be offered free pas s age through the Dardanel l es i n
return for swi tchi ng si des i n the wa r .
1 3
As the Gr and Vizier expl ai ned
to the Ge r man ambas s ador i n Const ant i nopl e, "One ought to
make peace with Rus s i a so that one coul d then hit Engl and all the
har de r . "
1 4
The Ge r mans relayed the proposal t o Russi a, but nothi ng
came of it. For the Tur ks there seemed to be no way out of a l osi ng
battle for the strai ts.
Th e roar of the Bri ti sh naval guns at the mout h of the Dardanel l es
echoed politically t hrough the capi tal cities of the strategically crucial
Bal kan countri es. In At hens, i n Bucharest , and i n Sofi a politicians
started movi ng toward the Al l i ed camp. It was evident that all of
them, even Bul gari a, woul d enter the war al ongsi de the Ent ent e
Powers i f the Dardanel l es campai gn were won.
1 5
As Ll oyd George
had repeatedl y argued, with the Bal kan countri es as allies, Bri tai n
coul d bri ng the war to an end by movi ng through the di saffected
Aus t ro- Hungari an Empi re to i nvade Germany from the relatively
undef ended sout h.
When the armada of Bri ti sh warshi ps, support ed by a French
s quadron, opened fire at long range on the morni ng of 19 February,
the Turki s h shore batteri es at the mout h of the Dardanel l es l acked
the range even to repl y. In order to inflict greater damage on the
Turki s h shore fortifications, Carden moved his warshi ps closer to
ON T O V I C T O R Y A T T H E D A R D A N E L L E S 135
shore. Tha t night the weather t urned, and the navy was obl i ged to
di sconti nue operati ons for five days because of poor visibility and icy
gal es. On 25 February the attack res umed. Bri ti sh mari nes who were
put on shore at the tip of the peni nsul a found the forts at the
entrance of the strai ts desert ed; the Tur ks and Ge r mans had with-
drawn to the Narrows , where the artillery defenses of the Dardanel l es
were concentrated.
Th e Bri ti sh mi ssi on i n Sofi a report ed that the Bul gari an army
mi ght join i n the attack on Turkey. Th e Pri me Mi ni ster of Rumani a
i ndi cated to the Bri ti sh representati ve in Bucharest that not only was
his own country a fri end to the Allies but that "Ital y woul d move
s oon. "
1 6
In early March a joyful and exci ted Churchi l l recei ved a
secret cabl e from Venizelos-still servi ng as Pri me Mi ni ster-prom-
ising Greek support , i ncl udi ng three army di vi si ons for Gal l i pol i ;
and, accordi ng t o Veni zel os, even the pro- German Ki ng Const ant i ne
was prepared to join the Al l i e s .
1 7
Vi ctory was i n the air. Tho ug h sufferi ng from influenza, Churchi l l
was elated. He confessed to Violet Asqui t h, the Pri me Mi ni ster' s
daughter, that "I think a curse shoul d rest on me because I am so
happy. I know this war is s mas hi ng and shatteri ng the lives of
t housands every moment and yet I cannot help i t I enjoy every
second I live. "
8
Accordi ng to a cabl e from Admi ral Carden to Churchi l l dated 4
March, the fl eet coul d expect to arri ve at Const ant i nopl e, weather
permi tti ng, i n about fourteen d a y s .
1 9
Th e postwar fate of the Ot t oman
Empi re l eaped to the t op of the international agenda; even the
Ital i ans, who had not yet entered the war, began to cl ai m their
"share i n the eventual parti ti on of Tur ke y . "
2 0
Churchi l l seems to
have sensed that such cl ai ms were premat ure: in a confidential letter
to the Forei gn Secret ary, he proposed that European Turkey shoul d
be capt ured but that the Allies shoul d di ctate an armi sti ce that woul d
leave Ot t oman Asi a i n Ot t oman hands at least t emporari l y.
2 1
Onl y Fi sher remai ned skepti cal for a few days more. "The more I
consider the Dardanelles, the less I like it I" (original emphas i s ) , he
wr ot e .
2 2
But on 10 March, even he was converted when i ntercepted
German wi rel ess mes s ages reveal ed that the remai ni ng Dardanel l es
forts, i ncl udi ng the key ones domi nat i ng the Narrows, were about to
run out of ammuni t i on. Shi fti ng suddenl y to great ent husi asm, Fi sher
proposed to go out to the Aegean and personal l y as s ume command of
the armada. Th e rush to take credi t for the i mpendi ng victory was
on.
One eveni ng after di nnera rare social occasi on for the War
Mi ni sterVi ol et Asqui t h spoke with Lo r d Ki t chener, and tol d hi m
that it was Churchi l l who woul d deserve the accol ades of t ri umph.
She sai d that "If the Dardanel l es comes off W. will deserve full and
136
T H E M I D D L E E A S T E R N Q U A G M I R E
al most sole credi t. He has shown such courage and consi stency i n
taki ng the responsi bi l i ty t hroughout all the vacillations of Fi sher and
others. " In her di ary she recorded that "Lor d K. repl i ed i ndi gnantl y:
' Not at al l I was al ways strongl y i n favour of it.' "
2 3
16
RUSSIA' S GRAB FOR TURKEY
i
It was at Russi a' s urgi ng that Ki t chener and Churchi l l had l aunched
the expedi ti on to the Dardanel l es, but when i t looked as t hough that
expedi ti on mi ght succeed, the Czar' s government pani cked. An Al l i ed
victory at the Dardanel l es mi ght seem an occasi on for rejoi ci ng; but
i t woul d mean that Const ant i nopl e woul d fall into Bri ti sh hands and
suddenl y a century of Great Ga me fears and jeal ousi es revi ved i n
Russi an mi nds. Th e Russi an government worri ed that once the
Bri ti sh capt ured Const ant i nopl e they mi ght deci de to keep it.
On 4 March 1915 the Rus s i an Forei gn Mi ni ster, Sergei Sazanov,
sent a secret ci rcul ar t el egram to London and Pari s conveyi ng a
message f rom Czar Ni chol as I I , demandi ng that the Allies turn over
Const ant i nopl e and the s t rai t s and also adjacent terri tori esto
Russi a. In return, the Czar and Sazanov promi sed to listen with
sympat het i c underst andi ng to Bri ti sh and French pl ans to achi eve
their own national ambi t i ons in other regi ons of the Ot t oman Empi re
and el sewhere.
In Pari s the Russi an demand was recei ved with di smay. Afrai d
that possessi on of Const ant i nopl e woul d enabl e Rus s i a to become
France' s rival i n the Medi t erranean, the French government at-
t empt ed to put off the Russi ans with vague expressi ons of "good-
will."
1
Del casse suggest ed that a detai l ed territorial settl ement shoul d
await the eventual peace conference.
Si r Edward Grey undercut the French posi ti on. In hi s sympat hy
for the suscepti bi l i ti es of his country' s Al l i es, Grey, who had al l ayed
French suspi ci ons of Bri ti sh i ntenti ons i n Syri a, now moved to allay
Russi an suspi ci ons of Bri ti sh i ntenti ons at the Dardanel l es. In doi ng
so he opened Pandora' s box. If Rus s i an cl ai ms were grant ed i n
advance of the peace conference, then France woul d be moved to
submi t her cl ai ms, and Lo r d Ki t chener woul d be moved t o s ubmi t
his. However alive he may have been to such dangers, Grey gave
priority to t he need to reassure Rus s i a.
H7
I I
Accordi ng to the Bri ti sh Forei gn Office, the posi ti on of the pro-
Allied mi ni stry i n Pet rograd mi ght be undermi ned by pr o- Ge r man
opponent s if Rus s i a were not gi ven sati sfacti on in the Const ant i nopl e
matter.
Grey later expl ai ned how pr o- Ge r man el ements at the Russi an
court-whom he seems to have genui nel y f earedwoul d mi srep-
resent Bri ti sh mi l i tary operati ons at the Dardanel l es if such an
assurance were not gi ven:
It had al ways been Bri ti sh pol i cy to keep Rus s i a out of
Const ant i nopl e and the St rai t s . . . of course i t was our policy
still. Bri tai n was now goi ng to occupy Const ant i nopl e i n order
that when Bri tai n and France had been enabl ed, by Russi a' s
hel p, to win the war, Rus s i a shoul d not have Const ant i nopl e at
the peace. If this were not so, why were Bri ti sh forces bei ng
sent to the Dardanel l es at a ti me when the French and Bri ti sh
armi es were bei ng so hard pressed i n France that the Rus s i an
Armi es were maki ng unheard of sacrifices to save t he m?
2
Grey and Asqui t h, the l eaders of the Li beral admi ni strati on, were,
i n any event, di sposed to make the concessi on that Bri tai n' s wart i me
ally request ed. Hei rs to the political tradi ti on of Gl adst one, they
were ant i - Turk and sympat het i c to Russi an aspi rat i ons; and they
coul d point to the concl usi on of the Commi t t ee of Imperi al Def ence,
arri ved at in 1903 duri ng a Conservat i ve admi ni strati on, that to
excl ude Rus s i a from Const ant i nopl e was no l onger a vital Bri ti sh
interest. At the outset of the Ot t oman war, the Pri me Mi ni ster wrote
that "Few thi ngs wd. gi ve me greater pl easure than to see the
Turki s h Empi re finally di sappear from Europe, & Const ant i nopl e
either become Russi an (whi ch I think is its proper desti ny) or if that
i s i mpossi bl e neutral i sed . . . "
3
In March 1915, when the i ssue arose,
he wrote of Const ant i nopl e and the strai ts that "It has become qui te
clear that Rus s i a means to i ncorporate t hem i n her own Empi r e , "
and added that "Personally I have al ways been & am in favour of
Russi a' s cl ai m . . . "
4
Unbeknownst to the rest of the Cabi net , Si r Edward Grey had
al ready commi t t ed the country to eventual Russi an control of
Const ant i nopl e, havi ng made promi ses al ong these lines to the
Russi an government i n 1908.
5
Hi s view was that i f Russi a' s l egi ti mate
aspi rati ons were satisfied at the strai ts, she woul d not press cl ai ms in
Persi a, eastern Europe, or el sewhere.
Th e mont h before, Grey had refused t o encourage an ant i - German
coup d'etat in Const ant i nopl e, ai med at taki ng Turkey out of the
war, because i t woul d have prevented hi m from gi vi ng Const ant i nopl e
to Rus s i a.
6
What he had done was i n line with Bri ti sh deci si ons
R U S S I A ' S G R A B F O R T U R K E Y 139
regardi ng Greece and the Bal kan st at es, not bri ngi ng t hem into the
war on the Al l i ed si de because doi ng so mi ght have meant, i n Grey' s
words, "the unsettl ement of Russi a' s whol eheartedness i n the war. "
7
Churchi l l di ssent ed. He was oppos ed t o i ssui ng anythi ng more
than a general statement of sympat hy for Russi an aspi rat i ons, and
wrote to Grey that he had i nstructed the Admi ral t y to undert ake a
st udy of how Russi an control of Const ant i nopl e and the strai ts woul d
affect Bri ti sh i nterests. He urged l ooki ng beyond i mmedi at e wart i me
concerns: "Engl i sh history will not end with this war, " he caut i oned.
8
Despi t e Churchi l l ' s counsel , the government , moved by an over-
ri di ng fear that Rus s i a mi ght seek a separat e peace, agreed to the
t erms proposed by Sazanov and the Czar. Th e Bri ti sh ( 12 March
1915), bel atedl y followed by the French (10 Apri l 1915), formal l y
accepted the secret proposal , rei terati ng that their accept ance was
conditional on their own desi res with respect to the Ot t oman Empi r e
bei ng real i zed, and on the war bei ng prosecut ed by all of t hem to a
final successful concl usi on.
In an addi ti onal Bri ti sh me mor andum, also dated 10 March 1915,
Grey provi ded Sazanov with a number of other Bri t i sh comment s
and qual i fi cati ons. Observi ng that Rus s i a had originally asked only
for Const ant i nopl e and the strai ts but was now aski ng for adjacent
territories as well, Grey al so poi nt ed out that before Bri tai n had been
gi ven a chance to deci de upon her own war goal s, "Russi a i s aski ng
for a definite promi se that her wi shes shall be satisfied with regard to
what is in fact the ri chest pri ze of the entire war. " Grey repeatedl y
emphasi zed that i n agreei ng to the Czar' s proposal s, the Bri ti sh
government was gi vi ng the greatest possi bl e proof of its fri endshi p
and loyalty to Rus s i a. It woul d be i mpossi bl e, wrote Grey, for any
Bri ti sh government to do any more than Asqui t h was doi ng i n meet-
i ng Russi a' s desi res, for the commi t ment into which he had j ust
entered "involves a compl et e reversal of the tradi ti onal pol i cy of Hi s
Majesty' s Government , and i s i n di rect opposi ti on to the opi ni ons
and senti ments at one ti me universally held i n Engl and and which
have still by no means di ed out. "
Grey went on to outl i ne what Rus s i a mi ght be expected to concede
i n return. He made i t clear that his government had not yet f ormu-
lated most of its own objecti ves i n the Eas t , but that one of t hem
woul d be revision of the 1907 Angl o- Russi an Agreement so as
to gi ve Bri tai n the hitherto neutral thi rd of Persi a in addi ti on to
the third she al ready occupi ed. He emphasi zed, too, that the
Const ant i nopl e agreement they had just reached was to be kept
secret.
Th e agreement was t o be kept secret because Grey was worri ed
about the effect on Mosl em opi ni on in Indi a if its t erms were re-
veal ed. He feared that Bri tai n woul d be seen as a party to the
destructi on of the last remai ni ng i ndependent Mohamme dan power
of any consequence. Accordi ngl y, Grey told the Rus s i ans that if the
t erms of their agreement were to become known, he woul d want to
state publ i cl y "that t hroughout the negoti ati ons, Hi s Majesty' s
Government have sti pul ated that the Mus s ul man Hol y Pl aces and
Arabi a shall under all ci rcumst ances remai n under i ndependent
Mus s ul man domi ni on. "
9
As Grey viewed it, Bri tai n woul d have to compensat e Isl am for
destroyi ng the Ot t oman Empi re by establ i shi ng a Mos l em state else-
where, and Mecca and Medi na made i t unthi nkabl e from a rel i gi ous
poi nt of view that it shoul d be establ i shed anywhere but in Arabi a.
Besi des, the promi se was an easy one to make; it was a terri tory that
none of the Great Powers coveted. Davi d Ll oyd George later wrote
that "no one cont empl at ed that forei gn t roops shoul d occupy any
part of Arabi a. It was too ari d a country to make it worth the while
of any ravenous Power to occupy as a permanent pas t ur e . "
1 0
It was
not then known that there were i mmense deposi ts of oil in the
regi on.
Il l
Arabi a di d, however, pl ay a role in the postwar pl ans of the powerful
Bri ti sh Secret ary of St at e for War. Russi a' s demands of 4 March
1915, and their accept ance by Bri tai n on 12 March, led Lo r d
Ki t chener to warn the Cabi net in a memorandum dated 16 March
that after the war "old enmi ti es and jeal ousi es which have been
stilled by the exi sti ng cri si s i n Europe may revive" and that Bri tai n
mi ght be "at enmi ty with Russi a, or with France, or with both in
combi nat i on. "
1 1
What he anti ci pated was no less than a revival of the
Great Game . He, too, urged the creati on of an i ndependent Arabi an
ki ngdom to i ncl ude Mecca and Medi na, but he added that i t shoul d
exist under Bri ti sh auspi ces. It was essential that it shoul d do so in
order to gi ve Bri tai n a hol d on the spi ri tual l eadershi p of the Mos l em
worl d.
In Ki t chener' s comprehensi ve desi gn for the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t ,
Bri tai n, f rom its recently annexed Medi t erranean i sl and of Cypr us ,
woul d control a conveni ent land route to Indi a safe from di srupti on
by France or Rus s i a. Th e War Mi ni ster' s pl an was for Bri tai n to take
possessi on of Al exandretta, the great natural port on the Asi an
mai nl and opposi t e Cyprus , and to construct a rai l road f rom it to the
Mesopot ami an provi nces (now i n I r aq) , of which Bri tai n woul d also
* Now called Iskenderun, and located in the extreme south of what is now
Turkey, near the frontier of what is now Syri a.
R U S S I A ' S G R A B F O R T U R K E Y
141
take possessi on. It was general l y bel i eved (though not yet proven)
that the Mesopot ami an provi nces contai ned l arge oil reserves
which were deemed i mport ant by Churchi l l and the Admi ral t y.
It was bel i eved, too, by Ki t chener and others, that the anci ent
Mesopot ami an l ands watered by the Ti gr i s and Euphrat es rivers
coul d be devel oped so as to produce agri cul tural ri ches; but i n
Ki t chener' s view the pri nci pal advant ages of his proposal were stra-
tegic. Th e Bri t i sh rai l road from the Medi t erranean to the head of the
Persi an Gul f woul d enabl e t roops to move to and f rom Indi a rapi dl y.
The broad swath of Bri ti sh-owned terri tory i t woul d traverse woul d
provi de a shield for the Persi an Gul f, as well as a road to Indi a. If
Bri tai n failed to take possessi on of it, he feared that Rus s i a woul d.
Si r Art hur Hi rtzel of the Indi a Office wrote a si mi l ar me mor andum
at about the s ame ti me, with one significant di fference i n emphas i s :
he urged that the Mes opot ami an provi nces shoul d be i ncorporat ed
into the Indi an Emp i r e .
1 2
He vi ewed i t as an area that coul d be
i rri gated and made rich by col oni sts f rom Indi a. In hi s scheme, the
admi ni strati on of the area woul d be ent rust ed to the Government of
Indi a and woul d fall within the juri sdi cti on of the Indi a Office. It
was becomi ng i ncreasi ngl y clear that i n London two of the cont endi ng
rival powers fighting one another for a share of the Ot t oman Empi re
were the Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi ssi oner i n Cai ro and the Bri ti sh Vi ceroy i n
Si ml a.
Underl yi ng bot h Hi rtzel ' s and Ki t chener' s memoranda was the
assumpt i on, shared by most members of the government , that i t was
now i n Bri tai n' s interest to carve up the Ot t oman Empi r e and to take
a large piece of it. The Pri me Mi ni ster was practically al one in seei ng
a need to exami ne that assumpt i on in a critical light. He admi t t ed,
however, that politicians such as Churchi l l , who felt that Bri tai n
ought to do as well out of the war as her allies, spoke for practically
everybody else on this i ssue.
Asqui t h wrot e:
I believe that, at the moment , Grey and I are the only two men
who doubt & di st rust any such settl ement. We bot h think that
in the real interest of our own future, the best thi ng woul d be
if, at the end of the War, we coul d say that . . . we have taken &
gai ned nothi ng. And that not from a merel y moral & senti mental
poi nt of view . . . but from purel y materi al consi derati ons.
Taki ng on Mes opot ami a, for i nstancewi th or wi thout
Al exandret t a . . . means spendi ng mi l l i ons in irrigation & devel-
opment with no i mmedi at e or early ret urn; keepi ng up qui t e a
l arge army white & col oured in an unfami l i ar count ry; tackl i ng
every ki nd of tangl ed admi ni strati ve questi on, worse than we
have ever had in Indi a with a hornet's nest of Arab t r i be s .
1 3
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster told members of his Cabi net that when they
di scussed the future of the Ot t oman terri tori es, their "di scussi on had
resembl ed that of a gang of buccaneers . "
1 4
But it was typical of hi m
that he di d not take a st and agai nst t hem. What he tol d the Cabi net
was that, while he was in sympat hy with Grey' s view "that we have
al ready as much terri tory as we are abl e to hol d, " he di d not regard
himself and his col l eagues as "free agent s" who were entitled to hold
back f rom taki ng more. If "we were to leave the other nati ons to
scrambl e for Turkey wi thout taki ng anythi ng oursel ves, we shoul d
not be doi ng our dut y. "
1 5
In the correspondence that compri s ed the Const ant i nopl e agree-
ment, Rus s i a i n effect had chal l enged the western powers to formul ate
their own territorial demands . As qui t h took up the chal l enge: he
appoi nted an i nterdepartmental group under the chai rmanshi p of
a career di pl omat , Si r Mauri ce de Buns en, to study the matter and
to recommend what Bri tai n ought to ask from an Ot t oman peace
settl ement.
Largel y unnoti ced and undi scussed, another maj or step had been
taken. In the 100 days between the out break of the Ge r man war and
the outbreak of the Ot t oman war, Bri tai n had overturned the foreign
pol i cy of more than a century by abandoni ng any commi t ment to the
preservati on of the territorial integrity of the Ot t oman Empi r e . Now,
in the 150 days si nce the out break of the Ot t oman war, the Asqui t h
government had come around to the view that di vi di ng up the
Ot t oman Empi re was positively desi rabl e, and that Bri tai n woul d
benefit f rom taki ng part in it.
I V
The Asqui t h government' s move to pl an the breakup of the
Ot t oman Empi re was prompt ed by the Russi an demand for
Const ant i nopl e. Lo r d Ki t chener had anti ci pated that demand at the
outset of the war. Mont hs before Asqui t h appoi nt ed the i nterdepart-
mental commi t t ee chai red by the di pl omat Si r Mauri ce de Buns en to
outline Bri tai n' s ai ms i n the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t , Ki t chener had
initiated i nformal i nqui ri es of his own al ong these lines, which
his l i eutenants pursued before, duri ng, and after the de Buns en
proceedi ngs.
Ki t chener turned to his former staff in Cai ro to el aborate the
details of his pl ans for the post war Mi ddl e Eas t , with speci al reference
to the possi bi l i ty that Rus s i a and France mi ght resume their tradi -
tional hostility to Bri tai n in that part of the worl d.
Apparent l y Oswal d Fi t zGeral d, Ki t chener' s ai de, wrote t o St orrs
aski ng for comment s on the role of Pal esti ne after the war with
respect to a probabl e French and/ or Rus s i an posi ti on further north.
It was one of the first t i mes that Zi oni s mt he movement to create a
Jewi sh homel and i n Pal esti neentered into Bri ti sh warti me specu-
l ati ons. St orrs repl i ed at the end of 1914:
With regard to Pal esti ne, I s uppos e that while we natural l y do
not want to burden oursel ves with fresh responsi bi l i ti es as woul d
be i mpos ed upon us by annexati on, we are, I take it, averse to
the prospect of a Russi an advance Sout hwards into Syri a, or of
a too great extensi on of the i nevi tabl e French Protectorate over
the Lebanon, etc. France woul d be a better nei ghbour than
Rus s i a, but we cannot count on the permanence of any Ent ent e,
however Cordi al e, when the generati on that is full of war
memori es passes away. A buffer St at e i s most desi rabl e, but can
we get one up? The r e i s no visible i ndi genous el ements out of
whi ch a Mos l em Ki ng do m of Pal esti ne can be const ruct ed. Th e
Jewi s h St at e i s i n theory an attracti ve i dea; but the Je ws ,
t hough they consti tute a majori ty in Jerus al em itself are very
much in a mi nori ty in Pal esti ne general l y, and form i ndeed a
bare si xth of the whol e popul at i on.
After consi deri ng the al ternati ves, St orrs concl uded that the most
attractive approach woul d be to annex and i ncorporate Pal esti ne into
Egypt . He ended by sayi ng, "Pl ease remember me t o the Chief.
Egypt i ans are hopi ng that he will conti nue to direct their fate from
af ar . "
1 6
St orrs wrote agai n at the begi nni ng of March 1915, proposi ng that
after the war Ki t chener shoul d return to a new "Nort h Afri can or
Near East ern Vi ce-Royal ty i ncl udi ng Egypt and the Sudan and across
the way from Aden to Al exandret t a. "
7
Thi s , he suggest ed, woul d
offer Ki t chener an attractive al ternati ve to becomi ng Vi ceroy of
Indi a. In effect he was proposi ng that most of the Arabi c- speaki ng
world shoul d be organi zed into a confederati on that woul d be a
Bri ti sh protectorate rul ed by Ki t chener from Ca i r o .
1 8
As he devel oped a Mi ddl e East ern policy for Bri tai n, the War
Mi ni ster based it on the St orrs proposal . On 11 November 1914,
Ki t chener wrote to Si r Edward Grey that the French shoul d be
persuaded to forego their tradi ti onal interest i n Syri a, and shoul d i n
exchange be gi ven more of Nort h Afri ca after the war; while Syri a
shoul d be nomi nal l y i ndependent under a Bri ti sh protectorate and
shoul d be joi ned to Arabi a under the spi ri tual l eadershi p of an Arab
cal i ph. ( Thi s was the matter about which Ki t chener had corresponded
with Hussei n of Mecca mont hs bef ore. )
Ki t chener later suggest ed to Grey that negoti ati ons mi ght be
opened with Arabi c- speaki ng l eaders without telling the French
government ; but Lo r d Crewe, the Secretary of St at e for Indi a, told
Grey that such a course of proceedi ngs woul d not be "feasi bl e. " In
any event, Ki t chener, St orrs , and Si r Mark Sykes, the Tor y M. P.
who joi ned the Ki t chener ent ourage in 1915, all wrongl y believed
that the French coul d be persuaded to abandon their interest i n Syri a
(except for the Chri st i an areas of Mount Lebanon, where their
presence mi ght prove to be, accordi ng to St orrs , "i nevi t abl e") .
2 0
As to the Arabi c- speaki ng peopl es, it l ong had been an article of
faith among the Bri ti sh officials who dealt with oriental affairs that
they were i ncapabl e of genui ne i ndependence. Gert rude Bell, the
most f amous of prewar Bri ti sh travel ers i n Arabi an l ands, repeated
what was regarded as obvi ous when she wrote that "the Arabs can't
govern t hemsel ves. "
2 1
As used by Bri t i sh officials among themsel ves
duri ng the war, "i ndependence" for Arabi c- speaki ng areas merel y
meant i ndependence from the Ot t oman Empi re, and i ndi cated that
such areas woul d move i nstead into the orbit of some European
22
power.
Throughout the next two years, Ki t chener and his col l eagues
conti nued to press their scheme. On 26 Augus t 1915, the field
marshal ' s col l eague, Regi nal d Wi ngate, Governor- General of the
Sudan, wrote the Governor- General of Indi a that "I concei ve it to be
not i mpossi bl e that in the di m future a federati on of semi - i ndependent
Arab St at es mi ght exist under European gui dance and s upport ,
linked together by racial and l i ngui sti c grounds, owi ng spi ri tual
al l egi ance to a si ngl e Arab Pri mat e, and looking to Great Bri tai n as
its patron and prot ect or. "
2 3
Taki ng the lead i n pushi ng for an Arab cal i phate, Wi ngate cor-
responded with Ki t chener' s candi dat e for the posi t i onHussei n, the
ruler of Mecca and Medi nat hrough an Arab religious l eader i n
the Sudan, Si r Sayyi d Ali al - Mi rghani . Capt ai n G. S. Symes ,
Wingate's pri vate secretary, produced a detai l ed memorandum out-
lining the pan- Arab scheme of which the cal i phate woul d be part ;
and St orrs submi t t ed another me mor andum support i ng the Arab
cal i phate on 2 May 1915. Gi l bert Cl ayt on, the Cai ro Intel l i gence
chief, support i ng the plan for Bri tai n to take Syri a and for the
cal i phate to be brought to Arabi a, made i t seem that many voices
were urgi ng the scheme, when in fact it was only a si ngl e faction
speaki ng, t hough with several voi c e s .
2 4
In London, Lo r d Ki t chener expl ai ned t o his col l eaguesi ncl udi ng
the representati ve of Indi a, which had been al armed by his corre-
spondence with Hussei n mont hs bef orewhy the movi ng of the
cal i phate was central to his strategy for the postwar worl d. At a
meeti ng of the War Commi t t ee of the Cabi net on 19 March 1915,
Lo r d Crewe sai d that two different views were taken in the Indi a
Office about the future of the Ot t oman Empi re. The Political De-
part ment wanted to sacrifice Turkey to Arabi a, while the Mi l i tary
Depart ment wanted to make Turkey as st rong as possi bl e as a barri er
agai nst a potential Russi an threat. Mi nut es of the meet i ng record
that
L O R D K I T C H E N E R objected to the Mi l i tary Depart ment ' s pl an.
Th e Tur ks , he sai d, woul d al ways be under pressure from their
st rong Russi an nei ghbour, with the result that the Khal i f at e
mi ght be to a great extent under Russi an domi nati on, and
the Russi an influence mi ght indirectly assert itself over the
Mohamme dan part of the popul at i on of Indi a. If, on the other
hand, the Khal i f at e were transferred to Arabi a, i t woul d remai n
to a great extent under our i nf l uence.
2 5
Th e Forei gn Office deemed i t unwi se to interfere i n Mos l em
rel i gi ous affai rs; the Indi a Office went further and called it danger-
ous. But the Forei gn Office woul d not, and the Indi a Office coul d
not, overrul e the j udgment of Herbert Ki t chener. He was more than
the head of the War Office, more than a Cabi net mi ni ster, more than
an old hand at Afri can and Asi an affai rs, more than the empi re' s
greatest sol di er. He was a living l egend west and east of Suez. He
was Ki t chener of Khar t oum; and in the sunset of his career, the tall
old sol di er cast a l ong shadow over the future of the Mi ddl e Eas t .
The image is one used by Lord Beaverbrook.
17
DEFI NI NG BRITAIN' S GOALS IN
THE MI DDLE EAST
Th e de Bunsen commi t t eet he i nterdepartmental group that
Asqui t h created to advi se the Cabi net as to what Bri tai n ought to
want i n the Mi ddl e Eas t was appoi nt ed on 8 Apri l 1915, and pro-
duced its report on 30 June 1915. Th e commi ttee was composed of
one representati ve each from the Forei gn Office, the Admi ral t y, the
Indi a Office, and other relevant depart ment s. Ki t chener' s War Office
was represented on the commi t t ee by General Si r Charl es Cal wel l ,
Di rect or- General of Mi l i tary Operat i ons. In addi ti on, Ki t chener
pl aced Si r Mark Sykes on the commi t t ee as his personal (as distinct
from his depart ment al ) representati ve; and t hrough Sykes, the War
Mi ni ster domi nat ed the commi ttee' s proceedi ngs. Thereaf t er Sykes
remai ned the London bureaucrat charged with responsi bi l i ty for
Mi ddl e East ern affai rs t hroughout the war.
Sykes, a wealthy, 36-year-ol d Roman Cathol i c Tor y baronet, had
been elected to the Hous e of Commons in 1911. Duri ng and after his
undergraduat e years at Cambri dge, he had travel ed widely i n Asi ati c
Tur ke y and had publ i shed account s of his j ourneys. Thi s had made
hi m one of the Conservati ve Party' s experts on Ot t oman affai rs, but
as Ot t oman affai rs had not pl ayed any significant role in Bri ti sh
politics between 1911 and 1914, and as his party was out of office,
Sykes was not well known either to the publ i c or to his fellow
pol i ti ci ans.
Sykes was the product of a curi ous background. He was the only
child of an unhappy marri age: his warm- heart ed but wanton mother
and his harsh elderly father lived apart . At the age of three, when
his mother converted to Roman Cat hol i ci sm, he became a Cathol i c,
too. When he was seven his father took hi m on a tri p to the Eas t . Hi s
religion and his travel s i n the Eas t remai ned lifelong passi ons.
Hi s educati on was fi tful . He was moved from school to school and
there were ti mes when he was not at school at all. He spent two years
at Je s us Col l ege, Cambri dge, but di d not stay to take his degree. He
was restl ess. Th e vast estates that he inherited and his horse-breedi ng
stabl es di d not keep hi m at home. He roamed the Eas t , and spent
146
D E F I N I N G B R I T A I N ' S G O A L S 147
four years attached to the embas s y i n Const ant i nopl e. He was wel-
comed everywhere for his tal ents. He was a cari caturi st and a mi me,
i n both cases of al most professi onal qual i ty. He was amus i ng and
made fri ends easily. He held opi ni ons strongl y, but changed t hem
rapi dl y.
When the war came, Sykes made an effort to find a j ob that woul d
make use of his Mi ddl e East ern expert i se. In the s ummer of 1914 he
wrote a letter to Wi nston Churchi l l aski ng for a j ob "on the spot"
worki ng agai nst Turkey, offering to "raise native scal l ywag corps,
win over notabl es, or any other oddment . " He wrote that "I know
you won't think me sel f-seeki ng if I say all the knowl edge I have of
local tendenci es and possi bi l i ti es, are at your di sposal but
Churchi l l either di d not have a posi ti on for hi m or di d not offer it.
Sykes fell into Ki t chener' s orbi t as a result of meeti ng Li eut enant -
Col onel Oswal d Fi t zGeral d, the field marshal ' s close friend and
personal military secretary. Fi t zGeral d arranged for Sykes to
be brought into the War Office early i n 1915, where he served under
Calwell prepari ng i nformati on bookl ets for troops i n the Medi t erranean
area. While there, he made an especi al friend of G. M. W. Macdonogh,
a fellow Roman Cathol i c who had attended the s ame publ i c school ;
as Di rect or of Mi l i tary Intel l i gence, Macdonogh proved a val uabl e
ally in advanci ng Sykes' s career.
Short l y after his arrival at the War Office, Sykes was gi ven his de
Bunsen assi gnment . Ki t chener requi red a young politician who knew
the Mi ddl e Eas t , and young Si r Mark Sykes was one of the handful
of Members of Parl i ament who knew the area. As a Tor y, he shared
many of Ki t chener' s senti ments and prej udi ces. In every sense they
were members of the s ame cl ub.
Yet , at the t i me of his appoi nt ment , he barel y knew Ki t chener;
and was never to know hi m much better. Sykes was di rected to call
Fi t zGeral d every eveni ng to gi ve a full report of the de Buns en
commi ttee' s di scussi ons. Fi t zGeral d woul d later tell hi m what
Ki t chener wanted hi m to say or do at the meeti ngs that followed. Hi s
few at t empt s at actual l y seei ng the recl usi ve national l egend evidently
proved unsati sfactory; Sykes later comment ed that "The less I saw
of hi m, the easier it was to do what he requi red . . . "
2
Fr o m the outset, t hough, the other members as s umed that he
spoke with the full wei ght of Lo r d Ki t chener' s authori ty. Th e rela-
tively i nexperi enced M. P. control l ed the i nterdepartmental com-
mi ttee. He was out spoken and opi ni onated. He was the only member
of the commi t t ee who had been to most parts of the Ot t oman
Empi r e ; he al one coul d speak f rom first-hand knowl edge. The n, too,
* Both belonged to the Other Cl ub, founded by Winston Churchill and F. E.
Smith.
he was a politician. He made the other key member of the commi t t ee,
Mauri ce Hankey, into a friend and personal support er. Hankey,
also in his thirties, was Secret ary to the Commi t t ee of Imperi al
Def ence and Secret ary to the War Counci l of the Cabi net , and was to
become the first holder of the office of Secretary of the Bri ti sh
Cabi net . Control l i ng the agenda, and wri ti ng the mi nut es of what
was sai d and deci ded at meet i ngs, Hankey was on the road to
becomi ng the most val uabl e and i mport ant man i n the bureaucracy,
and his support proved i nval uabl e to Sykes .
In the de Buns en proceedi ngs, i t was Sykes who outl i ned the
alternatives that were avai l abl e to Bri tai n. He expl ored the relative
advant ages of several different ki nds of territorial settl ement: an-
nexati on of the Ot t oman territories by the Allied Powers; di vi di ng
the territories into spheres of influence i nstead of annexi ng t hem
outri ght; leaving the Ot t oman Empi r e i n pl ace, but renderi ng its
government s ubmi s s i ve; or decentral i zi ng the admi ni strati on of the
empi re into semi - aut onomous uni ts. (Eventual l y the commi t t ee rec-
ommended tryi ng the last choi ce first, as bei ng the easi est. )
In order to di scuss these mat t ers, the commi t t ee had to deci de
what names to gi ve to the vari ous areas into which they mi ght want
to di vi de the Ot t oman Empi r e . It is i ndi cati ve of the spi ri t in which
they approached their task that they saw no need to follow the lines
of exi sti ng political subdi vi si ons of the empi re, the vilayets (or
provi nces) , and felt free to remake the face of the Mi ddl e Eas t as
they saw fit. In any event, the tendency of the commi t t ee members ,
like that of the Bri ti sh governi ng cl ass in general , was to be gui ded in
such mat t ers by the Greek and Lat i n cl assi cs they had st udi ed
at publ i c school : they empl oyed the vague Greek t erms used by
Hel l eni sti c geographers two t housand years earlier. Th e Arabi c-
speaki ng areas of Asi a to the north of Arabi a thus collectively were
referred to as "Mesopot ami a" in the east and "Syri a" in the west,
though the areas to be i ncl uded i n each were uncl ear. Th e southern
part of Syri a was called "Pal esti ne, " a corrupti on of "Philistia, " the
coastal stri p occupi ed by the Philistines more than a t housand years
before Chri st ; and while no country had ever called itself Pal esti ne,
it was a geographi c t erm current in the Chri sti an western worl d to
descri be the Hol y La nd.
Th e commi t t ee, led by Mark Sykes, proposed the creation of five
largely aut onomous provi nces i n the decentral i zed Ot t oman Empi re
which they envi saged. The y were to be Syri a, Pal esti ne, Armeni a,
Anatol i a, and Jazi rah- I raq (the northern and southern part s of
Mes opot ami a) , As the commi t t ee saw it, Bri ti sh influence or control
woul d be desi rabl e i n a wi de swath across the Mi ddl e Eas t from the
Medi t erranean to the Persi an Gul f . A Bri ti sh rai l road was to be
constructed from a Medi t erranean port to Mesopot ami a, to provi de
D E F I N I N G B R I T A I N ' S G O A L S 149
the overl and road to the Eas t . Ki t chener conti nued to insist on
Al exandret t a as the port, but Sykes demanded that i t be Hai f a, and
Fi t zGeral d, medi at i ng between the two, let Sykes have his way.
In all other respects Sykes hewed close to the Ki t chener line,
though with slight modi fi cati ons of hi s own. Li ke Ki t chener, he
advocated movi ng the cal i phate to the sout h to put it out of the reach
of Russi a' s influence; but he added that it also woul d put it out of
reach of financial control by France, for he assumed that Ot t oman
finances woul d be largely control l ed by the French in view of the
l arge French i nvestment i n the Ot t oman publ i c de bt .
3
Th e overall approach, however, was Ki t chener' s. Sykes, who had
been a conspi cuous member of the pro- Turki s h bl oc in Parl i ament,
abandoned his convi cti on that the integrity of the Ot t oman Empi re
ought to be mai ntai ned. To his i nti mate friend and fellow pro-
Turki s h M. P. , Aubrey Herbert , he wrote on Apri l Fool ' s Day:
I percei ve by your letter that you are pr o- Tur k still. I got a
s ummons f rom Fi el d to attend a meet i ng of the Ot t oman Soci ety
to which I never bel onged . . . I i mmedi atel y wired to Mc Ke nna
[ Home Secret ary] and I have every hope that the whole crowd
have been cl apped into barbed wi reha! ha! How furi ous this
mus t make you ha! ha! agai n. Your Policy i s wrong. Turkey
mus t cease t o be. Smyrna shall be Greek. Adal i a Ital i an,
Sout hern Ta ur us and Nort h Syri a French, Fi l i sti n [Pal esti ne]
Bri ti sh, Mesopot ami a Bri ti sh and everythi ng else Rus s i an
i ncl udi ng Const ant i nopl e, .. . and I shall si ng a Te Deum in St .
Sophi a and a Nunc Dimittis in the Mos que of Omar. We will
si ng it in Wel sh, Pol i sh, Kel t i c, and Armeni an in honour of all
the gal l ant little nati ons.
After more of the s ame, Sykes cl osed with a note:
To the Censor
Thi s is a brilliant letter from one geni us to another. Men of
base clay cannot be expected to underst and. Pray pass on with-
out fear.
Mark Sykes Lt . Col . F R G S , MP, CC, J P .
4
18
AT THE NARROWS OF FORTUNE
i
London was deal i ng qui ckl y with the political consequences of the
i mpendi ng victory at the Dardanel l es but , at the scene of battl e, the
f l eet moved slowly. Th e weather kept the warshi ps f rom bri ngi ng
their full fire power to bear. As the days went by, the Turki s h troops
al ong the shore began to regai n their confidence, and l earned to
harass the Bri ti sh mi nesweepers by firing on t hem with howitzers
and smal l mobi l e guns . On 13 March Churchi l l recei ved a cabl e from
Carden sayi ng that mi nesweepi ng was not proceedi ng sati sfactori l y
due to what Carden cl ai med was heavy Turki s h fire, al though no
Bri ti sh casual ti es had been suffered. Thi s , noted Churchi l l , "makes
me squi rm"; "I do not underst and why mi nesweepi ng shoul d be
interfered with by fire which causes no casual ti es. Two or three
hundred casual ti es woul d be a smal l pri ce to pay for sweepi ng up as
far as the Narrows . "
1
Part of the probl emand it was one of the defects in Admi ral
Carden' s original pl anwas that the mi nesweepers were manned by
civilian empl oyees, who were not willing to operate under fire; but
the major probl em was that Admi ral Carden was l osi ng his nerve.
Churchi l l had cabl ed hi m on 13 March reporti ng that "we have in-
formati on that the Turki s h Fort s are short of ammuni t i on and that
the German officers have made des pondi ng report s , "
2
to which Carden
repl i ed that he woul d l aunch the mai n attack into the strai ts and
wage the battl e for the crucial Narrows on or about 17 March,
dependi ng on the weather; but the admi ral worri ed, and coul d
neither eat nor sl eep. He had lost no shi ps and reported that he had
suffered no casual ti es, but the strai n of anxi ety proved too much for
hi m and suddenl y his nerves broke.
On the eve of the mai n battl e for the strai ts, Admi ral Carden told
his seconds- i n- command that he coul d no longer go on. He s ummoned
a fleet physi ci an, who exami ned hi m and certified that he was suf-
fering from i ndi gesti on and that he shoul d be pl aced on the sick list
150
A T T H E N A R R O WS O F F O R T U N E 151
for three or four weeks. On 16 March Carden cabl ed Churchi l l
"Much regret obl i ged to go on the sick list. Deci si on of Medi cal
Officer fol l ows. "
3
Churchi l l prompt l y appoi nted John de Robeck, the second-i n-
command, to take his pl ace. De Robeck, accordi ng to his cabl ed
report to the Admi ral t y, then commenced the mai n attack at 10:45
on the morni ng of 18 March.
Th e day began to go badl y when a French battl eshi p mysteri ousl y
expl oded and di sappeared just before 2:00 i n the afternoon. Two
hours later two Bri ti sh battl eshi ps struck mi nes. A vessel sent to
rescue one of t hem, the Irresistible, also struck a mi ne; and it and
the Irresistible both sank. The n a French warshi p damaged by gunfi re
was beached. De Robeck reported to the Admi ral t y, however, that
the rest of his shi ps woul d be ready to recommence action in three or
four days. At the Admi ral t y i n London, there was elation, for Naval
Intelligence had di scovered that when the action recommenced, the
enemy woul d col l apse. On the afternoon of 19 March, Capt ai n
William Regi nal d Hal l , the Di rect or of Naval Intel l i gence, brought
Churchi l l and Fi sher an i ntercepted, decoded message from the
Ge r man Kai s er; they grasped its significance i mmedi atel y. Churchi l l
cried out in exci tement that "they've come to the end of their am-
muni ti on, " as i ndeed they had. Fi sher waved the message over his
head and shout ed, "By Go d, I'll go t hrough t omorrow" and then
repeated "Tomorrow! We shall probabl y lose six shi ps, but I' m
goi ng t hrough. "
4
Churchi l l and Fi sher di d not tell the Cabi net , for
fear of compromi si ng their intelligence sources, nor di d they tell de
Robeck; they merel y cabl ed hi m that it was i mportant not to gi ve
the i mpressi on that operati ons were s us pended.
Unknown to Churchi l l and Fi sher, at Mauri ce Hankey' s sugges-
tion, the Di rect or of Naval Intel l i gence, Capt ai n Hal l , had initiated
negoti ati ons with Tal aat Bey, the young Tur k l eader, ai med at
i nduci ng the Ot t oman Empi re to leave the war in return for a l arge
payment of money. Th e Bri ti sh and Turki s h negoti ators met at a
seaport i n European Tur ke y on 15 Ma r c h.
5
Th e negoti ati ons failed
because the Bri ti sh government felt unabl e to gi ve assurances that
the Ot t oman Empi re coul d retain Const ant i nopl eso deepl y were
the Bri ti sh now commi t t ed to sati sfyi ng Russi a' s ambi t i ons. Capt ai n
Hall had not yet l earned of the col l apse of the negoti ati ons when, on
the night of 19 March, he told Churchi l l of the pl an to offer four
million pounds to Turkey i f she woul d leave the war. Churchi l l was
aghast and Fi sher was furi ous. At their insistence, Hal l cabl ed his
emi ssari es to wi thdraw the offer. Hal l later recalled that Fi sher
started up f rom his chair and shout ed "Four million? No, no. I tell
you I' m goi ng t hrough t omorrow. "
6
I I
All that st ood between the Bri ti sh-l ed Al l i ed fl eet and Const ant i nopl e
were a few s ubmerged mi nes, and Ot t oman suppl i es of these were so
depl eted that the Tur ks were dri ven to catch and re-use the mi nes
that the Russi ans were usi ng agai nst t hem.
Moral e i n Const ant i nopl e di si ntegrated. Ami dst rumors and pani c,
the evacuati on of the city commenced. Th e state archi ves and the
gol d reserves of the banks were sent to safety. Speci al trai ns were
prepared for the Sul t an and for the foreign di pl omati c colony. Th e
well-to-do sent wives and fami l i es ahead to the interior of the country.
Tal aat , the Mi ni ster of the Interi or, requi si ti oned a powerful
Mercedes for his personal use, and equi pped i t with extra petrol
tanks for the l ong dri ve to a di stant pl ace of refuge. Pl acards de-
nounci ng the government began to appear in the streets of the city.
Th e Greek and Armeni an communi t i es were expected by the au-
thorities to wel come the Al l i es, but now the police began to arrest
suspect s within the Turki s h- s peaki ng communi t y as well.
Meanwhi l e those members of the Enver- Tal aat faction who had
support ed i t to the bitter end gat hered up petrol and prepared to
burn down the city when the Allies arri ved, and wi red St Sophi a and
the other great monument s with dynami t e. Th e Goeben made ready
to escape into the Bl ack Sea.
Enver bravel y pl anned to remai n and defend the city, but his
military di sposi ti ons were so i ncompetent t hat as Li man von
Sanders later recal l edany Turki s h at t empt at opposi ng an Allied
l andi ng i n Const ant i nopl e had been rendered i mpossi bl e.
Ill
London rejoi ced and Const ant i nopl e despai red, but i n the strai ts of
the Dardanel l es, the mood of the Bri ti sh command was bl eak. Th e
casual ti es and l osses from mi nes on 18 March had left Admi ral de
Robeck despondent . He feared for his career. Accordi ng to one
report, when eveni ng came on the 18th and de Robeck surveyed the
resul ts of the day' s battl e, he sai d "I s uppos e I am done f or. "
7
De Robeck was unnerved because he di d not know what had
caused his l osses. In fact his shi ps had run into a si ngl e line of mi nes
runni ng parallel to the shore rather than across the strai ts. The y had
been pl aced there the night before and had escaped notice by Bri ti sh
aerial observers. It was a one-ti me fluke.
Fat e now appeared i n the charmi ng person of General Si r Ian
Hami l t on, whom Ki t chener had sent out i n advance of the forth-
comi ng t roops. Hami l t on was to be their commander, with orders to
A T T H E N A R R O WS O F F O R T U N E 153
let the navy win the campai gn and then to di sembark and take
possessi on of the shore. If the navy failed to win t hrough on its own,
Hami l ton' s al ternati ve orders were to i nvade the European shore of
the strai ts, capt ure the Narrows , and let the navy t hrough.
Once Admi ral de Robeck realized that he had an al ternati ve to
goi ng back into battl ethat i n London i t was regarded as acceptabl e
for hi m to turn over the responsi bi l i ty to Hami l t on and the army if
he chose to do s ohe saw no reason to run further ri sks. Whoever
said it first, de Robeck and Hami l t on agreed that the navy shoul d
wait until the army coul d come into acti on. Hami l t on had al ready
cabl ed his vi ews to Ki t chener, who on 18 March showed the cabl e to
the Pri me Mi ni st er; the cabl e pers uaded Asqui t h that "The Admi ral t y
have been over- sangui ne as to what they cd. do by shi ps al one. "
8
De Robeck cabl ed Churchi l l , after meet i ng with Ian Hami l t on on
22 March, that "havi ng met General Hami l t on . . . and heard his
proposal s I now consi der" that the army has to enter the c ampai gn.
9
On the morni ng of 23 March the War Gr o up met at the Admi ral t y
to di scuss de Robeck' s deci si on. Wi nston Churchi l l was appal l ed and
shocked, but the Fi rst Sea Lo r d, Admi ral Fi sher, took the view that
the deci si on of the man on the spot had to be accept ed, like it or not,
and i n this view he was support ed by Admi ral of the Fl eet Si r Art hur
Wilson and Admi ral Si r Henry Jacks on. Churchi l l violently dis-
agreed, and took the matter to the Cabi net when the War Gr o up
meet i ng ended. He had drafted a st rong cabl e to de Robeck which he
brought al ong for the Cabi net' s approval , and which i n no uncertai n
t erms ordered the admi ral to renew the attack. At the Cabi net
meeti ng Churchi l l recei ved support from both the Pri me Mi ni ster
and from Ki t chener, who drafted appropri at el y st rong cabl es to Si r
Ian Hami l t on.
Ret urni ng to the Admi ral t y that afternoon, Churchi l l found that
Fi sher, Wi l son, and Jacks on remai ned adamant l y oppos ed t o his
sendi ng the cabl ed order to de Robeck. As a civilian mi ni ster at-
t empt i ng to overrul e the Fi rst Sea Lo r d and his fellow admi ral s on a
naval matter, Churchi l l felt obl i ged to return to Asqui t h and ask for
the Pri me Mi ni ster' s consent. Asqui t h, however, refused to gi ve it.
Hi s personal view was that the attack shoul d be res umed, but he
woul d not order it over the opposi t i on of the Sea Lo r ds at the
Admi ral t y.
Knowi ng as he di d that the ammuni t i on crisis i n Turkey meant
that the road to Const ant i nopl e was open, Churchi l l fought back
agai nst the deci si on to let the navy abandon the campai gn. Si nce he
coul d not gi ve de Robeck orders to resume the attack, he at t empt ed
to get hi m to do it through persuasi on. He sent cabl es in which he
at t empt ed to reason with the admi ral and to show hi m why a re-
sumpt i on of the naval attack was i mport ant . He spoke agai n with the
Pri me Mi ni ster who expressed his "hope" that the attack woul d
resume s o o n.
1 0
It was to no avail. Onl y a few hundred casual ti es
had been suffered, but the Admi ral t y' s Dardanel l es campai gn was
over.
IV
After the battle of 18 Marcht he battl e that so al armed de Robeck
that he deci ded to t urn his shi ps around and st eam awayt he
Ot t oman commanders concl uded that their cause was lost. While
Admi ral de Robeck, aboard shi p, was gi vi ng his orders to gi ve up the
fight, on shore the Turki s h def endi ng forces, unaware of de Robeck' s
deci si on, recei ved orders to fire their remai ni ng rounds of am-
muni ti on and then to abandon their coastal posi ti ons. If Admi ral de
Robeck, who had led hi s fleet in battl e for only one day, had pl unged
back into battl e for a second day he woul d have seen the enemy
forces wi thdraw and mel t away. In a few hours his mi nesweepers,
worki ng wi thout i nterrupti on or opposi t i on, coul d have cl eared a
path t hrough the Narrows ; and once the lines of mi nes surroundi ng
the Narrows had gone, there were no more laid. Th e fleet woul d
have st eamed into Const ant i nopl e wi thout opposi ti on.
For Wi nston Churchi l l , who was only hours away f rom victory,
the nearness of i tthe knowl edge that he was al most there, that it
was within his gr as pwas to become the torment of a lifetime. It
was more than a personal t ri umph that had sl i pped t hrough his
fingers. It was also his last chance to save the worl d in which he had
grown up: to win the war while the fami l i ar, tradi ti onal Europe of
establ i shed monarchi es and empi res still survi ved.
It was al so the lost last chance for Bri tai n, France, and Russi a to
i mpose their desi gns on the Mi ddl e Eas t with ease. Though they
woul d conti nue to purs ue their ni neteenth-century goal s i n the regi on,
thereafter they woul d do so in the uncongeni al envi ronment of the
twentieth century.
The Ot t oman Empi re, which had been sentenced t o death, had
received an unexpect ed l ast-mi nute repri eve. Its l eaders rushed to
make use of the ti me that Bri tai n had allowed t hem before the new
trial of arms began.
* Historians still debate the question of whether victory in the Ottoman war in
1915 would have led to a rapid Allied victory in the German war. The "Easterners,"
led by Ll oyd George, never doubted that it would have done so.
19
THE WARRIORS
i
Shaken by the Al l i ed bombardment of 18 March, Enver Pasha an-
nounced an uncharacteri sti c and i mportant deci si on: he rel i nqui shed
command of the Ot t oman forces at the Dardanel l es to the Ge r man
general , Li man von Sanders . It ran counter to all of Enver' s i nsti ncts
to turn over his Mos l em warri ors to a f orei gnand Chri s t i an
commander. Unti l that moment he had resi sted pressures to turn
over authori ty, even to the Ge r man experts who served as depart -
mental and staff advi sers. Al t hough he had al l owed Ge r man officers
in his War Mi ni stry to move into key post s in the Depart ment s of
Operat i ons, Intel l i gence, Rai l roads, Suppl y, Muni t i ons, Coal , and
Fort resses, he had jeal ousl y quest i oned the j udgment s and ci rcum-
scri bed the authori ty of his Ge r man col l eagues; and i n many areas he
conti nued to do so. Yet under the guns of the Al l i ed armada he
fi nal l y st epped asi de on the battlefield that most mat t ered.
Li man had little t i me, and wasted none. He assembl ed such forces
and suppl i es as were to be f ound ami dst the wreckage of the empi re' s
resources. He made his own c ommand appoi nt ment s, notabl y gi vi ng
a responsi bl e posi ti on to Mus t apha Ke mal , a Turki s h officer who
admi red European ways and whose scorn of Ot t oman backwardness
and bitter consci ousness that he was superi or to those advanced over
his head had, until then, kept hi m i n obscure and unrewardi ng
assi gnment s. Ke mal was to prove the battlefield geni us of the comi ng
combat : the commander with the eye for the key tactical posi ti on,
who woul d seize the hi gh ground and domi nat e the fi el d.
Li ma n was kept well i nformed of Bri t i sh progress i n organi zi ng an
i nvasi on force. News of the Bri ti sh expedi ti on' s assembl y and em-
barkati on i n Egypt was publ i shed by newspapers i n Cai ro and re-
port ed t o the Tur ks by merchant s i n Al exandri a. Lat er, Ot t oman
agents i n neutral Greece coul d hardl y have mi ssed noti ci ng the vast
fl eet as i t moved t hrough the i sl ands of the Aegean, its l i ghts and
155
signal l amps shi ni ng bri ghtl y t hrough the night, its military bands
bl ari ng above the s ound of wi nds and waves by day.
Well-officered for once, the Ot t oman defendi ng forces under
Li man' s workmanl i ke direction were wai ti ng for the Bri ti sh invasion
when it came. It was the t ype of engagement in which the steadfast-
ness of the Ot t oman sol di ery coul d be empl oyed fo best advant age.
Si r Mark Sykes had poi nted this out in late February in a letter to
Churchi l l . He wrote that t hough they coul d be routed by a surpri se
attack, "Turks al ways grow f ormi dabl e i f given ti me to thi nk. "
1
I I
For Si r Ian Hami l t on, the Bri ti sh Commander, the campai gn began
the morni ng of 12 March when Lo r d Ki t chener unexpect edl yand
wi thout expl anat i ons ummoned hi m to the War Office to offer hi m
the command. He told the War Mi ni ster that he knew nothi ng about
Turkey, and therefore that he needed at least some word of expl anati on
and gui dance.
As Hami l t on later recal l ed, at their meeti ng the War Mi ni ster,
while gi vi ng hi m command of the di vi si on that initially was bei ng
sent out to the Dardanel l es in s upport of the navy, warned that the
t roops were "only to be a loan and are to be returned the moment
they can be s pared. " He expl ai ned that "all thi ngs earmarked for the
East are l ooked on by powerful i nterests both at home and i n France
as havi ng been stolen from the West . "
2
Th e Di rector of Mi l i tary Operat i ons at the War Office then bri efed
Hami l t on by showi ng hi m a map and a pl an of attack borrowed from
the Greek General Staff. Th e War Office had not taken the ti me or
troubl e to work out one of their own.
General Hami l t on was sent out with an i naccurate and out-of-date
map, and little else to gui de hi m. On seei ng the Gal l i pol i peni nsul a
for the first ti me, he remarked i mmedi atel y that "the Peni nsul a looks
a tougher nut to crack than i t di d on Lo r d K. ' s smal l and featurel ess
map. "
3
It was a rugged l andscape of ravi nes, and hills that di vi ded
the shoreline into tiny beaches cut off from one another.
Havi ng travel ed on a fast naval crui ser from Marsei l l es, Hami l t on
reached the coast of Gal l i pol i on 18 March, in ti me to influence de
Robeck to call off the naval campai gn. By late Apri l he was st eami ng
back toward the strai ts to command the army' s attack. He carefully
followed the i nstructi ons that the War Mi ni ster had gi ven hi m for the
campai gn. He was to attack only the European si de of the st rai t s: the
Gal l i pol i peni nsul a. He was not to attack until he had his whole
force, which is why (despi te his own mi sgi vi ngs) he had ordered the
navy to take hi m back from Tur ke y to Egypt to assembl e his forces.
It took hi m about three weeks to organi ze his expedi ti onary force;
T H E WA R R I O R S 157
then the navy took hi m back to Turkey to l aunch his i nvasi on of
Gal l i pol i , the western (or European) shore of the Dardanel l es.
It was a risky vent ure: i ndeed prewar Bri ti sh military studi es that
were revealed to the Cabi net by Asqui t h at the end of February had
concl uded that an attack on Gal l i pol i by the Bri ti sh army was too
risky to be undert aken.
4
Ki t chener had ordered that i t shoul d be
done nonethel ess, sayi ng that he bel i eved the Ot t oman general s had
left the European si de of the strai ts more or less undef ended.
At a War Counci l meeti ng, its only Tor y membert he former
Pri me Mi ni ster Art hur Bal f ouras ked "whether the Tur ks were
likely, if cut off, to surrender or to fight with their back to the wall. "
Ll oyd George sai d he "thought i t more probabl e that they woul d
make a st and"; but Ki t chener repl i ed that they woul d probabl y
s urrender.
5
A year later, a verdict on the matter was returned by Allied armi es
servi ng i n the field. Compt on Mackenzi e, the young novel i st-turned-
war correspondent , report ed f rom the Dardanel l es that "French of-
ficers who have fought in the West say that as a fighting unit one
Tur k is worth two Ge r mans ; in fact, with his back to the wall the
Tur k i s magni fi cent. "
6
Ill
At dawn on 25 Apri l 1915, the Bri t i sh, Domi ni on, and Al l i ed armi es
waded ashore onto six narrow, unconnected beaches on the Gal l i pol i
peni nsul a. Th e Tur ks , who had known when but not where the
Allies woul d attack, were taken by surpri se and probabl y coul d have
been overwhel med that day.
Th e nort hernmost i nvasi on site, Ari Burnu, also proved a surpri se
to the Aust ral i an and New Zeal and t roops who l anded t heret he
navy had taken t hem to the wrong beach. Ascendi ng the steep sl opes
to the ri dge above, they encountered Turki s h sol di ers who fl ed until
rallied by their commander, Mus t apha Ke mal . Th e battl e raged all
day. The r e were moment s when i t coul d have gone either way; but
i n the end the Tur ks drove the i nvaders back down the sl ope.
At the tip of Gal l i pol i , the five other Al l i ed l andi ngs were at
beachheads code- named S, V, W, X, and Y. At Y there were no
Tur ks , and the i nvaders cl i mbed unoppos ed to the top of the cliff
that domi nat ed the beach; but i nstead of marchi ng on, they st opped
because of confusi on as to who was i n command. At X, meet i ng little
opposi ti on, the attackers also mount ed the cl i ffand al so st opped
there. At S, the l andi ng party met little opposi ti on, but made camp
on the beach wi thout at t empt i ng to ascend to the top of the sl ope
that overl ooked it.
Th e Allies held an overwhel mi ng numeri cal superi ori ty that da y
most of Li man' s forces were held in reserve at a di stance f rom the
battl efi el dand at beaches Y, X, and S the invasion forces coul d
have expl oi ted their surpri se attack by advanci ng and destroyi ng the
smal l Tur ki s h garri son i n the vicinity.
By 26 Apri l the si tuati on had changed. Turki s h rei nforcements
started to pour in, and in a sense it was all over: a cheap victory at
Gal l i pol i was no l onger i n si ght for the Allies. General Bi rdwood,
commander of the ANZ AC forces, on the advi ce of his officers,
recommended re- embarki ng and abandoni ng the posi ti ons his forces
occupi ed. But Si r Ian Hami l t on, Bi rdwood' s commandi ng officer,
deci ded i nstead to di g in.
Unknowi ngl y, Hami l t on thereby conceded that the expedi ti on he
l edand whi ch was i ntended to break the mi l i tary stal emate i n the
warwas doomed to fail. As had been shown i n France and
Fl anders , di ggi ng in was more likely to produce a stal emate than
break one; and i ndeed, i n futile, bl oody assaul ts on fixed posi ti ons,
Gal l i pol i was to become a drawn- out repl ay of the trench warfare on
the western front.
Hami l t on had posi ti oned his t roops at best to fight the Tur ks to a
draw, but at worst to suffer di saster. While the Tur ks dug i n on the
domi nat i ng hei ghts, the Bri ti sh commanders ordered their t roops to
entrench on the beaches; and there at the water's edge the Al l i ed
fight eventual l y became one for survi val . Soon most members of the
Bri ti sh government i n London came to view evacuati on as the only
sol uti on, but Churchi l l and Ki t chener fought agai nst it: Churchi l l
because he was never willing to accept defeat, and Ki t chener because
he bel i eved it woul d be a di saster for a Bri ti sh army to be seen to be
defeated by a Mi ddl e East ern one.
20
THE POLITICIANS
i
Wi nston Churchi l l ' s dogged determi nati on to fi ght on at Gal l i pol i
until victory was won kept hi m in the spotl i ght even after the army
had taken over the Dardanel l es campai gn from the navy. He appeared
to be both the man who had brought the Ot t oman war about , and
the man who had caused Bri tai n to suffer one defeat after another i n
that war.
Al though from Apri l onward the battl e for the strai ts was no
longer the Admi ral t y' s operati on, Churchi l l was made the scapegoat
for the conti nui ng casual ti es and set backs as the Al l i ed armi es fought
on hopel essl y at Gal l i pol i . Ki t chener' s presti ge was so great that the
press, the publ i c, and Parl i ament f ound i t i nconcei vabl e that he had
been responsi bl e for the bl unders that had been commi t t ed; but
Churchi l l was an i nterferi ng civilian and it was easy to believe the
admi ral s who cl ai med that his amat euri sh meddl i ng i n naval mat t ers
had been the cause of Bri ti sh set backs. The Times gave voi ce to a
gatheri ng consensus in 1915 when its 18 May editorial procl ai med
that
What l ong ago pas s ed beyond the st age of mere rumour i s the
charge, whi ch has been repeatedl y and categori cal l y made i n
publ i c, that the Fi rst Lo r d of the Admi ral t y has been as s umi ng
responsi bi l i ti es and overri di ng his expert advi sers to a degree
which mi ght at any ti me endanger the national safety . . . When
a civilian Mi ni ster in charge of a fighting servi ce persi stentl y
seeks to gras p power which shoul d not pass into his ungui ded
hands, and at t empt s to use that power in peri l ous ways, it is
ti me for his col l eagues i n the Cabi net to take s ome definite
act i on.
1
Out si de of the War Cabi net , i t was not generally known that Lo r d
Ki t chener was the author of the pl an to send the navy on its own to
attack the Dardanel l es. Churchi l l was bl amed for the deci si on, and
159
therefore for the several weeks of advance warni ng that had been
given to Enver and Li man von Sanders , which enabl ed t hem to
entrench their armi es to repel the Al l i ed assaul t on Gal l i pol i . Th e
officers on the Gal l i pol i beaches saw the earlier naval attack as a
show-off stunt by the Fi rst Lo r d of the Admi ral t y, a coup that had
failed and threatened to lose t hem their lives. Aubrey Herbert , who
served in the armed forces there, wrote in his diary that "Winston's
name fi l l s everyone with rage. Roman emperors killed sl aves to make
themsel ves popul ar, he is killing free men to make himself f amous. If
he hadn't tried that coup but had cooperat ed with the Army, we
mi ght have got to Const ant i nopl e with very little l oss. "
2
Lat er he
wrote that "As for Wi nston, I woul d like hi m to die in some of the
t orment s I have seen so many di e in here. "
3
Abus e was heaped on Churchi l l f rom all quart ers, and his political
posi ti on deteri orated rapi dl y. A final split between Churchi l l and
Bri tai n' s greatest sai l or, Admi ral of the Fl eet Lo r d Fi sher, the Fi rst
Sea Lo r d, brought mat t ers to a head. Churchi l l and Fi sher had
conferred and had reached agreement on a program of rei nforcements
of the fl eet support i ng the Gal l i pol i campai gn on Fri day, 14 May.
Earl y the following morni ng Fi sher received several memoranda
f rom Churchi l l s ummari zi ng the poi nts on which they had agreed,
but also addi ng new suggest i ons of his own. Infuri ated, Fi sher, who
had announced that he was resi gni ng on eight previ ous occasi ons,
walked over from the Admi ral t y to nearby 11 Downi ng Street and
told the Chancel l or of the Exchequer, Davi d Ll oyd George, that he
was resi gni ng hi s office. Ll oyd George sent for the Pri me Mi ni ster,
who was next door at 10 Downi ng Street, and the two of t hem
at t empt ed to persuade Fi sher that he had to remai n at his post at
least temporari l y. Fi sher refused, and then went back to his room at
the Admi ral t y, l ocked the door, and drew the bl i nds. Lat er, he
di sappeared from view for a ti me.
Churchi l l learned of the situation from his col l eagues, for Fi sher
refused to see hi m. Th e i mmedi at e probl em was that the navyi n
the mi ddl e of a warwas wi thout its chief commandi ng officer, and
that the i ntenti ons of the other members of the Admi ral t y Board
were unknown. Churchi l l was assured on Sunday, 16 May, that the
Second, Thi r d, and Fourt h Sea Lo r ds were all willing to conti nue i n
their posi ti ons. He also secured the agreement of Admi ral of the
Fl eet Si r Art hur Wi l son to return to his prewar posi ti on of Fi rst Sea
Lo r d i n Fi sher' s pl ace. Si nce the press and the political worl d di d
not yet know of Fi sher' s resi gnati on, Churchi l l pl anned to announce
both Fi sher' s resi gnati on and the new di sposi ti ons at the Admi ral t y to
the Hous e of Commons on Monday morni ngbef ore the Opposi t i on
had ti me to di srupt his pl ans.
Fi sher, however, sent a hint of what he had done to Andrew Bonar
T H E P O L I T I C I A N S 161
Law, leader of the Opposi t i on. Bonar Law guessed what i t meant,
and called on Ll oyd George first thi ng Monday morni ng. He asked
the Chancel l or whether Fi sher had resi gned. When Ll oyd George
confi rmed that he had, Bonar La w expl ai ned his own view of the
grave political consequences that coul d be expected t o ensue. Th e
Opposi t i on theretofore had refrai ned f rom chal l engi ng the govern-
ment i n wart i me, but Bonar La w sai d that he coul d no l onger
restrain his fol l owers: Fi sher was their hero, and they woul d not let
Churchi l l stay at the Admi ral t y i f Fi sher went. Nor woul d they st op
their attacks there, for the Tor y Members of Parl i ament, in the face
of one mi l i tary failure after another, no l onger felt that they coul d
gi ve the Li beral government their unqual i fi ed support .
Bonar Law' s sol uti on was t o broaden the government . He proposed
that the Li beral government shoul d be repl aced by a coalition gov-
ernment, representi ng the two maj or parti es i n Parl i ament, and
Labour .
Ll oyd George instantly saw the force of the argument . He asked
Bonar Law to wait at 11 Downi ng St reet while he went next door to
consul t the Pri me Mi ni st er. Ll oyd George then put the case for a
coalition forcefully to Asqui t h, who abrupt l y agreed.
Churchi l l knew none of this. Earl y that afternoon he went to the
Hous e of Commons to announce that the Sea Lo r ds had agreed to
stay on with Admi ral of the Fl eet Wilson as their new head. He
arri ved to find that Ll oyd George and Asqui t h woul d not let hi m
make his speech. As qui t h sai d that he di d not want the schedul ed
debate between the parti es to take pl ace. He told Churchi l l that he
woul d f orm a new government in which the Li beral s woul d share
office with the Conservati ves and with Labour .
On 19 May 1915, the new government was announced. Churchi l l
was removed f rom the Admi ral t y and gi ven the mi nor posi ti on of
Chancel l or of the Duchy of Lancas t eri n effect, Mi ni ster Wi thout
Portfol i oal though he remai ned in the War Cabi net .
The political worl d di d not know at the ti me that, i f Churchi l l had
been listened to, the Dardanel l es campai gn coul d have been won at a
ti me when only a few hundred casual ti es had been i ncurred; and that
i t was because the admi ral s and general s had overrul ed hi m that
Bri tai n had embarked on a campai gn that was in the process of
costi ng her more than 200, 000 casual ti es. Thus i t failed to gras p the
essential fact that Bri tai n' s general s and admi ral s were l osi ng the war
for her and that the country urgentl y needed not less but more
civilian control of the mi l i tary.
Th e political worl d i n Bri tai n also failed to grasp another essential
fact: the war in the Eas t was not merel y bei ng lost by the Allies, it
was bei ng won by the other si de. Th e resul ts of the campai gn were a
reflection of the fact that the courage and tenacity of the Aust ral i an,
162
New Zeal and, Bri ti sh, and French sol di ery was bei ng mat ched by
the courage and tenacity of their Ot t oman opponent s.
I I
Ll oyd George had brought about the creati on of this first coalition
government , whi ch excl uded Churchi l l f rom a major Cabi net po-
sition. He cl ai med that "he had fought to get Winston high office . . .
Hi s col l eagues woul d not, however, agree to Winston's havi ng any-
thi ng but a mi nor posi t i on. "
4
Ll oyd George was aware, however,
that a hurt and angry Churchi l l pl aced the bl ame on hi m.
5
Churchi l l ' s
wife, even years later, spoke bitterly of the Chancel l or as a J uda s
whose "Welsh tri cki ness" had shattered the Fi rst Lord' s career; and
the Duke of Marl borough, Churchi l l ' s cousi n, sent a note on 24 May
sayi ng "Pro tern LG has done you i n. "
6
Churchi l l himself excl ai med:
"I am the victim of a political i ntri gue. I am finished!'"
Ll oyd George had al ways regarded the Ot t oman war as Churchi l l ' s
fault. In the spri ng of 1915 the Chancel l or took an even wider view
of his former protege' s fai l i ngs. When it became clear that Churchi l l
woul d have to leave the Admi ral t y, Ll oyd George comment ed: "It i s
the Nemes i s of the man who has fought for this war for years. When
the war came he saw in it the chance for gl ory for himself, & has
accordi ngl y entered on a ri sky campai gn without cari ng a straw for
the mi sery and hardshi p i t woul d bri ng to t housands, i n the hope
that he woul d prove to be the out st andi ng man m this war. "
21
THE LI GHT THAT FAILED
i
Th e Uni oni st - Conservat i ve members of the new Bri ti sh government
took office in the belief that their task woul d be to protect the
country' s mi l i tary l eadershi p f rom civilian interference. Havi ng suc-
ceeded i n removi ng Churchi l l f rom the Admi ral t y, they took i t that
the next i tem on the agenda shoul d be the defense of Lo r d Ki t chener
agai nst his pri nci pal adversary, the Li beral politician Ll oyd George.
Davi d Ll oyd George, the Chancel l or of the Exchequer, hel d the
distinction of havi ng been the first member of the Cabi net to quest i on
a deci si on of Fi el d Marshal Ki t chener' s after the latter became Sec-
retary of St at e for War. Once started on questi oni ng Ki t chener' s
j udgment s , Ll oyd George never s t opped. Avoi di ng the pitfall that
was Churchi l l ' s undoi ng at the Admi ral t y, the Li beral politician di d
not at first dare to chal l enge the field marshal on i ssues that were
strictly mi l i tary. Inst ead the Chancel l or of the Exchequer waged his
campai gn on grounds of his own choosi ng. Th e i ssue that he rai sed
was the short age of muni ti ons and other suppl i es. Invol vi ng quest i ons
of l abor, product i on, and finance, it was an i ssue regardi ng whi ch his
qualifications to speak were greater than Ki t chener' s.
On 19 May 1915, the day on whi ch formati on of the new govern-
ment was announced, Ll oyd George i naugurat ed the fi nal phases of a
campai gn that succeeded i n det achi ng the muni ti ons and suppl y
functi ons f rom Ki t chener' s War Office and pl aci ng t hem under hi m-
self as Mi ni ster of Muni t i ons. In hi s new mi ni stry he succeeded i n
starti ng to do what Ki t chener had not been abl e to do: expandi ng
civilian product i on of war materi al and finding new sources of suppl y.
The Uni oni st - Conservat i ve M. P. s who entered the new coalition
government began t o take another look at Ll oyd George and Lo r d
Ki t chener, whose quarrel they had prej udged. As Mi ni ster of
Muni t i ons, Ll oyd George became a t ornado twi sti ng with el emental
force t o dest roy the enemy. Th e Tori es came t o admi re and appl aud
his efforts. Bonar La w and his col l eagues had come into the Cabi net
to protect Ki t chener and the mi l i tary from interference by amateuri sh
Li beral civilians, but to their surpri se found themsel ves ranged
al ongsi de Ll oyd George i n quest i oni ng Ki tchener' s compet ence.
Th e i mmedi at e military deci si on faci ng the new government was
what to do about the Gal l i pol i expedi ti on. Th e War Counci l of the
Cabi net reconsti tuted itself as the Dardanel l es Commi t t ee, and held
its first meeti ng in Asqui t h' s rooms at the Hous e of Commons on 7
June 1915, to del i berate the matter. Thereaf t er i t met often. Th e
Tori es di scovered that the Secret ary of St at e for War di d not suppl y
them with the i nformati on they requi red in order to form a j udgment .
Ki t chener was secretive and rel uctant to di scl ose mi l i tary infor-
mati on to civilians. At ti mes he avoi ded answeri ng questi ons because
he was not fully and accuratel y i nf ormed. At ti mes he espoused
posi ti ons that were contradi ctory.
Bonar La w and his pri nci pal Tor y col l eague, the new Attorney-
General , Si r Edward Cars on, were inclined either to abandon the
venture or else to send enough rei nforcements to Gal l i pol i to ensure
success. Th e questi on was what level of rei nforcements woul d ensure
success, but Ki t chener woul d not say how many t roops the Tur ks
had at Gal l i pol i or how many Bri t i sh troops were needed i n order
to win. Inst ead he conti nued to talk in t erms of how many t roops
coul d be spared f rom the western front. In exasperati on, by early
Sept ember Carson was wri ti ng that "What I feel so acutely about is
that all our cal cul ati ons (if we can dignify t hem by that name) are
absol utel y haphazardwe are al ways told what we can send & not
how many are necessary . . . "
l
By quest i oni ng the War Office on one occasi on, mi ni sters found
that an i mportant piece of cabl ed i nformati on had been recei ved
there al though the War Mi ni ster deni ed all knowl edge of it. Ei ther
Ki t chener had forgotten the cabl e or had mi sunderst ood it. On 10
Downi ng Street stati onery, Cars on penned a note and passed i t al ong
the Cabi net tabl e t o Ll oyd Ge or ge : "K doesn't read the t el egrams &
we don't see t hemi t is i nt ol erabl e. "
2
Cars on began cross- exami ni ng Ki t chener i n Cabi net meet i ngs as
though he were an accused cri mi nal i n the dock. Th e fi el d marshal ' s
evasi veness, combi ned with hopeful predi cti ons f rom Si r Ian
Hami l t on that never seemed to be fulfilled, brought the Tor y l eaders
to frustrati on and despai r. Typi cal comment s duri ng sessi ons of the
Dardanel l es Commi t t ee were " S I R E. CARS ON sai d that the sl aughter
which had gone on was no success, and i nqui red if it were to be
conti nued" and " MR . BONAR L AW asked i f Si r Ian Hami l t on was t o
conti nue attacki ng when such action was obvi ousl y hopel ess. "
3
Th e questi on of what to do dragged on into the late aut umn.
Cabi net opi ni on began to harden in favor of wi thdrawal from
Gal l i pol i ; for Ki t chener failed to offer an alternative that promi sed
T H E L I G H T T H A T F A I L E D 165
success. Ki t chener di ssent ed, argui ng that Bri tai n shoul d sol di er on.
He cl ai med that "abandonment woul d be the most di sast rous event
in the history of the Empi r e , " t hough he admi t t ed that he "would
like to l i qui date the si t uat i on. "
4
Th e Cabi net was unwi l l i ng to order a wi thdrawal from Gal l i pol i
wi thout Lo r d Ki t chener' s sancti on, the more so as the commander
on the spot, Si r Ian Hami l t on, remai ned hopeful . On the Gal l i pol i
beaches the si tuati on was desperat e, and Wyndham Deedes , the
officer who had warned Ki t chener agai nst the Dardanel l es adventure
but who was servi ng there, joi ned together with two other officers,
George Ll oyd and Guy Dawnay, t o do somet hi ng about it. The y
schemed to get one of their number sent back to London to tell the
Cabi net the truth about their si tuati on. Dawnay had the chance, and
seized it.
Back i n London, Dawnay saw Ki t chener and other Bri ti sh l eaders,
even i ncl udi ng the recently demot ed Churchi l l . He tri ed to get his
message through to t hem, but they were reluctant to accept the
unpal at abl e truth. Deedes had also gues s ed what Dawnay woul d
di scover, and told hi m s o: "And I bet the best you found was
Wi nston after al l !"
5
In the end, Ian Hami l t on was repl aced; and the new Bri ti sh
commander saw at once that the si tuati on was hopel ess and called for
an i mmedi at e evacuati on. But the Cabi net conti nued to hesi tate; the
probl em, as al ways, was Lo r d Ki t chener.
I I
In Ll oyd George' s vi vi d i mage, Ki t chener' s mi nd was pi ctured as the
movi ng, t urni ng turret of a l i ghthouse; but somewhere in the ragi ng
st orm of the Gal l i pol i campai gn the light had suddenl y gone out.
Th e f i el d marshal ' s col l eagues wai ted with growi ng anger and i m-
patience in the darkness for the powerful beam of light that never
agai n swung around to di spel the ni ght.
Even the To r y Bonar Law had come around so far as t o propose
that Ll oyd George shoul d repl ace Ki t chener at the War Office, but
the Pri me Mi ni ster resi sted the proposal . Onl y the inner group i n the
government was aware of the field marshal ' s fai l i ngs; he retai ned his
following in the country, and Asqui t h felt that to repl ace hi m woul d
be politically i mpossi bl e. Th e Pri me Mi ni ster' s typical sol uti on was
to send Ki t chener out to the Dardanel l es on a fact-finding expedi ti on
in the hope that he woul d be detai ned there indefinitely.
In the event, once he went out and saw the battlefield himself,
Ki t chener felt compel l ed to agree that Gal l i pol i shoul d be abandoned.
Armed with Ki t chener' s approval , the Cabi net fi nal l y i ssued the
necessary authori zati on; and, at the begi nni ng of 1916, the evacu-
ati onwhi ch was far and away the most brilliant operati on of the
campai gnwas compl et ed. Deedes called the evacuati on "one of the
most remarkabl e thi ngs i n hi st ory. "
6
Ill
On 25 Apri l 1915, the Al l i es coul d have won an easy, bl oodl ess
victory by their surpri se attack; but 259 days later, when they
wi thdrew i n defeat f rom their last posi ti ons on the bl ood- soaked
beaches of the Dardanel l es, it emerged that they had lost one of the
costliest mi l i tary engagement s in hi story. Hal f a million sol di ers had
been engaged i n battle on each si de, and each had suffered a quart er
of a million casual ti es.
It was a deci si ve battl e, in that the Al l i es coul d have won it, and,
with it, the Mi ddl e East ern warbut di d not. It f oreshadowed, too,
thi ngs to come; a s uppos edl y backward Asi an army had defeated a
modern European one.
It had the effect of drawi ng Europe into Mi ddl e East ern affai rs on
a l ong-term basi s. Th e mi l i tary i nvol vement which Ki t chener had
feared but failed to prevent was s us pended temporari l y by the Al l i ed
evacuati on, but woul d resume a year later. More i mport ant , the
setback to Al l i ed fortunes drove Bri tai n both in a specific and a
general sense to involve herself more deepl y i n Mi ddl e East ern
affai rs. In a specific sense, as will be seen presentl y, it drove
Ki t chener' s l i eutenants to ally themsel ves with a Mi ddl e Eas t ern
ruler they bel i eved coul d hel p to save Si r Ian Hami l ton' s armi es at
Gal l i pol i f rom peri shi ng. And i n a general sense, the sheer magni t ude
of Bri tai n' s commi t ment and loss at Gal l i pol i made it seem vital years
later that she shoul d pl ay a maj or role in the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t to
gi ve some sort of meani ng to so great a sacrifice.
IV
On 18 November 1915, havi ng resi gned as Chancel l or of the Duchy
of Lancas t er, Wi nston Churchi l l crossed over to France to serve, at
his own request , as an army officer on the western front. Th e
political worl d conti nued to pl ace the bl ame for Gal l i pol i on hi m. In
the Cabi net , however, Ki t chener was bl amed too; and Ki t chener
knew it.
Lo r d Ki t chener was aware that his Cabi net col l eagues hoped he
woul d not return f rom his tri p to the Dardanel l es, but del i beratel y
di sappoi nt ed t hem. On returni ng to London at the end of 1915, he
T H E L I G H T T H A T F A I L E D 167
spoke frankly with the Pri me Mi ni ster about his l oss of s upport
within the Cabi net , and offered to resi gn. When an accept abl e re-
pl acement coul d not be f ound for hi m, he adopt ed a different ap-
proach. With the Pri me Mi ni ster' s approval , he arranged for a basi c
change in the nature of the posi ti on he hel d as War Mi ni ster, reduc-
ing the powers and responsi bi l i ti es of the j ob. A fighting sol di er f rom
the western front, Fi el d Marshal Si r William Robert son, was then
brought into office as Chief of the Imperi al General Staff with
widely expanded powers that until then had fallen within Ki t chener' s
domai n as War Mi ni ster.
Yet Ki t chener retai ned authori ty in formul ati ng political policy for
the Mi ddl e Eas t . When he returned to London at the end of 1915,
his aide Si r Mark Sykes also returned to London f rom a l ong fact-
fi ndi ng tri p, bri ngi ng with hi m exci ti ng news of a Mi ddl e East ern
ruler who mi ght ally himself with Bri tai n, and a revol uti onary
program on the basi s of that alliance for t urni ng the tide in the
Ot t oman war a program that Ki t chener was t o pus h t hrough the
Cabi net .
22
CREATING THE ARAB BUREAU
i
In the winter of 191516, as the Allies pl anned and executed their
evacuati on of Gal l i pol i and as Lo r d Ki t chener took a lesser role in
the conduct of the war, Bri ti sh pol i cy in the Mi ddl e Eas t took a new
t urn: Ki t chener and his col l eagues began to focus i n an organi zed
way on the uses Bri tai n mi ght make of di scontented Arab l eaders and
sol di ers within the Ot t oman Empi r e . The y acted on the basi s of
recommendat i ons brought back f rom the Eas t by Si r Mark Sykes,
Ki tchener' s personal l y appoi nt ed Mi ddl e East expert. Sykes was
returni ng home from a l ong mi ssi on of i nqui ry into how the Allies
shoul d deal with the defeated Mi ddl e Ea s t a mi ssi on wi thout much
urgency after Turkey' s victory at Gal l i pol i .
Projects often devel op a moment um of their own: in the winter of
1915 the Bri ti sh naval attack on the Dardanel l es had gone forward
even after the Russi an probl em it was meant to alleviate had been
sol ved, and when the winter was over the pl anni ng of how to carve
up the Mi ddl e East went forward even t hough Churchi l l ' s expected
conquest of Const ant i nopl ewhi ch was the reason for doi ng the
pl anni nghad not materi al i zed.
After the de Bunsen commi t t eewhi ch Si r Mark Sykes had
gui deds ubmi t t ed its report on the postwar Mi ddl e East on 30 June
1915, the Bri ti sh government sent Sykes out to the East to di scuss
the commi ttee' s recommendat i ons with officers and officials on the
spot . He traveled to the Bal kans, to Egypt twice (on the way out and
on the way back) , to the Persi an Gul f, to Mesopot ami a, and to
Indi a. It was a maj or undert aki ng; Sykes' s journey lasted half a year.
It gave hi m a uni que exposure to a range of different poi nts of view,
but it was al most 1916 before he was abl e to meet with Cabi net
members i n London to tell t hem i n person what he had l earned.
In his first st op in Cai roon the way out, in the s ummer of
1915Sykes met with Ki t chener' s Mi ddl e East advi sers i n Egypt .
Ronal d St orrs , whom he had known before the war, i ntroduced hi m
168
C R E A T I N G T H E A R A B B U R E A U 169
to Gi l bert Cl ayt on. Rel i gi on f ormed an i nstant bond: Cl ayton was a
devout Chri st i an whose seri ousness i mpressed Sykes deepl y. The y
became fri ends as well as col l eagues, al though Sykes was . more open
in his deal i ngs with Cl ayton than Cl ayt on was in ret urn.
Sykes was i ntroduced by his fri ends to Arabi c- speaki ng person-
alities of engagi ngl y pro- Bri t i sh vi ews, and became an advocate of
Cl ayton' s view that Syri a shoul d become Bri ti sh. He was led by
Cl ayton and St orrs to believe that the popul ati ons of the regi on
woul d wel come such a devel opment . France coul d be gi ven compen-
sation el sewhere, he sai d; and, i n any event, the only groups i n
France that wanted Syri a were clerics or promot ers of commerci al
concessi ons.
1
Attracted by the pl an espoused at that ti me by his
fri ends and by Wi ngate for the Sheri f Hussei n to be el evated to the
cal i phate, a plan that accorded perfectly with his own view that the
cal i phate shoul d be moved sout h, Sykes was won over to the St orrs
"Egypt i an Empi re" scheme. Thi s proposed a si ngl e Arabi c- speaki ng
entity, under the spi ri tual rule of the Sheri f and the nomi nal t emporal
rule of the fi gurehead monarch of Egypt , to be governed f rom Cai ro
by the Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi s s i onerwho was to be Lo r d Ki t chener.
There was, however, a current of opi ni on in Cai ro that Sykes
found di st urbi ng: the talk of rivalry between Bri tai n and France in
the Mi ddl e Eas t . Sykes di d not believe that there were any seri ous
grounds for di sagreement between the two warti me allies; he t hought
that France di d not really care about Syri a, and coul d be i nduced to
look elsewhere for her share of the wi nni ngs. Hi s assumpt i on was
that the talk of rivalry was i nspi red by enemy propagandi st s. Onl y
many mont hs later di d he learn that the ant i - French talk ( and more
than talk) came f rom some of his own fri ends i n Cai ro; and he never
learned that one of the ri ngl eaders of the group was his friend
Gi l bert Cl ayt on.
I I
In Indi a, at the opposi t e political pol e, Sykes found a recepti on that
was less than cordi al . He was a young man, halfway t hrough his first
year i n his first government al j ob, and he had come out f rom London
to tell Indi a about the Eas t . Th e man he had come to see was two
decades his senior, had spent a lifetime in government servi ce, and
was one of Bri tai n' s most di sti ngui shed foreign policy professi onal s.
Charl es Hardi nge, a former ambas s ador to Russi a, had been the
career official in charge of the Forei gn Office before comi ng out to
Indi a as Vi ceroy. As Governor- General , he served in a family tra-
dition that harked back to the previ ous century; his grandf at her had
been Governor- General of Indi a in the 1840s, the decade before the
Muti ny. Hardi nge' s policy was for Indi a to occupy and annex
Mesopot ami a, and his view of Cai ro' s proposal s was that they were
"absolutely fantasti c" and "perfectly fatal . " He rejected the notion of
Arab i ndependence, however nomi nal ; he wrote that "Sykes does not
seem to be abl e to gras p the fact that there are part s of Turkey unfit
for representati ve i nsti tuti ons. "
2
More inclined than ever to s upport Cai ro agai nst Si ml a, Sykes also
came to believe that the conflict in views and in juri sdi cti ons was
harmful in itself. He argued that "our traditional way of letting
vari ous offices run their own shows, which was allright in the past
when such sectors dealt with varyi ng probl ems which were not
rel ated, but it is bad now that each sector is deal i ng in reality with a
common enemy. "
3
The r e was no central pol i cy: Si ml a, Cai ro, the
Forei gn Office, the War Office, and the Admi ral t y each ran its own
operati on, as di d officials in the field, each worki ng in i gnorance of
what the others were doi ng, and often at cross- purposes. Th e ob-
stacl es in the way of arri vi ng at a pol i cy were f ormi dabl e: Sykes once
counted eighteen agenci es that woul d have to be consul ted before an
agreed deci si on coul d be reached.
4
Duri ng the course of his tri p, Sykes expl ored the i dea of establ i sh-
i ng an overall bureau to as s ume charge of Arab affai rs. Cai ro was
enthusi asti c; on 13 December 1915, Cl ayt on reported that he had
started to assembl e the nucl eus of a Near Eas t Office and hoped that
Sykes woul d press forward with the proj ect .
s
Ret urni ng to London
at the end of 1915, Sykes di d press forward by proposi ng the creation
of a central agency to coordi nate pol i cy: an Arab Bureau, to be
establ i shed i n Cai ro under his own di recti on. Th e new Secret ary for
Indi a, Aust en Chamberl ai n, at the s ame ti me urged the creati on of
an Isl ami c Bureau, to combat sedi ti ous enemy propaganda i n Indi a,
Persi a, and Af ghani st an. The Viceroy of Indi a, i n response, made i t
clear that he opposed the creati on of any bureau that pl anned to
i ntrude into areas within his juri sdi cti on, especially if Sykes and his
fri ends were to be in charge. Earl y in January 1916 Asqui t h ordered
an i nterdepartmental conference to consi der the creation of an Isl ami c
Bureau.
At the conference, agreement was reached to accept the Sykes
proposal , but with a maj or modi fi cati on that cut the subst ance out of
it. Th e Arab Bureau (as i t was to be cal l ed) was not to be a separat e
body, but merel y a section of the Cai ro Intel l i gence Depart ment .
Thi s was i nsi sted on by Ki t chener (represented by Fi t zGeral d) and
by the Forei gn Office; they di d not i ntend to surrender the control
they exerci sed over Bri ti sh pol i cy. Cai ro was authori zed to establ i sh
and staff a new entity; but a central agency to take charge of overall
policy was not creat edand that had been the poi nt of the Sykes
C R E A T I N G T H E A R A B B U R E A U 171
proposal . Th e vari ous depart ment s of government conti nued t o make
and carry out their i ndependent and often conflicting pol i ci es. Th e
l eadi ng role conti nued to be pl ayed by Ki t chener, to whom the
Forei gn Secret ary deferred. Sykes conti nued to make pol i cy only as a
representati ve of Ki t chener, and not in his own right as chief of an
i ndependent agency; Ki t chener, who di d not wish to rel i nqui sh
control , i nsi sted that the si tuati on shoul d remai n that way.
Th e head of Naval Intel l i gence quest i oned the desi rabi l i ty of
creati ng the new bureau i n Cai ro al ong the lines that Sykes and
Cl ayton propos ed; t o pl acate hi m, his candi dat e, Davi d G. Hogart h,
an Oxf ord archaeol ogi st servi ng as a Naval Intel l i gence officer, was
named to be its head. Hogart h was a shadowy figure who had worked
with Bri ti sh intelligence agenci es before the war.
Hogart h repl aced the acti ng head of the Arab Bureau, Al fred
Parker, a career army officer who was Ki tchener' s nephew. Fr o m the
outset Hogart h worked directly under Cl ayt on, whose pri nci pal vi ews
he seems to have shared. Unde r Hogart h, the bureau fought to assert
the views of Wi ngate and Cl ayt onwho wanted to expand Bri ti sh
Egypt ' s control of the Arab worl das agai nst those of the Forei gn
Office and the Government of Indi a.
An even- t empered, low-keyed officer of the Sudan government
named Ki nahan Cornwal l i s became Hogart h' s deput y, and Wingate's
secretary, an officer named G. S. Syme s , came over t o the Arab
Bureau from the Sudan. Phi l i p Graves , a former Times correspond-
ent, also joi ned the bureau; and Hogart h brought i n Tho ma s Edward
( "T. E. ") Lawrence, a young man who had worked for hi m at the
Ashmol ean Mus e um i n Oxf ord and over whose career he had presi ded
ever si nce. Lawrence was later to win renown as "Lawrence of
Arabi a. "
At the begi nni ng Cl ayton di d not have an expert i n Turki s h
af f ai rsand i n wagi ng an intelligence war agai nst Turkey that was
an evi dent di sadvant age. The n he had a stroke of luck. On 10
December 1915, Wyndham Deedes who had served i n the Ot t oman
Gendarmeri e before the wararri ved i n Cai ro from Gal l i pol i ; i n
early January Cl ayton succeeded i n co-opti ng hi m as deput y head of
Egypt i an Intel l i gence, where his knowl edge of Turki s h affai rs proved
an i nval uabl e asset.
Soon Cai ro was bust l i ng with young Members of Parl i ament and
others ambi t i ous to have a say in Mi ddl e East ern policy, revol vi ng
around the Arab Bureau. Among t hem were Aubrey Herbert , M. P. ,
and George Ll oyd, M. P. , both Mark Sykes' s fri ends f rom before the
Lawrence worked closely with the Arab Bureau, but was not officially posted to
it until the end of 1916.
war. At last Cai ro had become a center of Bri ti sh pol i cy- maki ng for
the Mi ddl e Eas t ; and Cl ayton had the sati sfacti on of knowi ng that i n
London the real makers of Bri tai n' s Mi ddl e East policy were Cai ro' s
l eader, Lo r d Ki t chener, and his representati ve, Mark Sykes .
23
MAKING PROMISES TO THE
ARABS
i
When Sykes returned f rom the Eas t at the end of 1915, he brought
back to London somet hi ng more i mmedi atel y startl i ng and of more
l asti ng i mport ance than his i dea of creati ng an Arab Bureau. What he
brought was news of a myst eri ous young Arab who cl ai med that he
and his fri ends coul d hel p Bri tai n win the war. Th e young man' s
name was Muhamme d Shari f al - Faruqi .
Not hi ng was known of al - Faruqi then; and little i s known of hi m
now. He emerged f rom obscuri ty i n the aut umn of 1915, and held
the attention of the Bri ti sh government well into 1916, before sl i ppi ng
back into obscuri t y and dyi ng young, killed on a road in I raq in 1920
duri ng a tribal rai d. Duri ng his mont hs in the spotl i ght in 191516,
he directly or indirectly led Bri tai n to promi s e concessi ons to France,
Russi a, Arabs , and others i n the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t . As mi ddl eman
between Bri t i sh officials and Arab l eaders, he was either mi sunder-
stood or else mi srepresent ed each to the other. One can only gues s at
his moti ves. To the twenti eth-century Mi ddl e Eas t , he left a l egacy
of mi sunderst andi ng that ti me has not yet entirely di ssi pat ed.
I I
The background t o the astoni shi ng al - Faruqi epi sode was the quasi -
agreement Lo r d Ki t chener had reached with the Emi r Hussei n of
Mecca at the outset of the war. As noted earlier, Lo r d Ki t chener,
regardi ng the Emi r Hussei n as a spi ri tual rather than a materi al
force, * had initiated a correspondence with hi m in the aut umn of
* Reginald Wingate, who governed the Sudan, was alone among Kitchener's
followers in believing from the very outset of the Ottoman war that Hussein could
be of military assistance to Britain.
173
1914 that had been concl uded on t erms sati sfactory to both men.
Hussei n* was to do nothi ng for the moment ; he woul d not use his
spi ri tual presti ge agai nst Bri tai n i n the Ot t oman war (as Ki t chener
had feared he mi ght do) and, at some future poi nt, he woul d use i t i n
favor of Bri tai n (as Ki t chener hoped he woul d do when the war was
over and Bri ti sh rivalry with Rus s i a res umed) .
Mat t ers havi ng been settled early in 1915, the Bri ti sh Resi dency in
Cai ro was surpri sed to receive another letter from Hussei n half a year
later, i n the s ummer of 1915, suddenl y demandi ngwi t hout expl a-
nati onthat al most all of Arab As i a shoul d become an i ndependent
ki ngdom under his rul e. ( As i ndi cated earlier, Bri ti sh officials were
unaware that Hussei n woul d underst and that they were offeri ng hi m
a ki ngdom when they suggest ed that he shoul d become the Ar ab
cal i ph; and i t was the ki ngdom, not the cal i phate, that t empt ed hi m
at the t i me. )
Hussei n' s unexpect ed demand, comi ng without expl anati on after
mont hs of silence, aroused wonder and mi rth i n Bri ti sh Cai ro. An
amus ed Ronal d St orrs comment ed that Hussei n ought to be satisfied
to be al l owed to keep the provi nce of the Hej az. St orrs comment ed
that Hussei n "knows he is demandi ng, possi bl y as a basi s of nego-
ti ati ons, far more than he has the ri ght, the hope, or the power to
expect. "
1
Si r Henry Mc Mahon, the Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi ssi oner i n
Egypt , not wi shi ng to di scourage Hus s ei n, gently repl i ed to hi m that
di scussi on of Mi ddl e East ern fronti ers ought to be post poned until
the end of the war.
But Hussei n' s s udden demand for an i ndependent Arab ki ngdom
was by no means the unreasonabl e act that it appeared to be at the
ti me i n Cai ro. Unbeknownst to Mc Mahon and St orrs, what had
happened i n Mecca was that i n Januar y 1915 Hussei n had di scovered
written evi dence that the Ot t oman government was pl anni ng to
depose hi m at the end of the warand i ndeed had post poned depos-
i ng hi m only because of the comi ng of the war .
2
He prompt l y sent
his son Fei sal to see the Gr and Vizier i n Const ant i nopl e, but l earned
that there was little chance of persuadi ng the Porte to reverse this
deci si on.
Th e Young Tur k pl an t o depose hi m forced Hussei n, agai nst his
inclinations, to consi der oppos i ng Turkey i n the war. Feari ng that
to do so mi ght isolate hi m i n the Arab worl d, Hussei n sent Fei sal
to Damas c us to s ound out the possi bi l i ty of obtai ni ng support
from the Ar ab secret societies headquart ered there. In carryi ng
out this mi ssi on, Fei sal st opped in Damas c us twi ce: en route to
Hussein ibn Ali, the Sherif of Mecca and its Emir, is referred to variously as
Hussein, the Sherif, the Sherif Hussein, the Emi r Hussein and, later, Ki ng Hussein.
He is also referred to as the ruler of the Hejaz and, later, as Ki ng of the Hejaz.
M A K I N G P R O M I S E S T O T H E A R A B S 175
Const ant i nopl e to see the Gr and Vizier, and agai n on his way back
from Const ant i nopl e afterwards.
On his first st op i n Damas c us , i n late March 1915, Fei sal was told
that there were three Ot t oman army di vi si ons with mai nl y Arab
sol di ers concentrated i n the Damas c us area, and that the secret
society conspi rat ors bel i eved that these di vi si ons woul d follow their
l ead. Though they talked of l eadi ng a revolt agai nst Turkey, the
members of the secret societies al so expressed reservati ons about
doi ng so. For one thi ng, most of t hem bel i eved Germany woul d soon
win the war; they were bound to ask themsel ves why they shoul d
join the l osi ng si de. For another, as between the Ot t oman Empi re
and the European Al l i es, they preferred to be rul ed by Mos l em
Tur ks than by European Chri st i ans.
Al t hough evi dence of what they were pl anni ng is scanty, the secret
societies apparent l y were inclined to set up a bi ddi ng competi ti on
between Bri tai n and Tur ke y for Arab loyalties. The y advi sed Hussei n
(through Fei sal ) not to join the Allies unl ess Bri tai n pl edged to
support i ndependence for most of Arab western Asi a. With such a
Bri ti sh pl edge i n hand, the secret soci eti es coul d then have asked the
Ot t oman Empi re to mat ch it.
After his meet i ngs i n Damas c us , Fei sal proceeded to Const ant i nopl e
to meet with the Gr and Vizier. When he returned to Damas c us on
23 May 1915, on his way home, he f ound the situation consi derabl y
changed. Dj emal Pasha, the Tur ki s h governor of Syri a, had scented
an Arab plot and taken st eps to s mas h it. He had crushed the secret
societies, arresti ng many of the ri ngl eaders and di spersi ng others. He
had broken up the three Arab army di vi si ons, and had sent many of
their officers away to Gal l i pol i and el sewhere.
3
A handful of the remai ni ng conspi rat orssi x men accordi ng to
one account, nine accordi ng to anot her
4
now told Fei sal that they
coul d no l onger initiate a revolt agai nst the Ot t oman Empi r e ; Hussei n
shoul d do it, and they woul d follow himif Hussei n coul d first
i nduce the Bri ti sh to pl edge support for Arab i ndependence.
Th e men of the secret societies had drafted a document defining
the territories that were to be Arab and i ndependent. Th e document
was called the Damas c us Protocol . Fei sal brought i t back from
Damas c us to Mecca. It set forth the demands that the Emi r Hussei n
was to submi t to Bri tai n. Hussei n had nothi ng to l ose i n maki ng the
demands . Doi ng so woul d help hi m obtai n support f rom the secret
soci eti esfor whatever that mi ght be worthwhen he l aunched his
revolt; it woul d also stake his cl ai m to l eadershi p in Arabi an and
Arab pol i ti cs, and woul d help to justi fy his support of Chri st i ans
agai nst Mos l em Tur ke y. So i n the s ummer of 1915 he sent his letter
i ncorporati ng the Damas c us Protocol demands to the Bri ti sh
Resi dency i n Cai ro, where the de mands as has been seenwere not
taken seri ousl y.
I I I
Li eut enant Muhamme d Shari f al - Faruqi , a 24-year-ol d Arab Ot t oman
staff officer from Mos ul (in what is now I raq) , was a secret soci ety
member stati oned i n Damas c us at the ti me of Fei sal ' s first st op there
i n early 1915. He may have been among those who met with Fei sal
there at that t i me; if not, he learned what had been sai d from
col l eagues who had at t ended the meeti ng.
Al - Faruqi was one of the secret society officers ordered out of
Damas c us and sent by Dj emal Pasha to the Gal l i pol i front, where
casual ti es were hi gh. Sendi ng suspect ed Arab pl otters to the front
lines to be killed l ooked to be a del i berate policy of Dj emal ' s in
crushi ng sedi ti on. On the other hand, there were valid mi l i tary
reasons for sendi ng t roops to rei nforce the Gal l i pol i front where the
Ot t oman regi me was fighting for survi val . Al - Faruqi may have s us -
pected, but coul d not have been sure, that his post i ng to Gal l i pol i
showed that Dj emal suspect ed hi m of treason.
Al - Faruqi kept in touch with secret soci ety officers who remai ned
i n Damas c us . Fr o m t hem he l earned further details of what Fei sal
and Hus s ei n were doi ng. He l earned that the remnant of the secret
societies i n Damas c us had encouraged Hussei n to lead an Ar ab revolt
agai nst the Ot t oman Empi r e i f Bri tai n woul d first agree to s upport
the Damas c us Protocol : the secret soci ety program for Arab i ndepend-
ence. He l earned, too, that Hussei n had i n fact written to the
Bri ti sh i n Cai ro i n the s ummer of 1915 i ncorporati ng the Damas c us
Protocol in his letter and presenti ng it as his own set of demands for
his establ i shment as monarch of an Arab ki ngdom compri si ng al most
all of Arab western Asi a.
In the aut umn of 1915, Li eut enant al - Faruqi deserted the Ot t oman
forces at Gal l i pol i and crossed over to Al l i ed lines. He cl ai med to
have i mportant i nformati on for Bri ti sh Intel l i gence i n Cai ro, and was
prompt l y sent to Egypt for i nterrogati on. Perhaps he feared that
Dj emal was about to obtai n proof of his membershi p i n the anti-
Turki s h conspi racy, and deci ded to escape while there was ti me.
Perhaps he hoped to win gl ory by pl ayi ng a lone hand in world
politics. Whatever his moti ves, he acted on an i mpul se of his own:
nobody had entrusted hi m with a mi ssi on.
Al - Faruqi spoke little Engl i sh, and it is difficult to tell f rom the
f ragment ary historical record the extent to which he was correctl y
underst ood or the extent to which words were put in his mout h by
those who wanted to hear what they cl ai med he sai d. Under in-
terrogati on by Bri ti sh Intel l i gence officials, the young officer cl ai med
to be a member of the secret Arab mi l i tary society al - Ahd. He
invoked the name of its l eadi ng figure stati oned in Damas c us ,
General Yasi n al - Hashi mi , Chi ef of Staff of the Ot t oman 12th
Di vi si on, and al though al - Faruqi admi t t ed that "I am not authori zed
to di scuss with you officially" the proposal s of al -' Ahd, the young
deserter pret endedf or whatever reasont o be a spokesman for the
organi zati on and was accepted as such by Gi l bert Cl ayt on, the head
of Bri ti sh Intel l i gence i n Cai r o.
5
Tho ug h his story was unverified,
Bri ti sh Intel l i gence bel i eved i t and di d not i nvesti gate further. He
was not in fact a representati ve of al -' Ahd or i ndeed of any other
gr oup: Cl ayton had been duped.
What gave pl ausi bi l i ty to al - Faruqi ' s cl ai m to represent al -' Ahd
was t hat f rom his col l eagues i n Damas c us he knew the detai l s of
the Bri ti sh correspondence with Sheri f Hussei n and knew about the
demands that Hussei n had sent to Cai ro i n the s ummer of 1915.
Al - Faruqi , purport edl y speaki ng for the Arab army officers i n
Damas c us , demanded that Bri tai n gi ve a pl edge to support an i nde-
pendent Arab state within the frontiers that Hussei n had outl i ned.
When he di d so the pi eces suddenl y seemed to fall into pl ace for
Bri ti sh Intel l i gence. Cl ayton gras ped the essential fact i t was no
coi nci dence that the two sets of demands were identical and that
both were the s ame as those that al - Mas ri t he founder of al - ' Ahd
and other Arab exiles i n Cai ro had been maki ng si nce the outset of
the war. If the secret societies were backi ng Hussei n, the Emi r of
Mecca was no longer to be thought of as representi ng merel y his
section of the Arabi an peni nsul a. For if the Arab secret societies
were as powerful as al - Faruqi represented t hem to be and as Cl ayt on
erroneousl y i magi ned t hem to be, Hus s ei n woul d be speaki ng for
hundreds of t housands of Ot t oman t roops and mi l l i ons of Ot t oman
subj ect s.
Al - Faruqi warned Cl ayt on and his col l eagues that they mus t reply
to Hussei n i mmedi atel y. Accordi ng to al - Faruqi , the Bri ti sh had to
guarant ee the i ndependence of the Arabi c- speaki ng Mi ddl e East i f
they wanted al -' Ahd to lead an Arab ri si ng within the Ot t oman
Empi re. Presenti ng an ul t i mat um, the young man gave Bri tai n only a
few weeks to accept the offer; otherwi se, he sai d, the Arab movement
woul d throw all of its s upport behi nd Germany and the Ot t oman
Empi re.
Cai ro was sei zed with exci tement. Ronal d St orrs wrote to
Fi t zGeral d/ Ki t chener on 10 Oct ober 1915, that "The Arab quest i on
i s reachi ng an acute s t at e. "
6
At about the s ame ti me Cl ayton com-
posed a me mor andum outl i ni ng his conversati ons with al - Faruqi
for General Maxwel l , the Bri ti sh army commander i n Egypt , who
urgently cabl ed Ki t chener on 12 Oct ober that a "powerful organi -
sati on" exi sted behi nd enemy lines, that Hussei n' s proposal s had
actually come from that organi zati on, and that unl ess agreement
were reached with it, the Arabs woul d go over to the enemy.
7
Ki tchener' s followers i n Cai ro apparentl y bel i eved that an Arab
* A curious assertion, since the Arabs were already in the enemy camp.
IV
Cl ayton, who was strongl y di sposed to oppos e French cl ai ms to the
interior of Syri a (on a line that runs from Al eppo to Damas c us
through Horns and Ha ma ) , reported that al - Faruqi sai d Hussei n
woul d never allow France to have Al eppo, Horns, Hama, and
Damas c us . Whether Cl ayt on was quot i ng, mi squot i ng, or para-
phrasi ng what al - Faruqi actual l y tol d hi m may never be known.
Cl ayton recogni zed that France coul d not be excl uded from the coast
rebellion woul d enabl e t hem to save the Al l i ed armi es who were
fighting for their lives at the edges of the Gal l i pol i peni nsul a in the
Dardanel l es. The Bri ti sh army commander at Gal l i pol i was Ian
Hami l t on, a Ki t chener prot ege, and Ki t chener' s Cai ro followers may
well have been i n touch with hi m to hel p t hem persuade the rel uctant
Hi gh Commi ssi oner i n Egypt , Si r Henry McMahon, to meet the
Arab demands . That they di d so i s suggest ed by a statement made
by Mc Mahon a year later, di savowi ng responsi bi l i ty for the (by then
unsuccessf ul ) Arab Revol t. Accordi ng t o McMahon,
It was the most unfortunate date in my life when I was left in
charge of the Arab movement and I think a few words are
necessary to expl ai n that it is nothi ng to do with me : it is purel y
military busi ness. It began at the urgent request of Si r Ian
Hami l t on at Gal l i pol i . I was begged by the Forei gn Office to
take i mmedi at e action and draw the Arabs out of the war. At
that moment a large porti on of the forces at Gal l i pol i and nearly
the whole of the force i n Mes opot ami a were Arabs . . .
8
While urgentl y pl eadi ng with London for authori zati on to meet al-
Faruqi ' s demands , the Resi dency report ed that those demands were
open to negoti ati on: the young Arab woul d make concessi ons where
necessary. In the weeks and mont hs that followed, al - Faruqi suc-
ceeded in remai ni ng at the center of the di al ogue. In what was
becomi ng a great hoax, the young man drew and redrew the frontiers
of countri es and empi res, in the course of exchanges among the
Bri ti sh Resi dency, the Emi r of Mecca, and Arab nationalist l eaders,
each of whom took al - Faruqi to be the emi ssary of one of the other
parti es. Al - Faruqi i ntroduced himself in a letter to Hussei n as an al-
'Ahd member who had the ear of the Bri ti sh, while in Cai ro he
purport ed to negoti ate for Hus s ei n. Fei sal tried to di scover the
identity of the myst eri ous Arab who had become so i mportant i n
Cai ro, but learned only his name, which told hi m nothi ng: "I di d not
know hi m, " Fei sal wrote in a report to Hus s e i n.
9
of Syri a- Lebanon, where Chri st i ans under French pat ronage re-
si ded; and agai n he report ed that al - Faruqi fell i n with his vi ews, and
seemed willing, i n Hussei n' s name, to surrender Arab cl ai ms i n that
area. Al - Faruqi i nformed Hussei n that he had been asked to make
such a concessi onand had refused.
Bas ed on Cl ayton' s report s, the Hi gh Commi ssi oner, Si r Henry
McMahon, in a cabl e to the Forei gn Office quot ed al - Faruqi as
sayi ng that the Emi r of Mecca woul d not insist on mai ntai ni ng his
original demand that hi s western frontier shoul d extend to the sea,
but that he woul d oppos e "by force of arms " any French at t empt to
occupy the di stri cts of Al eppo, Horns, Hama, and Da ma s c u s .
1 0
McMahon and Cl ayt on wanted authori zati on to accept these t erms.
But the geographi cal references made by McMahon were hazy.
Was reference made, for exampl e, to the city of Damas c us , the
envi rons of Damas c us , or the provi nce of Damas c us ? Di d "di stri cts"
mean wilayahs (envi rons) or vilayets ( provi nces) ? Was it al - Faruqi
who spoke of di stri cts, or was i t Mc Mahon or Cl ayton? By di stri cts,
di d the Bri ti sh mean towns?
Th e significance of the Al e ppo- Homs - Hama- Damas c us demand
has been bitterly debat ed ever si nce. For decades afterward part i sans
of an Arab Pal esti ne argued that if these four geographi cal t erms
were properl y underst ood, Bri ti sh Cai ro had promi sed that Pal esti ne
woul d be Ar ab; while parti sans of a Jewi sh Pal esti ne argued the
reverse. In a sense the debate was poi ntl ess; as will be seen, when
the ti me came to make pl edges, Mc Mahon del i beratel y used phrases
so devi ous as to commi t himself to nothi ng at all.
If Cl ayt on was the author of the Al e ppo- Homs - Hama- Damas c us
geographi cal definition, he was probabl y thi nki ng of Syri a and
Lebanon and of how to split off the interior of the country from the
French-i nfl uenced coast. Th e seacoast represented one of the two
north-south lines of civilization in Syri a; the four towns represented
the other. Si t uat ed between mount ai n and unrel i eved desert, they
defined the l ong narrow corri dor which was the agri cul tural l y culti-
vated regi on of inland Syri a. On the map of Syri a in the then-current
(1910) edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Damas c us , Al eppo,
Horns, and Ha ma are shown as the only towns of i nl and Syri a; so
they were the towns an Engl i shman mi ght specify if he sought to
define the terri tory of inland Syri a. Grant ed, the towns are di ssi mi l ar,
so that l eadi ng historians* have thought it illogical to group t hem
together; but to a reader of the Encyclopaedia the logic of groupi ng
them together woul d be evi dent.
The towns had another i mportant feature i n common: they consti -
tuted the rai l road line. Th e French- bui l t line of the Soci ete Ot t omane
* Professor Elie Kedouri e among them.
180 T H E M I D D L E E A S T E R N Q U A G MI R E
du Chemi n de Fer Da ma s - Ha ma et Prol ongement s, which was
opened in 1895, connected Al eppo in the north of Syri a to Damas c us
i n the s out h.
1 1
Damas c us , Al eppo, Horns, and Hama were its four
st ops. At Damas c us one made the connecti on with the Hej az rai l road,
which ran south to Medi na, connecti ng Syri a with Hussei n' s domai n.
Surel y this woul d have appeared to be of i mmense significance at the
t i me; and if al - Faruqi , not Cl ayt on, was the one who first menti oned
the four towns by name, surel y it was this that he had in mi nd.
In an era in which rai l roads were consi dered to be of pri me
mi l i tary and political i mport ance, any sol di er or politician represent-
ing Hussei n in a territorial negoti ati on woul d presumabl y have in-
si sted on gai ni ng control of the rai l road stati ons: not merel y of
Damas c us , as the metropol i s of the south, and of Al eppo, as the
metropol i s of the north, but also of the two rai l road towns that
connected t hem: Homs and Hama.
Recent experi ence di ctated the demand. Th e Young Tur ks (before
the war i ntervened) had pl anned to domi nat e the Hej az by control of
the railroad line runni ng from Damas c us down to the mai n cities of
the Hej az. It was only to be expected that if Hussei n were on the
wi nni ng si de of the war he woul d purs ue the mi rror opposi t e of their
strategy: he woul d domi nat e i nl and Syri a by control of its rai l road
line.
Whether or not they formul ated al - Faruqi ' s Al eppo- t o- Damas cus
demands , Cl ayt on and his fri ends were afrai d that other Bri ti sh
officials mi ght not underst and the i mport ance of meeti ng t hem.
Referri ng to Si r Mi l ne Cheet ham, his superi or at the Resi dency who
had been acti ng head until Mc Mahon arri ved, Ronal d St orrs wrote
to Fi t zGeral d/ Ki t chener at Chri s t mas i mpl ori ng t hem to gi ve priority
to the Arab negoti ati on and addi ng "Excus e my worryi ng you with
these difficulties, but if you knew the difficulty Cl ayton and I had all
last aut umn i n getti ng Si r Mi l ne to make any proposal about , or take
any interest in, the Arab quest i on, vou woul d underst and our
12
anxiety.
Cl ayton' s luck was that Si r Mark Syke s as menti oned earl i erhad
st opped in Cai ro agai n on his way back from Indi a to London in
November 1915. Havi ng told Sykes the al - Faruqi story, Cl ayton and
his col l eagues infected Sykes with their belief in the electrifying
possi bi l i ty that the Arab half of the Ot t oman Empi re mi ght come
over to the Allied si de of the war. Thi s was the amazi ng news that
greeted Sykes on his arri val , and that necessarily al tered all
cal cul ati ons.
That the Arabi c- speaki ng world coul d be a major factor in the war
came as especi al news to Sykes. Hi s view of politics in the area had
been that arrangement s were made between the rival foreign Great
Powers; the interests and aspi rati ons of native popul ati ons had not
M A K I N G P R O MI S E S T O T H E A R A B S 181
entered in any significant way into his cal cul ati ons. He had al ways
admi red the Turki s h- s peaki ng rul i ng cl ass but had not thought much
of the subject popul ati ons of the Ot t oman Empi re in Asi a. Hi s
undergraduat e descri pt i ons of t hem had been an exerci se in pejorati ve
vocabul ary.
Of town Arabs , he had written that they were "cowardl y, " "insolent
yet di spi cabl e [ si c] , " "vicious as far as their feeble bodi es will admi t . "
Bedoui n Arabs were "rapaci ous, greedy . . . ani mal s. "
l j
Yet these
were to be Bri tai n' s key allies in the Mi ddl e Eastern fighting, accord-
ing to the new i nformati on suppl i ed by Cl ayt on. Sykes, who had a
reputati on for pi cki ng up opi ni ons and argument s without taki ng the
ti me to think them t hrough, now showed that he coul d di scard them
with equal ease. He became a sudden convert to the cause of the
native peopl es of the Mi ddl e East .
Fr om school days onward, Sykes had harbored an abi di ng and
al most obsessi ve fear of Jews , whose web of dangerous international
i ntri gue he di scerned i n many an obscure corner. Yet there was
another group about which his feelings had been even more violent.
"Even Jews have their good poi nts, " he had written, "but Armeni ans
have none. "
1 4
Now Sykes met with Armeni an l eaders i n Cai ro, and
enthusi asti cal l y proposed the creation of an Armeni an army, to be
recrui ted from pri soners-of-war and Armeni ans i n the Uni t ed St at es,
to i nvade Tur ke y. He gave i t as his opi ni on that he coul d have the
army i n bei ng i n about eight we e ks .
1 5
Newl y enthusi asti c about Mi ddl e East erners, Sykes was entirely
won over to Cl ayton' s view that Arab armi es coul d suppl y the key to
victory. Cl ayton pri med hi m to return to London prepared to argue
Cai ro' s new thesi s that Hussei n coul d be more i mport ant than the
French in bri ngi ng the war in the East to a swift concl usi on.
Cl ayton al so coached Aubrey Herbert , an M. P. servi ng i n Cai ro
Intel l i gence, who was returni ng to London, and who undertook to
see Lo r d Ki t chener and the Forei gn Secret ary, Si r Edward Grey, t o
explain mat t ers to t hem. Herbert , with Cl ayton' s hel p, drafted a
st rong memorandum urgi ng the French to gi ve up their cl ai m to
Damas c us , Al eppo, Homs , and Hama, so that the towns coul d be
ceded to Hus s ei n.
V
With much that was new to report and to advocate, Sykes returned
to a warm wel come in London in December 1915. It was then that
he proposed creati ng an Arab Bureau and took the first st eps l eadi ng
to its establ i shment (see Chapt er 22) .
No other man had met with every i mportant Bri ti sh officer from
the Bal kans and Egypt to Indi a. Mauri ce Hankey arranged an audi -
ence for hi m with Ki ng George. Hankey also arranged for Sykes to
go before the inner War Commi t t ee of the Cabi net , of which he was
Secretary.
Th e pri nci pal message that Sykes brought back to the Cabi net was
that the Ar abs whom he had previ ousl y di sregarded as a factor in
the warwere now of pri me i mport ance to the Al l i es; and that it was
vitally and urgentl y i mportant to reach agreement with Hussei n.
Al though Cai ro and Sykes seemed unaware of the fact, i n London
it was recogni zed that Bri tai n woul d have to pay a pri ceand a high
one-to obtai n France' s consent to the maki ng of promi ses to Hus s ei n;
she woul d have to make major concessi ons to the French i n return
for the pri vi l ege of bei ng allowed to make concessi ons to the Arabs .
Ki t chener and Grey were willing to pay the pri ce. Ot hers were not.
It was the view of Lo r d Curzon, former Vi ceroy of Indi a, that no
promi ses shoul d be made to the Arabs because they were "a peopl e
who are at this moment fighting agai nst us as hard as they c a n. "
1 6
Th e new Secretary of St at e for Indi a, Aust en Chamberl ai n, was also
opposed t o doi ng s o; but Ki t chener, backi ng Sykes, Cl ayt on, and
St orrs, vehementl y i nsi sted on authori zi ng Cai ro to respond i m-
medi atel y and to reach agreement with Hus s ei n; and Ki t chener' s
views carri ed the day. Aut hori zed and di rected to do so by London,
Si r Henry McMahon then res umed the correspondence with
Meccat he f amous McMahon letters, the meani ng of whi ch has
been debat ed so much and so l ong by parti sans of Arab and Jewi sh
causes in Pal esti ne.
In the i nteri m, Hussei n had written McMahon a second letter. In
it he accused McMahon of "l ukewarmth and hesitancy" because of
his rel uctance to di scuss frontiers and boundari es. Had they been
merel y his own cl ai ms (the Emi r conti nued) such a di scussi on i ndeed
coul d have been post poned until the end of the war. But they were
not his own cl ai ms. The y di d not even represent his own suggest i ons.
The y were demands that had been formul ated by ot hers: by "our
peopl e. "
1 7
Cai ro Resi dency officials now knew that this meant the
mysteri ous secret soci ety conspi rators whom they i magi ned had a
mass following i n the Arab worl d.
On 24 October 1915 Mc Mahon repl i ed in a qui te different spi ri t to
Hussei n. Instructed by Lo r d Ki t chener t o make the necessary
pl edges, he reluctantly agreed to enter into a di scussi on of specific
territories and fronti ers; but as he evidently was unwilling to as s ume
* As noted earlier, advocates of an Arab Palestine have argued for decades that
the geographical terms employed by McMahon, if properly interpreted, indicate that
McMahon was pledging that Palestine would be Arab; and advocates of a Jewish
Palestine have argued the reverse.
personal responsi bi l i ty for maki ng definite commi t ment s, he used
l anguage evasi vel y. On the one hand, he agreed that after the war the
Arabs shoul d have their i ndependence; but , on the other, he i ndi cated
that European advi sers and officials woul d be needed to establ i sh the
admi ni strati on of Arab countri es, and i nsi sted that these advi sers
and officials shoul d be excl usi vel y Bri ti sh. In other words, any
"i ndependent" Arab ki ngdom i n the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t woul d have
to be a Bri ti sh protectorate.
What territories shoul d be i ncl uded in the Bri ti sh-protected i nde-
pendent Arab ki ngdom? Mc Mahon replied by di vi di ng the l ands
cl ai med by Hussei n into four areas and expl ai ni ng that Bri tai n coul d
not bi nd herself to support Hussei n' s cl ai ms in any one of t hem.
McMahon began by remarki ng that Hus s ei n must gi ve up cl ai m t o
territory west of the di stri cts of Damas c us , Al eppo, Horns, and
Hama. Al - Faruqi al ready had agreed (or at least McMahon thought
he had) that Hussei n woul d concede this poi nt. Mc Mahon later
wrote that he i ntended to say that the territories Hussei n and the
Arabs were not to have were coastal Syri a, Lebanon, and Pal esti ne,
with an eastern frontier that mi ght be drawn somewhere in what is
now Jor dan. Hi s l anguage can be read that way, but on a more
natural readi ng he was referri ng only to Syri a- Lebanon here, not
Pal esti ne.
In the eastern porti on of the Arabi c- speaki ng Mi ddl e Eas t , the
Mesopot ami an provi nces of Basra and Baghdad, McMahon observed
that the establ i shed posi ti on and i nterests of Bri tai n were such that
she woul d have to establ i sh "special admi ni strati ve arrangement s"
with respect to t hem; whether such arrangement s woul d leave any
room for an asserti on of Arab soverei gnt yand if so when and to
what ext ent was left unsai d.
In the western port i onSyri a and Pal est i neBri t ai n coul d extend
assurances to Hussei n only in those territories "in which she can act
without detri ment to the interests of her ally France. " Si nce France
at the ti me cl ai med those territories in their entirety (i ndeed Sykes
di scussed France' s claim to Pal esti ne with al - Faruqi i n November
1915) it followed that Bri tai n coul d not pl edge s upport for Arab
cl ai ms with respect to them ei thernot even to Damas c us , Al eppo,
Horns, and Hama.
That left only Arabi a, which at the ti me was di vi ded among a
number of l eaders, of whom Hussei n was one. Bri tai n at the ti me
enjoyed treaty rel ati onshi ps with other Arabi an chiefs, i ncl udi ng
Hussei n' s rival, I bn Saud. In his letter, McMahon poi nted out that
he coul d not promi se anythi ng to Hussei n that woul d prej udi ce
Britain's rel ati onshi ps with other Arab chiefs. By process of elimi-
nation, therefore, Bri tai n di d not bi nd herself to support Hussei n' s
cl ai ms anywhere at all.
Accordi ng to a s ummary later publ i shed in the secret Arab Bulletin
(no. 5, 18 June 1916), for Bri tai n' s mi l i tary, political, and intelli-
gence l eaders, the upshot of the correspondence was that Hi s
Majesty' s Government had i ndi cated a wi l l i ngness to promot e i nde-
pendence i n Arabi c- speaki ng Asi a but had refused to commi t itself
with respect to the f orms of government that woul d be installed in
the area or with respect to preci se boundari es.
McMahon, an experi enced bureaucrat , had seen the need to be
compl etel y noncommi t t al . Th e negoti ati ons between Sykes and the
French about the future of the Mi ddl e Eas t t o be descri bed
present l yhad not yet taken pl ace, and nobody in the Bri ti sh govern-
ment knew with any certainty what woul d have to be conceded to
France or, afterwards, t o Rus s i a. Mc Mahon was under orders from
Ki t chener not to lose the alliance with Hus s ei n; but the Hi gh Com-
mi ssi oner must have feared that he woul d be made the scapegoat i f
he di d go ahead to meet Hussei n' s demands , and later i t was di s-
covered that those demands cl ashed with other conflicting commi t -
ment s Bri tai n mi ght be called upon to make.
Suc h fears were by no means unreasonabl e. As Wyndham
Deedes t he Cai ro Intel l i gence expert on the Ot t oman Empi r e
anal yzed the si tuati on early in 1916, there were three groups of
Arabs ; and in all honesty Bri tai n coul d not agree to satisfy the
demands of any one of the three. The r e were the Syri ans, whose
mai n ai m was that the hated French shoul d not be al l owed i n ("It i s
difficult rather to account for this extraordi nary dislike he
wrote, but nonethel ess i t was t here) ; and of course that ran counter
to the demands of France. The r e was Hussei n, whose ai m was to
head an Arab ki ngdom; but Deedes sai d that most Arabs and all
Tur ks woul d be opposed to thi s. He wrote that "I think it is the view
of most of us, and is the view of many of the Arabs and all of the
Tur ks themsel ves" that "this i dea is not a practi cal one. " Other
Arabs , wrote Deedes , were unwi l l i ng to accept Hussei n as their
leader. Fi nal l y, there were the Arabs of Iraq, who (he bel i eved)
wanted i ndependence for themsel ves, but were up agai nst the inten-
tion of the Government of Indi a to annex and rule t hem. Deedes
feared that the difficulties in the way of arri vi ng at an underst andi ng
with the Arabs accordi ngl y mi ght prove "i ns uperabl e. "
1 8
It therefore woul d have been dangerous for Mc Mahon as Hi gh
Commi ssi oner to have made any firm commi t ment s to Hussei n. He
bel i eved that the i mpati ent Wi ngate had tri ed to push hi m into doi ng
so. But Regi nal d Wi ngate wrote to Cl ayton that Mc Mahon had
mi si nterpreted his vi ews, as had Lo r d Hardi nge, the Vi ceroy of
Indi a:
I am afrai d bot h the Hi gh Commi ssi oner and Lo r d Hardi nge
are under the i mpressi on that I am a believer in the creation of
a consol i dated Arab Ki ng do m under the Sheri f Of course any
such notion i s al together remote f rom my real vi ews, but i t has
sui ted me, as I believe it has sui ted all of us, to gi ve the l eaders
of the Arab movement this i mpressi on and we are qui te suffi-
ciently covered by the correspondence which has taken pl ace to
show that we are acti ng in good faith with the Arabs as far as
we have g o ne .
1 9
Gi l bert Cl ayt on, who strongl y oppos ed defining Bri tai n' s relations
with the Arabs until the war was over, bel i eved that the Mc Mahon
letters had succeeded in put t i ng the matter off and in avoi di ng the
gi vi ng of any meani ngful commi t ment . Mont hs later Cl ayt on
summari zed what Mc Mahon had done by writing that "Lucki l y we
have been very careful i ndeed to commi t oursel ves to nothi ng
what soever. "
2 0
Hussei n repl i ed to Mc Mahon that he coul d not accept the
Al e ppo- Homs - Hama- Damas c us f ormul a. He i nsi sted on havi ng
the provi nces of Al eppo and Bei rut . Not i ng France' s cl ai m to
Lebanon, he wrote that "any concessi on desi gned to gi ve France or
any other Power possessi on of a si ngl e s quare foot of terri tory in
those part s i s qui te out of the quest i on. " So he failed to reach
agreement with McMahon, but felt compel l ed to support the Allies
nonethel ess: the Young Tur ks were goi ng t o depose hi m, so he had
to rebel agai nst t hem whether Bri tai n met his t erms or not. In a
conversati on some years later with Davi d Hogart h, of the Ar ab
Bureau of Bri ti sh Intel l i gence i n Cai ro, Hussei n i ndi cated that with
regard to Pal esti ne and al so with regard to Lebanon and the other
l ands i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , he di d not regard matters as havi ng been
settl ed. He i ndi cated that he regarded all mat t ers as bei ng subj ect to
negotiation at the Peace Conf erence. Accordi ng to Hogart h, "He
compared oursel ves and himself . . . t o two persons about t o i nhabi t
one house, but not agreed whi ch shoul d take which fl oors or r ooms . "
2 1
In London the Forei gn Office took the view that the promi ses
woul d never become due for payment : that Bri tai n had pl edged
herself to s upport Arab i ndependence only if the Arab half of the
Ot t oman Empi r e rose agai nst the Sul t anwhi ch (the Forei gn Office
bel i eved) i t woul d never do. Si nce the Arabs woul d not keep their
si de of the bargai n (so ran the argument ) , the Bri ti sh woul d be under
no obl i gati on to keep thei rs. Th e Forei gn Office, which di d not rely
on Cl ayton, but had its own sources of i nformati on, di d not believe
that the Arabi c- speaki ng worl d was about to change si des i n the war,
but the Forei gn Secret ary, Si r Edward Grey, saw no harm i n letting
Ki t chener and his l i eutenants promi se anythi ng they wanted as an
i nducement to the Arabs to defect. Grey told Aust en Chamberl ai n
not to worry about the offers bei ng made by Cai ro as "the whole
thi ng was a castl e in the air which woul d never mat eri al i ze. "
2 2
McMahon, on the other hand, worri ed that the whole thi ng mi ght
not be a castl e in the air. He came, after all, from the Government of
Indi a, whose constant anxiety was the prospect of nationalist agi-
tati on. Mc Mahon confided to Wyndham Deedes that his fear was not
that the pl an for an Arab revolt woul d break down, but rather that it
woul d s ucceedand then woul d pose a danger to Br i t ai n.
2 3
To the Vi ceroy of Indi a, who cl ai med that Indi a' s i nterests were
negl ected i n the correspondence with Hussei n, Mc Mahon expl ai ned
that "I had necessari l y to be vague as on the one hand H MG di sl i ked
bei ng commi t t ed to definite future acti on, and on the other hand any
detailed definition of our demands woul d have fri ghtened off the
Ar ab. " He cl ai med that the negoti ati ons with Hussei n woul d neither
"establ i sh our ri ghts . . . or bi nd our hands . "
2 4
Thi s expl anati on di st urbed the Vi ceroy, who wrote to the Secretary
of St at e for Indi a about McMahon' s cl ai m "that the negoti ati ons are
merel y a matter of words and will neither establ i sh our ri ghts, nor
bi nd our hands i n that country. Tha t may prove eventually to be the
case, especially if the Arabs conti nue to help the enemy, but I di d
not like pl edges gi ven when there is no intention of keepi ng t he m. "
2 5
In early 1916 Azi z al - Masri , the Arab secret society l eader, wrote
t o Lo r d Ki t chener approachi ng the argument from the other si de.
He wrote (in French, the l anguage of di pl omacy) that Bri tai n coul d
not achieve her objecti ves i n the Arabi c- speaki ng Mi ddl e Eas t unl ess
she were willing to leave its peopl es free to exerci se full and genui ne
i ndependence. Thos e for whom he spoke wanted from Bri tai n "non
pas une domination ou un protectorat," that is, they di d not want
Bri ti sh domi nat i on or a Bri ti sh prot ect orat e.
2 6
The y woul d not accept
what Mc Mahon and Cl ayt on called Arab i ndependence: they de-
manded the real thi ng. The y woul d not support Bri tai n, he wrote, i f
she i ntended to govern t hemwhi ch of course was exactly what
Mc Mahon and Cl ayt on i ntended Bri tai n t o do.
Al - Masri had spotted the fal seness i n the British posi ti on. Ki t chener
and his followers badl y wanted to win Arab support but were unwilling
to pay the pri ce the Emi r Hus s ei n demanded for it; so i nstead they
were at t empt i ng to cheat, by pret endi ng to meet Hussei n' s demands
when in fact they were gi vi ng hi m the counterfeit coin of meani ngl ess
l anguage.
Though Cl ayt on and his col l eagues di d not know it, al - Masri , al-
Faruqi , and the Emi r Hussei n were offeri ng Bri tai n coin that was
equally counterfei t. Hussei n had no army, and the secret societies
had no vi si bl e following. Thei r talk of rallying tens or hundreds of
t housands of Arab t roops to their cause, whether or not they bel i eved
it themsel ves, was sheer fantasy.
Al - Faruqi , who had promi sed an Arab revolt when he first arri ved,
changed his story by 15 November, when he met Si r Mark Sykes : he
now sai d that there coul d be no Arab upri si ng until and unl ess Al l i ed
armi es fi rst l anded i n force on the Syri an coast. Hussei n, too, hopi ng
Bri tai n woul d take the mi l i tary l ead, refused to go into acti on by
cl ai mi ng i t woul d be premat ure to l aunch an upri si ng. Th e Arabs , i n
other words, woul d do nothi ng until Bri ti sh armi es arri ved on the
scene. Sykes, accepti ng these st at ement s at face val ue, concl uded
that it was urgent for Bri tai n to i nvade Syri a and Pal esti ne.
24
MAKING PROMISES TO THE
EUROPEAN ALLI ES
i
In December 1915 Sykes report ed to his government that i n Cai ro he
had been told by al - Faruqi that if Bri ti sh Egypt were to l aunch an
i nvasi on of Pal esti ne and Syri a, it woul d tri gger a revolt in whi ch the
Arabi c- speaki ng t roops and provi nces of the Ot t oman Empi re woul d
come over to the Al l i ed si de. Th e probl em was that Bri tai n needed
France' s permi ssi on to di vert the resources from the western front to
l aunch such an offensi ve; and what Sykes told the Cabi net mi ni sters
was that they ought to seek such permi ssi on from the French i m-
medi atel y. ( France was rel uctant to allow any di versi on of resources
from Europe, and not wi thout reason; early i n 1916 Germany attacked
Verdun i n what by 1918 was to become the bi ggest battl e i n worl d
history. Seven hundred t housand men on both si des were to be
killed, wounded, gas s ed, or capt ured at Verdun i n 1916, and 1, 200, 000
at the So mme ; it was not a year in which the Al l i es coul d easily
afford to send manpower el sewhere. )
At the s ame t i me, Sykes rai sed a rel ated matter: the Sheri f Hussei n
hesi tated to come over to the Al l i ed si de ( Sykes report ed) for fear of
French ambi t i ons i n the Arabi c- speaki ng worl d. Negot i at i ons with
France ai med at al l ayi ng such fears were the answer, he sai d. If these
probl ems with France were not resol ved soon, Sykes warned, the
Sheri f mi ght be deposed and killed by the Tur ks , and events i n the
Hol y Pl aces mi ght ignite a real Hol y War.
1
Th e radi cal new view that Sykes had brought back with hi m f rom
the Mi ddl e Eas t was that i n t erms of wi nni ng the war, the Arabs
were more i mportant than the Fr e nc h.
2
France was a modern i ndus-
trial power that had mobi l i zed eight million men to fight the war,
while Hussei n, wi thout i ndustri al , financial, military, or manpower
resources, brought with hi m only an uncertai n prospect of subvert i ng
loyalty i n the Ot t oman c amp; i n retrospect, Sykes' s new view was
unbal anced, but his government nonethel ess at t empt ed to persuade
France to make the concessi ons Sykes believed to be necessary.
188
M A K I N G P R O M I S E S T O T H E E U R O P E A N A L L I E S 189
In fact, the Bri ti sh government al ready had initiated talks with
France. Bri tai n coul d not make promi s es about Syri a to the Emi r
Hussei n wi thout France' s permi ssi on, for the Forei gn Secret ary, Si r
Edward Grey, had recogni zed France' s speci al interest i n that area.
Moreover, al - Faruqi had persuaded Lo r d Ki t chener and his fol-
lowers that Hussei n' s cl ai ms to Syri a also had to be accommodat ed,
at least to s ome extent. Th e Forei gn Office, havi ng authori zed
McMahon to make pl edges to Hus s ei n on 20 Oct ober 1915, therefore
i mmedi atel y request ed the French government to send a del egate
over to London to negoti ate the future frontiers of Syri a so as to
define the extent to which Bri tai n was free to deal with Hussei n.
Thus not only the Mc Mahon letters, but al s oand more i mport ant l y
the negoti ati ons with France, Rus s i a, and later Italy that ultimately
resul ted i n the Sykes- Pi cot - Sazanov Agreement and subsequent
Al l i ed secret treaty underst andi ngs were among the resul ts of
Li eut enant al - Faruqi ' s hoax.
I I
Th e French representati ve, Francoi s Georges Picot, came over t o
London and commenced negoti ati ons on 23 November 1915. The
Bri ti sh negoti ati ng team was at first headed by Si r Art hur Ni col son,
Permanent Under- Secret ary at the Forei gn Office, and i ncl uded
senior representati ves from the Forei gn, Indi a, and War Offices. Th e
talks had deadl ocked by the ti me Sykes returned to London i n
December; late that mont h the Bri ti sh government del egated
Sykes Ki t chener' s mant o take the pl ace of the Ni col son t eam i n
order to break the deadl ock. In effect the Forei gn Office t urned the
responsi bi l i ty over t o Lo r d Ki t chener.
Sykes possessed some of the qual i fi cati ons necessary to carry out
his assi gnment . He passi onatel y wanted to succeed i n reachi ng an
agreement with the other si de. He was pro- French. As a result of
early school i ng abroad, he spoke Frencht hough it is not clear how
well. As a Roman Cathol i c himself, he was not prej udi ced agai nst
France' s goal of promot i ng Cathol i c i nterests i n Lebanon. He had
lived and travel ed i n the Eas t , and had met with and knew the views
of Bri tai n' s sol di ers and civil servant s there.
On the other hand, he had held government office for less than a
year, and i t was his first di pl omat i c assi gnment . He had no experi ence
in negoti ati ng with a foreign government , and was in a weak bargai n-
ing posi ti on because he wanted too much from the other si de, too
obvi ousl y.
Unti l 3 Januar y 1916 Sykes went to the French embas s y on a daily
basi s to negoti ate. He reported i n detail at night to Fi t zGeral d and
through hi m conti nued to receive the ghostl y gui dance of Ki t chener.
3
It i s i mpossi bl e to know what Sykes sai d or was tol d: Ki t chener and
Fi t zGeral d kept no proper files, and none of the three men left a
record of what occurred. The r e may have been a mi sunderst andi ng
between t hem as to what Sykes was i nstructed to demand and what
he was told to concede. Lat er, i n descri bi ng his deal i ngs with Lo r d
Ki t chener, Mark Sykes remarked that "I coul d never make myself
underst ood; I coul d never underst and what he thought, and he coul d
never underst and what I t hought . "
4
The r e i s more evi dence from the French si de of the negoti ati ons
than f rom the Bri ti sh si de as to the secret hopes and pl ans that were
i nvol ved. Document s exist that establ i sh what Picot and his political
associ ates hoped to gai n f rom the negoti ati ons and how they hoped to
achi eve their goal s.
Picot, the sci on of a colonialist dynasty in Francehi s father was a
founder of the Comi t e de l ' Afri que Francai se, and his brot her was
treasurer of the Comi t e de l'Asie Francai s e, of which his father was
al so a memberact ed effectively as the advocate of the colonialist
party within the Quai d' Orsay and was as dedi cated a proponent of a
French Syri a as his government coul d have chosen to represent i t .
5
Earl i er in 1915 Pi cot had i nspi red a parl i amentary campai gn in Pari s
agai nst the mi ni sters who were prepared to gi ve way to Bri tai n i n the
Mi ddl e Eas t . Th e mi xt ure of domest i c French commerci al , clerical,
and political interests in s upport of Picot's posi ti on proved potent.
Th e Lyons and Marsei l l es Chambers of Commerce sent resol uti ons
to the Quai d' Orsay in s upport of a French Syri a. Proponent s of a
French Syri a took control of the Commi t t ee on Forei gn Affai rs of
the Chamber of De put i e s .
6
Pi erre-Eti enne Fl andi n, leader of the French Syri a movement i n
the Senat e, i ssued a report on Syri a and Pal esti ne in 1915 that
became the mani festo of the "Syri an Part y" i n French pol i ti csthe
party that Picot champi oned. Syri a and Pal esti ne form one country,
he argued, that for centuri es had been shaped by France, to such an
extent that i t f ormed the France of the Near Eas t . ( Hi s argument
harked back nearly a t housand years, to the Crus ades and the est ab-
l i shment of Lat i n Crus ader ki ngdoms i n Syri a and Pal esti ne. ) It was
i ncumbent upon France to conti nue its "mission historique" there, he
wrote. Th e potential wealth of the country was i mmense, he cl ai med,
so that for commerci al reasons, as well as historic and geographi c
ones, i t was vital for the French Empi r e to possess it. The n, too,
accordi ng to Fl andi n, i t was vital for strategi c reasons. Paral l el i ng
Ki t chener' s views about Mecca and the cal i phate, Fl andi n cl ai med
that Damas c us was the thi rd holiest city i n Isl am and was the
potential center of an Arabi c I s l am; France dared not let another
power di rect i t and perhaps use i t agai nst Fr anc e .
7
Fl andi n cl ai med
that at heart Syri a-Pal esti ne was French al ready. It s i nhabi tants,
accordi ng to hi m and his col l eagues, were unani mous i n desi ri ng to
be rul ed by France.
The French del uded themsel ves. Opposi t i on t o French rule was
intense among the educat ed cl asses i n Syri a (other than the
Maroni t es, the East ern- ri t e Roman Cathol i c communi t y sponsored
by Fr anc e ) . Sykes and his fri ends i n Cai ro believed that the French
were bl i ndi ng themsel ves when they i gnored this opposi t i on. ( Cl ayt on
and his col l eagues di d not see, however, that they were del udi ng
themsel ves in the s ame way by thi nki ng that the peopl es of those
areas ardentl y desi red to be governed by Bri t ai n. )
Picot drafted his own negoti ati ng i nstructi ons outl i ni ng a strategy
to win the concessi ons that he want ed from the Bri ti sh. The y show
that he woul d have preferred to preserve the Ot t oman Empi re intact,
for its "feeble condi ti on" offered France "limitless scope" to expand
her economi c i nf l uence.
8
Partition had become i nevi tabl e, however;
it therefore was advi sabl e to take control of Syri a and Pal esti ne, even
t hough France woul d di s member the Ot t oman Empi re by doi ng so.
Th e French Forei gn Office recogni zed that pol i ci ng i nl and Syri a
woul d strai n French resources; what Picot and his government most
desi red was to assert direct French rule only over the Medi t erranean
coastl i ne and an enl arged Le banon, and to control the rest of Syri a
indirectly t hrough Arab puppet rul ers. Picot's pl an was to pretend to
Sykes that France i nsi sted on obt ai ni ng direct rul e over all of Syri a,
so that when he moderat ed the cl ai m he coul d obtai n some concessi on
in return. What he hoped to get was an extensi on of the French
sphere of influence east ward f rom Syri a to Mosul (in what i s now
I r aq) .
In secretl y pl anni ng to take Mos ul , Picot was unaware that
Ki t chener and Sykes were secretly pl anni ng to gi ve i t to hi m. The y
wanted the French sphere of influence to be ext ended f rom the
Medi t erranean coast on the west all the way to the east so that it
paral l el ed and adj oi ned Russi an- hel d zones; the French zone was to
provi de Bri tai n with a shield agai nst Rus s i a. France and Rus s i a
woul d be bal anced one agai nst the other, so that the French Mi ddl e
Eas t , like the Great Wall of Chi na, woul d protect the Bri ti sh Mi ddl e
East f rom attack by the Russi an barbari ans to the north. Thi s concept
had appeared i n the de Buns en proceedi ngs. It had been suggest ed to
Ki t chener, perhaps by St orrs , and i t became central to his strategi c
plan for the post war Eas t . Even Bri tai n' s cl ai m to Mos ul , with the oil
riches strongl y suspect ed to exist there, was to be sacrificed i n order
to pl ace the French in the front line, at a poi nt where the Rus s i ans
mi ght be expect ed one day to attack. Th e War Office poi nt of view
was that "From a mi l i tary poi nt of view, the pri nci pl e of i nserti ng a
wedge of French territory between any Bri ti sh zone and the Russi an
Caucas us woul d seem i n every way des i rabl e. "
9
On the Bri ti sh si de of the negoti ati ons Sykes also wanted France' s
agreement to an Egypt i an offensi ve; Ki t chener wanted Al exandret t a,
and an agreement that Bri tai n coul d i nvade the Ot t oman Empi re at
Al exandret t a; Sykes held a brief from Cai ro to reserve the towns in
Syri a that were bei ng promi sed to the Sheri f Hus s ei n; and nobody i n
the Bri ti sh government wanted to see any other Great Power est ab-
lished in the postwar worl d astri de the road to Indi a. It was a
chal l engi ng agenda, especi al l y for Sykes , a neophyte in di pl omacy.
Th e Bri ti sh feared that Picot woul d not compromi s e on France' s
cl ai m to exerci se direct rul e over all of Syri a, while the French feared
that they woul d not be al l owed to rul e any of it, not even coastal
Lebanon. Picot argued that Chri st i an Lebanon woul d not tolerate
even the nomi nal rule of the Emi r of Mecca, while Paul Cambon, the
French ambas s ador i n London, warned that French rule woul d be
necessary to avert the out break of a rel i gi ous war: "It is enough to
know the intensity of rivalries between the vari ous rites and rel i gi ons
in the Ori ent to foresee the violence of the internal strife in Le banon
as soon as no external authori ty i s there to curb i t . "
1 0
In the end both Sykes and Picot obt ai ned what they wanted f rom
one another: France was to rule a Great er Lebanon and to exert an
excl usi ve influence over the rest of Syri a. Sykes succeeded i n gi vi ng,
and Picot succeeded in taki ng, a sphere of French influence that
extended t o Mosul . Bas ra and Baghdad, the two Mesopot ami an
provi nces, were to go to Bri tai n.
Pal esti ne proved to be a st umbl i ng bl ock. Sykes wanted it for
Bri tai n, even though Lo r d Ki t chener di d not, while Picot was de-
termi ned to get i t for France. In the end a compromi s e was reached:
Bri tai n was to have the port s of Acre and Hai f a (rather than
Al exandretta, north of Syri a, the harbor that Ki t chener preferred)
and a territorial belt on which to construct a railroad from there to
Mesopot ami a, while the rest of the country was to fall under some
sort of international admi ni st rat i on.
Except for Pal esti ne and for the areas i n which France or Bri tai n
exerci sed direct rul e, the Mi ddl e Eas t was to form an Arab state or
confederati on of states, nomi nal l y i ndependent but in reality di vi ded
into French and Bri ti sh spheres of influence.
Th e agreement reached by Sykes and Picot was to come into effect
only after the Arab Revol t was procl ai med. Picot and the French
ambas s ador, Cambon, were not persuaded that Hussei n woul d con-
tri bute anythi ng of val ue to the Al l i ed cause; they told their Forei gn
Mi ni ster to ratify the prel i mi nary Sykes- Pi cot Agreement ( concl uded
on 3 January 1916) as soon as possi bl e, before the Bri ti sh had a
chance to become di si l l usi oned about the Arabs , and therefore to
regret the extensi ve concessi ons they had made to France i n order to
be free to deal with Hus s e i n.
1 1
Ill
Si r Mark Sykes bel i eved that he had won for the Arabs what Hussei n
and al - Faruqi had demanded. Sykes characteri zed Arabs as wanti ng
recognition of their essential unity, but only as an i deal ; in practi ce,
he sai d, such unity woul d not be i n harmony with their national
geni us, nor woul d it prove feasi bl e f rom the poi nt of view of finance
and admi ni strati on. He had tol d the War Cabi net that Arabs "have
no national spi ri t in our sense of the word, but they have got a sense
of racial pri de, which i s as good. "
1 2
The y shoul d be content, he sai d,
with a "confederati on of Arabi c speaki ng states, under the aegi s of an
Arabi an pri nce. "
1 3
Sykes failed to recogni ze that Hus s ei n and the
secret societies were aski ng for a unified Arab state, just as they were
aski ng for a state that was fully i ndependent rather than a European
protectorate.
Sykes al so had mi sunderst ood hi s Bri ti sh fri ends and col l eagues i n
Cai ro. Under his veneer of worl dl i ness, Sykes was . an i nnocent: he
bel i eved that peopl e meant what they sai d. Cl ayt on, directly, and
also t hrough Aubrey Herbert , had told hi m that i t was i mport ant to
the Al l i ed cause t o promi se Damas c us , Al eppo, Horns, and Hama t o
Hussei n' s i ndependent Arab confederati on. Sykes therefore asked
Picot to agree to this ( and i magi ned that he had won Picot's consent,
not knowi ng that Picot wanted to gi ve i t ) . Th e Sykes- Pi cot Agree-
ment provi ded that the four towns shoul d be excl uded from the area
of direct French rul e and i nstead shoul d fall within the scope of an
i ndependent Arab state or st at est hough subject, of course, to ex-
cl usi ve French influence. To Sykes i t appeared that he had tai l ored
the commi t ment s to France and to the Arabs to fit together, and al so
that he had secured preci sel y the concessi on f rom France that his
fri ends i n Cai ro had asked for.
Sykes had concentrated on sati sfyi ng what Cai ro had told hi m
were Hussei n' s cl ai ms, and di d not see that behi nd t hem Cai ro was
advanci ng cl ai ms of its own. What Sykes di d not underst and was that
when Cl ayton and St orrs sai d they wanted i nl and Syri a for the
Arabs , they really meant that they wanted it for Bri tai n, and for
themsel ves as Bri tai n' s representati ves i n the regi on, advanci ng be-
hi nd an Ar ab f acade; and when they sai d they wanted i t to be
i ndependent, they meant that they wanted i t to be admi ni st ered by
Bri tai n rather than France.
Sykes di d not see that Hussei n' s Syri an domai ns woul d be any the
less i ndependent for bei ng advi sed by French rather than by Bri ti sh
officials. In Cai ro, however, a worl d of difference was seen between
Bri ti sh and French admi ni st rat i on. Not entirely wi thout reason,
Cl ayton and his col l eagues bel i eved French colonial admi ni st rat ors to
be i ncapabl e of allowing a country to retain its own character. What
the French t ermed their "civilizing mi ssi on" was seen as annex-
ati oni sm by the Bri t i sh; often it seemed to involve i mposi ng the
French l anguage and cul ture on a nati ve society. Th e Bri ti sh, on the
other hand, in Egypt and el sewhere, kept to t hemsel ves, dwelt in
their own cl ubs and compounds , and, apart from supervi si ng the
admi ni strati on of the government , left the country and its peopl e
al one. In the eyes of Cl ayt on and his col l eagues, this was the greatest
degree of i ndependence to which Arabi c- speaki ng peopl es coul d as-
pi re. As one of Cl ayton' s col l eagues tol d st udent s at a Bri ti sh Mi l i tary
Staff Col l ege a few years later, educat ed Arabs regarded Bri ti sh rule
as "the only decent al ternati ve" to Ot t oman r ul e .
1 4
Equat i ng, as they di d, a French presence with annexati on and a
Bri ti sh presence with i ndependence, Cl ayton and his col l eagues
(though they di d not tell Sykes so) regarded the Sykes-Pi cot Agree-
ment as a betrayal of the pl edge to grant i ndependence to the pro-
posed Arab confederati on. Ki t chener' s followers aspi red to rule Syri a
themsel ves, and bel i eved that Sykes had let t hem down. But that i s
not the way they put it. What they sai d was: Sykes has let down the
Arabs (as t hough it were the Arabs rather than themsel ves who
desi red Bri tai n to rule Syri a) .
For whatever i t meant to them politically, and perhaps even per-
sonally, Cl ayton and St orrs saw that Sykes had forecl osed the possi -
bility of their creati ng a new Egypt i an empi re. Si ml a had al ready
staked out a cl ai m to the nearby Mesopot ami an provi nces, so Baghdad
and Bas rat he pri nci pal Bri ti sh zone i n the Sykes-Pi cot Agree-
ment woul d be rul ed by their adversary, the Government of Indi a;
while Syri a, which coul d have been i n Cai ro' s sphere, was i nstead
surrendered t o France. The agreement al l owed Cai ro and Khar t oum
to expand their influence only in ari d, i nhospi tabl e Arabi a.
Ki t chener, after the war, coul d go out to Indi a as Vi ceroy; but
Cl ayton and St orrs were Arabi st s, tied emotionally and professi onal l y
to the fortunes of the Cai ro Resi dency. The y coul d hardl y hel p but
be di smayed by what Sykes had done.
Sykes never underst ood that his fri ends i n Cai ro held these vi ews;
he thought that he had done what they had asked. He thought he
had won i nl and Syri a for the Ar abs ; he di d not realize that they
thought he had lost it. He never suspect ed that Cai ro was goi ng to
try to undermi ne the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement . He was proud of the
agreement , and i t was ironic that the Arab Bureau which he had
created became the center of the plot to destroy it.
Hi s old friend Aubrey Herbert worked with the Arab Bureau i n
Cai ro and so Herbert knew (while Sykes di d not) that Cl ayt on
bitterly bel i eved that the Sykes-Pi cot Agreement had reduced Cai ro' s
Arab policy to tatters. Herbert cast the bl ame on Pi cot. He wrot e:
I am afrai d that swi ne Monsi eur Pfi cot] has let M. S . [ Mark
Sykes] badl y down. I told hi m I t hought it woul d happen. It is
an awful pity both for the thi ng itself, and for M. and al so
because it is one up to the old early Vi ctori ans who are in a
posi ti on to say "We told you so. Thi s i s what comes of di sre-
gardi ng the A B C of Di pl omacy, and letting Amat eurs have a
shy at delicate and i mportant negot i at i ons. "
1 5
I V
The Sykes- Pi cot Agreement was approved by the Bri ti sh and French
Cabi net s at the begi nni ng of February 1916. But its t erms and even
its exi stence were kept secret; the very fact that the Allies had
reached an agreement about the post war Mi ddl e Eas t was not reveal ed
until al most two years later. So me of the few officials i n London who
knew of the agreement expressed reservati ons about it. Th e common
Bri ti sh compl ai nt was that i t gave away too much to the French.
For Sykes, some of the justification for gi vi ng way to the French
was soon dest royed. Sykes had wanted to win France' s approval of
Cai ro' s proposal t o i nvade Syri a and thereby spark al - Faruqi ' s prom-
ised Arab Revol t. But the Pri me Mi ni ster, deferri ng to the general s
who i nsi sted on concentrati ng all forces on the western front in
Europe, rul ed out a new Mi ddl e East ern campai gn because of the
di versi on of resources that it woul d entail.
A furi ous Sykes del i vered a speech in the Hous e of Commons
denounci ng Asqui t h' s l eadershi p as muddl ed, and demandi ng the
establ i shment of a f our- member Cabi net commi t t ee to run the war.
Del i vered at a ti me when the Pri me Mi ni ster was fal teri ng as a
l eader, the speech attracted wi de and favorabl e publ i ci ty. It al so led
Sykes to two meet i ngs that proved i mport ant i n his cl i mb up the
political l adder: one with Ll oyd George, and one with the former
proconsul i n Sout h Afri ca, Lo r d Mi l ner, and his influential coteri e,
i ncl udi ng Geoffrey Robi nson, editor of The Times.
Despi t e his failure to win approval for an invasion of Syri a, Sykes
bel i eved that it was i mportant to concl ude the arrangement s with
France on the basi s that had been agreed. Th e Sykes- Pi cot Agree-
ment achi eved what Ki t chener, at least, wanted to achi eve: the
contai nment of Rus s i a i n the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t . Moreover, Sykes
seemed to bel i eve that for the Allies to resolve their di fferences and
196
arri ve at a definite agreement was in itself a good thi ng. Russi an
ratification was requi red, so the i mmedi at e assi gnment for Sykes was
to join Pi cotwho was al ready i n Pet rogradt o help secure Russi an
approval of their agreement .
V
The r e was a curi ous omi ssi on i n the agreement Sykes and Picot were
bri ngi ng to Pet rograd. As regards Pal esti ne, the document took ac-
count of the interests of France, Bri tai n, the other Al l i es, and the
Mosl em Arab leader Hus s ei n of Mecca; but no reference was made
to the i nterests of the peopl e of the Bi bl i cal Hol y La ndt he Je ws .
Yet political Zi oni smt he organi zed Jewi sh movement ai mi ng at a
national return of the Jewi sh peopl e to Pal est i nehad been an active
force in the world for two or three decades. Jewi sh resettl ement of
Pal esti ne had gone on in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuri es,
and by 1916 there was a substanti al Jewi sh popul ati on living and
worki ng there.
Before Sykes embarked for Rus s i a, his attention was caught by an
observati on made about this by Capt ai n William Regi nal d Hal l , the
head of intelligence at the Admi ral t y. Hall objected to the i nduce-
ment s bei ng offered to Hussei n' s Arabs , sayi ng that the Bri ti sh
shoul d l and troops i n Pal esti ne, for only then woul d the Arabs come
over to the Al l i es. "Force i s the best Arab propaganda, " cl ai med
Hal l , and besi des promi ses to the Arabs mi ght be opposed by Jews ,
who had "a st rong material, and a very strong political, interest in
the future of the country [original e mpha s i s ] . "
1 6
Sykes was struck by
the menti on of Je ws . Unti l then they had not figured in his cal cu-
lations. Before leaving for Rus s i a, Sykes therefore contacted Herbert
Samuel , the Home Secret ary, who was Jewi sh, hopi ng to learn about
Zi oni sm.
It will be remembered that i n their negoti ati ons, Sykes and Picot
had compromi sed their di fferences about Palestine by agreei ng that
most of it woul d be pl aced under an international regi me, the preci se
form of which woul d be det ermi ned after consul tati on with the other
interested Al l i es Rus s i a and I t al yand with Hussei n of Mecca.
Capt ai n Hal l ' s comment s led Sykes to worry, however, that the
compromi s e at which he and Picot had arri ved had left a pri nci pal
factor out of account : they had not taken into consi derati on the
possi bi l i ty that Jews mi ght be concerned in the political future of
Pal esti ne.
Evi dentl y Sykes was afrai d that when he brought this omi ssi on
to the attention of Picot, the Frenchman woul d think that he was
doi ng so in order to back out of their agreement. Accordi ngl y, on
his arrival i n Pet rograd he was at pai ns to establ i sh his good fai th. In
his i nnocence he di d not know-or even suspect t hat the French
government had al ready gone behi nd his back to renege on the
Pal esti ne compromi s e they had agreed upon. In secret negoti ati ons
with the Rus s i ans initiated by the French Premi er, Ari sti de Bri and,
on 25 March 1916, the French secured Russi an agreement that an
international regi me for Palestine-the arrangement Sykes had agreed
upon with Pi cot woul d be i mpracti cal and that i nstead a French
regi me ought to be i nstal l ed. A secret Franco- Rus s i an exchange of
notes on 26 Apri l 1916 outl i ned an agreement between the govern-
ment s as to their respecti ve spheres of influence in the Ot t oman
territories, and embodi ed a Russi an pl edge to France "to s upport in
negoti ati ons with the Bri ti sh government the desi gns of the govern-
ment of the Republ i c [ France] on Pal es t i ne. "
1 7
Th e Rus s i ans had no sympat hy for Jews or for Jewi sh cl ai ms, and
when Sykes arri ved i n Pet rograd, his Czari st hosts persuaded hi m
that Zi oni st Je ws were a great and potentially hostile power within
Rus s i a. Thereaf t er Sykes was seized with the conviction that Je ws
were a power in a great many pl aces and mi ght sabot age the Al l i ed
cause. But unlike the Rus s i ans , Sykes bel i eved i n at t empt i ng to wi n
t hem over. He reported to the Forei gn Office that he had told Picot
that, while Bri tai n had no interest in taki ng possessi on of Pal esti ne, it
was what the Zi oni st s wanted, and that they ought to be propi ti ated
if the Allies were to have a chance of wi nni ng the war.
8
Hi s own
notion was to offer the Zi oni sts an i ncorporated land company in
Pal esti ne; his questi on to the Forei gn Office was "Is a l and company
enough?"t o whi ch the brus que response from the Forei gn Office
was that he shoul d keep his t hought s to hi msel f .
1 9
( Evi dent l y the
Forei gn Office di d not want Sykes to meddl e in a matter about
which-it was cl earhe knew not hi ng. )
Ret urni ng to London i n Apri l 1916, Sykes took further st eps to
learn about Zi oni sm. He agai n saw Samuel , who i ntroduced hi m to
Dr Mos es Gas t er, chief Rabbi of the Sephardi c Jewi sh communi t y.
Accordi ng to Sykes , Gas t er "opened my eyes to what Zi oni sm
meant . "
2
Sykes then i ntroduced Gas t er to the French negotiator,
Georges Pi cot, and suggest ed to Picot that France and Bri tai n,
i nstead of operat i ng i ndependentl y of one another in the Mi ddl e
East , shoul d work together as pat rons of Arabs and Jews . Picot was
i mpressed neither by Gas t er nor by Sykes' s proposal , and held fast to
his territorial desi gns.
Sykes began to worry, at a ti me when a decisive Allied victory
seemed at best a remote possi bi l i ty, that Jewi sh forces woul d tilt the
scal es i n favor of the Ge r mans and Tur ks . He at t empt ed to persuade
* Jews whose ancestors in the Middle Ages lived in Spain and Portugal.
Picot that if the Allies failed to offer Jews a position in Pal esti ne,
France mi ght lose the war and, with it, cities and provi nces i n
France herself, of much more consequence to Frenchmen than
Pal esti ne. He urged Picot to tell his government that savi ng Pari s
and Verdun and regai ni ng Al sace were worth concessi ons i n the
Mi ddl e Eas t .
While Sykes was i n the process of di scoveri ng the Zi oni st i s s ue
before, duri ng, and after his Pet rograd trip)so was the Forei gn
Office i n London, prompt ed by Sykes' s ol d friend Geral d
Fi t zMauri ce. Fi t zMauri ce, who had attended the s ame publ i c school
( Beaumont ) and had acqui red many of the s ame views and prej udi ces
as had Sykes, wasi t will be rememberedt he pri nci pal source
within the Bri ti sh government of the fallacy that the Subl i me Porte
had fallen into the hands of Je ws . At the Admi ral t y early in 1916,
Fi t zMauri ce hit upon the converse of that proposi t i on: he i nspi red a
Forei gn Office col l eagueanother Ol d Boy of Beaumont , named
Hugh O' Bei rnet o suggest that "if we coul d offer the Je ws an
arrangement as to Pal esti ne which woul d strongl y appeal to t hem we
mi ght concei vabl y be abl e to stri ke a bargai n with t hem as to with-
drawi ng their support from the Young Tur k Government which
woul d then automati cal l y col l aps e. "
2 1
Jus t as Cai ro bel i eved i n
powerful , myst eri ous Ar ab soci eti es that coul d overthrow the Young
Tur ks , London bel i eved i n powerful , myst eri ous Jewi sh societies
that coul d do so, too.
O' Bei rne evidently i ntended to purs ue the matter within the
Forei gn Office himself, but di d not get the chance to do s o: he di ed
in the spri ng of 1916. So it was, after all, left to Sykes to rai se the
i ssue of Zi oni sm within the Bri ti sh bureaucracy, little t hough he
knew of Jews or their affai rs.
Li ke Fi t zMauri ce, Sykes retai ned his chi l dhood belief i n the exist-
ence of a cohesi ve worl d Jewi sh communi t y that moved in hi dden
ways to control the worl d. Bri tai n' s foremost academi c authori ty on
the Mi ddl e Eas t , Edward Granvi l l e Browne, Adams Professor of
Arabi c at Cambri dge Uni versi ty, who had known Sykes as a pupi l ,
t hough he had prai se for hi m i n other respects, comment ed that
Sykes "sees Je ws i n everyt hi ng. "
2 2
VI
Zi oni sm, however, was far f rom bei ng the chief i ssue with which
Sykes dealt i n wintry Pet rograd i n 1916. Th e broad outl i nes of the
Mi ddl e East ern settl ement were at i ssue, and when he arri ved he
found that the Russi an l eadersl i ke Bri ti sh officials i n Lo ndo n
cl ai med that France was bei ng promi sed too much. In response, the
French ambas s ador, Mauri ce Pal eol ogue, expl ai ned t o the Russi an
Forei gn Mi ni ster that the reason Bri tai n had pushed France to extend
her cl ai ms so far to the east was to provi de Bri tai n with a buffer
agai nst Ru s s i a .
2 3
Thi s was perfectly t rue, but the Forei gn Office i n
London was furi ous at bei ng gi ven away, and bombarded Pet rograd
with official deni al s. Pri vatel y, Forei gn Office officials descri bed
Pal eol ogue as "really i ncorri gi bl e. "
2 4
It was because Cai ro, taken i n by al - Faruqi ' s hoax and bel i evi ng
fully i n the potency of Arab secret soci eti es, had persuaded London
that Hussei n of Mecca coul d tear down the Ot t oman Empi re that all
of these commi t ment s, mort gagi ng the future of the postwar Mi ddl e
Eas t , had been made by the Asqui t h coalition government . Was i t
worth the pri ce? Within a few weeks of the Sykes- Pi cot - Sazanov
Agreement , Bri tai n was to find out.
25
TURKEY' S TRIUMPH AT THE
TI GRI S
i
As the Arab Bureau i n Cai ro wai ted and hoped for an Arab rebellion
that woul d bri ng down the Ot t oman Empi re, i t was called upon to
hel p Bri ti sh Indi a l i qui date yet another di sast rous and muddl e- headed
enterpri se i n the war agai nst Tur ke y: a smal l er-scal e but more
shameful Gal l i pol i by the shores of the Ti gri s river i n Mes opot ami a.
1
A mont h before the out break of the Ot t oman war in the aut umn of
1914, London had ordered a st andby force to be sent from Indi a to
the Persi an Gul f to protect Bri tai n' s oil suppl i es from Persi a in case
they shoul d be threatened. It s initial objecti ve in case of war was
to protect the oil refinery at Abadan, a Persi an island in the Shat t
al -' Arab, the waterway at the head of the Persian Gul f where the
Euphrat es and Ti gri s rivers meet. On 6 November 1914, the day
after Bri tai n decl ared war on Turkey, this force, by now augment ed,
moved forward. Th e Tur ki s h fort at Fa o at the mout h of the Shat t
al -' Arab fell after a brief bombardment by a Bri ti sh gunboat , the
river sl oop Odin; and a fortnight later, several t housand Bri ti sh
troops occupi ed the Mes opot ami an city of Bas ra seventy-five mi l es
upri ver. Al t hough the Bri t i sh Indi an force had l anded i n Mes opot ami a,
it di d so to shield nei ghbori ng Persi a f rom attack.
Turki s h resi stance was feeble, for the Bas ra front was hundreds of
mi l es from the mai n concentrati ons of Ot t oman t roops and suppl i es
near Baghdad. As the Bri ti sh Indi an expedi ti onary force went about
roundi ng out its posi ti on i n Bas ra provi nce, i t parri ed Turki s h
counterattacks with ease.
Drawn into the interior of marshy lower Mesopot ami a by the
Turki s h retreat, an ambi t i ous newly appoi nt ed Bri ti sh commandi ng
officer, Si r John Ni xon, who had arri ved i n Apri l 1915, sent his
officer i n the fi el d, Maj or- General Charl es Vere Ferrers Towns hend,
further and further upst ream in quest of new victories but with no
great sense of direction or strategi c purpos e. Fi nal l y, Ni xon ordered
the t roopsdespi t e Townshend' s mi sgi vi ngst o keep on marchi ng
all the way to Baghdad.
T U R K E Y ' S T R I U M P H A T T H E T I G R I S 201
A successful advance from Bas ra to Baghdad woul d have requi red
a mast ery of l ogi sti cs and an abundance of troops, river transport,
hospi tal equi pment , artillery, and suppl i es that Bri ti sh Indi a di d not
make avai l abl e to the expedi ti onary force. Th e troops were advanci ng
into a country of s wamps and deserts, wi thout roads or rai l roads, and
were therefore obl i ged to follow the meanderi ng course of the shal -
low, treacherous Ti gr i s river. For this they needed flotillas of river-
boats sui ted to the Ti gr i s . Th e country was pesti l enti al there were
maddeni ng, si ckeni ng s warms of fl i es and mos qui t os s o mobi l e
hospi tal s and medi cal suppl i es woul d be requi red. Whereas i n Bas ra
the weakened Tur ks were at the end of their l ong suppl y line, in
front of Baghdad Towns hend' s forces woul d be at the end of t hei rs
and woul d need to have brought with t hem adequat e suppl i es of food
and ammuni t i on.
Though his forces l acked these apparent necessi ti es, Towns hend,
whose talent for general shi p was cl ose to geni us, al most fought his
way t hrough to victory. But his final t ri umph, if it can be so
t ermedat Ct esi phon, about twenty-five mi l es southeast of Baghdad,
and hundreds of river mi l es from the base of his s uppl y line at
Bas r awas Pyrrhi c: he lost half of hi s smal l force. On the ni ght of
25 November he began his retreat.
Towns hend had l earned that Fi el d Marshal Col man von der Gol t z,
whom he regarded as one of the great strategi sts of his t i me, had
as s umed overall command of Ot t oman forces i n Mes opot ami a. He
had l earned, too, that 30, 000 Turki s h t roops were about to rei nforce
the 13, 000 that had opposed him at Ct esi phon. Towns hend' s own
fighting forces now numbered 4, 500; and they were short of ammu-
nition and food.
Towns hend bel i evedwi th good reasont hat the closest safe pl ace
for hi m to make a st and was s ome 250 miles downst ream, but
deci dedunwi sel yt hat his exhaust ed t roops coul d not go that dis-
tance. After a puni shi ng week-l ong retreat of nearly a hundred miles,
punct uat ed by battl es with the purs ui ng Tur ks , Towns hend, who
had suffered a t housand more casual ti es, chose to st op and make his
stand at Ku t el - Amara.
Kut was a mud village caught in a loop in the Ti gr i s river, and
surrounded by water on three si des. Shel teri ng within i t and en-
trenchi ng the fourth si de, Towns hend i mpri soned hi msel f in a
fortress-like posi ti on. It made it difficult for the Tur ks to get in or
for hi m to get out. In the event, von der Gol tz' s Ot t oman armi es left
a sufficient force at Kut to guard agai nst a British breakout, and then
marched on to entrench themsel ves downri ver so as to bl ock any
force Bri tai n mi ght send to the rescue.
Towns hend pl anned to be rescued, but rui ned his own chances.
Al though he had suppl i es sufficient to last until Apri l 1916, he
cabl ed that he coul d only hold out until January. Th e full forces
avai l abl e to rescue hi m coul d not be assembl ed by t hena few weeks
more were requi redbut dri ven on by Townshend' s i nconsi stent
and i ncreasi ngl y unbal anced cabl es, the partial forces avai l abl e
l aunched one premat ure attack after another and were beaten back.
Had they wai ted until they coul d attack i n force, they mi ght have
fought their way t hrough.
I I
On 26 Apri l 1916, the garri son at Kut havi ng exhaust ed its last
rati ons of food, the War Office i n London offered Towns hend the
servi ces of Capt ai ns Aubrey Herbert and T. E. Lawrence i n nego-
ti ati ng a surrender. Bot h were associ at ed with the Arab Bureau i n
Cai ro, and Herbert , a Me mbe r of Parl i ament, had been a well-known
friend of the Ot t oman Empi r e before the war. Bot h had just arri ved
i n Mes opot ami a, and Lawrence had al ready been stri cken with the
preval ent local fever.
Th e si ege of Kut had by then l asted 146 days, exceedi ng the
records previ ousl y set by the f amous si eges of Ladys mi t h (in the
Boer War) and Pl evna (in the Rus s o- Turki s h war of 1877). It was an
epi c of heroi s mas the defenders faced di sease, starvati on, and
f l oodsand of heartbreak, as suppl i es parachut ed to t hem were
bl own offcourse into the river, and ri verboats sent to their ai d went
aground or were st opped by chai ns the Tur ks stretched across the
river.
Towns hend, who had never qui te recovered from a fever contracted
i n 125-degree heat the s ummer before, had become emoti onal l y
unbal anced. At some poi nt duri ng the si ege he had deci ded that the
Tur ks mi ght let hi m and his men go free on parol e in return for a
payment of a million pounds . Herbert and Lawrence, who went with
hi m on 278 Apri l to negoti ate t erms, were authori zed by London
to offer even more: ashamed t hough they were of doi ng so, they
offered the Tur ks two million pounds . On orders from Enver, who
apparentl y enjoyed Bri tai n' s humi l i ati on i n beggi ng to buy the free-
dom of her t roops, the Turki s h commander rejected the offer.
Th e Bri ti sh defenders of Kut t hereupon destroyed their guns and
uncondi ti onal l y surrendered. Towns hend was treated with courtesy,
and sent by the Tur ks to live i n comf ort and i ndeed l uxuryi n
Const ant i nopl e. Hi s di seased, st arvi ng t roops, however, were sent on
a death march100 mi l es to Baghdad, then 500 more to Anat ol i a
and then were put to work on rai l road chai n gangs . Few of t hem
survi ved.
Towns hend' s forces suffered more than 10, 000 casual ti es between
T U R K E Y ' S T R I U M P H A T T H E T I G R I S 203
the start of their advance on Baghdad and their surrender. Twent y-
three t housand casual ti es were suffered by the Bri ti sh forces seeki ng
to rescue t hem f rom Ku t ; yet the garri son was carri ed off into
capti vi ty and f ound deat h al ong the way.
It was another national humi l i ati on inflicted upon Bri tai n by an
Ot t oman foe Bri ti sh officials had al ways regarded as i neffectual and
whom the Arab Bureau proposed to bri ng crashi ng down by internal
subversi on later in 1916.
P ART I V
SUBVERSION
26
BEHIND ENEMY LI NES
i
In 1916 the questi on seemed to be : whi ch of the warri ng coal i ti ons,
Germany and her allies or Bri tai n and her allies, woul d col l apse first
under the enormous strai ns i mpos ed by the war? Cai ro, with its
own speci al poi nt of view, was betti ng that Turkey woul d be the first
to crack. Woul d Hussei n' s revolt, schedul ed to occur i n mi d- 1916, be
abl e to subvert the loyalty of hundreds of t housands of Ot t oman
sol di ers and mi l l i ons of Ot t oman subj ect s? Bri t i sh Intel l i gence
thought i t not i mprobabl e, al ways havi ng regarded the Sul tan' s
regi me as feebl e.
In the western worl d i t had been as s umed for decades that one day
or another the ramshackl e Ot t oman Empi r e woul d col l apse or di si nte-
grat e. By such reckoni ng, the strai n of wagi ng war agai nst Bri tai n,
France, and Rus s i a woul d bri ng i t crashi ng down; and subversi on
from within woul d add to the strai n.
Yet the record as of mi d- 1916 suggest ed otherwi se. As nati onal i sts
who campai gned agai nst foreign influence and to eradi cate the ves-
ti ges of col oni al i sm, the Young Tu r k l eaders were sensi ti ve to any
alien presence in their mi dst even that of their allies. Bot h Enver
and Tal aat expressed concern about the reach of Ge r man influence
in the admi ni st rat i on of Turkey' s warti me effort. Yet no seri ous
wedge was dri ven between Tur ks and Ge r mans .
Al t hough many Ge r mans servi ng with the Ot t oman forces ex-
pressed frustrati on and di sgust at the obstacl es pl aced in the way of
getti ng their orders executed, they di d not allow their rel ati onshi p
* After Gallipoli, Enver resumed his earlier campaign to curb German influence.
In early 1916 he indicated that even the 5,500 German troops then in the Ottoman
Empire were too many, and should be withdrawn. To demonstrate that Turkey had
no need of them, he insisted on sending seven Ottoman divisions to southern
Europe to fight alongside the armies of other of the Central Powers. His efforts were
not entirely successful; indeed, by the end of the war, there were 25,000 German
officers and men serving in the Ottoman Empi re.
207
208 S U B V E R S I O N
with the Tur ks to break down. Germany exerted influence only with
a view toward wi nni ng the war and made no move to subvert the
i ndependence of the Ot t oman government or the posi ti on of the
C. U. P. l eaders. More than any other Great Power on either si de,
Germany demonst rat ed an ability to keep postwar ambi t i ons i n Asi a
from i ntrudi ng into wart i me deci si ons; and as a result she was best
abl e to take advant age of opport uni t i es to stir up troubl e behi nd
enemy lines. Th e Habs bur g and Ot t oman government s were sus-
pi ci ous of each other, as well as of the Germans , and there was the
inevitable bi ckeri ng in the field between jeal ous officers; but , on the
whole, the Ge r mans i mposed upon their allies, in the first years of
the war in Asi a, a sense that wi nni ng the war took priority over other
objecti ves. *
Af ghani st an was an except i on: where it was concerned, officers in
the field let their mut ual mi st rust get the better of t hem. Thei r
mi ssi on was to subvert Bri t i s h
-
control of that fi erce Isl ami c
country-a control exerci sed under the terms of the agreement of
1907 that ended the Great Ga me between Rus s i a and Bri tai n. As a
result of bi ckeri ng between Ge r mans and Tur ks and between
Ge r mans and other Ge r mans , only one of the four overl and ex-
pedi ti ons to Af ghani st an sent out at the begi nni ng of the war went on
to reach Kabul , where the Ge r mans spent six mont hs vainly at t empt -
ing to persuade the Emi r to come into the war agai nst Bri tai n. Th e
Emi r decl i ned to act unl ess the Central Powers coul d pl ace armi es i n
the fi el d to ensure the success of his rebel l i on. The y coul d not do so,
so the Emi r qui etl y remai ned within the Bri ti sh fold.
In Persi a, however, the Cent ral Powers enjoyed a consi derabl e
success. Th e Ge r mans , l ong before the war, had solidified their
relations with l eadi ng Persi an pol i ti ci ans, and in 1915 they succeeded
in i nduci ng the Pri me Mi ni ster to si gn a secret treaty of alliance. Th e
Ge r man ambas s ador al so secured the s upport of the 7, 000- st rong
Swedi sh-offi cered gendarmeri e, while his secret agents bui l t up s up-
port among the vari ous tri bes that consti tuted about 20 percent of
the total popul at i on. By the end of 1915 the Allies found the si tuati on
so menaci ng that the Rus s i ans , support ed by the 8, 000- st rong
It was not easy. As the archives of Austria-Hungary show, Habsburg officials
expressed deep distrust of the ambitions for expansion that they ascribed to the
German and Turki sh empi res.
1
For centuries, Austria-Hungary had been encroaching
on Ottoman territories in Europe. Her annexation of Ottoman Bosnia had brought
on the Balkan Wars and set the stage for Sarajevo. She continued to dispute the
Ottoman title to Albania, which she occupied in the earlier part of the world
war. Harboring territorial designs of their own, Habsburg officials suspected that
Hohenzollern officials were thinking along similar lines, so that Djemal's Suez
campaign brought expressions of concern from them that Germany might attempt to
annex Egypt; while Ottoman officials, as always, distrusted their European partners.
B E H I N D E N E M Y L I N E S 209
Russi an-offi cered Persi an Cos s acks , occupi ed the north of the
country, taki ng over the capi tal city of Teheran and, with it, the
weak, recently crowned young Shah. Th e most pr o- Ge r man of the
politicians fled, initially to the holy city of Qum, and later to
Kermans hah, near the Ot t oman frontier, where a Ge r man puppet
government was establ i shed, backed by Ot t oman t roops.
In the sout h, the most successful of the Ge r man agents, Wi l hel m
Was s mus s , sti rred up a fi erce tri bal upri si ng that was quel l ed only
with the ut most difficulty by Bri gadi er General Si r Percy Sykes , of
the Government of Indi a, who" in 1916 created an 11, 000- man
British-officered native force, the Sout h Persi a Rifles, and took com-
mand of the south with a base of authori ty i n Shi raz. Th e Sout h
Persi a Rifles, the Persi an Cos s acks , the tattered remnant s of the
gendarmeri e, and the German- s pons ored tribal confederati ons were
the only organi zed armed forces that remai ned i n what had been at
one ti me a soverei gn, and i ndeed consi derabl e, country. Th e Shah
had no effective forces at his di sposal to uphol d Persi a' s neutrality,
enforce her l aws, or defend her territorial integrity. In the north the
provi nce of Azerbai j an had been a battlefield between Tur ke y and
Rus s i a ever si nce Enver' s attack on the Caucas us at the outset of the
war; and as the war went on, Rus s i an and Ot t oman t roops surged
back and forth, movi ng t hrough and occupyi ng Persi an terri tory at
will.
Th e German- Ot t oman allies converted Persi a, whi ch had been
an Allied preserve, into a contested battlefield. By 1915 16 the
country had, for all practi cal purpos es , di sappeared as a soverei gn
entity, let alone one fully control l ed by the Allied Powers.
I I
Bri tai n' s efforts to subvert the Arabi c- speaki ng popul ati on behi nd
Ot t oman lines had met with no comparabl e success. But Dj emal
Pasha, the C. U. P . tri umvi r operat i ng out of Damas c us , took the
subversi on threat seri ousl y enough to crack down on those he sus-
pected of treason. In the wake of his rai ds in 1915 on the Arab secret
societies i n Syri a, he publ i shed i n St amboul i n 1916, under the
i mpri nt of the Ot t oman Fourt h Army, a book entitled La Verite sur
la question syrienne, setti ng forth the evi dence that he cl ai med
woul d justify his treatment of the al l eged pl otters. In the book he
di scussed the secret societies and their ai ms i n some detail, and
argued that the convi cted men were trai tors, not nati onal i sts.
Whether because or i n spi te of Dj emal ' s crackdown, the Arabi c-
speaki ng popul at i on di d not waver i n its loyalty. More i mport ant to
the Porte, Arab sol di ers demonst rat ed loyalty not only to I s l am but
also to the Ot t oman government . A Bri t i sh Intel l i gence memorandum
based on interviews with capt ured Arabi c- speaki ng officers in
pri soner-of-war camps report ed that most of the officers actual l y
support ed the Young Tur ks , and that even the mi nori ty who di d not
were "unabl e to s quare their consci ences with a mi l i tary revolt in the
face of the enemy. "
2
IP
In the eyes of the Young Tur ks , the loyalty of non- Mosl em i nhabi -
tants of the empi re was open to quest i on. Th e Porte was suspi ci ous,
not only of Chri st i ans, but also of Jewsespeci al l y the 60, 000 or
more of t hem in Pal esti ne.
It di st urbed Tal aat and his col l eagues that at least half of the Jews
in Pal esti ne were not Ot t oman subj ect s. Al most all of those who were
not Ot t oman subj ect s had come f rom the Russi an Empi re, mostl y
duri ng the half century before 1914 and remai nedi n t heory
subj ect s of the Czar.
Th e Young Turkey movement had no reason t o mi st rust t hem;
they had left Europe to escape f rom pol i ti cs and conspi raci es, not to
engage i n t hem. Fl eei ng the pogroms of Russi a, the Ukrai ne, and
Pol and, they coul d have f ound a new homeas many Je ws di di n
l ands of opport uni t y such as the Uni t ed St at es, which wel comed
i mmi grant s. Thos e who chose i nstead the hardshi ps of pi oneer life
i n barren Pal esti ne were dreamers who asked only to be al l owed to
practi ce their religion or their ideals in peace.
Some were drawn to the Hol y La nd by religion; others were
i nspi red to re-create the Judaean nationality that the Romans had
detroyed 2, 000 years bef ore; but most were socialist i deal i sts who
ai med at establ i shi ng an egal i tari an, cooperati ve society in self-
sufficient agri cul tural settl ements in a country di stant from European
ant i - Semi t i sm. Once arri ved, they revi ved the ancient Hebrew
l anguage, restored the depl eted soil, and cul ti vated self-reliance. By
the early part of the twentieth century their settl ements had begun to
fl ouri sh; more than forty of t hem dotted the l andscape of the Hol y
La nd. The y constructed towns as well; i n 1909, on barren sand
dunes by the sea, they began to bui l d what i s now Tel Avi v. The y
were encouraged and s upport ed from abroad by the relatively smal l
group of Jews whose program called for a return to Zi on: the Zi oni st
movement .
At the end of 1914, just after the Ot t oman Empi re entered the
Fi rst Worl d War, Dj emal Pasha, who became Turkey' s ruler of Syri a
and Pal esti ne, took violent action agai nst the Jewi sh settl ers. Influ-
enced by a bitterly anti -Zi oni st Ot t oman official named Beha- ed- di n,
B E H I N D E N E MY L I N E S 211
Dj emal moved t o destroy the Zi oni st settl ements and ordered the
expul si on of all foreign Jews whi ch is to say, most of Jewi sh Pal esti ne.
Th e expul si ons had al ready begun before the Ge r man government
fearful of al i enati ng Jewi s h opi ni on in neutral count ri esi nduced
Tal aat and Enver t o i ntervene. Th e Ameri can ambas s ador, Henry
Morgent hau, acted together with von Wangenhei m i n the matter.
Though the Ameri can and Ge r man government s were abl e t o
influence the Porte, the Porte was not al ways abl e to control the
acti ons of Dj emal , who frequentl y pl ayed a lone hand and l ooked
upon the Pal esti ni an Jewi sh communi t y as potentially sedi ti ous. To
s ome extent this proved to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. While most
Pal esti ni an Je ws chose to avoi d i nvol vement i n the worl d war, Davi d
Ben- Guri on and Itzhak Ben Zvi , former law st udent s at the Uni ver-
sity of Const ant i nopl e who were l eaders of the Labor Zi oni st move-
ment, offered to organi ze a Pal esti ni an Jewi sh army in 1914 to
defend Ot t oman Pal esti ne. But , i nstead of accepti ng their offer,
Dj emal deport ed t hem and other Zi oni st l eaders i n 1915. Ben- Guri on
and Ben Zvi went to the Uni t ed St at es, where they conti nued to
campai gn for the creati on of a pro- Ot t oman Jewi sh army. But early
in 1918 they rallied to a Jewi sh army formati on that was to fight in
Pal esti ne on the Bri ti sh si de agai nst the Ot t oman Empi re. Not hi ng
the wart i me Ot t oman government had done had gi ven t hem cause to
remai n pr o- Tur k.
Yet despi te Dj emal ' s capri ci ous and often cruel measures, most
Jewi sh settlers in Pal esti ne di d nothi ng to subvert the Ot t oman
Empi r e ; and only a tiny mi nori t yal bei t a highly effective one
worked agai nst it. Of that tiny mi nori ty, led by an agri cul tural
scientist named Aaron Aaronsohn, more will be said later.
IV
Accordi ng to the Tur ks , i n 191415 Rus s i an efforts at subversi on
behi nd Ot t oman lines were di rected across the frontier at the
Armeni ans of northeastern Anatol i a, adjacent to Russi an Armeni a.
The epi sode has been a subject of violent controversy ever si nce.
Turki s h Armeni a was the st agi ng area for Enver' s initial attack
on the Caucas us pl ateau, and it was the initial objecti ve of the
Russi an armi es when, i n turn, begi nni ng i n 1915, they st reamed
down f rom the Caucas us to i nvade Turkey. As Chri st i ans, the
Armeni ans were inclined to prefer the Russi an to the Turki s h cause.
Not hi ng in the history of Ot t oman rul e predi sposed t hem to remai n
loyal to Const ant i nopl e. Th e Turki s h massacres of Armeni ans i n
1894, 1895, 1896, and 1909 were still fresh in their mi nds. The n,
too, Enver had sent their bl ood enemi es, the Kur ds , into Armeni a i n
212
S U B V E R S I O N
Ot t oman military uni ts, reki ndl i ng anci ent f euds and gi vi ng rise to
new ones.
In early 1915, Enver, as Mi ni ster of War, and Tal aat , as Mi ni ster
of the Interior, cl ai med that the Armeni ans were openl y support i ng
Russi a, and had taken to mob violence. In reprisal they ordered the
deportati on of the entire Armeni an popul at i on from the northeastern
provi nces to locations outsi de of Anatol i a. Turki s h government rep-
resentati ves even today insist that "At the instigation and with the
support of Czari st Russi a, Armeni an i nsurgents sought to establ i sh
an Armeni an state i n an area that was predomi nant l y Turki s h" and
that, pri or to the deport at i ons, "Armeni an forces had al ready mas-
sacred the Mos l em popul at i on of the city of Van and engaged in hit-
and- run acti ons agai nst the flanks of the Turki s h army. "
3
Th e deportati ons, organi zed by Tal aat as Mi ni ster of the Interi or,
are still remembered as the Armeni an Mas s acres of 1915. Rape and
beati ng were commonpl ace. Tho s e who were not killed at once were
dri ven through mount ai ns and deserts wi thout food, dri nk, or shelter.
Hundreds of t housands of Armeni ans eventual l y s uccumbed or were
killed; Armeni an sources have put the figure as high as 1, 500, 000,
and t hough the figures are still the subj ect of bitter di sput e, there can
be no di sput i ng the resul t: Tur ki s h Armeni a was dest royed, and
about half its peopl e peri shed.
There are hi stori ans today who conti nue to support the cl ai m of
Enver and Tal aat that the Ot t oman rul ers acted only after Armeni a
had risen agai nst t he m.
4
But observers at the ti me who were by no
means ant i - Turk report ed that such was not the case. Ge r man officers
stati oned there agreed that the area was qui et until the deportati ons
be gan.
5
At the Ge r man and Aust ri an embassi es, the first reports of the
deportati ons were i gnored: officials clearly believed that massacres of
Chri st i ans were about to take pl ace, but di d not want to know about
t hem. The y accepted Tal aat ' s reassurances eagerly.
By May 1915 massacre reports were too persuasi ve to be i gnored
any longer. Th e Aust ri an ambas s ador told his government that he
thought he ought to "alert the Turki s h statesmen in a friendly
manner" to the possi bl e adverse repercussi ons of their proceedi ngs .
6
He later reported that he had i n fact spoken with Tal aat , had urged
that the matter be handl ed carefully, and had suggest ed avoi di ng
"persecution of women and chi l dren" because it woul d play into the
hands of Al l i ed propagandi s t s .
7
On 24 May the Al l i ed government s
denounced the Porte's pol i cy of "mass murder"; to which the Porte
replied that responsi bi l i ty rested on the Allies for havi ng organi zed
the i nsurrecti on i n Ar me ni a.
8
(Whether there had been such an
i nsurrecti on, and, i f so, whether Rus s i a organi zed or merel y encour-
aged it, remai n, as noted earlier, controversi al i ssues. )
Report s poured in f rom Ge r man officials in the field with gruesome
details of atroci ti es; von Wangenhei m, the German ambas s ador,
found it i ncreasi ngl y difficult to overl ook what was goi ng on. By the
mi ddl e of June , he cabl ed Berlin that Tal aat had admi t t ed that the
mass deportati ons were not bei ng carri ed out because of "military
consi derati ons al one. "
9
Though they received no gui dance from
their home government s, von Wangenhei m and his Aust ri an counter-
part, Pallavicini, communi cat ed to the Porte their feelings that the
i ndi scri mi nate mas s deport at i ons, especi al l y when accompani ed by
pi l l agi ngs and massacres, created a very bad i mpressi on abroad,
especially in the Uni t ed St at es, and that this adversel y affected the
interests that Germany and Turkey had i n c o mmo n.
1 0
In Jul y, von Wangenhei m reported to the German Chancel l or that
there no l onger was any doubt that the Porte was tryi ng to "extermi-
nate the Armeni an race i n the Turki s h empi re. "
1 1
He and Pallavicini
both concl uded that at t empt i ng to interfere di d no good. Hi s rec-
ommendat i on to his government was to bui l d a record showi ng that
Germany was not responsi bl e for what was happe ni ng.
1 2
Other
German officials di sagreed, and tried to interfere, as did the Ge r man
Pastor Johannus Leps i us , but the Wi l hel mstrasse accepted von
Wangenhei m' s advi ce. In Oct ober it asked the Porte to i ssue a publ i c
statement cl eari ng Germany of compl i ci ty and stati ng that German
representati ves i n the Ot t oman Empi re had tried to save the
Ar me ni ans .
1 3
When the Porte refused, the Wi l hel mstrasse threatened
to i ssue such a statement on its own, but then backed down for fear
of damagi ng the Turki s h alliance.
Th e Armeni an Mas s acres provi ded useful and effective propaganda
for the Al l i ed Powers, as the Ge r man and Aust ri an ambas s adors had
feared. Perhaps the massacres also affected Allied thi nki ng about
the t erms of a future postwar settl ement, for they rei nforced the
argument that the Ot t oman Empi r e coul d not be left in control of
non- Mosl em popul at i ons, and possi bl y not even of non- Turki s h-
speaki ng popul at i ons.
It was evi dent to neutral opi ni on that Tal aat and Enver were
happy to have ri d themsel ves of the Armeni ans. Thei r publ i c posi ti on
was that they had foiled an at t empt at subversi on. Certai nl y they had
succeeded i n el i mi nati ng unrest; Armeni a became as qui et as death
itself.
* The Liberal statesman, historian, and jurist, James Bryce, a pro-Armenian who
headed a commission to investigate the 1915 16 Armenian Massacres during the
war, issued a report that was damning to the C. U. P. government. Turki sh spokes-
men still claim that the Bryce report was a one-sided and distorted work of wartime
propaganda, and cite the admission of Arnold Toynbee, one of Bryce's assistants,
that the report was intended to further Britain's propaganda and policy objecti ves.
1 4
In this it succeeded.
V
The Allies di d have one clear opport uni t y to subvert the Ot t oman
Empi re, but they del i beratel y passed i t up. It was offered to t hem by
Dj emal Pasha.
Al one among the Young Tu r k t ri umvi rs, Dj emal took st eps t o
di stance himself from the Armeni an Mas s acres . Hi s apparent ai m
was to keep open his avenues to the Al l i ed Powers. Si nce his defeat
at the Suez Canal i n early 1915, Dj emal had settled i n Damas c us and
had come to rul e Great er Syri at he southwestern provi nces that
today compri se Syri a, Lebanon, Jor dan, and Israel al most as his
pri vate fi efdom. At the end of 1915, while the Armeni an Mas s acres
were taki ng pl ace, he proposed, with Al l i ed hel p, to seize the Ot t oman
throne for himself.
Maki ng use of the representati ve of the domi nant Armeni an politi-
cal soci ety, the Das hnakt s ut i um ( Armeni an Revol uti onary Feder-
ati on), to convey his proposal s, Dj emal appears to have acted on the
mi staken assumpt i on that savi ng the Armeni ans as di sti nct from
merel y expl oi ti ng their plight for propaganda purpos es was an i m-
portant Al l i ed objecti ve. In December 1915 Dr Zavri ev, a Das hnak
emi ssary to the Al l i es, i nformed the Rus s i an government that Dj emal
was prepared to overthrow the Ot t oman government . Thi s was the
mont h that the Allied evacuati on from Gal l i pol i began; i n the wake
of that di sast rous expedi ti on it coul d have been expected that the
Allies woul d be willing to pay a pri ce to bri ng hostilities with Tur ke y
to an end.
Dj emal ' s t erms, as outl i ned by Sazanov, the Rus s i an Forei gn
Mi ni ster, envi saged a free and i ndependent Asi ati c Turkey (consi sti ng
of Syri a, Mesopot ami a, a Chri sti an Armeni a, Cilicia, and Kurdi s t an
as aut onomous provi nces) whose s upreme ruler woul d be Dj emal as
Sul t an. Dj emal agreed i n advance to the inevitable Rus s i an demand
to be gi ven Const ant i nopl e and the Dardanel l es. He also offered to
take i mmedi at e st eps to save the survi vi ng Armeni ans. He proposed,
with Al l i ed hel p, to march on Const ant i nopl e to depose the Sul t an
and his government ; and i n return he asked financial ai d to hel p
reconstruct his country after the war.
The Russi ans proposed t o accept Dj emal ' s proposal , and Sazanov
seemed confident that his allies woul d agree to do s o .
I S
But , i n
March 1916, France rejected the proposal and i nsi sted on havi ng
Cilicia (in the south of what i s now Turkey) and Great er Syri a for
herself.
Si r Edward Grey, the Bri ti sh Forei gn Secretary, also showed hi m-
self to be unwi l l i ng to encourage revolt behi nd enemy lines if doi ng
so meant foregoi ng the territorial gai ns i n Asi ati c Turkey that Bri tai n
had promi sed to her allies. In their passi on for booty, the Al l i ed
government s lost si ght of the condi ti on upon which future gai ns were
predi cat ed: wi nni ng the war. Bl i nded by the pri ze, they di d not see
that there was a contest.
Dj emal ' s offer afforded the Allies their one great opport uni t y to
subvert the Ot t oman Empi re from wi thi n; and they let i t go. Enver
and Tal aat never di scovered Dj emal ' s secret correspondence with the
enemy, and Dj emal conti nued the fight agai nst the Allies at their
si de.
VI
Th e Ot t oman Empi re benefited from the fact that i t was not the
pri nci pal theater of war for any of its opponent s, all of whose forces
and energi es were concentrated el sewhere. Even so, its warti me
perf ormance was surpri si ngl y successful . Engaged in a three-front
war, the Ot t oman Empi r e defeated Bri tai n and France i n the west i n
1915 16, crushed the advanci ng armi es of Bri ti sh Indi a in the east
at the s ame t i me, and i n the north hel d off the Rus s i an i nvasi on
forces.
Behi nd enemy lines, the Ot t oman perf ormance was equal l y out-
standi ng. Turki s h and German subversi on had made a shambl es of
the Al l i ed-control l ed Persi an Empi r e . In stri ki ng contrast, as of
mi d-1916 Bri tai n had failed in her efforts to win over the Arabi c-
speaki ng peopl es of the Ot t oman Empi re, and Russi a' s appeal to the
Armeni ans had been followed only by their dreadful mas s acre.
Woul d Hussei n' s i mmi nent revolt i n June 1916 turn the si tuati on
around? Woul d i t prove any more successful than previ ous Al l i ed
efforts to stir up troubl e behi nd Ot t oman lines? On the basi s of the
record to mi d- 1916 the chances woul d have had to be rated as low,
but Cl ayton and his col l eagues were hopeful , and if they were right
they stood to win a great pri ze. For Hussei n' s i mmi nent revolt was
Cai ro' s chance to win the war i n the Eas t , and to sal vage the wart i me
reputati on of its l eader, Lo r d Ki t chener.
27
KI TCHENER' S LAST MISSION
In London di recti on of the war was now entrusted not to the War
Mi ni ster, but to the Chi ef of the Imperi al General Staff. Th e Cabi net
had reason to believe that Ki t chener had lost his touch even i n the
area he was s uppos ed to know best t he Eas t . Th e only Bri ti sh
military operati on he had oppos ed there until the endt he evacuati on
from Gal l i pol i was the only one to have proved a brilliant success.
Asqui t h, who bel i eved it politically i mpossi bl e to let Ki t chener
resi gn and yet f ound it awkward to retain hi m in office, hit on the
expedi ent of sendi ng the War Mi ni ster away on another l ong mi s s i on
a mi ssi on to Rus s i a. A tri p t herehe of course was obl i ged to travel
by shi pwoul d take most of the last half of 1916. A l ong, dangerous
voyage i n arcti c seas was much to ask of the agi ng sol di er f rom the
tropi cs, but he accepted his new assi gnment and made his preparat i ons
to depart .
Hi s l ong run of luck had finally run out. If he had di ed in 1914 he
woul d have been remembered as the greatest Bri ti sh general si nce
Wel l i ngton. Had he di ed i n 1915 he woul d have been remembered as
the prophet who foretol d the nature and durati on of the Fi rst Worl d
War and as the organi zer of Bri tai n' s mas s army. But i n 1916 he had
become the agi ng veteran of a bygone era who coul d not cope with
the demands pl aced upon hi m i n changi ng ti mes. "They expect too
much of me, these fellows, " he is s uppos ed to have confided to a
Cabi net col l eague; "I don't know Europe, I don't know Engl and,
and I don't know the Bri ti sh Army. "
1
Hi s heart and mi nd remai ned
with the colonial armi es of Egypt and Indi a that he had reorgani zed
and that were trai ned to do his bi ddi ng. In modern Europe he was
lost.
Shortl y before noon on Fri day, 2 J une 1916, Lo r d Ki t chener went
to the Ki ng' s Cros s rai l road stati on al most unattended and unnoti ced.
The train was a mi nut e and a half late in starti ng, and he was seized
with i mpat i ence; he hated del ay. Once started, the train sped hi m to
his port of embarkat i on.
At Sc apa Fl ow, the headquart ers of the Gr and Fl eet off the
K I T C H E N E R ' S L A S T M I S S I O N 217
northern ti p of Scot l and, Ki t chener and the faithful Fi t zGeral d
boarded the armored crui ser Hampshire the afternoon of 5 June
1916, bound for the Rus s i an port of Archangel . Th e depart ure route
of the Hampshire had al ready been pl otted, but shoul d have been
changed. Naval Intel l i gence, which earlier had broken the Ge r man
radi o code, i ntercepted a message to the Ge r man mi nel ayi ng s ubma-
rine U75 i n late May. It i ndi cated that the submari ne was to mi ne the
passage that the Hampshire i ntended to follow. Two further inter-
cepts confi rmed the i nformati on, as di d si ghti ngs of the s ubmari ne.
In the confusi on at Bri ti sh headquart ers at Sc apa Fl ow, Admi ral Si r
John Jel l i coe, the Bri ti sh naval commander, and his staff somehow
failed to read or to underst and the warni ngs that Naval Intel l i gence
sent to their flagship. (At a court of i nqui ry that convened later in
1916 to look into the matter, Admi ral Jel l i coe succeeded in hi di ng
the exi stence of these intelligence warni ngs, which were reveal ed
only i n 1985. )
2
Th e seas were st ormy, but Ki t chener refused to delay hi s depar-
t ure. Admi ral Jel l i coe' s officers had mi sread the weather charts,
which shoul d have shown t hem that the st orm woul d intensify, and
they bel i eved that i t woul d abat e. At 4:45 p. m. the Hampshire put
out to sea into a ragi ng gal e. Th e weather proved too much for the
destroyers assi gned to escort dut y; after two hours, they t urned
back. Th e Hampshire st eamed ahead al one. Somet i me between 7:30
and 7:45 i t struck one of the U75' s mi nes and went down with
al most all hands.
As soon as the mi ne expl oded, Ki t chener and Fi t zGeral d came out
on the st arboard quart erdeck, followed by officers of their staff. One
survi vor later recalled that the "Capt ai n was calling to Lo r d K to go
to a boat but Lo r d K apparentl y di d not hear hi m or else took no
noti ce. "
3
Es c ape f rom the doomed vessel seemed out of the questi on,
and the fi el d marshal made no move to at t empt it. He st ood on deck,
cal m and expressi onl ess, for about a quart er of an hour. Th e only
survi vor of the Hampshire who is still alive has never forgotten a last
gl i mpse of hi m, dressed in a greatcoat, st andi ng on deck and wai ti ng
i mpassi vel y for the shi p t o s i nk.
4
The n Lo r d Ki t chener and his shi p
went down beneath the turbul ent waves.
Fi t zGeral d' s body was washed ashore, but Ki t chener di sappeared
into the dept hs of the sea. A popul ar l egend s prang up in Bri tai n
soon afterward, accordi ng to which Lo r d Ki t chener had escaped
from death and woul d one day return.
28
HUSSEI N' S REVOLT
i
By a coi nci dence that often has been remarked upon, Lo r d Ki t chener
was lost at sea just as the Emi r Hus s ei n of Mecca procl ai med his
rebellion agai nst the Ot t oman Empi r e . Hussei n ordered i t when he
di scovered that the Young Tur ks i ntended t o depose hi m. But Bri ti sh
officialdom i n Cai ro and Khar t oum, unaware of this, regarded the
rebellion as an accompl i shment of the school of Ki t chenerof
Wi ngate, Cl ayt on, and St or r s and of their tactic of dangl i ng vague
but grandi ose prospect s of future gl ory in front of the Emi r' s eyes.
Th e Resi dency had been worki ng to generate the upri si ng for al most
nine mont hs. When the news of the desert upri si ng reached Cai ro,
Wyndham Deedes called i t "a great t ri umph for Cl ayt on. "
1
For Hussei n, i t was somet hi ng cl oser to an admi ssi on of defeat; his
policy had been to remai n neutral and collect bri bes from both si des.
He moved to the Al l i ed si de rel uctantl y, forced to do so by the
i mmi nent danger that the Young Tur ks woul d overthrow hi m.
Havi ng al ready di scovered that they i ntended to depose hi m eventu-
ally, he f ound himself exposed to new ri sks, starti ng i n the s ummer
of 1915, when Dj emal Pasha began to crush di ssent i n the Arab
circles with which Hussei n ( t hrough his son Fei sal ) had been i n
contact i n Damas c us . Dj emal acted on the basi s of document s ob-
tained from the French consul ates i n Bei rut and Damas c us that
betrayed the names of Arab conspi rat ors and of at least one key
Bri ti sh agent. Arrest s were made. Interrogati ons, torture, and trials
by mi l i tary court took pl ace. On 21 Augus t 1915 eleven persons
convicted of treason were execut ed. In the following mont hs there
were more arrests and more tri al s. A number of those arrested were
promi nent figures i n Arab life. Among those undergoi ng torture and
i nterrogati on in jail were peopl e who coul d have reveal ed detai l s of
Fei sal ' s conversati ons with the secret societies al -' Ahd and al - Fat at ,
and of Hussei n' s promi ses t o Ki t chener and McMahon. Th e Emi r
coul d not be sure that they woul d remai n silent. He sent pl eas to
2 1 S
H U S S E I N ' S R E V O L T 219
Dj emal and to the Porte aski ng that they show mercy to the pri soners.
Th e pl eas only compromi s ed hi m further.
The n, i n Apri l 1916, Hus s ei n l earned f rom Dj emal that a pi cked
and speci al l y trai ned Ot t oman force of 3, 500 men was about to
march t hrough the Hej az to the tip of the Arabi an peni nsul a, where
an accompanyi ng party of Ge r man officers pl anned to establ i sh a
tel egraph stati on. Th e Ot t oman force was sufficiently st rong t o crush
Hussei n as i t marched t hrough his domai n. Th e news threw the
Emi r into hasty and i mprovi sed acti vi ty; i t obl i ged hi m to strike first,
and to seek the protecti on of the Royal Navy al ong his coast. On
6 May there were twenty-one new executi ons i n Bei rut and Damas c us ;
the news was unexpect ed, and speeded up Hussei n' s schedul e.
Prudentl y, Hus s ei n had al ready obtai ned more than 50, 000 gol d
pounds from the Porte with which to rai se and equi p forces to
combat the Bri t i sh. To this he added the first i nstal l ment of a
substanti al payment from Bri tai n with whi ch to rai se and equi p
forces t o combat the Tu r k s .
2
Th e revolt i n the Hej az was procl ai med
somet i me between 5 and 10 June 1916. Th e Royal Navy i mmedi atel y
moved al ong the Hej az coastl i ne, whi ch deterred the Ge r man-
Turki s h force f rom advanci ng further.
Th e Arab Bureau bel i eved that the upri si ng woul d draw support
throughout the Mos l em and Arabi c- speaki ng worl ds. Mos t i mportant
of all, it bel i eved that the revolt woul d draw support from what the
Bri ti sh bel i eved to be a l argel y Arabi c- speaki ng Ot t oman army. Fei sal
and Hus s ei n report ed that they expected to be joi ned by about
100, 000 Arab t r oops .
3
Tha t woul d have been about a thi rd of the
Ot t oman army' s fighting strength. Accordi ng to other report s,
Hussei n expected to be joi ned by about 250, 000 t roops, or al most the
whole of the Turki s h army' s functional combat t r oops .
4
In the event, the Arab revolt for whi ch Hussei n hoped never took
pl ace. No Arabi c units of the Ot t oman army came over to Hus s ei n.
No political or mi l i tary figures of the Ot t oman Empi re defected to
hi m and the Al l i es. Th e powerful secret mi l i tary organi zati on that
al - Faruqi had promi sed woul d rally to Hussei n failed to make itself
known. A few t housand t ri besmen, subsi di zed by Bri ti sh money,
consti tuted Hussei n' s t roops. He had no regul ar army. Out si de the
Hej az and its tribal nei ghbors, there was no visible s upport for the
revolt i n any part of the Arabi c- speaki ng worl d. Th e handful of non-
Hejazi officers who joi ned the Emi r' s armed forces were pri soners-of-
war or exiles who al ready resi ded in Bri ti sh-control l ed terri tori es.
An initial mi l i tary probl em was that the Emi r' s smal l band of tribal
followers were hel pl ess agai nst Ot t oman artillery. Thei r attacks on
the Turki s h garri sons i n Mecca and nearby Tai f were repul sed, as
were their attacks on Medi na and on the port of Je ddah. Bri ti sh shi ps
and ai rpl anes came t o the rescue by attacki ng Je ddah. Once the port
was secured the Bri ti sh l anded Mos l em t roops from the Egypt i an
army, who moved i nl and t o hel p Hus s ei n take Mecca and Tai f . The
port of Rabegh, defended by fewer than thirty Tur ks , was capt ured
with ease, as was the port of Yanbo. Th u s the Bri ti sh Royal Navy
won control of the Red Sea coast of Arabi a, and establ i shed a Bri ti sh
presence ashore i n the port s.
Hussei n woul d not allow Chri sti an Bri ti sh military uni ts to move
i nl and. Hi s expressed view, which the Bri ti sh found parochi al , was
that it woul d compromi s e his posi ti on in the Mos l em worl d and
woul d be deepl y resented if non- Mosl ems were to enter the l and that
embraced the Hol y Pl aces.
Th e probl em was that Hussei n on his own was no match for the
Tur ks . Th e activist Regi nal d Wi ngate, Governor- General of the
Sudan, wrote to Cl ayt on that Bri tai n ought to send i n t roops whether
Hussei n wanted t hem or not. He noted that he had been i n favor of
sendi ng a Bri ti sh expedi ti onary force to the Hej az all al ong.
5
But
Wi ngate' s superi ors di sagreed with hi m, and i t became Bri ti sh policy,
i nsofar as it was possi bl e, to suppl y professi onal military assi stance to
the Hej az from among Mos l em officers and t roops. In a l and of
i ntri gue, this policy was al so beset with difficulties.
Maj or al - Masri , strongl y recommended by the Bri ti sh authori ti es,
was appoi nted Chi ef of Staff of the forces nomi nal l y commanded by
the Emi r' s son Ali. He took up his posi ti on in late 1916, and within a
mont h was removed f rom command as a result of a murky i ntri gue.
He was repl aced by the abl e Jaaf ar al -Askari , an Arab general i n the
Ot t oman army whom the Bri ti sh had taken pri soner.
Accordi ng to one account, al - Masri was pl otti ng to take over
control f rom Hussei n i n order to negoti ate to change si des. He spoke
of comi ng to an arrangement whereby the Hej az forces woul d return
to the Ot t oman fold in return for an agreement by the Porte to grant
local aut onomy to Arabi c- speaki ng ar e as .
6
It was not merel y that al - Masri and his col l eagues bel i eved that
Germany woul d win the war. Two years later, when i t had become
clear that it was the Allies who were goi ng to win, the one-ti me Arab
secret society commander i n Damas c us ( whom al - Faruqi had pur-
port ed to represent when he duped Cl ayt on and the others i n Cai ro) ,
General Yasi n al - Hashi mi , still refused to change si des. Gi l bert
Cl ayton had mi sread the politics of the Arab secret soci eti es: they
were profoundl y oppos ed to Bri ti sh desi gns i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . At
the begi nni ng of the war they had resol ved to support the Ot t oman
Empi re agai nst the threat of European conques t .
7
The y remai ned
faithful to their resol ve. The y preferred aut onomy or i ndependence
if they coul d get it; but if they coul d not, they preferred to be rul ed
by Turki s h Mos l ems rather than by Chri st i ans.
Hussei n himself, from the openi ng days of his revolt, conti nued-to
communi cat e with the Young Tur ks with a view to changi ng back to
the Ot t oman si de of the war. Th e Arab Bulletin (no. 25, 7 October
1916) quot ed the Arabi an warl ord Abdul Azi z Ibn Sa ud as chargi ng
that "Sheri f' s original intention was to pl ay off the Bri ti sh agai nst the
Tur ks , and thus get the Tur ks to grant hi m i ndependence guarant eed
by Germany. "
Hussei n' s basi c program remai ned constant: he wanted more power
and aut onomy as Emi r within the Ot t oman Empi re, and he wanted
his posi ti on to be made heredi tary. Al t hough the Bri ti sh were not yet
aware of his correspondence with the enemy, they rapi dl y became
di senchanted with the Emi r for other reasons. As they came to see it,
Hussei n, far from bei ng the leader of a newly created Arab national-
i sm, was a ruler who took little interest in nati onal i sm and whose
only concern was for the acqui si ti on of new powers and territories for
himself. Davi d Hogart h, the intelligence officer who headed the
Arab Bureau, drily comment ed that, "It i s obvi ous that the Ki ng
regards Arab Uni ty as synonymous with his own Ki ngs hi p . . . "
8
The Emi r i nsi sted on procl ai mi ng himself ki ng of the Arabs ,
al though Ronal d St orrs on behalf of Cai ro had warned hi m not to do
so. St orrs later wrote that "he knew better than we that he coul d lay
no kind of genui ne cl ai m" to be the ki ng of all the Ar a bs .
9
In this
respect, St orrs found that "his pretensi ons bordered on the tragi -
comi c, " yet felt that Bri tai n was now obl i ged to s upport hi m as far as
pos s i bl e .
1 0
Th e Arab Bureau was deepl y di sappoi nt ed by the failure
of Hussei n' s l eadershi p to take hol d.
I I
It i s due to T. E. Lawrence, a j uni or member of the Arab Bureau,
that its real views were recorded in conveni ent f orm, provi di ng an
account of the cont emporary observat i ons and pri vate t hought s of
the smal l band of Ki tchener' s followers who had organi zed Hussei n' s
revolt and who had pl aced so much hope i n it. It was Lawrence who
suggest ed that the Arab Bureau publ i sh an i nformati on bul l eti n.
Ori gi nal l y i ssued under the title Arab Bureau Summaries, it then
became the Arab Bulletin. It appeared at i rregul ar i nterval s, com-
menci ng 6 June 1916, and conti nui ng until the end of 1918. Th e first
i ssue was edi ted by Lawrence. For most of the next three mont hs,
i ssues were edi ted by Li eut enant - Commander Davi d Hogart h, the
Oxf ord archaeol ogi st who served as Di rect or of the Arab Bureau. At
the end of the s ummer, Capt ai n Ki nahan Cornwal l i s, Hogart h' s
deputy, took over as the regul ar edi tor.
Issued from the Arab Bureau offices i n the Savoy Hotel , Cai ro,
the Arab Bulletin was l abel ed "Secret . " Only twenty-six copi es were
pri nted of each i ssue. Th e restri cted di stri buti on list i ncl uded the
Viceroy of Indi a and the Bri ti sh commanders-i n-chi ef i n Egypt and
the Sudan. A copy each also went to the War Office and to the
Admi ral t y i n London. Th e i ssues provi ded a wi de range of confiden-
tial current and background i nformati on about the Arab and Mosl em
worl ds.
Lawrence, i n the first i ssue (6 June 1916), which appeared just as
the revolt in the Hej az began, i ndi cated that there were probl ems in
hol di ng Arabs together even for the purpos es of revolt. He wrote
that whenever there were l arge tribal gatheri ngs, di ssensi ons soon
arose; and, knowi ng this, the Tur ks held back and di d nothi ng.
The y del ayed "in the sure expectati on that tribal di ssensi on woul d
soon di s member their opponent s. "
Th e Arab Bulletin, no. 5 (18 J une 1916), reported the begi nni ng
of Hussei n' s procl ai med revolt a week or two earlier. Thi s i ssue and
i ssue no. 6 (23 June 1916) i ndi cate that Hussei n' s military operati ons
had achi eved only modest success, and that even this had been due
to Bri ti sh forces. Accordi ng to i ssue no. 6, the Tur ks on the coast
were caught between Bri ti sh shi ps and seapl anes, and the Arabs .
Seeki ng cover behi nd wal l s, the Tur ks were driven to surrender for
lack of food and water, for their wells were outsi de the wal l s. Turki s h
pri soners taken at Je ddah were quot ed in the Arab Bulletin, no. 7
(30 June 1916), as sayi ng that Engl i sh "shells and bombs i t was that
really took the town. "
Hussei n' s t roops were belittled as sol di ers. Accordi ng to i ssue
no. 6, "They are presumabl y t ri besmen only"; and "They are all un-
trai ned, and have no artillery or machi ne guns . Thei r preference i s
for the showy si de of warfare, and it will be difficult to hold them
together for any length of ti me, unl ess the pay and rati ons are
attracti ve. " A detai l ed anal ysi s and descri pti on written by T. E.
Lawrence, which appeared i n i ssue no. 32 (26 November 1916), was
i n the s ame vei n: "I think one company of Tur ks , properl y en-
trenched i n open country, woul d defeat the Sheri f' s armi es. Th e
val ue of the tri bes is defensi ve only, and their real sphere is gueri l l a
warfare. " He wrote that they were "too i ndi vi dual i sti c to endure
commands , or fight in line, or help each other. It woul d, I think, be
i mpossi bl e to make an organi zed force out of t hem. "
Hussei n' s call to revolt fell on deaf ears throughout the Arab
and Mos l em worl ds, accordi ng to the Arab Bulletin. Soundi ngs of
opi ni on around the gl obe, as reported i n i ssues t hroughout 1916,
elicited responses rangi ng from indifference to hostility. I s s ue no. 29
(8 November 1916), which reported Hussei n' s procl amat i on that he
was as s umi ng the title of Ki ng of the Arabs , comment ed icily that
"the pri nce, cl ai mi ng such recogni ti on, is very far from bei ng in
a posi ti on to substanti ate his pretensi on, " and that Hi s Majesty' s
Government was not goi ng to si gn a bl ank check on the future
political organi zati on of the Arab peopl es. In i ssue no. 41 (6 February
1917), Hogart h wrote that "the prospect of Arabi a uni ted under
either the Ki ng of the Hej az or anyone else seems very remot e. Th e
' Arab Cause' is evidently a very weak cement in the peni nsul a;
dislike of the Tur k is stronger; and a desi re to stand well with us is
perhaps stronger still."
Nearl y a year after Hussei n procl ai med the Arab Revol t, Hogart h
was prepared to write it off as a fai l ure. In reviewing what he called
"A Year of Revol t" in the Hej az for the Arab Bulletin, no. 52
(31 May 1917), he concl uded that it had not fulfilled the hopes
pl aced in it nor di d it justify further expect at i ons: "That the Hej az
Bedoui ns were si mpl y guerillas, and not of good qual i ty at that, had
been ampl y demonst rat ed, even in the early si eges; and it was never
i n doubt that they woul d not attack nor wi thstand Turki s h regul ars. "
The best that coul d be hoped for i n the future from Hussei n' s Arab
Movement , he wrote, was that it woul d "just hold its own in pl ace. "
It was not much of a return on the Bri ti sh i nvestment. Accordi ng
to a later account by Ronal d St orrs , Bri tai n spent, in all, 11 million
pounds sterl i ng to subsi di ze Hussei n' s revol t .
1 1
At the ti me this was
about 44 mi l l i on dol l ars; in today' s currency it woul d be closer to 400
million dol l ars. Bri tai n' s military and political i nvestment i n Hussei n' s
revolt was also consi derabl e. On 21 Sept ember 1918 Regi nal d
Wi ngate, who by then had succeeded Ki t chener and McMahon as
Bri ti sh proconsul i n Egypt , wrote that "Mosl ems i n general have
hitherto regarded the Hej az revolt, and our share i n it, with suspi ci on
or dislike"; and that it was i mport ant to make Hussei n look as
t hough he had not been a failure in order to keep Bri tai n from
l ooki ng b a d .
1 2
Ill
Thr e e weeks after Hus s ei n announced his rebellion, the Bri ti sh War
Office told the Cabi net in London that the Arab worl d was not
following his l ead. In a secret me mor andum prepared for the War
Commi t t ee of the Cabi net on 1 Jul y 1916, the General Staff of the
War Office reported that Hussei n "has al ways represented himself, in
his correspondence with the Hi gh Commi ssi oner, as bei ng the
spokesman of the Arab nation, but so far as is known, he is not
support ed by any organi zati on of Arabs nearly general enough to
secure . . . aut omat i c acceptance of the t erms agreed to by hi m. "
1 3
As a resul t, accordi ng to the me mor andum, the Bri ti sh government
ought not to as s ume that agreement s reached with hi m woul d be
honored by other Arab l eaders.
In a secret memorandum entitled "The Probl em of the Near
Eas t , " prepared at about the s ame t i me, Si r Mark Sykes predi cted
that if Bri ti sh aid were not forthcomi ng, the Sheri f Hussei n' s move-
ment woul d be crushed by early 1917. Gl oomi l y, Sykes foresaw that
by the cl ose of the war, Turkey woul d be the most exhaust ed of the
belligerent countri es and, as a resul t, woul d be taken over by her
partner, Germany. The Ot t oman Empi re, wrote Sykes, woul d be-
come little more than a Ge r man c ol ony.
1 4
Hi s anal ysi s i n this respect
foreshadowed the new views about the Mi ddl e Eas t that were to
become current in Bri ti sh official circles the following year under the
influence of Le o Amery and his col l eagues.
Sykes had become an assi stant to his friend Mauri ce Hankey,
Secretary of Asqui t h' s War Cabi net . In his new posi ti on Sykes
conti nued to concern himself with the Eas t . He had publ i shed an
Arabian Report, a London forerunner of Cai ro' s Arab Bulletin. When
his friend Gi l bert Cl ayton arri ved f rom Egypt in the latter half of
1916, the two men went before the War Commi t t ee to urge s upport
for Hussei n' s revolt i n the Hej az. The y also urged- that Si r Henry
Mc Mahon shoul d be repl aced as Hi gh Commi ssi oner i n Egypt ; for
McMahon had been appoi nt ed only to keep the posi ti on avai l abl e for
Ki t chener, and when the field marshal di ed, Ki t chener' s followers
wanted the j ob for Regi nal d Wi ngate, one of their own.*
Duri ng the s ummer of 1916, Sykes spent a good deal of ti me
maki ng publ i c speeches. In his speeches he gave currency to the new
descri pti ve phrase, "the Mi ddl e Eas t , " which the Ameri can naval
officer and hi stori an Al fred Thayer Mahan had i nvented i n 1902 to
desi gnate the area between Arabi a and I ndi a ;
1 5
and he added to his
publ i c reputati on as an expert on that area of the worl d.
In Sept ember, as intelligence report s from Cai ro i ndi cated that the
revolt in the Hej az was col l apsi ng even more rapi dl y than he had
anti ci pated, Sykes advocat ed sendi ng out military support to Hussei n
i mmedi at el ya pl an vi gorousl y advanced by McMahon and Wi ngate.
Hi s urgi ngs were in vai n: Robert son, the all-powerful new Chi ef of
the Imperi al General Staff, refused to divert troops or efforts from
the western front.
Th e late s ummer and aut umn of 1916 appeared t o be desperat e
ti mes for Hussei n' s cause, t hough i n retrospect Bri tai n' s naval control
of the Red Sea coastl i ne probabl y ensured the survi val of the Emi r' s
support ers. Th e Bri ti sh hit on the i dea of sendi ng a few hundred
Arab pri soners-of-war f rom Indi a' s Mesopot ami an front to join
Hussei n. When Si r Archi bal d Murray, commandi ng general (since
January 1916) of the Bri ti sh army in Egypt , reiterated that he coul d
* In the end, they succeeded. Wingate was appointed High Commissioner, but
not until January 1917.
spare no t roops to send to Hussei n' s defense, the Hi gh Commi ssi oner,
Si r Henry McMahon, suggest ed aski ng for help from France. He
also sent Ronal d St orrs , his ai de at the Resi dency, on a mi ssi on to
Arabi a to i nqui re as to what else coul d be done.
IV
At the end of the s ummer of 1916, the French government sent a
mi ssi on to the Hej az to at t empt to st op the Sheri f Hussei n' s revolt
from col l apsi ng. Li eut enant - Col onel Edouard Bremond, headi ng the
French mi ssi on, arri ved in Al exandri a 1 Sept ember 1916, and from
there took shi p for Arabi a, arri vi ng at the Hejazi port of Je ddah on
20 Se pt e mbe r .
1 6
Bremond' s opposi t e number i n Je ddah was Col onel C. E. Wi l son,
the senior Bri ti sh officer in the Hej az and representati ve of the
Government of the Sudanwhi ch is to say of Wi ngate, who was
soon to as s ume operati onal control of the Bri ti sh si de of the Hej az
revolt. Hi s assi stant, Capt ai n Hubert Young, was at the Bri ti sh
consul ate in Je ddah (which called itself the Pi l gri mage Office, as it
dealt with the affairs of Mos l em pi l gri ms from Bri ti sh Indi a and
el sewhere) to greet Bremond when he arri ved. Bremond also met
Vi ce-Admi ral Si r Rossl yn Wemyss, whose Bri ti sh fl eet control l ed the
Red Sea pas s age between Egypt and the Sudan and Arabi a, and who
ferried officers and men across it.
Bremond' s assi gnment was to shore up the Hej az revolt by suppl y-
ing a cadre of professi onal mi l i tary advi sers from among the
Mohamme dan popul ati on of the French Empi re who, as Mos l ems ,
woul d be accept abl e to the Sheri f. Th e French mi ssi on led by
Bremond compri s ed 42 officers and 983 men. Th e size of the French
mi ssi on prompt ed the rival Bri ti sh to send out a further compl ement
of officers of their own to serve under Wi l son. Bremond, in t urn,
cont empl at ed i ncreasi ng the size of his forces in order to strengthen
the forces of the Sherif, which were dangerousl y weak. Indeed,
Abdul l ah, the son closest to the Sheri f' s thinking, was fearful that
the Ot t oman forces based i n Medi na mi ght attack and overrun the
rebel posi ti ons on the road to Mecca.
In the mi ddl e of Oct ober, Ronal d St orrs , of the Bri ti sh Resi dency
i n Cai ro, took shi p from Egypt to the Hej az with an alternative
approach. He came i n support of Maj or Azi z al - Masri , the nationalist
secret society l eader, whom Cai ro had nomi nated to take i n hand the
trai ni ng and reorgani zati on of the Hej az forces, and whose brief
tenure i n command was descri bed earlier (see page 220) . Al - Masri
was of the opi ni on that it woul d be a political di saster to allow Al l i ed
t roops, even t hough Mos l em, to become too visibly i nvol ved i n the
Sheri f' s campai gn. Hi s view was that the forces of Mecca coul d fight
effectively on their own if trai ned in the techni ques of guerri l l a
warfare.
St orrs arranged for his young fri end, the juni or intelligence officer
T. E. Lawrence, t o come al ong on the shi p t o Je ddah. Lawrence had
accumul at ed a few weeks of leave t i me, and wanted to spend t hem in
Arabi a, which he had never vi si ted. St orrs obtai ned permi ssi on for
Lawrence to come al ong with hi m; so they arri ved i n Je ddah
together.
Tho ma s Edward Lawrence was twenty-ei ght years ol d, t hough he
looked cl oser to nineteen or twenty. He had been turned down for
army service as too smal l ; he st ood only a few inches above five feet
i n height. Hubert Young called hi m "a quiet little ma n. "
1 7
Ronal d
St orrs , like most others, called hi m "little Lawrence, " t hough St orrs
also called hi m "s uper- cerebral . "
1 8
Hi s personal ci rcumst ances seemed undi st i ngui shed. He was
apparentl y of a poor fami l y and of modest background, in an Arab
Bureau group that i ncl uded Members of Parl i ament, mi l l i onai res,
and ari stocrats. He had attended the Ci ty School at home i n Oxf ord
rather than a publ i c school (in the Bri ti sh sense) : Et on, Harrow,
Winchester, or the like. In Arab Bureau circles he ranked low, and
had no mi l i tary accompl i shment s to his credi t.
Lawrence had worked for the archaeol ogi st Davi d Hogart h at the
Ashmol ean Mus e um, and Hogart hwho later became head of the
Arab Bureauhad gotten hi m into the geographi cal section of the
War Office in the aut umn of 1914 as a t emporary second lieutenant-
t rans l at or.
1 9
Fr om there he went out to the Mi ddl e East to do survey
maps . He stayed on i n Cai ro to do other j obs.
When St orrs and Lawrence arri ved i n Je ddah, the Emi r Hussei n' s
son Abdul l ah met t hem. Abdul l ah proved an i mmedi at e di sappoi nt -
ment to Lawrence, but Lawrence so i mpressed Abdul l ah that he won
coveted permi ssi on to go into the field to meet the Emi r of Mecca' s
other sons. For Lawrence this was a maj or coup. Col onel Al fred
Parker, who had been the first head of the Arab Bureau and who
served as head of Mi l i tary Intel l i gence in the Hej az revolt, wrote to
Cl ayton on 24 Oct ober 1916, that "Before Lawrence arri ved I had
been pushi ng the idea of goi ng up country and had hoped to go up.
Don' t think I grudge hi m, especi al l y as he will do it as well or better
than anyone. Si nce he has been gone" the Hej az government "is not
inclined to agree to other t r i ps . "
2 0
In the field, Lawrence visited Fei sal and the other l eaders and
found Fei sal enchant i ng: "an absol ut e ri pper, " he later wrote to a
col l eague.
2 1
Lawrence deci ded that Fei sal shoul d become the field
commander of the Hej az revolt. Among his other qual i ti es, Fei sal
l ooked the part .
H U S S E I N ' S R E V O L T
227
On his own initiative, Lawrence sent a written report to Regi nal d
Wi ngate, Governor- General of the Sudan, who was soon to be sent
to Egypt to repl ace McMahon as Hi gh Commi ssi oner. When Lawrence
left the Hej az in November, i nstead of returni ng directly to Cai ro, he
embarked for the Sudan to i ntroduce himself to Wi ngate.
Lawrencet hrough hi s fri endshi p with Gi l bert Cl ayt on, the
Sudan' s representati ve i n Cai romus t have been familiar with
Wingate's outl ook on the future of Mi ddl e East ern politics. He woul d
have known that Wi ngate ai med at securi ng Bri ti sh domi nati on of
the postwar Ar ab Mi ddl e Eas t and (like hi msel f) at preventi ng France
f rom establ i shi ng a posi ti on in the regi on. Al t hough Wi ngate wanted
Hussei n' s forces to be saved from defeat and possi bl e destructi on, he
coul d not have wanted the rescue to be undertaken by Fr e nc hme n
for that woul d risk bri ngi ng Hussei n' s Arab Movement under long-
term French influence.
Lawrence propos ed to Wi ngate an al ternati ve to Bremond' s project
of empl oyi ng French and other Al l i ed regul ar army uni ts to do the
bul k of Hussei n' s fighting for hi m: Hussei n' s t ri besmen shoul d
be used as i rregul ars in a Bri ti sh-l ed guerri l l a warfare campai gn.
Azi z al - Masri had originally suggest ed the guerri l l a warfare i dea to
Lawrence, i ntendi ng t o excl ude France and Bri tai n f rom Arabi a;
Lawrence modi fi ed the pl an so as to excl ude only France. Lawrence
added that Fei sal shoul d be appoi nt ed to command the Sheri fi an
stri ki ng forces, and cl ai med that he himself was the only liaison
officer with whom Fei sal woul d work.
Wi ngate t ended to agree. Back i n 1914 he had been the fi rst to
urge that the Arabi an tri bes shoul d be sti rred up to make troubl e for
Turkey. In a sense i t was Wi ngate' s own pl an that Lawrence was
advocati ng. Indeed, wri ti ng to a fellow general some two decades
later, Wi ngate cl ai med that it was heand not "poor little
Lawrence"who had l aunched, s upport ed, and made possi bl e the
Arab Mo v e me nt .
2 2
Lawrence' s proposal s were also congeni al to the Bri ti sh mi l i tary
authori ti es i n Cai ro. The y di d not expect his guerri l l a warfare cam-
pai gn to be a great s ucces s qui t e the cont rarybut they had no
troops to s pare for the Hej az and therefore were del i ghted to hear
that none were needed. Lawrence rose high i n their esti mati on by
not aski ng for any.
Lawrence left Cai ro agai n on 25 November 1916, and by early
December had taken up his posi ti on with Fei sal . Wi ngate became
Hi gh Commi ssi oner i n January 1917, and suppl i ed Lawrence with
i ncreasi ngl y l arge s ums of gol d with which to buy s upport f rom the
Arab tri bes. Yet the winter and s pri ng of 1917 went by with no news
of any significant mi l i tary success that Lawrence' s t ri besmen had
won.
V
Th e most conspi cuous failure of the Mecca revolt was its failure to
carry with it Medi na, the other large holy city of the Hej az. Medi na
lay s ome 300 miles to the northeast of Mecca, bl ocki ng the rout e that
cont i nued nort hward t oward Syr i a. Fol l owers of the Sheri f Hussei n
attacked it in the first days of the revolt, but were beaten off with
ease; and the Sheri f' s forces were unabl e to capt ure it duri ng the
war. Nor coul d they by- pass it and allow its large Tur ki s h garri son to
attack t hem on the flank or from the rear.
Medi na was sur r ounded by a sol i d st one wall, sai d to dat e from the
twelfth cent ury, domi nat ed by t owers and, at the nort hwest , by a
castle manned by the Ot t oman gar r i son. The terminal of the Hej az
railroad from Da ma s c us was si t uat ed within its walls, and provi ded
access to suppl i es and rei nforcement s. Al t hough the railroad track
was repeat edl y dynami t ed duri ng the war by Allied-led Bedoui n
rai di ng part i es, the Ot t oman garri son cont i nued to repair it and keep
it in use.
Th e Ot t oman presence at Medi na, bl ocki ng the line of advance
that the Sherifian t ri besmen woul d have to follow in order to partici-
pate in the mai n theater of operat i ons of the Mi ddl e East er n war,
seemed t o demonst rat e that Hussei n was not goi ng anywhere. Th e
rebellion that st reamed forth from Mecca was visibly brought to a
halt by the cent uri es-ol d walls of Medi na. Th e st ruct ure of Ot t oman
authority held firm. It had not been in the state of advanced decay
that Eur opean observers had report ed it to be.
PART V
THE ALLIES AT THE
NADIR OF THEIR
FORTUNES
29
THE FALL OF THE ALLI ED
GOVERNMENTS: BRITAIN AND
FRANCE
i
Bet ween aut umn 1916 and aut umn 1917, the Ot t oman Empi r e held
firm while the gover nment s of its adversari es, the Al l i ed Powers,
col l apsed. Thi s was very much cont rary t o what Eur opean political
and military l eaders had expect ed.
Th e Ot t oman ar my' s success i n hol di ng the Dar danel l es pl ayed a
direct role in the overt hrow of Pr i me Mi ni st er Asqui t h' s gover nment
i n Bri t ai n and that of Czar Ni chol as i n Rus s i a. Th e overt hrow of the
Bri t i sh and Russi an gover nment s, and of the Fr ench gover nment i n
1917, br ought to power in the three Al l i ed capi t al s new l eaders who
held st r ong vi ews about the Mi ddl e East which were totally at
vari ance with t hose of their pr edecessor s.
Th e Pr i me Mi ni st er who had br ought Britain into the war was the
first Al l i ed leader to fall vi ct i m to it. Bonar La w once obser ved, in a
letter to Asqui t h, that "I n war it is necessary not only to be active
but t o seem act i ve. "
1
Asqui t h, with his indolent patrician ways,
seemed the reverse. He had achi eved a t oweri ng posi t i on in Bri t i sh
politics, but it was an aspect of his speci al geni us to make his
t r i umphs appear effortless. In the t ransact i on of political and govern-
mental busi ness he was unhur r i ed: he always seemed t o have t i me
for anot her di nner part y, another visit to the count rysi de, orall too
oftenanother cognac.
As military cat ast rophes mul t i pl i ed i n Mesopot ami a, Gal l i pol i , and
on the west ern front, the Pr i me Mi ni st er' s met hod of Cabi net
government by consensus seemed i ndeci si ve, while his unwi l l i ngness
t o call upon the nation for such st r ong measur es as compul sor y
military servi ce suggest ed that he was l ess than compl et el y dedi cat ed
to wi nni ng the war.
Ll oyd Geor ge, i n dramat i c cont rast , made the conscri pt i on i ssue
his own. In t aki ng the l ead on this i ssue he showed how much his
231
232 T H E A L L I E S A T T H E N A D I R O F T H E I R F O R T U N E S
political posi ti on had changed. While Asqui t h, who had brought the
country into the war, conti nued to uphol d peaceti me civil liberties
and Li beral val ues, Ll oyd George, the one-ti me Radi cal who until
the last moment had oppos ed entry into the war, emerged as a leader
prepared to sacrifice i ndi vi dual ri ghts for the sake of victory. Tr a -
ditional Li beral s , who had al ways oppos ed compul si on, felt that
Ll oyd George was goi ng over t o the other camp.
As he lost his old political fri ends, Ll oyd George acqui red new
ones, two of whom proved to be especi al l y i mport ant . One was Si r
Edward Cars on, the rebel Iri sh To r y who led the fi ght for conscri p-
tion i n the Hous e of Commons . Th e other was the champi on of
i mperi al i sm, Al fred Mi l ner, who led the fight for conscri pti on in the
Hous e of Lo r ds and, as chai rman of the Nati onal Servi ce Le ague , i n
the country. Mi l ner, an out st andi ng colonial admi ni strator, had been
largely responsi bl e for l aunchi ng the Boer War, the venture in Sout h
Africa at the turn of the century that Ll oyd George as a young
idealist had vi gorousl y oppos e d.
2
At the ti me Ll oyd George had
attacked Mi l ner bi tterl y. As a Radi cal , the young Wel shman had
opposed i mperi al expansi on, foreign i nvol vement, and mi l i tary ven-
t ures; while Lo r d Mi l ner, as a Li beral Uni oni st who became the
i nspi rati on of ri ght-wi ng Tori es , made himself the center of i mperi al -
ist thought. Hi s ideal was i mperi al uni on. Toget her with the young
men assembl ed i n Sout h Afri ca under his l eadershi p"Mi l ner' s
Ki ndergart en"he had st i mul at ed the movement for i ntegrati on of
the far-flung empi re into one organi c unit. Mi l ner was a s uperb
admi ni strator whose skills were later to prove i nval uabl e to Ll oyd
George in wi nni ng the war.
I I
In 1916, Ll oyd George became Secret ary of St at e for War when
Ki t chener di ed, but found hi msel f powerl ess to put an end to the
si ckeni ng military di sast ers of that year. It has been esti mated that
the total of mi l i tary and civilian casual ti es in all of Europe' s domest i c
and international conflicts in the 100 years between 1815 and 1915
was no greater than a si ngl e day' s combat l osses in any of the great
battl es of 1916.
3
Comi ng after Gal l i pol i and Mesopot ami a, and such
* Milner's ideal was a union of the white peoples of the British Empi re. Other
members of the Milner circle, however, advocated a multiracial imperial union.
Lionel George Curtis, his former secretary, in 1910 helped to found the
quarterly review the Round Table which advocated British imperial federalism.
Another former secretary, John Buchan, was a fervent imperialist who won over a
vast public by his popular adventure novels. Another graduate of the Kindergarten,
Geoffrey Robinson, edited The Times.
T H E F A L L O F T H E A L L I E D G O V E R N M E N T S
233
gory epi sodes as the 142, 000 Bri ti sh casual ti es suffered i n just four
days of fighting at Arras i n France, the terri bl e So mme offensive of
Jul y 1916 aroused a cl i max of despai r. On 1 Jul y the Bri ti sh lost
60, 000 men, the heaviest casual ti es ever suffered in a si ngl e day by a
Bri ti sh a r my .
4
By the ti me the offensi ve was over, Bri ti sh casual ti es
at the So mme had mount ed t o 420, 000. Among t hem was Raymond
Asqui t h, the Pri me Mi ni ster' s son.
Ll oyd George despai red of victory as he observed the lengthy and
inefficient meet i ngs of Asqui t h' s l arge War Cabi net , debat i ng end-
lessly and deci di ng nothi ng. On 9 November he told Mauri ce Hankey
that "We are goi ng to lose this war. "
5
At about the s ame ti me, the Gal l i pol i controversy was revi ved,
remi ndi ng the political worl d how i neptl y the Asqui t h government
had waged war. Unwi sel y, the government had sancti oned an official
i nqui ry i n June into the Dardanel l es campai gn. Churchi l l , now out
of office, devoted hi msel f to document i ng the case that his col l eagues
were to bl ame for the Gal l i pol i di saster. Th e al armed Pri me Mi ni ster
managed to have the report restri cted to the Commi s s i on of Inqui ry' s
concl usi ons, omi t t i ng the testi mony and other evi dence on whi ch
they were bas ed. Nonet hel ess, the political damage was done and the
Gal l i pol i i nqui ry cont ri but ed to the col l apse of the first coalition
government .
Th e story of Asqui t h' s overthrow has been told too often for it to
need retelling here at any l ength. A pri nci pal role in his downfall was
pl ayed by the Bri ti sh press, domi nat ed then, as i t never has been
before or si nce, by one man. Al fred Harms wort h, Vi scount
Northcl i ffe, control l ed half the London press, at a t i me, before radi o
or television, when publ i cati ons were the only medi a of mas s com-
muni cati on. Hi s ownershi p of The Times, with its presti ge, and of
the Daily Mail, with its popul ar appeal , gave hi m both "the cl asses
and the mas s e s . "
6
Northcl i ffe used his i mmense power to dramat i ze
the case that Asqui t h and his civilian col l eagues were preventi ng the
general s and admi ral s from wi nni ng the war.
Northcl i ffe' s newspapers ranged themsel ves behi nd Si r Edward
Carson, Bri tai n' s l eadi ng trial lawyer, who led the revolt agai nst the
government i n Parl i ament and i n the country. Cars on on the attack
was the most dangerous ani mal i n the political j ungl e. As he l ashed
out agai nst the government , the lean, dark, and bitter Iri shman
seemed to be everythi ng the Pri me Mi ni ster was not. As a historian
has written of hi m, "The notion became current that he possessed a
dri ve, a remorsel ess determi nati on, and unrel enti ng hostility to the
Ge r mans , whi ch contrasted strongl y with the di smal procrasti nati on
attri buted to As qui t h and his col l eagues. "
7
Al t hough he deni ed it, i n the aut umn of 1916 Ll oyd George began
worki ng closely with Cars on; and Si r Max Aitken (later Lo r d
V
The most conspi cuous failure of the Mecca revolt was its failure to
carry with it Medi na, the other large holy city of the Hej az. Medi na
lay some 300 miles to the northeast of Mecca, bl ocki ng the route that
conti nued northward toward Syri a. Fol l owers of the Sheri f Hussei n
attacked it in the first days of the revolt, but were beaten off with
ease; and the Sheri f' s forces were unabl e to capt ure it duri ng the
war. Nor coul d they by- pass it and allow its large Turki s h garri son to
attack them on the flank or from the rear.
Medi na was surrounded by a solid stone wall, said to date from the
twelfth century, domi nat ed by towers and, at the northwest, by a
castle manned by the Ot t oman garri son. The terminal of the Hej az
railroad from Damas c us was si tuated within its walls, and provi ded
access to suppl i es and rei nforcements. Al though the rai l road track
was repeatedl y dynami t ed duri ng the war by Al l i ed-l ed Bedoui n
rai di ng parti es, the Ot t oman garri son conti nued to repai r it and keep
it in use.
Th e Ot t oman presence at Medi na, bl ocki ng the line of advance
that the Sherifian tri besmen woul d have to follow in order to partici-
pate in the mai n theater of operat i ons of the Mi ddl e Eastern war,
seemed to demonst rat e that Hussei n was not goi ng anywhere. Th e
rebellion that st reamed forth from Mecca was visibly brought to a
halt by the centuri es-ol d walls of Medi na. The structure of Ot t oman
authority held firm. It had not been in the state of advanced decay
that European observers had reported it to be.
2 Si r Mark Sykes at his desk in 1916
16 Rus s i an occupat i on of Er z e r um
17 Rus s i an t roops i n Tr e bi z ond
11 j I i ^
PART V
THE ALLIES AT THE
NADIR OF THEIR
FORTUNES
29
THE FALL OF THE ALLI ED
GOVERNMENTS: BRITAIN AND
FRANCE
i
Between aut umn 1916 and aut umn 1917, the Ot t oman Empi re held
firm while the government s of its adversari es, the Al l i ed Powers,
col l apsed. Thi s was very much contrary to what European political
and mi l i tary l eaders had expect ed.
Th e Ot t oman army' s success i n hol di ng the Dardanel l es pl ayed a
direct role in the overthrow of Pri me Mi ni ster Asqui t h' s government
i n Bri tai n and that of Czar Ni chol as i n Rus s i a. Th e overthrow of the
Bri ti sh and Russi an government s, and of the French government i n
1917, brought to power in the three Allied capi tal s new l eaders who
held st rong vi ews about the Mi ddl e East which were totally at
variance with those of their predecessors.
The Pri me Mi ni ster who had brought Bri tai n into the war was the
first Allied l eader to fall victim to it. Bonar Law once observed, in a
letter to As qui t h, that "In war it is necessary not only to be active
but to seem acti ve. "
1
Asqui t h, with his indolent patri ci an ways,
seemed the reverse. He had achi eved a toweri ng posi ti on i n Bri ti sh
politics, but it was an aspect of his speci al geni us to make his
t ri umphs appear effortless. In the transacti on of political and govern-
mental busi ness he was unhurri ed: he always seemed to have ti me
for another di nner part y, another visit to the countrysi de, oral l too
oftenanother cognac.
As military cat ast rophes mul ti pl i ed i n Mesopot ami a, Gal l i pol i , and
on the western front, the Pri me Mi ni ster' s met hod of Cabi net
government by consensus seemed i ndeci si ve, while his unwi l l i ngness
to call upon the nati on for such st rong measures as compul sory
military servi ce suggest ed that he was less than compl etel y dedi cated
to wi nni ng the war.
Ll oyd George, i n dramat i c contrast, made the conscri pti on i ssue
his own. In taki ng the lead on this i ssue he showed how much his
231
political position had changed. Whi l e Asqui t h, who had brought the
country into the war, conti nued to uphol d peaceti me civil liberties
and Li beral val ues, Ll oyd George, the one-ti me Radi cal who until
the last moment had oppos ed entry into the war, emerged as a leader
prepared to sacrifice i ndi vi dual ri ghts for the sake of vi ctory. Tr a -
ditional Li beral s , who had al ways oppos ed compul si on, felt that
Ll oyd George was goi ng over to the other camp.
As he lost his old political fri ends, Ll oyd George acqui red new
ones, two of whom proved to be especi al l y i mport ant . One was Si r
Edward Cars on, the rebel Iri sh Tor y who led the fi ght for conscri p-
tion i n the Hous e of Commons . Th e other was the champi on of
i mperi al i sm, Al fred Mi l ner, who led the fight for conscri pti on in the
Hous e of Lo r ds and, as chai rman of the Nati onal Servi ce Le ague , i n
the country. Mi l ner, an out st andi ng colonial admi ni strator, had been
largely responsi bl e for l aunchi ng the Boer War, the venture i n Sout h
Afri ca at the turn of the century that Ll oyd George as a young
idealist had vi gorousl y o ppo s e d.
2
At the ti me Ll oyd George had
attacked Mi l ner bitterly. As a Radi cal , the young Wel shman had
opposed i mperi al expansi on, forei gn i nvol vement, and mi l i tary ven-
t ures; while Lo r d Mi l ner, as a Li beral Uni oni st who became the
i nspi rati on of ri ght-wi ng Tori es , made himself the center of i mperi al -
ist thought. Hi s ideal was imperial uni on. Toget her with the young
men assembl ed i n Sout h Afri ca under his l eadershi p"Mi l ner' s
Ki ndergart en"he had st i mul at ed the movement for i ntegrati on of
the far-flung empi re into one organi c unit. Mi l ner was a s uperb
admi ni st rat or whose skills were later to prove i nval uabl e to Ll oyd
George i n wi nni ng the war.
I I
In 1916, Ll oyd George became Secret ary of St at e for War when
Ki t chener di ed, but found hi msel f powerl ess to put an end to the
si ckeni ng mi l i tary di sasters of that year. It has been esti mated that
the total of military and civilian casual ti es in all of Europe' s domest i c
and international conflicts in the 100 years between 1815 and 1915
was no greater than a si ngl e day' s combat l osses in any of the great
battl es of 1916.
3
Comi ng after Gal l i pol i and Mesopot ami a, and such
* Milner's ideal was a union of the white peoples of the British Empi re. Other
members of the Milner circle, however, advocated a multiracial imperial union.
Lionel George Curtis, his former secretary, in 1910 helped to found the
quarterly review the Round Table which advocated British imperial federalism.
Another former secretary, John Buchan, was a fervent imperialist who won over a
vast public by his popular adventure novels. Another graduate of the Kindergarten,
Geoffrey Robinson, edited The Times.
T H E F A L L O F T H E A L L I E D G O V E R N M E N T S 233
gory epi sodes as the 142, 000 Bri ti sh casual ti es suffered i n just four
days of fighting at Arras i n France, the terrible So mme offensive of
Jul y 1916 aroused a cl i max of despai r. On 1 Jul y the Bri ti sh lost
60, 000 men, the heaviest casual ti es ever suffered in a si ngl e day by a
Bri ti sh a r my .
4
By the ti me the offensi ve was over, Bri ti sh casual ti es
at the So mme had mount ed t o 420, 000. Among t hem was Raymond
Asqui t h, the Pri me Mi ni ster' s son.
Ll oyd George despai red of victory as he observed the l engthy and
inefficient meet i ngs of Asqui t h' s l arge War Cabi net , debat i ng end-
lessly and deci di ng nothi ng. On 9 November he told Mauri ce Hankey
that "We are goi ng to l ose this war. "
5
At about the s ame ti me, the Gal l i pol i controversy was revi ved,
remi ndi ng the political worl d how i neptl y the Asqui t h government
had waged war. Unwi sel y, the government had sancti oned an official
i nqui ry i n June into the Dardanel l es campai gn. Churchi l l , now out
of office, devoted hi msel f to document i ng the case that his col l eagues
were to bl ame for the Gal l i pol i di saster. Th e al armed Pri me Mi ni ster
managed to have the report restri cted to the Commi s s i on of Inqui ry' s
concl usi ons, omi t t i ng the testi mony and other evi dence on which
they were bas ed. Nonet hel ess, the political damage was done and the
Gal l i pol i i nqui ry cont ri but ed to the col l apse of the first coalition
government .
Th e story of Asqui t h' s overthrow has been told too often for it to
need retelling here at any l ength. A pri nci pal role in his downfall was
pl ayed by the Bri ti sh press, domi nat ed then, as i t never has been
before or si nce, by one man. Al fred Harms wort h, Vi scount
Northcl i ffe, control l ed half the London press, at a t i me, before radi o
or television, when publ i cati ons were the only medi a of mas s com-
muni cati on. Hi s ownershi p of The Times, with its presti ge, and of
the Daily Mail, with its popul ar appeal , gave hi m both "the cl asses
and the mas s e s . "
6
Northcl i ffe used his i mmense power to dramat i ze
the case that As qui t h and his civilian col l eagues were preventi ng the
general s and admi ral s from wi nni ng the war.
Northcliffe's newspapers ranged themsel ves behi nd Si r Edward
Carson, Bri tai n' s l eadi ng trial lawyer, who led the revolt agai nst the
government i n Parl i ament and i n the country. Cars on on the attack
was the most dangerous ani mal i n the political j ungl e. As he l ashed
out agai nst the government , the lean, dark, and bitter Iri shman
seemed to be everythi ng the Pri me Mi ni ster was not. As a hi stori an
has written of hi m, "The notion became current that he possessed a
dri ve, a remorsel ess determi nati on, and unrel enti ng hostility to the
Ge r mans , which contrasted strongl y with the di smal procrasti nati on
attri buted to As qui t h and his col l eagues. "'
Al t hough he deni ed it, i n the aut umn of 1916 Ll oyd George began
worki ng closely with Cars on; and Si r Max Aitken (later Lor d
Beaverbrook) brought Bonar La w into a political combi nati on with
them. After intricate maneuveri ngs, As qui t h resi gned and went into
Opposi t i on, taki ng half of his Li beral Part yand all of its l eaders
except Ll oyd Georgewi t h hi m. Pus hed by Ai tken ("It was he who
made B . L . deci de t o break up the As qui t h government , " sai d Ll oyd
Ge o r g e ) ,
8
Bonar La w threw the weight of the Uni oni st - Conservat i ve
Party behi nd Ll oyd George. ( A maj or condi ti on i mposed by the
Conservati ves was that Churchi l l shoul d be excl uded from the new
government . ) A substanti al number of backbench Li beral s joi ned
with t hem, as di d the tiny Labour Party. On 7 December 1916,
Davi d Ll oyd George became Pri me Mi ni ster of Bri tai n as head of the
second coalition government .
Ll oyd George moved qui ckl y to i mpos e a war di ctatorshi p. Di rec-
tion of the war was entrusted to a War Cabi net , compos ed initially of
five members . Th e new Pri me Mi ni ster headed i t himself. Bonar
Law, who also became Le ade r of the Hous e and Chancel l or of the
Exchequer, became a member, as di d Labour' s Art hur Henderson.
Th e work of the War Cabi net was done pri nci pal l y by its other two
members , Lo r d Mi l ner, on whom Ll oyd George especi al l y relied,
and to a l esser extent, Lo r d Curzon. Mauri ce Hankey became Sec-
retary to the War Cabi net , and took charge of seei ng that its deci si ons
were carri ed out.
It was a sweepi ng, revol uti onary change in the way the country
was governed. Art hur Bal f our, the former Pri me Mi ni ster who be-
came Forei gn Mi ni ster i n the new government , remarked of Ll oyd
George at the t i me: "If he wants to be a dictator, let hi m be. If he
thinks that he can win the war, I' m all for his havi ng a t ry. "
9
A chance effect of the change in government was that it changed
Bri tai n' s objecti ves i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . Asqui t h and Grey, the only
two men i n the government who doubt ed the desi rabi l i ty of acqui ri ng
new territories i n the Eas t , had been dri ven from office. Lo r d
Ki t chener, who had i mposed his own Mi ddl e East ern views on the
Cabi net , was dead; and the new Pri me Mi ni ster had been an op-
ponent of Ki t chener' s views all al ong.
Unl i ke Ki t chener, Ll oyd George had believed, and conti nued t o
believe, that the East coul d be of great i mportance in wi nni ng the
war. Typi cal l y, only a few days after Ll oyd George took office as
Pri me Mi ni ster, Hankey recorded in his diary that "I l unched al ong
with LI . G. , who di scoursed mai nl y on his pl ans for a bi g military
coup i n Sy r i a . "
1 0
As for the future of the area, he was moved in l arge part by his
hatred of the Turki s h regi me. Fr o m his first political l eader, the
ni neteeth-century Li beral , William Ewart Gl adst one, he had i nheri ted
an abhorrence of the Ot t oman Empi re for its cruelty toward its
Chri sti an subj ect s. He was sympat het i c t o Greece, whi ch had terri -
torial ambi t i ons i n Asi a Mi nor, and espoused Zi oni st aspi rati ons i n
the Hol y La nd. In the latter case he had made clear, however, that
he expected the Jewi s h Nati onal Home to devel op within the context
of Bri ti sh rul e. What became clear only after Ll oyd George had been
in office for a year or two was that he envi si oned the Mi ddl e Eas t ,
not just as the road to Indi a, but as a pri ze worth seeki ng in itself.
Unl i ke Bri ti sh mi ni sters of the ni neteenth century, whose ai m was
limited to excl udi ng other European powers from the regi on, Ll oyd
George therefore sought Bri ti sh hegemony i n the Mi ddl e Eas t .
As Pri me Mi ni ster, Ll oyd George moved ever closer t o Mi l ner and
i mperi al i sm. Hankey later wrote that Mi l ner "was Ll oyd George' s
most t rust ed col l eague; except, perhaps Bonar La wbut he was
more for political advi ce. "
1 1
Ll oyd George was a pragmat i c, intuitive
opportuni st who i mprovi sed; Mi l ner, with his Ge r man background,
was methodi cal i n action and systemati c i n thought, suppl yi ng what
the Pri me Mi ni ster l acked.
Mi l ner further strengthened his hol d on the Ll oyd George govern-
ment by pl aci ng his own followers within Hankey' s secretari at.
Hankey was abl e to retain Si r Mark Sykes, his personal choi ce, as
one of his three assi stants, * but the other two were Le o Amery, one
of Mi l ner' s l eadi ng adherent s, and William Or ms by- Gor e , Mi l ner' s
Parl i amentary Secret ary.
When Ll oyd George, after the fashi on of an Ameri can presi dent in
the White Hous e, set up his own i nformal staff, Mi l ner had a hand in
i ncl udi ng some of his own followers, such as Li onel Curt i s, a founder
of the magazi ne Round Table, whi ch espoused i mperi al uni on, and
Philip Ke r r , the magazi ne' s edi tor. Th e staff was set up i n t emporary
bui l di ngs i n the garden of 10 Downi ng Street and was dubbed the
"Garden s ubur b. "
A sort of di ctatorshi p of two emerged from the early days of the
new Pri me Mi ni ster' s peri od of office: at 11:00 each morni ng Ll oyd
George woul d meet with Mi l ner, al ong with Hankey and the Chief of
the Imperi al General Staff, and only at noon woul d they meet with
the other members of the War Cabi net . In 1918 Mi l ner became War
Mi ni ster i n name as well as reality. He had the experi ence needed for
the j ob: he had run the civilian si de of the Boer War and now, under
Ll oyd George, ran the civilian si de of the Fi rst Worl d War.
Ll oyd George' s associ ati on with the Mi l ner circle was intellectual
as well as practi cal and bureaucrat i c. Th e Pri me Mi ni ster came to
Hankey wrote to Ll oyd George that Sykes was "mainly an expert on Arab
affairs" but that he was "by no means a one-sided man" and that his breadth of
vision could be "invaluable in fixing up the terms of peace. "
1 2
social gatheri ngs where the Round Tabl ers met to exchange views.
In the mi ddl e of 1917 Hankey observed that "Among the most
influential at the present moment I woul d pl ace the Round Tabl e
group. The y di ne every Monday . . . Mi l ner is the real l eader in this
group . . . Ll oyd George somet i mes attends their gat heri ngs . "
1 3
Th e influence was mut ual . Short l y afterward Hankey noted that
Mi l ner had "come compl etel y round to LI . G. ' s view . . . that it is
necessary to devote our mai n efforts agai nst Tur ke y . "
1 4
Ill
In France, several government s had fallen duri ng the course of the
war, but the differences between one government and another were
not dramat i c. In 1917 that changed.
Th e mut i ny of the French army i n May 1917 brought about the
fall of the last of France' s wart i me government s with whi ch her
politicians felt comf ort abl e. Th e traditional l eadershi p was
di scredi ted. Th e Vi vi ani , Bri and, and Ri bot government s had been
al l owed to resi gn, but the Paul Pai nl eve government had not been: i n
November of 1917 the French Parl i ament overthrew it. The r e was
only one potential premi er yet untri ed who mi ght fight on to victory,
but he was the most feared and detested man i n publ i c life. As Ll oyd
George remarked of hi m, "There was only one man left, and i t i s not
too much to say that no one want ed hi m. "
1 5
He was the man who
had exposed the corrupt practi ces of his political col l eaguesand
they had never forgi ven hi m.
Georges Cl emenceau was, like Ll oyd George, a political "loner."
He, too, was a Radi cal , t hough in France the label had rather a
different meani ng. Li ke Ll oyd George, he was believed to have
abandoned the leftist tenets of his y o ut h.
1 6
Li ke Ll oyd George, the
man of "the knock-out bl ow, " he had denounced proponent s of a
compromi se peace, and i ndeed had brought an end to di scussi ons
al ong those lines initiated by the Ge r mans through Ari sti de Bri and
i n 1917. He was growi ng deaf and fat and was seventy-six years old,
but he remai ned the fighter he had been all his life; and the Presi dent,
who felt obl i ged to offer hi m the premi ershi p, noted that this "devil
of a man has all patri ots on his si de, and if I di d not call on hi m his
l egendary strength woul d make any al ternati ve cabi net weak. "
1 7
Cl emenceau was above all a hater, and in all the world what he
most hated was Germany. He was the last survi vor of the Nati onal
Assembl y that i n 1871 had protested agai nst the harsh peace t erms
Germany had i mposed upon a vanqui shed France. He had never
given up. It had al ways been his view that France shoul d concentrate
on bui l di ng up her strength agai nst Germany, and therefore that
di verti ng strength into colonial advent ures was a mi stake. Thus the
senators and deput i es who ai med at annexi ng Syri a and Pal esti ne to
France saw i n hi m their chief enemy.
Between 1881 and 1885, over Cl emenceau' s prot est s, France had
led the way in new colonial expansi on. On a pretext, the French first
i nvaded and conquered Tuni s i a i n Nort h Afri ca, and then the states
that became Indochi na i n Asi a. Pri nce Otto von Bi smarck, the
Ge r man l eader, s upport ed and i ndeed encouraged such French ven-
tures. On 27 November 1884, Cl emenceau told the French Chamber
of Deput i es that "Bi smarck is a dangerous enemy, but even more
dangerous perhaps as a fri end; he showed us Tuni s , pl aci ng us i n
conflict with Eng l a nd. "
1 8
In Parl i ament and in his journal , La Justice, Cl emenceau de-
nounced the acqui si ti on of colonies as a financial and military burden,
a di stracti on f rom the probl em of the Ge r man frontier, and a clever
German- i nspi red move that Berl i n hoped woul d dri ve France into
quarrel s with Bri tai n. In opposi ng the pol i cy, he exposed the fi nanci al
corrupti on that accompani ed French colonial politics. La Justice's
suggesti on of sinister mani pul at i ons in the Tuni s i a affair were not far
off the mark: there were specul ati ons in real estate, railway con-
cessi ons, and submari ne cabl e tel egraph concessi ons, whatever their
relation mi ght have been to the formul ati on of government policy.
Th e financial corrupti on surroundi ng the adventure i n Indochi na
was even more l uri d. Cl emenceau' s accusati ons and exposures de-
stroyed reputati ons and brought down government s. He became
known as "the wrecker" even before he became known as "the
ti ger. "
Of French parl i amentary life at the t i me, Wi nston Churchi l l later
wrote, "The life of the French Chamber, hectic, fi erce, poi sonous,
flowed t hrough a successi on of scandal s and swi ndl es, of exposures,
of perjuri es, and murders , of pl otti ngs and i ntri gui ngs, of personal
ambi ti ons and revenges, of crooki ng and doubl e- crossi ng, which
find their modern parallel only in the underworl d of Chi c ago. "
1 9
Cl emenceau st rode t hrough it all in a murderous rage. In an age
when it was still the cust om to settle quarrel s on the field of honor,
he was a feared duel l i st. A speaker in the Chamber t aunt ed the other
members by sayi ng of Cl emenceau that "he has three thi ngs you
fear: his sword, his pi stol , and his t ongue. "
2 0
For fear of hi m the French government in 1882 hesi tated to joi n in
the occupati on of Egypt , with the result that Bri tai n took Egypt
entirely for herself. Hi s opposi ti on to colonial expansi on coul d easily
be port rayedand was port rayedas benefiting the Bri ti sh Empi re.
That was the line his opponent s took when he became vul nerabl e to
political attack. The y produced a forgery to prove that he had sol d
out to Bri tai n. Heckl ers were hi red to follow hi m around shout i ng
"Aoh yes, " and free copi es of a newspaper were ci rcul ated contai ni ng
a cartoon showi ng hi m j uggl i ng with sacks of pounds s t erl i ng.
2 1
In
1892 one l eadi ng Bri ti sh politician wrote to another that "A Frenchman
was here yesterday who told me an extraordi nary cock and bul l
which is apparentl y bel i eved in Pari s where they will believe any-
thi ng . . . It is to the effect that Cl emenceau' s paper La Justice
which i s sai d to be l osi ng money i s financed f rom Engl and on behal f
of Germany and Eng l a nd. "
2 2
In 1893 he was defeated for re-election
and was dri ven out of parl i ament ary life for a decade.
Thi s was the man whom a despai ri ng France turned to i n the
darkest moment of 1917, and who soon i mposed his will upon the
government of his nati on. Li ke Ll oyd George, he became a sort of
war di ctator, i ncarnati ng a dri vi ng determi nati on to fight on until
Germany was totally crushed. Li ke Ll oyd George, too, he happened
to bri ng to office a speci al view about pol i cy in the Mi ddl e Eas t .
As premi er, he conti nued to have no territorial goal s for France
outsi de of Europe. Of the traditional French cl ai m to Syri a, reflected
i n the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement , Cl emenceau sai d that i f Ll oyd George
coul d get France the right to install a protectorate regi me there he
woul d not refuse it, "as it woul d pl ease some reacti onari es, " but that
he himself attached no i mport ance to i t .
2 3
Th e fortunes of war and pol i ti cs had brought into power i n their
respecti ve countri es the fi rst Bri ti sh Pri me Mi ni ster who wanted to
acqui re territory i n the Mi ddl e Eas t and the only French politician
who di d not want to do so.
30
THE OVERTHROW OF THE CZAR
i
It was an i mprobabl e chai n of ci rcumst ances that led France to rally
behi nd a l eader who was oppos ed to French i mperi al i sm i n the
Mi ddl e Eas t , and an even odder chai n of ci rcumst ances that led
Russi a in the s ame mont h to fall under the sway of a leader who also
cl ai med to oppos e Rus s i an i mperi al i sm i n the regi on.
If one thi ng seemed clear by the begi nni ng of 1917, it was that
Rus s i a hel d the edge i n the Mi ddl e East ern war agai nst Tur ke y.
Enver' s catastrophi c defeat in early 1915 on the Caucas us front was
followed by a successful Russi an invasion of eastern Anatol i a in
1916. Th e Russi ans had st rengt hened their strategi c posi ti on by
wi nni ng mast ery of the Bl ack Sea and by constructi ng rai l road lines
from the Caucas us toward their new front line i n eastern Turkey.
Th e Grand Duke Ni chol as, the Rus s i an commander, pl anned t o
mount a new offensi ve as soon as the rai l road lines were compl et ed.
Accordi ng to a Ge r man staff officer attached to the Ot t oman armed
forces, the grand duke' s offensive woul d "have led to a compl et e
victory and perhaps dri ven Turkey out of the war in the s ummer of
1917. "
1
Yet years later, Ll oyd George told the Hous e of Commons that
"the col l apse of Rus s i a was al mbst entirely due" to the Ot t oman
Empi r e .
2
Th e basi s of Ll oyd George' s opi ni on was that by cl osi ng
off most of Russi a' s i mport s and export s, the Young Tu r k mast ers of
Const ant i nopl e had depri ved her of armament s and revenues. Thos e
who di sagree with Ll oyd George' s assessment are abl e to argue that
even i f the Const ant i nopl e trade route had remai ned open, wart i me
Russi a, with her peasant f armers away i n the army, produced less
than the normal amount of food and so had less to export, and her
Allies had little ammuni t i on to send her. But either observati on
poi nts to the paradoxi cal truth that Russi a' s military successes on the
Caucas us front were in a sense i rrel evant: the real war had become
an economi c and social survi val contest.
239
Th e i ndustri al i st Walter Rat henau i n Germany was the pi oneer i n
underst andi ng this. In 1914 he organi zed a Di vi si on of Raw Materi al s
for a skepti cal Mi ni stry of War in Berl i n. He was gi ven a secretary
and one smal l room at the back of the mi ni stry. By the end of 1918 it
was the l argest unit in the mi ni st ry; it had spread over several bl ocks
of bui l di ngs and al most overshadowed the res t .
3
In Rathenau' s
prescient vision, warfare was undergoi ng its i ndustri al revol uti on,
becomi ng a matter of financing, movi ng, and suppl yi ng on a gi ganti c
scal e, and therefore requi red central al l ocati on, pl anni ng, and control
over the whol e economy.
Ll oyd George i n his pragmat i c way l earned to see thi ngs much the
s ame way. He brought war soci al i sm to the hitherto i ndi vi dual i sti c
Bri ti sh economy. When he started the Mi ni stry of Muni t i ons in a
requi si ti oned hotel, he had no staff at all. By the end of the war, the
mi ni stry had 65, 000 empl oyees and i t exerci sed control over three
million workers .
4
In i ndustry after i ndustry, suppl i es were requi -
sitioned and al l ocated. New workers, i ncl udi ng l arge numbers of
women, were brought into the l abor force.
In Russi a, as i n Ge r many and Bri tai n, the violent and rapi d social
changes that accompani ed this wart i me i ndustri al revol uti on t ugged
at the st ruct ure of society, strai ni ng pi l l ars and support s never de-
si gned to carry a great wei ght. The r e were di spl acement s in moral s,
politics, empl oyment pat t erns, i nvestment patterns, fami l y st ruct ure,
personal habi t s, and l anguage. Some i dea of the magni t ude of the
changes may be suggest ed by the length of the Carnegi e Endowment ' s
postwar survey of the economi c and social changes that had occurred
in twenty-one count ri es: it ran to 150 vol umes. Th e Bri ti sh seri es
alone ran to 24 vol umes.
Of the pri nci pal European bel l i gerents i n the Fi rst Worl d War,
Czari st Rus s i a proved the least abl e to cope with these chal l enges
for it was weak in the el ements of i nf rast ruct uret ransport at i on
syst ems, communi cat i on syst ems, engi neeri ng i ndustri es, and capi tal
market st hat make a modern economy resilient and adapt abl e.
More than anythi ng else, however, Russi a' s failure was a failure of
l eadershi p.
Th e consequences of the Turki s h strangl ehol d on the Dardanel l es
underscored the lack of patri oti sm in s ome el ements of the governi ng
cl asses and the lack of compet ence i n others. The r e was no excuse
for the terri bl e short ages that devel oped in 1916 and 1917. Rus s i a
was a country natural l y rich in agri cul t ure: the peasantry made up 80
percent of the popul at i on, and cereal s al one consti tuted half of her
e xpor t s .
s
With the export trade cut off at Const ant i nopl e, all the
food formerl y sent out of the country was avai l abl e to be cons umed
at home; and t hough there was a fall in the producti on of agri cul tural
estates caused by the l oss of l abor to the army, more than enough
T H E O V E R T H R O W O F T H E C Z A R 241
food was produced to feed the count ry.
6
Th e short ages resul ted
i nstead f rom di srupti on of t ransport at i on and di stri buti on, due i n
part to bottl enecks and breakdowns, but due also to del i berate
maneuvers: specul ati on, profi teeri ng, and hoardi ng.
Th e Czar' s government recklessly i gnored the need to crack down
on the profiteers who accentuated the consequences of Turkey' s
strangl ehol d on Russi a' s t rade route to the West. Wi despread i ndus-
trial stri kes and the onset of financial chaos failed to move the
government to act. By 1917 current interest and si nki ng fund pay-
ment s due on its publ i c debt were greater than the total revenues of
the state in 1916, a national i nsol vency with which the government
dealt by pri nti ng paper money, so that pri ces duri ng wart i me years
rose by 1,000 percent .
7
An obvi ous way out of the cri si s was to bri ng the war to an end. In
1915 the Ot t oman Empi re and Ge r many had offered Rus s i a right of
passage t hrough the Dardanel l es i f she woul d abandon the Al l i es.
Throughout 1916 Germany conti nued to sound out the possi bi l i ty of
concl udi ng a separat e peace with Rus s i a. Many of the soundi ngs took
pl ace i n neutral Sweden. Th e st umbl i ng bl ock, s ome have sai d, was
the Czar' s unwi l l i ngness to rel i nqui sh his gri p on Pol and.
8
However,
the Rus s i an Mi ni ster to Sweden expl ai ned to the Ge r mans that i n his
"personal opi ni on" Rus s i a woul d have to conti nue in the war on the
Al l i ed si de until she recei ved the "key to the Bl ack Sea": which is to
say, Const ant i nopl e and the Dardanel l es .
9
On the field of battl e the
Czar' s hungry and tattered sol di ery were st ruggl i ng for survi val , but
his response to the Ge r man overtures shows that Ni chol as II con-
ti nued to gi ve priority to his i mperi al ambi t i onsabove all, perhaps,
to the conquest of the l ong-sought-for Dardanel l es.
I I
The history of the Rus s i an revol uti ons of 1917, whi ch is still bei ng
written and which remai ns ti mel essl y relevant to the worl d' s con-
dition, falls out si de the scope of the present st udy. One aspect of that
history, however, is of concern here and will be purs ued in the
following pages : the plot to promot e the fortunes of the then-unknown
Leni n that was hatched i n the Ot t oman Empi re.
In the di sast rous course of Russi a' s parti ci pati on i n the European
war, those in control of Russi a' s government , finance, and i ndustry
demonst rat ed that their interests di verged from those of the popu-
lation at l arge. At the leftward fringe of the outl awed revol uti onary
underground, an obscure and i sol ated figure had sai d as muc h
though for theoretical reasons of his ownf rom the moment the war
began. Duri ng the war he lived, st udi ed, and wrote i n penni l ess exile
in Zuri ch, Swi t zerl and. He was in his mi d-forti es and was not yet
f amous beyond police and revol uti onary circles.
Vl adi mi r Ilyich Ul yanov, who i n 1901 had adopt ed the ps eudonym
of Leni n, was a former attorney who had devoted his life to Marxi st
theory and factional di sput es. St ocky, muscul ar, with the hunched
shoul ders of a fighter,- he was a brilliant but abrasi ve and intolerant
man who fearlessly followed the j uggernaut of his logic wherever it
mi ght l ead. At the outset of the war he was shocked to see his
socialist col l eagues flock to the s upport of their respecti ve countri es.
Leni n' s theory led hi m to st and al one in opposi ti on to the war and
therefore in opposi ti on to his count ry. It set hi m apart from the
others. Even his own political facti on, the Bol shevi ks, di d not fully
underst and his views on the war.
At the begi nni ng of Sept ember 1914, he drafted his Seven Theses
on the War, in which he wrote that: "Fr om the poi nt of view of the
l abori ng cl ass and the toiling mas s es of all the peopl es of Rus s i a, the
lesser evil woul d be the defeat of the tsari st monarchy and its army,
which oppresses Pol and, the Ukrai ne, and a number of other peopl es
of Rus s i a. " In hi s Theses he repeatedl y denounced the empi re
exerci sed by the Russi ans over the other peopl es rul ed by the Cz a r .
1 0
He was a Rus s i an; but it was his dut y, as he saw it, to ai m at Russi a' s
defeat and at the di s memberment of the Russi an Empi r e .
In Const ant i nopl e at the ti me there lived a former col l eague of
Leni n' s, a fellow l eader of the Soci al i st Second Internati onal , who
had arri ved at si mi l ar concl usi ons. Al exander Israel Hel phand, who
had adopt ed the underground ps eudonym of "Parvus, " was a
Russi an Je w whose prof essed political objecti ve was the destructi on
of the Czari st Emp i r e .
1 1
Where Leni n was merely indifferent to the
prospect of a Ge r man vi ctory, Hel phand was positively enthusi asti c
about it. As i t happened, Hel phand possessed the money and political
contacts that enabl ed hi m to pursue his pro- German inclinations.
Of the s ame generati on as Leni n ( Hel phand was born i n 1869,
Leni n in 1870), Parvus had been one of the other intellectually
commandi ng figures on the left wi ng of the revol uti onary socialist
movement . Leavi ng Rus s i a for Germany i n the early 1890s, he had
made his name as a theorist and journal i st fighting al ongsi de the
Pol i sh-born Ge r man Jewes s Ros a Lux e mbur g for a pure revol uti onary
posi ti on. In the early years of the twentieth century, he had become
the mentor of Le on Trot s ky, and i n 1905 he had ori gi nated what was
to become Trot sky' s theory of the "permanent revol uti on. " Ret urni ng
to Russi a, Parvus was bani shed to Si beri a, but soon escaped to
western Europe.
But there was another si de to Hel phand/ Parvus, which showed
itself only gradual l y: he was a shady promot er who, from the poi nt
of view of his fellow-idealists, di d suspi ci ousl y well for himself. He
had set up publ i shi ng ventures that were meant to serve the revo-
l uti onary cause but seemed to serve his personal interests even better.
Leni n and his Bol shevi k faction had good reason for bel i evi ng that i n
1904 Parvus had embezzl ed perhaps 130, 000 marks* (roughl y 30, 000
dol l ars) i n literary royalties that the writer Maxi m Gorky had con-
tri buted to the Soci al Democrat i c Party. The y confronted hi m with
it and the expl anati ons that he offered were unconvi nci ng.
Abandoni ng publ i shi ng and revol uti onary activities, he had turned
full-time to a variety of busi nesses, movi ng on via Vi enna to the
Bal kans and the Ot t oman Empi re, where he became interested i n the
Young Turkey movement and began deal i ng i n corn and other
commodi t i es. By 1912 he had establ i shed close contact with Young
Tur k government officials, with whose ai d he obtai ned contracts to
provi de suppl i es for the Ot t oman armi es i n the Bal kan Wars.
When the Fi rst Worl d War broke out i n Europe, Hel phari d pub-
lished an article i n the Turki s h press advi si ng the Ot t oman govern-
ment that its i nterests woul d be served by a German victory. He also
hel ped foment pro- German feeling i n the Bal kan countri es. When
the Ot t oman Empi re entered the war, he hel ped the Porte obtai n
vital suppl i es of grai n and rai l road part s, t hough of course at a profit
to hi msel f; he al so advi sed the government on vari ous aspect s of
mobi l i zi ng its economy for the war effort. Dest royi ng the government
of Rus s i a was his goal , and his home in Const ant i nopl e became a
meeti ng pl ace for pl otters agai nst the Czar.
Thr ough hi s contacts, Hel phand managed to arrange an interview
with the Ge r man ambas s ador to the Ot t oman Empi re. He met von
Wangenhei m on 7 January 1915, and told hi m that "The interests of
the Ge r man government are identical with those of the Russi an
revol ut i onari es. "
1 2
Von Wangenhei m cabl ed a report of the meeti ng
to the Ge r man Forei gn Office two days later, in which he reported
that Hel phand had told hi m "that the Russi an Democrat s coul d
achieve their ai m only by the total destructi on of Czari s m and the
division of Rus s i a into smal l er s t at es . "
1 3
Hel phand propos ed that
Germany shoul d hel p hi m unite the revol uti onari es behi nd a program
of subvert i ng the Rus s i an Empi re.
At a high level, the Ge r man government evinced interest in his
proposal . At the end of February 1915 Hel phand went to Berlin to
meet with officials at the Forei gn Mi ni stry. The y asked hi m to
recapi tul ate his proposal in wri ti ng; in response, on 9 March, he
submi t t ed a memorandum to them embodyi ng a vast pl an for the
subversi on of Czari st Rus s i a by encouragi ng socialist revol uti onari es
and nati onal i sts. He told the Ge r mans about Leni n and his Bolshevik
faction, reported that Leni n and s ome of his followers were in
* There is some dispute about the exact figure.
Swi tzerl and, and si ngl ed t hem out as especi al l y worth Ge r man s up-
port. Thus Hel phand di scovered and identified Leni n for the
Germans .
Th e Ge r man l eaders agreed t o adopt Hel phand' s proposal s and at
the end of March gave hi m an initial payment of a million marks
(equal at that ti me to roughl y 240, 000 dol l ars i n U. S . currency) to
begi n the work of at t empt i ng to unify the vari ous revol uti onary
groups .
Hi s initial overtures to his former comrades were rebuf f ed. In
Berl i n, Ros a Lux e mbur g di d not even gi ve hi m an opport uni t y to
speak: she showed hi m to the door. Le v Davi dovi ch Bronst ei n, who
called himself Trot s ky, admi t t ed that Parvus had once been an
i mportant figure, a friend and teacher, but concl uded that in 1914 he
had changed, and that he was now "politically deceas ed. "
1 4
Th e
atti tude of Parvus' s former soci al i st-revol uti onary col l eagues was de-
scri bed by one of t hem who sai d they regarded hi m as "a Rus s i an
i nformer, a scoundrel , a confidence trickster, . . . and now a Turki s h
agent and s pecul at or. "
1 5
In the spri ng he made his most i mport ant approach. He went to
Zuri ch and set up court at the l uxuri ous Baur au La c Hot el . There
he lived ostentati ousl y, dri nki ng a bottl e of champagne each morni ng
at breakfast, smoki ng ci gars of enormous si ze, and surroundi ng
himself with showy wo me n.
1 6
He also began spreadi ng money around
among the poorer exiles, persuadi ng t hem that he had become the
paymast er of the revol uti on.
At the end of May he sought out Leni n at the restaurant where the
Bol shevi k theorist usual l y was to be f ound, went over to the tabl e
where Leni n and his associ ates were l unchi ng, spoke to t hem, and
accompani ed t hem back t o Leni n' s apart ment . Hel phand expl ai ned
his mi ssi on. Leni n, havi ng listened to his presentati on, accused hi m
of havi ng turned into a Ge r man "chauvi ni st, " and ordered hi m to
leave and never come ba c k.
1 7
Yet a friend of Leni n' s left with Hel phand to start put t i ng the
plan of subversi on into effect. Thei r base of operati on was to be
St ockhol m. Thr ough his fri end, Leni n was abl e to learn of devel op-
ment s as they occurred. Moreover, Leni n and the Bol shevi k Party
accepted money from Hel phand via a Pol i sh and a Rus s i an Soci al
Democrat ; Leni n later deni ed this, but his correspondence shows
that his deni al s were unt r ue .
1 8
Th e busi ness i n whi ch Hel phand ostensi bl y engaged was a t radi ng
firm, whose activities in fact enri ched hi m enormousl y. Secretl y he
organi zed subversi on and publ i shed a revol uti onary newspaper, which
the Ge r man government fi nanced. Th e publ i cati on was not a great
success. He at t empt ed to organi ze a general strike in Russi a, even
without the ai d of Leni n and the others. It was a much greater
success; he di d not achieve a general stri ke, but brought as many as
45, 000 protesters into the streets of Pet rograd (as St Pet ersburg, the
Russi an capi tal , had been called si nce 1914).
But Hel phand had focused the Ge r man government' s attention on
the parti cul ar i mport ance of Leni n as a di srupti ve force and, t hrough
other agents, the Ge r mans arranged to watch over the Bol shevi k
theorist and to lend hi m addi ti onal money when he needed it without
his necessari l y havi ng to acknowl edge the source of the f unds.
Thus Hel phand, the Const ant i nopl e- based i nti mate of the Young
Tur ks , had brought into play a st range new weapon with which
Turkey' s ally Germany coul d at t empt to bri ng their common Russi an
foe crashi ng down.
Ill
Pet rograd was a l ong di stance away from the granary of the south,
and its popul ati on suffered f rom food shortages and soari ng food
pri ces t hroughout 1916 and 1917. Dur i ng that ti me stri kes and
protests became a way of life: i ncl udi ng those i nspi red by Hel phand,
between mi d- 1915 and February 1917, there were 1,163 s t r i ke s .
1 9
Over half of these were politically rather than economi cal l y moti -
vated, which showed that the revolt agai nst the regi me had begun to
transcend the i ssue of short ages.
On 8 March 1917 a demonst rat i on took pl ace in cel ebrati on of
Internati onal Women' s Day. Housewi ves, protesti ng agai nst food
shortages, joi ned the demonst rat i on; so di d many of the roughl y
90, 000 workers then on strike i n about fifty factori es. Th e next day
there were about 200, 000 on stri ke, and the day afterward the strike
became general . Two days later four regi ments of sol di ers joi ned the
popul ace, strengtheni ng the demonst rat ors agai nst the i ncreasi ngl y
hel pl ess pol i ce. Th e army muti ny proved deci si ve, only because
effective government had long si nce vani shed. Th e governor of the
city ordered procl amat i ons of marti al law to be put up, but there was
no gl ue to hol d the post ers on the wal l s .
2 0
On 15 March Czar Ni chol as II abdi cat ed, effective f rom the
following day, i n favor of his brother, the Gr and Duke Mi chael . Th e
following day the Gr and Duke Mi chael decl i ned to accept the throne,
and Russi a became a republ i c governed by a Provi si onal Government
originally led by Pri nce G. E. Lvov and later by Al exander Kerensky.
Politicians of all shades of opi ni on were surpri sed to find that what
the popul ati on of Pet rograd had pushed agai nst was an open door.
As a l eadi ng hi stori an of these events has written, "The revol uti onary
parti es pl ayed no direct part i n the maki ng of the revol uti on. The y
di d not expect it . . . "
2 1
Were the events in Petrograd i nstead the
fruition of the conspi racy concei ved by Parvus, the associ ate of the
Young Tur ks ? Hel phand and the German General Staff, t hrough
their agents and their gol d, di d play a role in inciting Russi ans to
strike and to rebel, t hough surel y not to the extent suspect ed by
Bri ti sh Intel l i gence. At first it was not even clear whether the over-
throw of the Czar coul d help t hem to achieve their goal whi ch was
to defeat Rus s i a. At the ti me all political parti es, i ncl udi ng the
Bol shevi ks, were in favor of prosecut i ng the war; now that they no
longer had a government they detested, as Russi an patri ots they
wanted to defeat their enemi es, the Ge r mans and Tur ks .
But , as Hel phand alone underst ood, Leni n was of a different
persuasi onand was besi de hi msel f with frustrati on. He was i n
Zuri ch, cut off from parti ci pati on in the great events in Rus s i a; and
his followers in Petrograd mi sunderst ood what he wanted t hem to
do. Hel phand had anti ci pated the Bol shevi k theorist's reaction.
Without aski ng Leni n, Hel phand went ahead to make arrangement s
with the Ge r man General Staff to have a rai l road train pl aced at
Leni n' s di sposal to take hi m and his closest political associ ate,
Gregori Zi novi ev, back to Pet rograd. When he then i ssued the invi-
tation to Leni n, the latter warily refused and at t empt ed instead to
make arrangement s that di d not involve Hel phand. He also posed
condi ti ons: between twenty and si xty Russi an exiles shoul d be al l owed
on the train, without regard to their vi ews about the war, and the train
shoul d enjoy extraterritorial ri ghts. Th e German Mi ni ster i n Berne
cabl ed the German Forei gn Office that Leni n and Zi novi ev "believed
that they had, i n this way, i nsured themsel ves agai nst bei ng compro-
mi sed i n Rus s i a . "
2 2
Th e Ge r man government underst ood and agreed.
In Apri l of 1917 Leni n was sent in his seal ed train on his way to
Rus s i a.
Fr o m the moment that he arri ved at the Fi nl and station i n
Pet rograd, with typically acerbi c greeti ngs to those who met hi m,
Leni n set about posi ti oni ng his Bol shevi k f act i onas Hel phand had
expect edas the only political group i n Russi a that advocat ed endi ng
the war i mmedi atel y. Hi s followers had believed that they shoul d
support their country now that it had a republ i can government of the
political left. The y had fallen, accordi ng to Leni n, into error. In his
view, the war demonst rat ed that capi tal i sm had entered into its
i mperi al i st st age, which he regarded as its final st age; it therefore was
the right ti me for socialist parti es throughout Europe to l aunch
revol uti ons. It was not the ti me to wage international war, especially
in alliance with government s such as those of France and Bri tai n that
ought to be overthrown.
In the aut umn of 1917, when Leni nwi t h the aid of addi ti onal
fi nanci al subsi di es from Germanys ei zed power i n Pet rograd and
made himself di ctator of what remai ned of the shattered Russi an
state, he moved i mmedi atel y to take his country out of the war. In
March 1918 he accepted defeat by agreei ng to a peace treaty that met
Germany' s t erms. It appeared that Hel phand had served his fri ends
i n Const ant i nopl e and Berl i n well; as he had foretold, backi ng Leni n
had hel ped to dri ve Rus s i a out of the war.
IV
Bri ti sh observers of the Russi an revol uti ons in 1917 were st ruck by
the apparent conjuncti on of Bol shevi ks, Ge r mans , and Je ws . Many
of the Bol shevi k l eaders were of Jewi sh ori gi n. So was Hel phand,
who had brought t hem Ge r man money and s upport and who had
come from Const ant i nopl e and was an i nti mate of the Young Tur ks .
The Young Tur ks ac c or di ng t o the doctri ne l ong held by Bri ti sh
officialswere control l ed by Jewi sh Freemas ons who had brought
the Ot t oman Empi re into alliance with Germany. It was a long-
st andi ng Bri ti sh belief that Jews and Ge r mans were intimately re-
l ated. It all seemed to fit.
John Buchan, the popul ar novelist of i mperi al i sm, who had been
Mi l ner' s Pri vate Secretary i n Sout h Afri ca and who, on Mi l ner' s
recommendat i on, later became di rector of i nformati on servi ces for
Ll oyd George' s government , expressed this view i n the first chapter
of his cl assi c novel of suspense, The Thirty-Nine Steps ( 1915) :
Away behi nd all the government s and the armi es there was
a bi g subt erranean movement goi ng on, engi neered by very
dangerous peopl e . . . [ T] hat expl ai ned a lot . . . thi ngs that
happened i n the Bal kan War, how one state suddenl y came out
on t op, why alliances were made and broken, why certai n men
di sappeared, and where the si news of war came from. Th e ai m
of the whole conspi racy was to get Rus s i a and Germany at
l oggerheads . . . [ TJhe J e w was behi nd it, and the Je w hated
Russi a worse than hell . . . [ T] hi s is the return match for the
pogroms . Th e Je w is everywhere . . . with an eye like a rattle-
snake . . . [ H] e i s the man who i s rul i ng the world just now,
and he has his knife in the empi re of the Ts ar .
Th u s the Bol shevi ks came to be vi ewed, not as Russi ans or even as
ideological extremi sts, but as enemy secret agents called into exi stence
by Ge r mans doi ng the work of Je ws who were devoted to the
vengeful destructi on of Rus s i a. In 1917 and for many years afterward
Bri ti sh officials conti nued to believe that the Bol shevi ks were not
pri nci pal s in their own ri ght, with their own agenda and their own
objecti ves, but were mere empl oyees of the Ge r man General Staff
who took their orders from Jews and Prussi ans i n Berl i n.
Th e possi bi l i ty that Rus s i a mi ght col l apse had been Bri tai n' s
ni ghtmare ever si nce Sept ember 1914, just as i t had been the dream
of Enver Pas haa dream whi ch i nspi red hi m to bri ng the Ot t oman
Empi re into the war on the si de of the Central Powers. The Bol shevi k
Revol uti on had t urned the one's ni ght mare and the other's dream
into reality. Schol ars still differ in their accounts of how it came
about , but wi thout quest i on Russi a' s l eavi ng the war in 1917 was a
severe bl ow to Bri tai n and her allies, and an enormous victory not
only for Germany but al so for Ot t oman Turkey.
V
Duri ng the Gal l i pol i advent ure, Wi nston Churchi l l had sai d, "Thi s i s
one of the great campai gns i n hi story. Thi nk what Const ant i nopl e i s
to the Eas t . It i s more than London, Pari s, and Berl i n all rolled into
one are to the West. Thi nk how i t has domi nat ed the Eas t . Thi nk
what its fall will me an. "
2 3
Yet its capt urewhi ch had seemed i mmi nent to Churchi l l i n
March 1915cont i nued to prove el usi ve. After the Allies' failure to
win t hrough to Const ant i nopl e in 1915, it was the turn of the
Rus s i ans , who scored successes i n Turki s h Armeni a i n 1916 and
were poi sed to march toward Const ant i nopl e i n 1917. The n came the
revol uti ons i n Pet rograd, and the Rus s i an armi es on Tur ki s h soil,
bel i evi ng the war was comi ng to an end, gave up all thought of
l aunchi ng an attack.
By then the Tur ks were too exhaust ed to exploit the si tuati on by
l aunchi ng an attack of their own on the Russi ans. But their opponent s
were exhaust ed too; sufficiently so to consi der gi vi ng up such am-
bi ti ous goal s as wi nni ng Const ant i nopl e. In 1917 Mi l ner, and perhaps
Ll oyd George, flirted with the i dea of comi ng to an underst andi ng
with Germany, i n which the Rus s i an Empi re rather than the Ot t oman
Empi re coul d be parti ti oned as the spoi l s of vi ct ory.
2 4
Agai nst all odds , the Ot t oman Empi re had held its own. Th e
government s that had brought the Al l i ed Great Powers into the war
agai nst Tur ke yt he Asqui t h government i n Bri tai n, the Rene
Viviani government i n France, and the Czar and his mi ni ster Sazanov
i n Rus s i ahad all been overthrown. In s ome measure i t was Turkey' s
successful defense of the Dardanel l es that was responsi bl e for bri ngi ng
t hem down. Tho ug h at first it had seemed a madl y reckl ess act of
Enver and Tal aat to bri ng the totteri ng Ot t oman Empi r e into the
war, they had brought i t off; they had lost some terri tory but they
also seemed poi sed to gai n s ome, and at the end of 1917 they were
more powerful than ever within the Subl i me Port e. The y no longer
felt the need to cloak themsel ves in the respectabi l i ty of Pri nce Sai d
T H E O V E R T H R O W O F T H E C Z A R
249
Hal i m and fi nal l y al l owed hi m to resi gn as Gr and Vizier. Th e self-
made party boss Tal aat Bey bol dl y took the title into his own un-
ari stocrati c hands.
Yet for Tal aat and Enver the road ahead was peri l ous. Tho ug h the
threat from Rus s i a was removed, the threat from Bri tai n was re-
newed. Thei r enemy, the new Pri me Mi ni ster of Bri tai n, was a
dynamo and a war l eader of geni us. Though Ll oyd George was
willing to expl ore the possi bi l i ty of a compromi s e peace with the
Young Tur ks , he was a fighterand his heart was in the fight to
destroy Turkey' s empi re.
PART VI
NEW WORLDS AND
PROMISED LANDS
31
THE NEW WORLD
i
In 191617, the shadow of the Uni t ed St at es first fell over Ll oyd
George' s i mperi al ambi t i ons i n the Mi ddl e Eas t .
By the last quart er of 1916, the Allies had become dependent upon
the Uni t ed St at es not merel y for suppl i es but for financing. The y
were runni ng out of money, and the economi st John Maynard Keynes ,
speaki ng for the Bri ti sh Treas ury, warned the Cabi net that by the
end of the year "the Ameri can executi ve and the Ameri can publ i c
will be in a posi ti on to dictate to this count ry. "
1
Presi dent Woodrow
Wilson underl i ned the poi nt by i nterferi ng with a J. P. Morgan
financing for Bri tai n i n December 1916demonst rat i ng that he coul d
destroy the market for Al l i ed l oans i n the Uni t ed St at es and thereby
dri ve Bri tai n and France into i nsol vency.
2
Th e Allies were unsure of Wilson's intentions. In fact he was
opposed to their i mperi al i st ambi t i ons and i ntended to thwart t hem.
"Engl and and France have not the s ame views with regard to peace
that we have, " he noted, and he propos ed to "force t hem to our way
of thi nki ng. "
3
Th e conflict between his goal s and t hei rsi n the
Mi ddl e Eas t as el sewherewas to s hape the politics of the years that
followed. Th e entry of Wilson's Ameri ca onto the worl d st age there-
fore opened up dangers as well as opportuni ti es for Ll oyd George.
As a publ i c figure, Wi l son was not easy for t hem to underst and.
The grandson of a past or and the son of a Presbyteri an mi ni ster,
Wilson had st udi ed law and government , became a professor, then
Presi dent of Pri nceton Uni versi ty, Governor of New Jers ey, and
finally Presi dent of the Uni t ed St at es. Yet i n character, thought, and
t emperament , he was not so much a lawyer, a scholar, or a politician
as he was, like his father and grandf at her, a t heol ogi an.
4
He ai med at
converti ng orfai l i ng t hat def eat i ng rather than appeasi ng. A
politician takes professi onal pri de i n achi evi ng compromi ses, but
Wi l sonwho di d not wi sh to appear a pol i ti ci anpri ded hi msel f on
avoi di ng t hem.
253
254 NEW WO R L D S A N D P R O MI S E D L A N D S
I I
Bet hmann lost all control of his government i n early 1917. Th e new
Chief of the General Staff, Paul von Hi ndenburg, and his ani mati ng
military geni us, Eri ch Ludendorf f , believed that the war coul d be
A man of high mi nd, character, and pri nci pl es, he often saw. moral
i ssues in a controversy when others di d not; he frequentl y i nspi red
others to share his vi si on. He was, and still remai ns, a controversi al
fi gure: pri m and bespect acl ed, the aloof and schol arl y Presi dent,
whose features appeared finely asceti c to his admi rers, appeared
pri ggi sh and sel f-ri ghteous to others. He was a compl ex and for-
bi ddi ng figure.
Th e Allies at ti mes mi si nterpreted the Presi dent' s words and
acti ons as a show put on for purpos es of domesti c pol i ti cs, and failed
to appreci at e the sincerity of his desi re to keep the Uni t ed St at es out
of the worl d warand to keep them out of the new colonies they
pl anned to establ i sh for themsel ves i n such areas as the Mi ddl e Eas t .
Th u s they mi sunderst ood Wilson's at t empt to medi ate an end to the
wara mi ssi on that he undertook at the request of the Ge r man
Chancel l or at the end of 1916.
Bet hmann Hol l weg, the civilian Chancel l or of Germany, who for
mont hs had desi red a negoti ated settl ement, forwarded a note to the
Uni t ed St at es on 12 December 1916, expressi ng a wi l l i ngness to talk
peace. Bet hmann, for reasons of domest i c politics, was unabl e to
make the note more specific; but Wi l son went ahead to i ssue a peace
note of his own on 18 December, aski ng the Allies to define their war
goal s in the hope of narrowi ng the di fferences between the two si des.
Ll oyd George had j ust become Pri me Mi ni ster, and he and the
French bel i eved that Wilson was really aski ng for a program on the
basi s of which he coul d bri ng the Uni t ed St at es into the warwhi ch
i s what Secret ary of St at e Robert Lans i ng allowed t hem to under-
st and. Lans i ng, who was pro-i nterventi on, i n fact was undercutti ng
the Presi dent' s peace policy by suggest i ng to the Allies the t erms of
their repl y. Th e Allies obl i ged; they defined their goal s i n sweepi ng
t erms, among t he m"The l i berati on of the peopl es who now live
beneath the murderous tyranny of the Tur ks , and the expul si on from
Europe of the Ot t oman Empi re, which has proved itself radi cal l y
alien to Western ci vi l i zati on. "
5
Thi s was not a peace proposal but a
war cry; clearly the Ot t oman Empi r e woul d not negoti ate a compro-
mi se peace on the basi s of it. It was contrary to what the Presi dent
had sought , and it is not clear how he woul d have proceeded
if Germany had not suddenl y pushed hi m into the arms of the Al l i es.
T H E NEW WO R L D 255
won speedi l y and that compromi se was unnecessary. German policy
was di ctated by the military l eaders, who assured the Kai ser i n
January 1917 that unrestri cted submari ne warfare coul d force the
Bri ti sh into submi ssi on within six mont hs, and that Ameri can inter-
vention in the war, if it came, woul d come too late.
Th e Ge r man submari ne campai gn, exacerbat ed by the notori ous
Zi mmerman t el egram, pushed the Uni t ed St at es toward a decl a-
ration of war, t hough substanti al numbers of Ameri cans resi sted the
logic of events and remai ned adamant l y opposed to i nvol vement in
the war. Swept agai nst his will into the Al l i ed camp, the Presi dent
faced the chal l enge of uni ti ng his country behi nd hi m.
Th e Presi dent' s political probl emwhi ch was about to pl ay a role
i n shapi ng his goal s i n the Mi ddl e Eas t and el sewherewas that he
was the leader of a mi nori ty party. In 1912 he had won the presi dency
only because the majori ty part yt he Republ i cans had spl i t i n two,
with some voti ng for Wi l l i am Howard Taf t ' s Regul ars and others for
Theodore Roosevel t' s Progressi ves; and i n 1916 he had been re-
elected only with the support of the Progressi ves in the normal l y
Republ i can Mi ddl e and Far West. To carry the country behi nd hi s
candi dat es and his program i n future el ecti ons he woul d need to hold
the same swi ng voti ng groups that had thrown the 1916 race to hi m:
the big-city Iri sh Cathol i cs who were anti -Bri ti sh and the mai nl y
Republ i can, Mi ddl e Western German- Ameri cans ( many of t hem
born i n Germany) who were pr o- Ge r man. How was he to bri ng
the Uni t ed St at es into the Al l i ed c amp wi thout al i enati ng these
groups ?
Yet the U- boat s left hi m no choi ce: on 17 March 1917, Ge r man
submari nes sank three Ameri can merchant vessel s. On 20 March the
Presi dent met with his Cabi net to solicit advi ce. He listened to the
views of his Cabi net and sai d little, al though he remarked on the
"apparent apat hy of the Mi ddl e West"
6
as a probl em to be overcome.
He di d not tell the Cabi net whether he had made up his mi nd what
to do.
On 24 March Jos e ph Patri ck Tumul t y, the Presi dent' s l ong-ti me
pri vate secretary, wrote to hi m that the opi ni on of the Ameri can
publ i c, as reveal ed by edi tori al s in newspapers all over the country,
was that if the Uni t ed St at es went to war agai nst Germany, "it
shoul d be on an i ssue directly between us and t hem. "
7
Ameri ca
shoul d not be tied to Allied war goal s, whatever their meri t s;
Ameri cans shoul d not be asked to die for other peopl e' s causes.
The German Foreign Secretary, Arthur Zi mmerman, sent a secret cable in-
structing his Minister in Mexico to seek an alliance with Mexico against the United
States. Mexico was to be given Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The British
government turned over an intercepted copy of Zimmerman's cable to President
Wilson, who published it.
256 NE W WO R L D S A N D P R O M I S E D L A N D S
When Wilson went before Congres s the eveni ng of 2 Apri l to ask
for a decl arati on of war agai nst the Ge r man Empi re, it became
evident that he was thi nki ng al ong the s ame lines, for he devoted
much of his speech to the Uni t ed St at es' speci al goal s. In expl ai ni ng
why he felt compel l ed to ask for a decl arati on of war, he narrowed
the focus of the quarrel with Germany to grounds on which it was
difficult to fault hi m: the Ge r mans had sunk three Ameri can mer-
chant vessel s and proposed to si nk more. Act s of war were bei ng
commi t t ed agai nst the Uni t ed St at es, to which she had no honorabl e
choi ce but to respond in ki nd.
To emphasi ze that the quarrel was about the si nki ng of Ameri can
shi ps, the Presi dent post poned consi derati on of relations with
Germany' s ally, the Habs bur g Empi r e . He sai d that si nce Aust ri a-
Hungary had not made war on the Uni t ed St at es, the Uni t ed St at es,
at least for the moment , woul d not make war on her. ( In the event,
the Uni t ed St at es di d not decl are war agai nst the Habs bur g Empi re
until the end of 1917. ) Emphas i zi ng even further that he proposed to
enter the war on political grounds of his own choosi ng, the Presi dent
di d not menti on the Ot t oman Empi r e at all, nor Bul gari a, which had
recently joi ned the Central Powers. In fact the Uni t ed St at es never
decl ared or made war agai nst t hem, al though the Port eas a result
of German pres s urebroke off di pl omat i c relations with the Uni t ed
St at es.
But he depart ed from the specific quarrel about the merchant
vessel s to chal l enge the Ge r man government and the Al l i ed govern-
ment s t ooon more general grounds . Th e acti ons of the Kai ser' s
government , he tol d Congres s , consti tuted "a war agai nst all nati ons";
and so "The chal l enge i s to all manki nd. "
8
Th e Uni t ed St at es, he
sai d, woul d fight "for the ul ti mate peace of the worl d, and for the
liberation of its peopl es, the Ge r man peopl es i ncl uded"; and, in a
phrase that became f amous , he asserted that "The worl d mus t be
made safe for democracy. "
9
Impl i ci tl y di sti ngui shi ng Ameri can policy
from that of the Al l i ed Powers, Wilson procl ai med that "We have no
selfish ends to serve. We seek no i ndemni ti es for oursel ves, no
materi al compensat i on for the sacrifices we shall freely ma ke . "
1 0
Th e poi nt was later made explicit when the Uni t ed St at e s
keepi ng her di stance f rom the Europeans and their suspect political
ambi t i onsdecl i ned to become one of the Allies, and chose to be
desi gnated as an associ ate rather than as an ally. Thi s was an extra-
ordi nary deci si on: to fight al ongsi de Bri tai n, France, Ital y, and
Russi a, but to refuse to be their ally; and to fight agai nst Germany,
but to refuse to fight agai nst Germany' s allies. It was an indication of
a fundamental conflict between the European bel l i gerents and
Wilson's Ameri ca as to the purpos e of the war and the shape of the
T H E NE W WO R L D 257
peace. Th e intervention of the Uni t ed St at es was to cast a l ong
shadow over the gai ns with which the Ent ent e Powers had promi sed
to reward one another at the end of the war, especially in the Mi ddl e
Eas t .
Ill
Th e Presi dent was concerned about the attacks on his war policy by
Progressi ve and Soci al i st l eaders i n the Mi ddl e West, for they rep-
resented voti ng bl ocs he coul d not i gnore. They denounced his
policy as ai di ng i mperi al i sm, and cl ai med the war was bei ng fought
in the servi ce of major financial i nterests. The y pi ctured the war as a
greedy st ruggl e for spoi l s.
The y attacked where the Presi dent felt vul nerabl e, for he bel i eved,
correctly, that the Al l i ed government s had entered into secret agree-
ment s with one another to aggrandi ze their empi res, and feared that
i f these agreement s were made known they mi ght confi rm the charge
leveled agai nst hi m that he had associ ated the Uni t ed St at es with a
war that served essentially i mperi al i sti c i nterests. Th e secret Sykes-
Picot Agreement , for exampl e, provi ded for Bri tai n and France to
di vi de up the Arabi c- speaki ng Mi ddl e Eas t . Other agreement s pro-
vi ded for Rus s i a and Italy to annex porti ons of what i s now Turkey.
Wilson i nqui red into the details of the secret treati eseven t hough
his political confi dant, Edward Mandel l Hous e, felt these were mat-
ters best not gone into until the war was won. In response to the
Presi dent' s i nqui ry, the Bri ti sh Forei gn Secretary, Art hur Bal four,
sent copi es of the secret agreement s to Washi ngton on 18 May 1917.
Hous e (who used his honorary Te x a s title of colonel) was di smayed
by their contents. Of the pl an to parti ti on the Mi ddl e Eas t , Col onel
Hous e presci entl y remarked that "It i s all bad and I told Bal four so.
The y are maki ng i t a breedi ng pl ace for future war . "
1 1
Th e Allies woul d not renounce the cl ai ms that they had staked out
for themsel ves i n their secret agreement s. Th e Presi dent coul d not
use coercion to make t hem do so: while fighting al ongsi de t hem he
coul d not hurt t hem wi thout hurti ng the Uni t ed St at es. Yet he knew
that if news of the agreement s l eaked out it woul d hurt t hem all. As
an opponent , on pri nci pl e, of secret treati es, he was pushed into the
paradoxi cal posi ti on of tryi ng to keep the Mi ddl e East ern agreement s
a secret; but he was not abl e to do so. When the Bol shevi ks sei zed
power i n Pet rograd, they publ i shed the copi es of the secret agree-
ment s that they di scovered in the Russi an archi ves. Fearf ul of the
effect on Ameri can publ i c opi ni on, Wilson t ri edbut fai l edto
prevent the publ i cati on of the treaties in the Uni t ed St at es.
Fal l i ng back on a suggest i on by his brilliant young journal i st
support er Walter Li ppmann, then an edi tor of the New Republic,
Wilson took the offensive by redefining the goal s for which the war
was bei ng fought, in a way that he j udged woul d purify the Allied
cause, in the hopes of boost i ng publ i c moral e on his own si de and
of agai n appeal i ng to the Ge r man peopl e over the heads of their
l e ade r s .
1 2
Wilson defined the new war goal s in several ways and on a number
of occasi ons. Most f amous were the Fourt een Poi nts, which he
outl i ned to a joint sessi on of Congres s on 8 January 1918. Of these,
some were of a general nat ure: no more secret agreement s between
countri es; di pl omacy and negoti ati on al ways to take pl ace in the
publ i c view; freedom of the seas; f reedom of t rade, and an end of
tariff and other economi c barri ers; general di s armament ; and the
establ i shment of an associ ati on of nati ons to guarant ee the i ndepen-
dence and territorial integrity of all nati ons. Others dealt with specific
i ssues; and, of these, Poi nt Twel ve, al though the Uni t ed St at es was
not at war with the Ot t oman Empi re, outlined Ameri can objecti ves
with respect to it: "12. Th e Tur ki s h porti ons of the present Ot t oman
empi re shoul d be assured a secure soverei gnty, but the other
nationalities whi ch are now under Tur ki s h rule shoul d be assured an
undoubt ed securi ty of life and an absol utel y unmol est ed opport uni t y
of aut onomous devel opment . " In an earlier draft, Wilson had pro-
posed that Turkey be wi ped off the ma p ;
1 3
his mai n interest i n the
Mi ddl e Eas t was mi ssi onary and, like Ll oyd George, he seems to
have kept i n mi nd the Turki s h massacres of Chri st i ans. Th e fi nal
versi on, however, drafted by his advi sers, was in line with the
Presi dent' s cl ai m that the Uni t ed St at es was fi ghti ng the government s
rather than the peopl es of her adversari es.
Point Twel ve expressed the view, shared by Wilson and Hous e,
that the Mi ddl e East shoul d not be di vi ded among the belligerent
powers; that peopl es hitherto rul ed by the Tur ks shoul d become
aut onomous .
1 4
Onl y a year before, however, Wilson and Hous e had
agreed that it woul d be unwi se for the Presi dent to di scuss in publ i c
his pl ans for di spl aci ng the Ot t oman regi me because his words mi ght
endanger the Ameri can mi ssi onary col l eges i n Bei rut and outsi de
1 5
A mont h later, on 11 February 1918, Wilson spoke to Congress
and defined in a general way the Four Pri nci pl es upon which the
peace settl ement shoul d be made. Th e second and thi rd pri nci pl es
were:
2. That peopl es and provi nces are not to be bartered about
from soverei gnty to soverei gnty as if they were chattels or
pawns in a game, even the great game , now for ever di scredi ted,
of the bal ance of power; but that
T H E NEW WO R L D 259
3. Every territorial settl ement i nvol ved i n this war must be
made in the interest and for the benefit of the popul at i ons
concerned, and not as a part of any mere adj ust ment or compro-
mi se of cl ai ms amongst rival states . . .
In a speech on 4 Jul y 1918, Wi l son defined the Four Ends for
which the Uni t ed St at es and its associ ates were fighting as i ncl udi ng
Th e settl ement of every questi on, whether of territory or sover-
eignty, of economi c arrangement , or of political rel ati onshi p,
upon the basi s of the free acceptance of that settl ement by the
peopl e i mmedi atel y concerned, and not upon the basi s of the
materi al interest or advant age of any other nation or peopl e
which may desi re a different settl ement for the sake of its own
exterior influence or mast ery.
Wilson's peace proposal s were recei ved with ardent enthusi -
as m, but , revealingly, not by the Al l i ed government s. As Walter
Li ppmann' s bi ographer has written,
At first this puzzl ed Li ppmann, for he had as s umed that
Wilson had coordi nated his pl an with the Allies before maki ng
it publ i c. He had not, and for a good reason: he knew they
woul d turn it down. Def eat ed in his efforts to pers uade the
Allies to repudi at e the secret treati es, he had tried to i nduce the
peopl es of Eur ope to put pressure on their own government s.
Th e tactic failed, and as a result the Fourt een Poi nts were
si mpl y a unilateral Ameri can pronouncement rather than a dec-
laration of Al l i ed pol i cy.
1 6
Indeed they represented a chal l enge to the Al l i ed as well as to the
enemy government s.
IV
Point Twel ve was not only unilateral but also anomal ous : the
Presi dent was proposi ng to di s member the Ot t oman Empi re, with
which the Uni t ed St at es was not at war. It also seemed an anomal y
that the Uni t ed St at es shoul d have decl ared war agai nst Germany
and later agai nst Aus t ri a- Hungary wi thout also decl ari ng war agai nst
their allies.
Th e Senat e Forei gn Rel ati ons Commi t t ee appeared t o be i n
favor of i ssui ng the addi ti onal decl arati ons of war. Its chai rman
asked Secret ary of St at e Lans i ng for a fuller expl anati on of the
Admi ni strati on' s reasons for not doi ng so. In a lengthy me mor andum
submi t t ed by Lans i ng i n repl y, the Secret ary of St at e cited a number
of reasons. At the t i me, the Uni t ed St at es held no significant t rade,
260 NE W WO R L D S A N D P R O MI S E D L A N D S
economi c, or political stakes i n the Mi ddl e Eas t other than two
Protestant mi ssi onary- support ed col l egesRobert Col l ege and the
Syri an Protestant Col l egewi th whi ch Wilson's friend and chief
f i nanci al support er, Cl evel and Dodge , was intimately concerned. But
Lans i ng argued that saf eguardi ng these institutions in itself was of
sufficient i mport ance to justify the Admi ni strati on' s policy. He indi-
cated that these i nsti tuti ons were worth mi l l i ons of dol l ars and mi ght
be confiscated in the event of war. He al so warned that, in the event
of war, Chri st i ans and Je ws i n the Ot t oman Empi re mi ght become
the vi cti ms of new massacres. Lans i ng saw no parti cul ar advant age to
be gai ned by decl ari ng war, and poi nted out that Turkey had not
attacked the Uni t ed St at es.
Despi t e the many reasons cited by Lans i ng for the Admi ni strati on' s
deci si on, Congress remai ned unconvi nced, and a resolution was
i ntroduced in the Senat e in 1918 cal l i ng for the addi ti onal decl arati ons
of war. Test i f yi ng before the Senat e Forei gn Rel ati ons Commi t t ee,
Lans i ng sai d that the deci si on was essentially one for Congress to
make. At the request of the commi t t ee, he agreed to sound out the
Allies as to whether they bel i eved the addi ti onal decl arati ons of war
woul d help or hi nder the war effort.
In May, Lans i ng report ed to the Presi dent that the Allies were of
the opi ni on that it woul d be helpful if the Uni t ed St at es were to
i ssue the addi ti onal decl arati ons of war. Lans i ng poi nted out to the
Presi dent, however, that more than a million dol l ars a mont h was
bei ng sent to Ameri can mi ssi onari es i n the Ot t oman Empi re to feed
and care for Syri ans and Armeni ans, and that this aid woul d be cut
off in the event of wa r .
1 8
Th e Presi dent reaffirmed his deci si on not to decl are war. Th e
Senat e Forei gn Rel ati ons Commi t t ee was so i nformed and reluctantly
accepted his deci si on. Thus the Uni t ed St at es remai ned at peace
with the Ot t oman Empi re while the Presi dent conti nued to formul ate
his pl ans for breaki ng it up.
V
At the Presi dent' s request , Col onel Hous e, by- passi ng the St at e
Depart ment , began in early Sept ember 1917 to assembl e a group of
assi stants to hel p hi m formul ate Ameri ca' s pl ans for the postwar
worl d. It was to be an i ndependent group to which no publ i ci ty was
to be gi ven: it was code- named "the Inqui ry. " It met at first in the
New York Publ i c Li brary. At Wilson's suggesti on, Hous e drew
parti ci pants pri nci pal l y from the academi c worl d, begi nni ng with
names recommended by the presi dent of Harvard Uni versi ty and by
the editor of the New Republic. Presi dent Wilson personal l y chose
T H E NE W WO R L D 261
Walter Li ppmann. At its peak, the group assembl ed by Hous e num-
bered 126. Th e vast majori ty of its members had recei ved their final
academi c degrees from one of four elite uni versi t i esChi cago,
Col umbi a, Harvard, and Yal e and many were recrui ted directly
from the faculties of those or si mi l ar i nst i t ut i ons.
1 9
Yet the I nqui ryapart f rom its professi onal l y drawn ma p s
2 0
was conduct ed amat euri shl y. Th e Mi ddl e East ern group, compos ed
of ten schol ars operat i ng out of Pri nceton Uni versi ty, di d not i ncl ude
any speci al i sts i n the cont emporary Mi ddl e Eas t ; its chai rman was a
student of the Crus ades . Th e chai rman' s son, also a member, was a
speci al i st i n Lat i n Ameri can st udi es. Among other members were an
expert on the Ameri can Indi an, an engi neer, and two prof essors who
speci al i zed i n ancient Persi an l anguages and l i t erat ure.
2 1
Th e choi ce of the New York Publ i c Li brary as its first headquart ers
symbol i zed the approach adopt ed by the Inqui ry: havi ng rai sed all
the political quest i ons that di vi de the human race, the Inqui ry pro-
ceeded to look t hem up. Many of the researchers di d no more than
summari ze the i nformati on that they found in an encycl opaedi a.
Many del ved into quest i ons of literature and archi tecture that coul d
have no concei vabl e beari ng on the t erms of an eventual peace treaty.
Few of the reports had any beari ng on the questi on of Ameri can
national i nt eres t s .
2 2
It was typi cal that even in the economi c section of the Mi ddl e
East ern group' s report, there was no menti on of the possi bi l i ty that
significant deposi t s of pet rol eum mi ght be found in that part of the
worl d. Yet in 1918, in wagi ng a twenti eth-century war in which
tanks and ai rpl anes made their appearance, the Uni t ed St at es di s-
covered ( as di d France that s ame year, and as Wi nston Churchi l l
had done in Bri tai n before the war) that the vast quanti ti es of
petrol eum requi red in modern warfare had rendered the potential oil
resources which were suspect ed to exist i n the Mi ddl e Eas t of con-
si derabl e i mport ance. Tha t the Inqui ry' s reports on the Mi ddl e Eas t
i gnored the oil i ssue was an indication of the unworl dl i ness of the
Presi dent' s men that boded ill for the future Peace Conf erence.
2 3
VI
While the Presi dent' s peace program was i n some respect s qui xoti c,
the extraordi nary response that it evoked throughout the world
showed that it expressed a wi despread yearni ng to underst and why
the war was bei ng f ought . Bri tai n' s Forei gn Secretary, Bal f our, sai d
that the war "was perhaps the bi ggest event in history" but that,
beyond that, his mi nd woul d not go: "Comi ng generati ons mi ght
find it possi bl e to see the thi ng as it really exi sted, " but he and his
generati on coul d not. Th e war, by 1917, had grown so much l arger
than the events that caused i t that its causes seemed al most absurdl y
insignificant by compari son.
Th e day after Woodrow Wilson del i vered his speech to Congress
aski ng for a decl arati on of war, Walter Li ppmann wrote to hi m (in
words that were to appear in the New Republic later in the week) :
"Only a st at esman who will be called great coul d have made Ameri ca' s
intervention mean so much to the generous forces of the worl d,
coul d have lifted the inevitable horror of war into a deed so full of
meani ng. "
2 5
Li ppmann, as he so often di d, had found the word for
it: the Presi dent, by adopt i ng the goal s that he di d, had gi ven the
war a meaning.
Years later, in off-the-record comment s aboard shi p en route to the
peace conferences i n 1919, Wilson told his associ ates that "I am
convi nced that if this peace is not made on the highest pri nci pl es of
justi ce, it will be swept away by the peopl es of the worl d in less than
a generati on. If it is any other sort of peace then I shall want to
run away and hi de . . . for there will follow not mere conflict but
cat acl ys m. "
2 6
However, neither Wilson nor those who took part i n his Inqui ry
had f ormul at ed concrete programs that woul d transl ate promi ses into
realities: the Presi dent' s program was vague and bound to arouse
millennial expectati onswhi ch made it practically certain that any
agreement achi eved by pol i ti ci ans woul d di sappoi nt .
32
LLOYD GEORGE' S ZIONISM
i
As human bei ngs, no two men coul d have been less alike than the
austere Ameri can Presi dent and the charmi ng but moral l y lax Bri ti sh
Pri me Mi ni ster. As pol i ti ci ans, t hough, they were si mi l ar: l oners
who had won power t hrough the fluke of a party spl i t. Each carri ed
on a personal foreign pol i cy, by- passi ng the Depart ment of St at e and
the Forei gn Office. Bot h Wilson and Ll oyd George had been reluc-
tant to let their countri es enter the war and, after opt i ng for war, had
found it difficult to keep their pacifist and anti-war s upport ers in
line. Bot h men were of the political left; but there the si mi l ari ti es
came to an end, for while Wi l son was movi ng i n an ever more
progressi ve and idealistic di recti on, Ll oyd George was doi ng j ust the
opposi t e.
Had his political past been a gui de to his future perf ormance,
Ll oyd Ge or ge coul d have been expect ed t o share the Uni t ed St at es'
aversi on to i mperi al i st desi gns on the Mi ddl e Eas t . In his Radi cal
youth he had oppos ed Bri ti sh i mperi al i sm and i t woul d have been i n
character for hi m, on becomi ng Pri me Mi ni ster, to have overturned
the Asqui t h Cabi net' s agreement with the Allies to expand their
empi res but he di d not do s o.
Ll oyd George felt much the s ame need to reformul ate war goal s
that Wi l son di d, but arri ved at different concl usi ons. Wilson pro-
cl ai med that the enormi ty of the war requi red peace wi thout annex-
ati ons. Ll oyd George took the other vi ew: the enormi ty of the war
requi red i ndemni ti es and annexati ons on an enormous scal e.
Bot h Wilson and Ll oyd George promi sed the peopl es of the
Ot t oman Empi r e a better life, but where Wilson hel d out the hope of
sel f-government, Ll oyd George, while empl oyi ng the rhetoric of
national l i berati on, proposed to gi ve the Mi ddl e East better govern-
ment than it coul d gi ve itself. In this the Pri me Mi ni ster' s goal s
coi nci ded with those of Ki t chener' s l i eutenants who exerci sed day-to-
day control of Bri ti sh Cai ro' s Mi ddl e East ern pol i cy; thus the chances
that his pol i cy woul d actually be carri ed out were i mproved.
264 NEW WO R L D S A N D P R O M I S E D L A N D S
Taki ng office as 1916 turned into 1917, the new Pri me Mi ni ster
brought ol d-fashi oned Radi cal fervor to such emergi ng war goal s as
the destructi on of the reacti onary Ot t oman Empi regoal s that harked
back to the gl ori ous days of ni neteenth-century Li beral i s m. One of
Ll oyd George' s fi rst acti ons on becomi ng Pri me Mi ni ster was to
order his armi es i n Egypt onto the offensi ve. One of the others was
to order John Buchan, whom he i nstal l ed at Mi l ner' s suggest i on as
Di rect or of Inf ormat i on, to l aunch a propaganda campai gn port rayi ng
the destructi on of the Ot t oman Empi r e as a maj or purpose of the
war. Th e campai gn capt ured the i magi nati on of the publ i c: "The
Tur k Mus t Go ! " proved t o be an effective s l ogan.
1
Li ke Wilson's
procl ai med poi nts and pri nci pl es, it al so proved, at least in the short
run, good politics.
Ll oyd George' s program of sendi ng troops to fi ght i n the East
brought hi m into i mmedi at e conflict with his general s; they conti nued
to demand s upreme control over mi l i tary deci si ons, and i n this were
support ed by Ki ng George. Thei r strategy, as al ways, was t o con-
centrate all resources on the western front, and they compl ai ned that
their professi onal j udgment was bei ng defied by the new Pri me
Mi ni ster. Thei r newspaper fri ends on Fl eet Street took up the cause.
In early January the press l ord, Lo r d Northcl i ffe, i n a heated con-
versation threatened "to break" Ll oyd George unl ess he called off his
eastern s t rat egy.
2
Northcl i ffe gave himself the credi t for havi ng
overthrown As qui t h i n December, and appeared confident that he
coul d bri ng down Ll oyd George i n Januar y i f he chose.
At about the s ame ti me, the War Office asked someone close to
Ll oyd George to warn hi m that the general s were goi ng to fi ght hi m
and that he "might not get the best of it [original emphas i s ] . "
3
In
Germany the General Staff was i n the process of sweepi ng asi de the
civilian Chancel l or. With the Ki ng, the l eaders of his own Li beral
Party, the press, and the general s agai nst hi m, the Pri me Mi ni ster
coul d not be certain that the Bri ti sh Imperi al General Staff woul d
not at t empt somet hi ng si mi l ar. It was one of those ti mes in worl d
politics when anythi ng, even the previ ousl y uni magi nabl e, seemed
possi bl e.
Yet he st ood as firm as he coul d on his eastern strategy, scornful
of his military advi sers. Lo ng afterward, he wrote that "nothing and
nobody coul d have saved the Tur k from compl ete col l apse i n 1915
and 1916 except our General St af f . "
4
Accordi ng to Ll oyd George, a
victory over the Ot t oman Empi re before the end of 1916, when
Bul gari a entered the war, woul d "have produced a deci si ve effect on
the fortunes of the War. "
5
It woul d have been easy to beat Turkey at
any ti me, he sai d: "the resol ute f acade the Tur ks present ed to the
Allies . . . had nothi ng behi nd it. It was part of the War Office game
to pretend that the Tur ks had f ormi dabl e forces with ampl e reserves.
L L O Y D G E O R G E ' S Z I O N I S M 265
The y may have bel i eved it, but i f so, either their i nformati on was
defective, or they were easily taken i n. "
6
Fr om the begi nni ng of the war, Ll oyd George had argued that
Germany coul d be beaten by an attack t hrough the Bal kans. Def eat i ng
Turkey woul d open up the Bal kans to such an attack. Wri ti ng
l ong afterward, he was abl e to s upport his posi ti on by quot i ng von
Hi ndenburg, the chief of the Ge r man General Staff: "If ever there
was a prospect of a brilliant strategi c feat, it was here . . . Why di d
Engl and never make use of her opport uni t y? . . . Some day history
will perhaps clear up this questi on . . . "
7
Ll oyd George wanted to do it, but hi s probl em was that he lacked
the political strength to face down the general s and to commandeer
troops and equi pment i n sufficient quanti ty to do the j ob. Thr ough-
out 1917 and well into 1918, he and Bri tai n' s mi l i tary l eaders fought
a war of maneuver and i ntri gue agai nst each other. Ll oyd George' s
position was precari ous; he had no dept h of support in Parl i ament,
where he was sust ai ned for the ti me bei ng by former enemi es and
di strusted by former fri ends. Th e most dangerous politician to attack
the government was his one-ti me prot ege Wi nston Churchi l l . "Hi s
tone was rather bitter i n speaki ng of Ll oyd George whom he had
evidently come to consi der as his detested antagoni st, " noted a friend
of the two me n.
8
Churchi l l had cause to be bi tter; Ll oyd George had
excl uded hi m f rom the Cabi net . "He brought Turkey into the War, "
the Pri me Mi ni ster sai d. "Such men are too dangerous for hi gh
offi ce. "
9
In speeches and newspaper arti cl es, Churchi l l brought to bear his
vast knowl edge of mi l i tary affairs and his gras p of detail in criticizing
the conduct of the war. As Ll oyd George knew well, there was much
to criticize; he was powerl ess to i mpose his own views on the Al l i ed
commanders , yet as Pri me Mi ni ster he was responsi bl e to Parl i ament
for their conti nui ng costl y fai l ures. Keepi ng his lines of communi -
cation open, Churchi l l sent a pri vate warni ng to the Pri me Mi ni ster
that, di ssati sfi ed with the conduct of the war, the di sparat e opposi ti on
groups i n the Commons mi ght uni te to bri ng hi m down.
On 10 May 1917 Churchi l l and Ll oyd George happened to meet
after a sessi on of the Hous e of Commons , and the Pri me Mi ni ster
spoke of his desi re to have Churchi l l in the Cabi net . Tho ug h he still
thought Churchi l l had "spoilt himself by readi ng about Napol eon, "
Ll oyd George confi ded to Frances St evenson, his secretary and
mi stress, that he needed Churchi l l to cheer hi m up and encourage
hi m at a ti me when he was s urrounded by col l eagues with gl oomy
f ac e s .
1 0
As al ways, it was a questi on of whether it was a greater risk to
leave Churchi l l out or to bri ng hi m in. In mi d- Jul y he appoi nt ed
Churchi l l Mi ni ster of Muni t i ons; and, even t hough the post di d not
carry with i t members hi p i n the War Cabi net , the appoi nt ment
i mmedi atel y aroused such opposi t i on that for a ti me it endangered
the government' s exi stence. *
Churchi l l ' s aunt, wri ti ng to congrat ul at e hi m on becomi ng Mi ni ster
of Muni t i ons, added "My advi ce is stick to muni ti ons & don't try &
run the government ! "
1 2
Th e new appoi nt ment prompt ed The Times
to warn that the country "is in no mood to tolerate even a forlorn
at t empt to resusci tate amat eur s t rat egy. "
1 3
Churchi l l ' s family and
fri ends, who were worri ed for hi m, and his l egi ons of enemi es and
detractors, who were worri ed for the country, woul d have been
di smayed but not surpri sed to learn that, within a week of his
appoi nt ment , he had approached the Secret ary of the War Cabi net
with a revi ved pl an to i nvade the Mi ddl e Eas t . He proposed to land
Bri ti sh armi es at the port of Al exandret t a to i nvade northern Syri a
and cut across the lines of t ransport at i on and communi cat i on of the
Ot t oman Emp i r e .
1 4
Th e War Cabi net i gnored his proposal , and i t
came to nothi ng.
I I
Within mont hs of taki ng office, Ll oyd George was engaged i n secret
negoti ati ons with the Young Tu r k l eader, Enver Pasha. Th e Pri me
Mi ni ster' s agent i n the negoti ati ons was Vincent Cai l l ard, fi nanci al
di rector of the gi ant armament s fi rm Vi ckers, who had spent many
years in Const ant i nopl e as presi dent of the council of admi ni strati on
of the Ot t oman Publ i c Debt . Cai l l ard, i n turn, acted t hrough his
cl ose busi ness associ ate, Basi l Zaharoff, who had risen from the
underworl d of Smyr na to become the world's most notori ous arms
sal esman, known in the popul ar press as the "merchant of deat h. "
Zaharoff j ourneyed to Geneva i n 1917 and 1918 and reported that he
was abl e to conduct negoti ati ons there with Enver Pasha, at fi rst
through a go-between and then f ace- t o- f ace.
1 5
Thr ough his emi ssary, the Pri me Mi ni ster offered bri besl arge
bank account st o Enver and his associ ates to leave the war on
Bri tai n' s terms, which were: Arabi a to be i ndependent ; Armeni a
and Syri a to enjoy local aut onomy within the Ot t oman Empi r e ;
Mes opot ami a and Pal esti ne to become de facto Bri ti sh protectorates,
Lloyd George was saved by Bonar Law, who held his angry Conservatives in
line. Bonar Law disliked Churchill, and was bitter about not having been consulted
in the matter. Nonetheless, he remained loyal to the Prime Minister. Lloyd George
cleverly told him that Asquith had pledged, if he came back as Prime Minister, to
bring Churchill back to power as First Lord of the Admi ral ty.
1 1
The implied
message was that a Ll oyd George government, with Churchill confined to a relatively
less important position, was preferable.
like Egypt before the war, t hough under formal Ot t oman suzerai nty;
and f reedom of navi gati on t hrough the Dardanel l es to be secured. In
return, Ll oyd George offered to pl edge that the Capi t ul at i ons (the
treaties gi vi ng preferential treatment to Europeans ) woul d remai n
abol i shed, and that generous financial treatment woul d be gi ven to
Tur ke y t o ai d her economi c recovery. Th e t erms offered by Ll oyd
George di ffered i n two i mportant ways f rom those envi saged by the
pri or Asqui t h government : France, Ital y, and Rus s i a were t o get
nothi ng; and Bri tai n was to take Pal esti ne as well as Mes opot ami a.
Zaharoff' s report st he veracity of which it is difficult to j udg e
indicate that Enver, after mercuri al changes of mi nd and mood, di d
not accept Ll oyd George' s offer. It does not sound as t hough he ever
seri ousl y i ntended to do s o. But the i nstructi ons that Zaharoff re-
ceived reveal Ll oyd George' s i ntenti ons with regard to the Mi ddl e
Eas t .
Ill
In a secret sessi on of the Hous e of Commons on 10 May 1917, the
Pri me Mi ni ster surpri sed even a cl ose col l aborator by sayi ng un-
equi vocal l y that Bri tai n was not goi ng to gi ve back the Ge r man
colonies i n Afri ca capt ured duri ng the war, and that Turkey woul d
not be al l owed t o keep Pal esti ne or Me s opot ami a.
1 6
Tho ug h Ll oyd
George had definite i deas about the future of the l i berated Ot t oman
l ands, few of his col l eagues were aware of t hem. He avoi ded official
channel s and made his i deas known in detail only in the course of the
secret negoti ati ons with Enver Pas ha; hence the i mport ance of what
they reveal ed.
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster i ntended to deny France the posi ti on that Si r
Mark Sykes had promi sed her i n the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t , and took
the view that the Sykes-Pi cot Agreement was uni mport ant ; that
physi cal possessi on was all that mat t ered. Regardi ng Pal esti ne, he
told the Bri t i sh ambas s ador to France i n Apri l 1917 that the French
woul d be obl i ged to accept a fait accompli: "We shall be there by
conquest and shall remai n. "
1 7
Ll oyd George was the only man i n his government who had
always wanted to acqui re Pal esti ne for Bri tai n. He also wanted to
encourage the devel opment of a Jewi sh homel and in Pal esti ne. Hi s
col l eagues failed to underst and how strongl y he held these vi ews.
There was a background to Ll oyd George' s beliefs of which his
col l eagues were largely i gnorant. He was not, like As qui t h and the
other members of the Cabi net , educat ed i n an excl usi ve publ i c
school that st ressed the Greek and Lat i n cl assi cs; he was brought up
on the Bi bl e. Repeat edl y he remarked that the Bi bl i cal pl ace names
were better known to hi m than were those of the battl es and the
di sput ed frontiers that figured i n the European war. He expressed
himself about these pl aces with fervor. In his later memoi rs he wrote
that he had objected to the division of Pal esti ne in the Sykes-Pi cot
Agreement (most of it goi ng to France or into an international zone)
on the grounds that i t muti l ated the country. He sai d i t was not
worth wi nni ng the Hol y La nd only to "hew it in pi eces before the
Lo r d . "
1 8
He asserted that "Pal esti ne, i f recapt ured, mus t be one and
indivisible to renew its great ness as a living ent i t y. "
1 9
IV
Unl i ke his col l eagues he was keenly aware that there were centuri es-
old tendenci es i n Bri ti sh Nonconf ormi st and Evangel i cal thought
toward taki ng the l ead i n restori ng the Je ws to Zi on. Indeed they
formed the background of his own Nonconf ormi st faith. He was only
the latest in a l ong line of Chri st i an Zi oni sts in Bri tai n that stretched
back to the Puri tans and the era in which the Mayflower set sail for
the New Worl d. Promi sed l ands were still much thought about i n
those days, whether in the Uni t ed St at es or in Pal esti ne.
In the mi d-seventeenth century, two Engl i sh Puri tans resi di ng i n
Hol l andJoanna and Ebenezer Cart wri ght pet i t i oned their govern-
ment "That this Nat i on of Engl and, with the i nhabi tants of the
Net herl ands, shall be the first and the readi est to transport Izraell's
sons and daught ers i n their shi ps to the La nd promi sed by their
forefathers, Abraham, Isaac, and J a c o b for an everl asti ng Inheri -
t ance. "
2 0
Gui ded by the Scri pt ures, the Puri tans believed that the
advent of the Messi ah woul d occur once the peopl e of Judae a were
restored to their native l and.
Th e idea recurred: i n the mi d-ni neteenth century, the social re-
former Ant hony Cooper, who became Earl of Shaf t esbury, i nspi red a
powerful evangelical movement within the Church of Engl and that
ai med at bri ngi ng the Je ws back to Pal esti ne, converti ng t hem to
Chri sti ani ty, and hasteni ng the Second Comi ng. Shaf t esbury also in-
spi red Pal merst on, the Forei gn Secret ary and his relation by mar-
ri age, to extend Bri ti sh consul ar protecti on to Jews i n Pal esti ne:
"Pal merston had al ready been chosen by Go d to be an i nstrument of
good to Hi s ancient peopl e, " Shaf t esbury noted i n his di ar y.
2 1
Pal merst on acted from a mi xt ure of idealistic and practi cal reasons
not unlike those of Ll oyd George i n the next century. He pressed a
Jewi sh Pal esti ne on the Ot t oman Empi re i n the context of the Great
Game rivalry with France, at a ti me in the 1830s and 1840s when the
rebelling Vi ceroy of Egypt , Mehemet Al i , backed by France, marched
from Egypt on Syri a to threaten the territorial integrity of the empi re
and the throne of its Sul t an. As usual , Pal merst on uphel d the
Ot t oman cause. One of his purposes i n advocat i ng a Jewi s h Pal esti ne
was to strengthen the Ot t oman regi me, by provi di ng i t with Jewi sh
support . Another was to foil the French and their prot ege Mehemet
Ali by pl aci ng al ong their line of march a Bri ti sh-backed Jewi sh
homel and whi ch woul d bl ock their advance. Another was to provi de
Bri tai n with a client in the Mi ddl e Eas t , and therefore an excuse for
intervention i n Ot t oman affai rs. Th e Rus s i ans , as def enders of the
Ort hodox faith, and the French, as champi ons of the i mportant
and strategi cal l y located Maroni t e ( Roman Cathol i c) communi t y i n
Lebanon, cl ai med to represent significant Mi ddl e East ern interests
and communi t i es. For the want of Protestants i n the area, Bri tai n
had to adopt some other protege in order to be abl e to make a si mi l ar
cl ai m.
Pal merston' s notion of restori ng the Promi sed La nd to the Jewi sh
peopl e also proved to be shrewd domest i c pol i ti cs. It struck a respon-
si ve chord i n Bri ti sh publ i c opi ni on that harked back to Puri tan
ent husi asm. Accordi ng to the l eadi ng authori ty on Pal merston' s
di pl omacy, his pol i cy "became connected with" a mysti cal i dea, never
altogether lost in the nineteenth century, that Bri tai n was to be the
chosen i nst rument of Go d to bri ng back the Jews to the Hol y
La n d . "
2 2
Thi s somehow coexi sted, at least i n Bri tai n' s upper cl asses,
with pervasi ve ant i - Semi t i sm.
In 1914 the entry of the Ot t oman Empi re into the war appeared to
have brought about the political ci rcumst ances in which the Zi oni st
dream at last coul d be realized. "What i s to prevent the Je ws havi ng
Pal esti ne and restori ng a real J uda e a ? " asked H. G. Wells i n an open
newspaper letter penned the moment that Turkey came into the
war.
A si mi l ar thought occurred soon afterward to Si r Herbert Samuel ,
Post mast er General in Asqui t h' s Cabi net , one of the l eaders of the
Li beral Party, and the first person of the Jewi sh faith to sit in a
Bri ti sh Cabi net . In January 1915 he sent a memorandum to Pri me
Mi ni ster Asqui t h proposi ng that Pal esti ne shoul d become a Bri ti sh
prot ect orat ebecause it was of strategi c i mport ance to the Bri ti sh
Empi r e and urgi ng the advant ages of encouragi ng l arge-scal e Jewi sh
settlement there. Th e Pri me Mi ni ster had j ust been readi ng Tancred
a novel by Benj ami n Di srael i , the ni neteenth-century Bri ti sh leader
(bapti zed a Chri st i an, but born of a Jewi sh fami l y), who advocated a
Jewi sh return to Pal est i neand Asqui t h confided that Samuel ' s
memorandum "reads al most like a new edition of Tancred brought
up to dat e. I confess I am not attracted by this proposed addi ti on
It was a vision that inspired secular idealists as well. George Eliot, in her novel
Daniel Deronda (1876), proposed a Zionist program.
V
Ll oyd George, t hough of a Wel sh fami l y, was born i n Manchest er,
Bri tai n' s second
:
l argest city, and the home of the Radi cal Li beral
tradi ti on which he was to uphol d throughout much of his political
life. Manchest er was al so, next to London, the home of Bri tai n' s
largest Jewi sh communi t y; and Me mbe r s of Parl i ament f rom the
area, such as Bal f our and Churchi l l , were aware of the speci al con-
cerns of their Jewi s h consti tuents.
C P . Scot t , editor of the great Li beral newspaper the Manchester
Guardian, was converted to Zi oni sm in 1914 by Chai m Wei zmann, a
Russi an Jewi sh chemi st who had settled i n Manchest er. Scot t , who
was consi dered to be Ll oyd George' s closest political confidant, took
up the cause with all the force of his idealistic nat ure. Th e mi l i tary
correspondent of the Guardian, Herbert Si debot ham, saw a com-
pl ementary, aspect of the mat t er: a mi l i tary advant age to Bri tai n. In
the i ssue of 26 November 1915, he wrote that "the whol e future of
to our responsi bi l i ti es. But it is a curi ous illustration of Di zzy' s
[Di srael i ' s] favouri te maxi m that 'race is everythi ng' to find this
al most lyrical out burst proceedi ng f rom the wel l -ordered and me-
thodi cal brai n of H. S . . . . "
2 3
In March 1915 a revi sed versi on of Samuel ' s me mor andum was
ci rcul ated to the Cabi net . It di d not attract support , and Asqui t h' s
pri vate comment was that "Curi ousl y enough the only other parti san
of this proposal is Ll oyd George, who, I need not say, does not care
a damn for the Jews or their past or their future . . . "
2 4
Th e Pri me
Mi ni ster was unaware of the compl ex of moti ves behi nd the posi ti on
taken by Ll oyd George, who told the Cabi net that i t woul d be an
outrage to let the Chri st i an Hol y Pl aces in Pal esti ne fall into the
hands of "Agnosti c Athei sti c Fr a nc e . "
2 5
Asqui t h f ound i t odd that
Samuel and Ll oyd George shoul d advocat e a Bri ti sh protectorate
for Pal esti ne for such different reasons: "Isn't it si ngul ar that the
s ame concl usi on shd. be capabl e of bei ng come to by such different
r o a ds ? "
2 6
It was a presci ent remark for, i n the years to come, Bri ti sh
officials travel i ng al ong many different roads happened to arri ve at
the s ame concl usi on: a di sti ncti ve characteri sti c of Bri tai n' s evol vi ng
Pal esti ne pol i cy was that there was no si ngl e reason for it.
Ki t chener threw the great weight of his authori ty agai nst Samuel ' s
proposal . He told the Cabi net that Pal esti ne was of little val ue,
strategi c or otherwi se, and that it di d not have even one decent
har bor .
2 7
Samuel ' s proposal , therefore, was not adopt ed; but Ll oyd
George conti nued to di sagree with Ki t chener about the strategi c
i mport ance of Pal esti ne.
the Bri ti sh Empi re as a Sea Empi r e " depended upon Pal esti ne be-
comi ng a buffer state i nhabi ted "by an intensely patri oti c r ac e . "
2 8
The Manchester Guardian's conversi on was brought about in the
context of the Fi rst Worl d War, but Ll oyd George had come to
Zi oni s mor rather i t had come to hi mmore than a decade before.
In 1903 he had been retai ned as the Bri ti sh attorney for the Zi oni st
movement and for its founder, Dr The odor e Herzl , i n connecti on
with an i ssue that caused an agoni zi ng spl i t in Zi oni st ranks: whether
a Jewi sh state necessari l y had to be l ocated i n Pal esti ne. As one who
represented Herzl at the moment of deci si on, he was in a posi ti on to
underst and the movement ' s di l emmas.
Th e Zi oni st movement was new, but its roots were as ol d as
Judae a, whose i ndependence was undermi ned and later crushed by
ancient Rome , and most of whose i nhabi tants were dri ven into
foreign l ands i n the second century AD. Even i n exile the J uda e a ns
or Jews , as they came to be knowncl ung to their own religion, with
its di sti ncti ve laws and cust oms, setti ng t hem apart f rom the peopl es
amongst whom they lived and moved. Inferior st at us, persecuti ons,
frequent mas s acres , and repeated expul si ons f rom one country after
another further rei nforced their sense of separat e identity and special
desti ny. In the endaccordi ng to their rel i gi ous t eachi ngs God
woul d bri ng them back to Zi on, and i n the course of their Passover
ceremony each year they woul d repeat the ritual prayer, "Next year
i n Jerus al em! "
Th e future return to Zi on remai ned a Messi ani c vision until the
i deol ogy of ni neteenth-century Europe converted it into a cont empo-
rary political program. A representati ve i dea of that t i mewhi ch had
been pl anted everywhere by the armi es of the French Revol uti on and
had fl ouri shedwas that every nation ought to have an i ndependent
country of its own ( t hough, of course, what consti tuted a nation was
an open quest i on) . Th e Ital i an revol uti onary Gi us e ppe Mazzi ni was
the out st andi ng proponent of this doctri ne, accordi ng to whi ch each
nation shoul d be freed to realize its uni que geni us and to purs ue its
parti cul ar mi ssi on i n the service of manki nd. Thus the nati onal i sm of
each nation serves not merel y its own interests but also those of its
nei ghbors; and i n the servi ce of this creed Mazzi ni ' s col l eague Gi us eppe
Gari bal di I t al y' s greatest herof ought for Uruguay and France as
well as Ital y.
A converse of this proposi ti on was that a fundamental cause of the
world's ills was that some nati ons were bei ng kept f rom achi evi ng
unity or i ndependencea si tuati on that Mazzi ni and his followers
proposed to change by war or revol uti on. Thei r program was taken
over f rom the left by the ri ght It al y and Germany were f ormed into
countri es by Cavour and Bi smarck respecti vel yand became a com-
mon theme of European political di scourse. Nat i onal i sm was taken a
step further i n the Swi s s ( 1847) and Ameri can (18615) civil wars,
when seven confederated Swi s s cantons and eleven Conf ederat ed
St at es of Ameri ca at t empt ed to s ecedeand were crushed by the
armi es of their respecti ve federal government s. Thus peopl es were to
be unified into one nati on, like it or not.
Thi s suggest ed there mi ght be a dark si de to the new nati onal i sm:
intolerance of groups different from the majori ty. Je ws encountered
this at once. In the nationalist envi ronment of western Europe, the
Jewi sh questi on as s umed new gui ses: were the Je ws of Germany
Germans ? were the Je ws of France Fr e nc h?and, i f so, what of
their speci al identity? By the end of the nineteenth century, the Je ws
of western Eur ope had achi eved legal emanci pat i on f rom many of the
restri cti ons that had confined t hem for centuri es: they coul d move
out of their ghettos, practi ce the trade or professi on of their choi ce,
buy l and, and enjoy the ri ghts of ci t i zenshi pbut they still en-
countered a wave of hostility f rom their nei ghbors who consi dered
them alien.
In eastern Europet he Russi an Empi re, i ncl udi ng Pol and, the
Bal ti c l ands, and the Ukrai net he Jewi sh si tuati on was peri l ous.
Mos t of the world's Jews then lived within the section of the Russi an
Empi re to which they were confined so l ong as they lived within the
Czar' s domai ns : the Pal e, or encl osure (from the word for a wooden
stake used in bui l di ng f ences) . Onl y a few of t hems ome illegally,
some by speci al permi ssi onl i ved i n St Pet ersburg, Moscow, or
el sewhere out si de the Pal e. Th e six million within the Pale were
Russi an Je ws who were not al l owed t o be Jewi sh Rus s i ans . The y
were not only shackl ed by legal restri cti ons, but were vi cti mi zed by
the organi zed massacres called pogroms . In the last half of the nine-
teenth century and the first years of the twentieth century, these
grew so terrible that Je ws i n l arge number fled the Russi an Empi re
in search of refuge.
Si nce nati onal i sm was then consi dered the cure-all for political ills,
it was inevitable that s omebody woul d propose it as the answer to the
Jewi sh probl em. Nati onal unity and sel f-determi nati on within an
i ndependent Jewi s h commonweal t h were, in fact, proposed in a
number of el oquent books whose aut hors had arri ved at their con-
cl usi ons i ndependentl y. * So The odor e Herzl was not the first to
formul ate such a program, but he was the first to gi ve it tangi bl e
political expressi on, a t ' a ti me when Jewi sh pi oneers f rom Rus s i a
were begi nni ng to col oni ze Pal esti ne without wai ti ng for the politics
to be thrashed out.
* Among them were Moses Hess's Rome and Jerusalem (1862) and Leo Pinsker's
Auto-Emancipation (1882).
When Herzl , an assi mi l ated Jew, concei ved the i dea of political
Zi oni sm, his notion had been that Je ws needed to have a national
state of their ownbut that its l ocati on was not of pri mary i mpor-
tance. Of Je ws and Judai s m Herzl knew next to nothi ng. He was a
fashi onabl e journal i st, the Pari s correspondent of a Vi ennese news-
paper who had forgotten his Jewi s h ori gi ns until the shock of French
ant i - Semi t i sm in the Dreyf us case convi nced hi m of the need to
rescue the worl d' s Jews from their historical pl i ght.
As a man of the worl d, he knew how political busi ness was trans-
acted in the Europe of his ti me and began by establ i shi ng a Zi oni st
organi zati on. He then commenced negoti ati ons on its behalf with of-
ficials of vari ous government s. Onl y after he had come into worki ng
contact with other Je ws , and with Jewi s h organi zati ons that for years
had been fosteri ng settl ements i n the Hol y Land, di d he come to
recogni ze the uni que appeal of the country that the worl d called
Pal est i net he La nd of the Phi l i st i nesbut that Je ws called the
Land of Israel .
By the begi nni ng of the twentieth century, Herzl ' s negoti ati ons
with the Ot t oman Empi re had convi nced hi m that the Sul t an woul d
not agree to the Zi oni st propos al s at least for the ti me bei ng. So he
l ooked el sewhere. In 1902 Herzl hel d an i mportant meeti ng with
Jos e ph Chamberl ai n, the powerful Col oni al Secretary i n the Sal i sbury
and Bal four Cabi net s and the father of modern Bri ti sh i mperi al i sm.
Chamberl ai n, too, bel i eved in a national solution to the Jewi sh
probl em, and l i stened sympatheti cal l y to Herzl ' s fal l -back proposal
that a Jewi sh political communi t y shoul d initially be establ i shed
across the frontier f rom Pal esti ne, i n the hope that Pal esti ne woul d
eventually become avai l abl e, somehow or other. Herzl was talking i n
t erms of either Cyprus or the El Ari sh stri p at the edge of the Si nai
peni nsul a, next to Pal esti ne, both areas nominally part s of the
Ot t oman Empi re but i n fact occupi ed by Bri tai n. Chamberl ai n rul ed
out Cyprus but offered to hel p Herzl obtai n the consent of the
Bri ti sh officials in charge of Si nai .
To appl y for this consent, Herzl , t hrough his Bri ti sh representati ve,
Leopol d Greenberg, deci ded to retain the servi ces of a politically
knowl edgeabl e lawyer, and chose Davi d Ll oyd George, who person-
ally handl ed the matter on behalf of his London firm, Ll oyd George,
Robert s & Co. Th e proposal f oundered as a result of opposi t i on from
the Bri ti sh admi ni st rat i on i n Egypt and the Forei gn Office sent
letters to Dr Herzl on 19 June and 16 Jul y 1903 i nformi ng hi m that
his proposal was not practi cal .
Chamberl ai n then suggest ed that he coul d offer an area for Jewi sh
settl ement within the juri sdi cti on of his own depart ment and offered
the prospect of settl ement i n Uganda i n British East Afri ca. Th e
Pri me Mi ni ster, Art hur J a me s Bal f our, who had al so thought deepl y
about the Jewi sh quest i on and had concl uded that it requi red a
national sol uti on, support ed Chamberl ai n' s proposal . Herzl agreed,
and Ll oyd George accordi ngl y drafted a Chart er for the Jewi sh
Settl ement, and submi t t ed it formal l y to the Bri ti sh government for
approval . In the s umme r of 1903 the Forei gn Office repl i ed in a
guarded but affirmative way that i f st udi es and talks over the course
of the next year were successful , Hi s Majesty' s Government woul d
consi der favorabl y proposal s for the creati on of a Jewi sh colony. It
was the first official decl arati on by a government to the Zi oni st
movement and the fi rst official st at ement i mpl yi ng national st at us for
the Jewi sh pe opl e .
2 9
It was the first Bal f our Decl arati on.
A meeti ng of the Worl d Zi oni st Congres s convened shortly there-
after, where Herzl present ed the Uganda proposal , urgi ng the settle-
ment of Eas t Afri ca as a way-stati on and refuge al ong the road to the
Promi sed La nd, where the Je ws of the Czari st Empi re coul d escape
the terrors of the pogroms . Herzl ' s argument s swayed heads but not
hearts. Tho ug h they let their l eader win the vote on the i ssue, most
del egates were not i nterested in any l and other than that of their
ancestors. Th e Zi oni st movement was at a dead- end: Herzl di d not
know how to l ead it to Pal esti ne but it woul d not follow hi m anywhere
else. In the s ummer of 1904 Herzl di ed, l eavi ng behi nd a fragmented
and deepl y di vi ded l eadershi p.
In 1906, with a new Li beral government i n Bri tai n, Ll oyd George
agai n submi t t ed the Si nai proposal for consi derati on, at the instigation
of Leopol d Greenberg. Agai n the Bri ti sh government rejected it, and
Si r Edward Grey wrote on 20 March 1906 to say that the Forei gn
Office posi ti on had not c hange d.
3 0
Duri ng its formati ve years, then, Davi d Ll oyd George had rep-
resented the Zi oni st movement as it sought to define itself. It was no
more than one of his many cl i ent sand not a major one at thatyet,
as a result of his professi onal representati on of it, no other Bri ti sh
political leader was in a better posi ti on than he to underst and its
character and its goal s. As he cont empl at ed the conquest of Pal esti ne
in 1917 and 1918, nobody had a cl earer idea than he of what to do
with it once it was hi s.
Li ke Woodrow Wi l son, whose concern i n the Mi ddl e Eas t was for
Ameri can Protestant school s and mi ssi ons, Ll oyd George wanted his
country to carry out what he regarded as the Lord' s work i n the
regi on. But , unlike the Presi dent, the Pri me Mi ni ster pl anned to
aggrandi ze his country' s empi re by doi ng so.
Ll oyd George had followed his own intellectual path to the con-
clusion that Bri tai n shoul d sponsor Jewi s h nati onal i sm i n the postwar
Mi ddl e Eas t . A number of his col l eagues within the Bri ti sh govern-
ment arri ved at the s ame concl usi on in 1917, t hough by different
pat hs many roads led to Zi on. Th e odd thi ng was that, j ust as they
had support ed the Emi r Hussei n because of mi staken noti ons about
Arabs and Mos l ems , they were now about t o s upport Zi oni sm because
of mi staken noti ons about Je ws .
33
TOWARD THE BALFOUR
DECLARATION
i
Ll oyd Ge or ge an "East erner" both i n his war strategy and i n his
war goal ssucceeded i n wi nni ng s upport for his views from i mpor-
tant civilian members of the government , who came to view the
Mi ddl e Eas t i n general , and Pal esti ne i n parti cul ar, as vital i mperi al
i nterests, and who arri ved i ndependentl y and by vari ous pat hs at the
concl usi on that an alliance with Zi oni sm woul d serve Bri tai n' s needs
i n war and peace.
Ll oyd George persuaded Lo r d Mi l ner and his associ ates of the
strategi c i mport ance of the war in the Eas t in the winter of 1917,
when it was by no means clear that the Allies woul d be abl e to win a
deci si ve victory there or anywhere el se. Even after the Uni t ed St at es
entered the war in the spri ng, it seemed entirely possi bl e that the
Ameri cans mi ght not arri ve in ti me to stave off a negoti ated peace
agreement that woul d leave the bel l i gerent countri es more or less i n
their exi sti ng posi ti ons. The r e were also those who were worri ed
about al l owi ng the Ge r mans and Tur ks to retain control of an area
whose vital i mport ance had been underscored by the Pri me Mi ni ster.
Th e assi stant secretari es of the War Cabi net , Le o Amery and
Mark Sykes, worri ed that i n the post war worl d the Ot t oman Empi re
mi ght fall compl etel y into the cl utches of Germany. Were that to
happen, the road to Indi a woul d be i n enemy hands a threat that
the Bri ti sh Empi r e coul d avert only by ejecting the Tur ks and
Ge r mans , and taki ng into Bri ti sh hands the southern peri meter of
the Ot t oman domai ns. Th e Cabi net , from the begi nni ng, had thought
of annexi ng Mesopot ami a. As for Arabi a, arrangement s had been
made with the local rul ers who had assert ed their i ndependence: they
were subsi di zed and coul d be relied upon to remai n pro- Bri t i sh.
That left Pal esti ne as the only poi nt of vul nerabi l i ty. As the bri dge
between Afri ca and Asi a, i t bl ocked the l and road f rom Egypt to
Indi a and, by its proxi mi ty, i t threatened the Suez Canal and hence
the sea road as well.
276
T O WA R D T H E B A L F O U R D E C L A R A T I O N 277
Amery, the l eadi ng fi gure among Mi l ner' s associ ates i n the
government , di scussed the matter i n a memorandum to the Cabi net
dated 11 Apri l 1917. Warni ng agai nst allowing Germany to strike
agai n at Bri tai n t hrough domi nati on of Europe or the Mi ddl e East
after the war, he argued that "German control of Pal esti ne" was one
of "the greatest of all dangers which can confront the Bri t i sh Empi re
i n the f ut ure. "
1
Amery, al ong with Mark Sykes and, later, William Or ms by- Gor e ,
had been appoi nt ed assi stant to Mauri ce Hankey i n headi ng the
secretari at of the War Cabi net . A Member of Parl i ament and an
army officer who had been servi ng i n the War Office, Amery had
become one of the inner band di recti ng the war effort. In the
division of responsi bi l i ti es within the secretari at, the Mi ddl e East fell
outsi de Amery' s sphere and within that of Sykes. Yet Amery had
al ready i nvol ved himself in a mat t er affecting Mi ddl e East ern policy
by l endi ng a hand to an old fri end.
An army officer whom Amery had known i n Sout h Afri ca,
Li eut enant - Col onel John Henry Patterson, had commanded a Jewi sh
corps i n the Gal l i pol i campai gn, and asked Amery to hel p get per-
mi ssi on from the War Office to create a regi ment of non-Bri ti sh Jews
t o f i ght under Bri ti sh command. Thi s regi ment woul d then be sent
to fight in Pal esti ne if and when Bri tai n i nvaded the Ot t oman Empi re
from Egypt and the Si nai . Patterson was an Iri sh Protestant, a
student of the Bi bl e, a professi onal army officer and amat eur lion
hunter, known for his best-sel l i ng book The Man-eaters of Tsavo and
for his buccaneeri ng spi ri t. Th e i dea of a Jewi sh regi ment had come
from Vl adi mi r Jabot i ns ky, a fi ery Rus s i an Jewi sh journal i st who
bel i eved that Engl i shmen resented the presence in Bri tai n of a l arge
i mmi grant popul at i on of abl e- bodi ed Rus s i an Jews who were not yet
Bri ti sh subj ect s and who did not undert ake military servi ce. While he
di d not at first say so, Jabot i nsky was i nspi red by the thought that a
Jewi sh military uni t hel pi ng to l i berate Palestine woul d go far toward
maki ng the Zi oni st dream a real i t y.
2
Patterson was enthusi asti c; the
Jewi sh corps he had commanded at Gal l i pol i had been created i n
large part t hrough the efforts of Jabot i nsky' s associ ate, Capt ai n Jos e ph
Tr umpe l dor , and Patterson had enjoyed commandi ng i t .
3
Amery agreed to hel p Patterson, but i t was not an easy under-
taki ng. Official Jewi s h communi t y l eaders opposed the project bit-
terly; in their view it endangered Je ws who lived in the Ge r man,
Aus t ro- Hungari an, and Ot t oman empi res by suggest i ng that Je ws , as
such, were on the Al l i ed si de. Th e Zi oni st l eadershi p, t hough at
odds with the Bri ti sh Jewi sh communi t y i n most other mat t ers,
joi ned in depl ori ng the identification of the Zi oni st cause with one or
the other of the warri ng European coal i ti ons. When Jabot i nsky rai sed
the i ssue for the first ti me in 1915, the Bri ti sh authori ti es also saw
little merit in his proposal that the Jewi s h unit shoul d help to liberate
Pal esti ne. "But nobody knows yet when we shall go to Pal esti ne, "
sai d one high official, "and Lo r d Ki t chener says never. "
4
Amery persi sted throughout 1916 and 1917 and succeeded i n
laying Jabot i nsky' s petition before the War Cabi net . The Bri ti sh
government then went forward to negoti ate a conventi on with the
other Allied government s, al l owi ng each country to take into military
service the resi dent nati onal s of the ot hers; in other words, Russi an
Jews living i n Bri tai n coul d join the Bri ti sh army. Parl i ament author-
ized the conventi on, and in the s umme r of 1917 the Jewi s h unit
(later called the Jewi sh Legi on) was f ormed within the Bri ti sh army
under the command of Li eut enant - Col onel Patterson. Ll oyd George
was enthusi asti c: "The Je ws mi ght be abl e t o render us more assi s-
tance than the Arabs " i n the Pal esti ne campai gn, he s ai d.
5
Unti l his col l eague Mark Sykes spoke to hi m about Zi oni sm,
Amery had not put his strategi c concerns about Pal esti ne and his
support of the Jewi sh Legi on into a unified focus, even t hough his
general l eani ngs were toward Zi oni sm. A Jewi sh national entity
had behi nd it the authori ty of his political mentor, the late Jos e ph
Chamberl ai n, and was vi ewed favorabl y by his l eader, Lo r d Mi l ner,
who had acqui red a sympat hy for Zi oni sm early in life. Amery
himself felt a si mi l ar sympat hy; he later wrote that, apart from the
Uni t ed St at es, "Bi bl e readi ng and Bi bl e thi nki ng Engl and was the
only country where the desi re of the Jews to return to their ancient
homel and has al ways been regarded as a natural aspi rati on which
ought not to be deni ed. "
6
When William Or ms by- Gor e joi ned Amery and Sykes as one of
the three assi stant secretari es of the War Cabi net , he brought with
hi m a more concrete interest in the i mmedi at e prospect s of the
Zi oni st i dea. Or ms by- Gor e , a Member of Parl i ament and secretary
to Lo r d Mi l ner, had gone out to the Mi ddl e East to work with the
Arab Bureau. Under his personal command was Aaron Aaronsohn,
leader of a highly effective, i ntel l i gence-gatheri ng group operati on
worki ng behi nd Ot t oman lines i n Jewi s h Pal esti ne to provi de in-
formati on about Turki s h troop movement s. Li ke Jabot i nsky,
Aaronsohn was attacked by fellow J e ws for identifying Zi oni st i nterests
with those of the Al l i esand thus endangeri ng the Palestinian Jewi sh
communi t y, which Dj emal Pasha was t empt ed to treat as his col-
l eagues had treated the Armeni ans. Aaronsohn' s i nformati on about
Turki s h defenses and mi l i tary di sposi ti ons proved to be of great
val ue to the Bri ti sh mi l i tary c ommand i n Egypt , however, and was
appreci at ed by Or ms by- Gor e .
Another aspect of Aaronsohn' s life that fasci nated Or ms by- Gor e
was his agri cul tural expl orati on and experi ment at i ont he career i n
which he had become f amous. A decade earlier, Aaronsohn had
joi ned in the search for the original strain of wild wheat that had
fl ouri shed t housands of years ago. Si nce that ti me the plant had
deteri orated as a result of intensive i nbreedi ng, becomi ng i ncreasi ngl y
vul nerabl e to di sease. To save the pl anet' s basi c grai n food by finding
nature' s original pl ant was a romant i c quest for the bl ue-eyed, fair-
haired Aaron Aaronsohn. In the spri ng of 1906 he made the find of a
l i feti me: wild wheat bl owi ng in the breezes at the foot of Mount
Hermon, near the Jewi sh settlement of Rosh Pi na.
Or ms by- Gor e was struck by the work Aaronsohn had done at his
station for agri cul tural research in Pal esti ne, for it went to the heart
of the argument about Zi oni sm. Th e case agai nst Zi oni sm, whi ch
was made i n the Cabi net by Lo r d Curzon, was that Pal esti ne was too
barren a l and to support the mi l l i ons of Jews who hoped to settle
there. The argument made later by Ar ab groups , who cl ai med there
was no room in the country for addi ti onal settl ers, was that "no room
can be made i n Pal esti ne for a second nati on, " as George Ant oni us,
an el oquent Arab s pokes man, wrote l ong afterward, "except by di s-
l odgi ng or extermi nati ng the nation in possessi on. "
7
Aaronsohn' s
experi ments rebutted that argument . * Hi s work tended to show that,
without di spl aci ng any of the 600, 000 or so i nhabi tants of western
Pal esti ne, mi l l i ons more coul d be settl ed on l and made rich and
fertile by scientific agri cul ture. Hi s work had wider appl i cat i ons:
Or ms by- Gor e brought back with hi m to London the i dea that Zi oni st
Jews coul d hel p the Arabi c- speaki ng and other peopl es of the Mi ddl e
East to regenerate their regi on of the gl obe so that the desert coul d
once more bl oom.
I I
As soon as Ll oyd George became Pri me Mi ni ster, Le o Amery ini-
tiated a move that pl aced Pal esti ne within the context of the future
of the Bri ti sh Empi r e . At the end of 1916 Amery proposed creati ng
an Imperi al War Cabi net , and sent a note on the subject to Lo r d
Mi l ner, who arranged for Ll oyd George to put the i dea i n mot i on.
8
The war had created a need for such a body: the empi re had
contri buted so much manpower to the war effort that t roops from
outsi de Bri tai n consti tuted a substanti al part of the Bri ti sh armed
forces. Th e Domi ni ons al one cont ri but ed more than a million men to
the armed forces, while the Indi an Empi r e contri buted at least a half
million fighting men and hundreds of t housands of s upport t roops.
* At the end of 1984 the population of Israel was 4,235,000 and that of the West
Bank was 1,300,000a total of 5,535,000 people now living in about 25 percent of
the territory of Palestine as defined by the British Mandate.
Yet Canada, Austral i a, New Zeal and, Indi a, and Bri tai n' s other
part ners i n the fi ghti ng had never been consul ted about whether to
go to war. George V had decl ared war, and his governor- general s in
his Domi ni ons overseas had promul gat ed decl arati ons on their behalf.
Nei ther the parl i ament s nor the government s of the Domi ni ons had
been involved i n those deci si ons. Amery' s proposal was to recogni ze,
however bel atedl y, the i mport ance of these part ners by gi vi ng t hem
representati on in a central body in London deal i ng with the overall
direction of the war.
Amery was convi nced, as were Lo r d Mi l ner' s other fri ends, that
the structure of the Bri t i sh Empi re had to be changed f undament al l y;
and by the end of 1916, as the political si tuati on i n London became
fluid, and party and other di vi si ons were breaki ng down, much
seemed possi bl e that woul d not have seemed so before.
Unti l the t i me of Di srael i , the creati on of the empi re had been a
haphazard and, i t was sai d, an absent - mi nded affair. Di srael i gave i t
gl amor and focused attention on it. Comi ng afterward, Amery and
his fri ends in the Mi l ner circle, who had worked in concert with
Ceci l Rhodes and Jos e ph Chamberl ai n, were among the f i rst con-
sci ous and systemati c proponent s of empi re, while their associ ates
Rudyard Ki pl i ng and John Buchan were among its del i berate gl ori -
fi ers. Many among t hem advocated the creation of an empi re- wi de
economi c syst em, cl osed to out si ders by tari ffs. Ot hers, who recog-
nized that vari ous part s of the empi re often appeared to occupy
economi c posi ti ons in conflict with one another, advocated closer
political associ ati on. Li onel Curt i s , a founder of their publ i cati on,
the Round Table, cl ai med that the Bri ti sh Empi re had no choice but
federation or di si ntegrati on. He spoke for those i n the Mi l ner circle
whose program was organi c, political uni on of the empi re, with an
i mperi al parl i ament elected from the Domi ni ons as well as from
Bri tai n, gi vi ng rise to an i mperi al Cabi net which woul d rul e the
empi re as a whol e. Th e program had been rejected at an i mperi al
conference i n 1911, but the breakdown of worl d political st ruct ures
duri ng the Fi rst Worl d War seemed to offer a second chance.
On 19 December 1916, acti ng on Amery' s suggest i on, Ll oyd George
told the Hous e of Commons that "We feel that the t i me has come
when the Domi ni ons ought to be more formally consul ted" on the
i ssues of war and pe ac e .
9
Accordi ngl y, he convoked an Imperi al War
Conf erence, confusi ngl y al so cal l ed the Imperi al War Cabi net , to
meet i n London three mont hs later.
Nobody was more suspi ci ous of the government' s i ntenti ons than
the del egate f rom Sout h Afri ca, J a n Chri sti an Smut s , a lawyer-
turned-general who had fought agai nst the Bri ti sh i n the Boer War;
he had no desi re to be rul ed f rom London. He arri ved i n London for
the conference on 12 March 1917, and his suspi ci ons were deepened
when, the s ame day, he recei ved an invitation to dine at Brooks' s
with Lo r d Mi l ner, his former adversary.
When the conference opened, i ssue was joi ned at once and Smut s
won a l asti ng victory. On 16 March 1917 he pushed through a
resolution that post poned consi derati on of the details of how the
Bri ti sh Empi re shoul d be reorgani zed until the end of the war, but
commi t t ed the parti ci pants in advance to the proposi ti on that the
basi s of the reorgani zati on woul d be the i ndependence of Sout h
Afri ca, Canada, Austral i a, and New Zeal and.
Ll oyd George may have been less di sappoi nt ed at this out come
than were his col l eagues i n Mi l ner' s ci rcl e. The Pri me Mi ni ster had
purposes of his own, and saw ways i n whi ch Smut s , i n parti cul ar,
coul d serve t hem. Smut s was a s uperb admi ni strator of the cal i bre of
Mi l ner, Amery, and Hankey, and coul d hel p t hem to run the war
effort. As a successful general in his Boer War days and more
recently in Eas t Afri ca, and a representati ve of the Domi ni ons, he
coul d also help Ll oyd George by throwi ng his weight agai nst the
Bri ti sh general s. Ll oyd George prevai l ed upon Smut s to stay on i n
London and serve i n the War Cabi net "on loan" from his own
country' s Cabi net . Th u s he served not only as a member of the
Bri ti sh Cabi net , but al so as the Sout h Afri can representati ve i n the
Imperi al War Cabi net (or Imperi al War Conf erence) . He was the
only Cabi net mi ni ster in modern Bri ti sh history to have no connecti on
with either Hous e of Parl i ament ; and spent the rest of the war away
from home, living in a hotel room at the Sa v o y .
1 0
"General Smut s had expressed very deci ded views as to the stra-
tegical i mport ance of Pal esti ne to the Bri ti sh Empi r e , " Ll oyd George
later wrot e, " and became i mmedi atel y involved with the i ssue.
Perhaps because it had been deci ded that the political links of the
empi re were not to be ti ghtened, Smut s and Amery moved at the
same time to cement the geographi cal links of the entities compri si ng
the Bri ti sh s ys t em; and both men concentrated on the i mport ance of
Pal esti ne. If broadl y defined, and i n conjuncti on with Mes opot ami a,
Pal esti ne gave Bri tai n the land road from Egypt to Indi a and brought
together the empi res of Afri ca and Asi a. The capt ure of Ge r man
Eas t Afri ca by Bot ha and Smut s had al ready created a conti nuous
stretch of Bri ti sh-control l ed terri tori es between, on the one hand,
Cape Town, the Atl anti c Ocean port at the southern ti p of Afri ca,
and, on the other, Sue z , which bri dged the Medi t erranean and the
Red Sea at the continent's northeastern ti p. With the addi ti on of
Pal esti ne and Mes opot ami a, the Cape To wn t o Suez stretch coul d be
linked up with the stretch of terri tory that ran t hrough Bri ti sh-
controlled Persi a and the Indi an Empi r e to Burma, Mal aya, and the
two great Domi ni ons i n the Paci fi cAustral i a and New Zeal and. As
of 1917, Pal esti ne was the key mi ssi ng link that coul d join together
the parts of the Bri ti sh Empi re so that they woul d form a conti nuous
chain from the Atl anti c to the mi ddl e of the Pacific.
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster, of course, saw i t the s ame way. As he wrote
later, "For the Bri ti sh Empi r e , the fight with Turkey had a speci al
i mport ance of its own . . . The Turki s h Empi re lay right across the
track by l and or water to our great possessi ons in the Eas t I ndi a,
Burma, Mal aya, Borneo, Hong Ko ng , and the Domi ni ons of Aust ral i a
and New Ze al and. "
1 2
Amery, who was about to advi se the Cabi net that conti nued
Ot t oman (and thus Ge r man) control of Pal esti ne was a future danger
to the Bri ti sh Empi re, bel i eved, with the Pri me Mi ni ster, that
Pal esti ne ought to be i nvaded i mmedi at el yand that Smut s was the
general to do it. For Smut s was not only a brilliantly successful
general , but al so shared their i mmedi at e strategi c and broader geo-
political goal s.
On 15 March 1917, the day that Smut s won his victory at the
Imperi al Conf erence, Amery wrote to hi m that
Th e one thi ng, however, that is essential if we are goi ng to do a
bi g thi ng qui ckl y in the Pal esti ne di recti on, is a more dashi ng
general . . . If I were di ctator, I shoul d ask you to do it as
the only l eadi ng soldier who had had experi ence of mobi l e war-
fare . . . and has not yet got trenches dug deep i n his mi nd.
1 3
Ll oyd George offered the command t o Smut s , who hesi tated and
asked the advi ce of the Sout h Afri can Pri me Mi ni ster, General
Loui s Bot ha. Smut s , who was i n favor of accepti ng, reasoned that
"Position on the other fronts most difficult and Pal esti ne is only one
where perhaps with great push it is possi bl e to achieve consi derabl e
s ucces s . "
1 4
After consul tati on, Bot ha and Smut s deci ded that the
offer shoul d be accepted if the campai gn were to be mount ed "on a
large scal e, " "a first cl ass campai gn i n men and g uns . "
1 5
Smut s then conferred with Si r William Robert son, Chi ef of the
Imperi al General Staff, who made clear that he was not goi ng to
rel ease the necessary t roops and suppl i es from the western front,
and di smi ssed the Mi ddl e Eas t as a pri vate obsessi on of the Pri me
Mi ni ster' s, and at best "only a s i des how. "
1 6
Ll oyd George had been
in office only a few mont hs and his posi ti on was t enuous; his authori ty
over the military was l i mi ted; and his promi se of full support , Smut s
concl uded, was not one that he woul d be abl e to keep. Th u s Smut s
turned down the offer of the Pal esti ne command, feeling that the
campai gn i n the East woul d be sabot aged by Robert son and his
col l eagues.
Smut s conti nued, t hough, to take a keen interest in Pal esti ne. He
and Amery later went out together to the Mi ddl e Eas t to st udy the
situation and report ; and both of t hem came back urgi ng a st rong
Pal esti ne offensive.
As a Boer, st eeped i n the Bi bl e, Smut s strongl y s upport ed the
Zi oni st i dea when it was rai sed in the Cabi net . As he later poi nted
out, the "peopl e of Sout h Afri ca and especially the ol der Dut ch
popul ati on has been brought up al most entirely on Jewi sh tradi ti on.
Th e Ol d Tes t ament . . . has been the very marrow of Dut ch cul ture
here i n Sout h Af r i c a. "
1 7
Li ke Ll oyd George, he had grown up
bel i evi ng that "the day will come when the words of the prophet s
will become true, and Israel will return to its own l and, "
1 8
and he
fully agreed with Ll oyd George that the Jewi sh homel and shoul d be
establ i shed in Pal esti ne under Bri ti sh auspi ces. Whether or not he
ori gi nated the i dea, Smut s was responsi bl e for finding the f ormul a
acceptabl e to Woodrow Wi l sonunder which countri es like Bri tai n
woul d as s ume responsi bi l i ty for the admi ni strati on of territories such
as Pal esti ne and Mes opot ami a: they woul d govern pursuant to a
"mandate" from the future Le ague of Nat i ons. The territories woul d
be held i n trust for their peopl es a f ormul a desi gned to be compat -
ible with Ameri can anti -i mperi al i st noti ons.
Amery put together the pi eces of this new i mperi al vision at the
end of 1918, when he wrote to Smut s that Bri tai n' s hold on the
Mi ddl e East shoul d be permanent , and not termi nate when the
mandat es di d. Wi thout spel l i ng out the detai l s, he wrote that even
when Pal esti ne, Mes opot ami a, and an Arabi an state became i nde-
pendent of Bri ti sh t rust eeshi p, they shoul d remai n within the Bri ti sh
imperial syst em. Th e Bri ti sh Empi re of the future, as he saw it,
woul d be like a smal l er Le ague of Nat i ons; and other such mini-
l eagues woul d emerge elsewhere i n the worl d. Woodrow Wilson's
overall Le ague of Nat i ons woul d therefore have relatively few mem-
bers : there woul d be one representati ve from the Bri ti sh syst em, and
one from each of the several other s ub- s ys t e ms .
1 9
Th u s Amery saw no i ncompati bi l i ty between a Bri ti sh Pal esti ne
and a Jewi sh Pal esti ne. He al so saw no reason why either Bri ti sh or
Jewi sh aspi rati ons shoul d not be i n harmony with Arab aspi rat i ons.
Decades later, he wrote of the proponent s of the Zi oni st dream in
191718 that "Most of us younger men who shared this hope were,
like Mark Sykes, pro- Arab as well as pro- Zi oni st , and saw no essential
i ncompati bi l i ty between the two i deal s . "
2 0
34
THE PROMISED LAND
i
As the eventful year 1917 ran its course, Bri tai n' s Pal esti ne policy
conti nued to be shaped by many hands : Cabi net mi ni sters at one
level; bureaucrat s, little known beyond official circles and little known
today, at another.
Within the powerful secretari at of the War Cabi net , the Mi ddl e
Eas t fell within the domai n of Ki t chener' s protege Si r Mark Sykes,
as it had done si nce shortl y after the outset of the war. Mauri ce
Hankey, his superi or, held no st rong views about the Mi ddl e Eas t ,
and si nce the deaths of Ki t chener and Fi t zGeral d, Sykes had been
acti ng wi thout any real direction f rom above. He di d not know that
the new Pri me Mi ni ster hel d deci ded views about a Mi ddl e East ern
settl ement which were consi derabl y different from his own; nor was
he involved in the secret negoti ati ons t hrough Zaharoff in whi ch the
Pri me Mi ni ster' s t erms for peace i n the Mi ddl e Eas t were reveal ed.
On his own, then, and ungui ded, Sykes conti nued to circle un-
certainly around the quest i on of Pal esti ne. Hi s i nstructi ons f rom
Ki t chener and Fi t zGeral d had been to regard i t as of no strategi c
i mport ance to Bri tai n, and those i nstructi ons had never been can-
celled. Yet he had been made aware i n the course of his negoti ati ons
with France and Rus s i a i n 1916 that the Hol y La nd held a passi onat e
interest for many Jews whose support , Sykes felt, mi ght be vital to
the Al l i es. Yet Jewi sh opi ni on mi ght be alienated by some of the
arrangement s for the postwar Mi ddl e East that he was negoti ati ng
with Bri tai n' s allies and potential support ers. As he held di scussi ons
with Frenchmen and Rus s i ans , Armeni ans and Arabs , he was haunt ed
by a f eargroundl ess, but real to hi m nonethel essthat each of his
transacti ons ri sked runni ng afoul of Jewi s h opposi ti on.
At the begi nni ng of 1917 Sykes was engaged in a di al ogue with
Jame s Mal col m, an Armeni an bus i nes s man, about establ i shi ng an
i ndependent Armeni an national state. The y consi dered inviting
Rus s i a into the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t as the protecti ng power for a
284
T H E P R O M I S E D L A N D 285
uni ted Armeni a; but , as Sykes bel i eved Jewi sh opi ni on to be violently
ant i - Russi an, he suggest ed that somet hi ng ought to be done i n ad-
vance to di s arm potential Jewi s h opposi t i on to a scheme that al l owed
i mperi al Rus s i a to expand. Sykes asked Mal col m to fi nd out for hi m
who the l eaders of Zi oni sm were so that he coul d approach t hem
about thi s.
Mal col m had met Leopol d Greenberg, editor and co-owner of the
Jewish Chronicle who, as it happened, had also served as Theodore
Herzl ' s Bri ti sh representati ve. Mal col m wrote to ask hi m who were
the l eaders of the Zi oni st organi zati on, and passed on the i nformati on
he recei ved i n reply to Sykes . Two names appeared to be of especi al
i mport ance: Na hum Sokol ow, an official of the international Zi oni st
movement ; and Dr Chai m Wei zmann, an official of the Bri ti sh
Zi oni st Federat i on, who was oppos ed to the deci si on of the Zi oni st
movement to remai n neutral i n the worl d war. Mal col m i ntroduced
himself to Wei zmann and shortly afterward, on 28 January 1917,
i ntroduced Wei zmann to Sykes.
Wei zmannal t hough he di d not know that the Allies were al ready
maki ng pl ans for the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t want ed to secure a
commi t ment f rom Bri tai n about Pal esti ne while the war was still i n
progress. As a chemi st, he made a significant contri buti on to the war
effort by donat i ng to the government his di scovery of a process to
extract acetone f rom mai zeacet one bei ng a vital i ngredi ent in the
manuf act ure of expl osi ves. But , despi te his war work and his in-
creasi ng acquai nt ance with the circle of hi gh-ranki ng officials who
were di recti ng the war effort, he di d not know that Bri tai n had an
official whose brief was to negoti ate the desi gn of the post war Mi ddl e
Eas t . Another Bri ti sh Zi oni st l eader, Rabbi Gast er, knew Sykes and
knew that Sykes hel d that j obbut , seei ng Wei zmann as a rival,
jeal ousl y kept the i nformati on to himself. Th u s Wei zmann l earned of
Sykes only by acci dent i n early 1917 when Sykes ment i oned his j ob
to J a me s de Rot hschi l d i n the course of a chance conversati on about
their respecti ve horse- breedi ng st abl es. Rothschi l d passed on the
i nformati on to Wei zmann, and Wei zmann was about to arrange
to meet Sykes when J a me s Mal col m arranged for Sykes to meet
Wei zmann.
* Born in Russi a and naturalized a British subject, he was passionately pro-Allied
and believed that only the western democracies were compatible with Jewish ideals.
Since he held no official position in the international Zionist movement, he was free
to depart from its neutrality; but as an official of the British Zionist Federation, he
could nonetheless speak in a representative capacity.
Years after the war, Ll oyd Georgei n writing his memoirsinvented the
story that he had given the Balfour Declaration in gratitude for Weizmann's inven-
tion. Weizmann's important invention was real, but Ll oyd George's story was a work
of fiction.
286
NEW WO R L D S A N D P R O MI S E D L A N D S
Each wanted to do what the other wanted done. Sykes wanted to
fi nd someone with whom he coul d negoti ate an alliance between
Bri ti sh and Zi oni st i nterests; and Wei zmann wanted to be that
person.
Thei r fi rst meeti ngs were on an unofficial basi s. Fr om the start,
Sykes, as he al ways di d, tried to fi t all Mi ddl e East ern projects
within the exi st i ngbut still secret Sykes- Pi cot - Sazanov Agree-
ment, of whi ch Wei zmann knew nothi ng. In the agreement , the
Hol y Pl aces were to be pl aced under an international admi ni st rat i on;
so Sykes began by proposi ng that a Jewi s h entity in Pal esti ne shoul d
be under joint Angl o- French rul e ( "condomi ni um") t hough he
coul d not reveal to Wei zmann why he was maki ng the proposal .
Though Sykes di d not realize it, he was out of step not only with the
Zi oni st l eaders but also with the Pri me Mi ni ster. Ll oyd Georgel i ke
Wei zmann and his col l eagueswant ed Pal esti ne to be Bri ti sh. C. P.
Scot t , editor of the Manchester Guardian and Ll oyd George' s con-
fi dant, advi sed Wei zmann to take the matter up with the Pri me
Mi ni st er; but Wei zmann deci ded to concentrate on changi ng Sykes' s
mi nd rather than goi ng over his head.
1
In London, on 7 February 1917, Sykes met with Wei zmann and
other Bri ti sh Zi oni sts who told hi m that they were oppos ed to the
condomi ni um i dea and wanted Pal esti ne to be rul ed by Bri tai n.
Sykes repl i ed that all the other difficulties coul d be resol ved ("the
Arabs coul d be managed, " he sai d) but that rejection of the condo-
mi ni um approach brought t hem up agai nst a probl em for which he
had no sure sol uti on: France, he sai d, was "the seri ous di ffi cul ty. "
2
France, he expl ai ned, refused to recogni ze that concessi ons to Zi oni sm
mi ght hel p win the war; and he confessed to the Zi oni st l eaders that
he coul d not underst and French policy i n this respect. "What was
their mot i ve?" he as ke d.
3
Th e next day, at his London resi dence at 9 Bucki ngham Gat e,
Sykes i ntroduced the worldly Zi oni st leader Na hum Sokol ow to
Francoi s Georges Pi cot, who told Sokol ow that, havi ng seen the
resul ts of Jewi s h colonization in Pal esti ne, he believed the program
of Jewi sh settl ement was feasi bl e. Sokol ow told Picot that Jews
greatl y admi red France but "had l ong i n mi nd the suzerai nty of the
Bri ti sh government . "
4
Picot repl i ed that the questi on of suzerai nty
was one for the Allies to deci de among themsel ves. He sai d that he
woul d do his best to make the Zi oni sts' ai ms known to his govern-
ment, but that in his view there was no possi bi l i ty of his government
deci di ng to renounce its cl ai m to Pal esti ne. Indeed, he sai d, 95
percent of the French peopl e wanted France to annex Pal est i ne.
5
All concerned agreed to wait upon events, which were not sl ow in
comi ng. Within two mont hs the Czar was overthrown and the Uni t ed
St at es had entered the war. Sykes qui ckl y saw the i mpl i cati ons of
both events for his arrangement s with Pi cot. Mi l l i ons of Je ws lived
within the Czari st Empi r e ; their s upport , Sykes argued after the
Russi an Revol uti on i n March, coul d hel p i nduce the new Russi an
government to remai n i n the war .
6
At the s ame ti me, the Ameri can
entry into the war strengthened his conviction that the European
Allies woul d have to val i date their cl ai ms to a position in the postwar
Mi ddl e East by sponsorshi p of oppressed peopl es, such as Jews ,
Arabs , and Armeni ans. On both count s he felt he had new argu-
ment s with whi ch to persuade the French government to adopt a
more sympat het i c atti tude toward Zi oni sm.
Meanwhi l e his conversati ons with Picot were about to reopen:
Ll oyd George succeeded i n orderi ng the Bri ti sh army i n Egypt to
at t empt an i nvasi on of Pal esti ne in 1917, l eadi ng the French govern-
ment to insist on sendi ng Picot to Egypt to accompany the Bri ti sh
invasion f orcest o which the Bri t i sh government responded by
orderi ng Sykes to go there, too, to i nterpose between Picot and the
Bri ti sh commandi ng general . Picot vi ewed the proposed Bri ti sh in-
vasion as an attack on French i nterests. He reported that "London
now consi ders our agreement s a dead letter. Engl i sh troops will enter
Syri a from the sout h"f rom Egypt and Pal esti ne"and di sperse
our s upport ers . "'
Ll oyd George, i mpati ent with France' s pretensi ons i n the Mi ddl e
Eas t , told Wei zmann that the future of Pal esti ne was a questi on that
woul d be resol ved between Bri t ons and J e ws .
8
He professed t o be
unabl e to underst and why Sykes was so concerned about French
objecti ons and told Wei zmann that Pal esti ne "was to hi m the one
really i nteresti ng part of the war. "
9
On the afternoon of 3 Apri l 1917 Sykes, newly appoi nt ed as head
of the political mi ssi on to the General Officer Commandi ng- i n- Chi ef
the Egypt i an Expedi t i onary Force, went to 10 Downi ng Street
to receive his part i ng i nstructi ons. The r e he met with the Pri me
Mi ni ster, Lo r d Curzon, and Mauri ce Hankey. Sykes proposed t o try
to raise an Arab tribal rebellion behi nd enemy lines, but Ll oyd
George and Curzon i mpressed upon hi m the i mport ance of not com-
mi tti ng Bri tai n to an agreement with the tri bes that woul d be prej u-
dicial to Bri ti sh i nterests. Specifically they told hi m not to do anythi ng
that woul d worsen the probl em with France, and to bear i n mi nd the
"i mportance of not prej udi ci ng the Zi oni st movement and the possi -
bility of its devel opment under Bri ti sh aus pi ces . "
1 0
Accordi ng to
notes of the conference, "The Pri me Mi ni ster laid st ress on the
i mport ance, if possi bl e, of securi ng the addi ti on of Pal esti ne to the
Bri ti sh area i n the postwar Mi ddl e Ea s t . "
1 1
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster
warned Sykes not to make pl edges to the Arabs "and parti cul arl y
none in regard to Pal es t i ne. "
1 2
Sykes st opped first in Pari s, where he stayed at the Hotel Lot t i on
the Rue Cast i gl i one, only a few st eps away from the Pl ace Vendome,
with its monument al remi nder of Napol eon Bonapart e and his
conquest s. While there, Sykes told Picot that France woul d have to
change her way of thi nki ng and come around to a nonannexati oni st
approach, and that this might involve Ameri can or British sponsorshi p
of a reborn Judae a, and French sponsorshi p of a reborn Armeni a. He
was surpri sed that Picot appeared di sconcerted by what he s a i d.
1 3
Fr om the Hot ef Lot t i , Sykes wrote on 8 Apri l 1917 to the Forei gn
Secret ary, Art hur Bal f our, that the French were hostile to the notion
of bri ngi ng the Uni t ed St at es into Pal esti ne as a patron of Zi oni sm;
they feared that, i f i nt roduced into the Mi ddl e Eas t , the Uni t ed
St at es mi ght become France' s commerci al rival there. "As regards
Zi oni sm itself," he conti nued, "the French are begi nni ng to realize
they are up agai nst a bi g thing, and that they cannot cl ose their eyes
to i t . "
1 4
Th e French Forei gn Mi ni stry, like Sykes, now bel i eved that
Russi a' s Je ws mi ght hel p to keep Rus s i a in the war at a ti me when
military di sasters on the western front made the eastern front es-
pecially cruci al . Na hum Sokol ow, whom Sykes i ntroduced to the
Quai d' Orsay, seemed willing to hel p i n this respect. Hi s di scussi ons
with the French officials went well. On 9 Apri l Sykes wrote to
Bal four that "The si tuati on now i s therefore that Zi oni st aspi rati ons
are recogni zed as l egi ti mate by the Fr e nc h. "
1 5
France remai ned adamant , however, i n mai ntai ni ng her own cl ai ms
i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . Sykes met with the leader of the French co-
lonialist bl oc, Senat or Pi erre-Eti enne Fl andi n; and on 15 Apri l wrote
to the Forei gn Office that Fl andi n conti nued to insist that France
mus t have the whole sea-coast of Syri a, Lebanon, and Pal esti ne
down to El Ari sh i n the Egypt i an Si nai . Fl andi n cl ai med that "Picot
was a fool who had betrayed France" by compromi si ng with Bri tai n
i n the Sykes- Pi cot Agr e e me nt .
1 6
Fr o m Pari s, Sykes went on to Rome , where he arranged for
Na hum Sokol ow to pl ead the Zi oni st case with the Pope and other
Vati can officials. Whatever i nspi rati on he may have deri ved from
these meet i ngs was count erbal anced by the emergence of a new
probl em: Italy's Forei gn Mi ni ster, Baron Si dney Sonni no, strongl y
asserted Ital i an cl ai ms to a share i n the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t .
Once i n Cai ro, Sykes brought together his di verse allies to persuade
t hem to work together. He i nt roduced Picot to Arab l eaders i n Cai ro,
and later arranged for Picot to come with hi m on a journey to Arabi a
to meet with Sheri f Hussei n to outline for hi m, at least in a general
way, the t erms of the secret Sykes- Pi cot - Sazanov Agreement . Sykes
opti mi sti cal l y bel i eved that he had got Hussei n to admi t that the
French coul d prove helpful to the Arabs i n Syri a; that he had per-
suaded Arab l eaders to see that the Arabs were too weak to as s ume
T H E P R O MI S E D L A N D 289
responsi bi l i ty for an area of such compl ex interests as Pal esti ne; and
that he had reached an underst andi ng that Pal esti ni an Arabs woul d
agree to a national status* for the Jewi s h communi t y in Pal esti ne if
the Arab communi t y recei ved the s ame des i gnat i on.
1 7
In Cai ro, Sykes was warned by Cl ayt on and his fri ends at the Arab
Bureau that a French presence i n the Mi ddl e Eas t woul d cause
t r oubl e .
1 8
But Sykes, faithful and good- heart ed as ever, conti nued to
mai ntai n that his fri ends had fallen vi cti m to "Fas hodi s m"a desi re
to best the French, as Ki t chener had done at Fas hodaand that they
ought to show more loyalty to their ally. He conti nued to at t empt to
convert Picot into a genui ne partner, and suggest ed that the French
representati ve work out a common policy with Hussei n' s sons so that
Bri tai n and France coul d purs ue paral l el , constructi ve, cooperati ve
rel ati onshi ps with the new Arab rul ers of the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t .
On 12 May he cabl ed London that "Picot has come to t erms with the
Arab represent at i ves. "
1 9
A few weeks later he wrote to a col l eague:
"I think French will be ready to cooperat e with us in a common
policy t owards the Arab speaki ng peopl e . . . "
2 0
II
In the first half of 1917, General Si r Archi bal d Murray, commander
of the Bri ti sh army i n Egypt t he Egypt i an Expedi t i onary Fo r c e
sent his troops l urchi ng in fits and starts toward Pal esti ne. Whether
because London kept i ssui ng and then count ermandi ng i nstructi ons,
or because he hi msel f was inept, or a combi nati on of both, Murray
allowed the Ge r man commanders and their Turki s h t roops ti me to
regroup. But then he hastily at t ackedat Gaz a, which domi nat ed
the coastal road to Pal esti nei n the early morni ng fog on 26
March, and was beaten. Kr e s s von Kressenst ei n, the brilliant
German commander, who had fortified Gaz a effectively, suffered
only half as many casual ti es as the Bri ti sh.
Cal l i ng up rei nforcements f rom Egypt , Murray l aunched a second
attack on fortified Gaz a on 29 Apri l , and Kressenst ei n defeated hi m
even more deci si vel y: the ratio of Bri ti sh to Turki s h casual ti es was
three to one. Weary and di scouraged, the Bri ti sh armi es wi thdrew;
and within weeks Si r Archi bal d Murray was relieved of his command.
Ll oyd George was determi ned to renew the battl e for Pal esti ne i n the
aut umn but , for the moment , London was unwilling to commi t fresh
troops to the campai gn.
* The reference was to "millet" a term used in the Ottoman Empi re to designate
a community entitled to a certain amount of autonomy in administering the affairs
of its members.
Murray' s two defeats led Si r Mark Sykes to worry that the
Tur ks i n the breathi ng space before Bri tai n resumed the attack i n
the aut umnmi ght retaliate agai nst the Jewi s h, Arab, and Armeni an
popul ati ons whose support he had been enlisting on behalf of the
Al l i es. He cabl ed the Forei gn Office suggest i ng that Bri tai n shoul d
not go forward with Zi oni st, Arab, and Armeni an projects so l ong as
they exposed these peopl es to j e opar dy.
2 1
Hi s suggesti on met with no
response.
Di scouraged by the war newst he failure of the French offensive
i n Champagne, the muti ny of French army units there, the di si nte-
grati on of Rus s i a, and Murray' s fai l ure to i nvade Pal es t i neSykes
attached even greater i mport ance to wi nni ng the support of the
peopl es of the Mi ddl e Eas t . To hi m i t seemed, as i t di d to Le o Amery
and his col l eagues, that even if the Allies were to win the war, their
victory mi ght be an i nconcl usi ve one; and that such posi ti ons as they
mi ght win for themsel ves i n the Mi ddl e East coul d be subject to
continual pressure by a German- cont rol l ed Turkey that woul d make
full use of the Sul t an' s l eadershi p of Isl am. In his view, that made
the annexati oni st cl ai ms of pre- Cl emenceau France and of Baron
Sonni no' s Ital y all the more short - si ght ed. In a "Memorandum on
the Asi a- Mi nor Agreement " he wrote that
Th e i dea of annexati on definitely mus t be di smi ssed, i t i s con-
trary to the spirit of the ti me, and if at any moment the Rus s i an
extremi sts got hold of a copy they coul d make much capital
agai nst the whole Ent ent e, this is especially so with the Italian
cl ai m which runs counter to nationality, geography, and com-
mon sense, and is merel y Baron Sonni no' s concessi on to a
chauvi ni st group who only think i n bal d t erms of grab.
He went on to say that France, if she were wise, woul d deal with
her areas of influence in the Mi ddl e Eas t as Britain pl anned to deal
with hers: i n Syri a and the Le banon France shoul d sponsor Arab
i ndependence. If she di d not do so, wrote Sykes, Bri tai n shoul d do
nothi ng to hel p France deal with the t roubl es she woul d have brought
on her own head.
Outl i ni ng his own vision of the future, Sykes wrote that "I want to
see a permanent Angl o- French entente allied to the Je ws , Arabs , and
Armeni ans which will render pan- I s l ami s m i nnocuous and protect
Indi a and Afri ca from the Tur c o- Ge r man combi ne, which I believe
may well survi ve Hohenzol l erns . "
2 2
Sykes had won over Amery to this poi nt of view, and Amery later
wrote that "the Je ws alone can bui l d up a st rong civilisation in
Pal esti ne whi ch coul d hel p that country to hold its own agai nst
Ge r man- Tur ki s h oppressi on . . . It woul d be a fatal thi ng if, after
the war, the i nterests of the Jews t hroughout the worl d were enlisted
on the si de of the Ge r ma ns . "
2 3
Ill
Chai m Wei zmann was elected Presi dent of the Bri ti sh Zi oni st
Federat i on i n February 1917, enabl i ng hi m to propose officially that
the Bri ti sh government shoul d make a publ i c commi t ment to support
a Jewi sh homel and in Pal esti ne. After his meeti ngs with Sykes he
conti nued to meet with publ i c officials who expressed sympat hy with
his i deas.
Lo r d Robert Ceci l , Parl i amentary Under- Secret ary of St at e for
Forei gn Affai rs, and the thi rd son of Lo r d Sal i sbury, Victoria's last
Pri me Mi ni ster, became a devoted convert. Fi ve young Ceci l s were
killed i n the Fi rst Worl d War, and Lo r d Robert was moved to draft
a memorandum outl i ni ng a pl an for perpetual peace: the first draft
of what later became the Covenant of the Le ague of Nat i ons. Hi s
i deas of sel f-determi nati on di sconcerted his political col l eagues, who
poi nted out that logically his pl an woul d lead to the di ssol uti on of
the Bri ti sh Emp i r e .
2 4
A cont emporary essayi st wrote in wonder that
"He took the cross i n an odd i nternati onal crusade for peace; and
he f ound his allies in pl aces where Ceci l s normal l y look for their
enemi es . "
2 3
In a si mi l ar crusadi ng spi ri t he took up the cause of a
Jewi sh Pal esti ne.
Anot her sympat hi zer was Si r Ronal d Gr aham, an Arabi st who had
come back to the Forei gn Office after more than a decade of servi ce
in Egypt , where he had been the first Bri ti sh official to di scuss with
Vl adi mi r Jabot i nsky the creati on of a Jewi sh unit within the Bri ti sh
army. Now, havi ng returned to London, he urged the Forei gn Office
to make its support of Zi oni sm publ i c. While the notion of com-
mi tti ng Bri tai n to Zi oni sm was i nspi red by Geral d Fi t zMauri ce and
Mark Sykes, Gr aham was probabl y more responsi bl e than anyone
else in the government for actually embodyi ng the commi t ment in
an official document , t hough his role tends to be passed over by
hi st ori anspossi bl y because he failed to leave a significant archi ve of
pri vate papers behi nd hi m.
Gr aham and other officials of the Forei gn Office were keenly
aware that France was the obstacl e i n the way of gi vi ng Chai m
Wei zmann the publ i c commi t ment he request ed. Gr aham concl uded,
as had Sykes, that Zi oni sm was weakened by its excl usi ve attachment
to Bri tai n. He worri ed that the Zi oni sts were gambl i ng everythi ng on
the prospect that Bri tai n woul d govern Pal esti nei n i gnorance of the
secret Sykes- Pi cot Agreement i n whi ch Bri tai n had pl edged not to
do so. On 19 Apri l 1917 Gr aham wrote to Sykes that it was di s-
qui eti ng that the Zi oni st movement relied so compl etel y on the
prospect of Bri tai n havi ng Pal es t i ne.
2 6
However it was difficult to see how the Zi oni st movement coul d
turn to France for support . Within the French Forei gn Mi ni stry
Zi oni sm was spoken of with scorn, and i mportant segment s of French
opi ni on had expressed hostility all al ong to the movement , which was
regarded as pro- German. Zi oni sm had attracted little s upport among
France' s Jews and, as a resul t, the French government held a low
opi ni on of its strengthunti l the revol uti on i n Rus s i a made Jews
seem much more politically i mportant than they were. Even after
events in Rus s i a made it seem desi rabl e to win Zi oni st support , the
Quai d' Orsay hesitated to bi d for it, feari ng that an Al l i ed commi t -
ment to Zi oni sm mi ght amount to an abandonment of France' s cl ai m
to Pal esti ne.
The probl em was sol ved by Na hum Sokol ow who, i n his nego-
tiations with the French Forei gn Mi ni stry, poi ntedl y di d not rai se
the questi on of which country shoul d be the protecti ng power for
Pal esti ne. Officials at the Quai d' Orsay therefore were led to as s ume
that Zi oni sts woul d remai n neutral on that i ssue. French officials
were not prepared to s upport Zi oni sm in a postwar Pal est i neand
di d not envi sage al l owi ng Jews to achi eve a separate national s t at us
but they saw no harm i n offeri ng the Zi oni sts words of encourage-
ment so l ong as they were meani ngl ess. They believed that those
who held Zi oni st "daydreams" mi ght be won over by grant i ng t hem
some form of verbal encouragement that di d not consti tute a real
c ommi t me nt .
2 7
In return for Sokol ow' s agreement to go to Rus s i a to
use his influence with the Jews there, on 4 June 1917 Jul es Cambon,
Di rect or- General of the French Forei gn Mi ni stry, gave hi m a written
formal assurance from the French government of its sympat hy in the
following t erms :
You were good enough to present the project to which you are
devoti ng your efforts which has for its object the devel opment
of Jewi sh colonization i n Pal esti ne. You consi der that, ci rcum-
stances permi tti ng, and the i ndependence of the Hol y Pl aces
bei ng saf eguarded on the other hand, it woul d be a deed of
justi ce and of reparati on to assi st, by the protecti on of the
Al l i ed Powers, in the renai ssance of the Jewi sh nationality in
that l and f rom which the peopl e of Israel were exiled so many
centuri es ago.
Th e French Government , whi ch entered this present war to
defend a peopl e wrongful l y attacked, and which conti nues the
st ruggl e to assure the victory of right over mi ght, cannot but
feel sympat hy for your cause, the t ri umph of which i s bound up
with that of the Al l i es.
I am happy to gi ve you herewith such as s ur anc e .
2 8
It was subtl y phrased. Omi t t ed f rom the pl edge was the crux of
the Zi oni st i dea: that the renai ssance of the Jewi sh nation shoul d
occur within the context of a political entity of its own. Moreover,
the Hol y Pl aces, which were to remai n i ndependent of the pl edge of
sympat hy, had al ready been defined by the French i n the Sykes-
Picot Agreement as a l arge encl ave that took in most of i nhabi ted
Pal esti ne west of the Jor dan river. If that definition were to appl y,
French sympat hy for the Jewi s h nati on i n Pal esti ne woul d be re-
stri cted to Hai f a, Hebron, northern Gal i l ee, and the Negev Desert .
Th e Cambon letter was, as i t was i ntended to be, noncommi t t al .
Nonet hel ess, the French had out maneuvered themsel ves. Thei r
formal assurance was too cauti ousl y phrased to be meani ngful , but
its exi stence l i censed the Bri ti sh to i ssue an assurance of their own.
Once i t became common ground that the Allies s upport ed Jewi s h
aspi rati ons i n Pal esti ne, however defined, the Zi oni st movement
woul d have an i mportant role in sel ecti ng its protector, and woul d
choose Bri tai n. Thi s was a matter of l ess concern to Gr aham and
Sykes, whose pri nci pal objecti ve at that ti me was to secure a homel and
i n Pal esti ne for the Je ws , than to Le o Amery and his fri ends, to
whom Zi oni sm was attractive mai nl y because i t ensured that Pal esti ne
woul d be Bri t i sh.
Armed with the written French statement that Sokol ow had
brought back with hi m f rom Pari s, Gr aham and Ceci l advi sed a
willing Bal four in mi d- June 1917 that the ti me had come to i ssue a
written publ i c Bri ti sh commi t ment to Zi oni sm. Bal f our invited
Wei zmann to parti ci pate in the process of drafti ng an appropri at e
document . It was what Wei zmann and Sykes had sought all al ong.
Th e process of drafti ng the appropri at e l anguage, and deci di ng to
whom i t shoul d be addressed, went on through the s umme r until
Sept ember, when Mi l ner and Le o Amery took charge of it. Al most
all the government al figures who mat t ered were di sposed favorabl y
toward the propos ed decl arati on. Sykes, fortified by Or ms by- Gor e ,
had converted the War Cabi net secretari at to Zi oni sm. Bal f our, the
Forei gn Secret ary, had long sympat hi zed with Zi oni sm and now
believed that Bri tai n shoul d go on record i n its favor; and within his
own depart ment he was pushed forward i n this by Ceci l and Gr aham.
* It is sometimes pointed out that the Balfour Declaration was equally vague.
But, unlike the Cambon letter, the Balfour Declaration (a) was published, (b) refer-
red to the whole of Palestine, and (c) referred to the creation of an entity that was to
have a distinctly Jewish national identitya National Home.
Smut s was deepl y pro- Zi oni st . Mi l ner and his set, i ncl udi ng Phi l i p
Ke r r of the Pri me Mi ni ster' s secretari at, had come to view the
establ i shment of a Jewi sh Pal esti ne as a vital Bri ti sh i mperi al interest.
The Pri me Mi ni ster had al ways pl anned to carry t hrough a Zi oni st
program; and while he di d not express an interest i n decl ari ng
Bri tai n' s intentions in advance, neither di d he pl ace any obstacl e in
the way of his government' s doi ng so once his col l eagues thought it
useful .
Yet the proposal that Bal f our shoul d i ssue his pro-Zi oni st decl a-
ration suddenl y encountered opposi t i on that brought it to a halt.
Th e opposi ti on came f rom l eadi ng figures i n the Bri ti sh Jewi sh
communi t y. Edwi n Mont agu, Secret ary of St at e for Indi a, led the
opposi ti on group within the Cabi net . He , al ong with his cousi n,
Herbert Samuel , and Ruf us Isaacs ( Lo r d Readi ng) had broken new
ground for their co-rel i gi oni sts: they had been the first Je ws to sit in
a Bri ti sh Cabi net . Th e second son of a successful financier who had
been ennobl ed, Mont agu saw Zi oni sm as a threat to the posi ti on in
Bri ti sh society that he and his fami l y had so recently, and with so
much exerti on, attai ned. Judai s m, he argued, was a religion, not a
nationality, and to say otherwi se was to say that he was l ess than 100
percent Bri ti sh.
Mont agu was regarded as by far the most capabl e of the younger
men in the Li beral ranks, and it was deemed a political mast erst roke
for the Pri me Mi ni ster to have taken hi m and Churchi l l away from
Asqui t h. Yet a typical political comment at the ti me ( f rom Lo r d
Derby, the War Mi ni ster) was, "The appoi nt ment of Mont agu, a
Jew, to the Indi a Office has made, as far as I can j udge, an uneasy
feeling both i n Indi a and here"; t hough Derby added that "I , per-
sonally, have a very high opi ni on of his capability and I expect he
will do wel l . "
2 9
It bothered Mont agu that, despi te his lack of rel i gi ous
faith, he coul d not avoi d bei ng categori zed as a Je w. He was the
millionaire son of an Engl i sh l ord, but was dri ven to l ament that "I
have been stri vi ng all my life to escape from the Ghe t t o. "
3 0
Th e evi dence suggest ed that i n his non- Zi oni sm, Mont agu was
speaki ng for a majori ty of Je ws . As of 1913, the last dat e for which
there were figures, only about one percent of the world's Jews had
signified their adherence to Zi oni s m.
3 1
Bri ti sh Intelligence reports
i ndi cated a surge of Zi oni st feeling duri ng the war in the Pal e of
Russi a, but there were no figures either to substanti ate or to quanti fy
i t .
3 2
In Bri tai n, the Conjoi nt Commi t t ee, which represented Bri ti sh
Jewry i n all mat t ers affecti ng Je ws abroad, had been agai nst Zi oni sm
from the start and remai ned s o .
3 3
Mont agu' s opposi ti on brought all matters to a halt. In di sgust ,
* Disraeli, of course, though of Jewish ancestry, was baptized a Christian.
Gr aham report ed that the proposed decl arati on was "hung up" by
Mont agu, "who represents a certain secti on of the rich Je ws and who
seems to fear that he and his like will be expel l ed f rom Engl and and
asked to cul ti vate f arms i n Pal es t i ne. "
3 4
Th e s ub- Cabi net officials who were pushi ng for a pro-Zi oni st
commi t ment at t empt ed to allay such fears. Amery, who was hel pi ng
Mi l ner redraft the proposed Decl arat i on, expl ai ned the concept
behi nd it to a Cabi net member as not really bei ng addressed to
Bri ti sh subj ect s of the Jewi sh faith, but to Jews who resi ded i n
countri es that deni ed t hem real ci ti zenshi p. "Apart f rom those Jews
who have become citizens of this or any other country in the fullest
sense, there is also a l arge body, more parti cul arl y of the Je ws in
Pol and and Rus s i a . . . who are still in a very real sense a separate
nation . . . "
3 5
Deni ed the right to become Rus s i ans , they woul d be
offered a chance to rebui l d their own homel and in Pal esti ne.
Mont agu, however, took little interest in the posi ti on of Jews in
other countri es. It was the posi ti on of Je ws in Bri ti sh soci ety that
concerned hi m; feeling threatened, he fought back with a ferocity
that brought the Cabi net' s del i berati ons on the matter to a standsti l l .
Mont agu was ai ded by Lo r d Curzon, who argued that Pal esti ne
was too meagre i n resources to accommodat e the Zi oni st dream.
More i mport ant , he was ai ded by Andrew Bonar Lawl eader of the
domi nant party i n the Coal i ti on government and the Pri me Mi ni ster' s
powerful political part nerwho urged del ay. Bonar La w argued that
the ti me was not yet ri pe for a consi derati on of the Zi oni st i ssue.
Mont agu was also ai ded by the Uni t ed St at es, which, until mi d-
October 1917, cauti ousl y counsel l ed del ay. Presi dent Wi l son was
sympat het i c to Zi oni sm, but suspi ci ous of Bri ti sh mot i ves; he favored
a Jewi sh Pal esti ne but was less enthusi asti c about a Bri ti sh Pal esti ne.
As the Bri ti sh Cabi net consi dered i ssui ng the Bal four Decl arat i on, i t
solicited the advi ce, and by i mpl i cati on the support , of Presi dent
Wilson. Th e propos ed Decl arat i on was descri bed by the Cabi net t o
the Ameri can government as an expressi on of sympat hy for Zi oni st
aspi rati ons, as t hough it were moti vated solely by concern for the
plight of persecut ed Je ws . Wilson's foreign policy advi ser, Col onel
Hous e, transl ated this as follows: "The Engl i sh naturally want the
road to Egypt and Indi a bl ocked, and Ll oyd George i s not above
usi ng us to further this pl an. "
3 6
Thi s was a fair i nterpretati on of the views of the Pri me Mi ni ster
and of the Mi l ner circle which advi sed hi m. Accordi ng to Chai m
Wei zmann, Phi l i p Ke r r (the former Mi l ner aide who served as Ll oyd
George' s secretary) "saw in a Jewi s h Pal esti ne a bri dge between
Afri ca, Asi a and Europe on the road to I ndi a. "
3 7
It was not, however,
a fair i nterpretati on of the vi ews of the Forei gn Office, which had
been won over by the argument that a pro-Zi oni st decl arati on woul d
prove a crucial weapon agai nst Ge r many i n the war and afterward.
Th e Forei gn Office bel i eved that the Jewi s h communi t i es i n Ameri ca
and, above all, Russi a, wi el ded great power. Th e Bri ti sh ambas s ador
i n Pet rograd, well aware that Je ws were a weak and persecut ed mi -
nority in imperial Rus s i a and of no political consequence, report ed
that Zi oni sts coul d not affect the out come of the st ruggl e for power
i n Rus s i a. Hi s home government persi st ed i n bel i evi ng, however,
that the Jewi sh communi t y i n Rus s i a coul d keep the government that
rul ed t hem i n the Al l i ed c amp. As the cri si s i n Rus s i a deepened, the
Forei gn Office was sei zed by a sense of urgency in seeki ng Jewi s h
support .
I V
Fear begets fear. In Ge r many the press was aroused by rumors of
what the Bri ti sh Forei gn Office i ntended to do. In June 1917 Si r
Ronal d Gr aham recei ved from Chai m Wei zmann an i ssue of a Berl i n
newspaper known for its close rel ati onshi p to the government , re-
porti ng that the Bri ti sh were flirting with the i dea of endorsi ng
Zi oni sm i n order to acqui re the Pal esti ni an l and bri dge on the road
from Egypt to Indi a, and propos i ng that Germany forestall the
maneuver by endorsi ng Zi oni sm first. ( Though the Bri ti sh di d not
know it, the German government took little interest in adopt i ng a
pro-Zi oni st st ance; i t was the Ge r man press that took an interest i n
That s ummer Gr aham communi cat ed his fears t o Bal four. In his
mi nut e, Gr aham wrote that he had heard there was to be another
post ponement which he believed woul d "jeopardi se the whole Jewi sh
si tuati on. " Thi s endangered the posi ti on i n Rus s i a where, he asserted,
the Jews were all anti-Ally and, to a l esser extent, it woul d antagoni ze
publ i c opi ni on i n the Uni t ed St at es . Warni ng that Bri tai n must not
"throw the Zi oni sts into the arms of the Ge r mans , " he argued that
"We mi ght at any moment be confronted by a German move on the
Zi oni st questi on and i t mus t be remembered that Zi oni sm was
originally if not a Ge r man Jewi sh at any rate an Aust ri an Jewi sh
i de a. "
3 8
Gr aham attached to hi s mi nut e a list of dates showi ng how exten-
sive the government' s del ays had been in deal i ng with the Zi oni st
matter. In Oct ober, Bal f our f orwarded the mi nute to the Pri me
Mi ni ster, al ong with the list of dat es whi ch he sai d showed that the
Zi oni sts had reasonabl e cause to compl ai n, to which he added his
own recommendat i on that the questi on be taken up by the Cabi net
as soon as pos s i bl e .
3 9
On 26 Oct ober 1917, The Times publ i shed a l eadi ng article attack-
ing the conti nui ng del ay. St at i ng that it was no secret that Bri ti sh
and Al l i ed government s had been. consi deri ng a statement about
Pal esti ne, The Times argued that the t i me had come to make one.
Do our statesmen fail to see how val uabl e to the Al l i ed cause
woul d be the hearty sympat hy of the Je ws throughout the worl d
which an unequi vocal decl arati on of Bri ti sh policy mi ght wi n?
Germany has been qui ck to percei ve the danger to her schemes
and to her propaganda that woul d be i nvol ved i n the associ ati on
of the Allies with Jewi sh national hopes, and she has not been
idle in at t empt i ng to forestall us.
On 31 Oct ober 1917 the Cabi net overrode the opposi t i on of
Mont agu and Curzon and authori zed the Forei gn Secret ary to i ssue a
much- di l ut ed versi on of the assurance of s upport that Wei zmann had
request ed. An ebullient Sykes rushed over with the news, "Dr.
Wei zmann, it's a boy"; but the Zi oni st leader was unhappy that the
original l anguage had been so watered do wn.
4 0
Addres s ed to the most i l l ustri ous name i n Bri ti sh Jewry, the
Forei gn Secretary' s letter of 2 November 1917 st at ed:
Dear Lo r d Rot hschi l d,
I have much pl easure in conveyi ng to you, on behalf of Hi s
Maj est y' s Government , the following decl arati on of sympat hy
with Jewi s h Zi oni st aspi rati ons which has been submi t t ed to,
and approved by, the Cabi net : "Hi s Majesty' s Government
view with favour the establ i shment in Pal esti ne of a national
home for the Jewi s h peopl e, and will use their best endeavours
to facilitate the achi evement of this object, it bei ng clearly
underst ood that nothi ng shall be done which may prej udi ce the
civil and rel i gi ous ri ghts of exi sti ng non- Jewi sh communi t i es in
Pal esti ne, or the ri ghts and political st at us enjoyed by Jews i n
any other count ry. " I shoul d be grateful if you woul d bri ng this
decl arati on to the knowl edge of the Zi oni st Federat i on.
Bri tai n' s l eaders anti ci pated no adverse reaction f rom their Arab
allies; they had seen France as their only probl em i n this connecti on,
and that had been resol ved. Th e Pri me Mi ni ster later wrote of the
Arab l eaders that "Palestine di d not seem to gi ve t hem much
anxi et y. "
4 1
He poi nted out that his government had i nformed Ki ng
Hussei n and Pri nce Fei sal of its pl ans to re-create a Jewi sh homel and
i n the Hol y La nd. He causti cal l y added that "We coul d not get i n
touch with the Pal esti ni an Arabs as they were fighting agai nst u s . "
4 2
The publ i c announcement of the Bal f our Decl arati on was del ayed
until the following Fri day, the publ i cati on date of the weekly Jewish
Chronicle. By then the news was overshadowed by reports from
Pet rograd that Leni n and Trot s ky had sei zed power. Th e Forei gn
Office had hoped the Bal four Decl arat i on woul d help to swi ng Rus s i an
Jewi sh s upport t o the Al l i ed si de and agai nst Bol shevi sm. Thi s hope
remai ned alive until the Bol shevi ks decisively won the Russi an Civil
War in the early 1920s. In November of 1917 the battl e agai nst
Bol shevi sm i n Rus s i a had just begun, and those Bri t ons who s up-
port ed the Bal four Decl arat i on, because they mi stakenl y bel i eved
Russi an Jews were powerful and coul d be val uabl e allies, were dri ven
to s upport i t all the more by the dramat i c news f rom Pet rograd.
It was not until 9 November that The Times was abl e to report the
announcement of the Bal f our Decl arat i on, and not until 3 December
that i t publ i shed comment s approvi ng it. The comment s followed
upon a cel ebrati on at the London Opera Hous e on 2 December
organi zed by the Bri ti sh Zi oni st Federat i on. In addi ti on to the Zi oni st
l eaders, speakers i ncl uded Lo r d Robert Ceci l , Si r Mark Sykes,
and William Or ms by- Gor e , as well as a Syri an Chri sti an, an Arab
nationalist, and spokesmen for Armeni a. Th e theme of the meeti ng,
el oquentl y pursued by many of the speakers, was the need for Jews ,
Arabs , and Armeni ans to hel p one another and to move forward i n
harmony. Th e opi ni on of The Times was that "The presence and
the words of influential representati ves of the Arab and Armeni an
peopl es, and their assurances of agreement and cooperati on with the
Je ws , woul d alone have sufficed to make the meet i ng me mor abl e . "
4 3
Of the meeti ng, The Times wrote that "its out st andi ng features
were the Ol d Tes t ament spirit whi ch pervaded i t and the feeling
that, in the somewhat i ncongruous setti ng of a London theatre, the
approachi ng fulfillment of ancient prophecy was bei ng cel ebrated
with faith and f ervour. "
4 4
It was appropri at e that i t shoul d be s o:
Bi bl i cal prophecy was the first and most enduri ng of the many
moti ves that led Bri t ons to want to restore the Jews to Zi on.
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster pl anned to foster a Jewi sh home i n Pal esti ne,
in any event, and later wrote that the peace treaty woul d have
provi ded that Pal esti ne shoul d be a homel and for the Jews "even had
there been no previ ous pl edge or pr omi s e . "
4 5
Th e i mport ance of the
Bal f our Decl arat i on, he wrote, was its contri buti on to the war effort.
He cl ai med that Russi an Je ws had gi ven i nval uabl e s upport to the
war agai nst Germany because of it. Th e grateful Zi oni st l eaders had
promi sed to work toward an Al l i ed vi ct oryand had done so. Wri ti ng
two decades later, as the Bri ti sh government was about to abandon
the Bal four Decl arat i on, he sai d that the Zi oni sts "kept their word in
the letter and the spi ri t, and the only questi on that remai ns now is
whether we mean to honour o ur s . "
4 6
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster underest i mat ed the effect of the Bal four
Decl arati on on the eventual peace settl ement. Its character as a
publ i c document i s s ued with the approval of the Uni t ed St at es and
France and after consul tati on with Italy and the Vati can, and greet ed
with approval by the publ i c and the press t hroughout the western
worl dmade it a commi t ment that was difficult to i gnore when
the peace settl ement was bei ng negoti ated. It took on a life and
moment um of its own.
V
Th e Decl arati on al so pl ayed a role in the devel opment of the Zi oni st
movement i n the Ameri can Jewi sh communi t y. Ameri can Zi oni sm
had been a tiny movement when the war began. Of the roughl y three
million Jews who then lived i n the Uni t ed St at es, only 12, 000
bel onged to the often ephemeral groups loosely bound together i n
the amateuri shl y led Zi oni st Fe de r at i on.
4 7
The movement ' s treasury
contai ned 15, 000 dol l ar s ;
4 8
its annual budget never exceeded 5, 200
dol l ar s .
4 9
Th e l argest si ngl e donati on the Federat i on ever recei ved
pri or to 1914 was 200 dol l ar s .
5 0
In New York the movement had
only 500 me mbe r s .
5 1
Loui s D. Brandei s, an out st andi ng Bost on lawyer not previ ousl y
identified with specifically Jewi sh causes, had become a Zi oni st in
1912 and took over l eadershi p of the movement in 1914. As the
intellectual gi ant of the Progressi ve movement i n Ameri can pol i ti cs,
he was bel i eved to exert great influence over Presi dent Wi l son.
Brandei s was perhaps the first Jew to pl ay an i mport ant part i n
Ameri can politics si nce the Civil War. Onl y one Je w had ever been
a member of a presi dent' s cabi net, and Brandei s himself was to
become the first Jewi sh member of the U. S . Supr e me Court .
Th e great waves of Jewi sh i mmi grat i on into the Uni t ed St at es
were recent, and most i mmi grant s were anxi ous to learn Engl i sh, to
shed their foreign accents and ways, and to become Ameri can.
Ameri can- born Je ws , too, wanted to di stance themsel ves from any
foreign taint and feared that attachment to Zi oni sm on their part
mi ght make t hem seem less than whol ehearted i n their loyalty to the
Uni t ed St at es.
It was this i ssue, above all, that Brandei s set out to address. As
he saw it, Ameri can Jews l acked somet hi ng i mport ant that other
Ameri cans pos s es s ed: a national past . Ot hers coul d poi nt to an
ancestral homel and and take pri de in it and in themsel ves. Brandei s
especially admi red Iri sh- Ameri cans i n this respect and for mani festi ng
their opposi ti on to conti nued Bri ti sh rule in Irel and.
Argui ng that this ki nd of political concern and i nvol vement is
* Oscar Straus, Secretary of Commerce and Labor from 1906 to 1909.
entirely consi stent with Ameri can pat ri ot i sm, and i ndeed enhances
it, he procl ai med that "Every Iri sh- Ameri can who contri buted
towards advanci ng home rule was a better man and a better Ameri can
for the sacrifice he made. Every Ameri can Jew who ai ds i n advanci ng
the Jewi s h settl ement in Pal esti ne . . . will likewise be a better man
and a better Ameri can for doi ng s o . "
5 2
Th e ethical i deal i sm of Brandei s made a powerful i mpressi on on
Art hur Bal four when the Bri t i sh Forei gn Secret ary vi si ted the Uni t ed
St at es in 1917 and di scussed the future of Pal esti ne. In t urn, the
Bal four Decl arati on vi ndi cated the argument s that Brandei s had used
i n his appeal s to the Ameri can Jewi s h communi t y. It showed that
Zi oni sm was in harmony with patri oti sm in warti me because a Jewi sh
Pal esti ne was an Allied war goal . Soon afterward i t also became an
officially support ed Ameri can goal . On the occasi on of the Jewi sh
New Year i n Sept ember 1918, Presi dent Wilson endorsed the pri n-
ci pl es of the Bal f our Decl arat i on in a letter of holiday greeti ngs to the
Ameri can Jewi sh c ommuni t y.
5 3
Whether because of the Bal f our Decl arat i on or because of Brandei s' s
effective and professi onal l eadershi p, s upport for Zi oni sm within the
Jewi sh communi t y grew dramati cal l y. In 1919 members hi p of the
Zi oni st Federat i on grew to more than 175, 000, t hough Zi oni st s up-
porters remai ned a mi nori ty group within Ameri can Jewry and still
encountered fierce opposi t i on from the richer and more establ i shed
Jews oppos i t i on that was not really overcome until the 1940s. But
Brandei s had made Ameri can Zi oni sm into a substanti al organi zati on
al ong the lines pi oneered by Iri sh- Ameri cans who support ed i nde-
pendence for Irel and; and the Bal f our Decl arati on had hel ped hi m to
do soeven though the Forei gn Office had i ssued the decl arati on i n
part because they s uppos ed such a force was al ready in exi stence and
needed to be appeas ed.
VI
A measure of how far Bri ti sh war goal s had moved in the year since
Ll oyd George repl aced As qui t h i s provi ded by Le o Amery' s reflec-
tions in his di ary at the end of 1917. Looki ng back and eval uati ng
what he had been abl e to accompl i sh duri ng the year, he wrote that
one of his mai n achi evements in deal i ng with Bri ti sh government
col l eagues had been "all the work on Peace terms which gradual l y
drove into their heads the i mport ance of East Afri ca, Pal esti ne, and
Mesopot ami a and the Imperi al outl ook general l y. "
5 4
As Amery i ndi cated, Bri tai n' s mai n objecti ves by now were not i n
Europe. Th e destructi on wrought in the first three years of the war
made a meani ngful victory i n Europe i mpossi bl e. The rival warri ng
European coalitions were rui ned. It was not feasible to look for an
annexati on or acqui si ti on i n Europe to make up for what had been
lost. Even the destructi on of Germany woul d not meet Bri tai n' s
needs. In a wart i me speech Smut s poi nt ed out that Ge r many had to
remai n a subst ant i al power i n order to uphol d the European bal ance
of power, whi ch it was in Bri tai n' s vital interest to mai nt ai n.
s s
It was an open quest i on as to whether the Bri tai n that sai l ed onto
the worl d ocean and around the gl obe under Si r Franci s Drake had
peri shed forever with the generati on of 1914 on the western front. If
that Bri tai n coul d be revi ved, i t woul d have to be t hrough i mperi al
expansi on, partl y i n Afri ca but pri nci pal l y i n the Mi ddl e Eas t t hat
was the di recti on i n whi ch the Pri me Mi ni ster and the Mi l ner circle
were looking.
Thi s shift i n outl ook brought the Ot t oman war, whi ch had begun
as an acci dental i rrel evance, f rom the peri phery to the very center of
the Pri me Mi ni ster' s worl d pol i cy. Fr o m the begi nni ng he had sai d
that the Great War coul d be won there. Now he was sayi ng that his
postwar objecti ves coul d be won there too. With his political instinct,
he felt that it was an area in whi ch he coul d win tangi bl e rewards for
his count rymen, and with his strategi c vision he s awas di d Mi l ner,
Amery, Smut s , Ke r r , and Orms by- Goret hat , by suppl yi ng the
mi ssi ng section of the line that led from Cape Town to Indi a and on
to Aust ral i a and New Zeal and, it offered a new lease on Bri tai n' s
empi re i n Afri ca, Asi a, and the Pacific. Where the As qui t h Cabi net
eventually came to see hegemony over porti ons of the Mi ddl e Eas t as
somethi ng that Bri tai n merely wanted, the Ll oyd George government
came to see it as terri tory that Bri tai n needed. .
PART VI I
INVADING THE
MIDDLE EAST
35
JERUSALEM FOR CHRISTMAS
i
At the end of 1916, when Davi d Ll oyd George took office as Pri me
Mi ni ster, Bri ti sh fortunes i n the Eas t took a turn for the better. Th e
bl underi ng i ncompetence of the Government of Indi a i n conduct i ng
the Mesopot ami an campai gnt he advance on Baghdad late i n 1915
that ended in the spri ng of 1916 in the defeat and surrender of the
Bri ti sh Indi an Ar my at Kut el - Amarahad shocked London into
maki ng a clean sweep at the t op. Th u s a new chief of the expedi ti on-
ary army, who underst ood its logistical requi rement s, re- opened the
campai gn under a new Secret ary of St at e for Indi a, a new Vi ceroy,
and a new commander- i n- chi ef of the Indi an Army. Maj or- General
Stanl ey Maude led hi s Angl o- Indi an Ar my of the Ti gr i s forward into
the Mes opot ami an provi nces in December 1916, and in a methodi cal
campai gn capt ured Baghdad on 11 March 1917.
Al t hough i t had never been clear as to what purpos e the Baghdad
campai gn was meant to serve i n the overall strategy of the worl d war,
the capt ure of the anci ent capi tal , gl amorous f rom its associ ati on
with the Arabian Nights, caught the i magi nati on of the new Pri me
Mi ni ster. It brought hi m cheer at a ti me when it was badl y needed,
and i nspi red hi m to ai m at Jerus al em for Bri tai n' s next great t ri umph.
Th e successes of the Army of the Ti gri s rai sed the questi on of
what was to be done with the Ot t oman provi nces that i t had occu-
pi ed. Th e Government of Indi a, al though wary of commi t t i ng itself,
had envi saged all al ong that the Mesopot ami an provi nces of Bas ra
and Baghdad woul d fall within its sphere if they were det ached from
the Ot t oman Empi r e . To Si r Mark Sykes and his Arab Bureau
fri ends, the noti on that such areas shoul d be admi ni st ered i n what
they regarded as Indi a' s paternal i sti c way was abhorrent . In a memo-
randum written in 1916, Sykes warned the Cabi net that "if you
work f rom Indi a you have all the old tradi ti ons of bl ack and white,
and you can not run the Arabs on bl ack and white l i nes. "
1
To mark the capt ure of Baghdad, Si r Percy Cox, chief political
305
306 I N V A D I N G T H E M I D D L E E A S T
officer of General Maude' s expedi ti onary force, drafted a procl a-
mati on to the popul ace that essentially limited itself to calling for
cooperati on with the provi si onal Bri t i sh- Indi an admi ni st rat i on; but
London ordered hi m not to i ssue it. Several drafts were written i n
London, and after di scussi on the War Cabi net chose one written by
Si r Mark Sykes as a basi s for the text that was fi nal l y approved. Th e
procl amat i on invited the Arabs ' l eaderst hough i t was uncl ear who
they were to bet o parti ci pate in the government in col l aborati on
with the Bri ti sh authori ti es. It s pokeas was Sykes' s wonti n high-
flown phrases of liberation and f reedom, of past gl ory and future
great ness, and expressed the hope that the Arabi c peopl es mi ght fi nd
unity north, south, east, and west. It poi nted, however vaguel y,
toward an Arab Mi ddl e East ern confederati on under the l eadershi p
of Ki ng Hus s ei na Sunni Mos l em, al though most of the i nhabi tants
of the provi nces of Bas ra and Baghdad were Shi'ite, and the differ-
ences between Sunni s and Shi'ites were profound and more than a
t housand years ol d.
General Maude objected to the Sykes draft. As a military man, he
deemed it essential to install a Bri ti sh admi ni strati on to mai ntai n
securi ty while the war conti nued. Moreover, he observed that in
offeri ng a measure of sel f-government to the Arabs of Baghdad, the
procl amati on took no note of the fact t hat accordi ng to hi ma
majori ty of the i nhabi tants of the city were not Arabs but Jews . *
The Sykes draft nonethel ess was i mposed on General Maude and
Si r Percy Cox by London, and caused wi despread confusi on. Appar-
ently i ntended to assert that the occupyi ng forces of Bri ti sh Indi a
were not goi ng to rul e the provi nces of Mesopot ami a, the procl a-
mati on di d not make clear who was goi ng to rule i n their pl ace.
On 16 March 1917 the War Cabi net created a Mes opot ami an
Admi ni st rat i on Commi t t ee under the chai rmanshi p of Lo r d Curzon
to determi ne what form of government shoul d be installed in the
capt ured provi nces. Th e commi t t ee deci ded that the provi nce of
Bas ra shoul d become Bri t i shnot Bri t i sh- Indi anwhi l e the provi nce
of Baghdad shoul d joi n or shoul d become an Arab political entity
subject to a Bri ti sh prot ect orat e. Meanwhi l e Indi an personnel shoul d
be wi t hdrawn f rom the occupi ed provi nces.
General Maude had cabl ed to his superi ors that "local condi ti ons
Whether or not they constituted a majority in the cityand the then-current
Encyclopaedia Britannica indicated that they did notthe Jews were economically
preponderant. Baghdad, along with Jerusal em, was one of the two great Jewish
cities of Asia, and a thousand years before had become the seat of the exilarchthe
head of the Jewish religion in the eastern di aspora and thus the capital of oriental
Judai sm. Jews in large numbers had lived in the Mesopotamian provinces since the
time of the Babylonian captivityabout 600 BCa n d thus were settled in the
country a thousand years before the coming of the Arabs in AD 634.
J E R U S A L E M F O R C H R I S T M A S 307
do not permi t of empl oyi ng i n responsi bl e posi ti ons any but Bri ti sh
officers compet ent to deal with Mi l i tary authori ti es and with peopl e
of the country. Before any truly Arab f acade can be appl i ed to edifice
it seems essential that foundati on of law and order shoul d be well
and truly l ai d. "
2
Si r Percy Cox rai sed the s ame i ssues i n a different
way when he asked who the Arab l eader of Baghdad was goi ng to be.
It was evi dent that London either was not aware of, or had gi ven
no thought to, the popul at i on mi x of the Mes opot ami an provi nces.
Th e anti pathy between the mi nori ty of Mos l ems who were Sunni s
and the majori ty who were Shi ' i tes, the rivalries of tri bes and cl ans,
the historic and geographi c di vi si ons of the provi nces, and the com-
mercial predomi nance of the Jewi sh communi t y in the city of Baghdad
made it difficult to achi eve a si ngl e unified government that was at
the s ame ti me representati ve, effective, and widely s upport ed.
Cox rai sed other i mmedi at e and practi cal i ssues that obvi ousl y had
not been thought t hrough i n London. Th e l aborers and other non-
combat ant s upport groups of the Army of the Ti gri s were Indi an; i f
the Cabi net were seri ous in orderi ng the Indi ans out of the
Mesopot ami an provi nces, who woul d take their pl ace? Moreover,
under Turkey, the syst em of law court s i n the provi nces had oper-
ated under, and with a right of appeal to, the high court in
Const ant i nopl e, while under General Maude the court syst em of
Indi a offered si mi l ar ri ght s; but if the connecti on with Indi a were to
be broken, what woul d happen to the admi ni strati on of justi ce?
Th e Mesopot ami an Admi ni st rat i on Commi t t ee had no ready re-
pl i es, for the Ot t oman admi ni st rat i on of Mes opot ami a had been
dri ven out, and no body of experi enced officials other than those of
Bri ti sh Indi a exi sted i n the provi nces to repl ace it. Th e war con-
ti nued, and orders had to be gi ven and admi ni strati ve deci si ons taken
daily. Publ i c facilities and utilities had to be managed. Who was to
do it?
London was dri ven to reconsi der, and to accept the admi ni strati on
of the Government of Indi a so l ong as it was agreed that it shoul d
not be permanent . General Maude, i n whose name the Sykes proc-
l amati on had been i ssued, was put i n the posi ti on of preachi ng self-
rule while di scouragi ng its practi ce. Th e compromi s e f ormul a at
which the Bri ti sh had arri ved mi ght have been expressl y desi gned to
arouse di ssati sfacti on and unrest : havi ng vol unteered what sounded
like a pl edge of i ndependence to an area that had not asked for it, the
military and civil authori ti es of the occupyi ng power then proceeded
to wi thhol d it.
Th e Mes opot ami an provi nces were the first t o be capt ured f rom
the Ot t oman Empi re by Bri tai n duri ng the war. Whitehall's failure to
think through in practi cal detail how to fulfill the promi ses grat ui -
tousl y made to a section of the local i nhabi tants was reveal i ng, and
I I
Th e new commandi ng officer sent out to Egypt was General Si r
Edmund Al l enby, a caval ry officer who had served and commanded
with di sti ncti on i n France. He was chosen i n June 1917, after Smut s
had definitely deci ded that he woul d not accept the appoi nt ment .
Al l enby' s commi ssi on from the Pri me Mi ni ster was to i nvade and
occupy Pal esti ne and to take Jerus al em before Chri st mas.
Al l enby brought dri ve and di sci pl i ne to the Egypt i an Expedi t i onary
Force, and a new prof essi onal i sm. As head of Mi l i tary Intel l i gence
he chose Col onel Ri chard Mei nert zhagen, who had di sti ngui shed
himself in a si mi l ar capaci ty with Smut s in Eas t Afri ca.
Mei nertzhagen chose Wyndham Deedes , the expert on Ot t oman
affai rs, to serve under hi m in charge of the political section of the
di vi si on.
Mei nert zhagen took charge of espi onage operati ons behi nd enemy
l i nesoperati ons meant to pave the way for Al l enby to i nvade
Pal esti ne. Though he had been strongl y anti -Jewi sh, Mei nert zhagen
was moved to change his mi nd by Aaron Aaronsohn, whose spy
network i n Jewi sh Pal esti ne he regarded as i nval uabl e. But Aaronsohn
pai d a high price for wi nni ng the respect and fri endshi p of Bri ti sh
Mi l i tary Intel l i gence: his spy ri ng exposed the Jewi sh settlers i n
Pal esti ne to possi bl e Turki s h repri sal sat the worst of t i mes, for the
local Ot t oman admi ni strati on was inclined to strike out agai nst the
Jewi sh communi t y in any event. In the spri ng of 1917, on the feast
of Passover, Dj emal expel l ed the Je ws and Arabs of Jaf f a; i t was not
clear where he meant t hem to go, al though he spoke vaguel y of the
Syri an hi nterl and. Th e plight of the refugees, wi thout means or
suppl i es, evoked memori es of the Armeni ans. Soon afterward Dj emal
boded ill for the provi nces that were the next to be i nvaded:
Pal esti ne, Syri a, and Lebanon. It showed that Si r Mark Sykes and
his col l eagues had adopt ed policies for the Mi ddl e Eas t wi thout first
consi deri ng whether i n exi sti ng condi ti ons they coul d feasibly be
i mpl ement ed, and, if so, whether Bri ti sh officers on the spot woul d
actual l y allow t hem to be i mpl ement ed.
It was an i nauspi ci ous begi nni ng and suggest ed the extent to
which the Bri ti sh government di d not know what it was getti ng into
when i t deci ded to supersede the Ot t oman Empi re i n Asi a. If there
was this much muddl e when Bri ti sh Indi a occupi ed nearby
Mesopot ami a, i t was reasonabl e to s uppos e there woul d be even
more muddl e when Bri ti sh Egypt marched on an area of such compl ex
international i nterests as Pal esti ne.
i ndi cated that he meant to deport the civil popul ati on of Jerus al em,
of which the majori ty was Jewi s h. Onl y the firm intervention of the
German Forei gn Mi ni st ry kept the tragedy from occurri ng.
In these ci rcumst ances, the Pal esti ni an Jewi sh communi t y faced
catastrophe if the extent and effecti veness of Aaronsohn' s activities
were uncoveredas eventually they were. Aaron' s sister Sarah and a
number of her associ ates were arrested by the Tur ks i n Oct ober
1917, tortured and i nterrogated. Some were hanged. Sarah Aaronsohn,
after four days of torture, succeeded i n commi t t i ng sui ci de. Repri sal s
agai nst the Jewi sh popul ati on mi ght have followed had not the
Germans and Tal aat i ntervened. As it was, only about a third of the
Jewi sh popul at i on remai ned i n Jerus al em by the end of 1917; most
of the rest had di ed of starvati on or di sease.
Ill
Mei nert zhagen was i mpressed by the effectiveness of Aaronsohn' s
Je ws in contri buti ng to the preparat i ons for a Bri ti sh invasion of
Pal esti ne, but was l ess i mpressed by the effectiveness of Fei sal ' s
Arabs .
Th e Bri ti sh civil authori ti es i n Cai ro had little contact with T. E.
Lawrence, their liaison with Fei sal ' s Arabi an guerri l l as: and i n the
spri ng of 1917 he di sappeared into the desert. Th e Bri ti sh military
authori ti es i n Cai ro showed little concern for whatever Lawrence and
Fei sal mi ght be doi ng, havi ng gi ven up interest i n the Arab Revol t
the previ ous year.
Lawrence had gone off with Auda abu Tayi , the fighting chief of
the Bedoui n tribal confederati on of northern Arabi a, whose adherence
Lawrence had secured by the payment of 10, 000 pounds sterl i ng.
Thei r objecti ve was Aqaba, a sl eepy, tiny port at the southern tip of
Pal esti ne, si tuated at the head of a channel of the Red Se a so narrow
that the Royal Navy dared not enter it while its shore batteri es were
i n enemy hands. Its several hundred Ot t oman defenders and their
gun posi ti ons faced out to sea, so Auda' s band pl anned to steal up
from behi nd to take Aqaba by a surpri se at t ack. *
It was Auda who led the expedi ti on, though Lawrence rode with
hi m. With Bedoui n cunni ng, Auda led his followers from the Arabi an
coastline nort hward into the desert, where their movement s were lost
from view. When they reappeared i n southern Pal esti ne two mont hs
later, their comi ng was a total surpri se. On 6 Jul y they overwhel med
* It was probably Lawrence's idea, though Auda and/or Feisal may have thought
of it independently.
Aqaba' s smal l and unprepared Tur ki s h garri son. Despi t e his two
puni shi ng mont hs i n the desert, Lawrence i mmedi atel y set off on an
arduous and dangerous tri p across a wi l derness of enemy-hel d terri-
tories to Sue z to report Auda' s capt ure of Aqaba. He astoni shed
everyone by unexpectedl y emergi ng f rom the Si nai desert, i n Arab
dress, creati ng a sensati on at headquart ers just after General Al l enby
came to take up his new command.
Lawrence possessed many vi rtues but honesty was not among
t hem; he passed off his fantasi es as the truth. A few mont hs before,
he had sent a letter to General Cl ayt on that contai ned an al most
certainly fictitious account of an expedi ti on he cl ai med to have
undertaken on his own.
3
Now he had real personal expl oi ts to an-
nounce and to exaggerat e, as he al l owed his listeners to underst and
that he had pl ayed the chief role i n the Aqaba campai gn. Lawrence' s
arrival with the news f rom Aqaba compl et ed his nine mont hs' trans-
formati on into a military hero. Auda abu Tayi , sheikh of the eastern
Howei tat, who had in fact won the victory, di d not have a name that
tri pped easily off the t ongues of Bri ti sh officers. Inst ead they sai d, as
hi stori ans di d later, that "Lawrence took Aqaba. "
Whoever deserved credi t, the capt ure of Aqaba t ransf ormed the
Hej az rebellion which had hitherto been bottl ed up i n the Arabi an
peni nsul a by the Turki s h garri son at Medi na. Now the Royal Navy
coul d transport Arabi an t ri besmen to Pal esti ne; and t hus, for the
first ti me, Hussei n' s forces coul d reach a battlefield on which the
Bri t i sh- Turki sh war was actually to be fought, for Lawrence per-
suaded Al l enby that Arab i rregul ars coul d assist Bri ti sh forces i n the
comi ng Pal esti ne and Syri a campai gns .
Fei sal still remai ned at headquart ers i n the Hej az when Al l enby
approved Lawrence' s pl an to transport hi m and a smal l stri ki ng force
of his t ri besmen by sea from the Bri ti sh-hel d coast of Arabi a to
Aqa ba a sea voyage of 250 mi l es. The r e they coul d act as a diver-
si onary force on the right flank of the Bri ti sh army in the comi ng
Pal esti ne campai gn which Al l enby pl anned to l aunch i n the aut umn.
Fei sal accepted the pl an, al though it meant cutti ng himself off f rom
the Hej az, his father, and his brot hers; he was deputi zed as a Bri ti sh
general and came under Al l enby' s command.
A few mont hs earlier, the Arab Bureau had consi dered the prob-
l ems that woul d arise from any at t empt to empl oy Fei sal ' s forces i n
the Pal esti ne and Syri a campai gns . The bureau had reported t o
Cl ayton on 16 May 1917 that Fei sal ' s Bedoui ns coul d not st and up to
regul ar t roops, and that an addi ti onal di sadvant age of empl oyi ng
t hem was that their goi ng into settled di stri cts woul d be unwel come
to town dwel l ers. Accordi ng to the Arab Bureau, the probl em coul d
be sol ved by recrui ti ng Syri an deserters from the Ot t oman army to
serve under Fei sal . Thi s woul d "change the character of Sheri f
Fei sal ' s campai gn from a seri es of desul tory rai ds agai nst the railway
to an organi zed at t empt to free the count ry. "
4
*
I V
In the aut umn of 1917 Al l enby i nvaded Pal esti ne. Th e Tur ks and
their German commanders expected hi m to l aunch hi s attack on
coastal Gaza, the obvi ous gateway to Pal esti ne; but its defenses and
defenders were well prepared and Al l enby merel y feinted at it while,
with stealth and speed, his mai n forces swung around t hrough the
desert to attack inland at Beersheba i nstead. Th e Ot t oman forces
were taken by surpri se, and fell back in di sarray.
One reason for the Tur ks ' surpri se was a ruse devi sed and executed
by Mei nert zhagen. On 10 Oct ober he rode into no man' s l and; when
an Ot t oman caval ry patrol fired at hi m he pretended to be hit, and
dropped a bl ood-stai ned sack that contai ned apparentl y confidential
Bri ti sh document s i ndi cati ng that the mai n attack woul d be at Gaz a.
"Mei nertzhagen' s devi ce won the bat t l e, " Davi d Ll oyd George later
wrote; he was "One of the abl est and most successful brai ns I had
met i n any army. " Ll oyd George added that "Needl ess to say he
never rose in the war above the rank of Col onel . "
6
While Al l enby' s forces were rolling up the Gaza- t o- Beers heba line,
Fei sal ' s forces harassed the Tur ks on the Bri ti sh right fl ank. As
liaison officer between the Bri ti sh and Arab officers, first as a maj or
and then as a colonel, T. E. Lawrence enjoyed a colorful campai gn
that later won hi m great publ i ci t ybut also much envy.
Bremond, the French representati ve i n the Hej az, later jeal ousl y
observed that Lawrence "represented" 200, 000 pounds st erl i ng,
7
but
it was more than that: by the end of the war, the Arab Revol t had
cost Bri tai n more than fi fty ti mes that amount . Whatever the s um, i t
was i mmense i n those days and more so by desert Bedoui n stan-
dards. The tri bes had never known such wealth as Lawrence brought
t hem. Eventual l y the wealth t ransf ormed not merel y the face of
* British officers put this program into effect when Feisal came to Aqaba, and
served with him to provide professional advice and guidance. Lieutenant-Colonel
Pierce Charles Joyce, stationed at Aqaba, was the senior British officer serving with
Feisal's corps, as O. C. (Officer Commandi ng) Hejaz operations, reporting to
Colonel Alan Dawnay of Allenby's General Staff. Dawnay at the planning level and
Joyce at the operations level were the principal British officers placed in charge of
the Arab army corps. General Harry Chauvel, commander of the Australian army in
the Palestine and Syria campaigns, later wrote that "Joyce was the organiser of the
only fighting force of any real value in the whole of the Arab Army and I always
thought that he had more to do with the success of the Hejaz operations than any
other British officer."
5
tribal al l egi ances but al so the appearance of the young Engl i shman
who served as paymast er; his Arab wardrobe grew to be even more
spl endi d than Fei sal ' s. Nearl y half a century later, when asked if he
remembered Lawrence, a Bedoui n shei kh replied "He was the man
with the gol d. "
8
Th e sheer l ogi sti cs of getti ng the gol d safely to Lawrence posed a
probl em, for not many peopl e coul d be trusted with the possessi on of
it. In Cai ro, Wyndham Deedes used t o s pend his Sat urday afternoons
personal l y packi ng gol d soverei gns into cartri dge cases and watchi ng
them bei ng l oaded onto camel s for the journey to Lawrence i n the
desert.
Apart f rom the tri bes, whose role was sporadi c, Fei sal ' s army
consi sted of about 1,000 Bedoui ns suppl ement ed by about 2, 500
Ot t oman ex-pri soners of war. Bri ti sh expectati ons that the ex-
pri soners of war woul d t ransf orm Fei sal ' s forces into somet hi ng akin
to a regul ar army were, at first, a di sappoi nt ment . A representati ve
of the U. S . Depart ment of St at e i n Cai ro reported at the end of 1917
that Fei sal ' s army remai ned "i ncapabl e of copi ng with di sci pl i ned
troops"; and his report undoubt edl y echoed official Bri ti sh opi ni on
in Cai ro at the t i me .
9
Another di sappoi nt ment was the perf ormance of Lawrence' s rai di ng
party when assi gned a specific operati onal task by Al l enby: they were
to dynami t e a hi gh-arched vi aduct to cut the rai l road communi cat i ons
of the Ot t oman forces headquart ered i n Jerus al em. Lawrence and his
men failed i n the task, but Al l enby, havi ng pushed the Turki s h right
fl ank north of Jaf f a, then t hrust t hrough the Judaean hills, and
capt ured Jerus al em anywayeven earlier than Chri s t mas . Tho ug h
Lawrence bitterly bl amed hi msel f for hi s fai l ure, Al l enby di d not
and showed it by i nvi ti ng Lawrence to attend, as staff officer of the
day to General Cl ayt on, the ceremony of entrance into Jerus al em.
V
On 11 December 1917 General Si r Edmund Al l enby and his officers
entered the Hol y Ci ty of Jerus al em at the Jaf f a Gat e, on foot. At the
Ci tadel , Al l enby read out a procl amat i on pl aci ng the city under
marti al law. To the French representati ve, Picot, Al l enby expl ai ned
that the city fell within the mi l i tary zone, so that authori ty in the
area was vested solely i n the commandi ng general . As commandi ng
general , Al l enby woul d deci de how l ong the area woul d remai n
under an excl usi vel y mi l i tary admi ni st rat i on. Onl y when he deemed
that the mi l i tary si tuati on permi t t ed hi m to do so, sai d Al l enby,
woul d he allow civil admi ni st rat i on to be i nsti tuted. Unti l then, the
questi on of the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement and the ul ti mate di sposi ti on
of Pal esti ne woul d be def erred.
Th e liberation of what he called "the most f amous city in the
worl d" was what the Pri me Mi ni ster had wanted for Chri s t mas ; with
it, he later wrote, Chri st endom had been abl e "to regain possessi on
of its sacred s hri nes . "
1 0
Th e capt ure of Baghdad and Jerus al em had
produced a t remendous psychol ogi cal effect, he cl ai med, but al so a
materi al one. "The cal l i ng of the Tur ki s h bluff was not only the
begi nni ng of the cracki ng- up of that mi l i tary i mpost ershi p which the
i ncompetence of our war direction had permi t t ed to i nti mi date us for
years; it was itself a real contri buti on to ul ti mate vi ct ory. "
1 1
After the capt ure of Jerus al em, Fei sal ' s Arab forces, under vari ous
Ar ab and Bri t i sh officers, showed their worth. Campai gni ng i n
Trans j ordan, the rai di ng parti es conti nued their hi t-and-run attacks,
while the regul ars, trai ned by Joyce and t ransport ed by his col l eague
Hubert Young, di sproved the contenti onfrequentl y advanced by
Bri ti sh intelligence officers i n the pas t t hat they coul d not stand up
to the Turki s h army. A significant role was pl anned for t hem in the
next phase of the campai gn by Al l enby, who i ntended t hem to
spread di sorder among the Tur ks on hi s right flank.
Al l enby was now in a posi ti on to march on Damas c us , and then on
Const ant i nopl e to deliver the knock-out bl ow to the Ot t oman Empi r e ,
but just at that moment his hand was stayed. Th e Ge r mans were
prepari ng an offensi ve agai nst western Europe, made possi bl e by
Russi a' s surrender, whi ch al l owed Ludendorf f to bri ng back
Germany' s armi es from the eastern front. Suddenl y Al l enby was
obl i ged to send back to Europe al most all of his Bri ti sh t roops. On
the first day of spri ng 1918, German t roops l aunched a surpri se
attack that s mas hed t hrough Al l i ed lines i n northern France and
threatened to win the war before Ameri can rei nforcements coul d
arri ve. It was not until the s ummer that the fury of Ludendorf f ' s
offensive was spent . Meanwhi l e Al l enby remai ned i n Pal esti ne, re-
bui l di ng his forces for the future.
Fr om Chri s t mas until summer' s end, as Al l enby awai ted a chance
to resume his offensi ve, political battl e lines were f ormi ng within the
Bri ti sh government and the Al l i ed c amp as to the ul ti mate di sposi ti on
of the l ands compos i ng the Ot t oman Empi r e . Meanwhi l e Enver
Pasha was starti ng on a sort of Ludendorf f offensive of his own in
the north, desi gned to capt ure the Turki s h- s peaki ng l ands of the
Czari st Empi reAzerbai j an and Tur ke s t anand perhaps then t o
descend on Persi a, Af ghani st an, and Indi a to destroy Bri tai n' s eastern
empi re while all of her Bri ti sh t roops were away in Eur ope .
In retrospect, Enver' s offensi ve, like Ludendorf f ' s , looks like havi ng
been a last desperat e throw of the di ce. But at the ti me the Ot t oman
Empi re' s capabi l i ti es and i ntenti ons were less easy to as s es s ; and the
Ot t oman offensive brought vast areas of the northern Mi ddl e Eas t ,
hitherto uncontested in the war, into the spotl i ght of worl d war and
politics.
While Enver was attacki ng north and east, Al l enby was at last abl e
to res ume his attack on Enver' s forces in the west.
36
THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS
i
Between Chri s t mas of 1917 and the s ummer of 1918, Al l enby laid
the foundati on for resumi ng his campai gn agai nst the Tur ks . In
January and February he restored and extended Jerus al em' s railway
connecti ons to the coast, so as to relieve hi s army' s dependence upon
pack ani mal s and rui ned roads. He rai ded enemy forces t o keep t hem
off bal ance. Meanwhi l e he trai ned his raw Indi an t roops for the
comi ng campai gn.
Damas c us was the next objecti ve on his line of march. Even more
than Baghdad and Jerus al em, i t was an i mportant city for all histori-
cal ages. Bel i eved to be the ol dest conti nuousl y i nhabi ted urban
center in the worl d, its ori gi ns were lost in the mi st s of ti me.
Damas c us was a fl ouri shi ng oasi s town before there were Jews or
Arabs , Mos l ems or Chri st i ans, Engl i s hmen or Ge r mans . Th e capt ure
of Damas c us woul d symbol i cal l y compl et e not merel y the Bri ti sh
occupati on of the Arabi c- speaki ng Ot t oman Empi re, but al so assure
Bri tai n' s pl ace in the line of l egi ti mate successi on from the ancient
worl d conquerors who had seal ed their t ri umphs by achi evi ng mast ery
of the oases of Syri a.
Bri tai n cl ai med to be somet hi ng other than a tradi ti onal conqueror,
for she was acti ng on behalf of an array of associ ated powers and
causes. Al l enby was an Allied commander, and his armi es were
prepared t o advance under many f l ags. Among their banners was one
desi gned by Si r Mark Sykes for Hus s ei n and the Ar ab cause. Its
col orsbl ack, whi te, green, and redwere meant to symbol i ze the
past gl ory of Mos l em Arab empi res and to suggest that Hussei n was
their cont emporary champi on. Hussei n' s only modi fi cati on of the
desi gn was to change the hue of the r e d.
1
Sykes had ordered fl ags to
be made up by the Bri ti sh mi l i tary suppl y offices i n Egypt , and then
had t hem del i vered to the Hej az forces.
Th e Bri t i sh- desi gned, Bri t i sh- produced f l ag of Arab nati onal i sm
si gnal ed a critical i ssue as Al l enby' s armi es prepared to march on
315
Damas c us : the extent to which the parti cul ar Bri ti sh officials who
mattered most i n shapi ng Mi ddl e East ern policy were si ncere or
cynical in their espousal of the vari ous causes to which they had
supposedl y been converted al ong the way. Si r Mark Sykes, who
before 1914 had admi red the Tur ks as a rul i ng peopl e, had become
converted duri ng the war to the cause of l i berati ng the subject
peopl es from Ot t oman tyranny. An out spoken ant i - Semi t e, he had
come to express his concern for the Je ws , as di d Mei nert zhagen, al so
an avowed ant i - Semi t e. Col oni al officials such as St orrs and Cl ayt on,
who had al ways mai ntai ned that Arabi c- speaki ng nati ves were in-
capabl e of sel f-government, appeared to support Sykes as he hailed
the renai ssance of Arab i ndependence. Not all of these conversi ons
were genui ne.
At one end of the s pect rum was Sykes , who bel i eved i n honori ng
the pl edges of whi ch, in l arge part, he was the author. At the other
end were operati onal officers who depl ored the pl edges, and at ti mes
deprecat ed the causes i n whose names they had been made. At the
begi nni ng of 1918 Sykes , in London, moved into a Forei gn Office
posi ti on in charge of the pol i ti cs of the Ot t oman theater of war.
Thos e in charge of the politics of the Ot t oman theater of war in the
f i el dCl ayt on i n Pal esti ne, Wi ngate i n Egypt , and the Government
of Indi a in Baghdadwere skepti cal of the politics of i deal i sm that
Sykes had come to espouse, t hough they di d not tell hi m so openl y.
Beneat h the surface civility of Bri ti sh government i nterchanges in
1918 there ran a hi dden line on whi ch the Forei gn Office and officers
i n the field pul l ed i n opposi t e di recti ons. Baghdad, Jerus al em, and,
beyond Al l i ed lines, Damas c us , awai ted word of their eventual fate,
unaware that a tug- of war within the Bri ti sh bureaucracy mi ght
deci de it.
I I
Bri gadi er General Gi l bert Cl ayt on served as chief political officer to
General Al l enby, but remai ned the political alter ego of Si r Regi nal d
Wi ngate, the Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi s s i oner i n Cai ro. He thus occupi ed
a commandi ng posi ti on in det ermi ni ng the politics of both Egypt and
the Sudan, as well as those of the army of occupati on i n Pal esti ne.
Cl ayt on was a career army officer whose professi onal cauti on often
kept hi m f rom expressi ng his vi ews freely when they contradi cted
those of his superi ors. He therefore expressed his views candi dl y to
Wi ngate, with whom he agreed, but guardedl y to Sykes, with whom
he di d not.
Cl ayt on and St orrs envi saged an Arab ki ngdom or confederati on
gui ded by the Bri ti sh i n a Mi ddl e Eas t i n which there was no room
T H E R OA D T O D A M A S C U S 317
for France (except perhaps i n Le banon) . Cl ayt on deni ed that he was
ant i - French; it was not, he expl ai ned, as though he wanted to
excl ude the French from Syri a. It was the fault of the French
t hemsel ves: they were detested by the Syri ans and, if gi ven a chance
to rul e Syri a, woul d bungl e it. Cl ayt on sai d he woul d not conni ve at
bri ngi ng about that resul t; i t was si mpl y that he was predi ct i ng it.
"You need not be afrai d of any Fas hoda- i s m on my part , " he wrote
to Sykes on 20 Augus t 1917.
2
It was rather that he feared Bri tai n
woul d be bl amed for France' s fai l ure, and told Sykes that the i m-
portant thi ng was to establ i sh a record showi ng that it was not
Bri tai n' s fault.
Though denyi ng ant i - French bi as, he di d admi t havi ng reservati ons
about Bri tai n' s other Mi ddl e East ern allies. Even by the st andards of
the ti me, Cl ayt on and his col l eague, Wi ngat e, were strongl y di sposed
to be ant i - Jewi sh. Wi ngate had bl amed Je ws for inciting the out break
of the Ot t oman war. In 1916 Cl ayt on report ed to Wi ngate that Je ws
were behi nd the movement to make peace with the Ot t oman Empi re
as well.
But when the i ssue of a compromi s e peace with Turkey agai n
came to the fore i n 1917, Cl ayton argued that Bri tai n had no moral
right to negoti ate because "We are commi t t ed to the s upport of
Arabs , Syri ans, Je ws , and Armeni ans" and therefore had t o press
forward to compl et e vi ct ory.
4
At the s ame ti me, he oppos ed enteri ng
into just such commi t ment s, i ncl udi ng the commi t ment to Zi oni sm.
As the Bal four Decl arat i on was bei ng drafted, he wrote to Sykes that
i t woul d be best to keep Aaron Aaronsohn and the Je ws "in pl ay"
without maki ng any statement of Bri t i sh i nt ent i ons.
5
Pol i ti cs, he
wrote, tended to di stract Jews and Arabs from the war effort. By
nature caut i ous, he saw no need in any event to make pl edges in
advance.
A mont h after the i ssuance of the Bal four Decl arat i on, Cl ayton
wrote to Sykes suggest i ng that it mi ght have been a mi st ake.
I am not fully aware of the wei ght which Zi oni sts carry, es-
pecially i n Ameri ca and Russi a, and of the consequent necessi ty
of gi vi ng t hem everythi ng for whi ch they may ask, but I mus t
* In the summer of 1916, when the Tory leader Lord Lansdowne privately
argued in favor of a compromise peace, Clayton was in London; and on returning to
Cairo wrote Wingate that "One impression I gained which confirmed what I have
always thought, and which I know you take an interest in, was the widespread
influence of the Jews. It is everywhere and always on the 'moderation' tack. The
Jews do not want to see anyone 'downed'. There are English Jews, French Jews,
German Jews, Austrian Jews & Salonika Jewsbut all are J EWS .. . You hear
peace talk and generally somewhere behind is the Jew. You hear pro-Turk talk and
desires for a separate peace with Turkeyagai n the Jew (the mainspring of the
C. U. P. ) [original emphasi s]. "
3
# * *
poi nt out that, by pushi ng t hem as hard as we appear to be
doi ng, we are ri ski ng the possi bi l i ty of Arab unity becomi ng
somet hi ng like an accompl i shed fact and bei ng ranged agai nst
u s .
6
Nonet hel ess, Cl ayton was not pro- Arab, in the sense of favori ng
Arab i ndependence. On the contrary, early in 1917 he and Wi ngate
proposed to abol i sh even the nomi nal i ndependence of Egypt and to
move toward outri ght annexation-a j udgment whi ch the Forei gn
Office successful l y oppos ed. Wri ti ng to Sykes at the ti me, in s upport
of his own proposal and agai nst the officials in London who had
bl ocked it, Cl ayton cl ai med that
It is st rong and I know dead agai nst their policy, but , mark my
words, I know I am ri ght. All this cl apt rap about Sul t ans & self
government for Egypt is rot. The y are not nearly ready for it
and if you have a Pal ace, every ounce of power and self govern-
ment which you think you are gi vi ng to the Peopl e will go
strai ght into the hands of the Sul t an & his mi ni ster to be used
agai nst you. Beauti ful theories are all very nice, but hard facts
remai n.
7
Al t hough Cl ayton had been the first to make much of the Arab
secret societies, even before the out break of the Ot t oman war, he
consistently i gnored what they told hi m: they di d not want to be
rul ed by Chri st i ans or Europeans not even the Bri ti sh. A remi nder
of. this came in early 1918 in the di pl omat i c pouch from Madri d,
where the Bri ti sh ambas s ador had seen Azi z al - Masri , the secret
society l eader, and reported receiving a proposal from hi m to organi ze
the overthrow of the Enver- Tal aat government in Const ant i nopl e.
Th e Ot t oman Empi re woul d then be reorgani zed al ong federal lines,
offering local aut onomy to Arabs and others, and reconci l i ng the
reorgani zed empi re with the Al l i ed Powers .
8
Al - Masri had often sai d
much the s ame thi ng to Cl ayton in Cai ro at the begi nni ng of the war,
but it di d not seem to regi ster on Cl ayton that it meant that those for
whom al - Masri spoke, t hough willing to be rul ed by the Turki s h
Porte, refused to be rul ed by the Bri ti sh Resi dency. What Cl ayt on
was propos i nga Bri ti sh protectorate for the Arab Mi ddl e Eas t was
what al - Masri i ndi cated he woul d never accept.
Thus Cl ayt on, the officer who advi sed Al l enby about the policies
t o be purs ued i n occupi ed Pal esti ne, Trans j ordan, Lebanon, and
Syri a, t hough he cl ai med he was not an enemy of the French, and
insisted he was a friend of both the Zi oni sts and the Arabs , in
practi ce opposed the ambi t i ons of all three.
I I I
Si r Mark Sykes was a novice in government i n 1917 he had held
executi ve office for only two years and was a mercuri al personal i ty
who remai ned subject to sudden ent husi asms. As remarked earlier,
he was qui ck to take up a cause or to put it down. But t hough
i nconsi stent, he was not di shonest : he di d not di ssembl e. Havi ng
converted f rom ant i - Arab, ant i - Jew, ant i - Armeni an to pro- Arab, pro-
Jew, pro- Armeni an, he knew no way but one to keep faith with his
new fri endswi th a whole heart.
Sykes, who bel i eved i n keepi ng the promi ses he had made to
Arabs , Je ws , Armeni ans, and Frenchmen, conti nued to l abor i n
191718 to keep his di sparat e coalition together. Chai m Wei zmann
descri bed his out st andi ng qual i ti es by wri ti ng that "He was not very
consi stent or logical i n his thi nki ng, but he was generous and warm-
heart ed. "
9
Because of his role in hel pi ng to fulfill Jewi s h national
aspi rati ons, it was appropri at e that the door to Sykes' s office was
known to the Zi oni st l eader Nahum Sokol ow as "the Door of Ho pe . "
1 0
But within his own government there were those who objected to
this generosi ty to forei gners. Indeed Sykes' s pri nci pal probl em was
to secure the s upport of his own col l eagues, who were puzzl ed by his
vi ewspuzzl ed, because it seems not to have occurred to t hem that
he was, by their st andards, nai ve.
Part of Sykes' s probl em was that he di d not know which of his
col l eagues were in favor of what; he di d not underst and that some of
them kept their moti ves and pl ans hi dden. In confidential conferences
and correspondence with t rust ed Bri ti sh government col l eagues, he
felt that he coul d express his views openl y and fully, and wrongl y
as s umed that they felt the s ame way. Civil servants and career army
officers like Cl ayt on were cauti ous by professi on and, unlike Sykes,
were di sposed not to show their hands. Sykes was a Hous e of
Commons man; i t was his t rade to make speeches. By professi on he
spoke up; while, by professi on, men like Cl ayton kept their own
counsel .
Ret urni ng to London i n the s ummer of 1917, Sykes di scovered
that pro- Ot t oman members of the Forei gn Office, i n combi nat i on
with the former Ameri can ambas s ador i n Const ant i nopl e, Henry
Morgent hau, had at t empt ed in his absence to negoti ate a separat e
peace with Tur ke yan at t empt abort ed by the prompt opposi ti on of
Chai m Wei zmann, among others. Sykes wrote to Cl ayton that "On
my arrival I f ound that the Forei gn Office had been carefully de-
stroyi ng everythi ng I had done in the past 2 years. St i mul at i ng anti-
Entente feelings [i . e. , ant i - French feelings] and pushi ng separat e
negoti ati ons with Tur ke y i deas. Indeed I just arri ved in the nick of
ti me. Lucki l y Zi oni sm held good . . . " He was right about Zi oni sm,
but wrong about the Forei gn Office, whi ch was not ant i - French; the
ant i - French organi zati on was Cl ayton' s Arab Bureau, which Sykes
himself had created.
Davi d Hogart h, di rector of the Arab Bureau, had been i n London
i n 1917 just before Sykes ret urned; and had l obbi ed agai nst the
Sykes-Pi cot Agreement , agai nst a French role in the Mi ddl e East ,
and in favor of a Bri ti sh protectorate over a Hussei n- l ed Arab con-
federati on. In pri vate Gi l bert Cl ayton' s views were al most identical
to those expressed by the more candi d Hogart h, but Sykes was
unaware of that. Sykes wrote to Cl ayt on that "Hogart h arri ved and
pl ayed hell by wri ti ng an ant i - French and anti Agreement memo-
randum. Pouri ng cold water on the Arab movement and goi ng
i n for . . . a Bri ti sh Mecca. " Sykes gleefully report ed: "He got
trounced . . . "
Repeat i ng that "The mai n thi ng i s never to yield to Fas hoda- i s m
French or Bri t i sh, " Sykes announced that he and Picot (referred to
as P) were goi ng to force both the French and Bri ti sh government s
to be honest with one another and honest with the Ar abs : " . . . there
i s only one possi bl e policy, the Ent ent e first and last, and the Arab
nati on the child of the Ent ent e. " Th e Arabs , too, had to be taken i n
hand and made to see that they shoul d not try to split the Angl o-
French Ent ent e. "Get your Engl i shmen to stand up to the Arabs on
this and never let t hem accept flattery of the 'you very good man hi m
very bad man' ki nd. I am goi ng to sl am into Pari s to make the
French play up to the Arab cause as their only hope. Col oni al i sm i s
madnes s and I believe P and I can prove it to t hem. "
1 1
Sykes di d not
seem to suspect that Picot himself remai ned a colonialist, who saw
Bri tai n as his country' s rival in the Mi ddl e East , nor di d he suspect
that Cl ayton hoped to keep France out of the region al together.
Cl ayton proved to be qui te unwi l l i ng even to work with Picot and
protested agai nst carryi ng out an agreement reached with the French
duri ng the Asqui t h government-whereby a joint Angl o- French ad-
mi ni strati on woul d be i ntroduced into the territories i n the Mi ddl e
East occupi ed duri ng the war. Picot, acti ng as the French representa-
tive at Al l enby' s headquart ers, asserted that Si r Edward Grey had
promi sed it to hi m; but Cl ayt on wrote to Sykes that "If this is so, I
have heard nothi ng of it, and I cannot protest too strongl y agai nst
any such unworkabl e and mi schi evous arrangement . "
1 2
In any event,
General Al l enby exerci sed his authori ty to post pone consi derati on of
such mat t ers until the military si tuati on was deemed sui tabl e by hi m,
which, in effect, cancel l ed that parti cul ar agreement for the ti me
bei ng.
With respect t o Arabs , Jews , and Armeni ans, Cl ayton expressed
his views to Sykes more guardedl y. In the week following the publ i -
cation of the Bal f our Decl arat i on, an exuberant Sykes sent a cypher
cabl e to an unenthusi asti c Cl ayt on i nf ormi ng hi m that the Zi oni st
movement was prepared to work on behal f of Arabs and Armeni ans
and that he, Sykes, was in process of f ormi ng a joint commi t t ee to
unify the three g r o ups .
1 3
Chai m Wei zmann woul d represent the
Zi oni st s; J a me s Mal col m, the Armeni ans; and a Syri an Chri sti an
and an Arab Mos l em woul d jointly represent the Arabs . It was
i mportant that more Arabs shoul d joi n, added Sykes, for i t woul d
help Arabs everywhere.
A few weeks later Sykes cabl ed Cl ayt on agai n, report i ng that he
had prevai l ed on the Zi oni st l eadershi p to adopt a st rong pro- Arab
l i ne .
1 4
He asked Cl ayton to tell the Syri an Arab groups i n Cai ro that
i f the Tur ks and Ge r mans capt ured Zi oni st support , i t woul d be bad
for t hem as well as everyone else whose hopes rode with the Al l i es.
He thus i mpl i ed that the Bal four Decl arat i on was i ssued i n the Arab
as well as in the Bri ti sh interest. Shortl y after cabl i ng Cl ayt on, Sykes
sent a mes s age to Picot, telling hi m that Arab interests were bei ng
ampl y saf eguarded and that Je ws i n Pal esti ne woul d pay scrupul ous
attention to Arab r i ght s .
1 5
Sykes al so sent a letter to Cl ayt on telling
hi m that the Zi oni st and Armeni an l eaders were i n compl et e accord
and that i t was i mportant that Arab l eaders shoul d al so joi n "the
c ombi ne . "
1 6
Pouri ng cold water, Cl ayton in reply cabl ed that "in spi te of all
argument s Mecca di sl i kes Jews and Armeni ans and wi shes t o have
nothi ng to do with t hem, while Arabs of Syri a and Pal esti ne fear re-
petition of the story of Jac ob and Es au. In any case an Arab- Jewi s h-
Armeni an combi nat i on i s so foreign to any previ ous experi ence and
to exi sti ng senti ment that we mus t proceed with great caut i on. "
1 7
He
added that i t woul d not be feasi bl e to send an Arab del egati on to
London to joi n the commi t t ee, as Sykes had asked, because the
Arabs were too di vi ded.
A few days later he wrote to Sykes in a more conciliatory vei n that
"I qui te see your argument s regardi ng an Arab- Jew- Armeni an com-
bine and the advant ages that woul d accrue if it coul d be brought
off. We will try it, but it mus t be done very cauti ousl y and, honestl y,
I see no great chance of any real success. It is an at t empt to change
in a few weeks the traditional senti ment of centuri es. " Caut i oni ng
especially agai nst the Jewi sh aspect of the combi ne, he added that
"We have . . . to consi der whether the si tuati on demands out and out
support of Zi oni sm at the risk of al i enati ng the Arabs at a critical
mome nt . "
1 8
Th e next day Cl ayton' s cl osest associ ate, the Hi gh Commi ssi oner
i n Egypt , Si r Regi nal d Wi ngate, wrote to Al l enby that "Mark Sykes
is a bit carri ed away with 'the exuberance of his own verbosi ty' in
regard to Zi oni sm and unl ess he goes a bit sl ower he may qui te
uni ntenti onal l y upset the appl ecart . However Cl ayt on has written
hi m an excellent letter whi ch, I hope, may have an anodyne ef f ect . "
1 9
Nonethel ess Cl ayton held a meet i ng with Syri an representati ves in
Cai ro, as Sykes had asked, and appears to have told t hem, as he had
been i nstructed, that only if Jewi sh s upport for the Al l i ed si de were
forthcomi ng woul d the Arab cause, whi ch was bound up with that of
the Allies, st and a chance of wi nni ng. He told them that Jews desi red
a home in Pal esti ne but had no intention of creati ng a Jewi sh state
t he r e .
2 0
Th e Syri an Arabs responded favorabl y, and an Arab Bureau report
to Cl ayt on quot ed a spokesman for the Syri an commi t t ee as sayi ng
that its members "fully realized that their best and only policy was to
co-operate with the Jews on the lines you suggest ed. He assured me
that the Syri ans qui te underst and the power and position of the Jews
and that they now wish to di ssemi nat e propaganda to emphasi ze
Syri an- Jewi sh fraternity and unity as regards Pal est i ne. "
2 1
Cl ayton reported to Sykes that he bel i eved Jews and Arabs were i n
fact comi ng together. He al so report ed that he had i nstructed T. E.
Lawrence, the Bri ti sh liaison officer with Fei sal , to i mpress upon
Fei sal his need to form an entente with the J e ws .
2 2
In admi ni st eri ng the l i berated areas of Pal esti ne, however, Bri ti sh
officials made no at t empt to take advant age of this favorabl e di spo-
sition. Al t hough the Bal f our Decl arat i on was publ i shed in London a
mont h before Al l enby entered Jerus al em, the Bri ti sh mi l i tary author-
ities refused to publ i sh it in Jerus al em. Th u s it di d not enter into the
policy of the provi si onal military admi ni st rat i on establ i shed by Al l enby
under Ronal d St orrs , who decl i ned to raise potentially di st urbi ng
i ssues while the war was bei ng fought. Cai ro Intel l i gence told the
Forei gn Office that appl i cati ons by Je ws to proceed to settle in
Pal esti ne shoul d be deni ed until the military si tuati on was resol ved
and until an organi zati on had been created to deal with the vari ous
probl ems that mi ght be expected t o a r i s e .
2 3
The r e was an evident tendency on the part of mi l i tary admi ni s-
tration officials to believe that officials at home in London di d not
appreci ate the very real difficulty of reconci l i ng Mos l ems in Pal esti ne
to the prospect of an i ncrease in Jewi sh settlement in the country.
The y therefore gave the i mpressi on of bei ng unwilling to carry the
Bal four Decl arat i on into effect. Some observers noted, too, a ten-
dency to prefer Mos l ems , who were treated as "natives, " to Chri st i ans
and Je ws , whom it was more difficult to treat as such. William
Or ms by- Gor e , one of the three assi stant secretaries of the War Cabi -
net, wrote to his col l eague Mark Sykes from Tel Avi v i n the s ummer
of 1918 that the mi l i tary occupati on officers, drawn from servi ce in
Egypt and the Sudan, were persons "whose experi ence . . . does not
make for a ready realisation of the very wide questi ons of worl d
policy which affect Pal esti ne. One can't hel p noticing the i neradi cabl e
tendency of the Engl i shman who has lived in Indi a or the Sudan to
T H E R O A D T O D A M A S C U S 323
favour qui te unconsci ousl y the Mos l em both agai nst Chri st i an and
Je w. " He added that "The Arabs i n Pal esti ne are, I gather, showi ng
their ol d tendency to corrupt met hods and backsheesh and are en-
deavouri ng to 'steal a march' on the J e ws . "
2 4
Cl ayton forwarded the Or s mby- Gor e letter to Sykes with a coveri ng
letter of his own, sayi ng that he felt it was somewhat mi sl eadi ng.
Cl ayton protested that he personal l y was i n favor of Zi oni s m.
2 5
Apparent l y he had come around to the view that an agreement
between Arabs and Je ws coul d be worked out. He held no hi gh
opi ni on of the local Arabs and he wrote to Gert rude Bell, the author
and traveler i n the Eas t who was servi ng i n the British admi ni strati on
in Baghdad, that the "so-called Arabs of Pal esti ne are not to be
compared with the real Arab of the Desert or even of other civilised
di stri cts i n Syri a and Me s opot ami a. "
2 6
Ronal d St orrs , who was appoi nt ed mi l i tary governor of Jerus al em,
wrote to Sykes in the s ummer of 1918 that non-Jewi sh el ements in
the popul ati on, havi ng eventual l y to take "a lower pl ace in the land
which the others are in the end absol utel y certain to possess, the
transacti on shoul d be effected so far as possi bl e with decency, gentl e-
ness, and tact, and that the out goi ng garri son shoul d be al l owed
somethi ng of the honours of War. " Ur gi ng a policy of goi ng slowly,
he wrote that "It will take mont hs, possi bl y years, of pati ent work to
show the Jews that we are not run by the Arabs , and the Ar abs that
we are not bought by the J e ws . "
2 7
In the s ame letter, St orrs wrote that "it is one thi ng to see clearly
enough the probabl e future of this country, and another thi ng to fail
to make al l owances for the posi ti on of the weaker and probabl y
di sappeari ng el ement. Th e resul ts of the changes will be more sati s-
factory and more l asti ng i f they are brought about gradual l y with
pati ence, and wi thout violent expressi ons of illwill, l eavi ng behi nd
t hem an abi di ng r anc our . "
2 8
Th e quest i on this rai sed for Sykes and his col l eagues i n London
was whether this pol i cy advocated by the man on the spot was better
cal cul ated to achi eve, or to defeat, their objecti ves.
I V
In early 1918 Sykes and his col l eagues at the Forei gn Office took
st eps to carry their Pal esti ne policy into effect. On 13 February the
Forei gn Office di spat ched a cabl e to Si r Regi nal d Wi ngate at the
Resi dency in Cai ro to i nform hi m that a Zi oni st Commi s s i on had
been created and was bei ng sent out to the Mi ddl e Eas t . Compos e d
of representati ves from Bri ti sh and other Zi oni st movement s, i t was
headed by Dr Chai m Wei zmann and was to be pl aced i n the charge
of William Or ms by- Gor e . Its object was to prepare the way to carry
out the Bal four Decl arat i on.
2 9
Inaugurat i ng the work of the Zi oni st Commi s s i on, Al an Dawnay,
of Al l enby' s staff, arranged for Wei zmann to meet Pri nce Fei sal , and
wrote to Li eut enant - Col onel P. C. Joyce, the seni or Bri ti sh officer
with Fei sal , that "From what I gathered of the Zi oni st ai ms, in
rather a short conversati on, I think there shoul d be no difficulty in
establ i shi ng a friendly rel ati onshi p between t hem. "
3 0
Wei zmann was i ntroduced to Pri nce Fei sal and was enthusi asti c
about hi m. Of Fei sal , Wei zmann wrote to his wife that "He is the
first real Arab nationalist I have met. He is a l eader! He' s qui t e
intelligent and a very honest man, hands ome as a pi ct ure! He is not
interested i n Pal esti ne, but on the other hand he wants Damas c us
and the whole of northern Syri a . . . He is cont empt uous of the
Pal esti ni an Arabs whom he doesn't even regard as Ar a bs ! "
3 1
Thi s was in line with what Or ms by- Gor e told a Zi oni st meet i ng in
London some mont hs later. Accordi ng to a summary of his speech,
he told the Zi oni st Political Commi t t ee that
the true Arab movement really exi sted outsi de Pal esti ne. Th e
movement led by Pri nce Fei sal was not unlike the Zi oni st
movement . It contai ned real Arabs who were real men. Th e
Arabs i n t rans- Jordani a were fine peopl e. Th e west of the
Jor dan the peopl e were not Arabs , but only Arabi c- speaki ng.
Zi oni sts shoul d recogni se i n the Arab movement , originally
centered in the Hej az, but now movi ng north, a fellow move-
ment with high i de al s .
3 2
Fei sal ' s senior Bri ti sh military advi ser, Li eut enant - Col onel Joyce,
attended the Wei zmann- Fei sal meeti ng and reported his personal
opi ni on that Fei sal wel comed the prospect of Jewi sh cooperati on and
in fact regarded it as essential to the realization of Arab ambi t i ons.
Though Fei sal was unabl e to express definite views wi thout recei vi ng
authori zati on from his father, accordi ng to Joyce, he woul d accept a
Jewi sh Pal esti ne if doi ng so woul d influence the Allies to s upport his
cl ai m to Sy r i a .
3 3
Th e meet i ng went well, and paved the way for the
publ i c support of Zi oni sm offered by Fei sal at the Peace Conference
the following year.
In Jerus al em, Wei zmann found his Mosl em audi ences less recep-
tive, t hough he assured them that Pal esti ne was large enough to
accommodat e all its communi t i es and that Jewi sh settl ement woul d
not be undertaken at the expense of Mos l ems or Chri st i ans. He was
* Thi s may have been the first indication that high-ranking British officials were
thinking of restricting Zionism to those sections of Biblical Palestine that lay west of
the Jordan river.
di squi eted by the atti tude of Bri ti sh admi ni strati ve officials in
Pal esti ne: when Wei zmann urged t hem to avow their government' s
Bal four Decl arati on policy openl y and to expl ai n i t to the Mos l em
communi t y, Ronal d St orrs and his col l eagues refused.
In his comment s to the Forei gn Office, St orrs took i ssue with
Wei zmann' s contenti on that it was the busi ness of the mi l i tary ad-
mi ni strati on to bri ng home to the Mos l em popul ati on the seri ousness
of Bri tai n' s pro-Zi oni st i ntenti ons. That had al ready been done, he
sai d, by Bal f our i n London and by the worl d' s newspapers. What
was needed was for the Zi oni st Commi s s i on to i magi ne itself in the
posi ti on of non- Jewi sh i nhabi tants of the country and to recogni ze
how very much reassurance they woul d need. "Palestine, up to now a
Mosl em country, has fallen into the hands of a Chri sti an Power
which on the eve of its conquest announces that a consi derabl e
porti on of its l and is to be handed over for colonisation purposes to a
nowhere very popul ar peopl e. " It was not lost on the urbane Ronal d
St orrs that he was governor of Jerus al em in line of successi on from
Ponti us Pi l ate; and as such he washed his hands of an i ssue for which
he di d not hol d himself responsi bl e. He i nsi sted to the Forei gn
Office, however, that he spoke "as a convi nced Zi oni s t . "
3 4
Gi l bert Cl ayt on also advocated del ay. Hi s strategy, of which he
gave an i ndi cati on i n early 1918, was not merel y to post pone the
Zi oni st i ssue but to link it to the i ssue of an Arab Syri a, as Fei sal also
proposed t o do. To the strongl y pro-Zi oni st Le o Amery, Cl ayt on
expl ai ned that "the two most i mport ant poi nts are not to make too
much of a spl ash locally with Zi oni sm until the Arabs have got a slice
of cake themsel ves, i . e. , Damas c us , and to get the French to come
out clearly . . . di savowi ng any i deas of Col oni al annexati on and
emphasi zi ng their adherence to the i dea of Arab aut onomy. "
3 5
Nei ther Cl ayton nor St orrs addressed the questi on of whether, if
they refused to admi t i n Jerus al em that their government had i ssued
the Bal four Decl arat i on i n London, Arabs and Jews i n Pal esti ne
woul d ever learn to trust the Bri ti sh any more than Mos l ems i n Syri a
and Le banon trusted the French. As i t was, the Zi oni st l eaders were
given cause to worry that the Bal f our Decl arat i on policy procl ai med
i n London mi ght be undermi ned i n Pal esti ne by Cl ayt on, St orrs ,
and other officers on the spot .
V
In Baghdad and Bas ra, not much more than lip servi ce was pai d to
the pro- Arab i ndependence policies procl ai med by Sykes and the
Forei gn Office. Si r Percy Cox was obl i ged to leave on a lengthy tour
and eventual l y to return to Persi a; in his absence, his deput y, Capt ai n
Arnol d T. Wi l son, acted i n his pl ace and then succeeded hi m as civil
commi ssi oner. Wi l son, an officer i n the Indi an Army, believed
neither in i ndependence for the provi nces he governed nor in a role
for Ki ng Hussei n of the far-off Hej az i n their affai rs.
Th e most f amous author of books about Arab l ands of her day,
Gert rude Bell, had come up to Baghdad with the Army of the Ti gri s
and served as Wilson's assi stant. She at fi rst empl oyed her great
presti ge and extensi ve network of fami l y and social fri endshi ps to
back up hi s policy. Not much of a political thinker, she was gi ven to
ent husi asms and, at the t i me, was enthusi asti c about Wilson's vi ews.
In February 1918 she wrote to her ol d friend Charl es Hardi nge,
Permanent Under- Secret ary of the Forei gn Office, that "amazi ng
stri des have been made t owards ordered government . . . There' s no
i mportant el ement agai nst us . . . Th e stronger the hold we are abl e
to keep here the better the i nhabi tants will be pl eased. What they
dread i s any half measure . . . " She concl uded that no one i n Baghdad
or Bas ra coul d conceive of an i ndependent Arab gove r nme nt .
3 6
Thi s was a far cry from the procl amat i on drafted by Si r Mark
Sykes on the l i berati on of Baghdad, calling for a renai ssance of the
Ar ab nation, such as was proposed by the Emi r of Mecca i n the
Hus s ei n- McMahon correspondence, and hinting that Hus s ei n woul d
become the leader of the Arab nati on.
El sewhere, too, Sykes' s alliance pol i ti cs were modi fi ed as Bri ti sh
officials moved away f rom their wart i me ent husi asm for the rul er of
Mecca. While Sykes conti nued to champi on Hussei n' s cause, Bri ti sh
officials noted the deteri orati on of the Ki ng' s position vis-d-vis his
rival, Abdul Azi z I bn Saud, l ord of the Arabi an district of Ne j d,
whom Indi a had backed all al ong. Sykes had recei ved a hint of this
deteri orati on when he visited the Hej az i n the spri ng of 1917; Hussei n
had been surpri si ngl y conciliatory i n agreei ng to cooperat e with
Bri tai n i n Mes opot ami a and even with France i n Syri a, addi ng "but
we do ask that Great Bri tai n will hel p us with Ibn Sa ud. "
3 7
*
One of the great failures of Kitchener and his colleagues in the intelligence field
had been their ignorance of the spectacular revival of the puritanical Wahhabi sect in
Arabia which had begun under the sponsorship of Ibn Saud, and, in late 1912, gave
birth to a warrior brotherhood: the fierce Ikhwan. Minutes of a Cabinet War
Committee meeting on 16 December 1915, to hear testimony from Sir Mark Sykes
on the Arab question, show Lord Kitchener asking, "Wahabism, does that still
exist?" and Sykes answering, "I think it is a dying fi re. "
3 8
Two years laterand a full five years after the Wahhabi warrior brotherhood
began to formGilbert Clayton for the first time reported to Sykes that "we have
indications of considerable revivalist movement on Wahhabi lines in Central Arabia,
such as has in the past occurred when the prestige of Islam has fallen low. We are
not yet in a position to appreciate the strength of this movement," but conditions
"conduce to fostering it. Thi s question is engaging our serious attention here . . . it
may modify the whole situation considerably.
In January 1918 Ki ng Hussei n tol d an Arab Bureau officer, Maj or
Ki nahan Cornwal l i s, that he was thi nki ng of procl ai mi ng himself
Cal i ph. Thr e e years earlier this had been Lo r d Ki t chener' s pl an,
prompt ed by memoranda f rom Cl ayt on and St orrs , and had been
champi oned by the officers who later f ormed the Arab Bureau (see
Chapt er 22) .
By January 1918, however, the Ar ab Bureau, which now held
Hussei n in low esteem, had come around to the opposi t e view.
Cornwal l i s, at t empt i ng to di scourage Hussei n, poi nted out to hi m
that seri ous probl ems woul d ari se i f he at t empt ed to as s ume the
cal i phate. On receipt of Cornwal l i s' s news, the Hi gh Commi ssi oner,
Si r Regi nal d Wi ngate, sent off a di spat ch to the Forei gn Office
sayi ng that he hoped for an opport uni t y of "checking premat ure or
i l l -consi dered action" by Hus s e i n.
4 0
Thi s was the s ame General
Wi ngate who on 17 November 1915 had i nduced an Arab rel i gi ous
leader to tell Hussei n that he was "the right man to take over his
rightful heri tage and verify the hopes of his peopl et he
Mohamme dans and Arabs to recover their stolen Khal i f at e" and
calling upon the Hashemi t e l eader to establ i sh "the Hashemi t e
Arabi an Khal i f at e. "
4 1
Ki t chener' s followers found i t i nconveni ent to remember that once
they and their chief had encouraged Hussei n to cl ai m the cal i phate;
erasi ng it from their mi nds , they woul d later i gnore it in their books
and edit it out of official document s. In memoi rs publ i shed three
decades later, Si r Ronal d St orrs del eted the cal i phate section from
Ki t chener' s historic cabl e i n 1914 t o Hussei n. T. E. Lawrence wrote
that Ki t chener and his followers had bel i eved i n Arab nati onal i sm
from the begi nni ngwhen in fact they di d not believe in it at all.
The y bel i eved i nstead i n the potency of the cal i phate; that Hussei n
coul d capt ure i t for t hem; and that i n the Eas t nati onal i sm was
nothi ng while religion was everythi ng. *
Indeed, in 1918 politics and the desi re to rewrite history both
di ctated a shift in emphas i s : Fei sal , not Hussei n, began to emerge as
Cai ro' s preferred Arab l eader, for Fei sal showed a di sposi ti on, lacking
i n his father, to accept Bri ti sh counsel and gui dance.
By the aut umn of 1918, the armi es commanded by Hussei n' s sons
were reckoned by Bri ti sh sources to total only a few t housand trai ned
troops. In publ i c the Bri ti sh cl ai med that vast numbers of Arabs had
flocked to the st andard of the Hejazi pri nces; in pri vate they had a
If their purpose had been to raise a nationalist revolt, they would not have
sought out Hussein, the Turkish-appointed guardian of the Holy Places, who
employed Turki sh troops to quell Arab discontent. They would have sought out a
nationalist warlord. That indeed is the way Lawrence later told the story in his book -
Seven Pillars of Wisdom, portraying Feisal, rather than his father, as such a leader.
different story to tell. Secret Bri ti sh government document s filed in
1919 admi t that "The fol l owi ngs quot ed duri ng the war were grossl y
exaggerat ed. "
4 2
A report f rom the Bri ti sh Agency in Je ddah in 1919
pi ctured Ki ng Hussei n as militarily i nconsequenti al : his following
was esti mated at only 1,000 regul ars, 2, 500 i rregul ars, and possi bl y
several t housand more f rom Bedoui n tri bes, and their fighting qual -
ities were rated as "poor. " Accordi ng to the report, Ki ng Hussei n
"i ndul ged in wild dreams of conquest , " but the wi thdrawal of
Bri ti sh support woul d leave hi m "at the mercy of I bn Sa ud and the
ri si ng wave of WAHHABI SM. "
4 3
An Arab Bureau report on the Hej az revolt i n 1918 stated that
"The real i mport ance of this revolt has only made itself felt in the
course of the last few mont hs and it is spreadi ng from day to day. At
the same ti me i t mus t be sai d that 90% of the Sheri f' s t roops are
nothi ng more than robbers . . . " Accordi ng t o the report, Arabs rose
up agai nst the Tur ks only when Bri ti sh forces had al ready arri ved, so
that "In a word, the extent of the Sheri f' s revolt depends entirely on
the ability of the Bri ti sh to advanc e . "
4 4
Col onel Mei nert zhagen, the
head of Al l enby' s intelligence, wrote that "It is safe to say that
Lawrence' s Desert Campai gn had not the slightest effect on the mai n
theatre west of J o r d a n . "
4 5
But others di sagreed. Sykes, conti nui ng to stand by the alliance
with Hussei n and bel i evi ng that Fei sal and his brothers were maki ng
a significant contri buti on to the war effort, argued that in Arabi a and
el sewhere, by 1918 the Hej az revolt was occupyi ng the attention of
38, 000 Ot t oman t r o o ps .
4 6
Th e memoi rs of the enemy commander,
Li man von Sanders , show that i n 1918 when his armi es turned to
f l ee, they found themsel ves pai nful l y harassed by Arab Be doui ns .
4 7
Th e tone of Gi l bert Cl ayton' s memoranda show that he bel i eved
Fei sal and Lawrence were accompl i shi ng i mportant objecti ves on
Allenby's right fl ank. Other evi dence, too, suggest s that the Arab
forces i n Trans j ordan succeeded i n s preadi ng di sorder i n Turki s h-
held areas.
Mi red in politics then and ever si nce, the questi on of how much
Fei sal contri buted to the Allied success remai ns unresol ved; at the
ti me i t rai sed the quest i on of whether Bri tai n shoul d back Hussei n
and Fei sal agai nst i ndi genous Syri an Arab l eadershi p, and whether
Bri tai n shoul d support Fei sal agai nst Hussei n.
Within the Sherifian c amp there were strai ns, as Fei sal , physi cal l y
cut off f rom the Hej az and his fami l y, moved into the Bri ti sh orbi t.
In cabl es that the Bri ti sh military authori ti es secretly i ntercepted and
read, Hussei n compl ai ned that "they have turned my son agai nst me
to live under other countries, who is rebellions & di shonest to his
Fat her [original e mphas i s ] . "
4 8
He compl ai ned that "Li vi ng under the
orders of a di sobedi ent son and a traitor has burdened my shoul der
with this mi sery. " He threatened that "If Fei sal still persi sts i n
destroyi ng his good fortune his nation and his honour" i t woul d be
necessary to appoi nt a war council in his pl a c e .
4 9
Meanwhi l e, accord-
ing t o Arab Bureau report s f rom Cai ro, Syri an spokesmen i ndi cated
that they woul d be willing to accept Fei sal as their consti tuti onal
monarch, but only in his own right, and not if he acted as deput y or
representati ve of Hus s e i n.
5 0
VI
Al t hough Bri ti sh l eaders f rom 1914 onward had prof essed faith i n
the l eadershi p of Hussei n within the Ar ab worl d, i n 1917 and 1918
they felt dri ven to reassess the val i di ty of that belief.
As Bri tai n moved to compl et e her conquest of the Arabi c- speaki ng
world of the Mi ddl e Eas t , Bri ti sh officials began to worry about the
local opposi t i on that they mi ght encounter. Cl ayton' s endeavors,
begi nni ng in 1914, to arri ve at an underst andi ng with separati st
l eaders from Baghdad and Damas c us had f oundered on their objecti on
to bei ng rul ed by non- Mosl ems. Now that Damas c us was on Britain's
line of march the quest i on was how Damas cenes coul d be won over
to the Al l i ed cause and to the Al l i ed scheme for the future of the
Mi ddl e Eas t . That Fei sal had agreed t o the Al l i ed program mi ght
carry no wei ght with t hem.
In the s ummer of 1918 William Or ms by- Gor e told the Zi oni st
Political Commi t t ee i n London that "The Syri an 'Intelligentzia' law-
yers and t raders consti tuted the most difficult and thorny probl em
of the Near Eas t . The y had no civilisation of their own, and they had
absorbed all the vices of the Le vant . "
5 1
Si r Mark Sykes seems to have started worryi ng about the Syri an
probl em the year before in the context of pl edges he i ntended Bri tai n
to keep to her al l i esand her allies to keep to her. Hi s concern was
that Syri ans mi ght not accept the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement and the
terms outl i ned by Si r Henry McMahon to the Sheri f Hussei n. In
1917 he asked the Ar ab Bureau to set up a meeti ng for hi m with
Syri an Arabs l eaders in Cai ro, apparentl y in order to arri ve at an
agreement with t hem that woul d be consi stent with the secret accords
with France and with the Hej azaccords whose exi stence, however,
he coul d not reveal to t hem. He cl ai med he had succeeded; in his
own hand he noted that "The mai n difficulty was to manoeuvre the
del egates into aski ng for what we were prepared to gi ve them, with-
out letting t hem know that any preci se geographi cal agreement had
been come t o . "
5 2
Th e "preci se geographi cal agreement" must have
meant the Damas c us - Homs - Hama- Al e ppo line that was to be the
westward frontier of Arab i ndependence i n Syri a under the agree-
ment with al - Faruqi in 1915 and with France in 1916.
But reports arri ved f rom vari ous quart ers that the Ot t oman govern-
ment mi ght be pl anni ng t o pre- empt Ar ab nati onal i sm by grant i ng
aut onomy to Syri a i mmedi atel y. That woul d leave Bri tai n i n the
awkward posi ti on of sponsori ng the cl ai ms of Ki ng Hussei n as agai nst
an i ndi genous Arabi c l eadershi p i n Damas c us that threatened to be
far more popul ar i n the Syri an provi nces.
Towar d the end of 1917 Sykes cabl ed Cl ayt on: "I am anxi ous
about Arab movement . Let t ers i ndi cate difficulty of combi ni ng
Meccan Patri archal i sm with Syri an Ur ban intelligensia. " Qui ck as
al ways to invent a new expedi ent, Sykes proposed to create an Arab
executi ve commi t t ee to promot e uni ty. Cl ayton mus t have sai d i t
coul d not be done, for Sykes res ponded: "Agree as to difficulty but
mi l i tary success shoul d make this easi er. " Sykes sai d that Picot
shoul d be persuaded to reassure the Syri ans that France was i n favor
of their eventual i ndependence. Th e s ame argument s were to be used
on Pi cot on behalf of the Arabs that had been used on hi m on behalf
of Zi oni s m: that it was better to gi ve up somet hi ng in the far-off
Mi ddl e Eas t than to risk l osi ng the war, and with it a chance to
regai n Al sace and Lorrai neprovi nces closer t o ho me .
5 3
Sykes was argui ng that Bri tai n coul d honor all pl edges, and ac-
commodat e the Syri ans as well, if only reasonabl e concessi ons were
made all around. Cl ayt on, as al ways, pi ctured Bri tai n' s warti me
commi t ment s as embarras s ment s to be shed, and repl i ed to Sykes
that "There is no doubt a very real fear amongst Syri ans of finding
themsel ves under a Government in which patri archal i sm of Mecca is
predomi nant . The y realize that reacti onary pri nci pl es f rom whi ch
Sheri f of Mecca cannot break loose are i ncompati bl e with progress
on modern l i nes. " Proposi ng to move away from the alliance with
Hussei n, he sai d that Fei sal as an i ndi vi dual mi ght be accept abl e as
head of a Syri an confederati on, but only with a spi ri tual , not a
political, role for his father. No such pl an, however, and no com-
mi ttee or announcement or propaganda woul d be of any effect,
Cl ayton conti nued, i f the basi c probl em were not addressed. And
that probl em, he hinted ( t hough he di d not put it in these words ) ,
was posed by the pl edges Sykes had made to the French and to the
Zi oni sts. As agai nst the probabl e Tur ki s h maneuver of setti ng up an
aut onomous Syri an government , nothi ng woul d be of any avail, he
argued, because of the general fear in the Arabi c- speaki ng world that
Bri tai n pl anned to turn Syri a over to France. Thi s was compounded,
he cl ai med, by the publ i c pl edge just made to Zi oni sm. Th e only
solution was to obtai n from France a clear publ i c announcement
denyi ng that she i ntended to annex any part of S y r i a .
5 4
Anot her approach was urged by Os mond Wal rond, a former mem-
ber of Lo r d Mi l ner' s staff who knew Egypt f rom before the war and
who had come out to serve i n the Ar ab Bureau i n Cai ro. As Wal rond
saw it, Bri tai n was negl ecti ng the Arab secret societies, and accord-
ingly he set out to cultivate their s upport . Wal rond wrote to Cl ayton
in the s ummer of 1918 to descri be his conversati ons with members of
these soci eti es. He sai d that he had asked t hem to elect a smal l
commi t t ee to represent t hem so that he coul d deal with t hem. The y
had elected a commi t t ee of seven me mbe r s .
5 5
Apparent l y Wal rond' s
intention was to repeat Sykes' s maneuver of the year before with
another group of Cai ro Arabs suspi ci ous of Hus s ei n: arrange for
t hem to accept a statement of Bri tai n' s pl ans for the Mi ddl e East
so that they, like Hussei n, woul d be tied into acceptance of those
pl ans.
In mi d- 1918 Si r Mark Sykes accordi ngl y addressed a decl arati on
of Bri ti sh i ntenti ons to Wal rond' s commi t t ee of seven Syri ans in
answer to quest i ons ostensi bl y rai sed by t hem. It was an official
decl arati on, approved by Sykes' s superi ors at the Forei gn Office, but
di d not break new ground. Li ke so much that came from the pen of
Si r Mark Sykes, i t restated the s ame intentions for the post war
Mi ddl e Eas t but i n different words. Out si de the Arabi an peni nsul a,
the Arab worl d was to fall under varyi ng degrees of European influ-
ence or control . In effect, Sykes' s Decl arat i on to the Sevenl at er to
be a subject of much cont roversyrecogni zed compl et e Arab inde-
pendence only within the Arabi an peni nsul a, for it offered such
recogni ti on only to areas that had been i ndependent before the war
or that had been l i berated by the Arabs by themsel ves as of the date
of the decl arati on.
Sykes coul d go no further i n assuagi ng Arab suspi ci ons of French
intentions i n Syri a and Le banon wi thout securi ng France' s coopera-
tion in i ssui ng a joint pl edge. In the aut umn of 1918 the French
government was finally persuaded to join the Bri ti sh Forei gn Office
in i ssui ng a new statement of Allied intentions desi gned to allay Arab
f ears and Ameri can suspi ci ons. Th e Angl o- French decl arati on of
8 November 1918 was broadl y phrased to suggest full support for the
creati on of i ndi genous government s i n the Mi ddl e Eas t ; but i t was
desi gned to mi sl ead, for, on French insistence, it di d not refer
specifically to Arab "i ndependence. "
5 6
French officials seemed as
unlikely as their Bri ti sh count erpart s to follow the idealistic pat h that
Si r Mark Sykeswi t h an eye t oward accommodat i ng the views of
Wilson and the Ameri cans had marked out for t hem.
37
THE BATTLE FOR SYRIA
i
As the s ummer of 1918 drew to a cl ose, Si r Edmund Al l enby gave
the order to advance on Syri a, and foresaw that Li man von Sanders
woul d expect hi m to repeat the strategy he had empl oyed i n southern
Pal esti ne. In the Jerus al em campai gn, Al l enby had feinted at the
coast but l unged eastward to deliver his attack in the interior. In
attacki ng northern Pal esti ne, he therefore di d exactly the reverse: he
feinted i nl and, while l aunchi ng his mai n attack al ong the coast. Hi s
purpos e was to achi eve overwhel mi ng local numeri cal superi ori ty
al ong the coast so as to break t hrough the Turki s h lines at the most
favorabl e poi nt for his Aust ral i an and New Zeal and ( ANZAC) caval ry.
Al t hough he held an overall two-to-one advant age in effectives
( 69, 000 agai nst 36, 000, accordi ng to hi s est i mat es) , he bol dl y left
much of his roughl y 65-mi l e-l ong line undefended in order to con-
centrate the maxi mum number of t roops on the coast; he relied on
control of the air and on brilliantly effective intelligence operat i ons to
keep the enemy away from the gaps in his own defensi ve line.
By night the bul k of Al l enby' s forces silently moved west to
concentrate in the olive and ci trus groves of the lightly defended
coastal pl ai n, where they were camouf l aged and remai ned undetected.
By day smal l uni ts marched east, and then returned to march east
over and over agai n, rai si ng great cl ouds of dust which pers uaded the
Tur ks that a vast army was on the march to attack i nl and. In the
east, too, smal l Bri ti sh uni ts threw up what appeared to be l arge
camps , stabl ed with what appeared to be horses. Eas t of the Jor dan,
Bri ti sh agents al l owed it to be di scovered that they were bargai ni ng
for l arge quanti ti es of forage.
Decei ved, Li man von Sanders concentrated his forces i nl and i n
eastern Pal esti ne, and when the attack came his armi es were caught
off bal ance. So effective was Al l enby' s offensive that it was not until
days after i t had begun that the Ot t oman commanders came to
appreci ate the real si tuati on.
332
T H E B A T T L E F O R S Y R I A 333
At 4:30 in the morni ng of 19 Sept ember 1918 nearly 400 Bri ti sh
cannon suddenl y opened f i re on the surpri sed and out numbered
( 45, 000 agai nst 8, 000) Ot t oman def enders of the coastal pl ai n. Fi fteen
mi nut es later the infantry attack commenced. Bri ti sh, French, and
Indi an t roops pus hed the overwhel med def enders asi de, as the caval ry
poured through the gapi ng hole i n the Ot t oman lines to win the
battle of Megi ddot he "Armageddon" of the Bi bl e.
At dawn, speci al bomber s quadrons of the Royal Ai r Force attacked
tel ephone and tel egraph exchanges behi nd enemy lines, effectively
cutti ng off all communi cat i ons. Other R. A. F . warpl anes guarded the
ski es over enemy ai rport s, keepi ng Ge r man reconnai ssance pl anes on
the ground. Li ma n and his fi el d commanders were cut off from
i nformati on and f rom one another.
As Ot t oman uni ts reeled backward, they found their lines of
retreat bl ocked by Bri ti sh uni ts whi ch had raced before and behi nd
t hem t o secure control of the key roads . Th e ANZ AC caval ry gal -
l oped northward for thirty mi l es al ong the coastal pl ai n, but then cut
i nl and, threateni ng to cut off the Ot t oman line of retreat toward
Damas c us . Bri ti sh mi l i tary aircraft bombe d and strafed the retreati ng
Tur ks . Meanwhi l e the few uni ts Al l enby had depl oyed i n the east
fi nal l y attacked i nl and. In the predawn darkness of 23 Sept ember
battal i ons of the Jewi sh Legi on sei zed control of the crucial Umm
esh Shert ford across the Jor dan river. Th e Second Aust ral i an Li ght
Hors e Bri gade went across it, and by eveni ng the Ot t oman forces
east of the river found themsel ves envel oped in a gi ant pi ncer.
At Ma' an, i n the sout h of Trans j ordan, above Aqaba, the Turki s h
garri son whi ch had been besei ged by Fei sal ' s forces ever si nce their
arrival f rom Aqaba the year before, held out until Aust ral i an caval ry
arri ved to accept their surrender and protect them agai nst the mas-
sacre threatened by the Arab besi egers. Furt her north, Fei sal ' s Camel
Corps di srupt ed the rai l road lines upon which the mai n Turki s h
forces depended.
On 25 Sept ember Al l enby ordered an advance on Damas c us , while
the remnant of the Ot t oman forces broke and fl ed.
1
Th e occupati on
of the pri nci pal towns of the Syri an provi nces was i mmi nent ; de-
ci si ons about occupati on policy were made rapi dl y. The r e i s still
controversy as to who made t hem and why.
I I
In the s ummer Al l enby had told London that, subject to his own
s upreme military authori ty, he woul d accept French advi sers to deal
with civil admi ni st rat i on in areas of speci al interest to France, so
long as London woul d tell hi m what areas these were and whether
they were still defined by the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement .
2
Al t hough
the Cabi net and its East ern Commi t t ee strongl y favored di scardi ng
the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement , the Forei gn Office reaffirmed the agree-
ment by di recti ng Al l enby to follow its territorial outl i nes. Le o
Amery, of the War Cabi net secretari at, bitterly bl amed the political
chiefs of the Forei gn Of f i ceBal f our and Ceci l f or t hi s .
3
Amery' s
col l eague, Si r Mark Sykes, however, was the Forei gn Office official
directly responsi bl e for policy i n Syri a and, presumabl y, the person
who made or recommended the deci si on i n the first i nstance.
On 25 Sept ember the War Office i nstructed Wi ngate i n Cai ro and
Al l enby at headquart ers that if Syri a were to fall within the sphere of
any European power, that power was t o be Fr a nc e .
4
Th e t erms of
that i nstructi on left open the possi bi l i ty that it mi ght not fall within
the sphere of a European powert hat Fei sal mi ght achi eve his
i ndependence. However, Al l enby was i nstructed to empl oy French
officers for all areas of civil (as di sti nct f rom mi l i tary) admi ni st rat i on.
Accordi ng to the War Office cabl es, if Al l enby were to take
Damas c us , "it woul d be desi rabl e that i n conformi ty with Angl o-
French agreement of 1916 he shoul d if possi bl e work t hrough an
Arab admi ni strati on by means of a French l i ai son. "
5
Fl ags were to i ndi cate the desi gnat ed areas of t emporary admi ni s-
trati on. Th e hoi sti ng of Hussei n' s f l ag over Damas c us and other
i mport ant Syri an cities once they were capt ured was authori zed, and
i ndeed ordered, by the Forei gn Of f i ce.
6
The f l ag was the bl ack,
white, green, and red one that Sykes had desi gned (see page 315)
and it served two political purpos es : it boost ed Hussei n' s cl ai m to
l eadershi p i n Arab Syr i a, * and i t remi nded France that i nl and Syri a
was desi gnated for at least nomi nal Arab i ndependence.
At a conference in the Pal esti ni an town of Jeni n on 25 Sept ember,
Al l enby approved the pl ans of Aust ral i an General Harry Chauvel
who was i n charge of the operat i onf or the advance on Damas c us .
Chauvel , accordi ng to his later notes, rai sed the i ssue of occupati on
policy. Damas c us , he sai d, was a city of 300, 000 peopl e; it was too
bi g to be handed over to a mi l i tary governor and a mere handful of
assi st ant s. Al l enby repl i ed that Chauvel shoul d retain the Ot t oman
governor and admi ni st rat i on, and s uppl y them with whatever extra
mi l i tary police they mi ght need to keep order. Chauvel asked about
rumors that the Arab movement was to have the government of
Syri a, but Al l enby repl i ed that any deci si on woul d have to wait until
* In early 1918 Gilbert Clayton had written to Sykes that "If Feisal makes good in
a military sense he may well carry Syria with him" but that if he did not, nobody
from Mecca would matter in Syrian politics.
7
The raising of the flag constituted a
symbolic affirmation of Feisal's military success that could pave the way for his
political leadership.
he came to Damas c us himself. He added that, "if Fei sal gi ves you
any t roubl e, deal with hi m t hrough Lawrence who will be your
liaison offi cer. "
8
There was a fl urry of cabl es between London, Pari s, and the
Mi ddl e Eas t . Al t hough Al l enby had told Chauvel to keep the Turkish
admi ni strati on i n Damas c us i n pl ace for the t i me bei ng, the Forei gn
Office told the French government that Al l enby woul d deal with a
provi si onal Arab admi ni strati on in Da ma s c us i n line with the Sykes-
Picot Agreement t hrough a French liaison offi cer.
9
In t urn, the
French government agreed that the Al l i es shoul d recogni ze the Arabs
as a belligerent poweri n other words, as an al l y.
1 0
The s e com-
muni cati ons between Bri tai n and France show that the Forei gn Office
expected Al l enby to repl ace the Tur ki s h admi ni strati on i n Damas c us
with an Ar ab one sooner or later; but that i t believed the Sykes- Pi cot
arrangement s woul d not come into pl ay until then.
Armed with these agreement s, the Forei gn Office got the War
Office to send Al l enby new and i mport ant i nstructi ons, devel opi ng
policy t hemes that had been hi nted at before. Th e Syri an l ands that
Al l enby was i n process of occupyi ng were to be treated as "allied
territory enj oyi ng the st at us of an i ndependent state" rather than as
occupi ed enemy terri tory. It was i n this connecti on that the Forei gn
Office i ssued its much- di scussed di recti ve that "It woul d be desi rabl e
to mark the recogni ti on and establ i shment of native Arab rul e by
some conspi cuous or formal act such as the hoi sti ng and sal uti ng of
the Arab flag at i mport ant cent res . "
1 1
Sykes (if that is who it was) went on in the cabl e to outline a
characteristically i ngeni ous scheme. Th e exi sti ng agreement with
France was that wherever i n the Syri an provi nces Bri tai n establ i shed
a military admi ni st rat i on, France was entitled to have her officers
exercise all civilian admi ni strati on on behal f of the Ai l i es. In the
tel egram of 1 Oct ober, Al l enby was i nstructed to limit his area of
military admi ni strati on to the bare mi ni mum, l i mi ti ng the French
role correspondi ngl y. The Forei gn Office al so told hi m to reduce
Bri ti sh mi l i tary admi ni strati on in Trans j ordan as well, so that the
French coul d not say that Bri tai n' s action i n inland Syri a was part of
a pl ot to reduce France' s role therewhi ch of course it was.
Wi ngate, who had read the cabl es, wrote to Al l enby that "it will be
very i nteresti ng to see how the Sherifian Fl ag and the French liaison
i s taken by all and s undr y. "
1 2
In effect, the Forei gn Office had
i nstructed Al l enby to carry out the formal requi rement s of the
Sykes-Pi cot Agreement , while (as advocat ed by Mark Sykes) revi si ng
the spi ri t of the agreement . Thi s was a solution sati sfactory neither
to the French, who wanted more, nor to Fei sal or the Arab Bureau,
who wanted France to have nothi ng at all.
As requi red by the Sykes-Pi cot Agreement , France was to be gi ven
1
direct control of the coastl i ne. Inl and Syri a was to be i ndependent
not i ndependent i n name only, as envi saged by the agreement but
substanti vel y i ndependent ; but France woul d have her official liaison
officer, as requi red, and later woul d pres umabl y have her official
advi ser at Fei sal ' s court. Syri a' s rul er, as, i ndi cated i n the Mc Mahon
correspondence, woul d be a Has hemi t e. Th e hoi sti ng of Sykes' s fl ag
over Damas c us and the towns of Horns, Hama, and Al eppo thus
woul d symbol i ze the weavi ng together of all the st rands of Bri ti sh
Mi ddl e East ern policy al ong the lines that Sykes had al ways advocat ed.
He had sai d all al ong that he had shaped Bri tai n' s commi t ment s to be
consi stent with one another, and that all woul d fit within the formal
framework of the agreement that he had devi sed.
Meanwhi l e on 29 Sept ember i t was deci ded at General Al l enby' s
fi el d headquart ers that Fei sal ' s Arabs shoul d be the only Al l i ed
troops to enter and occupy Damas c us pr e s umabl y to forestall re-
si stance by a possi bl y hostile Mos l em metropol i s to a Chri sti an
occupati on. * Fei sal was three days away, so i n the meant i me the
ANZ AC caval ry uni ts purs ui ng the f l eei ng Tur ks were i nstructed t o
ri de around, rather than t hrough, Damas c us .
But in the confusi on of advance and retreat, the actors in the
drama of Damas cus ' s liberation di d not follow the scri pt that Al l enby
and Cl ayton had written for t hem. Th e Ot t oman government di d not
remai n in the city; it fled with the retreati ng Turki s h army at about
noon on 30 Sept ember, leaving di sorder behi nd. Local Arab notabl es,
the Emi r Abd el Ka de r and his brother Sai d, descendant s of the
Al geri an warri or who had fought the French a century before and
had been subsi di zed to live i n exile, moved at some poi nt into s ome
sort of control of the city. Th e Abd el Kade r brot hers, whom
Lawrence regarded as personal enemi es and, perhaps, as support ers
of Hussei n and Isl am rather than of Fei sal and nati onal i sm, cl ai med
* Evidence is scanty as to who made the decision and why. A report to the
Foreign Office from Allenby's chief political officer, General Gilbert Clayton,
suggests that Clayton must have feared there would be unrest in the city if the
Australians occupied it, presumably because Damascenes would guess that Britain
intended to turn them over to France. Clayton had expressed fears all along that
Britainby allowing herself to be associated with Francemight excite the hostility
of Syrian Arabs. Clayton later reported to the Foreign Office that "Our permitting
the occupation of Damascus by the Sherifians has allayed some of the suspicions of
French intentions."
1 3
Nobody knows for sure what the quarrel between Lawrence and the Abd el
Kaders was about, though a number of possibilities have been suggested. The Abd
el Kaders may have feared that Hussein was being duped by the British or that
Feisal was under Lawrence's influence; while Lawrence may have considered them
to be pan-Isl am, anti-Christian chauvinists. Or Lawrence may have believed them
to be pro-French or pro-Turk. It has also been suggested that the quarrel was
mainly or entirely personal, and that perhaps the Abd el Kaders were about to reveal
damaging information about Lawrence's personal life.
to have rai sed the Hej az flag on the afternoon of 30 Sept ember in the
name of Hussei n. Th u s when the Arab fl ag was finally hoi sted, i t had
nothi ng to do with the Forei gn Office's pl an; Damas cene Arabs di d
it on their own.
At first light on the morni ng of 1 Oct ober, an Aust ral i an caval ry
bri gade that had been ordered to cut the Ot t oman retreat al ong the
Horns road north of Damas c us , deci ded to go t hrough Damas c us to
reach the Homs road, and entered the ci ty; whereupon Sai d Abd el
Kade r , surrounded by notabl es, officially wel comed t hem. Thus the
honor of bei ng the first Al l i ed t roops to enter Damas c us fell to the
Aust ral i ans, contrary to pl an.
An hour later General Chauvel and his staff joi ned Maj or- General
Si r George Barrow, the local divisional commander, a few mi l es
south of the city. Lawrence was s uppos ed to be stayi ng with Barrow,
and Chauvel wanted to see hi m i n order to start maki ng arrangement s
for preservi ng the exi sti ng civil admi ni st rat i on of the city. To his
chagri n, Chauvel di scovered that Lawrence had sl i pped away early i n
the morni ng, wi thout permi ssi on and without i nformi ng anyone, to
follow the Fi f t h Caval ry Di vi si on into Damas c us . Chauvel borrowed
a car and drove into Damas c us hi msel f to find out what was
happeni ng.
By now the Al l enby- Cl ayt on pl an for Fei sal to l i berate the city
was i n tatters. Fei sal was still days away, while the Bri ti sh and
Aust ral i ans were i n Damas c us , either tryi ng to move t hrough the
streets or hopi ng to fi nd out what was goi ng on. Chauvel , who had
been ordered not to l ead his men into the city, now followed t hem in
i nstead.
T. E. Lawrence, Chauvel ' s A. W. O. L. staff liaison officer, had
taken his favori te bat t ered old Rol l s- Royce armored car that morni ng
and-with a fellow Bri ti sh officer, W. E. Sti rl i ng, and Nuri el - Sa' i d,
an ex- Ot t oman officer who was a chief Fei sal l oyal i sthad dri ven to
the city and found that some of Fei sal ' s tribal allies, who had arrived
earlier, had accepted the Abd el Kade r s as Damas cus ' s governors.
Execut i ng a swift coup d'etat, Nuri ordered the Abd el Kade r s to
wi thdraw and appoi nt ed his own pro- Fei sal candi dat e as governor.
The n an irate General Chauvel arri ved, demandi ng expl anati ons.
Lawrence, maki ng excuses, sai d he had assumed Chauvel wanted
hi m to scout out the si tuati on, and cl ai med that he had been on the
verge of returni ng to tender his report .
When Chauvel then asked Lawrence to bri ng the governor to hi m,
Lawrence present ed Nuri ' s candi dat e, cl ai mi ng that he was the
governor. Chauvel called that nonsense, poi nti ng out that Nuri ' s
candi date was obvi ousl y an Arab, while the Ot t oman governor woul d
have been a Tur k. But Lawrence repl i ed that the Ot t oman governor
had fl ed (whi ch was t rue) , and that the peopl e had el ected Nuri ' s
candi dat e to take his pl ace (which was fal se).
Taki ng Lawrence' s word for it, Chauvel confi rmed the appoi nt-
ment of Nuri ' s pro- Fei sal candi dat e as governor. Accordi ng to
Chauvel ' s own account, he soon l earned that Nuri ' s candi dat e was
support ed by only a smal l pro- Fei sal cl i que, and that the popul ati on
as a whole was di st urbed by the appoi nt ment ; but Chauvel di d not
see how he coul d change the appoi nt ment after havi ng announced it.
However, faced with seri ous di sorders, he marched his Bri ti sh forces
through the city on 2 Oct ober in an at t empt to overawe opposi ti on.
Thi s was exactly what Al l enby and Cl ayt on had hoped to avoi d: the
popul ati on aroused, Chri st i an t roops defiling through the streets of a
great Mos l em city to restore order, and Fei sal ' s Arab t roopswhose
presence was meant to reassure local opi ni onsti l l nowhere i n si ght.
It was not until the morni ng of 3 Oct ober that Lawrence announced
that Fei sal and several hundred followers were about to arri ve, and
asked permi ssi on to st age a' t ri umphal entry into the city for t hem.
Lat er, Chauvel grumbl i ngl y wrote that "Seei ng that he, Fei sal , had
had very little to do with the ' conquest' of Damas c us , the suggest ed
t ri umphal entry di d not appeal to me very much but I thought it
woul d not do harm and gave permi ssi on accordi ngl y. "
1 4
It was arranged for 3:00 that afternoon, but General Al l enby' s
schedul e woul d not allow for it. Al l enby had only a few hours to
spend that afternoon i n Damas c us , and called on Fei sal and Lawrence
to attend hi m at the Hotel Vi ctori a, where he had establ i shed himself.
Al l enby' s visit was prompt ed by Chauvel ' s appoi nt ment of the pro-
Fei sal Arab to the governorshi p whi ch, in turn, acti vated the Sykes-
Picot Agreement and the inter-Allied agreement that Al l enby woul d
deal with an Arab admi ni strati on i n Syri a through the French. Had
Al l enby' s original orders been carri ed out t o retain a Turki s h
governor for the ti me bei ngt hi s compl i cati on woul d have been
post poned, but now i t had to be faced. Al l enby di d not bl ame
Chauvel , but i ndi cated that what he had done had gi ven rise to
compl i cati ons with the French whi ch requi red a meeti ng with Fei sal
i mmedi atel y.
Al l enby, Chauvel , Fei sal , and their respecti ve chiefs of staff were
present at the conference, as were officers of the Bri ti sh mi ssi on to
the Hej az, an officer of the Arab Bureau from Cai ro, and Fei sal ' s
chief commander. Lawrence acted as interpreter.
At the meet i ng the Bri ti sh commander spel l ed out i n specific detail
for the Arabi an pri nce the arrangement s that had been agreed upon
by Bri tai n and France, and assert ed his determi nati on to enforce
t hem until and unl ess they were modi fi ed at the Peace Conf erence.
The t erms were exactly those that Si r Mark Sykes and the Forei gn
Office had i nstructed hi m to uphol d. Any hopes that Lawrence may
have entertai ned, or i nspi red i n Fei sal , that Cl ayt on and Al l enby
woul d help t hem conni ve at subvert i ng the Forei gn Office's policy
were dashed that afternoon. Fei sal ' s bitter di sappoi nt ment was not
that the Arab confederati on woul d not i ncl ude Pal esti nehe said he
accepted t hat but that i t di d not i ncl ude the Lebanon (that i s to
say, the Le banon, or "white," Mount ai ns ) , and that Syri a was not to
be free of French control .
Accordi ng to Chauvel ' s mi nut es of the meeti ng, Al l enby (referred
to as "the Chi ef") plainly told Fei sal :
(a) That France was to be the Protecti ng Power over Syri a.
( b) That he, Fei sal , as representi ng his Fat her, Ki ng Hussei n,
was to have the Admi ni st rat i on of Syri a (less Pal esti ne and
the Le banon Provi nce) under French gui dance and f i nanci al
backi ng.
(c) That the Arab sphere woul d i ncl ude the hi nterl and of Syri a
only and that he, Fei sal , woul d not have anythi ng to do
with the Le banon.
( d) That he was to have a French Li ai s on Officer at once, who
woul d work for the present with Lawrence, who woul d be
expected to gi ve hi m every assi st ance.
Fei sal objected very strongl y. He sai d that he knew nothi ng
of France in the mat t er; that he was prepared to have Bri ti sh
Assi st ance; that he underst ood f rom the Advi ser whom Al l enby
had sent hi m that the Arabs were to have the whole of Syri a
i ncl udi ng the Le banon but excl udi ng Pal esti ne; that a Count ry
without a Port was no good to hi m; and that he decl i ned to
have a French Li ai s on Officer or to recogni se French gui dance
in any way.
Th e Chi ef turned t o Lawrence and sai d: "But di d you not
tell hi m that the French were to have the Protectorate over
Syri a?" Lawrence s ai d: "No, Si r, I know nothi ng about it."
Th e Chi ef then sai d: "But you knew definitely that he, Fei sal ,
was to have nothi ng to do with the Lebanon. " Lawrence sai d:
"No, Si r, I di d not. "
After s ome further di scussi on, the Chief told Fei sal that he,
Si r Edmund Al l enby, was Commander- i n- Chi ef and that he,
Fei sal , was at the moment a Li eut . - General under his command
and that he woul d have to obey orders. That he must accept the
si tuati on until the whole matter was settled at the concl usi on of
the War. Fei sal accepted this deci si on and left with his en-
t ourage, except La wr e nc e .
1 5
Nei ther Fei sal nor Lawrence had been candi d with the pl ai n-
spoken Al l enby. Th e t erms outl i ned to them were those of the
Sykes-Pi cot Agreement , with which all of t hem were well acquai nt ed.
What Fei sal meant i n denyi ng knowl edge of those t erms ( Lawrence
expl ai ned later in London) was that he had not been i nformed of
t hem officially. For himself, Lawrence had not even that excuse;
he had si mpl y lied.*
As Fei sal left the meeti ng, Lawrence told Al l enby that he was
unwilling to serve al ongsi de a French advi ser to Fei sal . Lawrence
sai d that he had accumul at ed s ome l eave ti me and woul d like to take
it i mmedi atel y and return to Bri tai n. Al l enby agreed. By all indi-
cati ons, he was not at all angry with Lawrence; far from it, for he
encouraged Lawrence to go to London to argue his case to the
Forei gn Office in person.
Fei sal , havi ng wi thdrawn f rom the meeti ng, returned to l ead his
tardy and compromi sed t ri umphal entry into Damas c us , ri di ng at the
head of between 300 and 600 mount ed men. Perhaps with encour-
agement from Lawrence (who later deni ed i t), Fei sal then sent a
commando force of a hundred of his followers to Bei rut, which they
entered unopposed and where they rai sed the Arab flag of the Hej az
on 5 Oct ober. Th e following day the al armed French sent warshi ps
into Bei rut harbor and l anded a smal l conti ngent of t roops. On 8
October Indi an troops of Al l enby' s Egypt i an Expedi t i onary Force
entered the city. Al l enby took command of the si tuati on by orderi ng
Fei sal ' s force to lower the Arab flag and wi thdraw; when they di d so,
the French were left i n control . Lat er Francoi s Georges Picot arri ved
to act as France' s civil and political representati ve in the area, subject
to the s upreme authori ty of Al l enby as commander-i n-chi ef.
Cl ayton advi sed Fei sal to rein back his followers i n Le banon; on
11 Oct ober, he wrote to Wi ngate that "I have told Fei sal . . . that he
will only prej udi ce his case before the Peace Conference if he tries to
grab . . . It i s not an easy probl em. I hope that with a certain amount
of gi ve & take on both si des a modus vivendi will be reached . . . "
1 7
The French armed forces i n Bei rut i n fact proved too weak to
affect the full annexati oni st program that the colonialist party in
France desi red, and French agents therefore pursued a fall-back
posi ti on to provi de for the possi bi l i ty that their claim to the whole of
Syri a mi ght fail. * Th e pl an, concei ved by French officers i n the
field, was to carve out of Syri a an i ndependent state that woul d
i ncl ude not only the Chri sti an areas of Mount Lebanon but also a
l arge area of predomi nant l y Mos l em terri tori es, and which was to be
rul ed by Maroni t e Chri st i ans under French s pons or s hi p.
1 9
Activities
* In Chapter 101 of Seven Pillars of Wisdom, he admitted that he had known of
the agreement and that "Fortunately, I had earlier betrayed the treaty's existence to
Feisal . . . "
** Some of the French troops were Armenian refugees who had been conscripted.
Others were native troops from North Africa. The entire force has been described as
"only 3,000 Armenians, 3,000 Africans 'and 800 Frenchmen who had been promised
that they would not have to fight.' "
1 8
on behalf of this pl an further contri buted to the fragmentati on of
political life that had al ready begun to cause unrest behi nd Al l i ed
lines.
Beneath the surface of Al l enby' s orderl y arrangement s of the chai n
of command, f euds, i ntri gues, and facti onal i sm seethed in the wake
of the di sappearance of Ot t oman authori ty. Bedoui ns cl ashed with
city dwel l ers. Former enemi es moved to take over Fei sal ' s movement
from within. Obs cure quarrel s were settled i n dark pl aces. In
Damas c us , Emi r Abd el Kade r was shot and killed by pro- Fei sal
pol i ce, supposedl y while tryi ng to escape when they came to arrest
hi m.
Th e natural envi ronment was even more out of control. Th e
Bri ti sh caval ry had been afflicted by mal ari a as it passed t hrough
Turki sh- hel d territories where sani tati on had been negl ected; after a
fortnight of i ncubati on, the di sease struck down whole regi ment s as
the conquest of the Syri an provi nces was bei ng compl et ed. Mal ari a
was followed by influenza that proved to be not just debi l i tati ng but
massi vel y fatal.
Ill
Al l enbyf rom his headquart ers in the Mi ddl e Eas t ar r ange d a
warm recepti on for Col onel Lawrence i n London as he arri ved to
pl ead the case agai nst France. At the end of Oct ober, Lawrence
appeared before the East ern Commi t t ee of the Cabi net and reported
that Picot propos ed to i mpose French advi sers on Fei sal , but that
Fei sal cl ai med the right to choose whatever advi sers he wanted.
Moreover, he wanted either Bri ti sh oroddl y, in view of the enmi ti es
that devel oped l at erAmeri can Zi oni st Jewi sh advi s e r s .
2 0
Fei sal , accordi ng to Lawrence, relied on the provi si ons of the
Decl arat i on to the Seven, the document i n which Si r Mark Sykes
outl i ned Al l i ed intentions to anti -Fei sal Syri an emi gre l eaders i n
Cai ro. In Fei sal ' s name, Lawrence mi sconst rued the decl arati on,
cl ai mi ng that it promi sed i ndependence to the Arabs in any area they
l i berated t hemsel ves. ( I n context, it is clear that the decl arati on
promi sed i ndependence only i n areas that had al ready been l i berated
by Arabs as of the date of the decl arati on in June 1918; areas in
Ot t oman hands as of that date were pl aced in a separat e cat egory. )
Fei sal himself mi sconst rued the decl arati on even further; reportedl y,
he cl ai med to have an agreement with the Bri ti sh and French accord-
ing to which the first one to arri ve at any city won the right to govern
i t .
2 1
Lawrence began to mai ntai n that Fei sal ' s troops i n fact had been
the first to enter Damas c us , decl ari ng that 4, 000 tri besmen associ ated
with Fei sal ' s cause had sl i pped into the city duri ng the night of 30
September 1 October and thus had been the first Al l i ed t roops to
arri ve. But there was first-hand evi dence that the 4, 000 t ri besmen
were entirely i magi nary. Nobody saw them there; and nobody saw
them enter or l eaveeven t hough they woul d have had to pass
t hrough Bri ti sh lines t o do s o .
2 2
In the East ern Commi t t ee and i n the Cabi net , Lawrence nonethe-
less f ound a sympat het i c audi ence for his pl ea that French influence
or control shoul d not be i ntroduced into the Mosl em Arabi c- speaki ng
Mi ddl e Eas t . He al so f ound i mport ant allies i n the press.
At the end of November 1918, The Times publ i shed several anony-
mous articles, written by Lawrence, provi di ng a much exaggerat ed
account of what had been accompl i shed by Fei sal ' s forces and stati ng
that the account came from an eyewi tness correspondent . Lawrence' s
versi on of the facts began to be ci rcul ated in other peri odi cal s as
well, much to the annoyance of the Austral i an t roops i n Syri a. Th e
official "pool" news correspondent of the London newspapers with
Al l enby' s Egypt i an Expedi t i onary Force wrote that "An article was
pri nted i n an official paper ci rcul ated among the troops that the Arab
Army was first i n Damas c us . Th e credi t of wi nni ng Damas c us and
bei ng the fi rst i n the city bel ongs to the Austral i an Li ght Hors e, and
General Chauvel was qui ck to have the error recti fi ed. "
2 3
For personal as well as political reasons, Lawrence conti nued to
mai ntai n the pretense that Fei sal ' s forces had l i berated Damas c us ;
and so great was his artistry that he succeeded in i nsi nuati ng at least
some of his versi on into the historical record. Yet he mus t have
known that sooner or later his fraudul ent cl ai m woul d be exposed for
what i t was. In the 1920s, when the poet and novelist Robert Graves ,
a friend who was wri ti ng a bi ography of Lawrence, proposed to
base his account of the liberation of Damas c us on that suppl i ed by
Lawrence in his Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence cauti oned hi m:
"I was on thin ice when I wrote the Damas c us chapter and anyone
who copi es me will be through it, if he is not careful . S. P. [Seven
Pillars] is full of half-truth he r e . "
2 4
IV
Lawrence used his versi on of the Damas c us campai gn to attempt to
persuade his government to jettison the Sykes-Pi cot Agreement ,
which al most all officials with whom he spoke wanted to di savow.
Gi l bert Cl ayton had written to Lawrence i n 1917 that t hough Bri tai n
was bound in honor to the agreement , it woul d di e of its own accord
if i gnored: "It is in fact dead and, if we wait qui etl y, this fact will
T H E B A T T L E F O R S Y R I A
343
soon be real i zed. "
2 5
In 1918 Cl ayton told Picot that the agreement no
longer coul d be appl i ed because i t was "completely out of dat e . "
2 6
Th e East ern Commi t t ee hoped t o resci ndrat her than merel y
i gnoret he Sykes- Pi cot Agreement , and had thought that the
Forei gn Office woul d arrange to modi fy or resci nd it in the context
of negoti ati ons with respect to how the occupi ed territories were to
be admi ni st ered. Th e Forei gn Office di d no such thi ng, but took the
position that Bri tai n was absol utel y bound by the agreement unl ess
France agreed to change or cancel it. When Lor d Curzon, the
chai rman of the East ern Commi t t ee, l earned the terms that had been
worked out with France, he observed with some asperi ty that "The
Forei gn Office appeared now to be relying upon the Sykes-Pi cot
Agreement from which the Commi t t ee had hitherto been doi ng their
best to e s c ape . "
2 7
Si r Mark Sykes, who had worked out the terms of the admi ni stra-
tive arrangement s with the French, persi st ed in bel i evi ng that the
Sykes-Pi cot Agreement met current needs. In the spri ng of 1917 he
wrote to Percy Cox, chief political officer of the Bri ti sh admi ni strati on
in Mesopot ami a, that one of its vi rtues was that it was f ramed in
such a way as not to violate the pri nci pl es that Woodrow Wilson's
Ameri ca and the new socialist Rus s i a espoused with respect to
national sel f-determi nati on and nonannexati on. "The i dea of Arab
nati onal i sm may be abs urd, " he wrote, "but our Congres s case will
be good if we can say we are hel pi ng to devel op a race on nationalist
lines under our protecti on. " Hussei n may not gi ve much help i n the
war physi cal l y, he conti nued, but he gi ves moral hel p that France
ought to recogni ze, and "I think French will be ready to co-operate
with us i n a common policy towards the Arab speaki ng peopl e. "
2 8
Davi d Hogart h, head of the Arab Bureau, wrote to Gi l bert Cl ayton
at that ti me that nobody both took the Sykes-Pi cot Agreement
seriously and support ed it, except for Si r Mark Sy ke s .
2 9
Thi s was a
slight exaggerati on, because officials of the Forei gn Office, which
Sykes joi ned, also took the pact seri ousl y, but it was not far from the
truth.
Lo r d Curzon stated that the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement was not only
obsol ete "but absol utel y i mpract i cabl e. "
3 0
As chai rman of the East ern
Commi t t ee, which was in charge of defining Bri ti sh desiderata for
the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t , he made it clear that Bri tai n woul d like the
French out of Syri a al t oget her.
3 1
But a War Office representati ve
told the commi t t ee that the only way to break the agreement was to
operate behi nd "an Arab facade" i n appeal i ng to the Uni t ed St at es to
support Wilson's theori es of sel f - det ermi nat i on.
3 2
Curzon sai d that "When the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement was drawn
up it was, no doubt , i ntended by its authors . . . as a sort of fancy
sketch to sui t a si tuati on that had not then ari sen, and which it was
thought extremel y unlikely woul d ever ari se; that, I s uppos e, must
be the pri nci pal expl anati on of the gros s i gnorance with which the
boundary lines i n that agreement were dr awn. "
3 3
Ll oyd George al so felt that the pact had been superseded by
events, but then, he had been agai nst i t from the start. As was his
wont with his favori tes, he made excuses for Sykes, and rewrote
history to absol ve hi m from bl ame. He wrote, decades later, that
It is i nexpl i cabl e that a man of Si r Mark Sykes' fine intelligence
shoul d ever have appended his si gnat ure to such an arrange-
ment. He was al ways ashamed of it, and he defended his action
i n agreei ng to its t erms by expl ai ni ng that he was acti ng under
definite i nstructi ons recei ved f rom the Forei gn Office. For that
reason he hotly resented the constant and indelible remi nder
that his name was and al ways woul d be associ ated with a pact
with which he had only a nomi nal personal responsi bi l i ty and of
which he thoroughl y di sapproved.
4
In the opi ni on of Ll oyd George, the Sykes-Pi cot Agreement "was a
fatuous arrangement j udged from any and every poi nt of vi ew. "
3 5
Even Sykes himself finally came to agree: on 3 March 1918 he
wrote to Wi ngate and Cl ayton that the agreement had to be aban-
doned because of such events as the Uni t ed St at es' entry into the
war, Woodrow Wilson's Fourt een Poi nts, the Bol shevi k Revol uti on,
and the publ i cati on by the Bol shevi ks of the terms of the Sykes-Pi cot
Agreement to an apparentl y i ndi gnant wor l d.
3 6
On 18 June 1918 he
told the East ern Commi t t ee that, while the Sheri fi ans had no right to
be i ndi gnant about the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement , for he had fully
i nformed Hussei n of its t erms, Bri tai n shoul d ask France to agree
that the agreement no l onger a ppl i e d.
3 7
A mont h later he told the
commi ttee that "The Agreement of 1916 was dead, al though the
French refused to admi t it. What was requi red now was some modi -
fication of, or subst i t ut e for, that Agreement . "
3 8
When the French
refused to agree to modi fy the agreement , however, he went ahead to
negoti ate t erms for the admi ni strati on of occupi ed territories on the
basi s that the agreement therefore remai ned i n force.
On 5 Oct ober 1918 Le o Amery noted i n his di ary: "Tal k with
Sykes about what to do with the Sykes-Pi cot Agreement . He has
evolved a new and mos t i ngeni ous scheme by which the French are
to clear out of the whole Arab regi on except the Lebanon" and i n
return get all of Kurdi s t an and Armeni a "from Adana to Persi a and
the Ca uc a s us . "
3 9
But the French di d not agree.
Pi cki ng up on Fei sal ' s protest to Al l enby "that a Count ry without a
Port was no good to hi m" Sykes expl ored a possi bl e compromi s e i n
which the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement woul d be modi fi ed by transferri ng
one coastal port f rom the area of di rect French control to the area in
which Fei sal woul d serve as rul er. General Al l enby seemed hopeful
about this approach. On 15 December he wrote to his wife that
"Sykes is all for soothi ng the Arabs & gi vi ng t hem a port ; & Picot is
less Chauvi ni st than he was . "
4 0
But nothi ng came of this approach
either.
The French refused to waive any of their rights under the agree-
ment; but there was a chorus of opi ni on f rom Bri ti sh officers servi ng
in the field to the effect that it woul d be di sast rous to at t empt to
enforce its t erms.
Th e followers of the late Lo r d Ki t chener, sayi ng the s ame thi ng
through many voices, as they so often di d, had been argui ng for
some ti me that the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement had to be annul l ed i n
the i nterests of Jewi s h- Arab fri endshi p i n Pal esti ne. Jewi s h- Arab
fri endshi p was a cause i n which Si r Mark Sykes sincerely bel i eved;
whether his col l eagues who rai sed the poi nt shared his belief in it is
doubtful .
Ronal d St orrs , governor of Jerus al em, reported that the Arabs
were ready to accept the Zi oni st program, but only under a Bri ti sh
government for Pal es t i ne.
4 1
Gi l bert Cl ayt on reported that the Arab
and Zi oni st causes were "i nterdependent, " and that both of t hem
coul d be satisfied and woul d cooperat e, but only i f the French coul d
be made to agree that the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement "is no l onger a
practical i ns t rument . "
4 2
C
n a
i
m
Wei zmann assi sted i n the campai gn
by wri ti ng to Bal f our al ong the s ame lines, and added that French
i ntri gues ai med at securi ng excl usi ve commerci al concessi ons were
obscuri ng the cause of sel f-determi nati on for Jews as well as for
Ar a b s .
4 3
T. E. Lawrence told the East ern Commi t t ee that "there
woul d be no difficulty i n reconci l i ng Zi oni sts and Arabs i n Pal esti ne
and Syri a, provi ded that the admi ni st rat i on of Pal esti ne remai ned i n
Bri ti sh ha nds . "
4 4
If the agreement were to be abrogat ed with respect to Pal esti ne,
there was no reason why i t shoul d not be abrogat ed with respect
t o Syri a as wel l though Pri me Mi ni ster Ll oyd George repeatedl y
asserted that Bri tai n had no desi re to take over Syri a for herself, and
Bri ti sh officers i n the field made the s ame cl ai m. The y asserted that
they wanted France to rel i nqui sh her cl ai ms, not in favor of Bri tai n,
but i n favor of an i ndependent Arab nation led by Fei sal . Thi s was
sheer di shonesty, for the Arab Bureau officers di d not believe that
Arabs were capabl e of sel f-government. By an i ndependent country
rul ed by Fei sal they meant a country gui ded by themsel ves as agents
of Bri tai n.
Davi d Hogart h, the head of the Ar ab Bureau who succeeded
Cl ayton as chief political officer in the field, reported f rom newly
l i berated Damas c us that Fei sal ' s Ar ab admi ni strati on was i ncom-
petent. He wrote that a European power must run t hi ngs .
4 5
If France
1
were to be excl uded, it was evi dent whi ch European power (in his
view) woul d be obl i ged to as s ume that responsi bi l i ty.
V
Nearl y a fortnight after his interview with Fei sal at the Hotel Vi ctori a
i n Damas c us , Si r Edmund Al l enby returned t o Damas c us t o be the
di nner guest of Pri nce Fei sal . He report ed to his wife that "He gave
me an excellent di nner; Arab di shes, but all good, served i n the
ordi nary ways of civilization. Water to dri nk; but good, fresh, cool
water; not tepi d barl ey water!" Al l enby added that "You woul d like
Fei sal . He i s a keen, sl i m, highly st rung man. He has beauti ful
hands, like a woman' s; and his fingers are al ways movi ng nervousl y
when he tal ks. But he i s st rong i n will, and strai ght i n pri nci pl e. " As
to pol i ti cs, "He is nervous about the peace settl ement; but I tell hi m
he mus t trust the Ent ent e powers to treat hi m f ai rl y. "
4 6
"Trus t the Ent ent e Powers": Fei sal coul d not have thought that
was a parti cul arl y firm foundati on on which to base his future pros-
pect s. Th e Entente Powers di d not even trust one another. Th e
French di d not believe that the Bri t i sh were sponsori ng Jewi s h and
Arab aspi rati ons i n good faith, while the Bri ti sh di scussed how,
rather than whether, to break their agreement s with France. Nei ther
Bri tai n nor France pl anned to honor warti me commi t ment s to Ital y.
Nei ther Bri tai n nor France was di sposed to carry out the idealistic
program of Woodrow Wi l son with whi ch, when Washi ngton was
listening, they pret ended to be i n sympat hy.
Fei sal was aware that only the year before, Bri ti sh l eaders had
cont empl at ed behi nd his back a compromi s e peace in whi ch the
Russi an rather than the Ot t oman Empi re woul d have been par-
t i t i onedt hus abandoni ng hi m and his father to the merci es of the
Tur ks . He knew, too, that Bri tai n and France had secretly agreed
two years before to di vi de the Ar ab worl d between t hem, and that
they had reveal ed detai l s of their agreement to hi m only when they
were forced to do so.
Tr us t was not a part of the at mosphere i n which Fei sal lived. He
himself had corresponded with the Tur ks that year about his changi ng
si des i n the war. Hi s father had hel d si mi l ar correspondence with the
Tur ks . Nei ther of t hem had kept faith with Bri tai n, and Fei sal had
not kept faith with his father either.
Hi s only regul ar t roops were desert ers from the enemy c amp, who
mi ght as easily desert hi m, i n t urn, i f his star waned. Th e Bedoui n
tri bes that were his allies were notori ousl y fickle, often changi ng
si des in Arabi a even on the field of battl e itself; and they were bound
to hi m pri nci pal l y by the gol d that was Lawrence' s, not his, to
r
di spense. As for the Syri ans, they accept ed hi m only because he was
pl aced over t hem by the Bri ti sh army.
Even his own body betrayed hi m; his worry- bead fi ngers gave hi m
away. He was nervous and had every reason to be.
P ART VI I I
THE SPOILS OF
VICTORY
"The victor bel ongs to the spoi l s. "
F . Scot t Fi t zgeral d
38
THE PARTING OF THE WAYS
i
Gi ddy with fati gue and caught up i n the last hysterical convul si ons
of the war, the Ot t oman and Bri ti sh empi res l aunched themsel ves
into far-off deserts and i nl and seas to fight a barely remembered
series of final campai gns that produced no deci si ve resul t. Yet in the
course of the military and political maneuveri ng two new devel op-
ments arose that were to affect prof oundl y the future of the twentieth
century. Western armi es f ound themsel ves at war with Rus s i a, their
former ally; and oil became a cruci al i ssue in the battl e for the
Mi ddl e Eas t .
It all began because Enver Pasha, i nstead of at t empt i ng to deal
with the l osi ng si tuati on in Syri a, opened up a new theater of opera-
tions agai nst a less f ormi dabl e opponent . As a resul t, while the
Bri ti sh were marchi ng from success to success i n the Arabi c- speaki ng
provi nces of the Ot t oman Empi re, Ot t oman forces to the north were
marchi ng f rom success to success i n what used to be the Rus s i an
Empi re. In the last half of 1918 Turkey and Bri tai n were engaged i n
what appeared to be not so much one war as two parallel wars i n
which they purs ued si mi l ar goal s: to excl ude their allies f rom a share
i n the wi nni ngs. Enver Pasha, like Ll oyd George, was so capti vated
by the prospect i ve spoi l s of victory that he coul d not bear to share
t hem with other countri es. Th e near-di ctatori al Tur ki s h l eader, like
his near-di ctatori al Bri ti sh count erpart , therefore took the risk of
endangeri ng his alliances for the sake of i mperi al ambi t i ons.
Leni n had i t the wrong way around. Imperi al i sm-defi ned as the
quest for col oni esdi d not cause the war; the war engendered i m-
peri al i sm. Thei r st aggeri ng l osses drove the belligerent powers to try
to compensat e by seeki ng new gai ns. Th e col l apse of the Russi an
Empi re answered the need for new worl ds to conquer; its domai ns
were there to be taken. Lo r d Mi l ner worri ed that once Rus s i a was
out of the war Germany mi ght be more difficult to defeat, and rai sed
the possi bi l i ty of a negoti ated compromi s e peace in whi ch Bri tai n
351
352 T H E S P O I L S O F V I C T O R Y
woul d be compensat ed by di vi di ng the Russi an rather than the
Ot t oman Empi re. Germany, however, havi ng s mas hed the Czar' s
Empi re, was i n no mood to share her wi nni ngs with the Entente
Powers. Th e Ge r mans conti nued to purs ue their campai gns of war
and subversi on agai nst Rus s i a. Thei r postwar goal s of aggrandi ze-
ment grew more far-reachi ng as the wart i me need for agri cul tural
product s and raw materi al s became more pressi ng; and as they
pursued those goal s, they collided with their Turki s h allies.
Enver Pasha had dreamed of one day uniting all the Turki s h-
speaki ng peopl es of Asi a under Ot t oman l eadershi p, but this became
his operati onal political program only when the di si ntegrati on of
Petrograd' s authori ty dangl ed that prospect in front of hi m. After the
war, Wi nston Churchi l l , among others, fostered the l egend that the
Young Tur ks had been ani mat ed by pan- Turki s h ( "pan- Turani an")
i deol ogy all al ong and had brought Tur ke y into the war i n order to
pursue expansi oni st pl ans i n Cent ral As i a. Th e evi dence now avai l abl e
i s to the contrary: the demands the C. U. P. made of Germany i n
1914 and t hrough 1917 show that the Ot t oman l eaders were thi nki ng
in essentially defensi ve t erms at that t i me, hopi ng at most to shore
up their exi sti ng frontiers in order to win a more compl et e i ndepend-
ence within t hem. It was only i n 1917 that Enver seri ousl y pl anned
to expand the Ot t oman Empi re east ward. Vast terri tori es, no longer
held by the Czar, seemed there for the taki ng, and coul d compensat e
for what Bri tai n had taken in the Arabi c- speaki ng sout h.
A Bri ti sh Intel l i gence report on the movement to uni te all the
Turki sh- speaki ng peopl es, the Pan- Turani an Movement , prepared
by the Depart ment of Informati on in the aut umn of 1917, esti mated
that outsi de the Ot t oman Empi re more than seventeen million peopl e
i n Asi a spoke one or more of the Tur ki c l anguages. Accordi ng to the
report, "Turki sh- speaki ng Central Asi a i s one of the l argest conti nu-
ous l anguage areas i n the worl dl arger than the Great Russi an area
and al most as l arge as the Engl i sh or Spani sh- speaki ng area i n
Ameri ca. " While di sdai nful of pan- Turani ani s m as an i deol ogy, the
report pi ct ured it as a dangerous i nst rument in the hands of the
Young Tur k l eaders. "The whole popul ati on i s Tur ki s h; the whole
popul ati on i s Sunni ; and the present possessor [i . e. Russi a] i s not an
ancient Mos l em St at e, but a recent Chri sti an conqueror. " Were the
C. U. P. to create a Turki s h- I s l ami c state there, in alliance with
Persi a and Af ghani st an, Indi a woul d be directly threatened. "It
woul d create a vast anti -Bri ti sh hi nterl and behi nd the anti -Bri ti sh
tri bes on the Nort h- West ern fronti er. "
1
Enver, t hough aware of these possi bi l i ti es, made no preci pi tate
move but al l owed events to evolve favorabl y on their own. The
overthrow of the Czar left a Russi an army of half a million sol di ers in
northeastern Turkey, hol di ng such maj or towns as Trebi zond,
T H E P A R T I N G O F T H E WAYS 353
Erzerum, and Ka r s . Th e t roops, initially at least, were not Bol shevi k
i n senti ment, but suffered from war weari ness. As di sci pl i ne di si n-
tegrated, they deserted and returned to Rus s i a. In agreement with
the Ge r man General Staff, the Ot t oman forces di d not attack the
thi nni ng Rus s i an lines but allowed the Rus s i an army to dwi ndl e to
nothi ng of its own accord.
By the ti me the Bol shevi ks sei zed power in Pet rograd in the
aut umn of 1917, practically all that remai ned was a vol unteer force
f rom the Trans caucas i an areas across the frontier and a few hundred
Russi an of f i cers.
2
Still Enver held back, expecti ng the Bol shevi ks to
sue for peace, as they di d several weeks later.
Th e Turki s h mi l i tary si tuati on on the eastern frontier with Persi a
al so i mproved of its own accord. Bri ti sh forces in the south of Persi a
had been operat i ng behi nd the shi el d of Russi an forces in the north,
but coul d no l onger do so with assurance. As revol uti onary fervor
took hol d of the Rus s i an t roops, they became i ncreasi ngl y friendly to
the Persi an nati onal i sts whom they had hitherto held i n check. On 27
May 1917 the pro-Al l i ed regi me i n Teheran col l apsed, and on 6 June
was repl aced by a government of nationalist hue which approached
Pet rograd with a view toward reduci ng the Russi an mi l i tary presence.
Hi gh- ranki ng officials in the War Office in London and in the
Government of Indi a feared that Tur ke y mi ght attack t hrough Persi a
toward Af ghani s t an
3
al t hough the Chi ef of the Imperi al General
Staff di d not share these vi ews. Th e Cabi net wavered between maki ng
concessi ons to the new Persi an regi me or allowing relations to de-
teri orate; dangers were apparent either way.
As the authori ty of the Kerens ky government i n Pet rograd evapo-
rated, the Russi an army i n the north of Persi a appeared to Bri ti sh
officials to be i ncreasi ngl y unrel i abl e. On 31 Oct ober 1917 an inter-
depart ment al commi t t ee in Whitehall deci ded to put the anti-
Bol shevi k segment s of the Rus s i an army in northern Persi a on the
Bri ti sh payrol l ; but the Russi ans nonethel ess proved unwilling to do
Bri tai n' s bi ddi ng.
Once the Bol shevi ks sei zed power i n Pet rograd the following week,
matters rapi dl y came to a head. Within mont hs, on 29 January 1918,
Trot s ky, as Sovi et Commi s s ar for External Affai rs, renounced the
Conventi on of 1907, which f ormed the basi s of the Angl o- Rus s i an
occupati on of Persi a. Di scl ai mi ng responsi bi l i ty for any anti-
Bol shevi k Rus s i an t roops remai ni ng on Persi an soil, he expressed the
hope that the other foreign armi es occupyi ng Persi an soi l the Tur ks
and the Bri t i shwoul d wi thdraw as well.
Th e Bri ti sh government feared that the Russi an wi thdrawal woul d
expose the Indi an Army i n Mes opot ami a to an attack from behi nd by
Ot t oman armi es wheel i ng t hrough Persi a; for despi te the l ong conflict
between the two empi res in that area, Bri tai n had come to rely on
Rus s i a to hold the line agai nst the Tur ks i n northern Persi a, and was
uncertai n what course to purs ue when that protecti on was abruptl y
wi thdrawn.
I I
In March 1918 Germany i mposed crushi ng armi sti ce t erms on the
defeated Rus s i ans . As soon as they had si gned the armi sti ce with
Rus s i a, the Ot t oman and Ge r man empi res began t o di sput e possessi on
of the provi nces that the Russi an Empi r e had rul ed adjoi ni ng the
Turki s h frontier. Chri sti an Georgi a and Armeni a, and Mosl em
Azerbai j ant he three states collectively called Trans caucas i awere
now i ndependent . Germany urgentl y needed the agri cul tural and
mi neral wealth and the rai l road syst em of Georgi a, and even more so
the oil wells of Azerbai j an, to sustai n her war effort. Thi nki ng ahead
to the postwar worl d, German l eaders also i ntended to use
Trans caucas i a as a spearhead into the markets of the Mi ddl e Eas t .
Th e Ot t oman l eaders also l ooked to the commerci al uses of the
provi nces across their frontier. The y thought i n t erms of restori ng
the ol d trade route with Iran, and of reviving their Bl ack Sea and
Cri mean commerce. Enver, above all, ai med at the creati on of a
new Tur ki s h empi re that stretched into Central Asi a, to whi ch
Trans caucas i a woul d be the link.
Convi nced that Germany had di sregarded Turki s h interests when
she negoti ated the t erms of the armi sti ce with Russi a, Enver pro-
ceeded to di sregard Ge r man i nterests i n Trans caucas i a, and sent the
flower of his remai ni ng armi es across the frontier to conquer Georgi a
and Armeni a and t o march on Azerbai j an. For the purpos e he
created a speci al army corps, det ached from the regul ar Ot t oman
army which was permeat ed with Ge r man officers. Hi s new "Army of
Isl am" contai ned no Ge r mans : i t consi sted only of Ot t oman troops
and Azerbai jani Tar t ar s . Its orders were to march on the Azerbai jani
metropol i s of Baku, which had been taken over by a local Sovi et.
Baku, an i ndustri al i zed city of some 300, 000 peopl e on the shores of
the Cas pi an Sea, was only half Mos l em and qui te unlike the sur-
roundi ng Tart ar hi nterl and. At the ti me i t was the great oi l - produci ng
city of the Mi ddl e Eas t .
By 1918 the mi l i tary i mport ance of oil began to be general l y recog-
ni zed. Bef ore the war, Churchi l l ' s Admi ral t y had swi tched to oil as
* Winston Churchill, who had recognized it before the war and had arranged at
that time for the British government to purchase a majority shareholding in the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, aroused a great deal of opposition, especially within
the Government of India, from British officials who did not see the need for i t.
4
T H E P A R T I N G O F T H E WA Y S 355
fuel for the navy's shi ps and, duri ng the war, the Allies came to rely
heavily on f uel - consumi ng trucks for l and t ransport . Ta nks and
aircraft had begun to come fully into their own in the last days of the
war and they, too, cons umed quanti ti es of gas and oil. In 1918
Cl emenceau' s government i n France and the U. S . Depart ment of
the Navy both came to recogni ze that oil had become of cardi nal
i mport ance.
Germany, beset by short ages, had count ed on repl eni shi ng her
resources f rom the capt ured sout h and west of Rus s i a, and control l ed
much of the economy of Georgi a duri ng 1918; but i n Berl i n the
resources of Georgi a were not regarded as sufficient. Enver' s race to
Baku, i n Azerbai j an, threatened to depri ve Germany of the oil she so
desperatel y needed, and al so threatened to wreck the armi sti ce ar-
rangement with Rus s i a. Th e enraged heads of the German General
Staff sent angry notes to Enver, whi ch he di sregarded.
Th e state secretary of the Ge r man Navy Depart ment told the
l eaders of his country' s Forei gn Office and General Staff that it was
absol utel y cruci al for Germany to get hold of Baku' s oil and that the
Ot t oman attack on the city therefore had t o be s t oppe d.
5
Th e Ge r man
l eaders told the Rus s i an ambas s ador i n Berl i n that they woul d take
steps to st op the Ot t oman advance i f Rus s i a gave assurances that she
woul d s uppl y at least s ome of Baku' s oil to Germany. "Of course, we
will agree, " Leni n cabl ed to St al i n i n report i ng thi s devel opment .
6
Baku was al so i mportant strategi cal l y. As a maj or port i t domi nat ed
Caspi an shi ppi ng and woul d enabl e Enver to move his armi es by
sea, if he chose, to the eastern shore of the Cas pi an, where the
Mos l ems of Turkes t an coul d be expect ed to rally to his s t andard and
where he woul d avail hi msel f of the rai l road network that the
Rus s i ans had bui l t there to enabl e t hem to reach Af ghani st an and
attack Indi a.
Th e Bri t i sh, keenly aware of the danger, viewed Enver' s progress
with f orebodi ng.
Ill
Two tiny Bri t i sh mi l i tary mi ssi ons i n northern Persi a watched these
events from across the frontier with no clear idea of what role they
shoul d pl ay i n t he m.
7
Maj or- General L. C. Dunst ervi l l e was appoi nted chief of the
Bri ti sh mi ssi on to the Caucas us i n early 1918. Had he ever reached
Ti fl i s, the Trans caucas i an capi tal , he woul d have served as Bri ti sh
Representati ve there as well, where hi s objecti ve woul d have been to
help stiffen the resi stance of the Russi an army i n Turkey agai nst an
Ot t oman advance.
Dunstervi l l e' s convoy of forty-one Fo r d cars and vans travel ed via
Mes opot ami a into Persi a and headed toward a Persi an port on the
Caspi an Se a then called Enzel i (later renamed Pahl evi ) on the road
to Trans caucas i a. By the t i me the Bri ti sh arri ved, most of
Trans caucas i a had fallen into Ot t oman or German hands. A worri ed
Bri ti sh government ordered Dunst ervi l l e to clear the road to Enzel i
of a revol uti onary band of Persi an nati onal i sts, allied to the Bol shevi ks
but also acti ng in the i nterests of the advanci ng Ot t oman Army of
Isl am.
As Enver' s forces approached Baku, the Bri ti sh government de-
bated what role Dunstervi l l e' s tiny force shoul d or coul d pl ay in the
unexpect ed battle for Central Asi a i n which Tur ks , Ge r mans ,
Rus s i ans , and others were i nvol ved. Th e questi on also arose of what
Maj or- General Wilfred Mal l eson' s mi ssi on ought to be. General
Mal l eson was an officer in the Mi l i tary Intel l i gence branch of the
Indi an Army, who had served for years on the staff of Lo r d
Ki t chener. Si ml a had sent hi m out with six officers to Mes hed, i n
eastern Persi a, to watch over devel opment s in the vast l ands of
Russi an Turkes t an that were bel i eved to be Enver' s next objecti ve.
Dunst ervi l l e was to watch over the l ands to the west of the Cas pi an
Sea, and Mal l eson was to watch over the l ands to the east.
In Mal l eson' s area of responsi bi l i ty, there were several mat t ers that
concerned the Bri ti sh mi l i tary l eaders. One of these was the l arge
store of cotton whi ch mi ght fall into enemy hands. Another was the
presence of s ome 35, 000 Ge r man and Austri an pri soners-of-war who
mi ght be rel eased either by the Bol shevi ks or by Enver' s forces.
To the Bri ti sh l eaders the i ntenti ons of the enemy forces at work
west and east of the Caspi an were obscured by the growi ng political
fragmentati on i n those areas. Politically the Ge r mans appeared not
only to be hand-i n-gl ove locally with the anti -Bol shevi ks in Ti fl i s,
but al so to be involved with the Bol shevi ks in Pet rograd, while
havi ng fallen out with the Tur ks , who were their publ i c allies but
their secret enemi es. Enver' s allied force of Ot t oman and Azerbai jani
Mos l em Tur ks and Tar t ar s was on the march toward Baku, whi ch
was governed by a di vi ded Sovi et that reflected a division within the
city itself. Th e Azerbai jani half of the popul ati on favored the Ot t oman
Empi re, while the Armeni ans, feari ng massacre, were i n favor of
anybody but the Tur ks . Th e Soci al Revol uti onari es and other non-
Bol shevi k Rus s i ans feared Bri ti sh i nterventi on, but i n the end grew
to fear Turkey more. St epan Shaumi an, the Bol shevi k chai rman of
the Sovi et, while l eadi ng the resi stance to the Ot t oman- Azerbai j ani
allies, even preferred Turki s h rul e to a Bri ti sh intervention and, in
any event, had recei ved direct orders from Leni n and St al i n not to
accept Bri ti sh ai d.
In Turkes t an a Bol shevi k-control l ed Rus s i an Sovi et was i n control
of the oasi s town of Tas hkent , but its forces had been beaten by the
native Tur ks of Bukhara, and had been obl i ged to recogni ze the
Emi r of Bukharawhos e domai ns had fallen under Russi an sway
duri ng the Great Ga me i n the ni neteenth cent uryas once agai n an
i ndependent rul er. Rumor s reachi ng London i ndi cated that the newly
i ndependent khanates of Bukhara and Khi va mi ght be enteri ng into
alliance with the Por t e .
8
As vi ewed f rom London, the chaos i n Central Asi a was a source of
danger and promi se. Th e danger was that i t mi ght permi t an assaul t
on Indi a, and on the Indi an Army i n Persi a and Mes opot ami a, that
coul d ignite flames i mpossi bl e to ext i ngui sh. Accordi ng to a General
Staff me mor andum:
[ Germany] will make use of the Pan- Turani an movement and
of Mohamme dan fanati ci sm to fan into a flame the ever gl owi ng
embers of a rel i gi ous war, in order to let l oose on Indi a the
pent - up ti de of a Mosl em i nvasi on . . . While Russi a was healthy
and while Persi a was under control we were abl e to deal with
this difficulty, but if German agent s had free access to the
lawless tri bes of Af ghani st an and the frontiers of Indi a, bred as
they have been on tal es of the l egendary wealth of loot which
mi ght be thei rs, i nnumerabl e hordes of savage warri ors coul d
swarm into the pl ai ns, ravagi ng, murderi ng, destroyi ng. Th e
i nsti tuti ons built by l ong years of careful government woul d be
swept away in a few short weeks and the attenuated garri son of
the country woul d have to be largely reinforced f rom t roops
badl y needed el sewhere. None but White troops coul d be
t rus t ed.
9
Si nce Bri t i sh pol i cy-makers bel i eved the Russi an Bol shevi k govern-
ment was in the pay of i mperi al Germany, and were not aware of the
extent to whi ch the Porte and the Wi l hel mstrasse had part ed com-
pany, it appeared in 1918 that the Ge r mans had taken control of
northern Asia, were in process of taki ng over the center of Asi a, and
were prepari ng to mount an attack on Bri ti sh posi ti ons i n southern
Asi a. It fitted in with the warti me view that Ge r many ai med at a
worl d empi re and with the fear that, when the war was over, all of
Asi a mi ght be left as a vast sl ave col ony in Germany' s possessi on,
and its weal th and raw materi al s woul d fuel German i ndustry and
allow it to domi nat e the gl obe.
Le o Amery proposed to Ll oyd George that Bri tai n shoul d adopt a
strategy to counter that threat. If Bri tai n were to capt ure the center
of Asi a, then the partition of Rus s i a between Germany and Bri tai n,
whi ch Mi l ner had proposed the year before, woul d i n effect be
"White troops": British rather than Indian soldiers of the Indian Army.
achi eved. At the end of 1917 Amery noted i n his di ary that "The
war is goi ng Eas t with a vengeance and we shall find oursel ves
fighting for the rest of it to deci de where the Angl o- German bounda-
ry shall run across Asi a. " Th e French, l ooki ng to eastern Europe for
their post war gai ns, woul d fail, he predi ct ed, "while we poor meek
Bri ti sh will probabl y find our non- aggressi ve little Empi re at the end
of the war i ncl udi ng Turkes t an, Persi a, and the Ca uc a s us ! "
1 0
Thi s represented yet a further enl argement of the vast section of
the gl obe that Amery regarded as properl y falling under Bri ti sh
hegemony. Li ke Mi l ner' s other associ at es, his essenti al focus was on
"the whole of the great semi -ci rcl e whi ch runs from Cape To wn to
Cai ro, thence t hrough Pal esti ne, Mes opot ami a and Persi a to Indi a
and so t hrough Si ngapore t o Aust ral i a and New Zeal and. " Within
that area, he wrote to the Pri me Mi ni ster of Aust ral i a in late 1917,
"What we want . . . i s a Bri ti sh Monroe Doct ri ne which shoul d keep
that porti on of the worl d free f rom future interference of ambi t i ous
powers . . . "
n
By June of 1918 Amery had come to feel (and to advi se Ll oyd
George) that, i f Ge r man expansi on i n Asi a were not s t opped, this
"Sout hern Bri ti sh Worl d" coul d not "go about its peaceful busi ness
without constant fear of Ge r man aggressi on. " He wrote that "as soon
as this 'little si de show' i n the West i s over . . . we shall have to take
the war for the mast ery of Asi a i n hand s eri ous l y. "
1 2
Thi s harked
back to his view that Bri t i sh forei gn policy was flawed by gi vi ng
Bri tai n' s i nterests i n Europe pri ori ty over her i nterests el sewhere. He
wrote i n 1917 that "The great danger to my mi nd i s that the Forei gn
Office and the publ i c . . . take too European a point of view about
peace t erms, i nstead of l ooki ng at t hem from the perspecti ve of an
Empi re whi ch i s di stri buted all over the worl d . . . "
1 3
He al so thought
that they were taki ng too European a poi nt of view about the war.
He di scerned fresh dangers i n Asi a.
He wrote to Smut s on 16 Oct ober 1917, warni ng that Enver woul d
gai n "some five million" Tur ks who dwelt i n Trans caucas i a and then
woul d link up with the Tur ks of Tur ke s t a n.
1 4
Event s early i n the
following year seemed to confi rm thi s view.
Amery, like other Bri ti sh mi l i tary and political l eaders in the first
half of 1918, was persuaded that the Ge r man and Ot t oman conquest
of Trans caucas i a demonst rat ed that Germany was in process of ex-
ecuti ng the "Grand Des i gn" outl i ned i n John Buchan' s Greenmantle.
In Buchan' s adventure novel, the Ge r mans were pl anni ng a sweep
t hrough Isl ami c Asi a to and across the Indi an frontier to destroy the
Bri ti sh Empi re i n the east and repl ace i t with their o wn.
1 5
Th u s i n
wagi ng war as i n maki ng peace, accordi ng to Amery, Bri ti sh forces
shoul d be moved up to a defensi ve line runni ng all the way across the
former Rus s i an Empi re from the Ural s i n the west to Si beri a i n the
e a s t .
1 6
T H E P A R T I N G O F T H E WA Y S 359
Nei ther the War Office nor the Government of Indi a was willing
to make avai l abl e the forces for such l arge schemes i n di stant pl aces;
and Amery went so far as to propos e that Japan and the Uni t ed
St at es shoul d be invited to associ ate themsel ves in the enterpri se of
occupyi ng the Ural s to Si beri a l i ne .
1 7
Bri ti sh and Al l i ed military
l eaders also urged that Japan shoul d be asked to send armi es t hrough
Si beri a and across Asi a to joi n battl e with Enver' s forces west of the
Caspi an S e a .
1 8
But Ll oyd George and Lor d Mi l ner were so compl etel y occupi ed
with the war i n Europe and Pal esti ne that Amery coul d not attract
their attenti on; and in the absence of their l eadershi p, their subordi -
nates failed to devel op a coherent pol i cy. Breathtaki ngl y ambi t i ous
geopolitical goal s were outl i ned by Amery and by general officers of
the high command, but no resources were al l ocated and no strategy
was put in moti on to achi eve t hem.
So, wi thout gui dance and wi thout support , the tiny mi ssi ons sent
out by the Bri ti sh Government of Indi a headed into the interior of
Asi a.
IV
Baku, the oil capi tal of Central Asi a, was a focus of activity in the
s ummer of 1918, as Bol shevi k l eaders fled the city. A new non-
Bol shevi k government was hastily f ormed, which called i n the Bri ti sh.
Dunstervi l l e asked and received permi ssi on from his superi ors to
enter and defend Baku. Hi s advance guard arri ved i n Baku 4 Augus t ,
thwarti ng Ge r man hopes of obtai ni ng Baku' s oil, whereupon the
Germans deci ded that Tur ke y was a lesser danger than Bri tai n just
as the Bol shevi ks were reachi ng the opposi t e concl us i on.
1 9
Th e
Germans asked permi ssi on of the Bol shevi k government to l aunch an
attack on Bri ti sh-hel d Baku, either alone or in combi nat i on with
Enver' s Army of I s l am. Th e Bol shevi k government agre.ed to accept
a German occupati on of Baku, but not in combi nati on with the
Army of I s l am; for even the Bri ti sh, accordi ng to Pet rograd, were
preferabl e to the Tur ks . But the Ge r man force i n Georgi a was too
weak to spare t roops in ti me for a campai gn agai nst Bakuand that
left the Ar my of Isl am and the Bri ti sh mi ssi on as the only contestants
in the field.
Dunstervi l l e' s force amount ed to about 900 officers and men ac-
cordi ng to one source, or about 1,400 accordi ng to anot her.
2 0
Th e
Army of I s l am was esti mated to be ten or twenty ti mes greater.
When it attacked Baku, the Bri ti sh were on their own; local forces
proved to be of little hel p. On 14 Sept ember Dunstervi l l e evacuated
his forces from the city and wi thdrew to Persi a, havi ng occupi ed the
ci t yand depri ved the enemy of oi l for six weeks. A Bri ti sh
Reut ers' di spat ch descri bed the Baku evacuati on as one of the
"thrillingest chapt ers" of the wa r .
2 1
At about the ti me that Dunst ervi l l e marched to the relief of Baku,
General Mal l eson, also by invitation, marched to the relief of
Turkes t an, whose government had been f ormed by anti -Bol shevi k
Russi an Menshevi ks and Soci al Revol uti onari es with the ai d of rail-
road workers. Th e Turkes t an government procl ai med its i ndepend-
ence from the Bol shevi k Russi an authori ti es; and, i n respondi ng to
its appeal , Mal l eson in effect was i nterveni ng in a Rus s i an civil
war-an act prompt ed by fears that Ge r many woul d get Turkest an' s
cotton suppl i es, and that the Ge r man and Aus t ro- Hungari an
pri soners-of-war woul d be freed.
Th e Turki sh- speaki ng native popul at i on of Turkes t an, while op-
posed to both the Bol shevi k and the anti -Bol shevi k Rus s i an settl ers,
threw their support behi nd the latter when forced to choose between
the two. It was expected that once Enver' s Army of I s l am arri ved,
they woul d support it.
The r e on the plains of Turkes t ani n the mi ddl e of nowhere, as
far as the western worl d was concernedt he confused armi es cl ashed.
On the battlefields of Dus hak, Kaakha, and Merv, General
Mal l eson' s Bri t i sh- Indi an forces fought al ongsi de Enver' s Turki s h
support ers agai nst Sovi et Russi ans ai ded by i mperi al Ge r man and
Aus t ro- Hungari an pri soners-of-war who had been rel eased and armed
by the Bol shevi ks. Al l i ances had been reversed: i t was now Bri tai n
and Turkey versus Rus s i a and Germany.
General Mal l eson di d not wi thdraw from Central Asi a until Apri l
1919, half a year after the war ended; and he wi thdrew only when
the anti -Bol shevi k White armi es of General Deni ki n occupi ed the
area. Hi s i nterventi on, whi ch initially was ai med at st oppi ng the
progress of the Ot t oman and Ge r man empi res, i n the end was
di rected agai nst the Bol shevi ks. * At the ti me the Bri ti sh authori ti es
di d not di sti ngui sh clearly among the three; all of t hem seemed to be
ranged together on the enemy si de i n the worl d war.
Th e Government of Indi a had al so sent out a thi rd mi ssi on,
consi sti ng of three officers who were unaware of the Dunstervi l l e and
Mal l eson forays into former Russi an territory. The y were sent to
Kas hgar i n Chi nese Turkes t an to observe devel opment s from across
the border. Once there they deci ded to cross into Russi an Turkes t an
Interventions elsewhere in the Russian Empi re by British and Allied troops fail
outside the scope of this volume. The Government of India did not coordinate its
three missions, discussed above with the other interventions, nor did Simla send out
the three missions in .the context of some more general plan or pattern of
intervention.
and to proceed to Tas hkent t he seat of the local Sovi et govern-
ment-in an at t empt to win the cooperati on of the Bol shevi k author-
ities in the mat t ers of the pri soners-of-war and of the cotton. Onl y
when they arri ved i n Tas hkent di d they learn that Mal l eson had
intervened on behalf of the rival government .
Two of the three officers returned t o Kas hgar . Th e thi rd, Col onel
Frederi ck Mars hman Bai l ey, deci ded to remai n i n Tas hkent to rep-
resent Bri ti sh i nterests in the event that the local Bol shevi k regi me
col l apsed. When he l earned that the local authori ti es were prepari ng
to take measures agai nst hi m, he di sgui sed himself and di sappeared.
In hi di ng he took many identities, among t hem those of a Hungari an
cook, a Rumani an coachman, and an Al bani an butterfly collector. He
remai ned undercover until 1920, gat heri ng i nformati on as events
unfol ded. At the end he posed as an agent of Bol shevi k Rus s i an
counteri ntel l i gence. Sovi et authori ti es, greatl y exaggerat i ng, credi ted
hi m with bei ng the mast ermi nd of vast i ntri gues agai nst t hem.
London and Pet rograd, havi ng been warti me allies not l ong before,
were now enemi es. Between 1917 and 1918, the political worl d had
turned ups i de down.
V
As Ot t oman fortunes prospered i n the east, they crumbl ed i n the
south and west. A secret report to Davi d Ll oyd George i n 1918
i ndi cated that Enver was tal ki ng of an Ot t oman empi re from the
Adri ati c to Indi a; yet at other ti mes he supposedl y spoke of surren-
deri ng. Enver was reported to have predi cted gl oomi l y that "if the
Ge r mans won this War, Turkey woul d be Germany' s vas s al . "
2 2
Ludendorf f , the presi di ng geni us of the German General Staff,
cl ai med that the Porte coul d not be t rust ed. Th e oil of Baku was
essential to Germany, he st at ed, but the Tur ks had shown that they
i ntended to keep all the resources of Trans caucas i a for t hems el ves .
2 3
In response to an i nqui ry from the Wi l hel mstrasse to the General
Staff, Ludendorf f reported i n Sept ember 1918 that the mi l i tary
authori ti es had been st udyi ng the consequences shoul d Turkey betray
Germany and go over t o the Allied s i d e .
2 4
Th e cl ose col l aborati on between Germany and Bol shevi k Rus s i a
infuriated the Porte. Agai nst a background of Turki s h press cri ti ci sm
of Ge r man meddl i ng i n Trans caucas i a, Tal aat sent word to Berlin
that i f Ge r many conti nued to make arrangement s with Rus s i at he
"enemy of yest erday and the enemy of t omorrow"at Turkey' s
expense, the Ot t oman government mi ght have to go its own way i n
the wa r .
2 5
On 7 Sept ember 1918 Tal aat went to Berl i n to argue for
organi zi ng the Turki sh- speaki ng mi l l i ons of Central Asi a for a military
crusade agai nst Bri t ai nand Ru s s i a .
2 6
At the s ame ti me Bri tai n, too, moved closer to war agai nst
Rus s i a. Mal l eson remai ned in Cent ral Asi a, where the executi on of a
group of Bol shevi k commi s s ars by hi s anti -Bol shevi k allies was bl amed
on Bri tai n by the Pet rograd government . On the other si de of the
Cas pi an, a sudden col l apse of the Central Powers followed by the
soon- t o- be- di scussed armi sti ces of aut umn 1918, led Bri ti sh forces to
return through Baku to repl ace Ot t oman and Ge r man t roops i n the
i ndependent republ i cs of Trans caucas i a. Th u s the sout hern stretches
of the former Russi an Empi r e on both si des of the Cas pi an Sea
appeared to be i n the hands of anti -Bol shevi k or separati st groups
under Bri ti sh protecti on.
A significant observati on was made by a Bri ti sh parti ci pant in the
first battl e between Mal l eson' s force and the Bol shevi ks in Central
Asi a. Bot h the anti -Bol shevi k t roops and the Bol shevi k t roops, he
noted, were weari ng the s ame uni f orms. "At close quart ers, " he
wrote, "it was difficult to di st i ngui sh friend f rom enemy. "
2 7
By the
aut umn of 1918 that was true not merel y in Central Asi a but all
across the Mi ddl e Eas t .
39
BY THE SHORES OF TROY
i
In the s umme r of 1918 the Chi ef of the Imperi al General Staff
advi sed the Imperi al War Cabi net i n London that victory i n Europe
coul d not be won before the mi ddl e of 1919 and was far more likely
to be won in the s ummer of 1920. Commande r s in the field took a
more hopeful view of the prospect s for an early victory, but they had
frequentl y been wrong i n the past , and i n London their cheerful
predi cti ons were vi ewed with consi derabl e skept i ci sm.
Ludendorf f ' s powerful offensives of the spri ng and early s ummer,
which had once agai n threatened Pari s, had been s t opped, and the
Ge r mans were falling back; but by Sept ember 1918 Ludendorf f had
establ i shed a st rong defensi ve line and there was no reason to believe
that he coul d not hol d it for a l ong t i me. Th e war in the Eas t , too,
seemed likely to drag on, for Enver' s forces dri vi ng t oward the
Caspi an seemed poi sed to conti nue their offensive toward Persi a,
Af ghani st an, or Indi a.
Sudde nl yand unexpect edl yan Allied breakt hrough came i n
Bul gari a, where General Loui s - Fel i x- Francpi s Franchet d' Esperey,
the new French commander of the Al l i ed forces in hi therto-negl ected
Sal oni ka in Greece, l aunched a l i ghtni ng offensive at the end of the
s ummer. Bul gari a col l apsed and, on 26 Sept ember 1918, asked for an
armi sti ce. Th e request shoul d have been forwarded t o the Supr e me
War Counci l of the Allies i n Pari s, but Franchet d' Esperey dared not
chance the del ay. He composed the t erms of an armi sti ce himself,
and had it si gned within a matter of days so that he coul d turn
i mmedi atel y to mount a devastati ng offensive on the Danube agai nst
the Ge r mans and Aust ri ans, t hus successful l y executi ng the
"East ern" strategy that Ll oyd Ge or ge had been advocat i ng i n vain
ever si nce the war began.
On 29 Sept ember Ludendorf f , l earni ng that a Bul gari an armi sti ce
* But of course it can be argued that it would not have worked before 1918.
363
had been concl uded that day, advi sed his government that Germany
woul d therefore have to sue for an armi st i ce t oo: he had no t roops
with which to make a st and on the new southeastern frontthe
Danube f ront t hat Franchet d' Esperey had opened up.
Th e Bri ti sh Cabi net had not expect ed the enemy to col l apse so
soon or so suddenl y, was not prepared for it, and di d not entirely
believe it. Armi st i ce t erms for the vari ous enemy powers had not
been drafted or even consi dered. A day after Franchet d' Esperey
received the Bul gari an request for an armi sti ce, the Bri t i sh Chi ef of
the Imperi al General Staff i nqui red "what our Forei gn Office was
goi ng to do i f Turkey followed sui t . "
1
Bal f our, the Forei gn Secret ary,
repl i edwi th compl et e candort hat he di d not know.
But the i ssue had to be faced i mmedi at el y: i t present ed itself
within a matter of days. Between 1 and 6 October bot h the govern-
ment of the Ot t oman Empi re and several promi nent i ndi vi dual
Tur ki s h l eaders l aunched peace feelers. On the night of 34 Oct ober
Germany, too, sent a note to Presi dent Wi l son, i naugurat i ng armi sti ce
negoti ati ons that were to go on for several weeks, as fighting con-
ti nued and as Ge r man t roops successful l y hel d on to a defensi ve line
that ran t hrough eastern France and Bel gi um.
On 1 Oct ober the Bri ti sh War Cabi net deci ded to convoke a
meet i ng of the Supr e me War Counci l of the Allies in order to
address the questi on of peace t erms for Turkey. At the s ame ti me,
however, the War Cabi net deci ded to send two Bri ti sh Dreadnought -
cl ass battl eshi ps to the Aegean to strengthen Bri tai n agai nst France
in the waters off Turkey.
Th e Cabi net was sei zed by a pani cky fear that the war mi ght come
to an end before the Bri ti sh armed forces coul d occupy the vital
Mi ddl e East ern areas i t hoped to domi nat e. Amery warned Smut s
and the Chi ef of the Imperi al General Staff that only actual possessi on
of the Mi ddl e Eas t before a cease-fire went into effect woul d enabl e
the Cabi net to bri ng the regi on into the Bri ti sh orbi t .
2
Th e armi es of
Bri ti sh Indi a i n Mes opot ami a were still weeks away f rom strategi cal l y
i mportant and oil-rich Mos ul ; on 2 Oct ober its commander was
advi sed by the War Office to "occupy as large a porti on of the oil-
beari ng regi ons as possi bl e. "
3
On 3 Oct ober the War Cabi net di scussed at length the quest i on of
an armi sti ce or peace agreement with the Ot t oman Empi r e . The
Pri me Mi ni ster, who hoped to reduce France' s and Italy's share i n
Bri tai n' s wi nni ngs in Ot t oman Asi a, argued that in all fai rness her
Allies were not entitled to what they had originally been promi sed.
Accordi ng to an extract from mi nut es of the meeti ng,
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster sai d he had been refreshi ng his memory
about the Sykes- Pi cot Agreement , and had come to the con-
cl usi on that it was qui te i nappl i cabl e to present ci rcumst ances,
B Y T H E S H O R E S O F T R O Y
365
and was al together a most undesi rabl e agreement from the
Bri ti sh poi nt of view. Havi ng been concl uded more than two
years ago, it entirely overl ooked the fact that our posi ti on in
Turkey had been won by very l arge Bri ti sh forces, whereas our
Allies had cont ri but ed but little to the res ul t .
4
It was speci ous reasoni ng, but Bal f our, respondi ng as though the
Pri me Mi ni ster were si ncere i n urgi ng fair pl ay, poi nt ed out the
fallacy in his reasoni ng.
Mr Bal four remi nded the War Cabi net that the ori gi nal i dea
had been that any territories that the Allies mi ght acqui re
shoul d be pool ed and shoul d not be regarded as the propert y of
the nation whi ch had won t hem. Th e theory had been that the
fighting in one theatre of war, where there was little to gai n,
mi ght be j ust as i mport ant a contri buti on to the cause of the
Allies as much easier fighting i n other theatres where great
successes were achi eved. He bel i eved that some statement of
this kind had been ma de .
5
Bonar La w confi rmed Bal four' s recollection.
Ll oyd George took another approach and argued that Bri tai n and
Turkey ought to concl ude a peace agreement i mmedi atel y, rather
than a mere armi st i ce. ( It was evi dent that, with Bri ti sh armi es i n
occupati on of most of the Ot t oman Empi r e , a peace treaty negoti ated
i mmedi atel y was likely to favor Bri tai n as the only power in a
posi ti on to extract concessi ons f rom the Port e. )
Ll oyd George argued that the Ot t oman Empi re was unlikely t o
accept a mere armi sti ce wi thout knowi ng what peace t erms were to
be i mposed later. Suspi ci on of French and Ital i an ambi t i ons, he sai d,
woul d dri ve the Porte to refuse such an arrangement . Theref ore
Turkey woul d fight on. Thi s , the Pri me Mi ni ster conti nued, woul d
be i ntol erabl e, for i t meant that the Bri ti sh woul d have to fi ght on,
too, for the sake of securi ng purel y French and Ital i an ambi t i ons;
and that ought to be out of the quest i on. He sai d that he woul d
present the matter in this light to the French and Ital i an premi ers in
Pari s, and he expressed confi dence that they woul d let hi m have his
way.
Nonet hel ess the Cabi net drafted the t erms of a proposed armi sti ce
agreement , which the Pri me Mi ni st er took with hi m to Pari s to
di scuss with the other Al l i ed heads of government t oward the end of
the fi rst week i n Oct ober. In Pari s the Allies agreed on an armi sti ce
proposal based largely on the Bri ti sh draft and agreed that the
armi sti ce shoul d be negoti ated on behal f of the Allies by whi chever
power was approached by Turkey i n the matter. However the Allied
premi ers di smi ssed out of hand Ll oyd George' s scheme for an
i mmedi at e peace treaty.
A subject of i ncreasi ng controversy between the Al l i ed l eaders was
the questi on of who shoul d exerci se s upreme military command i n
the several theaters of war agai nst the Ot t oman Empi re. Th e French,
who exerci sed s upreme naval c ommand i n the Medi t erranean, sought
to di spl ace the Bri ti sh commander of its Aegean wi ng, Vi ce- Admi ral
Somerset Art hur Gough- Cal t horpe, who cl ai med that the French
were "on the whole i ncapabl e of runni ng a sound naval campai gn. "
6
Th e i ssue was not merel y mi l i tary; for whi chever country held the
command woul d be first off the mark in getti ng to the spoi l s of
victory.
In Franchet d' Esperey' s c ommand, the eastern fl ank (whi ch faced
Tur ke y) had been led by a Bri ti sh general , George Franci s Mi l ne.
Franchet d' Esperey, fl ushed with success i n Bul gari a, now proposed
to break up his Bri ti sh conti ngent, to entrust the eastern flank to a
French commander and to prepare an eventual t ri umphal march into
Const ant i nopl e, led by himself. Ll oyd George vetoed the t ri umphal
entry, and succeeded i n getti ng Cl emenceau to order General Mi l ne
to be rei nstated as commander of Sal oni ka' s Turki s h front. With the
support of Marshal Foch, Ll oyd Ge or ge managed t o change the
Cl emenceau- Franchet d' Esperey strategy of concentrati ng all l and
forces i n the Bal kan theater on the European campai gn. Inst ead
some forces were detached under General Mi l ne to march on
Const ant i nopl e in s upport of an Al l i ed naval attack t hrough the
Dardanel l es.
Ll oyd George propos ed, in a letter to Cl emenceau dated 15
Oct ober, that a Bri ti sh admi ral shoul d l ead the t ri umphal entry into
Const ant i nopl e by sea. On 21 Oct ober Cl emenceau repl i ed, refusi ng
to agree; his count erproposal was that the Al l i ed fl eet st eami ng up
the straits to the Ot t oman capi tal shoul d be under French command.
Cl emenceau argued that si nce a Bri ti sh general had been given
command of the Sal oni ka campai gn agai nst Turkey, i t was i ntol erabl e
that a Bri ti sh officer shoul d al so be gi ven command of the naval
campai gn. He poi nted to the i mmense French i nvestment i n the
Ot t oman publ i c debt as a significant national interest that requi red
France to pl ay a l eadi ng role in mat t ers affecting Turkey.
I I
In hi di ng, in a Greek home in Pera, the residential section of
Const ant i nopl e, was Li eut enant - Col onel Stewart F. Newcombe. A
Bri ti sh officer active in the Arab Revol t, he had been taken pri soner
a year before while l eadi ng a dari ng di versi onary attack duri ng
Al l enby' s Jerus al em campai gn. On his third at t empt , he had suc-
ceeded i n escapi ng from Turki s h capti vi ty, and from 22 Sept ember
B Y T H E S H O R E S O F T R O Y 367
1918 he had been hi di ng in Pera, where he soon l earned that there
were Ot t oman politicians who were i n search of an i mmedi at e
armi sti ce.
Opi ni on in the Ot t oman capi tal was at a turni ng poi nt. Unti l mi d-
Sept ember, C. U. P. members by and l arge still bel i eved i n ul ti mate
victory. Ci vi l i an members of the Cabi net had deferentially accepted
Enver' s assurances that all was goi ng well. Lat er they cl ai med to
have bel i eved the War Mi ni ster when he expl ai ned that the apparent
Ge r man retreat in France was actual l y a brilliant decept i on: a ma-
neuver by the Ge r man General Staff to trap the unwary Al l i ed
armi es and destroy t hem. Enver went so far as to ask Cabi net
members not to gi ve Berl i n' s game away, and to repeat i n publ i cas
though they bel i eved i tthat the Ge r mans had been defeated and
were ret reat i ng.
7
Tal aat , the Gr and Vizier, was better i nformed, knew that the
Germans really were sufferi ng defeats, and therefore advocated a
Ge r man- Tur ki s h bi d for a compromi s e peace; but not even he
believed that i t had to be done urgentl y, for Enver had mi sl ed hi m,
too, into thi nki ng that the mi l i tary si tuati on was sati sfactory for the
moment and that i t offered s ome new grounds for hope .
8
In Sept ember, Tal aat went to Berl i n and Sofi a and l earned some-
thi ng of the true si tuati on from his allies there: on his way back he
wi tnessed the col l apse of the Bul gari an army and was officially notified
that Bul gari a woul d seek a separat e peace. Bul gari a was the l and link
t o Ge r many; her defecti oni n Tal aat ' s j udgment doomed Turkey
to defeat. He returned det ermi ned to seek a peace agreement. In
concert with the Ge r mans , his government prompt l y went ahead to
sound out the Ameri can government on the possibility of surrenderi ng
to the Uni t ed St at es on the basi s of Woodrow Wilson's Fourt een
Poi nts. Washi ngt on, not bei ng at war with the Porte, i nqui red of
Bri tai n how to repl y, but recei ved no response from London; for
whatever reason the Bri ti sh repl y never reached Washi ngt on, whi ch
therefore was unabl e to respond to the Porte. In effect this meant
that the benefit of the Fourt een Poi nts was not avai l abl e to the
Ot t oman Empi r e , for only a power that surrendered to the Uni t ed
St at es coul d expect Ameri can peace t erms.
It was at this point that Newcombe, from his hi di ng pl ace, took a
hand i n mat t ers. Enver, who was det ermi ned to go on with the war,
felt that by conti nui ng to fi ght Turkey coul d win better t erms ; and
poi nted to Tur ki s h successes i n the Caucas us and on the Cas pi an as
proof that he coul d wi n victories in the east that woul d force Bri tai n
to concede favorabl e peace terms i n 1919. The s e were the argument s
that Newcombe assai l ed. He drafted notes for the Young Tur k
l eaders i n whi ch he at t empt ed to prove that just the reverse was t rue:
that Bri tai n woul d grant more favorabl e terms in 1918 than in 1919.
Thr ough hi s Turki s h fri ends, Newcombe' s notes were ci rcul ated at
the Porte, and he reported later that they had produced a prof ound
effect. Accordi ng to his i nformants, the notes had caused a split in
the C. U. P. l eaders hi p.
9
Actual l y the split had been caused by the Cabi net' s real i zati on
brought about by the col l apse of Bul gari a and by Germany' s deci si on
to sue for peacet hat Enver had been decei vi ng it. Turkey' s allies
were not (as Enver had cl ai med) wi nni ng the war; they were faci ng
dest ruct i onand woul d leave the Ot t oman Empi re i sol ated, cut off
from its suppl i es of fuel, ammuni t i on, money, and possi bl e re-
i nforcements, to face the vi ctori ous Al l i ed Powers al one. Earl y in
October the Fi nance Mi ni ster noted i n his diary that "Enver Pasha' s
greatest guilt is that he never kept his fri ends i nformed of the
si tuati on. If he had sai d five or si x mont hs ago that we were in so
difficult a si tuati on, natural l y we woul d have . . . made a favourabl e
separate peace at that ti me. But he conceal ed everythi ng, .and . . . he
del uded himself and brought the country to this s t at e . "
1 0
On the morni ng of 1 Oct ober, soon after Tal aat learned that
Germany was about to sue for peace, he called his Cabi net together
to tell its members that they mus t resi gn. The Ot t oman Empi re was
forced to seek an armi sti ce i mmedi atel y, he told them, and the Allies
woul d i mpose far harsher t erms if they thought that he and his
C. U. P. col l eagues were still i n cont rol .
1 1
Enver and Dj emal di sagreed
and argued that the Cabi net coul d secure better terms by hol di ng on
and hol di ng out, but they were i n the mi nori ty. Tal aat prevai l ed,
and i nformed the Sul t an that he and his Cabi net i ntended to resi gn.
The new Sul t an, Mehmed VI , who had succeeded t o the throne
several mont hs earlier on the death of his brother, was provi ded with
a new Grand Vizier and Cabi net only with the greatest difficulty.
Th e Sul t an preferred a neutral Cabi net , or perhaps one drawn from
the ranks of the political opposi t i on, but Tal aat and the Young
Turkey Party still control l ed the Parl i ament, the pol i ce, and the
army, and demanded representati on in the Cabi net to keep watch on
the new regi me. It took a week to find a st at esman approved by
the Sul t an yet prepared to agree to Tal aat ' s t erms. At last the
di st i ngui shed Fi el d Marshal Ahmet Izzet Pas haa man bel i eved t o
be acceptabl e to the Al l i esf ormed a new Cabi net that i ncl uded
several members of the C. U. P. On 13 October Tal aat and his mi ni -
sters formal l y resi gned. The next day Izzet Pasha drove t hrough
silent, gl oomy crowds to the Porte to take office.
Th e Ot t oman si tuati on was more grave than the Al l i ed Powers
real i zed. The fall of Bul gari a had severed the l and route to Aust ri a
and Germany, cutti ng off hope as well as suppl i es. Within Turkey
itself half a million maraudi ng deserters from the Ot t oman army
brought chaos i n their wake. Though he di d not weaken his posi ti on
by di scl osi ng it, the new Gr and Vizier felt that it was not possi bl e to
go on with the war. Two days after taki ng office, Izzet Pasha at-
t empt ed to send Col onel Newcombe to Greecet he nearest Al l i ed
army headquart ers t o try to bri ng the war to an end, but no air-
pl ane coul d be found i n which to fl y hi m there.
Th e Porte therefore sent an emi ssary by sea: another Bri ti sh
pri soner-of-war, General Charl es Towns hend. Towns hend had sur-
rendered to the Ot t oman army at Kut i n Mes opot ami a i n the spri ng
of 1916, and had lived ever si nce under house arrest on an i sl and off
Const ant i nopl e. Entertai ned and lionized by the Ot t oman l eaders, he
moved with relative f reedom in the political society of the capi tal .
Towns hend became aware i n the aut umn of 1918 of ri si ng peace
senti ment and, like Newcombe, he deci ded to gi ve events a p u s h .
1 2
When Towns hend learned that the Tal aat mi ni stry had fallen, he
arranged an interview with the new Gr and Vizier, and on 17 Oct ober
went to the Subl i me Porte carryi ng s ome notes that he had sketched
out to i ndi cate the sort of peace t erms that mi ght be asked by
Bri tai n. Hi s notes suggest ed that Bri t ai n woul d be willing to leave
the Ot t oman Empi re i n possessi on of Syri a, Mesopot ami a, and per-
haps even the Caucas us , so l ong as these regi ons were allowed local
aut onomy within a restructured empi re that woul d resembl e a
confederati on of states.
Towns hend offered to help Turkey obtai n generous t erms al ong
these lines and offered to make i mmedi at e contact with the Bri ti sh
authori ti es. Th e Gr and Vizier told hi m that i t was a cri me for the
Ot t oman Empi re to have made war on Bri tai n, and that i t was
Enver' s faul t. He accepted Towns hend' s offer of hel p i n securi ng
honorabl e peace t erms wi thout letting Towns hend suspect that he
woul d accept whatever terms he coul d get.
That eveni ng Towns hend met with the Mi ni ster of the Mari ne,
who was his best friend i n the new mi ni stry, and who set out
Turkey' s armi sti ce t erms, which were similar to those outl i ned i n
Towns hend' s notes. Arrangement s were then made to send
Towns hend out of Tur ke y through the port of Smyrna. Under cover
of darkness, he left Smyr na on a t ugboat .
Earl y i n the morni ng of 20 Oct ober, Townshend' s t ugboat reached
the Greek i sl and of Mi tyl ene, where it encountered a motor vessel of
the Bri ti sh navy. Fr o m Mi tyl ene, Towns hend wi red the detai l s of
the Tur ki s h posi ti on to the Forei gn Office i n London. At his request,
a fast vessel then took hi m to the Bri ti sh naval commander in the
Aegean, Admi ral Cal t horpe, whose headquart ers were at the Greek
island of Le mno s .
Towns hend tol d London that the new Gr and Vizier was willing to
make peace on the basi s of the sort of generous t erms that he himself
had sketched out i n Const ant i nopl e. He gave London the i mpressi on
that i f such generous t erms were not offered, the Ot t oman Empi re
woul d conti nue to wage war. Above all, however, he i ndi cated that
the Porte wanted to deal with Bri tai n rather than with the other
Allies. ( In f act t hough Towns hend di d not know i tIzzet' s first
at t empt had been to establ i sh contact with France, but his emi ssary
had not yet been abl e to get t hrough to French he adquar t e r s .
1 3
For
decades afterward the Bri ti sh conti nued to bel i eveas have most
hi stori ansthat Turkey had i nsi sted on surrenderi ng to them rather
than to the French. )
Cal t horpe, on 20 Oct ober, also cabl ed the news to London. He
stressed (accordi ng to the Pri me Mi ni st er) "that the Tur ks parti cu-
larly wanted to deal with us, not with the Fr e nc h. "
1 4
At the s ame
ti me Cal t horpe attacked the French pl an of taki ng command of the
fl eet that woul d st ream toward Const ant i nopl e. Accordi ng to
Cal thorpe' s cabl e, "the effect of a Fl eet under French command
goi ng up to Const ant i nopl e woul d be depl orabl e. "
1 5
Of course no
Allied fleet coul d enter the Dardanel l es safely unl ess the forts on
shore were turned over to the Allies. Cal t horpe reported that Town-
shend sai d the Tur ks woul d make this concessi on, not to all of the
Allied forces, but to Bri tai n, if she woul d agree to protect them
agai nst whatever action mi ght be taken by the Ge r man forces re-
mai ni ng i n the vicinity. "General Towns hend thinks that the Tur ks
woul d be willing to send pl eni -potenti ari es now to treat for peace
with Bri ti sh representati ves and that they woul d allow the Bri ti sh to
take over the Fort s of the Dardanel l es if they were assured of support
agai nst the Germans i n Turkey and the Bl ack S e a . "
1 6
Th e t el egrams from Towns hend and Cal t horpe led to the longest
Bri ti sh Cabi net meeti ng of the war. Th e Cabi net , still somewhat
fearful that the war agai nst Germany mi ght drag on into 1919 or
1920, wanted to secure sea passage for the Royal Navy t hrough the
Dardanel l es into the Bl ack Sea, where the fl eet coul d move to the
Rumani an coast to play a significant role in the final st ages of the war
i n Europe. Th e Cabi net agreed, i f necessary, to di spense with the
rest of the twenty-four terms of the Allied armi sti ce proposal so long
as the Tur ks ceased hostilities, turned over the Dardanel l es forts,
and di d everythi ng possi bl e to ensure safe passage for the fl eet
through the strai ts and into the Bl ack Sea.
The Cabi net authori zed Cal t horpe to negotiate an armi sti ce rather
than a peace agreement because the latter woul d requi re consul tati on
with the Allies and thus woul d cause de l ays .
1 7
The Cabi net told hi m
to accept no less than surrender of the Dardanel l es forts and free
passage t hrough the strai ts. Th e Cabi net also i nstructed hi m to ask
for the rest of the twenty-four t erms and to secure the adopti on of as
many of t hem as possi bl e, but to gi ve way i f the Tur ks woul d not
agree to t hem.
Th e French Forei gn Mi ni ster prot est ed on the ground that France
had not been consul ted before the Cabi net gave Cal t horpe authori z-
ation to negoti ate and to depart f rom the armi sti ce t erms upon which
the Allies had agreed. Cl emenceau was furi ous. It was not that the
French Premi er had changed hi s opi ni ons and now harbored desi gns
on the Mi ddl e Eas t ; i t was that he di d not want France treated as
t hough she were a subordi nat e or defeated c ount r y.
1 8
Th e Cabi net
qui ckl y sent Lo r d Mi l ner to Pari s to expl ai n mat t ers to Cl emenceau,
and for the moment the French were mollified.
A new cause of contenti on arose as soon as the French became
aware of the Bri ti sh i nterpretati on of the inter-Allied agreement as to
who shoul d conduct armi sti ce negoti ati ons. Th e agreement provi ded
that the first member of the Al l i ance approached by Turkey for an
armi sti ce shoul d conduct the negoti ati ons. Bri tai n, havi ng been ap-
proached by the Tur ks t hrough Towns hend, i nterpreted the agree-
ment to mean that she shoul d not merel y conduct the negoti ati ons,
but shoul d conduct t hem al one.
Th e Bri ti sh government i nstructed Admi ral Cal t horpe t o excl ude
the French f rom the negoti ati ons shoul d they at t empt to parti ci pate
in t hem. Perhaps the Bri ti sh were afrai d that the French, if al l owed
to parti ci pate, woul d insist on maki ng demands on Turkey that
woul d del ay or prevent the concl udi ng of an armi s t i ce.
1 9
Or alter-
natively, i t may have been (as many i n France bel i eved) an overt
openi ng move i n the Bri ti sh campai gn to deny France the posi ti on
that had been promi sed to her i n the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t .
Ill
Th e armi sti ce conference opened at 9:30 i n the morni ng on Sunday,
27 Oct ober 1918, aboard the Agamemnon, a Bri ti sh battl eshi p at
anchor off the port of Mudros on the Greek island of Le mnos . Th e
smal l Ot t oman del egati on was headed by Towns hend' s friend Rauf
Bey, the new Mi ni ster of the Mari ne. Th e Bri ti sh del egati on was
headed by Admi ral Cal t horpe.
Cal t horpe showed the Ot t oman del egati on a letter he had recei ved
from Vi ce-Admi ral Je an F. C. Amet , the seni or French naval officer
i n the area, stati ng hi s government' s desi re that he shoul d parti ci pate
i n the negoti ati ons. He proposed to attend the meeti ngs aboard the
Agamemnon as the representati ve of Vi ce- Admi ral Domi ni que M.
Gauchet , the Al l i ed naval commander-i n-chi ef i n the Medi t erranean
and, as such, Cal t horpe' s superi or officer.
Th e Ot t oman del egates expl ai ned that they were accredi ted only to
the Bri ti sh, not to the French. Cal t horpe repl i ed that it woul d not
have been desi rabl e for the French to parti ci pate i n any event. He
refused to invite Admi ral Amet aboard the Agamemnon.
Th e negoti ati ons were conduct ed i n the captai n' s after-day cabi n
on deck. In a seemi ngl y open spi ri t, Cal t horpe began by readi ng
al oud and di scussi ng the proposed armi sti ce t erms one at a ti me. As
the Ot t oman del egates di d not at first see the document in its entirety,
they di d not i mmedi atel y comprehend the cumul at i ve effect of its
twenty-four cl auses. Moreover, Cal t horpe assured t hem that Bri tai n
meant no harm and i ntended only to be hel pful . He expl ai ned what
he s uppos ed to be the Al l i ed purpos e i n f rami ng the vari ous cl auses
in such a way as to suggest that they provi ded remedi es for conti n-
genci es so remot e that i t was unlikely they woul d ever have to be
i nvoked. At the s ame t i me, he managed to suggest that there was not
much gi ve in the Allied posi t i on: that if the Tur ks wanted an
armi sti ce, they woul d have to accept the Al l i ed draft more or l ess i n
its entirety.
Seei ng no al ternati ve, on the eveni ng of 30 Oct ober the head of the
Ot t oman del egati on, Rauf Bey, si gned an armi sti ce little changed
f rom the original Al l i ed draft. It provi ded that hostilities shoul d
cease as of noon the following day. Th e armi sti ce was in fact a
surrender which permi t t ed the Allies to occupy strategi c poi nts i n
the Ot t oman Empi re shoul d their securi ty be threatened: i n effect
the Allies were free to occupy any territory they wanted.
When Rauf Bey and his fellow del egates returned to
Const ant i nopl e, they cl ai med that the armi sti ce di d not consti tute a
surrender and pi ctured its t erms as far more lenient than they actually
we r e .
2 0
In doi ng so they sowed the seeds of later di si l l usi on and
di scontent.
While the armi sti ce negoti ati ons were goi ng on, Tal aat convened a
meeti ng of close political associ ates at Enver' s villa to f ound an
underground organi zati on desi gned t o protect those Young Turkey
l eaders who were to remai n i n the country from possi bl e Al l i ed
repri sal s, in case there shoul d be any, and also to lay the ground for
armed resi stance to Al l i ed t erms shoul d that prove necessary.
Underground cells were organi zed i n Const ant i nopl e and thereafter
throughout the provi nces.
For themsel ves, Enver, Tal aat , and Dj emal made arrangement s
(of which the Gr and Vizier was aware) to e s c a pe ;
2 1
and on 2
November the ex-rul ers of Const ant i nopl e fl ed with their Ge r man
allies. Th e following day, 3 November, the Gr and Vizier went
through the mot i ons of demandi ng that the Ge r mans return the
fugitives, but Germany was di si ntegrati ng and the fugi ti ves had
di sappeared.
IV
Cl emenceau, the French Premi er, was enraged at Bri tai n' s havi ng
made unilateral deci si ons at Mudr os , and protested vehementl y at a
sessi on of the Supr e me War Counci l of the Allies at the Quai d' Orsay
on 30 Oct ober. But Ll oyd George, accordi ng to observers, gave back
better than he got. Col onel Hous e, Woodrow Wilson's emi ssary, sai d
of the two pri me mi ni sters that "they bandi ed words like fish-wives,
at least Ll oyd George di d. "
2 2
Ll oyd George told Cl emenceau and the others that
except for Great Bri tai n no one had contri buted anythi ng more
than a handful of bl ack troops to the expedi ti on in Pal esti ne . . .
Th e Bri ti sh had now some 500, 000 men on Turki s h soil. Th e
Bri ti sh had capt ured three or four Turki s h Armi es and had
i ncurred hundreds of t housands of casual ti es in the war with
Tur ke y. Th e other government s had only put i n a few ni gger
pol i cemen to see that we di d not steal the Hol y Sepul chre!
When, however, it came to si gni ng an armi sti ce, all this fuss
was ma d e .
2 3
Bal f our poi nt ed out that Franchet d' Esperey had negoti ated the
Bul gari an armi sti ce wi thout consul ti ng Bri tai n, and that Cal t horpe
had been no less entitled to negoti ate the Turki s h armi sti ce wi thout
consul ti ng France. Cl emenceau took counsel with his Forei gn
Mi ni ster and, i n the end, agreed that as the Armi st i ce of Mudr os was
al ready si gned, there was nothi ng further to be done about it; he
woul d consi der the matter cl osed. '
On 12 November 1918, al most two weeks after the Turki s h
armi sti ce was si gned and the day after the armi sti ce on the western
front, a s quadron under the command of Admi ral Cal t horpe entered
the straits of the Dardanel l es, passi ng cl ose to the rui ned site of
ancient Tr oy, and st eamed i n t ri umph toward Cons t ant i nopl e
under the Bri ti sh fl ag.
V
One of the Bri ti sh Pri me Mi ni ster' s reasons for acti ng qui ckl y in the
Tur ki s h matter was that he wanted to settle thi ngs before the Uni t ed
* Three thousand years before, Troy had seen another wartime European alliance
come to grief when Agamemnon, the leader of the alliance, did what Britain did
aboard the Agamemnon: he withheld a victory prize that previously had been
awarded to an ally.
St at es i ntervened. An entry for 6 Oct ober in the di ary of Mauri ce
Hankey, Secretary to the War Cabi net , records an unusual l y frank
statement by the Pri me Mi ni ster of what he i ntended to do.
LI G took a very intransigeant atti tude and wanted us to go
back on the Sykes- Pi cot agreement , so as to get Pal esti ne for
us arid to bri ng Mos ul into the Bri t i sh zone, and even to keep
the French out of Syri a. He al so had some subtl e dodge for
aski ng Ameri ca to take Pal esti ne and Syri a, i n order to render
the French more anxi ous to gi ve us Pal esti ne, so that they
mi ght have an excuse of [for] keepi ng Syri a. He was also very
cont empt uous of Presi dent Wi l son and anxi ous to arrange the
di vi si on of Turkey between France, Ital y, and G. B. before
speaki ng to Ameri ca. He also t hought i t woul d attract l ess
attention to our enormous gai ns in the war if we swal l owed our
share of Tur ke y now, and the Ge r man colonies l at e r .
2 4
Bal four took a much different poi nt of view. When the French
suggest ed doi ng what Ll oyd George had i n mi ndset t l i ng mat t ers
before the Ameri cans arri vedBal f our thought the suggest i on little
short of i nsane. "Thei r del i berate effort to excl ude the Ameri cans
from any effective share in the worl d settl ement is . . . neither in our
interest nor i n that of the French themsel ves . . . Hous e i s undoubt -
edly anxi ous to work with us as closely as he can and i t woul d be
fatal to gi ve hi m the i mpressi on that we were settl i ng or had the least
desi re to settle great quest i ons behi nd hi s bac k. "
2 5
Bal f our bel i eved
that the stabi l i ty of the peace settl ement woul d requi re Ameri can
parti ci pati on. Unl i ke the Pri me Mi ni ster, he was not only si ncere in
offeri ng the Uni t ed St at es the mandat e for Pal esti ne, but bel i eved i t
vital that she shoul d be made to accept it.
Le o Amery, of the War Office and the War Cabi net secretari at,
who had become politically cl ose to the Pri me Mi ni ster, feared rather
than hoped that the Uni t ed St at es mi ght accept such an offer if it
were made. He wrote to the Zi oni st leader Dr Chai m Wei zmann to
ask hi m to work agai nst a U. S . t rust eeshi p, and secured a statement
from Dr Wei zmann that he agreed with Amery that Bri tai n woul d be
a better choi ce as the mandat ory po we r .
2 6
However, Mauri ce Hankey, Secret ary to the War Cabi net and
Amery' s i mmedi at e superi or, was in favor of a U. S . trusteeshi p as a
way for Bri tai n to secure the strategi c benefit of excl udi ng any
potential enemy from Pal esti ne wi thout as s umi ng the burden of
doi ng so herself. He tol d Ll oyd George that he wanted the Uni t ed
St at es to have Pal esti ne "with the object of creati ng a buffer state to
cover Eg y pt . "
2 7
Impl i ci t i n hi s suggesti on was the old Ki t chener
notion that Pal esti ne was of no val ue in herself. Ll oyd George, of
course, di sagreed.
VI
On 1 December 1918 Cl emenceau met i n London with Ll oyd George
at 10 Downi ng St reet . It was a mont h after the armi sti ces, and a
coupl e of mont hs before the peace conferences were to open in Pari s.
It was not until the end of December that the Presi dent of the
Uni t ed St at es was to visit London and outline his idealistic vision of
the f ut ure; there was ti me to reach pri vate agreement s before then.
The two pri me mi ni sters met al one and neither took notes. An
account of what occurred was suppl i ed i n wri ti ng to the Bri ti sh
Cabi net some eight mont hs later by Bal f our, who presumabl y had i t
from Ll oyd George. Lat er i t was confi rmed i n Ll oyd George' s
memoi rs of the peace treati es.
In the course of a conversati on that began with European ques-
tions, the subject of the Mi ddl e Eas t was rai sed. Cl emenceau asked
what modi fi cati ons of the French cl ai ms were desi red by Bri tai n.
Ll oyd George repl i ed: "Mosul . "* Cl emenceau sai d, "You shall have
it. Anyt hi ng el se?" Ll oyd George repl i ed, "Pal esti ne. " Agai n
Cl emenceau sai d, "You shall have i t . "
2 8
A man of his word,
Cl emenceau kept to it t hrough all the bitter wrangl i ng of the peace
conferences, despi te the fact that there was no written confi rmati on
of his concessi ons and even though the Bri ti sh di d not recogni ze that
he expected to receive compensat i on for t hem.
Throughout his long political life, it had been Cl emenceau' s policy
to defer to Bri tai n in the Mi ddl e Eas t in order to secure her support
i n Europe agai nst Ge r many; and that i s what the French Premi er
seems to have bel i eved that he had accompl i shed on 1 December.
Apparent l y Cl emenceau bel i evedwrongl y, as i t turned out t hat
he had obtai ned at least the tacit agreement of Ll oyd George to
support France' s cl ai ms i n Europe i n return for Cl emenceau' s express
agreement to grant Bri tai n' s cl ai ms i n the Mi ddl e Eas t .
But in fact the two pri me mi ni sters had not even reached an
agreement about the Mi ddl e Eas t on 1 December. It transpi red over
the course of the next few mont hs that Ll oyd George had not
presented all of his Mi ddl e East ern cl ai ms when asked by Cl emenceau
to do so on 1 December; in addi ti on to those he menti oned, he also
wanted France to rel i nqui sh her cl ai m to Syri a.
In this Ll oyd George was not pursui ng a purel y personal foreign
policy; on 2 Decembert he day following the Ll oyd George-
* Mosul, commercial center of the oil-rich region that is now northern Iraq, had
been promised to France in the Sykes-Picot negotiations (1916) by Sykes and
Kitchener.
In French political circles, it was believed that Lloyd George had given assur-
ances in returnthough it is not clear what they were supposed to have been.
Cl emenceau meet i ngLord Curzon told the East ern Commi t t ee of
the Cabi net that he bel i eved it was i mperati ve to excl ude France
from Syri a. Curzon, who was chai rman of the commi t t eewhi ch the
Cabi net had entrusted with the task of redefining Bri tai n' s goal s i n
the Mi ddl e East f el l back on the logic of the Great Ga me i n which
he had earlier pl ayed so conspi cuous a rol e. Former Vi ceroy of Indi a
and traveler al ong the t hen- expandi ng Russi an frontier, he had be-
lieved earlier, and now had come to believe agai n, that Bri tai n' s
strategi c goal was to prevent any Great Power f rom cutti ng the road
to Indi a. The r e was no reason to believe that France, Bri tai n' s
European partner, had any intention of i nterferi ng with Bri tai n' s
road to the Eas t . But possessi on of Syri a woul d put France i n a
position to do s o; and i ndeed woul d make France the only Great
Power that coul d mount such a threat.
As the General Staff argued in a memorandum of 9 December
1918, "It is difficult to see how any arrangement coul d be more
objecti onabl e f rom the military poi nt of view than the Sykes-Pi cot
Agreement of 1916, by whi ch an enterpri si ng and ambi t i ous foreign
power is pl aced on interior lines wi th reference to our position in the
Mi ddl e Ea s t . "
2 9
That was Curzon' s view, too.
Lo r d Curzon told the East ern Commi t t ee that
A good deal of my publ i c life has been spent in connecti on with
the political ambi t i ons of France in al most every di stant region
where the French have sway. We have been brought , for reasons
of national safety, into an alliance with the French, which I
hope will last, but their national character is different from
ours, and their political i nterests collide with ours i n many
cases. I am seri ousl y afrai d that the great power from whom we
have most to fear in future is Fr a n c e .
3 0
Curzon took an especi al l y spaci ous view of the area from which
France therefore had to be excl uded i n Asi a. Th e Chi ef of the
Imperi al General Staff, Si r Henry Wi l son, who saw thi ngs si mi l arl y,
wrote that, "from the left bank of the Don to Indi a is our interest
and pres erve. "
3 1
Bal f our was skepti cal ; the gateways to Indi a, he
remarked, were "getting further and further from Indi a, and I do not
know how far west they are goi ng to be brought by the General
St af f . "
3 2
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster was not of a mi nd to ground his policies in
any such geopol i ti cal theory. So far as one can tell, Ll oyd George
was si mpl y tryi ng to keep as much capt ured territory as he coul d; i n
the Syri a matter, he appears to have been merel y an opportuni st
i ndul gi ng i n unsyst emat i c overreachi ng.
VI I
Support for the Pri me Mi ni ster' s objecti ves came from the Ki t chener
loyalists in the Mi ddl e Eas t , who had been sayi ng for more than a
year that Bri tai n had to have Pal esti ne, usi ng the pretext that she
needed it in order to reconcile Arabs and Jews . A few mont hs after
the Armi st i ce of Mudros , General Gi l bert Cl ayton enl arged on this
line of argument . In a memorandum that appears to have reached
the Pri me Mi ni ster' s desk, he cl ai med that after some mont hs of
experi ence in occupati on of former Ot t oman terri tori es, it had become
clear to hi m that in practi ce the commi t ment s made by Bri tai n to
Francenot merel y i n Pal esti ne, but also i n Syr i ahad become
i ncompati bl e with those made to Arabi s m and Zi oni sm. Fri cti on was
bound to conti nue and to create dangers for Bri tai n. A choi ce, he
wrote, had to be made. Cl ayt on argued that i f Syri a had to be gi ven
to France, then Bri tai n shoul d renounce interest in Pal esti ne in favor
of the Uni t ed St at es or some other country willing to as s ume the
burden. Th e better al ternati ve, however, woul d be for Bri tai n to take
over the government both of Pal esti ne and Syri a, with due regard to
both Jewi sh and Arab aspi rati ons, and t o reward France el sewhere,
perhaps by gi vi ng her Cons t ant i nopl e.
3 3
In the winter of 1919 the office of the Pri me Mi ni ster di stri buted
to the Bri ti sh press a confidential background me mor andum purport -
ing to show that Fei sal ' s forces "materially assi sted" General Al l enby
in the conquest of Syri a and that they entered "the four great inland
towns of Syri a [ Damas cus , Horns, Hama, and Al eppo] ahead of
General Al l enby' s other forces" and di d so, accordi ng to the memo-
randum, not as foreign i nvaders f rom the Hej az, but as a native
force. "The great majori ty of the Arab t roops who thus assi sted i n
l i berati ng Syri a were nati ves of the provi nce. "
3 4
Th e tendency of the
memorandum was t o demonst rat e that Arabi c- speaki ng Syri a had
risen up and freed herself, and that it woul d be contrary to the
pri nci pl es prof essed by the western democraci es to at t empt to re-
i mpose forei gn rul e.
Fei sal ' s Arab corps i n the Pal esti ne and Syri a campai gns was com-
posed of approxi mat el y 3, 500 men, but Ll oyd George obtai ned from
Fei sal a publ i c statement that the Arabs who at one t i me or another
duri ng the war had served or allied with hi m or his father numbered
about 100, 000; and i n his argument agai nst the French that i s the
figure the Pri me Mi ni ster used. Ll oyd George knew the figure to be
wildly inflated ("Eastern ari thmeti c is proverbi al l y romant i c, " he
later wrote) and i ndeed he believed the Ar ab contri buti on to the con-
quest of Pal esti ne and Syri a "was al most i nsi gni fi cant. "
3 5
As agai nst
the French, however, the Pri me Mi ni ster argued that he was pl aced
in a difficult posi ti on when asked by t hem to act agai nst his other
PART I X
THE TIDE GOES OUT
40
THE TI CKI NG CLOCK
i
Victory in the Fi rst World War brought the British Empi r e to its
zenith: with the addi ti on of the territories it had occupi ed in the
Mi ddl e East and el sewhere, i t had become larger than i tor any
other empi rehad ever been before. Ll oyd George, t hough his
country was war-weary and tired of di stant and expensi ve advent ures,
sought to hold on to as much as possi bl e of what Bri tai n had gai ned in
the war. That was to be a chief objecti ve in the negoti ati ons he was
about to begi n with the other Allied and Associ ated Powers. But
before t urni ng to the Peace Conf erence, the Pri me Mi ni ster chose to
seek a mandat e from the el ectorate.
On the night that the armi sti ce with Germany was si gned, the
Pri me Mi ni ster asked only two other politicians to di ne with hi m and
with the Chi ef of the Imperi al General Staff, Si r Henry Wi l son, at
Downi ng St reet . The y were Wi nston Churchi l l and Churchi l l ' s best
friend, the brilliant At t orney- General , F. E. Smi t h. In his di ary, Si r
Henry Wilson noted that "we di scussed many thi ngs but pri nci pal l y
the General El ecti on!"
1
With his keen eye for political advant age, the Pri me Mi ni ster saw a
chance to win at the polls by calling an election in the i mmedi at e flush
of victory. With a renewed and secure parl i amentary majori ty, he
hoped to gai n ti me to carry through his programs . He sought his new
mandat e when his popul ari ty was at its height. At the end of 1918 he
was still "the man who won the war. " Th e leader of the Conservati ve
Party spoke for many in sayi ng that "He can be Pri me Mi ni ster for life
if he l i kes. "
2
The general election took pl ace on 14 December 1918, t hough to
allow ti me to receive sol di ers' bal l ots, the votes were not counted until
28 December. Li beral Pri me Mi ni ster Ll oyd George and his political
partner, the Conservat i ve leader Andrew Bonar Law, led the govern-
mental Coal i ti on. Asqui t h' s wi ng of the Li beral s contested the elec-
ti ons; and Labour also dropped out of the Coal i ti on to do so.
384 T H E T I D E G O E S O U T
The Coal i ti on scored an overwhel mi ng victory. Even Ll oyd George
was stunned by its magni t ude. Al most 85 percent of those who took
their seats in the new Hous e of Commons were his support ers.
Asqui th' s Li beral s were crushed by the Coal i ti oni sts and Asqui t h
himself lost his seat, as di d other promi nent l eaders of the prewar
Li beral Party. Th e Asqui t h Li beral s were overtaken by Labour,
which for the first ti me coul d lay cl ai m to be the official Opposi t i on.
The nature of the electorate had been radically t ransf ormed by
warti me legislation that for the first ti me gave the vote to women
(from the age of thirty) and to all men (from the age of twenty-one).
Twent y- one million peopl e were eligible to vote in 1918, as compared
with a mere seven and a half million before the war; and both the new
worki ng-cl ass and women voters seemed to have radically different
ideas about such i ssues as payi ng the bills for imperial expansi on
abroad.
For Ll oyd George, a potentially di squi eti ng feature of his spec-
tacular t ri umph was that the electoral gai ns for the most part were
made by Bonar Law' s Conservat i ves rather than by his own Li beral s .
Indeed the Conservati ves commanded a majori ty in the new Hous e
of Commons . Many of the Conservat i ves were new men, taki ng their
seats in the Hous e of Commons for the first t i me; and, of these,
many were busi nessmen who tended toward the right wi ng of their
party. Thei r political agenda was not the s ame as the Pri me
Mi ni ster' s.
For the moment , however, the Pri me Mi ni ster received full s up-
port from Andrew Bonar Law and therefore felt politically secure.
Ll oyd George had formed a cl ose worki ng partnershi p with the
Conservati ve leader that sui ted both men well. Modest and shy,
Bonar Law was happy to let the exuberant and colorful Pri me
Mi ni ster take the lead and the limelight. "I tell you we must never let
the little man go, " said Bonar Law to one of his l i eutenants, in
reference to the di mi nuti ve occupant of 10 Downi ng St reet . "Hi s
way and ours lie si de by si de in the f ut ure. "
3
II
Winston Churchi l l , a 45-year-ol d politician tryi ng to live down his
past, was asked by Ll oyd George to serve as Secretary of St at e for
War and for Air in the postwar Cabi net . The Pri me Mi ni ster ten-
dered his offer of the two mi ni stri es ("Of course there will be but one
sal ary!") on 9 January 1919.
4
Churchi l l accepted the offer the follow-
ing day. As Mi ni ster of Muni t i ons he had not been a member of the
War Cabi net , so his entry into the War Office marked his return to
T H E T I C K I N G C L O C K 385
the inner circles of government . Predi ct abl y, the appoi nt ment aroused
violent opposi t i on.
A Conservat i ve newspaper comment ed that "we have wat ched his
brilliant and erratic course in the confident expectation that sooner or
later he woul d make a mess of anyt hi ng he undert ook. Charact er is
dest i ny; there is some tragic flaw in Mr Churchill which det ermi nes
him on every occasi on in the wrong course . . . It is an appoi nt ment
which makes us t rembl e for the f ut ur e. "
5
Churchi l l , who had to over come a reput at i ondeserved or not
for squander i ng the resources of the count ry, set out to show that he
coul d be economi cal : he ar gued that ambi t i ous policies ought to be
scaled back if the resources to suppor t t hem were not avai l abl e. But
when he suggest ed that Britain mi ght lack the money and the man-
power to back up Ll oyd Geor ge' s pl ans for Britain to repl ace the
Ot t oman Empi r e i n the Mi ddl e East , the Pri me Mi ni st er pointedly
ignored hi m.
Th e Pr i me Mi ni st er cl ai med that Britain was entitled t o play the
domi nant role in the Mi ddl e East , recalling that at one t i me or
another t wo and a half million Bri t i sh t roops had been sent there,
and that a quart er of a million had been killed or wounded; while the
Fr ench, Gal l i pol i apart , had suffered practically no casual t i es in the
Mi ddl e East , and the Amer i cans had not been there at al l .
6
At the
Peace Conference, Ll oyd Geor ge ar gued that his cl ai m was based on
the 1, 084, 000 Bri t i sh and imperial t roops occupyi ng the Ot t oman
Empi r e .
7
In the occupat i on forces, as he poi nt ed out , there were no
non-Bri t i sh cont i ngent s of meaningful si ze.
Dur i ng the war, accordi ng to the Secret ary of the Cabi net , the
Pri me Mi ni st er had "never lost sight of the advant ages he mi ght hope
to derive at the eventual peace conference from the acqui si t i on of the
territory of our enemi es . "
8
Ll oyd Geor ge had sai d to a friend that
"once we were in military possessi on it woul d make a great
di fference. "
9
What Wi nst on Churchill insistently repeat ed was that this situa-
tionthe occupat i on of the Mi ddl e East by a million Bri t i sh
sol di er swas only t empor ar y; the t roops demanded t o be brought
home. Thi s was the fi rst probl em with which Churchi l l had t o
gr appl e as War Mi ni st er, and he cont ended that it i mposed new
priorities on the government as a whol e.
On 10 Januar y 1919, Churchi l l ' s first day in office as Secret ary of
St at e for War, the Chief of the Imperi al General St aff urgently
consul t ed him about a crisis in the r anks: sol di ers had demonst r at ed,
demandi ng i mmedi at e demobi l i zat i on. Di sor der was wi despr ead, and
Churchill feared that the unrest mi ght lead to a Bol shevi k upri si ng;
later he wrote that such fears were valid at the t i me because " S o
many frightful thi ngs had happened, and such t remendous col l apses
of establ i shed structures had been wi tnessed, the nati ons had suffered
so l ong, that a tremor, and i ndeed a s pas m, shook the foundati ons of
every St a t e . "
1 0
Churchi l l believed that the troops had to be brought
home as fast as the rai l roads and t roopshi ps coul d bri ng t hem.
A fortnight later 5, 000 Bri ti sh t roops at Cal ai s muti ni ed to demand
demobi l i zati on, but Churchi l l was ahead of them with his sol uti on,
for he had al ready prepared a demobi l i zati on pl an of evi dent fai rness;
and under his direction it was rapi dl y carri ed into effect throughout
1919.
But demobi l i zati on threatened to prej udi ce Bri tai n' s chances of
i mposi ng peace t erms. Fi el d Marshal Si r Dougl as Hai g, Commander-
in-Chief of the Bri ti sh Expedi t i onary Force i n Europe, told
Churchi l l on 15 January 1919 that the exi sti ng Bri ti sh army "was
rapi dl y di sappeari ng, " and unl ess an army of occupati on was created,
"the Ge r mans woul d be in a posi ti on to negoti ate another kind of
pe ac e . "
1 1
The s ame woul d be true of the Tur ks . A few days later
Churchi l l submi t t ed a me mor andum to the Pri me Mi ni ster in whi ch
he argued that "Unl ess we are to be def rauded of the frui ts of victory
and . . . to throw away all that we have won with so much cost and
troubl e, we mus t provi de for a good many mont hs to come Armi es of
Occupat i on for the enemy' s terri tory. The s e armi es mus t be st rong
enough to extract from the Ge r mans , Tur ks and others" the t erms
de ma nde d.
1 2
To gi ve the Pri me Mi ni ster ti me t o i mpose his peace t erms,
Churchi l l at t empt ed to mai ntai n armi es of occupati on with newly
i nducted t roops, on the basi s of Bri tai n' s fi rst peaceti me draft; but
the Pri me Mi ni ster, mi ndful of domest i c political realities, ordered a
reducti on in the size of Churchi l l ' s armi es. Lat er Churchi l l was
obl i ged to promi se that conscri pti on woul d come to an end by March
1920. Though he warned the Hous e of Commons , "Do not di sband
your army until you have got your t e r ms , "
1 3
political consi derati ons
forced a demobi l i zati on so rapi d that, by October 1919, Churchi l l
admi t t ed that "the Army had mel ted away. "
1 4
Yet i n the Eas t , as will
be seen presentl y, Bri tai n had still not got her t erms. In 1914
Churchi l l had been the Cabi net mi ni ster most keenly aware that the
ti metabl es of mobi l i zati on were dri vi ng the Great Powers into a
worl d war; i n 1919 he was the Cabi net mi ni ster most keenly aware
that the ti metabl es of demobi l i zati on were forci ng the empi re to
abandon the field before victory had been secured.
He also saw that, in order for Bri tai n to live within her means, the
government urgentl y needed to cut expenses. Churchi l l promi sed the
Commons that "I shall do my ut most to secure substanti al reduct i ons
in military forces, for wi thout those reducti ons good finance is i m-
pos s i bl e. "
1 5
In fact in the years to come he sl ashed expendi t ures to a
T H E T I C K I N G C L O C K 387
mere 17 percent of what they had been, from 604 million pounds in
1919 to 111 million pounds i n 1 9 2 2 .
1 6
Another probl em, he argued, had to be f aced: bri ngi ng the Bri ti sh
troops home left the Mi ddl e Eas t i n the hands of Indi an sol di ers.
Bri ti sh Indi a, duri ng the 1914 war, had sent more t han a million
troops overseas, many of t hem Mo s l e m.
1 7
At the begi nni ng of 1920
Churchi l l poi nt ed out to the Cabi net the political consequences of
the fact that these predomi nant l y Mos l em sol di ers were the occu-
pati on t roops who had been left i n pl ace, entrusted with the di staste-
ful task of coerci ng fellow Mos l ems . Churchi l l wrote that "All our
limited means of getti ng the Mi ddl e Eas t to settle down qui etl y are
compri sed i n the use of Indi an t roops. We mus t not do anythi ng that
will raise Indi an senti ment agai nst the use of these t roops or affect
their own l oyal t y. "
1 8
Si nce Bri tai n now had to rely on her Mosl em
t roops, her pol i ci es i n the Mi ddl e Eas t woul d have to be modi fi ed so
as not to offend Mosl em sent i ment ; and he arguedt hough with
little effect on the Pri me Mi ni st ert hat this poi nted toward the need
for a friendlier policy toward the Tur ks .
Ill
Davi d Ll oyd George, flowing with energy despi te his arduous years
of warti me l eadershi p, f ormed his post war Coal i ti on government a
week before his fifty-sixth bi rt hday. Th e i tems on hi s i mmedi at e
personal agenda were i n the real m of forei gn policy. He arranged to
spend much of his ti me abroad, redrawi ng the political map of the
worl d. To free hi msel f to concentrate on foreign pol i cy, he left the
management of domest i c policy and the Hous e of Commons to
Bonar La w.
But Bonar Law proved unequal to the t ask; he failed to win ti me
for the Pri me Mi ni ster to concentrate on reconstructi ng the worl d
undi st urbed. It was not only that the war i n Irel and had resumed,
but that the social and economi c conflicts within Bri tai n had moved
out of the pol l i ng stati ons and into the streets and factori es. Man-
agement and l abor, each tryi ng to mai nt ai n its wart i me gai ns even
though the economy was shri nki ng, turned to i ndustri al warfare a
mont h after the election. Vi ol ence broke out. Th e government took
counsel with the army and naval chiefs of staff on measures to
s uppres s what t heyhaunt ed by Bol shevi smf eared mi ght be a
worki ng-cl ass revol uti on.
In 1920 and 1921 the Bri ti sh economy col l apsed. Pri ces col l apsed,
export s s l umped, compani es went out of busi ness, and the country
was gri pped by mas s unempl oyment on a scal e never known before.
Politicians began to quest i on whether Bri tai n coul d afford foreign
policy advent ures i n pl aces like Pal esti ne and Mes opot ami a and began
to questi on whether she coul d even afford measures that were de-
si gned to buy social peace at home. Th e Pri me Mi ni ster had espoused
a posi ti ve Li beral program of housi ng and social ref ormi n large
part, it was in the hands of his pri nci pal parl i amentary l eader,
Dr Chri st opher Addi s onbut he was dri ven t o abandon the pro-
gram, and Dr Addi son, i n the face of Tor y attacks on government
wasteful ness. Yet i t had al ways been Ll oyd George' s view that "the
way to prevent the spread of-the revol uti onary spirit was to embark
at once on l arge schemes of social pr ogr e s s . "
1 9
In his view, to gi ve up
such schemes was to leave the door open for agi tati on and vi ol ence;
yet that is what he di d rather than abandon his i mperi al ambi t i ons in
the Mi ddl e Eas t .
It was agai nst this background of a di sappeari ng army, a deteri o-
rati ng economy, and a di si ntegrati ng society that the Pri me
Mi ni s t era man who had worked mi racl es duri ng the warconcen-
trated on redrawi ng the map of the Mi ddl e Eas t and of the worl d,
while Wi nston Churchi l l , unheeded, conti nued to warn that ti me was
runni ng out.
41
BETRAYAL
i
Th e specific t erms of the Mi ddl e Eas t agreement upon which the
Pri me Mi ni ster and his Al l i ed col l eagues fi nal l y settled proved to be
less i mport ant than the process by whi ch they were reached. One
aspect of that process was that it took a l ong t i me, duri ng whi ch
ci rcumst ances, as will be seen, were to change for the worse. Fri endl y
foreign l eaders were repl aced by others less cooperati ve; quarrel s
devel oped between former allies; defeated enemi es regrouped and
revi ved; and the Bri ti sh armyi t was Churchi l l ' s constant t heme
was dwi ndl i ng away and l osi ng its ability to hold on to its conquest s.
Anot her aspect of the negoti ati ons that was to weaken the eventual
settl ement was the general sense that they were conduct ed i n bad
faith. Th e negoti ati onsto be descri bed present l ywere s haped by
the Pri me Mi ni ster' s strategy of pl ayi ng off the Uni t ed St at es agai nst
Italy and France, while counti ng on the Uni t ed St at es to protect
Bri tai n agai nst possi bl e future threats f rom Sovi et Rus s i a or from a
revived and rearmed Germany. It was not until the 191819 nego-
ti ati ng season had gi ven way to that of 191920 that Ll oyd George
di scovered that the Uni t ed St at es was not goi ng to be Bri t ai n' sor
anybody' sal l y: she was goi ng to wi thdraw from worl d affai rs and
"entangl i ng al l i ances. " As will be seen, Ll oyd George was then
obl i ged to reverse course, seeki ng a French alliance si nce an Ameri can
one was unavai l abl e; and that, i n t urn, requi red hi m to reverse the
course of his ant i - French policy i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . But by then the
damage to the Angl o- French alliance had al ready been done.
In the end the Bri ti sh l eaders felt a sense of havi ng been betrayed
by the Ameri cans, while the Ameri cans felt that the Bri ti sh had
cynically betrayed the ideals for whi ch the world war supposedl y had
been fought. As a result of Ll oyd George' s lack of scrupl e and
Woodrow Wilson's lack of skill, the negoti ati on of a Mi ddl e East ern
settl ement began badl y and ended worse.
389
I I
So determined was Woodrow Wilson to play a personal role in formu-
lating the provisions of the peace treaties that he came to Europe to
negoti ate t hem hi msel f t he first Ameri can presi dent to leave the
western hemi sphere duri ng his t erm of office. Hi s unprecedent ed
move made the Al l i es uneas y; as Cl emenceau observed, he and
hi s fellow pr i me mi ni s t ers , as heads of government , woul d be
outranked by the President who also served as head of state. By right of
precedence, the President therefore would be entitled to chair the Peace
Conference.
Suggest i ons were made i n the press and el sewhere that Wilson
shoul d stay home to devote hi msel f full ti me to wi nni ng support i n
the Senat e and in the country for his peace t erms, l eavi ng his
advi ser, Edward Hous e, t o represent hi m i n Eur ope . Th e Presi dent
rejected such suggest i ons and, perhaps because of t hem, began to
questi on the good faith of Col onel Hous e . Crossi ng the ocean on the
liner George Washington in December 1918, Wilson and his many
Ameri can advi sers arri ved at Brest on Fri day the 13th.
Everywhere he went, Wi l son met with a t umul t uous wel come.
John Maynard Keynes wrote that "When Presi dent Wi l son left
Washi ngton he enjoyed a presti ge and a moral influence t hroughout
the worl d unequal l ed i n hi story. "
1
Not hi ng, however, coul d have
provi ded a better descri pti on of what was goi ng to happen at the
Peace Conf erence than Wilson's speeches about what was not goi ng
to happen. Peopl es and provi nces were i ndeed "bartered about from
soverei gnty to soverei gnty as if they were chattels or pawns in a
game . " It was not the case that every settl ement was "made in the
interest and for the benefit of the popul ati on concerned"; on the
contrary such settl ements were made ( t hough Wilson sai d they woul d
not be) in order to provi de an "adj ust ment or compromi s e of cl ai ms
among rival states" seeki ng "exterior influence or mast ery. " Not even
his own country was prepared to follow the pat h that he had marked
out.
In November 1918, at roughl y the ti me the Armi st i ce agreement s
were si gned, the Presi dent' s party had lost control of the Uni t ed
St at es Senat e i n the mi dt erm elections. Th e Senat e Forei gn Rel ati ons
Commi t t ee therefore passed into the hands of the Presi dent' s adver-
sari es. Even before the Peace Conf erence began, the Presi dent ac-
cordi ngl y was on notice that he woul d face probl ems i n securi ng
ratification of whatever t erms he mi ght negoti ate. Not hi ng in the
Presi dent' s unbendi ng nature di sposed hi m to make the concessi ons
or to engage in the political deal - maki ng that woul d have mi ti gated
these political probl ems at home.
* For Wilson's speeches, see Chapter 31.
B E T R A Y A L 391
Abroad i t became clear al most i mmedi at el y that he had not thought
t hrough how he was goi ng to carry into effect the generous and
idealistic pri nci pl es that he had arti cul ated. He arri ved i n Europe
with many general opi ni ons but wi thout specific proposal s for deal i ng
with the mat t ers that were to be deci ded. In his memorabl e portrai t
of Wi l son, Keynes poi nted to what fol l owed: "As the Presi dent had
thought nothi ng out, the Counci l was generally worki ng on the basi s
of a French or Bri ti sh draf t . "
2
Lacki ng both detailed knowl edge and
negoti ati ng skills, Wilson was reduced to an obstructi ve role, often
refusi ng to be carri ed al ong by his col l eagues, but unabl e to carry
them al ong with hi m.
Hous e advi sed compromi sewi t h the Allies abroad, and with the
Senat e at home. Wi l son spurned the advi ce, and t urned agai nst the
i nti mate friend who offered it. The Presi dent broke with Hous e;
from mi d- 1919 on he refused to see hi m agai n.
i n
Ll oyd George' s Mi ddl e East ern strategy was to direct the Ameri cans'
anti -i mperi al i st ire agai nst the cl ai ms present ed by Italy and France,
di stracti ng the Presi dent from areas in which he mi ght make difficul-
ties for Bri tai n. Mauri ce Hankey, Bri ti sh Secretary to the Peace
Conf erence, recorded in his di ary even before the conference con-
vened that Ll oyd George "means to try and get Presi dent Wi l son
into Ge r man Eas t Afri ca i n order to ri de hi m off Pal esti ne. "
3
In fact
much of the ti me no special effort was needed: European i ssues in-
evitably were gi ven a high, and other i ssues a relatively low, pri ori ty.
Th e questi on of Rus s i a and the fear that Bol shevi k revol uti ons woul d
break out t hroughout Europe haunt ed the Peace Conf erence. The
other great questi on was the future of Germany. Th e future of the
Ot t oman Empi re ranked as a lesser i ssue and Wilson was too pre-
occupi ed to pay full attention to the Mi ddl e Eas t . When Wilson di d
turn to these mat t ers, Ll oyd George adroitly excl uded f rom the con-
ference agenda quest i ons about the Bri ti sh-occupi ed areas of the
Mi ddl e Eas t , pl aci ng t hem beyond the scope of the Presi dent' s scru-
tiny. At the s ame t i me, the Pri me Mi ni ster di verted the Presi dent' s
anti -i mperi al i st energi es into critical scruti ny of the ambi t i ons of
Bri tai n' s rivals i n the Mi ddl e Eas t her warti me Allies.
IV
Italy had agreed to come into the war on the Allied si de in return for
Bri ti sh and French promi ses of territorial gai n that eventually in-
cl uded a share i n the partition of the Ot t oman Empi r e . Th e promi se
of Turkish territory was embodi ed and defined in a treaty signed by
Italy, Bri t ai n, and Fr anc e , known as the Agreement of St Jean
de Maurienne, concluded in the mi ddl e of 1917. By its terms, the agree-
ment was subject to the assent of the Russi ans. Si nce the Russi an
government had been overthrown by the Bolsheviks, the agreement had
never come into effect. The Italians claimed the territories nonetheless,
asking for equal treatment. As one Italian senator put it, "If the others have
nothing, we will demand nothing. "
4
Italy had been promi sed a porti on of Anat ol i aAsi a Mi nor, as it
was somet i mes cal l edi f she came into the war, but there were no
Ital i an communi t i es there for her to protect, and no other communi -
ties whose interests she purport ed to sponsor. Indeed, i n t erms of
Woodrow Wilson's sel f-determi nati on pri nci pl es, there was no reason
for Italy to occupy any part of Asi a Mi nor at all. Pri me Mi ni ster
Emanuel e Orl ando seemed to recogni ze the difficulties of hi s case,
but Ital i an publ i c opi ni on was caught up in a gust of nationalist
frenzy, as were Parl i ament and the Cabi net , as represented by Forei gn
Mi ni ster Baron Si dney Sonni no.
5
Orl ando and Sonni no had reason
to fear that a failure to pers uade the Al l i es to honor warti me promi ses
to Italy woul d undermi ne their political posi ti on at home, and felt
dri ven to take acti on.
St art i ng in the mi ddl e of March 1919, Ital i an t roops began a
program of l andi ng i n southern Anatol i a at Adal i a (the present-day
Ant al ya) , s uppos edl y to restore order, and then re- embarki ng. Even-
tually they st opped re- embarki ng, and after two mont hs they had
t roops on a more or less permanent basi s at Adal i a and al so, further
up the coast, at Ma r ma r i s .
6
Th e Al l i es feared that, havi ng l anded,
the Ital i ans were about to march i nl and to occupy the entire section
of Anatol i a to which they cl ai med they were entitled.
Ll oyd George pushed the Uni t ed St at es into the l ead on thi s ques -
tion. Woodrow Wilson appeal ed to Ital i an publ i c opi ni on to exert a
moderat i ng influence on Orl ando' s territorial demands i n Eur ope
and the Mi ddl e Eas t ; whereupon, on 24 Apri l 1919, the Ital i an
del egati on left the Peace Conf erence to return home to seek domest i c
support . In the absence of the Ital i ans, the Uni t ed St at es, France,
and Bri tai n turned agai nst t hem. Ital y, t hough yesterday' s ally, s ud-
denl y l oomed as an i mperi al i st aggressor posi ng threats to the peace;
and as the Allies banded together agai nst her, Cl emenceau remarked :
"What a begi nni ng for the Le ague of Nat i ons ! "
7
On 2 May 1919, out raged by report s of Italian shi ps bei ng sent to
Smyrna, Presi dent Wilson offered to send i n the Ameri can navy, and
spoke of the possi bi l i ty of the Uni t ed St at es goi ng to war agai nst
Italy in order to defeat aggres s i on.
8
By 5 May, as Wi l son and others
told tal es of atrocities they cl ai med were bei ng commi t t ed by the
Ital i ans, the Allies were at fever pi tch, and determi ned to reach a
B E T R A Y A L 393
deci si on before the Ital i an del egati on returned on 7 May. Fol l owi ng
a suggest i on by Ll oyd George, they agreed to ask Greece, whi ch was
near at hand, to land t roops at Smyr na, supposedl y to keep order,
but i n fact to pre- empt the Ital i ans. Th e Greeks l anded their t roops
on 15 May.
Though i ntended by the Allies as a t emporary meas ure di rected
solely agai nst the Ital i ans, the Greek l andi ng as s umed a di fferent
and more permanent charact er from the start. Mauri ce Hankey,
head of the Bri ti sh secretari at at the Peace Conf erence, bel i eved that
the Smyrna encl ave, where Greek t roops had l anded, ought t o be
detached from Turkey and i ncorporated into Gr e e c e .
9
In this view
he was not al one; Ll oyd George and Wilson were enchanted by
El eutheri os Veni zel os, the Greek Pri me Mi ni ster, and were won over
to his vision of Greece' s historic mi ssi on.
Veni zel os had establ i shed an astoni shi ng hol d over the i magi nati ons
of his fellow Al l i ed l eaders; but even had he not done so, his case
was st rong where Italy's was weak. Hi s posi ti on was intrinsically
appeal i ng bot h to Wilson's sense of Ameri ca' s pri nci pl es and to
Ll oyd George' s sense of Bri tai n' s i nterests. Venizelos's cl ai ms to
Anatol i a, unl i ke Ital y' s, were based on popul ati on as well as hi story.
Smyrna, the coastal metropol i s, was a Greek city, and had been a
center of Greek civilization si nce remotest anti qui ty. Accordi ng to
the then-current (1911) edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, of
its popul ati on of 250, 000, "fully a half is Greek. " Th e Britannica
added that "Modern Smyrna is in all but government a Chri st i an
town . . . " Th e notion of transferri ng its government from Mos l em
Turkey to Chri st i an Greece appeal ed strongl y to Ll oyd George' s
Chri sti an and Hel l eni st val ues. It appeal ed, too, to Presi dent Wilson's
pri nci pl es of sel f-determi nati on.
Li ke Ital y, Greece had been late i n enteri ng the war on the Al l i ed
si de but , unl i ke Ital y, Greece had been regarded by the Bri ti sh as a
client and prot ege si nce the early days of the Great Ga me . The
Bri ti sh navy, at the battl e of Navari no in 1827, had won t he wa r for
Greek i ndependence, and the two countri es had tradi ti ons of friend-
shi p for one another. Ll oyd George saw Venizelos's Greece as
Bri tai n' s natural ally.
Italy and Greece had advanced conflicting cl ai ms: they eyed es-
sentially the s ame areas of the expi ri ng Ot t oman Empi re. In sendi ng
i n Greek t roops, Wilson and the Al l i ed l eaders i ntended to keep the
Ital i ans from sei zi ng these areas before a deci si on coul d be reached as
to who shoul d have t hem. But the effect of doi ng so was to deny the
* It will be remembered that Venizelos offered to bring Greece into the Ottoman
war as Britain's ally as far back as the summer of 1914. That was even before
Turkey and Britain had definitely decided to go to war. See page 74.
394
T H E T I D E G O E S O U T
Ital i an cl ai m and to favor that of Greece. On the Bri ti sh si de there
were those who were di smayed by this out come, but i t fi tted with
Ll oyd George' s view of Bri tai n' s i nterests and pri nci pl es.
Accompl i shi ng many purposes at once, Ll oyd George was abl e t o
di vert Woodrow Wilson's attention f rom Bri tai n' s desi gns to those of
Ital y, by letting the Ameri can Presi dent take the l ead i n i mposi ng
what was really Bri tai n' s policy i n Smyrna. At the showdown with
the Ital i an l eaders, Wilson casti gated them for their "imperialist
ambi t i ons . "
1 0
Taki ng a friendlier line, Ll oyd George i nstead appeal ed
to their nobility, in a speech of such el oquence that it moved
Orl ando, the Italian Pri me Mi ni ster, to tears. Orl ando went to the
wi ndow and s obbed emoti onal l y. Acros s the street, an observer who
caught si ght of hi m asked, "What have they been doi ng to the poor
old gent l eman?"
1 1
What they were doi ng to hi m was presentl y made clear. On 19
J une 1919, weakened by hi s fai l ure to achieve Italy's territorial
ambi t i ons at the Peace Conf erence, Orl ando was obl i ged to resi gn as
Italy's Pri me Mi ni ster.
V
Ll oyd George' s second di versi onary project for Wilson was to turn
hi m agai nst the French cl ai m to Syri a.
Th e Ameri can Presi dent was al l owed to parti ci pate i n the Ot t oman
negoti ati ons even t hough the Uni t ed St at es had never joi ned i n the
war agai nst Turkey. Al t hough Woodrow Wilson's Fourt een Poi nts
were not appl i cabl e to the Ot t oman settl ement (unlike Germany,
Turkey had not been al l owed to surrender on the basi s that any of
the poi nts woul d be appl i ed) , they were an expressi on of the political
phi l osophy with which he approached publ i c i ssues. Ll oyd George
recogni zed thi s; and when Presi dent Wilson turned to the Arabi c-
speaki ng Ot t oman provi nces, the Bri ti sh Pri me Mi ni ster shrewdl y
di verted his attention from Bri tai n' s desi gns to those of France by
di recti ng hi s attention to the French threat to Syri an i ndepend-
encea threat that ran counter to Wilson's poi nts and pri nci pl es.
The Bri ti sh del egati on di d not go so far as to pretend to the
Presi dent or to the other del egates that Fei sal had l i berated
Damas c us . General Al l enby accuratel y i nformed the conferees that
"Shortl y after the capt ure of Damas c us , Fei sal had been al l owed to
occupy and admi ni ster the ci t y. "
1 2
Th e Bri ti sh di d pret end, however,
that Fei sal and his followers had pl ayed a substanti al role in the
liberation of Syri a. Th e Bri ti sh cont ended that Fei sal had therefore
earned the right to serve as the ruler of a free Syri a; and specifically
B E T R A Y A L 395
that he shoul d be free to reject French advi ce and advi sers i f he
chose to do so. As presented by Ll oyd George, this was the i ssue of
the di sput e. Accordi ng to the Pri me Mi ni ster the parti es to the
di sput e were Fei sal ' s Syri a and Cl emenceau' s France. Bri tai n, he
cl ai med, was a friend to both parti es and therefore woul d not take
si des.
Wilson was natural l y di sposed to s upport the Syri ans' right to
choose their own government and desti ny. He also coul d not hel p
but be favorabl y influenced by Fei sal ' s wi l l i ngness to cooperate i n
achi evi ng a settl ement. Fei sal met with Fel i x Frankf urt er, a rep-
resentative of the Ameri can Zi oni st l eader, Loui s Brandei s ; and,
after the meeti ng, Frankf urt er report ed to Brandei s that "The Arab
questi on has ceased to exist as a difficulty to the real i sati on of our
programme before the Peace Conf erence. "
1 3
Indeed, as Arab rep-
resentative at the Peace Conf erence, Fei sal tol d the conferees that he
excl uded Pal esti ne f rom the area he cl ai med for Arab i ndependence.
Fei sal ' s apparent reasonabl eness i n deal i ng with Jewi sh cl ai ms con-
trasted sharpl y with Cl emenceau' s hard line i n deal i ng with Arab
cl ai ms to i ndependencecl ai ms that Cl emenceau took to be a Bri ti sh-
i nspi red s ham.
Th e Bri ti sh sai d that they were ready to allow the French whatever
influence over Fei sal that they were abl e to exert. That , i n the
French view, was thoroughl y di shonest, for Fei sal , as everybody
knew, refused to accept French di recti on or influence. It was evi dent
that he was behol den to the Bri t i sh. He was on their payrol l ; his
del egati on' s expenses were pai d by Bri tai n. At the Peace Conference
he went everywhere with his Bri ti sh liaison officer, T. E. Lawrence,
who was his fri end, advi ser, confi dant, transl ator, and i nseparabl e
compani on.
Recogni zi ng that to accept Fei sal as Syri a' s spokesman was i n
effect to concede Syri a to Bri tai n, the French produced Syri an
l eaders of their own. The most promi nent of t hem had lived i n
France for many years, some of t hem under Quai d' Orsay sponsor-
shi p. The y cl ai med that, despi te si mi l ari ti es i n l anguage and religion,
Syri ans were not Arabs , and deserved a country of their own under
French gui dance.
Ll oyd Ge or ge counterattacked by linking Bri ti sh cooperati on with
France agai nst Ge r many i n Europe to resolution of the Syri an ques-
tion. Th e Ge r man i ssue was of overri di ng i mport ance t o Cl emenceau,
as he had demonst rat ed at the end of 1918 when he conceded
Pal esti ne and Mos ul to Ll oyd George i n order to cement the Angl o-
French al l i ance.
Cl emenceau had al ready gone al most to the limit of what was
politically possi bl e for hi m. When he accepted Fei sal as leader of
Syri a, subj ect to Fei sal ' s meeti ng French t erms, he went the whole
way. In aski ng hi m to accept not merel y Fei sal but al so full Arab
i ndependence, the Bri ti sh were aski ng hi m to go further and rui n
himself politically; yet he needed Bri tai n' s hel p agai nst Germany
and, i n coupl i ng the i ssues, Ll oyd George pl aced hi m i n an agoni zi ng
posi ti on. Duri ng the course of their conferences the French Pri me
Mi ni ster often erupt ed into f rust rat ed rage. Once he was dri ven to
such anger that he offered Ll oyd Ge or ge the choice of sword or
pi s t ol s .
1 4
It was not as though he had not made his posi ti on pl ai n. He had
told one of Ll oyd George' s advi sers that French political opi ni on
woul d not permi t the abandonment of cl ai ms to Syri a: "he personal l y
was not parti cul arl y concerned with the Near Eas t , " but France
"always had pl ayed a great part there, and . . . French publ i c opi ni on
expect ed a settl ement whi ch was consonant with France' s posi ti on.
He coul d not . . . make any settl ement which di d not compl y with
this condi t i on. "
, s
Thi s was no exaggerat i on, as was demonst rat ed
when officials of the French Forei gn Mi ni stry organi zed a press
campai gn agai nst their own Pri me Mi ni ster in Le Temps and Le
Journal des Debats, al l egi ng that he was gi vi ng away too much to
the Br i t i s h.
1 6
But Ll oyd George went on pushi ng for more con-
cessi ons, and went on breaki ng what Cl emenceau had regarded as
firm Bri ti sh commi t ment s to France. "I won't gi ve way on anythi ng
any more, " Cl emenceau sai d, "Ll oyd George i s a cheat . "
1 7
It remai ns uncl ear why Ll oyd Ge or ge was so determi ned to excl ude
France from the Mi ddl e Eas t . With respect to French cl ai ms to
Syri a, and to Ci l i ci a, the adjacent area just to the north, Ll oyd
George' s stated posi ti on was that Bri t i sh t roops woul d have to remai n
in occupati on in order to keep the peace between the French and
Fei sal ' s Ar a b s ;
1 8
but i t was a somewhat one-si ded peace that Bri tai n
i mposed. A smal l French force conti nued to occupy a narrow coastal
area centered on Bei rut . Fr om Fei sal ' s area, Arab uni ts conti nued to
mount hi t-and-run guerri l l a rai ds agai nst the French. Th e pres-
ence of Al l enby' s Bri ti sh t roops protected Fei sal ' s area f rom French
retaliation.
General Al l enby warned that war mi ght break out between the
Arabs and the French. Presi dent Wilson appeared to take the warni ng
seri ousl y, and reacted by maki ng a proposal that took Ll oyd George
and Cl emenceau by s urpri s e: a commi ssi on shoul d be sent out to the
Mi ddl e Eas t to ascertai n the wi shes of its i nhabi tants. Th e proposal
was viewed as chi l di sh by French and Bri ti sh career officials, who
di d not believe that publ i c opi ni on, i n the European or Ameri can
sense, exi sted i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . For Ll oyd George the proposal
B E T R A Y A L 397
was di smayi ng because sendi ng out a commi ssi on woul d take t i me.
Nonet hel ess, the Bri ti sh Pri me Mi ni ster tri ed to make the best of it
by at t empt i ng to get the commi ssi on to focus exclusively on the
cl ai ms of Fr anc e and the resi stance to those cl ai ms by the Arabs
whom France sought t o rul e.
Th e Bri t i sh, like the French, had st aked out an enormous cl ai m
i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , but Ll oyd George successful l y kept the Bri ti sh
cl ai ms f rom bei ng scruti ni zed. When Presi dent Wilson's Commi s s i on
of Inqui ry went out to ascertai n the wi shes of the Mi ddl e East ern
peopl es, i t di d not go to Mes opot ami a, where Bri ti sh Indi a had
i nsti tuted di rect rul e. Th e Bri ti sh, who had decl ared Egypt a protec-
torate, al so succeeded i n securi ng Ameri can recogni ti on for this ex-
tension of their rul e, which had the addi ti onal effect of keepi ng
Egypt off the agenda of the Peace Conf erence. In early 1919 Persi a
was also added to the Bri ti sh sphere as an i nformal prot ect orat e; and
that, too, was accompl i shed out si de the Peace Conf erence by a
Conventi on between the two countri es si gned on 19 Augus t 1919.
Bri tai n' s control of the Persi an Gul f shei khdoms, rounded out and
regul ari zed duri ng the war, was not di scussed or contested i n Pari s ;
nor was Bri tai n' s paramount posi ti on i n Arabi a, secured by alliances
with Hussei n and with Ibn Sa ud that made t hem her prot eges. It
had been agreed i n advance between Ll oyd George and Cl emenceau
that Pal esti ne shoul d be awarded to Bri tai n, so that Syri a was left as
the only contested i ssue on the commi ssi on' s agenda.
As the wrangl i ng at the Peace Conf erence became more embi t t ered,
Cl emenceau refused to send out French parti ci pants to the Com-
mi ssi on; and Ll oyd George, suddenl y worri ed that he mi ght have
gone too far i n estrangi ng France, deci ded that the Bri ti sh parti ci -
pant s i n that case woul d not be sent al ong either. Th u s the Ameri can
commi s s i oners Henry Ki ng, the presi dent of Oberl i n Col l ege i n
Ohi o, and Charl es Crane, a Chi cago busi nessman and contri butor to
the Democrat i c Part yproceeded on their mi ssi on al one.
Th e Ki ng- Cr ane Commi s s i on travel ed t o Syri a and Pal esti ne,
where Bri ti sh officers were often in a posi ti on to det ermi ne who
shoul d testify and who shoul d not. Th e French were enraged by the
Bri ti sh mani pul at i on and organi zati on of wi tnesses and testi mony. In
the end it di d not mat t er: the report of the commi ssi on was never
consi dered, it pl ayed no official role, and its text was not made
publ i c until more than three years later. Th e Ki ng- Cr ane i nqui ry
i ncreased the ani mosi ty between France and Bri tai n, and i t aroused
such false hopes among vari ous groups of Arabs that Gert rude Bell,
a speci al i st in Mi ddl e East ern affai rs, denounced it as a cri mi nal
decept i on.
1 9
Above all, its proceedi ngs had taken too much t i meand
Ll oyd George was runni ng out of t i me.
VI
Bri tai n had never gone ahead with the notion of an Ameri can
Mandat e for Pal esti ne but had propos ed that the Uni t ed St at es
shoul d as s ume the Le ague of Nat i ons Mandat es t o occupy and govern
porti ons of Anatol i a, Const ant i nopl e, the Dardanel l es, Armeni a, and
the Caucas us . In the end these narrowed down to Const ant i nopl e,
the Dardanel l es, and Armeni a.
The r e were two reasons why Bri tai n wanted the Uni t ed St at es to
as s ume these Mandat es : i t woul d i mpl i cate the Uni t ed St at es i n the
Mi ddl e East ern settl ement so as to i nsure that she woul d hel p to
s upport its t erms ; and i t woul d station the Uni t ed St at es i n the front
lines if Sovi et Rus s i a were ever to attack Turkey.
Wilson and the other Ameri cans in Pari s made it clear that it
woul d be difficult to persuade Congres s to accept the Mandat es .
Nonet hel ess the Presi dent undert ook t o try. That proved t o be Ll oyd
George' s undoi ng; l ong after i t had become clear that Wilson was
goi ng to fail, the Pri me Mi ni ster was obl i ged to wait for an official
Ameri can response that seemed to be a l ong ti me comi ng.
On 29 J une 1919, a bit more than six mont hs after he had arri ved
i n Europe for the Peace Conf erence, the Presi dent returned to the
Uni t ed St at es for the last ti me. Carryi ng his campai gn directly to the
peopl e, Wilson col l apsed from exhausti on, and went into a state of
partial physi cal and political paral ysi s. In the Senat e his program,
i ncl udi ng ratification of the Tr e at y of Versai l l es and Ameri can ad-
herence to the Le ague of Nat i ons, went down to defeat, as the
Presi dent commi t t ed one political bl under after another, dri vi ng
even potenti al support ers to oppos e hi m.
Wi l son had lost control over the left si de of his body, and his
thi nki ng, too, may well have been i mpai red. Despi t e his i ncapaci ty,
he and his wife refused to turn over his authori ty to others. Years
l at erl ong after Wilson's de at hLl oyd George wrote of his illness
that "The only faculty that remai ned uni mpai red t o the end . . . was
his abnormal s t ubbornnes s . "
2 0
Fr o m Jul y to November of 1919, all Ot t oman deci si ons were put
off until it was learned what posi ti on the Uni t ed St at es woul d take
on as s umi ng the Mandat es for Const ant i nopl e and Armeni a. But ,
after his parti al physi cal recovery, Presi dent Wilson di d not get
around to proposi ng an Ameri can Mandat e for Armeni a until 24 May
1920. The Senat e rejected his proposal the following week.
Mauri ce Hankey noted in his di ary that "We cannot get on with
the Turki s h treaty until we know whether the Ameri cans will accept
a mandat e in Tur ke y. "
2 1
In his note he suggest ed the possi bi l i ty that
an incident mi ght occur in Anatol i a unl ess a treaty were concl uded
speedi l y. Ll oyd George compl ai ned that Wilson had pl aced the Allies
"in an i mpossi bl e pos i t i on. "
2 2
B E T R A Y A L 399
Th e breakdown of his Ameri can ally drove Ll oyd George t o make
his peace with France and Ital y; but the Bri ti sh Pri me Mi ni ster
found that he now had to contend with Allied l eaders with whom it
was far less easy to deal . Th e new Ital i an l eaders were inclined to
look for commerci al rather than territorial concessi ons i n Tur ke y;
they therefore were di sposed rather to oppos e than to parti ci pate i n
Ll oyd George' s proposed parti ti on of Turkey, especi al l y as the new
Italian Forei gn Mi ni ster ( 19201) , Count Carl o Sf orza, was sym-
patheti c to Tur ki s h nati onal i sm.
In France, Cl emenceau had failed to obtai n the presi dency i n
1920; and had t hereupon resi gned the premi ershi p and retired f rom
pol i ti cs. Ll oyd George ascri bed Cl emenceau' s defeat i n part to his
wi l l i ngness to make concessi ons to Bri tai n i n the Mi ddl e Ea s t .
2 3
Al exandre Mi l l erand, who repl aced Cl emenceau as Premi er, was not
di sposed t o make such concessi ons.
When the Al l i es fi nal l y met at 10 Downi ng St reet on 12 February
1920, to start drawi ng up an Ot t oman treaty, Lo r d Curzon spoke for
the Pri me Mi ni ster as well as hi msel f in sayi ng that "The delay in
negoti ati ng the Treat y was excl usi vel y due to the Powers havi ng to
await the deci si on of the Uni t ed St a t e s . "
2 4
It woul d have been more
true to say that the delay was due to Ll oyd George' s at t empt to play
off the Uni t ed St at es agai nst Bri tai n' s warti me Allies.
VI I
Woodrow Wilson had predi cted that the peace woul d not endure if
its t erms were not basi cal l y fair to all si des. Th e t erms that the Allies
i mposed on their defeated enemi es after the Fi rst Worl d War were
percei ved by many at the t i me, and have been percei ved by many
si nce, as a failure in that respect. Fel i x Frankf urt er later recalled that
"My mont hs at the Pari s Peace Conf erence i n 1919 were probabl y
the saddest of my life. Th e progressi ve di si l l usi onment of the high
hopes whi ch Wilson's nobl e talk had engendered was not unlike the
feelings that death of near ones bri ngs . "
2
Perhaps Wi l son had pi tched
the worl d' s hopes too hi gh; when upri si ngs subsequent l y broke out
i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , Mauri ce Hankey bl amed them on Woodrow
Wilson's Fourt een Poi nts and his "i mpossi bl e doctri ne of self-
det ermi nat i on. "
2 6
Over and above any specific deci si ons there was a general sense
that somet hi ng was fundamental l y wrong with the Peace Conference
itself. In a general sense, and for the publ i c that j udged the Allies by
their wart i me promi ses and expressed pri nci pl es, i t was the way i n
which deci si ons were made that consti tuted a betrayal . Deci si ons, by
all account s, i ncl udi ng those of the part i ci pant s, were made with
little knowl edge of, or concern for, the l ands and peopl es about
which and whom the deci si ons were bei ng made. Thi s was true
even of the peace t erms i mpos ed i n Europe, and was even more so
of those i mposed "by Europeans upon the di stant and unfami l i ar
Mi ddl e Eas t . Art hur Bal f our watched Wi l son, Ll oyd George, and
Cl emenceau i n conferencerel yi ng for experti se only on Mauri ce
Hankey (who was forty-one when the Peace Conference convened,
some thirty-five years younger than Bal f our) and pi ctured t hem as
"Thes e three al l -powerful , al l -i gnorant men, si tti ng there and carvi ng
up conti nents, with only a child to lead t he m. "
2 7
An Ital i an di pl omat
wrote that "A common sight at the Peace Conf erence in Pari s was
one or other of the worl d' s st at esmen, st andi ng before a map and
mut t eri ng to himself: 'Where is that damn' d . . . ? ' while he sought
with ext ended forefinger for some town or river that he had never
heard of bef ore. "
2 8
Ll oyd George, who kept demandi ng that Bri tai n
shoul d rule Pal esti ne from (in the Bi bl i cal phrase) Dan to Beersheba,
di d not know where Dan was. He searched for it in a nineteenth-
century Biblical atl as, but it was not until nearly a year after the
armi sti ce that General Al l enby was abl e to report to hi m that Dan
had been l ocated and, as i t was not where the Pri me Mi ni ster wanted
it to be, Bri tai n asked for a boundary further north.
The i mpressi on was created, too, that most of the i nterested
parti es, i n the Mi ddl e Eas t as el sewhere, were bei ng excl uded from
the del i berati ons. Inst ead of all the Al l i ed Powers, only five of t hem
met in the first i nstance to plan the negoti ati ons. The y were then
superseded by the Counci l of Four : the l eaders of the Uni t ed St at es,
Bri tai n, France, and Ital y. Di s agreement s and difficulties at home
led Italy to wi t hdraw; domest i c pol i ti cs led the Uni t ed St at es to
wi thdraw. Di s cus s i ng the Mi ddl e Eas t a year after the armi sti ce, the
French Forei gn Mi ni ster told the Bri ti sh Forei gn Mi ni ster, who
agreed, that "there remai ned only two parti es whose i nterests had
seri ousl y to be consi dered and reconci l ed, namel y, Great Bri tai n and
Fr a nc e ";
2 9
and together they went on to make the deci si ons about
the Ot t oman domai ns.
Yet there were dozens of other parti es whose i nterests were at
stake, and their numbers were swel l ed by the number of their spokes-
men. In addi ti on to two mai n rival del egati ons from Armeni a, for
exampl e, there were some forty i ndependent Armeni an del egati ons at
the Peace Conf erence. Te n t housand peopl e came to Pari s for the
Peace Conf erence. The hordes of cl ai mants i n the background cast
into bol d relief the narrowness of the i nterests taken into account by
the two government s that remai ned to make the deci si ons.
Moral cl ai ms and wart i me promi ses were the stock-i n-trade of
those who came to pl ead a case. Th e texts of warti me pl edges by
Al l i ed l eaders, and especially by vari ous Bri ti sh government officials,
were scruti ni zed and compared, as i ndeed they still are by schol ars,
B E T R A Y A L 401
to see whether such pl edges coul d be read i n such a way as to
be consi stent with one another, and as t hough such pl edges had
gi ven rise to ri ghts that coul d be enforced i n a court of law. Th e
Const ant i nopl e Agreement ( 1915) , the Treat y of London ( 1915) , the
Hus s ei n- McMahon correspondence (1915 16), the Sykes- Pi cot
Agreement ( 1916) , the Agreement of St Je an de Mauri enne ( 1917) ,
the Bal f our Decl arat i on ( 1917) , the Hogart h message ( 1918) , the
Decl arat i on to the Seven ( 1918) , and the Angl o- French Decl arati on
( 1918) , as well as Presi dent Woodrow Wilson's Fourt een Poi nts (8
January 1918), Four Pri nci pl es (11 February 1918), Four Ends
( 4 Jul y 1918), and Fi ve Parti cul ars (27 Sept ember 1918), were
among the many st at ement s that were present ed by rival cl ai mant s to
be honored as promi ssory notes or contracts at law.
Davi d Ll oyd George, who saw the negoti ati ons as a bargai ni ng
rather than a judi ci al process, was proud of what he had been abl e to
accompl i sh i n the Mi ddl e East ern settl ement. He had made materi al
gai ns for Bri tai n. Ref erri ng to assignats the Pri me Mi ni ster told an
i nti mate fri end: "Well, Wilson has gone back home with a bundl e of
assi gnat s. I have returned with a pocket full of soverei gns in the
shape of the Ge r man Col oni es, Mes opot ami a, etc. Everyone to his
t as t e . "
3 0
In all the Pri me Mi ni ster had succeeded i n addi ng nearly a
million square mi l es to the Bri ti sh Empi r e .
He was not bl i nd to the moral consi derati ons at i ssue, but his
i nterpretati ons of t hem were fi ercel y part i san. Wri ti ng to defend the
peace treaties more than a decade later, Ll oyd George cl ai med that
"The Treat i es of Pari s consti tute the greatest measure of national
liberation of subj ect nati ons ever achi eved by any war settl ement on
record . . . no peace settl ement has ever emanci pat ed as many subj ect
nationalities f rom the gri p of forei gn tyranny as di d that of 1919. "
3 1
He was parti cul arl y i ncensed by cl ai ms that he had not honored
the pl edges made to the Arabi c- speaki ng peopl es.
Th e Allies redeemed the promi ses made i n these decl arati ons to
the full. No race has done better out of the fi del i ty with whi ch
the Allies redeemed their promi ses to the oppressed races than
the Arabs . Owi ng to the t remendous sacrifices of the Al l i ed
Nat i ons, and more parti cul arl y of Bri tai n and her Empi re, the
Arabs have al ready won i ndependence i n I raq, Arabi a, Syri a,
and Tr ans - Jor dani a, al though mos t of the Arab races fought
t hroughout the War for the Tur ki s h oppressors.
He added i n part i cul ar that "The Pal esti ni an Arabs fought for Turki s h
r ul e . "
3 2
Perhaps he coul d have i mposed his Mi ddl e East ern settl ement
The worthless paper currency issued in France during the French Revolution.
402
T H E T I D E G O E S O U T
more effectively if he had arri ved at it at the end of 1918. But the
at t empt to go back on Bri tai n' s wart i me pl edges had taken an i m-
mense amount of t i me and so had lost hi m that chance. By the
s ummer of 1920 it was too late for the Pri me Mi ni ster to i mpose his
t erms upon his warti me Allies and upon an i ncreasi ngl y t roubl esome
Mi ddl e Eas t becaus eas Churchi l l had warned repeat edl yby then
he no longer had the t roops to do s o.
42
THE UNREAL WORLD OF THE
PEACE CONFERENCES
i
"Di pl omacy by Conf erence" was a phras e, attri buted to Mauri ce
Hankey, that descri bed Ll oyd George' s proceedi ngs i n the postwar
years .
1
It became the st andard descri pti on of the unreal worl d i n
which the Pri me Mi ni ster lived. Di vorci ng himself as best he coul d
f rom the other responsi bi l i ti es of his office, he spent more than three
years i n attendi ng international meet i ngs ai med at shapi ng the post-
war worl d. Th e meet i ngs among the Allies began al most as soon as
the armi sti ces were si gned, and devel oped into a way of life. Ll oyd
George, between 1919 and 1922, at t ended no fewer than thirty-three
international conferences; and, even before they began, had engaged
i n i nformal meet i ngs, such as those with Cl emenceau and with
Wilson i n London at the end of 1918. Th e formal prel i mi nari es to
the Peace Conf erence began i n Pari s i n January 1919, and shifted to
other l ocati ons f rom ti me to t i me. At i ssue were the t erms to be
i mposed upon the Ge r man, Aus t ro- Hungari an, and Ot t oman em-
pi res, and their ally, Bul gari a. Th e deci si ons about the Ot t oman
Empi re were agreed upon for the most part at the Fi rst Conf erence
of London ( begi nni ng i n February 1920), were confi rmed i n the
Ital i an Ri vi era resort town of San Remo (Apri l 1920) , and were
embodi ed in a treaty si gned at Sevres, a residential s ubur b of Pari s,
on 10 Augus t 1920.
With respect to the negotiation of the peace settl ement in the
Mi ddl e Eas t , the deci si ve fact was that i t took so much t i me. Of all
the peace treati es, that with the Ot t oman Empi re was the last to be
concl uded. Begi nni ng with the i nformal di scussi ons between Ll oyd
George and Cl emenceau after the armi sti ce, i t took si xteen mont hs to
reach agreement on subst ant i ve mat t ers, and another four mont hs to
di spose of remai ni ng i ssues and si gn a treaty. In all, it took nearly
two years to concl ude the peace treaty with the Ot t oman Empi r e ; at
the outset Ll oyd George had predi cted that it woul d take about a
week.
2
Because of the l ong del ay, si tuati ons were al l owed to devel op, and
deci si ons were requi red to be made, that i n the end proved more
i mportant than the t erms of the treaty itself. Th e Al l i ed st at esmen
thought that they had det ermi ned the future of Arabi c- speaki ng Asi a
by what they di d at San Remo, and of the Turki s h- s peaki ng Ot t oman
Empi re by what they di d at Sevres ; but what they di d not do in 1918
and 1919 proved to have more influence on the future of bot h.
At the outset Ll oyd George had stated that i t woul d be i mpossi bl e
for his country to s upport indefinitely its 1, 084, 000- man army of
occupati on i n the Ot t oman Empi r e .
3
Churchi l l and the General
Staff, it will be recalled, had i mpressed upon hi m the need to reach a
settl ement while he still had the t roops to enforce it. By the s ummer
of 1919, some six mont hs later, the Bri ti sh Cabi net was tol d that the
army of occupati on was down by more than two-thi rds to 320, 000
me n.
4
As the army mel ted away, its commanders adhered to a
ti metabl e of wi thdrawal that i mposed a seri es of deadl i nes upon the
Pri me Mi ni ster at the Peace Conf erence, as di d the conti nui ng drai n
of Bri ti sh financial resources.
In the north, al ong the Caucas us frontier with Rus s i a, Bri ti sh
t roops had remai ned i n pl ace i n the hope that the Uni t ed St at es,
Ital y, or France coul d be persuaded to repl ace t hem and defend
newly i ndependent Armeni a, Georgi a, and Azerbai j an i f Rus s i a or
Turkey shoul d revive sufficiently to attack t hem. But Bri tai n l acked
the men and money to undert ake the j ob, and was eventually forced
to abandon her charges to their fate.
In orderi ng Bri ti sh forces to leave these formerl y Rus s i an terri-
tories, the Pri me Minister disregarded the strong objections of Winston
Churchi l l . For all his recent ent husi asm for retrenchment, Churchi l l
was a fi rebrand on the communi st i ssue and was prepared to send
men and money into Rus s i a to overthrow the Sovi et regi me. Even
Mauri ce Hankey, who believed that "in the comi ng years Bol shevi sm
was the greatest danger to Eur ope , "
5
descri bed Churchi l l as "quite
barmy i n his ent husi asm for the ant i - Bol shevi ks";
6
Churchi l l was
obsessi vel y det ermi ned to keep Bri ti sh t roops north of the Turki s h
frontier to hel p the Whites fight the Reds in the Russi an Civil War.
Ll oyd George' s political fears were of a different sort. Th e Pri me
Mi ni ster told Hankey that he was anxi ous to get all Bri ti sh t roops out
of all formerl y Russi an territories to keep them from becomi ng
"restless"; by which he presumabl y meant that he wanted to keep
them f rom bei ng infected with the revol uti onary vi r us .
7
Pursuant to
his orders, Bri ti sh forces north of the Rus s i an- Turki s h frontier were
evacuated in the s umme r of 1919.
To the south of the old Russi an frontier, i n mount ai n valleys
where the present Turki s h borders run with those of Syri a, I raq, and
Iran, lay the area i mpreci sel y known as Kurdi s t an, where Bri ti sh
T H E U N R E A L WO R L D 405
officials t hought of sponsori ng another of their protectorates. Th e
area fell within the sphere promi sed to France in the Sykes-
Picot Agreement , so the Bri ti sh envi saged a seri es of aut onomous
Kur di s h st at es, to be advi sed by Bri t i sh political officers, whi ch the
French were to be asked to concede in the Wi l soni an spi ri t of self-
determi nati on for the Kur di s h peopl e. Th e Ku r d s are an ancient
mount ai n peopl e who have never known unity, and whose energi es
have been channel ed into violent quarrel s with nei ghbors, especially
Arabs and Armeni ans . A Bri ti sh at t empt to organi ze them in 1919
resul ted i n three upri si ngs, as the Ku r d s turned agai nst the Bri ti sh
newcomers; soon afterward, Bri ti sh troops pul l ed back from
Kurdi s t an, too.
I I
Within Turkey, the Bri ti sh posi ti on conti nued to di si ntegrate. Th e
Bri ti sh authori ti es still relied on the Armi st i ce of Mudr os . Th e brief
armi sti ce document dealt al most entirely with naval and military
mat t ers, requi ri ng the Tur ki s h authori ti es to demobi l i ze all their
armed forces except those requi red to mai ntai n internal order.
Ot t oman t roops pi l ed up their weapons and muni ti ons i n dumps .
Bri ti sh officers supervi sed the surrender, ri di ng through the country-
si de i n twos and threes. Th e armi sti ce t erms permi tted the Ot t oman
authori ti es to remai n in control of the Turki sh- speaki ng remnant of
their empi re, subj ect to the Allies' right to occupy strategi c poi nts
shoul d a si tuati on ari se that threatened their securi ty. In practi ce,
Bri ti sh naval control of the seacoast, coupl ed with control of the
communi cat i ons and transportati on syst ems, took the pl ace of mi l i tary
occupati on of Tur ke y.
Th e capital city, Const ant i nopl e, remai ned i n theory unoccupi ed,
al though Al l i ed forces were much i n evi dence. Th e Bri ti sh fl eet was
anchored there, and, i n a t ri umphal ceremony, the French General
Loui s Franchet d' Esperey, the Al l i ed commander i n Ot t oman
Europe, rode into the city on a white charger.
The Ot t oman government formed to negoti ate the armi sti ce was
di smi ssed soon afterward by Mehmed VI , who had become Sul t an i n
June 1918 and was chiefly concerned with retai ni ng his throne. To
this end, his pol i cy was to seek favor with the Al l i es, and when
Turki s h pol i ti ci ans began t o oppos e Al l i ed cl ai ms and proposal s,
the Sul t an di ssol ved Parl i ament and rul ed by decree. Soon afterward
Mehmed appoi nt ed his brother-i n-l aw to head the government as
Gr and Vizier, t hus compl et i ng the change back from consti tuti onal
to personal rul e.
Th e Sul t an' s government was not, however, unchal l enged. Ci vi l i an
and mi l i tary networks of the Young Tur ke y Party operated t hrough-
out Anatol i a, and the War Of f i ceEnver' s fi efdomremai ned largely
under their cont rol .
8
The y pl otted agai nst the new Sul t an and his
mi ni sters, and hoped to force the Allies to offer mi l der peace t erms.
Out si de the capital city, all authori ty was on the wane. In the
interior there was an ups urge of bri gandage and communal stri fe.
Thi s breakdown of order t hroughout Asi a Mi nor was a cause of
concern to the Al l i es, especially when it resul ted in threats to the
safety of Chri st i ans. When Greek villages behi nd the Bl ack Sea
port of Sams un were attacked by Tur ki s h Mos l ems , the Allies de-
manded that the Gr and Vizier take acti on. Al armed, the Grand
Vizier consul ted the Act i ng Mi ni ster of the Interi or, who advi sed
that there was no way to bri ng the si tuati on under control f rom
Const ant i nopl ean officer woul d have to be sent into the field to
deal with mat t ers on the spot . Th e Act i ng Mi ni ster suggest ed the
name of his fri end, General Mus t apha Ke mal , the hero of Gal l i pol i ,
whose opposi ti on to Enver had kept hi m from receiving the major
command appoi nt ment s duri ng the war that were his due. Th e
suggesti on was adopt ed and Ke mal succeeded i n obtai ni ng excepti on-
ally broad civil and mi l i tary powers as Inspect or- General of the
Ni nth Army, coveri ng most of Anatol i a.
On the eveni ng of 6 May 1919 he embarked for Sams un. It was
the begi nni ng of one of the great political voyages of the twentieth
century. At mi dni ght Wyndham Deedes t he Bri ti sh Intel l i gence
expert on Ot t oman af f ai rssped to the Subl i me Porte to warn the
Gr and Vizier not to let Ke mal go, only to learn that he was too l ate.
Ke mal had al ready set off for Sams un, and his pur pos e as
Wyndham Deedes seems to have di vi nedwas to rally forces
t hroughout Tur ke y to resi st Al l i ed peace t erms i f they proved too
harsh. Thos e forces consi sted i n l arge part of Ot t oman t roops i n the
unoccupi ed center and east of Tur ke y, andarmed with the Sul tan' s
commi ssi on and his own f ormi dabl e s ki l l s Kemal pl anned to put
himself at their head.
Ill
In 191819 Turkey was darkand col d. Fuel was scarce, and the
lights of Const ant i nopl e were kept di m. El sewhere, too, the l ands
that at the outset of the war had f ormed the Ot t oman domai ns
entered into a sort of twilight exi stence, defined in t erms of inter-
national law by the Regul at i ons annexed to the 1907 Hague Conven-
tion Respect i ng the La ws and Cus t oms of War on La nd. As the
occupyi ng power i n most of these domai ns, Bri tai n' s obl i gati on was
essentially to keep thi ngs as they were under Ot t oman law until some
fi nal determi nati on as to their fate shoul d be made.
Such a determi nati on woul d take the form of a treaty of peace
between the Ot t oman Empi re and its conquerors. On the Ot t oman
si de, no difficulty suggest ed itself; the Sul t an lived in the shadow of
Bri ti sh warshi ps and i n fear of l osi ng his throne, and pres umabl y
woul d sign al most any document the Bri ti sh naval commander pl aced
in front of hi m. All that the Allies had to do was deci de among them-
selves what t erms they wanted to i mpose.
That si tuati on changed fundamental l y i n May 1919 when Presi dent
Wilson and Pri me Mi ni ster Ll oyd George deci ded to play the Greeks
off agai nst the Ital i ans in Anatol i a. Th e uni nt ended effect of the
deci si on was to arouse Greek hopes and Turki s h fears that Greece
had come back to Asi a Mi nor to st ay. Mos l em Tur ki s h hatred of
the two l arge Chri st i an popul at i ons i n their mi ds t Gr e e ks and
Armeni ans had al ways exerted a powerful force, and di d so agai n
even i n Turkey' s exhaust ed state. While the Al l i ed st at esmen were
l ooki ng the other way, Ot t oman sol di ers in the interior of Anatol i a
regrouped and returned to seize their weapons from the dumps
where they were deposi t ed.
Within days after the news of the Greek l andi ng at Smyr na became
known, Inspect or- General Mus t apha Ke mal was ordered t o return
to Const ant i nopl eand di sobeyed. Inst ead he met with three col-
l eagues, at the ancient provi nci al capital city of Amas ya, to draft a
decl arati on of i ndependence. Di s regardi ng the Sul tan' s government
as a capti ve of the Al l i es, Ke mal attended a regional nati onal i st
congress at Erzerum, in the east of Turkey; and then assembl ed a
national congress at Si vas , in the interior of Anatol i a, mi dway between
Erzerum and Ankara. He won the al l egi ance of a number of army
officers his own age and younger, many of whom, like himself, had
been associ ated with the mi l i tary wi ng of the C. U. P. ; for the most
part he carri ed with hi m the maj ors and colonels rather than the
general s .
9
He al so seems to have taken over l eadershi p of the mi l i tary
and civilian resi stance networks organi zed by the Young Tur ks ,
al though he prudent l y di scl ai med any connecti on with the officially
di sbanded C. U. P. Des pi t e Kemal ' s st rong secul ar bi as, Mos l em holy
men proved to be hi s strongest adherent s.
The Al l i ed l eaders knew little about Mus t apha Ke mal , the lean,
t ough- mi nded, hard-l i vi ng officer in his late thirties who i nspi red
and led the rebellion agai nst t hem. Nei ther the Bri ti sh Forei gn
Office nor Bri ti sh Intel l i gence was even abl e to tell the Pri me Mi ni ster
whether Ke mal was acti ng for or agai nst the Sul t an.
Unaware of what was happeni ng i n Turkey, the Al l i ed l eaders i n
Europe conti nued to meet in conferences that were i ntended to
deci de Turkey' s fate. At a conference i n London on 28 February
1920, the Al l i ed l eaders were amazed by the news that an army of
30, 000 Tur ki s h t roops under Kemal ' s command had defeated a smal l
French conti ngent at Maras h i n southern Anatol i a. What surpri sed
t he mLl oyd George later cl ai medwas not so much the out come
of the battl e (for the French were greatl y out numbered) but the
revelation that Kemal ' s army of regul ars exi sted. Accordi ng to Ll oyd
George, this was the first that he and his col l eagues had heard of
such an army. "Our military intelligence had never been more
thoroughl y unintelligent, " he later wrote in his memoi rs, typically
putti ng the bl ame on ot he r s .
1 0
I V
As Kemal ' s revolt spread t hrough Anatol i a, a parallel movement
devel oped i n the Arabi c- speaki ng south of the Ot t oman Empi re,
where the token French presence al ong the seacoast at Bei rut, Tri pol i ,
Si don, and Tyr e presented a t empt i ng target to Mos l em mi l i tants i n
Damas c us . Th e French i ntruders on the coast of Syri a and Lebanon
threatened to overthrow the delicate bal ance of Chri sti an and Mos l em
rel i gi ous communi t i es, evoki ng a reaction not unlike that agai nst the
Greeks i n Turkey.
Bri tai n allowed i nl and Syri a, like i nl and Anatol i a, sel f-rul e. In
theory the Syri an admi ni strati on was headed by Fei sal , who was
away at the Peace Conf erence. In practi ce i t was admi ni st ered by
peopl e over whom he had little control , and who f euded bitterly with
one another. For more than a year after the Ot t oman retreat, inland
Syri awi t h its capital at Damas c us was admi ni st ered, i f somewhat
chaotically, by Arabs , and the novel habi t of i ndependence, once
contracted, was not one that they wi shed to surrender.
A Bri ti sh Intel l i gence chief warned the Forei gn Secretary in
London i n 1919 that the Arab government i n Damas c us and Kemal ' s
movement i n Turkey were prepari ng to enter into an al l i ance.
1 1
But
the Arab and Turki s h movement s were not as alike as he s uppos ed:
Ke mal was a nationalist in the western sense of the word, while
i n Ar ab Damas c us , t hough everybody now spoke the fashi onabl e
l anguage of nati onal i sm, it was not a native t ongue. Of the Arabi c-
speaki ng l eaders who governed f rom Damas c us i n 1919, mos t
perhaps four out of fi vehad not been adherents of an Arab national
identity or of Arab i ndependence as late as 1918.
1 2
Th e Syri ans
among t hem were mostl y from l andowni ng fami l i es, with a stake in
mai ntai ni ng the establ i shed order. An anal ysi s of the occupati onal
groups from whi ch they were dr a wn
1 3
shows the l eadershi p made up
in l arge part of Ot t oman sol di ers and officials, many of t hem from
Iraq and Pal esti ne, who were out of a j ob. Most of t hem had
remai ned loyal to Turkey duri ng the war with Bri tai n.
In the year si nce the Ot t oman army had left Damas c us , and under
the noses of the di stracted Bri ti sh, who were thi nki ng about France,
T H E U N R E A L WO R L D
409
the Ot t oman Arabs who had opposed t hem duri ng the war had taken
back control of the liberated provi nce. The Ot t oman Arabs , however,
were f ragment ed al ong geographi cal lines in their current politi-
cal concerns. Tho s e from communi t i es like Jerus al em denounced
Zi oni sm i n Pal esti ne; those from Baghdad compl ai ned of the Bri ti sh
i n Mes opot ami a; and the Syri ans want ed to expel the French f rom
their seacoast and from Lebanon. Meanwhi l e, l eaders of the tra-
ditional pro- Ot t oman anti -Fei sal rul i ng families were pi tted agai nst
ambi t i ous young mi l i tants seeki ng their political fortunes. Behi nd the
rhetoric of the political parti es and the renascent secret societies lay
obscure fami l y and local conflicts. It was a confused and conf usi ng
political si tuati on, in which Fei sal ' s posi ti on was secured essentially
by the s upport of Bri tai n, visibly represent ed by General Al l enby' s
armi es, and by the common Arab supposi t i on that because of Fei sal ,
Bri tai n woul d oppose the colonialist desi gns of France.
In retrospect it can be seen that Bri tai n entered 1919 with a peri od
of grace of less than nine mont hs in which to bluff France into
backi ng down; by the s ummer of 1919 financial pressures and social
unrest forced Ll oyd George and the War Office to recogni ze that a
ti metabl e for Bri ti sh wi thdrawal from Syri a coul d no l onger be
post poned. On 4 Sept ember 1919 the Pri me Mi ni ster convened a
conference of his advi sers at the vacati on house of his friend Lo r d
Ri ddel l , near Trouvi l l e on France' s Normandy coast, to consi der
what shoul d be done about the Mi ddl e Eas t . Only a few days before
Ri ddel l had recorded i n his di ary that Ll oyd George was "angry with
the French for their atti tude concerni ng Syri a. He sai d that the
Syri ans woul d not have the French, and asked how the Allies coul d
compel t hem t o accept mandat ori es who were di stasteful . . . Hi s
atti tude to the French has changed greatl y . . . He conti nual l y refers
to their g r e e d. "
1 4
Yet he and his advi sers saw no al ternati ve but to
abandon the fi el d to the French.
On 13 Sept ember 1919 the Bri ti sh government announced that
wi thdrawal woul d take pl ace i n November, l eavi ng the French and
Fei sal to settle mat t ers between themsel ves. Accordi ng to the Bri ti sh
l eaders, they thereby honored their commi t ment s both to France and
to the Arabs . It was a di si ngenuous cl ai m. Th e Bri ti sh had pret ended
that Fei sal headed a great Arab army i n Syri a, but government
officials were aware that this was a pretense without subst ance. For
the Bri ti sh army to leave was to leave Fei sal to the mercy of the
French. To Ki t chener' s followers i n Bri tai n and the Mi ddl e Eas t ,
this meant a betrayal of all they had worked for; while to the French,
the ni ne-month at t empt to face t hem down, even t hough it was
abandoned, was unf orgi vabl e.
For Fei sal , the nervous pri nce with the worry- bead fi ngers, the
Bri ti sh announcement of wi thdrawal was another s udden t urni ng i n
the l abyri nth of decepti on t hrough whi ch he tried to wend his way.
The r e was, however, a teasi ng, tantal i zi ng possi bi l i ty that briefly
opened up before hi m. Cl emenceau, willing as al ways to accom-
modat e Bri ti sh preferences i n the Mi ddl e Eas t i f politically pos-
si bl ewas prepared to let Fei sal be ki ng of Syri a (si nce that is what
Bri tai n want ed) i f Fei sal woul d meet hi m halfway. Th e French
Premi er agreed to enter once agai n into negoti ati ons with the Arab
l eader, ai med at securi ng recogni ti on of France' s mi ni mum t erms :
that France woul d rule a Great er Le banon, and that Syri a, t hough
i ndependent, woul d become a French client state. But these French
t erms pl aced Fei sal i n the mi ddl e, between col l i di ng forces. Th e
mi l i tant Arabs of Damas c us who cl ai med to be his followers, but
who had no parti cul ar attachment to hi m, were prepared to allow
hi m to call himself their rul er only so l ong as he coul d keep the
French out; while the French were prepared to let hi m rul e only if
he coul d succeed in bri ngi ng t hem in. Fei sal , a stranger in the l and
of Syri a, was i n no posi ti on to do anythi ng but medi at e. All he coul d
do was obtai n concessi ons f rom Cl emenceau and then try to obtai n
concessi ons from the Arab mi l i tants i n Damas c us .
Earl y in January 1920, Fei sal and Cl emenceau arri ved at a secret
accordsecret , because Cl emenceau, seeki ng to become Presi dent of
France, di d not want his opponent s to be abl e to cl ai m he had been
weak on Syri apermi t t i ng Fei sal ' s Ar ab state its i ndependence, but
with excl usi vel y French advi sers. Th e accord was desi gned to l ead to
a French Mandat e, but only of the loosest sort. Fei sal then left
for Damas c us to see i f he coul d pers uade the Arab l eadershi p
there to accept its relatively mi l d t erms ; but hi s mi ssi on proved to
be another bl i nd turn in the political l abyri nth for on 17 January
Cl emenceau, rejected i n his bi d for the presi dency, gave up his
political career. Al exandre Mi l l erand, Cl emenceau' s successor as
Premi er, l acked his inclination to save Bri tai n' s face in the Mi ddl e
Eas t , and therefore saw no need either to allow Syri a her i ndepend-
ence or to let Fei sal mount her t hrone.
V
At the begi nni ng of 1920, with Bri tai n no longer bl ocki ng French
ambi t i ons in Syri a, the way was clear for the two Al l i es finally to
formul ate the t erms they woul d i mpos e upon the defeated Ot t oman
Empi r e . Th e t erms upon which they then agreed were that the
Arabi c- speaki ng porti ons of the empi re were to be det ached and
di vi ded between the two European powers, with Pal esti ne and
Mesopot ami a to be kept by Bri t ai n; Arabi a was to remai n i ndepend-
ent under Bri ti sh-i nfl uenced monarchs, Egypt and the Gul f coast
al ready havi ng been taken by Bri t ai n; and Syri a, i ncl udi ng Lebanon,
was to go to France. Pal esti ne, i ncl udi ng Tr ans j or dan; Syri a, i ncl ud-
ing Le banon; and I raq were all desti ned for eventual i ndependence,
if one bel i eved the l anguage of the Le ague of Nat i ons Mandat es ,
pursuant to which the Allies awarded these territories to themsel ves.
But France, i n parti cul ar, regarded the pl edge of i ndependence
as wi ndow- dressi ng, and approached Syri a and Le banon i n an
annexati oni st spi ri t.
Apart f rom the Dodecanes e i sl ands, mos t of the Aegean i sl ands
and European Turkey (eastern Thrace) were ceded t o Greece.
Smyrna, and the district of western Anatol i a of which it was the
l eadi ng city, were to be admi ni st ered by Greece for five years, after
which a pl ebi sci te woul d be taken, pres umabl y l eadi ng to i ncorpo-
ration of the area within the Ki ng do m of Greece. Th e Dardanel l es,
where the Royal Navy coul d make itself felt, were pl aced under
international control , and al ong with Const ant i nopl e became hos-
tages guarant eei ng Turkey' s good behavi or i n such mat t ers as the
treatment of Chri st i an mi nori ti es. In eastern Anatol i a, Armeni a was
grant ed i ndependence, and Kurdi s t an was gi ven aut onomy. Turki s h
finances were pl aced under Bri ti sh, French, and Ital i an supervi si on.
Within these limits, and subject to these restri cti ons, what little re-
mai ned of Turki s h- s peaki ng Anatol i a was to remai n nomi nal l y in-
dependent under the Ot t oman Sul t an.
Suc h were the t erms, agreed upon i n London and San Re mo i n
the first half of 1920, that were di ctated to the Sul t an' s govern-
ment whi ch reluctantly si gned the treaty i mposed upon i t i n Augus t
1920, i n the French s uburban city of Sevres. As only France' s
Poi ncare seems to have noti ced, it was an i nauspi ci ous choi ce for the
site of a treaty upon which Europe i ntended to rely; Sevres was
known for its chi na, which was fragile and easily broken.
Ll oyd George was the only one of the original Bi g Four who
remai ned in his posi ti on when the final peace treaty was si gned. He
was also the only Bri ti sh Cabi net mi ni ster at the begi nni ng of the
Fi rst World War who remai ned i n the Cabi net t hroughout the war
until its concl usi on. Th e only Bri ti sh politician to survi ve the war, he
was the only Al l i ed leader to survi ve the peace; but the Ot t oman
settl ement, of whi ch he was so proud, was to prove his undoi ng.
P ART X
STORM OVER ASIA
43
THE TROUBLES BEGI N:
1919-1921
When the Bri ti sh armed forces occupi ed the Mi ddl e Eas t at the end
of the war, the regi on was passi ve. But soon t roubl es began. The y
began i n Egypt , with demands for i ndependence i n 1918 followed by
ri oti ng i n 1919. Next t hough there was no i mmedi atel y apparent
connect i onwar broke out in 1919 in Af ghani st an, on the Indi an
frontier. At about the s ame t i me, Bri ti sh policy i n Arabi a began to
come apart . It was possi bl e to believe that i t was just bad luck that
caused one thi ng after another to go wrong for Bri tai n i n the Mi ddl e
Eas t ; and one coul d have conti nued to believe that when tribal
di st urbances brought di sorder to Tr ans j or dan or, i n the s pri ng of
1920, when Arabs ri oted agai nst Je ws i n western Pal esti ne, or i n the
s ummer of 1920, when Iraq fl amed into revolt. An obvi ous expl a-
nation for the di sorders, and arguabl y the correct one, was that, after
the war, Bri tai n' s garri sons i n the Mi ddl e Eas t were so undermanned
as to embol den Bri tai n' s local opponent s everywhere to defy her.
Th e French, weakened i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , as were the Bri t i sh, by
pressures to economi ze and demobi l i ze, were si mi l arl y defied by
Arab pol i ti ci ans, agai nst whom they finally went to war i n Syri a.
Rus s i a, defeated i n the war and cri ppl ed by revol uti ons and civil
war, also faced Mosl em revolts and i ndependence movement s i n
Central Asi a, her domai n i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . But bot h the French
and Rus s i ans , i nstead of finding common cause with Bri tai n, i ntri gued
to undermi ne her posi ti on i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , thus conf usi ng the
i ssue by maki ng i t pl ausi bl e to s uppos e that they were causi ng
(rather than merel y addi ng to) Bri tai n' s difficulties.
In retrospect, one sees Bri tai n undergoi ng a ti me of t roubl es
everywhere i n the Mi ddl e Eas t between 1919 and 1921; but i t was
not experi enced that way, at least not in the begi nni ng. Ri ot i ng in
Egypt i n 1919, for exampl e, was seen as an Egypt i an law and order
probl em that was then brought under control ; it was not seen as a
prel ude to the riots that broke out in Pal esti ne in the spri ng of the
next year or to the revolt that spread in Iraq as spri ng gave way to
s ummer. So the chapt ers that follow tell of the successi ve Mi ddl e
A1 c
416 S T O R M O V E R A S I A
East ern chal l enges to Bri t ai nand to the French, to whom Bri tai n
had yi el ded Syri aroughl y i n the order that they occurred, and as
t hough they amount ed merel y to one separat e set of difficulties after
another.
Though they were not percei ved at the ti me as comi ng together to
consti tute one l arge overall event, the i ndi vi dual i ntri gues and revolts
agai nst Bri ti sh rule were bel i eved by a great many Bri ti sh officials to
be i nsti gated by a si ngl e group of conspi rat ors; and presentl y it will
be seen who these were bel i eved to be. Whether the di sorders and
upri si ngs i n the Mi ddl e East were i ndeed pl anned and coordi nated
or, on the contrary, sporadi c, was a pri nci pal questi on confronti ng
the Ll oyd George government as the extent of the chal l enge to
Bri ti sh rule i n the Mi ddl e Eas t emerged i n 1919 and 1920 and stood
revealed to a di senchanted Bri ti sh publ i c, press, and Parl i ament by
1921.
44
EGYPT: THE WINTER OF
1918-1919
Th e first postwar chal l enge to Bri tai n' s Mi ddl e East ern posi ti on was
i n Egypt , the Arabi c- speaki ng country that she had rul ed "tempo-
rarily" for decades, and whose Bri ti sh admi ni st rat ors had persuaded
themsel ves at the outset that the Arabi c- speaki ng peopl es preferred
Bri ti sh rule to any other. But Bri tai n had repeatedl y promi sed Egypt
her i ndependence and i t was not unreasonabl e for Egypt i an pol i ti ci ans
to have bel i eved the pl edges, and t hus to s uppos e that once the war
was brought to a successful concl usi on, Bri tai n mi ght agree to some
sort of ti metabl e l eadi ng to eventual Egypt i an i ndependence. * At
least one group of local politicians propos ed to take Bri tai n at her
word. On 13 November 1918, two weeks after the Ot t oman surrender
aboard the Agamemnon, a del egati on of out-of-office Egypt i an polit-
ical figures was grant ed an interview with Si r Regi nal d Wi ngate, the
Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi s s i oner i n Cai ro. Th e del egati on had been formed
and was led by Saad Zaghl ul , a lawyer of about sixty, a former
j udge, admi ni st rat or, Mi ni ster of Educat i on, and Mi ni ster of Jus t i ce,
and a l eader of the Legi sl at i ve As s embl y, which the Bri ti sh had
prorogued indefinitely at the begi nni ng of the war. Zaghl ul expl ai ned
to Wi ngate that he had request ed the interview in the expectati on
that marti al law and the protectorate woul d soon be abol i shed, now
that the war was over. Indi cat i ng that he expected Bri tai n to keep
her promi se t o grant Egypt i ndependence, Zaghl ul asked that Egypt
shoul d be heard by the Allies duri ng their peace negoti ati ons. He
also asked to go to London to negoti ate the promi sed changes i n
Egypt ' s political st at us.
Nei ther negoti ati ons nor i ndependence were what Bri t i sh officials
had in mi nd at the t i me. A gui de to their thi nki ng was provi ded by
* When Britain went to war against the Ottoman Empi re at the end of 1914, the
Asquith government formally announced that Egypt had been released from Ottoman
suzerainty and had become a British protectorate; but the British authorities also
announced that the freedom and independence of Egypt were among the goals for
which Britain was fighting.
1
417
418 S T O R M OV E R A S I A
a Bri ti sh official's account, some t i me later, of the meet i ng with
Zaghl ul . "On Nov. 13 he pai d a visit to the Hi gh Commi ssi oner and
expressed the desi re to go to London to put forward a programme of
compl et e aut onomy, a proposal whi ch was rejected as cal cul ated to
serve no good obj ect . "
2
Recei vi ng no encouragement f rom Wi ngate, Zaghl ul began that
same day to try to force the i ssue. Perhaps acti ng with the secret
support of the new Egypt i an Sul t an, Ahme d Fuad, * he set out to
organi ze a del egati on that coul d win broad support from the groups
and cl asses within Egypt whose i nterests he aspi red to represent;
which, in t urn, drove rival political figures to form and head del-
egati ons of their own. On 17 November 1918 Wi ngate cabl ed the
Forei gn Secret ary that Egypt i an pol i ti ci ans were calling for a "pro-
gr amme of compl et e aut onomy"; that he had warned t hem agai nst
agi tati on; but that the Sul t an and hi s mi ni sters di d not feel strong
enough to oppos e nationalist de mands .
3
Indeed the Sul tan' s mi ni s-
ters, not wanti ng to be viewed as Bri tai n' s nomi nees, cl ai med that
they woul d refuse to lead a del egati on abroad unl ess Zaghl ul and his
col l eagues were al so allowed to proceed to Europe. In the event,
Bri tai n di d not allow any del egati on to go either to London or to
Pari s duri ng 1918.
In Januar y 1919, as the openi ng dat e of the Peace Conf erence
approached, Zaghl ul and his Waf d ("Delegation") Party st epped up
their activities. The y were i ndi gnant to learn, on 12 January, that a
del egati on from Syri a woul d be al l owed to attend the Peace Con-
ference. At a so-called General Congres s of the Wafd hel d the next
day i n the home of one of its members , Zaghl ul cl ai med the same
right for Egypt , and spoke i n favor of i ndependence. Thereaf t er the
Bri ti sh admi ni strati on prevented Zaghl ul from speaki ng i n publ i c;
whereupon the Sul tan' s mi ni sters resi gned rather than lead a del-
egati on t o Eur ope while Zaghl ul was bei ng si l enced. Th e Bri ti sh
military authori ti es then arrested Zaghl ul and three of his pri nci pal
col l eagues, and, on 9 March, deport ed them to Mal t a.
A wave of demonst rat i ons and stri kes swept the country. Th e
Bri ti sh authori ti es were taken by surpri se. Th e cabl es sent from
Cai ro to London at the ti me suggest that the Resi dency had little
underst andi ng of what had been happeni ng i n Egypt duri ng the
warti me ye ar s .
4
It was unaware of the i mpl i cati ons of the prof ound
social and economi c changes brought about by the war: the new
cl asses and ambi t i ons that had emerged, the new i nterests, the new
resent ment s, and the new sources of di scord and di saffecti on.
Th e Resi dency di d know, t hough, that there were many Egypt i ans
* Ahmed Fuad became Sultan of Egypt on the death of his brother in October
1917.
E G Y P T : T H E WI N T E R O F 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 1 9 419
who woul d have been happy to see Bri tai n lose the war agai nst
Turkey. Wi ngate, Cl ayt on, and their associ ates, i n argui ng unsuc-
cessfully that Bri tai n ought to annex Egypt and rul e the country
directly, had poi nted out some of the dangers that mi ght ari se if such
peopl e took control of Egypt ' s desti ni es. Li eut enant - Commander
Hogart h of the Arab Bureau, i n a me mor andum of 22 Jul y 1917
support i ng Cl ayton' s annexati on proposal , had cl ai med that Egypt
"is at present potentially an enemy country" and that the danger
coul d be averted only by Bri tai n' s taki ng responsi bi l i ty for the re-
organi zati on of Egypt i an soci et y.
5
Within the murky worl d of Egypt i an pol i ti cs, the new Sul t an, the
Sul tan' s mi ni sters, and such opposi ti on l eaders as Zaghl ul , all were
maneuveri ng, somet i mes for and somet i mes agai nst one another,
under the cover of their respecti ve nationalist proposal s,
to win the s upport of the vari ous di saffected groups within the
Egypt i an economy and Egypt i an soci ety. Yet of these current s, un-
dermi ni ng the st ruct ure of the protectorate and threateni ng one day
to sweep it away, the Bri ti sh authori ti es evinced little awareness.
Zaghl ul was seen as a mere di sgrunt l ed office-seeker, usi ng his
political demands as l everage to obtai n a government j ob. Accordi ng
to the Resi dency i n 1917, "He i s now getti ng ol d and probabl y
desi res an i ncome. "
6
Yet within a week of his arrest and deportati on,
demonst rat i ons i n Cai ro, Al exandri a, and other towns spread to the
Del t a, led to violence, and were followed by massi ve stri kes. Rai l road
lines were torn up in key pl aces, in accord, ironically, with a Bri ti sh
warti me pl an to di srupt the country in the event of an Ot t oman
i nvasi on. Trans port workers struck. On 16 March 1919, a week after
Zaghl ul ' s deport at i on, Cai ro' s rai l road and tel egraph communi cat i ons
with both the Del t a and Uppe r Egypt were cut, while foreign colonies
were besi eged. Th e fl ames of di sorder raged out of control .
Wi despread attacks on Bri ti sh mi l i tary personnel cul mi nat ed on 18
March in the murder of eight of t hemt wo officers, five sol di ers,
and an i nspector of pri s ons on a train from Aswan to Cai ro. Th e
Hi gh Commi ssi oner' s admi ni strati on report ed that it retai ned "no
means of regai ni ng control i n Uppe r Egypt , from whence there i s
practically no news. "
7
Accordi ng to a recent account, the upheaval
"seemed likely for a moment to l ead to a revolt on a scal e unparal l el ed
i n the East ern Empi r e si nce the Indi an Mut i ny. "
8
The s e fears were
exaggerat edbut they were sincerely felt and widely hel d.
What the Hi gh Commi ssi oner' s office i n the Resi dency f ound so
shocki ng i n the rebellion was its "Bol shevi k tendency, " and al so that
the "present movement in Egypt is national in the full sense of the
word. It has now the sympat hy of all cl asses and creeds . . . "
9
Copt s
demonst rat ed al ongsi de Mos l ems . Theol ogi cal st udent s demon-
strated al ongsi de st udent s f rom the secul ar school s. Women, albeit
only from the upper cl asses, demonst rat ed al ongsi de me n .
1 0
What
especially unnerved the Bri ti sh authori ti es was the i nvol vement of
the peasantry i n the count rysi det he pl aci d masses on whose inertia
they had count ed. Unnervi ng, too, was the subsequent di scovery
that the upri si ng was organi zed. Suddenl y the Bri ti sh were faced
with a local politician who appeared to have a national fol l owi ng
which surpri sed them and may have surpri sed hi m, too.
General Al l enby, who was qui ckl y sent out to deal with the si tua-
tion, arri ved in Cai ro on 25 March and decl ared his intention of
put t i ng an end to the di st urbances. On 7 Apri l he announced
Zaghl ul ' s rel ease. Bri ti sh t roops gradual l y restored order i n the spri ng
and s ummer of 1919, but strikes and demonst rat i ons conti nued.
At the end of 1919 London sent out a Commi s s i on of Inqui ry
under Lo r d Mi l ner, which concl uded that the Bri ti sh protectorate
had i ndeed to be abol i shed and repl aced by some new rel ati onshi p,
the nature of which Bri tai n at t empt ed to negoti ate throughout 1920,
1921, and 1922.
Th e process proved t o be frustrati ng, and deport i ng Zaghl ul agai n
proved to be of little hel p. Th e pri nci pal Bri ti sh fantasy about the
Mi ddl e Eas t t hat i t wanted to be governed by Bri tai n, or with her
assi st anceran up agai nst a stone wall of reality. Th e Sul t an and
Egypt ' s other l eaders refused to accept mere aut onomy or even
nomi nal i ndependence; they demanded full and compl et e i ndepend-
ence, which Bri t ai ndependent upon the Suez Canal woul d not
grant . Though Bri ti sh officials tri ed to reach s ome ki nd of agreement
with Egypt ' s l eadershi p, they fai l ed; and so i n the years to come,
Bri tai n was obl i ged to mai ntai n her armed presence and her hegemony
in Egypt wi thout the consent of the country' s pol i ti ci ans.
On the other si de of the Mi ddl e Eas t , however, in Af ghani st an, a
real questi on arose as to whether Bri tai n could preserve her hegemony
without the consent of local l eaders.
45
AFGHANI STAN: THE SPRING
OF 1919
Egypt , with its vital Suez Canal , was one of the key strategi c posi ti ons
on Bri tai n' s road to Indi a; Af ghani st an, with its mount ai n passes
l eadi ng into the Indi an pl ai ns, was another. Over the course of a
century Bri ti sh armi es had repeatedl y been bl oodi ed i n the course of
their efforts to prevent hostile forces from control l i ng the fierce
mount ai n ki ngdom. Th e i ssue was bel i eved by Bri ti sh st at esmen t o
have been resol ved satisfactorily i n 1907, when Russi a agreed that
the ki ngdom shoul d become a Bri ti sh protectorate.
On 19 February 1919, however, the Emi r of Af ghani st an was
assassi nat ed; and after a short peri od in whi ch rival cl ai mant s ma-
neuvered for the successi on, his thi rd son, 26-year-ol d Amanul l ah
Khan, wrote to the Governor- General of Indi a announci ng his ac-
cessi on to the "free and i ndependent Government of Af ghani st an. "
1
By the t erms of Bri tai n' s agreement with Rus s i a i n 1907, Af ghani st an
was not, of course, fully free and i ndependent, for Bri tai n was
entrusted with the conduct of her forei gn relations. Yet on 19 Apri l
the new ruler went on to assert hi s compl et e i ndependence in external
as well as internal affai rs.
Amanul l ah secretl y pl anned an attack on Bri ti sh I ndi at hrough
the Khyber Pas s t hat was to coi nci de with an Indi an nationalist
upri si ng i n Peshawar, the pri nci pal Bri ti sh garri son town near the
f ront i er.
2
Amanul l ah bel i eved that a nati onwi de Indi an upri si ng
woul d then occur.
Amanul l ah' s army commander moved too soon, however, before
the Peshawar upri si ng coul d be organi zed, and unwi tti ngl y al erted
the Bri ti sh to their danger. On 3 May 1919 a det achment of Af ghan
troops crossed the frontier into Bri ti sh Indi a at the t op of the Khyber
Pass. The y sei zed control of a border village and a pumpi ng station
control l i ng the water suppl y to a nearby Indi an mi l i tary post . On 5
May the Governor- General of Indi a tel egraphed to London that i t
looked as t hough a wart he Thi rd Af ghan Warhad st art ed.
Accordi ng to Amanul l ah, he had ordered his troops to the frontier
421
in response to the Bri ti sh repressi on of di st urbances in Indi a. Refer-
ri ng to the Amri t sar Mas s acre, * and to the policy for whi ch it stood,
Amanul l ah decl ared that i n the name of Isl am and of humani t y, he
regarded the peopl es of Indi a as justi fi ed i n ri si ng up agai nst Bri ti sh
rul e, and that his own t roops were at the frontier to keep di sorder
f rom spreadi ng.
Th e Bri ti sh were unsure of his i ntenti ons. The y were aware that
duri ng the war a Ge r man mi l i tary mi ssi on had nearly persuaded the
Af ghan government to l aunch an i nvasi on of Indi a, and they bel i eved
that Enver' s old pan- Turki s h col l eagues, and also the new Bol shevi k
government i n Russi a, mi ght influence the Af ghan government i n
dangerous ways. Al armi ng i nformati on reachi ng the Bri ti sh author-
ities i n May, at the ti me Amanul l ah' s t roops crossed the border,
i ndi cated that the Af ghans pl anned a si mul t aneous attack on three
fronts, spearheaded by hordes of rel i gi ous fanati cs, respondi ng to the
procl amat i on of a Hol y War, and s upport ed by regul ar t roops in
coordi nati on with frontier t ri bes ;
3
while, at the s ame ti me, Bri ti sh
forces were to be i mmobi l i zed by mas s ri oti ng within I ndi a .
4
Bel i evi ng that prompt action was necessary, Bri ti sh officers i n the
border regi on attacked Af ghan posi ti ons. Inconcl usi ve combat took
pl ace at scattered poi nts al ong a wi de front. For the Bri t i sh, the
unreliability of their native conti ngents proved only one of several
unsettl i ng di scoveri es i n a messy, unpopul ar, and unsati sfactory cam-
pai gn. At a ti me when it coul d ill afford the money, the Bri ti sh
Government of Indi a was obl i ged to i ncrease its budget by an enor-
mous s um of 14, 750, 000 pounds to cover the costs of the one-month
c ampai gn.
5
Al t hough they succeeded i n expel l i ng the Af ghan forces from
Indi a and, by the end of May, had gai ned the upper hand, the
Bri ti sh forces were i nadequat e to the task of i nvadi ng, s ubdui ng, and
occupyi ng the Af ghan ki ngdom. What won the day for t hem was the
use of ai rpl anes, which the t ri besmen, with their pri mi ti ve weapons,
were unabl e to combat . In parti cul ar, i t was the bombi ng of Af ghan
cities by the Royal Ai r Force that unnerved Amanul l ah and led hi m
to ask for peace. Nonet hel ess, the out come of the war, from the
Afghans' poi nt of view, was better than a draw. The y had wi thdrawn
f rom Indi a but had regai ned their f reedom within their own fronti ers.
Th e Treat y of Rawal pi ndi , si gned the morni ng of 8 Augus t 1919,
brought the Thi r d Af ghan War to an end. In the treaty Bri tai n
conceded the compl et e i ndependence of Af ghani st an, and relin-
qui shed control over Afghani stan' s foreign rel ati onsa control that
* On 11 April 1919 a small British military force in the Indian city of Amritsar,
the holy city of the Sikhs, opened fire on a group of people who had assembled in a
public park for a political meeting, killing 379 of them.
A F G H A N I S T A N : T H E S P R I N G O F 1919 423
she had requi red i n order to excl ude hostile foreign powers, Rus s i a
chief among them, from the strategi cal l y i mportant mount ai n king-
dom. But soon after the concl usi on of the Tr e at y of Rawal pi ndi , the
Af ghan government made use of its new i ndependence by enteri ng
into a treaty with the Bol shevi ks whi ch, amongst other provi si ons,
al l owed the Rus s i ans to establ i sh consul ates within the ki ngdom. By
1921 the nervous Bri ti sh authori ti es were aski ng the Af ghans to alter
their agreement with the Bol shevi ks, cl ai mi ng that the Rus s i ans were
setti ng up consul ates at "pl aces so remot e f rom the sphere of Russi a' s
l egi ti mate i nterests that i t was obvi ous that the consul ates coul d serve
no purpos e but that of facilitating hostile i ntri gue on the Indi an
fronti er. "
6
In 1921 the Bri ti sh entered into new negoti ati ons with the Af ghan
regi me. Ur gi ng liberal concessi ons, The Times correspondent wrote
on 1 Sept ember 1921 that "the Bri t i sh Cabi net , despi t e the influence
of Lo r d Curzon, whose great knowl edge of the East i s out of dat e, "
shoul d be convi nced that Af ghan nati onal i sm and i ndependence had
to be recogni zed, and that i f they were, the Kabul regi me woul d
show fri endshi p toward Bri tai n.
But years of Bri ti sh tutel age had fostered not fri endshi p but resent-
ment. Dur i ng the 1921 negoti ati ons the Bri ti sh del egati on was abl e
to produce proof that the Af ghans had joi ned in a plot agai nst
Bri t ai n; for Bri ti sh Intel l i gence had deci phered the Sovi et code and
had l earned of pl ans for joint Af ghan and Russi an military action
agai nst the Bri ti sh Empi r e .
7
Des pi t e liberal concessi ons by the Bri ti sh
delegation, the Kabul regime continued to afford facilities to Bolshevik
representati ves and i t was soon di scovered that Rus s i an agent s were
successful l y i ntri gui ng with the warlike frontier t ri bes .
8
Of course i t coul d be argued that Afghani stan had al ways posed
difficult probl ems and that the set back to Bri ti sh influence there was
an i sol ated, excepti onal event. But Bri t i sh policy i n Arabi a, too, was
i n t at t ers and Arabi a had seemed open to Bri ti sh influence and was
rul ed by monarchs who prof essed fri endshi p for Bri tai n. In the
spri ng of 1919, while wagi ng the Thi r d Af ghan War, Bri tai n suddenl y
faced a l osi ng si tuati on in Arabi a; and while there was no apparent
connecti on between the two, or between either of the two and the
si tuati on in Egypt , the coi nci dence of difficulties on the western,
eastern, and southern ends of Bri tai n' s Mi ddl e East ern empi re
suggest ed that Bri tai n mi ght have overextended her i mperi al
commi t ment s .
46
ARABIA: THE SPRING OF 1919
Of all the Mi ddl e East ern l ands, Arabi a seemed to be Bri tai n' s most
natural preserve. Its l ong coastl i nes coul d be control l ed easily by the
Royal Navy. Two of its pri nci pal l ords, Hussei n i n the west and Ibn
Sa ud i n the center and east, were Bri ti sh prot eges s upport ed by
substanti al regul ar subsi di es from the Bri ti sh government . As of
1919 no rival European powers sought to i ntrude themsel ves into
Arabi an political affai rs. Th e field had been left clear for Bri tai n.
Yet the Fi rst Worl d War was barel y over before the Cabi net i n
London was forced to recogni ze that its policy in Arabi a was in
di sarray. Its al l i esHussei n, Ki ng of the Hej az, and I bn Sa ud, lord
of Nej dwere at daggers drawn. Hus s ei n compl ai ned that he was
obl i ged to spend 12, 000 pounds a mont h out of his Bri ti sh s ubs i dy to
defend agai nst attacks f rom Ibn Saud, who hi msel f recei ved 5, 000
pounds a mont h i n s ubs i di es .
1
Th e Bri ti sh representati ve who re-
layed Hussei n' s compl ai nt characteri zed Bri tai n' s financing of both
I bn Sa ud and Hus s ei nwhen they were fighting one anot heras
a bs ur d.
2
So was the bitter di sput e that broke out within the Bri ti sh
government over what to do about i twhi ch paral yzed the process
of maki ng a deci si on, so that none was made. Inst ruct i ons and
ul t i mat ums were drafted but not sent. Officials who made deci si ons
were not told that other officials had cancel l ed those deci si ons. The r e
were changes of mi nd from one day to the next.
Th e di sput e centered around possessi on of the smal l urban oasi s
centers of Kh u r ma and Tur a ba , l ocated at the frontier where Hussei n' s
hegemony left off and I bn Saud' s began. Th e stakes were l arger than
they seemed, i n part because possessi on of Khur ma and Tur a ba
brought with it tribal al l egi ances that al so involved substanti al areas
of grazi ng l and, but mostl y because the quarrel was about religion.
In early 1918 the Arab Bulletin had recorded Hussei n' s compl ai nt s
that his authori ty was bei ng undermi ned by rel i gi ous prosel yti zi ng
conduct ed by Ibn Saud' s adherent s; for the Saudi cl ai ms on Khur ma
and Tur a ba deri ved f rom rel i gi ous conversi on.
I bn Saud was the heredi tary champi on of the teachi ngs of
424
A R A B I A : T H E S P R I N G O F 1919 425
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, an ei ghteenth-century rel i gi ous
leader whose alliance with the Hous e of Saud i n 1745 had been
strengthened by frequent i nt ermarri age between the two fami l i es.
The Wahhabi s ( as their opponent s called t hem) were severely puri -
tanical reformers who were seen by their adversari es as fanati cs.
It was I bn Saud' s geni us to di scern how their energi es coul d be
harnessed for political ends.
At the end of 1912 a movement of rel i gi ous revival had begun that
was to change the nature of Arabi an politics i n I bn Saud' s favor.
Tri bes men started sel l i ng their horses, camel s, and other possessi ons
in the market towns in order to settle in cooperati ve agri cul tural
communi t i es to live a strict Wahhabi rel i gi ous life. Th e movement
became known as the Ikhzvan: the Bret hren. Ibn Sa ud i mmedi atel y
put himself at the head of i t ,
3
which gave hi m an army of true
Bedoui ns t he greatest warri ors i n Arabi a. In the Bret hren, both the
authori ty of each tribe's shei khs and the separati on between tri bes
tended to di mi ni sh, while the authori ty of Ibn Sa ud grew.
It was the spread of this uncompromi s i ng puri tani cal faith into
nei ghbori ng Hej az that, i n Hussei n' s view, threatened to undermi ne
his authori ty. Hus s ei n was an ort hodox Sunni ; to hi m the Wahhabi s
were doctri nal and political enemi es. He sent expedi ti on after un-
successful expedi ti on agai nst Khur ma and Tur a ba t o recall t hem
from their Wahhabi ways. Th e final expedi ti on was mount ed i n the
spri ng of 1919, in the flush of Al l i ed victory over the Ot t oman
Empi re. Le d by Hussei n' s son Abdul l ah, the trai ned Hej azi army of
5, 000 men brought al ong the modern equi pment which the Bri ti sh
had suppl i ed duri ng the war. On 21 May 1919 Abdul l ah' s t roops
occupi ed Tur a ba , whereupon Ibn Sa ud set out f rom Ri yadh t o
attack t hem. But the pi tched battl e for whi ch both si des had prepared
never took pl ace. A Bret hren force of 1,100 camel - ri ders, who had
gone ahead of Ibn Saud' s forces as scout s, came upon Abdul l ah' s
camp on the ni ght of 25 May. Ar me d only with swords, spears, and
anti que rifles, they swooped down upon the sl eepi ng Hej azi army
and destroyed it. Abdul l ah, i n his ni ghtshi rt, escaped; but his t roops
di d not .
4
Th e defeat of Hussei n' s forces was so compl et e that i t brought
Bri tai n to his rescue. Bri ti sh ai rpl anes were sent to the Hej az; Bri ti sh
warni ngs were sent t o Ibn S a u d .
5
Ever the di pl omat , Ibn Saud
avoi ded confrontati on, made a show of deferri ng to Bri tai n' s desi res,
and cl ai med to be tryi ng his best to restrai n the hot headed Bret hren.
Hussei n provi ded a compl et e contrast, remai ni ng obdurat e; and i t
was only with difficulty that Bri tai n forced hi m to accept a t emporary
armi sti ce i n Augus t 1920. Thus i t seemed that Cai ro and London
had backed the wrong si de, especi al l y as Ibn Sa ud went on to new
victories, capt uri ng the mount ai nous provi nce of Asi r i n 1920, and
overthrowi ng the rival Arabi an Hous e of Ras hi d at the end of 1921.
Spearheaded by the Bret hren, whose fighting men were esti mated at
150, 000,
6
I bn Saud' s forces went about roundi ng out their conquest
of Arabi a.
On 20 Sept ember 1920 a speci al Mi ddl e East ern correspondent of
The Times wrote that the Arab Bureau' s ol d proposal that Hussei n
become Cal i ph of I s l ami ns pi red by Lo r d Ki t chener' s suggest i on i n
the aut umn of 1914was provi ng to be a di saster. He predi ct ed that
I bn Saud woul d i nvade the Hej az and capt ure it; i n fact Ibn Saud
di d so, and drove Hussei n into exile, four years later.
Agai nst their will, the Bri ti sh were pl aced i n an adversary posi ti on
with respect to I bn Sa ud by their need to shore up Hussei n. Bri ti sh
presti ge was i nvol ved; as a Forei gn Office official noted, "we shall
look fools all over the Eas t if our puppet is knocked off his perch
as easily as t hi s. "
7
Yet the Bri ti sh coul d do little about it. As i n
Af ghani st an, the physi cal character of the country was f orbi ddi ng.
Not even a demonst rat i on use of force seemed practi cal ; asked what
targets al ong the Arabi an coast the Royal Navy mi ght bombar d,
officials al ong the Gul f coast repl i ed that in fact there were none
worth shel l i ng.
8
Th u s on the southern as well as the western and eastern frontiers
of their Mi ddl e East ern empi re, Bri t i sh officials in 1919 began to find
themsel ves no l onger in control of events for reasons that they coul d
not i mmedi atel y f at hom; and no course of conduct was evi dent to
them that coul d bri ng the local popul at i ons back into line.
But perhaps the most seri ous chal l enge they encountered was
i n Tur ke yt he heartl and of the Ot t oman Empi re, whi ch Bri tai n
supposedl y had crushed i n 1918.
47
TURKEY: JANUARY 1920
Th e fate of what remai ned of the Ot t oman Empi re was at the heart
of the Mi ddl e East ern questi on as the Al l i ed Powerst hroughout
1919, 1920, and 1921conti nued to wrangl e about the di sposi ti on of
its Turki s h- s peaki ng center i n Anatol i a. Ll oyd George changed his
mi nd several t i mes about what shoul d be done. In early 1919 he
favored a pl an whereby the Uni t ed St at es woul d take Const ant i nopl e
and Armeni a; Greece woul d take an encl ave centered on Smyr na;
and the rest of the country woul d be di vi ded between France i n the
north and Italy in the sout h. A few mont hs later he changed his
mi nd compl etel y and, falling i n with the views of hi s Cabi net ,
decl ared that "the Al l i es had no more right to split up Tur ke y than
Germany, i n former days, had had t o split up Pol and. "
1
Th e treaty
that he propos ed to i mpose upon the Sul t an the following year
nonethel ess was harsh, and i mposi ng its t erms upon the Tur ki s h
government i n 1920 proved more difficult than Ll oyd George had
s uppos ed.
At the end of 1919, elections were held throughout the post-
armi sti ce Ot t oman Empi re for a new Turki s h Chambe r of Deput i es ;
and Tur ki s h nati onal i sts won an overwhel mi ng victory. Even before
the Chamber convened, newly elected deput i es converged on Angora
(now Ankara) , deep i n the interior of the country and far f rom the
sea and the guns of the Bri ti sh Navy, where Mus t apha Ke mal , the
38-year-ol d nationalist general , had moved his headquart ers. There
they subscri bed to a Kemal i s t decl arati on of political pri nci pl es that
became known as the Nati onal Pact. Th e Nati onal Pact called for the
creation of an i ndependent Turki s h Mos l em nati on-state. Th e pact' s
wi despread appeal underscored a comment by the Bri ti sh naval
commander in the Medi t erranean to the effect that "the Greek occu-
pati on of Smyr na has st i mul at ed a Tur ki s h patri oti sm probabl y more
real than any whi ch the war was abl e to evoke. "
2
In mi d- January 1920 the new Chambe r of Deput i es convened i n
Const ant i nopl e. On 28 January 1920, i n secret sessi on, the deput i es
427
voted to adopt the Nati onal Pact ; and on 17 February, they an-
nounced to the publ i c that they had done so. While the l eaders of
France and Bri tai n were meet i ng i n Eur ope to reach final agreement
on the t erms of the peace settl ement they meant to i mpose, the
Ot t oman Chamber of Deput i es, wi thout bei ng asked, had defined
the mi ni mum terms they were prepared to accept. If the political
t heme of the twentieth century is seen to be the endi ng of Europe' s
rule over its nei ghbori ng conti nents, then the Ot t oman Chamber' s
decl arati on of i ndependence si gnal l ed the dawn of the century.
French and Bri ti sh mi l i tary l eaders warned their pri me mi ni sters
that at least twenty-seven army di vi si ons woul d be needed to i mpose
upon the rebel l i ous Tur ks the t erms on which the two pri me mi ni s-
ters were resol ved.
3
Thi s was well beyond what the Allies coul d
field. Th e Bri ti sh Imperi al General Staff urged Ll oyd George t o
reconsi der his proposed peace t erms, but he refused to do so. In
early 1920 hostilities commenced. Fi ght i ng erupt ed i n Ci l i ci a, the
southern Turki s h- s peaki ng area (adjoi ni ng Syri a) that Bri tai n had
al l owed France t o occupy. Fr o m February t hrough Apri l , Kemal i s t
forces inflicted repeated defeats on the French, capt uri ng posi ti ons,
inflicting hundreds of casual ti es, and taki ng t housands of pri soners.
Th e French Premi er, Mi l l erand, caught between pressures for de-
mobi l i zati on and pressures to protect French interests i n Syri a,
ordered his local commander to try to come to some agreement with
the Turki s h nat i onal i st s.
4
Ll oyd George was opposed to conci l i ati on; he met force with
force. In mi d- March, Bri tai n led an Al l i ed mi l i tary occupati on of
5
Al l i ed t roops moved i n and repl aced the Ot t oman
pol i ce, decl ari ng marti al law and di ssol vi ng the Chamber of Deput i es .
Th e Allied army of occupati on prompt l y arrested 150 Ot t oman
mi l i tary and civil officials, i ncl udi ng a substanti al number of the
elected deput i es, and deport ed t hem to Mal t a, where Zaghl ul and his
Egypt i an col l eagues had been sent ( but subsequent l y rel eased) the
year bef ore.
6
France and Italy hastened to assure Ke mal that these
measures represented Bri ti sh pol i cy, not their own.
7
Th e occupati on of the Sul t an' s capi tal at Const ant i nopl e di d not
damage Mus t apha Ke mal . Cont rary t o what some Bri ti sh authori ti es
bel i eved, he no l onger acted for the Sul t anand an uni nt ended
effect of the Al l i ed occupat i on was to destroy whatever presti ge or
l egi ti macy that remai ned to the Sul t an' s government and to transfer
i t to Kemal ' s regi me. Thi s was i l l ustrated the following mont h when
100 members of the Chambe r of Deput i es who remai ned free joi ned
in Angora with 190 others elected f rom what they t ermed resi stance
groups to f orm a new Parl i ament .
8
The y voted to create a government
of the Gr and Nati onal As s embl y, of which Mus t apha Ke mal
was elected pres i dent .
9
Th e Sul t an was decl ared a pri soner of the
T U R K E Y : J A N U A R Y 1920 429
Al l i es, and his acts i nval i d. Th e Sul t an' s government , i n occupi ed
Const ant i nopl e, repl i ed by brandi ng the l eaders i n Angora as trai tors.
Kemal ' s Angora government prudent l y chose to leave its rel ati onshi p
to the Sul t an' s government ambi guous .
Th e conflict i n Anatol i a was cl ouded by the emergence of semi -
aut onomous warl ords and outl aw bands , somet i mes acti ng for them-
selves, somet i mes acti ng in alliance with one or the other of the
government s, or with the Bri ti sh, or with the Greeks, or with com-
muni st s ( Rus s i an and otherwi se). The r e were local rebel l i ons, i n
some cases undertaken by great l andhol di ng families seeki ng to
reassert their i nterests, but there were al so maraudi ng groups of
nomads and refugees, Kur ds , Ci rcassi ans, and Tar t ar s from the
Cri mea and Central Asi a. Though groups such as the Green Army
began as expressi ons of one or another political cause, they tended to
degenerate into no more than glorified ba ndi t s .
1 0
To r n by anarchy
and civil war, the Turki s h- s peaki ng Ot t oman Empi r e came in-
creasi ngl y to resembl e the l ands that had been Czari st Rus s i a, and
which in 1918 had formed a vast i ndi sti nct battlefield on which
Whites and Reds , bandi t s and warl ords, foreign armi es and indig-
enous i ndependence movement s engaged i n a confusi ng and mul ti -
si ded conflict. Th e frontier between the two ancient empi res was
bl urred by local upri si ngs and the movement s of vari ous armed
groups ; while the fl ow of Bol shevi k agents and propaganda into
Anatol i a made i t seem that an effective border between the two vast
and confused ex- empi res no l onger exi sted.
Th e first deci si on of Kemal ' s new government i n Angora was to
send a mi ssi on to Russi a, where it arri ved in May 1920, possi bl y in
pursuance of earlier agreement s between Kemal ' s Nati onal i sts and
Leni n' s Bol s hevi ks .
1 1
Th e worki ng rel ati onshi p that emerged, t hough
with such difficulty that it was not solidified for nearly a year (in the
treaty of 16 March 1921), was one that the Bri ti sh authori ti es mi s-
underst ood. Th e Russi an Bol shevi ks had gi ven refuge and encourage-
ment to Enver Pasha, the Ot t oman Empi re' s exiled warti me l eader;
and the Bri t i sh wrongl y as s umed that Enver was behi nd the Angora
gove r nme nt .
1 2
In fact Enver and Ke mal were deadl y ri val s; when
this became clear to t hem, the Rus s i ans fl i rted with the i dea of usi ng
one agai nst the other but , in the end, felt compel l ed to choose
between t hem.
Wrong i n bel i evi ng that Ke mal was secretly acti ng on behalf of the
Sul t an, and wrong, too, i n suspect i ng that he was acti ng for Enver,
the Bri ti sh were al so wrong in suspect i ng that he was acti ng for the
Bol shevi ks. Ke mal was i n fact an i mpl acabl e enemy of Russi an
Bol shevi sm, and as soon as he felt abl e, he suppressed the Russi an-
i nspi red Turki s h Communi s t Party, killed its l eaders, and killed or
i mpri soned its agent s. As a resul t, many of the Russi an l eaders were
di sposed t o treat Ke mal as an enemy. Th e Kemal i s t s were gi ven the
i mpressi on that it was only as a resul t of Stal i n' s powerful inter-
vention, and over the objecti ons of the Sovi et Mi ni st ry of Forei gn
Affai rs, that Rus s i a agreed to deal with Angora at al l .
1 3
St al i n,
Commi s s ar for Nati onal i ti es and for St at e Cont rol , evidently put
Russi an national i nterests ahead of Bol shevi k i deol ogy, and recogni zed
that Ke mal mi ght be abl e to inflict damage on the Bri t i sh. Damagi ng
the Bri ti sh was one of Stal i n' s chief objecti ves, and the real i sti cor
cyni cal Bol shevi k was willing to s upport even Ke mal i n order to
achi eve his goal . So Sovi et money and suppl i es began t o pour over
the Rus s o- Turki s h frontier, in amount s still not known, to ai d the
anti -Bol shevi k Nat i onal i st s. It was the first significant mi l i tary ai d
that Sovi et Rus s i a had gi ven to a forei gn movement . But within the
Bol shevi k government , the resi stance to suppl yi ng ai d to Turki s h
anti -Bol shevi ks mus t have been i ntense, for it took a yearf rom the
spri ng of 1920 when the Tur ki s h mi ssi on went to Rus s i a to ask for
s upport t o compl et e the arrangement s.
Meanwhi l e, the possi bi l i ty that Turkey woul d be thrown into the
arms of the Sovi et s rei nforced the vi ews of Al l i ed mi l i tary officials,
who bel i eved that Ll oyd George woul d be maki ng a mi stake i n
forci ng the Sul tan' s government to si gn a harsh treaty. On the
Bri ti sh si de as well as the French, it was the view of the admi ral s and
general s most directly concerned that they di d not have the manpower
to i mpose t erms on the rebel l i ous Tur ks . Veni zel os, the Greek Pri me
Mi ni ster, told the other Al l i ed l eaders that Greek forces coul d do i t
al one, but the Bri ti sh servi ce chiefs di d not share his confi dence.
A close friend asked Ll oyd George whether he still thought it wi se
to gi ve Smyr na to the Greeks . "I have no doubt about it," repl i ed
the Pri me Mi ni ster. "You mus t deci de whom you are goi ng to back.
Th e Tur ks nearly brought about our defeat i n the war. It was a near
thi ng. You cannot trust t hem and they are a decadent race. Th e
Greeks, on the other hand, are our fri ends, and they are a ri si ng
peopl e . . . We must secure Const ant i nopl e and the Dardanel l es. You
cannot do that effectively wi thout crushi ng the Turki s h power. "
Referri ng to the doubt s about his policy voi ced by Bri ti sh mi l i tary
l eaders, he sai d, "Of course the mi l i tary are agai nst the Greeks . The y
always have been. The y favour the Tur ks . Th e mi l i tary are confi rmed
Tori es . It i s the To r y policy t o s upport the Tu r k s . "
1 4
On the night of 1 4 - 1 5 June 1920, Kemal ' s Turki s h Nati onal i st
troops attacked a Bri t i sh battal i on near Const ant i nopl e, posi ng
a threat to the forces occupyi ng the Ot t oman capi tal , where the
Allies held the Sul t an as a virtual pri soner. Comi ng only a mont h
after Ke mal sent his mi ssi on to Rus s i a (though a year before Rus s o-
Turki s h arrangement s were concl uded) and soon after the defeats the
Nati onal i sts had inflicted on the French i n Cilicia, the Tur ki s h attack
T U R K E Y : J A N U A R Y 1920 431
caused al arm. Th e Bri ti sh commandi ng officer t el egraphed for re-
i nforcements. Th e Chi ef of the Imperi al General Staff i n London
reluctantly recogni zed that the only t roops avai l abl e were Greek, and
proposed to the Cabi net that a Greek di vi si on be request ed to help
defend Const ant i nopl e. Veni zel os was willing to suppl y it, provi ded
that the Al l i es also authori zed Greece to advance f rom Smyrna. Thi s
woul d allow the Greek army to sei ze and occupy the substanti al
enclave that Veni zel os proposed to annex. It woul d compl et e the
transformati on of Greek t roops f rom a t emporary pol i ci ng force into
a permanent army of occupat i on.
Ll oyd George was more than willing. He had met with Veni zel os
earlier, had warned hi m that the other Allies woul d not hel p, had
asked Greece to enforce the t erms of the Tr e at y of Sevres by herself,
and had agreed with Venizelos that their mi l i tary advi sers exaggerat ed
the difficulty of doi ng s o .
1 5
On 20 June 1920 French Premi er
Mi l l erand agreed with Ll oyd George to authori ze a l i mi ted Greek
advance f rom Smyrna. On 22 J une the Greeks l aunched a successful
t hree- pronged attack whi ch by early Jul y had brought t hem all of
Asi a Mi nor as far as the Anatol i an pl at eau. On the far si de of the
Dardanel l es, meanwhi l e, Greek t roops drove t hrough eastern Thr ac e .
Mont hs bef orei n occupyi ng Const ant i nopl et he Allies had
crushed resi stance i n the capi tal . Now the Greek army seemed to
have crushed resi stance outsi de the capi tal as wellif the exi stence
of Ke mal was i gnored. "Turkey i s no more, " an exul tant Ll oyd
George announced t ri umphant l y.
1 6
On 10 Augus t 1920 the Treat y of
Sevres was si gned by representati ves of the virtually capti ve Turki s h
Sul t an and his hel pl ess government .
Th e Treat y of Sevres (see page 411) embodi ed al most all of
the t erms that Ll oyd George and Veni zel os most desi red. While
reduci ng the Ot t oman state al most to a nonentity, it restored to
Greece the coastal l ands of Asi a Mi nor that Greeks had settled nearly
3, 000 years bef ore. Li ke Arabs , Greeks were bound together by a
common l anguage and civilization rather than by political ties, so
that what Greece accompl i shed i n 1920 with Bri ti sh political backi ng
was to extend her territorial frontier in Europe to her cul tural frontier
i n Greek- speaki ng Asi a. It was the Li beral dream of t ri umphant
Hel l eni sm and Chri sti ani ty, promot ed by Gl adst one' s political heir,
Davi d Ll oyd George.
Th e probl em, which seems t o have st ruck Veni zel os and Ll oyd
George al most i mmedi atel y after the si gni ng at Sevres , was how to
keep the t erms of the treaty from bei ng eventual l y overthrown. The
Bri ti sh armed forces had al ready been demobi l i zed, and there was
consi derabl e domest i c political pressure i n Greece, too, to demo-
bilize i mmedi atel y. Yet once the Allies depart ed from Turkey, Ke mal
mi ght well descend f rom the Anatol i an pl ateau to retake the coast
and undo the treaty. In Oct ober 1920 Veni zel os rai sed with Ll oyd
George the questi on of the other al ternati ve: whether to send his
army into the interior to destroy Kemal ' s Nati onal i sts while Greece
still had the armed forces t o do s o .
1 7
Li ke Napol eon ami dst the
burni ng rui ns of Moscow, Veni zel os and Ll oyd George were chal-
l enged by an enemy who woul d neither st and and fi ght nor surrender.
Indeed, Kemal ' s plan was to purs ue the strategy the Russi ans had
used successful l y agai nst Napol eon i n the war of 1812: drawi ng the
enemy forces into the interior, while weari ng t hem down.
What Venizelos and Ll oyd George woul d have deci ded to do can
never be known for sure, for one of the most bi zarre political ac-
ci dents in modern history took the matter out of their hands. On 30
Sept ember 1920 the young Greek Ki ng, Al exander, while taki ng a
walk in the grounds of his pal ace, was bitten by a monkey. A severe
fever set i n and, on 25 Oct ober, Al exander di ed. In a f amous phrase,
Winston Churchi l l later wrote that "It is perhaps no exaggerati on to
remark that a quart er of a million persons di ed of thi s monkey' s
bi t e"
1 8
f or it was his belief that if Al exander and Veni zel os had
conti nued to rul e Greece, the tragi c out come of the war that Greece
was to wage agai nst Tur ke y i n 1921 and 1922 woul d have been
averted (see Chapt er 60 bel ow) .
Th e i mmensel y compl i cat ed questi on of successi on to the throne
arose at the same ti me as the Greek elections. Th e resul ts were
astoni shi ng. Agai nst al most all expectati ons the supposedl y popul ar
Venizelos was defeated. Brought back into power were the pro-
Ge r man, anti-Allied l eaders whom Veni zel os and the French had
deposed and exiled duri ng the war.
Const ant i ne I, Al exander' s father, forced off the throne in 1917,
was once agai n ki ng. Back from French- i mposed exile, Demet ri os
Gounari s , the bitter enemy of Veni zel os and of the Al l i es, control l ed
the government . Const ant i ne and his mi ni sters were eager to press
forward i n Turkey. But for anyone on the Al l i ed si de who wanted to
abandon the compl exi ti es of the Asi a Mi nor i nvol vement, the turn-
about i n Greece provi ded the perfect occasi on for doi ng so. The
French and the Ital i ans took advant age of the situation by wi thdraw-
ing their s upport f rom Greece and, by i mpl i cati on, from the Treat y
of Sevres. Bot h countri es had been i ncreasi ngl y unhappy with Ll oyd
George' s vent uresome policy. France, i n parti cul ar, had felt con-
strai ned only by a personal commi t ment to Venizelos, f rom whi ch
his defeat at the pol l s rel eased her. Thereaf t er both Italy and France
l ooked i ncreasi ngl y to a future Kemal i s t government of Turkey as a
source of financial concessi ons and advant ages.
In Bri tai n, Churchi l l and the War Office argued in favor of
concessi ons to Ke mal i n order to detach hi m from Bol shevi k Russi a.
Indeed Churchi l l urged maki ng a peace with Ke mal that woul d
T U R K E Y : J A N U A R Y 1920 433
re-create that "Turki s h barri er to Rus s i an ambi t i ons" that had been
the tradi ti onal Bri ti sh policy duri ng the Great Ga me .
1 9
But Ll oyd
George resi sted all such pr opos al s .
2 0
Mas s i ve unempl oyment and
other severe economi c and social probl ems i n Bri t ai nas well as
probl ems i n Egypt , Af ghani st an, Arabi a, and el sewhere i n the Mi ddl e
East st i l l di d not cause Ll oyd Ge or ge to concl ude (as Churchi l l
had concl uded) that Bri tai n coul d not afford to devote resources to
coerci ng Tur ke y.
In an apparent effort to settle mat t ers, however, the Allies con-
vened a round- t abl e conference in London to which a Kemal i s t
del egati on was i nvi ted. Th e conference was schedul ed to meet i n
London, and its first full sessi on fell on 21 February 1921. Th e new
Greek government agreed to attend the conference, but before the
conference convened the Greek army' s hi gh command ordered a
probe of Kemal ' s defenses. Evi dent l y thi nki ng in t erms of a mi l i tary
rather than a negoti ated settl ement, the Greek commander- i n- chi ef
sent forward a reconnai ssance force toward the Kemal i s t lines in
the interior. Movi ng over difficult, broken, high ground i n harsh
winter weather, the Greeks met and were repul sed by a Turki s h
force under the command of Kemal ' s col l eague, Ismet , near a little
village called Inonu. For the Tur ks the out come was a portent of
victories t o come. Th e Greeks, however, came away f rom the engage-
ment with the i mpressi on that they had tested the fi ghti ng qual -
ities of the Tur ks and had f ound that the Turki s h defenses were
vul nerabl e.
At the London conference i n February, little progress was made
toward resol vi ng the di sput e about Anatol i a' s fate. Th e Greeks had
made up their mi nds i n advance that they were prepared to go to
war i n order to wi n a total victory. Th e Kemal i s t Tur ks , moreover,
were not willing to let Greece retain the Smyrna encl ave; yet any
Greek government woul d have rai sed domest i c political difficulties
for itself by surrenderi ng it. Veni zel osout of office, but still
act i vehad al ready told Ll oyd George that i f Ki ng Constanti ne' s
government abandoned Smyrna, Venizelist l eaders i n Greek Anatol i a
woul d procl ai m Smyrna an i ndependent republ i c and woul d carry
on the war agai nst the Tur ks . "Hel l eni sm, " he wrote to the Bri ti sh
Pri me Mi ni st er, "is a force much broader than the confines of the
Greek Ki ng do m, and . . . i f the latter does not wish or i s unabl e to
hold Smyr na with its surroundi ng di stri ct, i t i s possi bl e for Hel l eni sm
in Turkey itself to undert ake this duty, provi ded the allies, or to
speak more preci sel y Engl and, are di sposed to support this task
. . . "
2 1
In guarded t erms, Ll oyd George i ndi cated that he mi ght be
di sposed t o tender such s uppo r t .
2 2
The London conference achi eved nothi ng; neither si de was willing
to compromi s e. Th e Kemal i s t del egati on was encouraged, by the
eagerness of France and Italy to negoti ate separatel y with it, to
believe that i t need not moderat e its demands . Si mi l arl y, the Greeks
were encouraged to remai n i ntransi gent by the ant i - Turki sh en-
t husi asm of the Bri ti sh Pri me Mi ni st er. Ll oyd George was convi nced
that Veni zel os had been prof oundl y right i n observi ng that "the most
i mport ant result for humani t y of the great war was not the di sso-
lution of the Aust ro- Hungari an Empi r e nor the limitation of the
Ge r man, but the di sappearance of the Turki s h Empi r e . "
2 3
But victory over Ot t oman resi stance forces conti nued to el ude the
Pri me Mi ni ster. In Turkey itself, Ke mal still defied the Al l i es, while
to the sout hi n Syri aOt t oman officers, officials, and notabl es
centered i n Damas c us also procl ai med Arab defiance of the Allies.
48
SYRIA AND LEBANON: THE
SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1920
i
Th e nomi nal rul er of Syri a was Fei sal , the pri nce from Mecca who
had led the Arab stri ki ng force on the right fl ank of the Al l i ed armi es
in the Pal esti ne and Syri an campai gns . Pendi ng negoti ati on of a
peace settl ement, General Al l enbycommenci ng i n the aut umn of
1918had al l owed Fei sal to admi ni st er Syri a' s affairs f rom the capi tal
city of Damas c us . Fei sal hi msel f spent much of 1919 i n Eur ope
negoti ati ng with the Al l i es; he entrusted the admi ni st rat i on of Syri a
to others.
As the met ropol i s of the Arabi c- speaki ng areas that Bri tai n had left
provi si onal l y i ndependent , the anci ent oasi s town of Damas c us was a
center upon whi ch di scontented Arab political and mi l i tary figures
from many part s of the former Ot t oman Empi re converged.
1
Care-
lessly admi ni st ered in Fei sal ' s name by feudi ng rivals, it was in a
state of cont i nuous unrest t hroughout 1919 and 1920, as traditional
rul i ng fami l i es battl ed agai nst the ambi t i ons of advent urous new-
comers, while mi l i tants of the pri nci pal political cl ubs di vi ded largely
al ong regional lines.
A General Syri an Congres s was called into bei ng by Fei sal and
assembl ed 6 J une 1919. Fei sal , aware that he was a forei gner in
Damas c us and mi ndful of the pri nci pl es procl ai med by Woodrow
Wilson, s ummone d the congress to endorse the demands he pl anned
to present at the Peace Conference and to prove to the conference
that he was the authenti c spokesman for the peopl es of the Syri an
provi nces. Fei sal had not yet recogni zed the necessi ty of pl aci ng
control of the Syri an General Congres s i n the hands of men who
woul d be prepared to endorse the extensi ve concessi ons that, i n the
nature of international pol i ti cs, he woul d be obl i ged to make at the
Peace Conf erence i n Pari s.
Th e ol d- guard tradi ti onal rul i ng families i n Syri a were among
those whose loyalty to the Ot t oman Empi re had remai ned unshaken
throughout the war. The y had remai ned hostile to Fei sal , the Allies,
435
and the militant Arab nationalist cl ubs ; yet they won congressi onal
seats in Damas c us and in the other pri nci pal i nl and towns of Horns,
Hama, and Al eppo. Nonet hel ess the radical nationalist cl ubs suc-
ceeded i n wi nni ng control of the General Syri an Congress, i n part by
maki ng deal s with some el ements i n the conservati ve ol d- guar d.
2
Of the three mai n nationalist cl ubs, one al - Ahd, the organi zati on
of Arabi c officers i n the Ot t oman armywas domi nat ed by mem-
bers from the Mesopot ami an provi nces, whose chief interest was i n
the future of their own provi nces. Another, the Arab Cl ub, was
domi nat ed by members from the Pal esti ni an area and was set up as
an anti -Zi oni st organi zati on devoted to forci ng Fei sal to abandon his
commi t ment to Zi oni sm. Several members of the Execut i ve Com-
mi ttee of the Arab Cl ub occupi ed i mport ant posi ti ons i n Fei sal ' s
admi ni strati on, even t hough the Pal esti ni ans had largely remai ned
pro- Ot t oman and anti -Fei sal t hroughout the war. Pal esti ni ans also
achieved l eadershi p posi ti ons i n the broad- based Isti ql al Party, est ab-
l i shed by the thi rd and most promi nent of the nationalist cl ubs,
al - Fat at .
Th e orientation of the General Syri an Congress was revealed as
soon as it met in mi d- 1919, by its call for a compl etel y i ndependent
Great er Syri a that woul d i ncl ude all of the area that is occupi ed
today by Syri a, Lebanon, Jor dan, and Israel . To Fei sal , who hoped
for an Ameri can or Bri ti sh Mandat ory regi me and for Ameri can,
Bri ti sh, and Zi oni st s upport agai nst the demands of France, i t ap-
peared that mat t ers were passi ng out of his control and that he woul d
have to take st eps "to take st eam out of the Syri an Congres s . "
3
However, he was obl i ged to remove himself from the scene i n order
to attend negoti ati ons with the Great Powers in Europe.
At the end of the negoti ati ons in Europe in 1919, Fei sal succeeded
in reachi ng the secret underst andi ng descri bed earlier with the French
Premi er, Cl emenceau. Thei r agreement allowed Fei sal to rei gn over
an i ndependent Syri a over which France woul d exerci se only a l oose
t rus t ees hi p.
4
Fr o m the poi nt of view of Cl emenceau, these were
generous t erms : no other French politician woul d have agreed to let
Arab Syri a retain a certain measure of i ndependence or offered to let
the pro- Bri t i sh Fei sal remai n i n Damas cus l et alone as Syri a' s mon-
arch. When Cl emenceau fell f rom power i n January 1920, the st rong
colonialist bl oc in the newly elected French Parl i ament certainly
mi ght have bal ked at honori ng such t erms. Fei sal ' s only hope was the
French woul d feel themsel ves bound by the secret agreement once
they learned of its exi st enceso l ong as the Syri an Arabs were
willing to be bound by i t too. But when Fei sal returned f rom Europe
to Syri a on 14 January 1920, he found that Arab nati onal i sts were
unwilling to accept any role at all for France in gui di ng Syri a' s
affai rs. In vai n, Fei sal warned a commi t t ee of one of the Arab
S Y R I A A N D L E B A N O N 437
nationalist societies in Damas c us that to reject his agreement with
Cl emenceau meant war with France; but the commi t t ee repl i ed that
"We are ready to decl are war on both Engl and and Fr anc e . "
5
Lat er
i n January, with militant Arab nati onal i sts i n control, the General
Syri an Congres s voted down the t erms of the Fei sal Cl emenceau
agreement .
Unabl e to persuade the nati onal i sts to follow his policy of concilia-
ting Franceunabl e, in other words, to lead the nat i onal i st sFei sal
seemi ngl y changed course and began to talk as though he meant to
follow t hem. In February he was report ed to be speaki ng of wi nni ng
full Arab i ndependence from France "by the s word. "
6
But this ap-
pears to have been mere demagoguery, desi gned to rival that of the
nationalists i n bi ddi ng for popul ar s upport . For under cover of his
violent rhetori c, Fei sal reached out to the only significant i ndi genous
force that coul d be i nduced to s upport his policy of compromi s e
with Fr anc e : his former enemi es, the conservati ve, tradi ti onal rul i ng
families of Damas c us and the i nl and towns, who had s upport ed the
Ot t oman Empi re i n the worl d war agai nst the Allies and Fei sal .
Fei sal pers uaded t hem to form a new political part yt he Nati onal
Part ywhi ch espoused in publ i c the i ndependence of a Great er
Syri a, but i n pri vate was prepared to accept the Fei sal - Cl emenceau
agreement and a French presence. Th e Nati onal Party di d not i n fact
insist on full and i mmedi at e i ndependence for Syri a and was also
prepared to recogni ze a Jewi sh Nati onal Home i n Pal est i ne.
7
*
Rus hi ng to head off the Nati onal Party by acti ng before it coul d
organi ze its forces, the militant nationalist cl ubs called the General
Congres s back into sessi on. Th e second Syri an General Congres s
convened in early March 1920, and i mmedi atel y passed a resol uti on
procl ai mi ng Syri a to be compl etel y i ndependent within her "natural"
boundari es, i ncl udi ng Le banon and Pal esti ne, under the ki ngshi p of
Fei sal as consti tuti onal monar c h.
8
At the same ti me an Arab del-
egation in Pal esti ne confronted the Bri ti sh military governor with a
resolution oppos i ng Zi oni sm and peti ti oni ng to become part of an
i ndependent Syri a; while a group of Mes opot ami ans met to procl ai m
the i ndependence of their provi nces Bas ra and Baghdadunde r the
ki ngshi p of Fei sal ' s brother, Abdul l ah.
9
Th u s early i n 1920, within
weeks after the Ot t oman Chamber of Deput i es i n Const ant i nopl e
had publ i cl y defied the Allies and decl ared the i ndependence of the
Turki s h- s peaki ng part of the empi re, the Arabi c- speaki ng part seemed
to be following the s ame course.
General Al l enby, thoroughl y al armed, warned his superi ors that i f
Arab opinion in Palestine and Syria regarded both as part of the same country,
so that Zionism was also an issue in Damascus, although it was not the overriding
issue that it was in Jerusal em, Jaffa, or Haifa.
Bri tai n and France "persist in their atti tude of decl ari ng null and
void the action of Fei sal and Syri an Congres s , I feel certain that war
mus t ensue. If hostilities ari se, the Arabs will regard bot h French
and Engl i sh as their enemi es, and we shall be dragged by the French
into a war which is agai nst our own interests and for which we are ill-
pr e par e d. "
1 0
Bri tai n bl amed France for this. Lo r d Curzon s ummoned
the French ambas s ador to the Forei gn Office to point out the mi stakes
France had made, and to pl ace on record his opi ni on that the di re
turn of events was entirely France' s f aul t .
1 1
Th e French and, even more so, the Bri ti sh were startl ed by the
Damas c us procl amat i ons; and cauti oned Fei sal that grave conse-
quences woul d follow any attempt to carry t hem into ef f ect .
1 2
Yet ,
carri ed away by a congress that he coul d not control , Fei sal not only
allowed his followers to carry on guerri l l a attacks agai nst the French
and Chri st i ans on the c oas t ,
1 3
but moved to establ i sh support for
Kemal i s t Turkey, which was successful l y inflicting defeats on the
French i n Ci l i ci a, above the frontier. Fei sal and his parti sans deni ed
France the use of the Al eppo rai l road line, cutti ng off rei nforcements
by l and and obl i gi ng the French to suppl y their bel eaguered garri son
i n Ci l i ci a by sea i ns t e ad.
1 4
But the Syri an nati onal i sts failed to realize how much their posi ti on
and Fei sal ' s had depended on Bri ti sh s upport ; their procl amat i ons,
attacki ng Bri ti sh cl ai ms to govern Mes opot ami a and Pal esti ne, effec-
tively forced Bri tai n back into the arms of France, and briefly restored
the alliance of the two European powers i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . Even
Ll oyd George, whose initial reacti on was glee at the news that
France was bei ng defied, saw no alternative but to reach agreement
with the French. Th e policies of Ll oyd George and the armi es of
Al l enby had f ormed the shi el d behi nd which the Syri ans had been
allowed to i ndul ge i n provocati ve politics with i mpuni t y. Once the
shi el d was wi thdrawn, the French government as its colonialist
group qui ckl y s awwas free to act.
France' s mai n concern was to det ach the Syri ans from their danger-
ous alliance with the forces of Kemal i s t Turkey. Robert de Cai x, the
l eadi ng propagandi st of the colonialist society the Comi t e de l'Asie
Frangai se, who had become France' s chief political representati ve i n
Syri a, led a del egati on to Angora on 20 May 1920 to negoti ate an
armi sti ce with Ke mal i n person. He succeeded i n pat chi ng up a
t emporary t ruce. Thi s , together with an agreement with the Bri ti sh,
paved the way for France to take mi l i tary action.
On 27 May 1920 Pari s ordered its commander i n Bei rut , General
Goi i raud, to prepare to take the field agai nst Fei sal . On Basti l l e Day
1920, General Gour aud, pushed by Pari s, sent an ul t i mat um to
Fei sal , setti ng forth t erms that he coul d not have expect ed the Arab
S Y R I A A N D L E B A N O N 439
leader to accept, i ncl udi ng the di sbandi ng of the Arab army. But
Fei sal , evidently l osi ng his nerve, agreed to the French t erms, where-
upon the mobs of Damas c us rioted agai nst hi m. General Gour aud,
under orders from Pari s, took the posi ti on that the reply Fei sal had
sent hi mabj ect though it was-was nonethel ess unsati sfactory.
Fei sal rushed to send another, offeri ng uncondi ti onal surrender, but
Gouraud was prevai l ed upon by de Cai x to reply that i t was too late,
and to order his t roops to march on Damas c us .
Th e French had few t roops avai l abl e for the campai gn, and mean-
while the breakdown of their truce with Ke mal suddenl y exposed
them to dangers on both si des: Ke mal to the north, Fei sal to the
east. The French appeared to be t rapped between enemi es on two
fronts, but they were in luck, for they met with no effective resi stance
f rom the Syri ans . Th e largely Senegal ese t roops of France' s Army
of the Levant advanced through twi sti ng gorges in which a compet ent
opponent woul d have ambus hed t hem; but unaccount abl y, Fei sal ' s
parti sans wai ted until the Senegal ese emerged before chal l engi ng
t he m.
1 5
At that poi nt, a French air s quadron appeared overhead, and
the def enders of Damas c us pani cked, turned, and fl ed, offeri ng no
res i s t ance.
1 6
On 26 Jul y 1920 the French occupi ed Damas c us ; on 27
Jul y they ordered Fei sal into exile; and on 28 Jul y he left. The
French Pri me Mi ni ster procl ai med that Syri a henceforth woul d be
held by France: "The whole of it, and f orever. "
1
'
Th e French authori ti es went ahead t o di vi de Syri a into sub- uni t s.
One of these, Great Lebanon, was the forerunner of the country
today called Lebanon. The Great Lebanon procl ai med by General
Gour aud on 1 Augus t 1920 also corresponded roughl y to the area of
direct rule promi sed to France i n the Sykes-Pi cot Agreement . In
addi ti on to the old Turki s h canton of Le banoni n which France' s
Maroni te Chri st i an proteges as well as their traditional enemi es, the
Drus es , were cent eredGreat Lebanon i ncl uded the coastal cities of
Bei rut, Tri pol i , Si don, and Tyr e , as well as the l ong Bekaa valley
which covered a consi derabl e area in the interior of the country.
None of these territorial addi t i onsBei rut , Tri pol i , Si don, Ty r e , or
the Bekaahad fallen within the canton of Lebanon, where Chri st i an
power was bas ed; i ndeed they brought with them l arge Sunni and
Shi'ite Mos l em popul at i ons.
Whether this expansi on of Lebanonwhi ch was to lead to so
much bl oodshed i n the 1970s and 1980s, as vari ous groups attacked
the l eadi ng posi ti on of the Maroni t e mi nori ty in what had become a
predomi nantl y Mos l em count rywas the result of Maroni t e Chri st i an
or of French political pressure cannot be det ermi ned.
1 8
Many hands
pushed General Gouraud toward his deci si on. At the t i me its ri sks
were not fully appreci at ed.
I I
Th e ease with whi ch the occupati on of Damas c us had been effected
seemed to expose the pretensi ons of Fei sal and Arab nati onal i sm as
s hams that had been i nvented by Bri tai n i n order to cheat France out
of her cl ai m to Syri a. Whenever there were local upri si ngs in Syr i a
and there were di st urbances f rom ti me to ti me t hroughout the life of
the French Mandat ei t was natural for the French to bl ame t hem
on the Bri t i sh, and they di d s o .
1 9
Ll oyd George, who had lost
France' s good will by at t empt i ng to withhold Syri a, di d not regai n
that good will by changi ng his policy so as to let France have her.
Havi ng wi thdrawn his t roops i n 1919, Ll oyd George had i n fact
lost control of events in Syri a at least as much as he had in the
interior of Anatol i a, in the deserts of Arabi a, in the mount ai ns of
Af ghani st an, and i n the peasant vi l l ages of Egypt . In Syri a the result
was that the Bri ti sh were bl amed on all si des. Th e French bl amed
them for put t i ng Fei sal up and the Arabs bl amed t hem for letting
Fei sal down.
Arab part i sans of Fei sal i n Pal esti ne and Iraq now ranged them-
sel ves among Bri tai n' s enemi eswhi ch rai sed the questi on of why
Bri tai n was mai ntai ni ng a presence i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . Th e Bri ti sh
publ i c had been told that one of Bri tai n' s goal s was to s upport
Fei sal ' s Arab movement . But i f Fei sal ' s Arabs had become Bri tai n' s
enemi es, why shoul d she conti nue to support t hem? Moreover,
Fei sal ' s support ers j eopardi zed Bri tai n' s relations with Fr a nc e
among other pl aces, i n Bri ti sh-hel d Pal esti ne east of the Jor dan river.
Thei r activities seemed likely to goad France into an i nvasi on of
Trans j ordan, which woul d pl unge Bri tai n into an unwant ed and
dangerous international conflict. Rel ati ons between Bri tai n and
France were fragile enough as i t wasespeci al l y i n regard to
Pal esti ne, a l and that France had coveted for hersel f and the Bri ti sh
feared that Fei sal ' s part i sans east of the Jor dan mi ght provi de the
French colonialist group with an excuse for sendi ng troops across the
border.
49
EASTERN PALESTI NE
(TRANSJORDAN): 1920
At about the s ame ti me that i t ordered the i nvasi on, conquest , and
occupati on of Syri a, the French government i naugurated a di pl omat i c
and propaganda campai gn desi gned to prevent nei ghbori ng Palestine
from becomi ng "a Zi oni st st at e. "
1
Si nce Bri tai n was sponsori ng
Zi oni sm in Pal esti ne, the campai gn took on an anti -Bri ti sh hue; but
the French government was even more opposed to a Jewi s h than to a
Bri ti sh Pal esti ne, and feared that France' s commerci al and clerical
interests i n the Hol y La nd mi ght be endangered by Bri t i sh- sponsored
Zi oni sm.
The l anguage used by the Quai d' Orsay expressed refined, and
that used i n the press expressed crude, ant i - Semi t i s m.
2
But i n June
1920when the two European allies, Bri tai n and France, entered
into detai l ed negoti ati ons to draw a frontier between Pal esti ne and
Syri a- Lebanon ("Palestine" and "Syri a" were both vague t erms, and
if was uncl ear at the ti me where one ended and the other s t ar t e d)
the hard stance taken by French negoti ators expressed French self-
interest. For the French pi ctured the frontier as between France and
Bri tai n i n the Levant , and took an uncompromi s i ng posi ti on, urged
on by a colonialist group that bitterly accused France' s l eaders of
havi ng abandoned too many of her cl ai ms and interests i n Asi a. Th e
new chai rman of the Commi s s i on of Forei gn Affai rs of the Chamber
of Deput i es, who al so served as presi dent of one of the pri nci pal
French colonialist societies, the Comi t e de l'Orient, was as ready as
was the popul ar press to brand compromi s e as t reasonabl e. At stake
in the negotiation of Palestine's fronti ers were the val uabl e headwaters
of the Jor dan and Yar muk ri verswhi ch the French successful l y
insisted on obt ai ni ng for Syri a- Lebanon.
Th e Oeuvre des Ecol es d' Ori ent, whi ch represented French Cat ho-
lic mi ssi onari es i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , pi ctured the Jewi sh Nati onal
Home as "merely a means for the Engl i sh to undermi ne our po-
si ti on. "
3
It al so cl ai med to di scern a Jewi sh worl d conspi racy behi nd
both Zi oni sm and Bol shevi sm "seeking by all means at its di sposal
441
442
S T O R M O V E R A S I A
the destructi on of the Chri sti an worl d. ' Robert de Cai x, who man-
aged France' s political interests i n Syri a, agreed, cl ai mi ng that "The
revol uti onary and propheti c spi ri t whi ch i s so often f ound among
Jews has turned to Bol shevi sm" among the Zi oni sts who were arri vi ng
i n Pal esti ne from eastern Eur o pe .
5
Th u s the French saw their position
in Syri a and Lebanon as bei ng threatened by a movement that they
believed to be at once Bri ti sh, Jewi sh, Zi oni st, and Bol shevi k. Ac-
cordi ng to the presi dent of the Oeuvre des Ecol es d' Ori ent, it was
not merel y French national i nterests but also rel i gi ous sensibilities
that requi red action to be taken agai nst the Protestant and Jewi sh
posi ti ons in Pal esti ne. "It is i nadmi ssi bl e, " he sai d, "that the ' Count ry
of Chri st' shoul d become the prey of Jewry and of Angl o- Saxon
heresy. It must remai n the inviolable i nheri tance of France and the
Church. It woul d be a national i nfamy and an i rreparabl e cri me not
to remove this sacred l and from the brutal rapaci ty of our al l i es. "
6
At the t i me, the French government financed an anti -Bri ti sh politi-
cal cl ub called the Li t erary Soci ety whi ch had branches i n Jerus al em
and other Pal esti ni an towns. However, i n 1920, the i mmedi at e French
threat to Bri ti sh interests was posed i n the l arge, and largely unpopu-
lated, area east of the Jor dan called Trans j ordan, that was to form
roughl y 75 percent of the territory i ncl uded in the Bri ti sh Mandat e
for Pal esti ne. In t erms of tribal life and st ruct ure, Tr ans j or dan was
akin to Arabi a; in historical t erms, much of it was part of the land of
the Bi bl e, and it had also once f ormed part of the Roman provi nce of
Arabi a. Si nce the aut umn of 1918, when Al l enby drove out the
Tur ks , i t had been essentially ungoverned, for the Bri ti sh mi l i tary
authori ti es had left i t under Fei sal ' s ineffective Damas c us admi ni s-
trati on. Thi s turned out to have been ( f rom Bri tai n' s poi nt of view) a
mi stake, for when the French suppl ant ed Fei sal and his mi ni sters as
rul ers of Damas c us , they put themsel ves in a posi ti on to claim this
area as Fei sal ' s successors.
Trans j ordan was a di sordered area of tribal conflict. Th e Bri ti sh
feared that the l awl essness of the area mi ght be sei zed upon by the
French as an excuse for occupyi ng i t to bri ng order and civilization.
Arab enemi es of French rule i n Syri acl ai mi ng they were fighting to
bri ng Fei sal back t o Damas c us had gathered and mi ght mount
rai ds f rom Trans j ordan agai nst French Syri a; and these coul d be
used by the French as justification for mount i ng an invasion i n
retaliation.
Th e Bri ti sh admi ni strati on, centered i n western Pal esti ne, proposed
to send i n Bri ti sh t roops, but there were none to be had, for London
opposed the venture; all that London woul d authori ze was the send-
i ng in of a handful of civil admi ni s t rat ors .
7
A Bri ti sh officer servi ng i n Trans j ordan, C. D. Brunt on, reported
to his superi ors that peopl e were sayi ng the Bri ti sh woul d wi thdraw
E A S T E R N P A L E S T I N E ( T R A N S J O R D A N ) : 1 9 2 0 443
from the country and that "no one seems satisfied with our occu-
pat i on. "
8
Capt ai n Brunt on predi cted that it woul d take little to throw
the country into compl et e anarchy. He expl ai ned that
the peopl e here do not form a homogeneous political entity.
There is a sharp line of division between the settled popul ati on
and the Bedoui n. Th e former wish settl ed government and
protecti on from the extorti ons and violence of the latter. Th e
Bedoui n prefer anarchy to order as they live from extorti ons
f rom the peasantry and rapi ne as well as from their fl ocks and
herds. You cannot expect t hem to f orm a government for their
common count ry.
9
Hi s i mmedi at e concern was that a representati ve of Fei sal ' s
Hashemi t e fami l y was rai si ng passi ons agai nst the French. On 9
Sept ember 1920 Brunt on reported that the Hashemi t e representati ve
had procl ai med a Hol y War agai nst the French i n Syri a, had recrui ted
vol unteers, and had rel eased cri mi nal s f rom jail in the town of
Amman to join his move me nt .
1 0
Two days later, i n a cal mer mood,
he was abl e to report that the Has hemi t e representati ve had secured,
i n all, only fi fty vol unt eers .
1 1
But Brunt on remai ned unhappy about
the Bri ti sh government' s approach t o governi ng Tr ans j or dan: "The
i dea of control l i ng a country parti al l y i nhabi ted by predat ory savages
by gi vi ng i t Home Rul e and a few Bri ti sh advi sers may sound
attractive as an experi ment , " he wrote, but in practi ce it was not
wor ki ng.
1 2
Si nce Bri tai n di d not mai ntai n an army i n Trans j ordan, she coul d
not defend the territory i f France were to i nvade it. To retain
Trans j ordan for herself, Bri tai n woul d therefore have to avoi d pro-
voki ng a French i nvasi on. Arab rai ds on French posi ti ons i n Syr i a
i f l aunched f rom Tr ans j or danc oul d provoke such an i nvasi on, and
therefore had to be s t opped. Th e pol i cy of F. R. Somers et , a Bri ti sh
official i n Trans j ordan, was to st op the Arab tri bes f rom l aunchi ng
rai ds agai nst French Syri a by pl ayi ng off one tri be agai nst another.
Somerset ' s pol i cy, if successful , woul d depri ve France of a reas on
or an excusef or i nvadi ng undef ended Trans j ordan. But what i f
France were to attack the Bri ti sh t rust eeshi pnot merel y of Tr ans -
j ordan, but of the rest of Pal esti ne as wel l by other means : by
politics, propaganda, and subversi on rather than armed i nvasi on? As
of 1920, Arab nati onal i sts hated Fr anc e ; but what i f France shoul d
turn t hem around and persuade t hem to hate Bri tai n i nstead?
Somerset feared that France mi ght l aunch a propaganda crusade for
a Great er Syri a, to i ncl ude Trans j ordan and western Pal esti ne, on an
anti -Zi oni st pl at f or m
1 3
that woul d be popul ar with Arabs everywhere
i n Pal esti ne. France mi ght promi se the Arabs that i f she were al l owed
to take Pal esti ne (i ncl udi ng Trans j ordan) away from Bri tai n, she
woul d put a st op to Zi oni s mand Arabs mi ght rally behi nd France
on the basi s of such a program. Somerset ' s view, whi ch was shared
by a l arge section of Bri ti sh officialdom, was that Zi oni st s were
compromi si ng the Bri ti sh cause, as well as their own, by maki ng
their ul ti mate i ntenti ons publ i c. "It i s the Je ws and not us that
everyone is agai nst , " he wrote. "If the Jews woul d keep their silly
mout hs shut they coul d buy up the whol e count ry. "
1 4
T. E. Lawrence
took rather a different view: "He trusted that in four or five years,
under the influence of a just policy, the opposi ti on to Zi oni sm woul d
have decreased, if it had not entirely di s appe ar e d. "
1 5
But , for the moment , Arab opposi t i on to Zi oni sm was l oud and
lively, and was di st urbi ng the peace of Bri ti sh-hel d Pal esti ne.
50
PALESTINEARABS AND JEWS:
1920
In 191718, when General Al l enby took Pal esti ne away f rom the
Tur ks , he establ i shed a Bri ti sh mi l i tary admi ni strati on for the
country. Ever si nce then, t hroughout the military admi ni strati on,
there had run a st rong streak of resentment at havi ng been burdened
by London with an unpopul ar and difficult-to-achieve pol i cy: the
creation of a Jewi s h homel and in Pal esti ne pursuant to the Bal four
Decl arat i on. Fr om the begi nni ng, Gi l bert Cl ayt on, as chief politi-
cal officer to General Al l enby, and Ronal d St orrs , as governor of
Jerus al em, had avoi ded gi vi ng any si gn that they proposed to s up-
port that pol i cy. Bot h men privately prof essed to bel i eve i n Zi oni sm,
t hough Cl ayt on in parti cul ar seemed to define it in its narrowest
possi bl e sense: the fosteri ng of an expanded Jewi sh communi t y i n
Pal esti ne that coul d serve as a cul tural and senti mental center for
Je ws t hroughout the worl d, but within a Bri ti sh admi ni st ered, mul ti -
national Pal esti ne that woul d not become a Jewi s h state. Other
Bri ti sh officers servi ng i n Pal esti ne were unsympat het i c to Zi oni sm
even i n thi s l i mi ted sense, and si ded with the Arabs , who oppos ed i t
altogether. As they saw it, London' s policy of Zi oni sm mi ght have
been expressl y desi gned to stir up troubl e, and must have been
devi sed by far-off officials who di d not have to live with and deal
with local condi ti ons.
To Zi oni st l eaders, on the other hand, i t appeared that the waveri ng
stance or downri ght hostility of the Bri ti sh admi ni strati on hampered
their effort to secure Arab accept ance of the Bal f our Decl arat i on.
The y cl ai med that, had the Arab popul ati on of the country been
made to feel that the Bal four Decl arat i on was the unal terabl e policy
of the Bri t i sh government and inevitably woul d be carri ed into
effect, Arabs woul d have acqui es cedand mi ght even have become
recepti ve to its benefits. Dr Wei zmann and his col l eagues in the
Zi oni st l eadershi p st ressed their desi re to cooperate with the Arab
communi t i es; emphasi zed that the new Jewi sh i mmi grant s woul d not
be taki ng anythi ng away f rom the exi sti ng i nhabi tants, but woul d
buy, col oni ze, and cul ti vate l and not then bei ng us ed; and repeated
445
that Jewi sh colonization woul d bri ng substanti al economi c benefits to
the whole country, and i ndeed to the whole Arab Mi ddl e Eas t .
Among the Arabi c- speaki ng communi t i es of Pal esti ne, there was
consi derabl e di sagreement on most i ssues, and perhaps even on
Zi oni sm. Thi s was shown i n February 1919, at a congress convened
by the anti -Zi oni st Mosl em- Chri st i an Soci ety. A majori ty of the
thirty active politicians who at t ended the congress were abl e to paper
over their differences by agreei ng on a program calling for an Arab
federati on headed by Fei sal and centered on Syri a. The r e was some
feeling, however, in favor of creati ng a separat e Pal esti ne, some pro-
Bri ti sh feeling, some pro- French feeling, and enough di scord so that
five of the thirty del egates di d not si gn a resol uti on oppos i ng Zi oni sm.
Much volatility i n political views was demonst rat ed by the del egates
and their col l eagues duri ng the course of the next coupl e of years, as
those who had called for Fei sal to become ki ng t urned agai nst hi m,
pro- Bri t i sh and anti -Bri ti sh factions changed si des, and the pro-
ponents of Great er Syri a were forced, by the French conquest of
Damas c us , to restrict the focus of their views to the terri tory about
to be embraced within Bri tai n' s Pal esti ne Mandat e.
Arab pol i ti cs within Pal esti ne were f ormed by the rivalry between
the great urban fami l i es. Thr oughout the Bri ti sh occupat i on, the
most conspi cuous rivalry was that between the Jerus al em families of
al - Hussei ni and al - Nashashi bi . Al - Nashashi bi family politics moved
f rom anti -Bri ti sh to pro- Bri t i sh and pro-conci l i ati on in 1920; and in
the years i mmedi atel y thereafter the Zi oni st l eadershi p bel i eved that
it had arri ved at a basi s for mut ual cooperati on with the al - Nashashi bi
that mi ght l ead t o Arab- Jewi s h harmony. Th e al - Hussei ni , however,
who moved at the s ame ti me from support ers to opponent s of the
Bri ti sh, found themsel ves favored in the competi ti on to lead the
Ar ab communi t i es of the area by the sympat hy shown by the Bri ti sh
local admi ni strati on to the anti -Zi oni st cause. If even Bri ti sh officers
argued that the Arabs shoul d make no concessi ons, how coul d pro-
conciliation Arab l eaders pers uade their followers that concessi ons
had t o be made?
Vi ol ence broke out late in 1919 when Bedoui n tri bes attacked
Jewi sh settl ements i n the Uppe r Gal i l ee, i n the no-man' s l and between
the Bri ti sh and French military admi ni st rat i ons. Earl y i n 1920,
maraudi ng Arabs entered the Zi oni st settl ements and, i n the ensu-
i ng gun-fi ghti ng, several settlers were killed, i ncl udi ng the Russi an-
Jewi sh war hero, Capt ai n Jos e ph Tr umpe l dor .
Thereaf t er rumors were rife of violence to come i n Jerus al em that
spri ng. In response Vl adi mi r Jabot i ns kyt he Russi an- Jewi sh journal -
ist who had organi zed the Jewi sh regi ment i n Al l enby' s ar my
secured the agreement of other Zi oni st l eaders to allow hi m to form a
P A L E S T I N E A R A B S A N D J E WS : 1920 447
sel f-defense group, to be compos ed largely of veterans like himself of
the Jewi s h Legi on i n the Bri ti sh army. Jabot i nsky i nformed the
Bri ti sh governor of Jerus al em that he was formi ng such a gr oup;
asked that his group be, i n effect, deput i zed; and request ed the
Bri ti sh admi ni strati on to i ssue arms to hi m. When the Bri ti sh refused,
he bought arms from an Armeni an gunrunner i n the Ol d Ci t y.
Th e violence predi cted for Jerus al em broke out on 4 Apri l 1920.
Duri ng the Mos l em spri ngt i me festival of the Prophet Mos es , fiery
orators roused Arab mobs to what became three days of ri oti ng
agai nst Jews , of whom some were killed and hundreds wounded.
1
No casual ti es were suffered i n New Jerus al em, however, whi ch was
patrol l ed by Jabot i nsky' s forces. All of the casual ti es were suffered in
the Ol d Ci t y of Jerus al em, which Bri ti sh army uni ts prevented
Jabot i nsky' s forces from enteri ng.
Addi ng an especially omi nous ti nge to the bl oodl etti ng i n the Ol d
Ci ty was the cry of the rioting mobs that "The Government i s with
us ! "
2
That the mobs were not unjusti fi ed i n their cry became evident
when the Bri ti sh mi l i tary authori ti es met ed out puni shment . Onl y a
few ri oters were puni shed by seri ous court sentences; but Jabot i nsky
and his col l eagues were swiftly brought before a cl osed court marti al ,
charged with di stri buti ng arms to the sel f-defense group, and sen-
tenced to fi fteen years' hard l abor i n the fortress-pri son of Ac r e .
3
The s e deci si ons caused an outcry that led the Bri ti sh government to
order a court of i nqui ry into how the military were conduct i ng the
admi ni strati on of Pal esti ne.
Th e government' s court of i nqui ry held heari ngs i n Jerus al em, at
which mi l i tary officials cl ai med that Je ws were at fault, sayi ng they
had provoked the Mos l ems , while Jewi sh wi tnesses charged that the
Bri ti sh military government had encouraged the ri oters. Ri chard
Mei nert zhagen, the head of Mi l i tary Intelligence in Cai ro, had been
sent out to Pal esti ne to report on whether London' s pro-Zi oni st
policy was bei ng carri ed out, and when he testified in court that the
Jewi sh wi tnesses were correct, the government was shocked into
accepti ng the truth of their t es t i mony.
4
Mei nert zhagen confided in his diary that "I am not sure that the
worl d is not still too selfish to appreci ate the worth of the meri ts of
Zi oni st ai ms. Th e worl d i s certainly too anti -semi ti c and too sus-
pi ci ous of Jewi sh brai ns and money. In any case I find mysel f alone
out here, among genti l es, i n uphol di ng Zi oni sm . . . And that i s the
irony of the whole si tuati on, for I am also i mbued with anti semi -
tic feelings . . . "
s
Sus pect i ng that his fellow officers mi ght have
moved f rom senti ments to acti ons, he spi ed on t hem while he was i n
Pal esti ne. Lat er, he report ed to General Al l enby that he had pl anted
an agent within the military admi ni st rat i on, and had l earned that the
Bri ti sh colonel who served as chief of staff of the admi ni strati on was
conspi ri ng with the Arab Mufti of Jerus al em to foment new anti-
Jewi sh ri ot s .
6
Within weeks after the government had held its court of i nqui ry,
London di sbanded the mi l i tary admi ni st rat i on of Pal esti ne and in-
stal l ed a civilian admi ni strati on i n its pl ace. Ll oyd George appoi nt ed
Herbert Samuel to be its head, as the new Hi gh Commi ssi oner.
Samuel , a Je w and a l eadi ng Li beral , had been the fi rst member of
the Bri ti sh government i n 1914, when the war agai nst Turkey
begant o have proposed the creati on of a Bri t i sh- sponsored Jewi sh
homel and i n Pal esti ne. Hi s appoi nt ment showed that the Pri me
Mi ni ster was unwaveri ng in his Pal esti ne pol i cy; yet the violence
which the mi l i tary admi ni strati on had encouraged caused others i n
London to have second thoughts about s upport for a Jewi sh home-
l and. Even Wi nston Churchi l l , who had been an enthusi asti c pro-
Zi oni st all his life, wrote, on 13 J une 1920, to Ll oyd George that
"Palestine is costi ng us 6 mi l l i ons a year to hol d. Th e Zi oni st move-
ment will cause conti nued friction with the Arabs . Th e French . . .
are oppos ed to the Zi oni st movement & will try to cushi on the Arabs
off on us as the real enemy. Th e Pal esti ne venture . . . will never
yield any profit of a materi al ki nd. "
7
The s e doubt s were intensified by spectacul ar upri si ngs i n Iraq at
about the s ame ti me, that drai ned Bri tai n' s resources, and whi ch
comi ng after the riots in Egypt , the war in Af ghani st an, the rel i gi ous
war i n Arabi a, the nationalist rebellion i n Turkey, and the troubl es
with French Syri as ugges t ed to many Engl i shmen that Bri tai n
shoul d wi thdraw from the Mi ddl e Eas t entirely.
51
MESOPOTAMIA (IRAQ): 1920
In the first heady days of Arab nati onal i sm i n Damas c us after the
war, it became apparent that one of the i mportant regi onal di fferences
between the vari ous Arab acti vi sts was that those f rom the
Mes opot ami an provi ncest he eastern half of the Arabi c- speaki ng
worl dwere for the most part mi l i tary men. Al t hough the
Mesopot ami an sol di ers cl ai med to act in the name of Fei sal and his
brot hers, most of t hem were former Ot t oman officers who had re-
mai ned loyal to the Sul t an and the Young Tur ks until the very end
of the war. Battlefield professi onal s and dedi cat ed opponent s of
Bri tai n, they coul d have been expect ed to consti tute a more seri ous
potential threat to Bri ti sh pl ans than di d the politicians and orators
of Damas c us or Jerus al em.
At first the Bri ti sh admi ni strati on i n the Mes opot ami an provi nces
di d not see it that way. Tens i ons between the di verse popul at i ons of
the area seemed to pose greater probl ems, and the l awl essness of
groups such as the Ku r d s and the Bedoui n tri bes seemed t o pose
greater t hreat s. Incoherence, communal stri fe, and habi tual di s-
orderrat her than organi zed nat i onal i smwere percei ved as the
chal l enge. Th e talk of national sel f-government came mostl y (accord-
i ng to the local Bri ti sh authori ti es) from ambi t i ous i ntri guers of
shady character who woul d s ubs i de into insignificance if only the
Al l i ed l eaders woul d cease their unsettl i ng Wilsonian propaganda.
At the cl ose of the war, the t emporary admi ni st rat i on of the
provi nces was i n the hands of Capt ai n (later Col onel ) Arnol d Wilson
of Bri ti sh Indi a, who became civil commi ssi oner. Hi s f amous assi s-
tant was Gert rude Bel l , at that t i me the best-known Bri t i sh writer
about Arab countri es. She t ended toward protectorate, he, toward
direct rul e, but in 1918 they were enough in agreement for hi m to
forward with approval her me mor andum argui ng that the talk of self-
determi nati on before and at the Peace Conference was detri mental .
She had previ ousl y written that "the peopl e of Mes opot ami a, havi ng
wi tnessed the successful termi nati on of the war, had taken it for
grant ed that the country woul d remai n under Bri ti sh control and
449
were as a whole content to accept the deci si on of ar ms . " Th e decla-
rati ons in favor of national sel f-determi nati on at the Peace Conference
by Woodrow Wilson and others "opened up other possi bi l i ti es which
were regarded al most uni versal l y with anxi ety, but gave opport uni t y
for political i ntri gue to the less st abl e and more fanatical el ements. "
1
When, in line with the Ameri can pri nci pl es bei ng adopt edor at
least affectedi n London, the Cabi net i nstructed Arnol d Wilson to
ask the peopl es of Mes opot ami a what states or government s they
woul d like to see establ i shed in their area, Wilson's repl y was that
there was no way of ascertai ni ng publ i c opi ni on.
2
While he was prepared to admi ni st er the provi nces of Bas ra and
Baghdad, and al so the provi nce of Mosul (which, with Cl emenceau' s
consent, Ll oyd George had det ached from the French sphere and
i ntended to wi thhol d f rom Tur ke y) , he di d not believe that they
formed a coherent entity. I raq (an Arab term that the Bri ti sh used
i ncreasi ngl y to denote the Mes opot ami an l ands) seemed to hi m too
spl i ntered for that to be possi bl e. Mosul ' s strategi c i mport ance made
it seem a necessary addi ti on to I raq, and the st rong probabi l i ty that
it contai ned val uabl e oilfields made it a desi rabl e one, but it was part
of what was s uppos ed to have been Kur di s t an; and Arnol d Wilson
argued that the warl i ke Ku r d s who had been brought under his
admi ni strati on "numberi ng half a million will never accept an Arab
rul er. "
3
A f undament al probl em, as Wilson saw it, was that the al most two
million Shi ' i te Mos l ems i n Mes opot ami a woul d not accept domi -
nation by the mi nori ty Sunni Mos l em communi t y, yet "no form of
Government has yet been envi saged, which does not involve Sunni
domi nat i on. "
4
Th e bi tterness between the two communi t i es was
hi ghl i ghted when each produced a rival Arab nationalist soci et y.
5
Al so to be consi dered was the l arge Jewi s h communi t y, whi ch domi -
nated the commerci al life of Baghdad, and the substanti al Chri sti an
communi t y that i ncl uded the Nest ori an- Chal daean refugees from
Turkey who had gat hered i n the area of Mos ul .
Seventy-fi ve percent of the popul at i on of Iraq was tri bal , Wilson
told London, "with no previ ous tradi ti on of obedi ence to any govern-
ment . "
6
Al ong the same lines, Gert rude Bell wrote to her father that
"The provi nci al magnat es are goi ng strongl y agai nst an Arab Ami r, I
think, and even agai nst an Arab Govt . The y say they don't want to
be rid of one tyranny in order to fall into the cl utches of anot her. "
7
* (See page 450.) Nuri el-Sa'id, the Mesopotamian officer who had served as one
of the heads of Feisal's Allied army corps during the war, advocated the creation of a
single government for Syria and Mesopotamia. The Mesopotamian delegates asso-
ciated with the Syrian General Congress in Damascus instead advocated splitting
them between governments in Damascus and Baghdad.
ME S O P O T A MI A ( I R A Q ) : 1920 451
Unl i ke Arab nati onal i sts, who were thi nki ng i n t erms of political
unity on a l arge scal e, there were those who quest i oned whether
even at t empt i ng to uni te the Mes opot ami an provi nces mi ght not be
too ambi t i ous to be practi cal . Gert rude Bel l , worki ng on her own
pl ans for a unified I raq, was cauti oned by an Ameri can mi ssi onary
that she was i gnori ng rooted historical realities i n doi ng so. "You are
flying in the face of four mi l l enni ums of history if you try to draw a
line around Iraq and call it a political entity! Assyri a al ways looked
to the west and east and north, and Babyl oni a to the sout h. The y
have never been an i ndependent uni t. You' ve got to take t i me to get
t hem i ntegrated, i t mus t be done gradual l y. The y have no concepti on
of nati onhood yet . "
9
A l eadi ng Arab political figure in Baghdad cauti oned her al ong
different lines. Speaki ng to her on 12 June 1920, he reproached her
with the fact that, more than three years after occupyi ng Baghdad i n
the war, Bri tai n conti nued to talk about establ i shi ng an i ndependent
government but still di d nothi ng about it. He contrasted thi s with
the si tuati on i n Damas c us , where the Bri ti sh had set up Fei sal ' s
i ndependent admi ni strati on as soon as they had arri ved. Well aware
that she was one of the Bri ti sh officials who were maki ng pl ans for
his government , he remi nded her that "You sai d i n your decl arati on
that you woul d set up a native government drawi ng its authori ty
from the initiative and free choi ce of the peopl e concerned, yet you
proceed to draw up a scheme wi thout consul ti ng anyone. It woul d
have been easy for you to take one or two l eadi ng men in your
counci l s and this woul d have removed the reproach whi ch i s levelled
agai nst your scheme . . . "
I 0
Gert rude Bell di scount ed the danger of a native upri si ng. Her
chief, Arnol d Wilson (agai nst whom she i nt ri gued) , di d not. He
warned London that demobi l i zati on had left his armed forces danger-
ousl y undermanned. Th e military depl oyed only a tiny force of
mobi l e troops to patrol an area of 170, 000 s quare mi l e s .
1 1
He poi nted
to the danger posed by Fei sal ' s adherent s; al though Nuri el -Sa' i d and
other top Mes opot ami an officers who had served i n the Hej az forces
with Lawrence and the Allies had been forbi dden to return home, as
suspect ed potenti al t roubl emakers, a number of act i vi st smany of
whom had served with the enemy duri ng the warhad sl i pped back
into the country after the Damas c us procl amat i ons calling for
Mesopot ami an i ndependence. The r e was al so talk of agents sent by
Kemal i s t Tu r k e y .
1 2
Bri ti sh nerves were on edge as vague rumors , constant unrest, and
repeated killings took their toll. In the s ummer of 1919 three young
Bri ti sh capt ai ns were murdered i n Kurdi s t an. Th e Government of
Indi a sent out an experi enced official to take their pl ace in Oct ober
1919; a mont h later he, too, was killed.
At Chri st mas that year, Arnol d Wilson sent to London to enlist
the aid of Col onel Geral d Le ac hman, an officer whose feats of travel,
advent ure, and war i n the eastern desert s had become l egendary.
Le ac hman arri ved back i n Mes opot ami a, before the spri ng of 1920,
to find that six Bri ti sh officers had been killed in the ten days before
his r e t ur n.
1 3
More was t o come: the next mont h Le ac hman was abl e
to rescue a party of Bri ti sh officers attacked by a rai di ng party in the
desert but , in the early s ummer, he was unabl e to save two of his
political officers who were abduct ed as hostages and later murdered.
Th e desert was alive with Arab rai di ng parti es and, i n Leachman' s
opi ni on, the only way to deal with the di saffected tri bes was "whole-
sale s l aught er: "
1 4
In June the tri bes suddenl y rose i n full revol ta revolt that seems
to have been tri ggered by the government' s efforts to levy t axes. By
14 J une the formerl y compl acent Gert rude Bell, goi ng f rom one
extreme to another, cl ai med to be living t hrough a nationalist rei gn
of t e r r or .
1 5
She exaggerat ed, but i n the Mi ddl e Euphrat es , post s
were i ndeed overrun, Bri ti sh officers killed, and communi cat i ons
c ut .
1 6
For one reason or anot hert he revolts had a number of causes
and the vari ous rebel s pursued different goal svi rt ual l y the whole
area rose agai nst Bri tai n, and revolt then spread to the Lower
Euphrat es as well. A Hol y War was procl ai med agai nst Bri tai n in the
Shi'ite Mos l em holy city of Ka r b a l a h .
1 7
On the northwestern frontier,
Arab caval ry, initially led by one of Fei sal ' s ex-officers, swept down
on Bri t i sh out post s and massacred their defenders.
There was more bad news: Le ac hman, who left Baghdad on 11
Augus t to attend a meet i ng with tribal allies at a station on the
Euphrat es , was tricked into sendi ng away his armed escort and
then was shot i n the back and killed by order of the tri bal shei kh who
was his host. "Arab Treachery" was the headline of the Reuters'
report of the assassi nat i on; "Bad To Worse In Mesopot ami a" was the
headl i ne of The Times.
l&
Th e news of Leachman' s killing led to
further tribal upri si ngs agai nst the Bri t i sh al ong the Euphrat es . Fres h
upri si ngs occurred north and west of Baghdad. By mi d- Augus t a
group of i nsurgent s felt confident enough to decl are a provi si onal
Arab gove r nme nt .
1 9
In a l eadi ng article on 7 Augus t 1920, The Times demanded to
know "how much l onger are val uabl e lives to be sacrificed in the vain
endeavour to i mpose upon the Arab popul ati on an el aborate and
expensi ve admi ni strati on which they never asked for and do not
want ?" In a si mi l ar article on 10 Augus t , The Times sai d that "We
are spendi ng s ums i n Mes opot ami a and i n Persi a which may well
reach a hundred million pounds this year" in s upport of what it
t ermed "the foolish policy of the Government i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . "
Th e Government of Indi a poured i n rei nforcements of men and
ME S O P O T A MI A ( I R A Q ) : 1920
453
suppl i es to restore order. Th e mai n popul at i on centers qui ckl y were
secured, but regai ni ng control of the count rysi de took t i me. It was
not until Oct ober that many of the cut-off Euphrat es towns were
relieved and not until February of 1921 that order was restored more
or less compl etel y. Before put t i ng down the revolt Bri tai n suffered
nearly 2, 000 casual ti es, i ncl udi ng 450 d e a d .
2 0
Th e Bri ti sh were confused as to the ori gi ns of the revolt. Arnol d
Wilson submi t t ed a list of thirteen contri buti ng factors, stressi ng,
above all, the i nvol vement of Fei sal ' s support ers and Kemal ' s Turkey,
perhaps s upport ed, he cl ai med, by Ameri can St andard Oi l i nt eres t s .
2 1
An intelligence officer attached to the Indi a Office produced a chart
outl i ni ng the conspi racy, i mpl i cati ng Fei sal but , even more so, the
Tur ks , who (he assert ed) conti nued to take orders via Mos cow and
Swi tzerl and f rom Be r l i n.
2 2
Hi s chart was ci rcul ated among Cabi net
members i n London.
Th e myst eri ous upri si ngs i n I raq threw the normal l y poi sed Bri ti sh
Indi an admi ni strati on off bal ance. Si r Arnol d Wilson told the Cabi net
at the end of 1920 that "there was no real desi re in Mes opot ami a for
an Arab government , that the Arabs woul d appreci ate Bri ti sh r ul e . "
2 3
If that were so, then the expl osi on i n Mes opot ami a coul d not be
expl ai ned as an Ar ab i ndependence movement . "What we are up
agai nst , " sai d Wi l son, "is anarchy pl us fanati ci sm. The r e i s little or
no Nat i onal i s m. "
2 4
Th e t ri besmen, he sai d, were "out agai nst all
government as such" and had no notion what they were fi ghti ng
f o r .
2 5
In mi d- Augus t he sai d that the "revol uti onary movement has
for s ome ti me past ceased to have any political aspect and has
become entirely anarchi c. "
2 6
It was not a sati sfactory expl anati on, comi ngas the Iraqi upri s-
i ngs di don t op of t roubl es everywhere else i n the Mi ddl e Eas t .
Why were the despi sed Tur ks , under Kemal ' s l eadershi p, successful l y
conti nui ng to defy the Al l i es? Why was Bri tai n' s prot ege, Ki ng
Hussei n, l osi ng the st ruggl e for mast ery i n Arabi a? Why di d the
Egypt i ans conti nue to refuse to negot i at eon any bas i s f or Bri tai n' s
forces to remai n i n their country? Why were the Af ghans conspi ri ng
with the Rus s i ans ? Why di d Fei sal lose out to France and then allow
his followers to strike out at Bri tai n? Why di d Arabs riot in Pal esti ne
and rebel in I raqal l at a ti me when Bri tai n' s economy had col l apsed
and when the government ' s ti me, energy, and resources were needed
to revive it?
In London there was no agreement about what had happened i n
the Mi ddl e Eas t , but there was a stri ki ngl y l arge body of opi ni on that
held that what had occurred was caused by out si ders, and that the
di sorders t hrough the Eas t were somehow linked with one another.
Certai n names conti nued to recur i n the course of Bri ti sh specul ati ons
as to the ori gi ns of the di sorders: Enver Pasha, Mus t apha Ke mal ,
Fei sal , Pan- I s l am, the Ge r mans , St andard Oil, the Je ws , and the
Bol shevi ks.
With respect to the Bol shevi ks, Bri t i sh suspi ci ons i n fact proved to
be well f ounded. Th e Russi ans, l ooki ng for a chance to undermi ne
the Bri ti sh posi ti on i n Asi a, deci ded that, by bri ngi ng pressure to
bear on Bri tai n el sewhere, they mi ght enabl e the i nsurgency i n I raq
to succeed. Th e area of Bri ti sh vul nerabi l i ty they chose to exploit
was i n Persi a, the political battlefield on whi ch Bri tai n and Rus s i a
had cl ashed so often i n the course of the Great Ga me .
52
PERSIA (IRAN): 1920
When the Fi rst Worl d War came to an end, the Bri ti sh Pri me
Mi ni ster' s attention was too much occupi ed el sewhere for hi m to pay
much attenti on to Persi a, the Ot t oman Empi re' s eastern nei ghbor,
which was not, in any event, an area of the worl d in whi ch he took
much i nterest. By defaul t the way was left open for George Curzon,
chai rman of the East ern Commi t t ee of the Cabi net and, f rom 1919
onward, Forei gn Mi ni ster, t o take charge. Lo r d Curzon cared about
Persi a more than he cared about practi cal l y anywhere el se.
Curzon' s tendency was to exaggerat e the i mport ance of areas i n
which he was expert and there was no questi on that he was an expert
on Persi a. Hi s j ourney in 1889 to that then little-known l and was
f amous ; and his book Persia and the Persian Question was j udged to
be the st andard authori ty on the subj ect i n the Engl i sh l anguage. Hi s
view, correspondi ngl y, was that the magni t ude of Bri ti sh i nterests i n
that country was i mmens e.
Fr o m the nineteenth century, Lo r d Curzon brought with hi m a
strategy of creati ng "a Mos l em nexus of states" i n the Mi ddl e Eas t as
a shield to ward off Rus s i an expans i on.
1
Russi an expansi oni st desi gns
had fi gured promi nentl y in his expressed t hought s and in his wri ti ngs
when he expl ored Cent ral Asi a i n the late nineteenth century, and
had figured promi nentl y in his pol i ti cs when he became Vi ceroy of
Indi a early i n the twentieth century. When the Bol shevi k Revol uti on
brought about Russi a' s wi thdrawal from her forward posi ti ons,
Curzon propos ed to take advant age of the si tuati on by put t i ng his
Bri t i sh- sponsored Mos l em nexus of states into pl ace. In the nine-
teenth century the nexus woul d have been a line across the Mi ddl e
Eas t f rom the Ot t oman Empi re t hrough the Persi an Empi r e t o the
khanates and emi rates of Central Asi a and Af ghani st an; but Curzon
was in no posi ti on to reconstruct a line that long.
Dri ven to wi t hdraw by Wi nston Churchi l l and his pol i cy of radical
retrenchment, Bri ti sh forces al most everywhere i n Asi a were bei ng
evacuated f rom posi ti ons that Lo r d Curzon wi shed to see mai nt ai ned.
Of the nexus, only Persi a remai ned-but there Curzon retai ned his
4
solitary domi nance of Bri ti sh pol i cy. Edwi n Mont agu, a member of
the Cabi net' s East ern Commi t t ee, observed that the draft mi nut es of
a meeti ng of the commi t t ee, f rom which all members but Curzon
were absent, recorded that "the Commi t t ee agreed with the Chai r-
man. " "Surel y you will not allow this to s t and?" Mont agu wrote to
Curzon; "the Commi t t ee consi sted of the Chai rman: and the Chai r-
man, of course, not unnatural l y, agreed with the Chai r man. "
2
Insofar
as Persi a was concerned, that was the manner i n whi ch he proceeded,
taki ng policy entirely into his own hands and i gnori ng t he rel uctance
of his Cabi net col l eagues to follow where he led.
"The integrity of Persi a, " he had written two decades earlier,
"must be regi stered as a cardi nal precept of our Imperi al creed. "
3
Saf eguardi ng that integrity agai nst future Russi an encroachment s
remai ned the pri nci pal object of his pol i cy. Th e means at his di sposal ,
however, were few and sl ender.
Th e end of the worl d war found Bri tai n (and Bri ti sh Indi a) with
smal l forces in four areas of Persi a. In the northeast and the north-
west, there were the tiny mi l i tary mi ssi ons of General s Mal l eson and
Dunst ervi l l e, whose advent ures i n Rus s i a were followed earlier (see
Chapt er 38) . On the Gul f coast there were a few garri sons of Indi an
t roops. In the south there was a native force recrui ted duri ng the war
and led by Bri ti sh officers, called the Sout h Persi a Ri fl es; but mu-
tinies and deserti ons, tri ggered before the armi sti ce by a tribal revolt
agai nst Bri ti sh rul e, had brought its effectiveness into questi on.
The s e forces were insufficient to Lo r d Curzon' s purpos es , even
had there not been pressure f rom the War Office and f rom Indi a to
make further reducti ons i n t roops and subsi di es. Curzon there-
fore concentrated his energi es on the organi zati on of a new Bri ti sh-
supervi sed regi me i n Persi a that coul d t ransf orm the sprawl i ng,
anarchi c, much- di vi ded territory into an efficient, effective country
abl e to s upport and defend itself, and thus di spense with Bri ti sh
subsi di es and t roops.
Th e pl an was embodi ed i n a treaty between Bri tai n and Persi a that
Lo r d Curzon i mposed upon the government s of both countri es.
Fl abby young Ahmed Shah, last of the fadi ng Kadj ar dynasty to sit
upon the throne of Persi a, posed no probl em: he was fearful for his
life and, in any event, recei ved a regul ar subsi dy f rom the Bri ti sh
government in return for mai ntai ni ng a pro- Bri t i sh Pri me Mi ni ster in
office. Under Lo r d Curzon' s supervi si on, the Bri ti sh Mi ni ster i n
Teheran negoti ated a treaty with the Persi an Pri me Mi ni ster and two
of his col l eagueswho demanded and received a secret payment of
130, 000 pounds from the Bri ti sh i n return for si gni ng i t .
4
Curzon was proud of the Angl o- Persi an Agreement of 9 Augus t
1919. "A great t ri umph, " he wrote, "and I have done it all al one. "
5
By the t erms of the agreement , Bri ti sh officers were to construct a
P E R S I A ( I R A N ) : 1920 457
national railway network; Bri ti sh expert s woul d reorgani ze the
national finances; a Bri ti sh loan woul d provi de the wherewithal for
accompl i shi ng these proj ect s; and Bri t i sh officials woul d supervi se
the collection of cus t oms dut i es so as to ensure that the loan woul d
be repai d.
Accordi ng to Curzon, the agreement was desi gned to bol ster
Persi an i ndependence. He di d not foresee that others woul d put a
different constructi on upon it. He made no provi si on for the possi -
bility that oi l -consci ous al l i es France and the Uni t ed St at es mi ght
react agai nst the apparent grant to Bri tai n of a political monopol y.
He seemed unaware, too, of the di recti on i n which currents of
opi ni on were flowing in Persi a itself: he as s umed that, as in ti mes
gone by, Persi ans feared Russi an expansi oni sm and woul d wel come
protecti on agai nst it. Persi an fear of it i nstead seems to have di s ap-
peared when the Rus s i an Empi re col l apsed i n 1917. By 1919 Bri tai n
represented the only European threat to the aut onomy of the interest
groups t he local, provi nci al , and tribal l eadershi ps i n part i cul ar
that exerci sed such authori ty as still functi oned in the chaoti c Persi an
territory. As for publ i c opi ni on: i n the capi tal , Teheran, of the
twenty-six newspapers and other peri odi cal s publ i shed there at the
ti me, twenty-five denounced the Angl o- Persi an Agreement .
6
A short ti me after executi on of the agreement , it was di scovered in
London and Teheran that a provi si on i n the Persi an Consti tuti on
requi red that all treaties had to be ratified by the Maj l i s (as the
l egi sl ature was cal l ed) . Th e Majl i s had not met si nce 1915 and had
been i gnored by both government s i n arri vi ng at the agreement .
In the cl osed worl d of tradi ti onal di pl omacy it was not then
regarded as honorabl e for a l egi sl ature to fail to ratify a treaty dul y
executed by the government ; the requi rement of ratification, accord-
ingly, was regarded as a mere technicality and, as such, was easy for
negoti ators to overl ook. Yet once the i ssue was rai sed i t as s umed
i mport ance. For Lo r d Curzon, i t became i mport ant t o demonst rat e
to his Cabi net col l eagues and to cri ti cs i n France and the Uni t ed
St at es that the agreement was a genui ne expressi on of the will of the
Persi an nati on, whi ch only an affirmative vote of the Maj l i s ( i mper-
fectly representati ve t hough that body mi ght be) coul d provi de. But
one Persi an Pri me Mi ni ster after another (for mi ni stri es i n Teheran
fell in rapi d successi on) del ayed convoki ng the Maj l i s for fear that its
members coul d not be control l ed. As no move coul d be made to
i mpl ement the agreement until it was ratified, Persi a remai ned in
di sorder, vul nerabl e (Bri ti sh officials feared) to Bol shevi k propaganda
and agi tati on.
All al ong, the procl ai med policy of the Bol shevi k regi me with
regard to Persi a had provi ded an appeal i ng contrast to that of Bri tai n.
At the begi nni ng of 1918, the Sovi et government renounced Rus s i an
political and mi l i tary cl ai ms on Persi a as i nconsi stent with Persi a' s
soverei gn ri ghts. As the s umme r of 1919 began, the Sovi et govern-
ment also gave up all economic claims belonging to Russi a or Russi ans
i n Persi a, annul l i ng all Persi an debt s to Rus s i a, cancel l i ng all Russi an
concessi ons i n Persi a, and surrenderi ng all Russi an propert y i n Persi a.
Of course i t coul d be poi nted out that the Sovi et government was
surrenderi ng cl ai ms it was too weak to enforce; in that sense, it was
gi vi ng away nothi ng. Yet its surrender of economi c cl ai ms in the
s ummer of 1919 pl aced in stark relief the far-reachi ng economi c
concessi ons that Lo r d Curzon demanded and recei ved for Bri tai n i n
the Angl o- Persi an Agreement si gned that s ame s ummer. Freed, at
least temporari l y, from their fears of Russi a, Persi an nati onal i sts
al l owed themsel ves to resent the st rong measure of foreign control
central to Lo r d Curzon' s pl an for their protecti on.
So nationalist opi ni on hardened. Th e winter of 191920 pas s ed,
and ratification of the Angl o- Persi an Agreement drifted slowly, frus-
tratingly, out of Curzon' s gras p. The n, i n the spri ng of the year,
events took a new turn.
In Augus t of 1918 Capt ai n Davi d T. Norri s of the Royal Navy
had organi zed a smal l Bri ti sh naval flotilla to control the Cas pi an Sea
for General Dunstervi l l e' s mi l i tary mi ssi on as i t occupi ed and then
retreated f rom Baku (see page 359) . In the s ummer of 1919 the
Bri ti sh government had t urned the fl oti l l a over to the Whi te Rus s i an
forces of General Deni ki n for use in the Russi an Civil War. When
Deni ki n' s forces col l apsed, the remai ns of the fl oti l l a, s ome ei ghteen
vessel s, manned by anti -Bol shevi k Rus s i ans , found refuge i n Enzel i ,
the Royal Navy' s base and the pri nci pal Persi an port on the Cas pi an
Sea. The r e they were taken into custody by Persi an officials and by
the Bri ti sh and Indi an garri son still in pl ace. As of the s pri ng of 1920
the Bri ti sh and Persi an government s had not yet deci ded what to do
with the flotilla, whi ch still was of a size and strength sufficient to
affect any contest for mast ery of the Caspi an.
At dawn on 18 May 1920, thirteen Sovi et Rus s i an warshi ps
l aunched a surpri se attack on Enzel i . Under cover of a barrage from
their shi ps, Sovi et t roops l anded and cut off the Bri ti sh garri son i n
its camp at the tip of a peni nsul a. Th e t rapped Bri ti sh commandi ng
general , after vainly seeki ng i nstructi ons from his superi ors in
Teheran, accepted the t erms di ctated to hi m by the vi ctori ous Sovi et
commander: the Bri ti sh garri son surrendered bot h its military
suppl i es and the Deni ki n fl oti l l a to the Bol shevi ks, and then retreated
from Enzel i .
Within weeks a Persi an Soci al i st Republ i c was procl ai med in Gi l an,
the provi nce in which the port of Enzel i was l ocated, and a Persi an
Communi s t Party was f ounded i n the provi nce to support it. Al t hough
Russi ans pl ayed a key role in these events, Sovi et Rus s i a was at pai ns
P E R S I A ( I R A N ) : 1920 459
to deny it. Mos cow even deni ed havi ng ordered the attack on Enzel i ;
accordi ng to Sovi et spokesmen, i t was undertaken by the local Russi an
naval commander on his own responsi bi l i ty.
If there were a justification for the Angl o- Persi an Agreement and
for a commandi ng Bri ti sh presence in the country, it was shattered
by the chai n of events that began at Enzel i . Bri tai n had undertaken
to defend Persi a agai nst Rus s i a and Bol s hevi s mbut was visibly
failing to do so. Th e retreat from Enzel i spurred the War Office to
demand the wi thdrawal of the remai ni ng Bri ti sh forces f rom Persi a.
As Wi nston Churchi l l wrote to George Curzon, there was somet hi ng
to be sai d for maki ng peace with the Bol shevi ks, and somet hi ng to be
sai d for maki ng war on them, but nothi ng to be sai d for the current
pol i cy.
7
Accordi ng to the new Pri me Mi ni ster of Persi a, the Angl o-
Persi an Agreement was "in s us pens e. " Th e Pri me Mi ni ster of Bri tai n
bl amed his Forei gn Secretary for what had occurred, sayi ng that
Curzon was al most entirely responsi bl e for saddl i ng Bri tai n with
responsi bi l i ti es i n Persi a that shoul d never have been as s ume d.
8
At the end of the s ummer of 1920, the Russi an Bol shevi k repre-
sentati ve, Le v Kamenev, came to London as chai rman of a peace
del egati on charged with negoti ati ng an end to the conflict between
Rus s i a and her former warti me allies. Kame ne v was one of the half-
dozen or so pri nci pal l eaders of the Communi s t Party of the Sovi et
Uni on, and for many years had been one of the cl osest political
associ ates of Leni n. In London, Kame ne v seems t o have become
aware of the extent to which the Bri ti sh government had been
thrown off bal ance by the upri si ngs in I raq, and saw a chance for his
government to expl oi t the si tuati on in Persi a in order to i ncrease
Bri tai n' s difficulties in I raq. In a secret cabl e ( decoded by Bri ti sh
Intel l i gence) from London to the Sovi et Forei gn Mi ni ster i n Moscow,
Kame ne v st at ed that "pressure on the Bri ti sh t roops i n Nort h Persi a
will strengthen the posi ti on of the Mesopot ami an i nsurgent s. " A
revolution al ong a geographi cal line runni ng from Enzel i in Persi a to
Baghdad in I raq, he conti nued, "threatens the most vital i nterests of
the Bri ti sh Empi r e and breaks the st at us quo i n As i a. "
9
Here was the
linkage between one upri si ng and another, in which Bri ti sh officials
believed with superst i t i ous fervor; but, contrary to what they be-
lieved, only the events i n northern Persi a ( and to s ome extent those
i n Af ghani st an) were directly i nspi red by Sovi et Rus s i a.
In the aut umn of 1920 a new Bri ti sh commander, Maj or- General
Edmund Ironsi de, arri ved to take charge of the si tuati on i n northern
Persi a. Hi s vi ews about what shoul d be done were consi derabl y at
vari ance with those of Lor d Curzon. An overwhel mi ng fi gure, six
feet, four i nches tall and wei ghi ng 275 pounds, Ironsi de di d not
hesitate to i mpose his own policy.
0
Li ke Churchi l l , he thought it
foolish to oppos e the Bol shevi ks if one were not allowed to engage in
an all-out war to defeat t hem. Th e best that coul d be hoped for, i n
his opi ni on, was for Bri tai n and Rus s i a to wi thdraw their forcesi f a
Persi an government coul d be left in pl ace that coul d hol d its own.
In the whole of northern Persi a there was only one more-or-l ess
i ndi genous force avai l abl e to Ironsi de that was of s ome cons equence
the Persi an Cossack Di vi si on, which had been created i n 1879 by the
Russi an Czar as a bodyguard for the Persi an Shah. But i t suffered
f rom bei ng Russi an- i nspi red and Rus s i an- l ed: its commander and a
number of its commi ssi oned and noncommi ssi oned officers were
Russi an, and t hrough the years i t had been heavily subsi di zed by the
Russi an government . After the Rus s i an revol uti ons, the Bri ti sh
government had taken over the payment of the subsi dy; yet in 1920
its commandi ng officer, a Rus s i an colonel named St arossel ski , ref used
nonethel ess to compl y with Bri ti sh demands and, t hough an anti-
Bol shevi k, i nsi sted on uphol di ng "Russi an i nt erest s. "
1 1
General Ironsi de eyed the Persi an Cossacks as a vehicle for the
accompl i shment of his program. Th e Persi an el ement i n i t was l arge
and the Rus s i an group was smal l : 6, 000 Persi an sol di ers and 237
Persi an officers, versus 56 Rus s i an officers and 66 noncommi ssi oned
of f i cers .
1 2
Th e Rus s i an commander, St arossel ski , was i n a vul nerabl e
posi ti on: after scori ng initial successes agai nst the Persi an Soci al i st
Republ i c, he had failed di smal l y.
Ironsi de prompt l y arranged to have Starossel ski di s mi s s ed; later
he also arranged for Starossel ski ' s repl acement to be sent away. In
their pl ace, Ironsi de put Reza Kha n, a t ough, bul l et-headed Persi an
colonel whom Ironsi de later descri bed as "the most manl y Persi an"
he had me t .
1 3
Aware of War Office pl ans to compl et e the evacuati on of Bri ti sh
forces f rom Persi a i n 1921, Ironsi de went about arrangi ng for Reza
Kha n to rul e the country as Bri tai n depart ed. On 12 February 1921
Ironsi de told Reza Kha n that the remai ni ng Bri ti sh forces woul d not
oppos e hi m if he carri ed out a coup d'etat, so l ong as he woul d
agreeas he di dnot t o depos e the Bri t i sh- subsi di zed monarch,
Ahmed Shah. *
On 15 February Ironsi de met with the Shah but failed to persuade
hi m to appoi nt Reza Khan to a posi ti on of power; so, on 21 February,
Reza Kha n marched into Teheran at the head of 3, 000 Cos s acks and
sei zed power, installing himself as commander-i n-chi ef of the armed
forces. "So far so good, " Ironsi de comment ed when he heard the
news. "I fancy that all the peopl e think that I engi neered the coup
d'etat. I s uppos e I di d, strictly s peaki ng. "
1 4
Nonetheless in 1925 Reza Khan placed himself on the throne as Reza Shah
Pahlavi, deposing Ahmed Shah, who by then resided in Paris. In 1935 Reza Shah
changed the name of his kingdom from Persia to Iran.
P E R S I A ( I R A N ) : 1920
461
In fact, Ironsi de' s role i n these events was qui t e unknown, and
remai ned unknown until di scovered and reveal ed by an Ameri can
schol ar more than half a century l at e r .
1 5
In Londonwhere officials
were unaware of Ironsi de' s i nvol vement t he course of events in
Persi a was greet ed fi rst with puzzl ement and then with di s may. On
26 February 1921, only five days after achi evi ng power, the new
government i n Teheran formally repudi at ed the Angl o-Persi an Agree-
ment. Th e s ame day i t di rected the Persi an di pl omat i c representati ve
in Moscow to si gn a treaty (its first treaty si nce taki ng office) with
Sovi et Rus s i a. Th e twin events of 26 February marked a revolution
i n Persi a' s posi ti on, as the country t urned from Bri ti sh protecti on
agai nst Rus s i a t o Rus s i an protecti on agai nst Bri tai n. The s e events
occurred j ust as Rus s i a al so si gned a treaty with Mos l em Af ghani st an,
and only a mont h before the final concl usi on of Russi a' s treaty with
Kemal i s t Tur ke y. In Turkey, Persi a, and Af ghani st ant he three
crucial countri es that Bri tai n had been di sput i ng i n the Great Ga me
with Rus s i a for more than a cent uryt he new rul ers had each
negoti ated a treaty with Moscow as his first move in forei gn pol i cy.
Moreover, Kemal i s t Turkey' s fi rst treaty with an Isl ami c nati on was
concl uded with Af ghani st an; it was negoti ated in Moscow with
Russi a' s encouragement . All of Moscow' s new Isl ami c prot eges were
joi ni ng hands under Russi a' s aegi s agai nst Bri tai n. By their t erms,
the treaties were di rected agai nst i mperi al i sm, and their l anguage left
little doubt that it was Bri ti sh i mperi al i sm that they meant . Agai n,
Bri ti sh officials were left with a sense that the many revolts agai nst
Bri tai n i n the Eas t were linked together.
Lo r d Curzon, who i n 1918 had sai d that "the great power from
whom we have most to fear in future is France, " cl ai med in 1920 that
"the Russi an menace i n the Eas t i s i ncomparabl y greater than any-
thi ng else that has happened i n my ti me to the Bri ti sh Empi r e . "
1 6
It
was not that Rus s i a was parti cul arl y powerful ; war, revol uti on, and
civil war had taken too great a toll for that to be t rue. Rat her it was
that the Bol shevi ks were seen to be i nspi ri ng dangerous forces every-
where i n the Eas t . With Rus s i an encouragement , Dj emal Pasha,
Enver' s col l eague i n the Young Tu r k government , went out to
Afghani stan in 1920 to serve as a military advi ser; and his mi ssi on
i l l umi nated what the Bri ti sh government most feared. Th e C. U. P. ,
the conti nued influence of Germany even in defeat, pan- I s l am,
Bol shevi sm, Rus s i aal l had come together and were poi sed t o swoop
down upon the Bri ti sh Empi re at its greatest poi nts of vul nerabi l i ty.
Thus the Sovi et s were support i ng Persi an nati onal i sm agai nst
Bri tai n. The y were doi ng so because Kamenev believed that bri ngi ng
pressure to bear on the Bri ti sh posi ti on in Persi a mi ght help rebel
groups in nei ghbori ng Iraq to resist Bri ti sh rule in that country.
Meanwhi l e Sovi et - support ed Turki s h nati onal i sm, led by Ke mal and
i nspi red (the Bri ti sh bel i eved) by the Young Turkey movement ,
threatened t o tear up the peace treaty that Ll oyd George had i mpos ed
upon the Ot t oman Empi r e . At the t i me Arab ri oters i n Egypt and
Pal esti ne had taken to the streets, and I bn Sa ud i n Arabi a and Fei sal
in Syri a had taken to the field with their armi es, to contest the
di sposi ti ons that Bri tai n had made of their desti ni es. For Bri t ai n
fl at on her back economi cal l y, and i n no posi ti on to cope with foreign
di st urbancest he Mi ddl e East ern t roubl es were overwhel mi ng, and
l ooked as t hough they had been purposef ul l y incited by a dedi cat ed
enemy: Sovi et Rus s i a.
P ART XI
RUSSIA RETURNS TO
THE MIDDLE EAST
53
UNMASKI NG BRITAIN' S
ENEMIES
i
It was true that the Sovi et s encouraged Persi an nati onal i sm, s up-
ported Turki s h nati onal i sm, and sought to ai d rebellion i n I r aq; but
the Rus s i ans had not i ns pi redand di d not di rect any of these
movement s. Th e growi ng Bri ti sh convi cti on that Bol shevi k Rus s i a
was involved in a far-reachi ng international conspi racy that had
incited rebellion t hroughout the Mi ddl e East was a del usi on. What
had occurred was a seri es of uncoordi nat ed upri si ngs, many of them
spont aneous, that were rooted in i ndi vi dual , local ci rcumst ances.
Al t hough the Sovi et s tried to make use of these local movement s,
neither Bol shevi sm nor Bol shevi ks pl ayed any significant role in
t hem. Yet there was an edge of truth to the Bri ti sh percepti on that
Bri tai n had moved into conflict with the new Russi an state and that
the Bol shevi ks-hopi ng to expl oi t local opposi ti on to Bri ti sh rul e
viewed the Mi ddl e Eas t as a theater of operati ons in that conflict.
Among Bri ti sh and other Allied officials, it had been a common
belief that ai di ng the Ge r man war effort was not a mere incidental
effect of the Bol shevi k coup d'etat, but its dri vi ng purpos e. Th e
Ge r mans , urged on by Al exander Hel phand, had financed the
Bol shevi ks and had sent Leni n back to lead t hem. It may have been a
matter of indifference to Leni n whether the achi evement of his pro-
gram hel ped or harmed either of the contendi ng capi tal i st al l i ances;
but to many Al l i ed officials at the ti me, the evi dence of Ge r man fi nan-
cial i nvol vement demonst rat ed that hel pi ng Germany was Leni n' s
desi re and his intention. Suc h officials therefore viewed Bol shevi ks as
enemy agent s, and regarded the Bol shevi ks' communi st theories as
mere camouf l age, or propaganda, or as an i rrel evance. In turn, this
view of Bol shevi sm fitted in with suspi ci ons that had been formed and
harbored by Bri ti sh officials, especially i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , since l ong
before the warsuspi ci ons that pl aced German- i nspi red Bol shevi sm
in the context of an older conspi racy theory: a pr o- Ge r man inter-
national Jewi s h pl ot.
466 R U S S I A R E T U R N S T O T H E M I D D L E E A S T
Confi rmati on that Je ws were pr o- Ge r man seemed to be provi ded
by events in the Ot t oman Empi re in the early part of the twentieth
century. As seen earlier (see pages 41 3) , Geral d Fi t zMauri ce had
reported to his government that the Young Tur ks were tools i n
Jewi sh hands ; and t hough Fi t zMauri ce' s report, as hi stori ans now
know, was fal se, it was bel i eved at the ti me to be t rue. When the
C. U. P. , once i n power, moved the Ot t oman Empi re into the Ge r man
orbi t, its policy was seen as an exampl e of the effectiveness of the
Jewi s h alliance with Germany.
Th e Mi ddl e East ern old hands who subscri bed t o this vi ewmen
like Wi ngate and Cl ayt onbel i eved that I s l am was a weapon that
coul d be wi el ded at will by the Sul t an- Cal i ph of Const ant i nopl e.
When the supposedl y Jewi s h Young Tur ks took control of the Sub-
l i me Porte, Bri ti sh officialdom therefore as s umed that I s l am, as well
as the Ot t oman Empi r e and the pan- Turki s h movement , had passed
into the hands of the German- Jewi s h combi ne.
It was i n this context that the second Russi an Revol uti on was seen
by Bri ti sh officials as the latest mani festati on of a bi gger conspi racy.
Jews were promi nent among the Bol shevi k l eaders; so the Bol shevi k
sei zure of power was vi ewed by many within the Bri ti sh government
as not merel y German- i ns pi red but as Jewi sh- di rect ed.
When the upri si ngs in the Mi ddl e East after the war occurred, it
was natural for Bri ti sh officials to expl ai n that they f ormed part of a
sinister desi gn woven by the l ong-ti me conspi rat ors. Bol shevi sm and
international finance, pan- Arabs and pan- Tur ks , Isl am and Rus s i a
were pi ct ured by Bri ti sh Intel l i gence as agents of international Jewry
and Prussi an Germany, the managi ng part ners of the great con-
spi racy. In the mi nd of Bri ti sh officialdom, bitter enemi es such as
Enver and Ke mal were pl ayi ng on the s ame si de; and so, they
bel i eved, were Arabs and Je ws .
Bri ti sh officials of course were aware that significant numbers of
Palestinian Arab Mos l ems , reacti ng agai nst Zi oni st col oni zati on, ex-
pressed violent ant i - Jewi sh feel i ngs; but this observati on di d not
necessarily negate their view that I s l am was control l ed by Jewry.
I s l am, in the sense that Bri t ons feared it, was the pull and power of
the Cal i ph, whom they viewed as a pawn moved by Bri tai n' s
adversari esa view that, oddl y, they conti nued to hold even after
the Sul t an- Cal i ph became their virtual pri soner i n Const ant i nopl e.
As they saw it, i t was evi dent that Arabs coul d not govern t hemsel ves;
so that the questi on came down to whether the Arabi c- speaki ng
Mi ddl e Eas t shoul d be governed by Ge r mans and Je ws , acti ng
through the agency of Tur ks , or whether i t shoul d be governed by
Bri tai n. Th e appeal of Bri ti sh government , they felt, was that i t was
decent and honest; the appeal of Bri tai n' s adversari es was that
Turki s h government was Mos l em government . I s l am was thus bei ng
U N M A S K I N G B R I T A I N ' S E N E M I E S 467
used, as was Bol shevi sm, and as were Tur ks and Russi ans, by a cabal
of Jewi s h financiers and Prussi an general s to the detri ment of Bri tai n.
While in the clear light of hi story thi s conspi racy theory seems
absurd to the poi nt of l unacy, it was believed either in whole or in
part by l arge numbers of otherwi se sane, wel l -bal anced, and reason-
ably wel l -i nformed Bri ti sh officials. Moreover, i t coul d be support ed
by one actual pi ece of evi dence: the career of Al exander Hel phand.
Hel phand was a Je w who conspi red to hel p Germany and to destroy
the Russi an Empi r e . He was closely associ ated with the Young Tur k
regi me in Const ant i nopl e. He did pl ay a significant role in sel ecti ng
Leni n and i n sendi ng hi m into Rus s i a to foment a Bol shevi k revolt
with a view to hel pi ng Germany win the war. He did conti nue to
weave his conspi ratori al webs after the war. He was what Wi ngate
and Cl ayt on bel i eved a Jew to be: ri ch, subversi ve, and pro- German.
Agai nst this background, the trend of Bri ti sh Intel l i gence assess-
ment s i n the i mmedi at e postwar years appears less irrational than
woul d otherwi se be the case. On 5 May 1919, only half a year after
the armi sti ces had brought hostilities i n the Fi rst Worl d War to an
end, a Bri ti sh intelligence agent filed a report with the Arab Bureau
based on extensi ve conversati ons with Young Tur k l eaders who had
f ound safety i n Swi t zerl and. Accordi ng to the Arab Bureau' s intelli-
gence operati ve, the Al l i ed victory had not brought enemy anti-
Bri ti sh agi tati on to an end. On the contrary, the work of the wart i me
Pan- Isl ami c Propaganda Bureau i n Berl i n was bei ng conti nued i n
Indi a, Egypt , Turkey, Persi a, and el sewhere with the goal of inciting
"The Revol t of I s l am. " "The East ern enemi es of Great Bri tai n have
uni ted with avowed object of overthrowi ng Bri ti sh rul e in the E A S T , "
he report ed. "They can rely upon the s upport of Germany and of the
Russi an Bol shevi ks . . . "' Th e i ntermedi ary between the Mi ddl e
East ern rebel s and the Bol shevi ks, the report conti nued, was
Al exander Hel phand.
Th e erupti on of violence i n Mes opot ami a the following year elicited
other intelligence reports al ong si mi l ar lines, notabl y f rom Maj or
N. N. E. Bray, a speci al intelligence officer attached to the Political
Depart ment of the Indi a Office. It was Bray whose chart of the
alleged conspi racy was ci rcul ated to the Cabi net at the end of the
s ummer of 1920 (see page 453) . Bray argued that i n Mes opot ami a,
"both the Nati onal i st and Pan- Isl ami st movement s deri ve their i nspi -
ration f rom Berl i nt hrough Swi tzerl and and Moscow. Th e si tuati on
i s further compl i cat ed with Italian, French and Bol shevi st i nt ri gues. "
2
Bray urged the government to track down the secret "comparati vel y
smal l central organi zati on" at the center of the far-reachi ng inter-
national cons pi racy.
3
Si nce it di d not exist, it was never f ound.
Nonethel ess the preponderant opi ni on within the government , at
least for a t i me, was that the rebel l i ons breaki ng out in Bri tai n' s
Mi ddl e East ern domai ns were the result of coordi nated hostile forces
from out si de. Within the Forei gn Office there were several officials
who argued that the source of the vari ous Mi ddl e East ern troubl es
was to be located within the Mi ddl e East ern countri es t hemsel ves;
but these officials represented a mi nori ty poi nt of view.
In fact there was an out si de force linked to every one of the
out breaks of violence in the Mi ddl e Eas t , but it was the one force
whose presence remai ned invisible to Bri ti sh offi ci al dom. It was
Bri tai n herself. In a regi on of the gl obe whose i nhabi tants were
known especi al l y to dislike forei gners, and in a predomi nant l y Mos l em
world which coul d abi de bei ng rul ed by al most anybody except non-
Mos l ems , a foreign Chri sti an country ought to have expect ed to
encounter hostility when i t at t empt ed to i mpose its own rul e. Th e
shadows that accompani ed the Bri ti sh rul ers wherever they went i n
the Mi ddl e East were in fact their own.
What Bri tai n faced i n the Mi ddl e East was a l ong and perhaps
endl ess seri es of i ndi vi dual and often spont aneous local rebel l i ons
agai nst her authori ty. Th e rebellions were not di rected by forei gners;
they were di rected against forei gners. Perhaps if the Bri ti sh Empi re
had mai ntai ned its mi l l i on-man army of occupati on i n the Mi ddl e
Eas t , the region's i nhabi tants mi ght have resi gned themsel ves to the
inevitability of Bri ti sh rul e and to the usel essness of at t empt i ng to
defy it; but once Bri tai n had demobi l i zed her army, the stri ng of
revolts i n the Mi ddl e Eas t became predi ct abl e. Th e agents of Bri ti sh
policy i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , however, conti nued to bl ame their
t roubl esas Ki t chener and his col l eagues had bl amed all their Mi ddl e
East ern fai l ures si nce 1908on the supposedl y Jewi sh- cont rol l ed,
German- i nf l uenced Young Tur k l eadershi p and its international
rami fi cati ons, chief among whi ch were Isl am and now Bol shevi sm i n
a line that ran f rom Enver t hrough Al exander Hel phand to Leni n.
I I
A sensati onal i st expose was publ i shed in London for the first ti me in
1920 that purport ed to di scl ose the ori gi ns of this worl dwi de con-
spi racy. Enti tl ed The Jewish Peril, the book was an Engl i sh transl ati on
of the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. A French transl ati on
was publ i shed i n Pari s at the s ame t i me. Th e Protocols purport ed to
be a record of meet i ngs held by Jews and Freemas ons at the end of
the nineteenth century in which they pl otted to overthrow capi tal i sm
and Chri sti ani ty and to establ i sh a worl d state under their joint rul e.
Th e Protocols had originally appeared in Russi a, in a newspaper in
1903 and in book form in 1905, and had allegedly been di scovered by
Sergei Ni l us, a Czari st official. The y attracted little attention until
U N M A S K I N G B R I T A I N ' S E N E M I E S 469
the Russi an revol uti ons of 1917, when it was widely remarked that
many of the Bol shevi k l eaders were Jews and that communi st doctri ne
bore a certain resembl ance to that descri bed in the Protocols. There-
fore there were those i n London and Pari s i n 1920 who accepted
Ni l us' s revel ati ons as genui ne. As such, the Protocols expl ai ned
among other t hi ngst he myst eri ous revolts agai nst Bri tai n every-
where in the Eas t .
It was not until the s ummer of 1921a year after they appeared in
London and Pari st hat the Protocols were proven to be a forgery by
Phi l i p Graves , Const ant i nopl e correspondent of The Times, who
revealed that they had been concocted by the Czari st secret pol i ce.
Th e pol i ce had not even bot hered to compos e the forged document s
themsel ves; they had pl agi ari zed them, as Graves was i nformed by a
White Russi an refugee named Mi chael Rasl ovl eff (whose name was
not revealed until 1978). Raslovleff, who part ed with the i nformati on
only because of a "very urgent need of money, " showed Graves that
whole secti ons of the Protocols were paraphrased from a sati re on
Napol eon I I I written by a French lawyer and publ i shed i n Geneva
(1864) and Brussel s ( 1865) .
4
It was an obscure work, of whi ch few
copi es were still i n exi stence; Rasl ovl eff showed Graves the copy he
had bought from a former Rus s i an secret pol i ce official, and The
Times in London f ound a copy in the Bri ti sh Mus e um. Raslovleff
said that i f the work had not been so rare, somebody woul d have
recogni zed the Protocols as a pl agi ari sm i mmedi atel y upon their
publ i cati on. ( Subs equent l y it has been l earned that passages in the
Protocols were pl agi ari zed from other books as well, i ncl udi ng a
fantasy novel publ i shed at about the s ame ti me as the French sati re. )
Ill
For the i mport ant body of Bri ti sh opi ni on represented by The Times,
those responsi bl e for Bri tai n' s set backs i n the Mi ddl e Eas t were not
foreign conspi rat ors but Bri ti sh offi ci al sBri ti sh Arabophi l es chief
among t hem. Parti cul arl y al armed by the upri si ngs i n I raq, a speci al
Mi ddl e East ern correspondent of The Times filed a di spat ch, pub-
lished on 20 Sept ember 1920, i n which he wrote that "My convi cti on,
based on careful st udy, i s that the Arab Bureau at Cai ro, the
G. H. Q. at Cai ro, and our Occupi ed Enemy Terri t ori es Admi ni s-
trations in Pal esti ne and last year in Syri a, bear a heavy l oad of
responsi bi l i ty for the present waste of Bri ti sh lives and money in
Mes opot ami a. " He charged that "Bri ti sh Pan- Arab propaganda i s one
of the most seri ous exi sti ng dangers to the worl d' s peace. " Put t i ng
asi de the few Bri ti sh officials who genui nel y believed in Arab in-
dependence, he denounced the "extremely dangerous officials who
have no great belief in the Arabs ' own capaci ty for government , but
an i ntense belief i n our Imperi al Mi ssi on" to run Arab affai rs behi nd
a f acade of nomi nal Arab i ndependence. He di d not menti on
Wi ngate, Cl ayt on, or Hogart h by name, but the descri pti on fitted
t hem; and they, i n his account, and not the Bol shevi ks, were the
cause of the di sorders throughout the Mi ddl e Eas t .
In a l eadi ng article the next day, The Times denounced the Arab
Bureau' s l ong-hel d belief in an Arab confederati on of the Mi ddl e
East presi ded over by Ki ng Hus s ei n: ". . . the del usi ve dream of a
huge Arabi an Federat i on shoul d no l onger be entertai ned i n any
official quart er. " A year later, on 27 Sept ember 1921, The Times
rejected the Arab Bureau' s old notion of a speci al Bri ti sh mi ssi on in
the Mos l em worl d. Di scerni ng a common theme i n the many Mos l em
Mi ddl e East ern revolts agai nst European Chri sti an rul e, The Times
was of the opi ni on that "The probl em i s far too bi g for any one
European nation t o cope with alone . . . "
Th e pri nci pal danger, as The Times pi ctured it, lay in Bri ti sh
overcommi t ment . Th e pri nci pal chal l enge to the country, i n its view,
was at home and was economi c. Bri tai n needed to invest her money
in renewi ng herself economi cal l y and socially, and was threatened in
her very exi stence by a government al di sposi ti on to squander money
i nstead on Mi ddl e East ern advent ures. In an editorial publ i shed on
18 Jul y 1921 The Times denounced the government for thi s, sayi ng
that "while they have spent nearly 150, 000, 000 si nce the Armi st i ce
upon semi - nomads in Mes opot ami a they can find only 200, 000 a
year for the regenerati on of our s l ums , and have had to forbi d all
expendi t ure under the Educat i on Act of 1918. "
But while The Times argued that the danger to Bri tai n came from
Bri ti sh offi ci al dom, much of Bri ti sh officialdom conti nued to focus
on the Sovi et threat to the Mi ddl e Eas t , and on the questi on of how
to respond to that threat.
54
THE SOVIET CHALLENGE IN THE
MI DDLE EAST
Th e heads of the three great depart ment s of the Bri ti sh government
charged with deal i ng with the Rus s i an questi on i n the Mi ddl e Ea s t
the Forei gn Office, the War Office, and the Indi a Of f i cedi sagreed
among themsel ves about the nature of the Sovi et chal l enge and about
how to respond to it.
Lo r d Curzon, guardi an of the fl ame of the Great Ga me who
became Forei gn Secretary in 1919, argued for a forward Bri ti sh
military posi ti on i n the Mi ddl e Eas t to guard agai nst Rus s i a. He
urged the Bri t i sh army to take up posi ti ons defendi ng Trans caucas i a
(which had broken away f rom Russi a) and northern Persi a. He and
the Permanent Under- Secret ary at the Forei gn Office, Lo r d
Hardi nge-both of t hem former vi ceroys of Indi acl ai med that the
loss of any one area i n the Mi ddl e Eas t to Russi an aggressi on woul d,
in t urn, lead to the loss of the area behi nd it, in a domi no reacti on
that mi ght l ead eventual l y to the loss of I ndi a.
1
Th e Secretary of St at e for Indi a, Edwi n Mont agu, and the Vi ceroy
of Indi a, Frederi c John Napi er Thes i ger, 3rd Baron Chel msf ord,
di sagreed. Mont agu and Chel msf ord believed that Bol shevi k Rus s i a
posed a political rather than a mi l i tary threat to Bri tai n' s posi ti on in
the Mi ddl e East . The y argued that Bri tai n ought to be compet i ng
agai nst Rus s i a to win the support of nationalist forces t hroughout
Isl ami c Asi a. Inst ead, as they saw it, Bri tai n was purs ui ng politics
that mi ght have been expressl y desi gned to dri ve these forces into the
arms of Mos cow; and the presence of Bri ti sh armi es mi ght be ex-
pected to alienate these forces still further.
Mont agu wrote to Curzon at the begi nni ng of 1920 that "The
danger of the Bol shevi ks to Persi a and to Indi a" was largely the
result of the Bri ti sh government' s own policies, which he character-
ized as ant i - Mohammedan. "We coul d have made Pan- I s l ami s m
friendly to Great Bri t ai n, " he wrote, but instead "We are maki ng it
hosti l e. "
2
Indi a, of course, had opposed London' s Mi ddl e East ern
policy ever si nce Lo r d Ki t chener took charge of it in 1914; and what
Mont agu wrote in 1920 was consi stent with the cri ti ci sms he had
471
levelled all al ong agai nst his government ' s pro- Arab and pro- Zi oni st
policies and agai nst the school of Ki t chener view that Isl am was a
force managed and di rected by Bri tai n' s enemi es.
Chel msf ord, in t el egrams to Mont agu at the begi nni ng of 1921,
put the matter in historical perspect i ve by poi nti ng out that until
1914 the Bri ti sh had been the "champi ons of Isl am agai nst the
Russi an Ogr e . "
3
Now, however, the harsh Treat y of Sevres that
Ll oyd George had i mposed on the hel pl ess Ot t oman Empi re and the
one-si ded treaty that Curzon had i mpos ed on the prost rat e Persi an
Empi re appeared to Indi an Mos l ems as exampl es of "Britain's crush-
ing of I s l am. "
4
In Rus s i a, on the other hand, the war had brought
into power a new regi me t hat at least in the Mi ddl e Eas t s poke
the l anguage of national i ndependence. In the long run, accordi ng to
the Vi ceroy, the "real defence" agai nst Russi an Bol shevi k expansi on
in the Mi ddl e Eas t lay not in i nstal l i ng forward military posi ti ons but
in support i ng a "nationalist spi ri t" among the Mos l em peopl es of the
regi on whose basi c rel i gi ous tenets were hostile to Bol shevi sm and
whose nati onal i sm woul d l ead t hem to oppos e Rus s i an advances .
5
It
woul d be a mi stake for Bri tai n to mai ntai n a mi l i tary presence in the
Mi ddl e Eas t , he conti nued, or even a merel y economi c one, for it
mi ght lead native l eaders to concl ude that the real threat to their
i ndependence came from London.
Maj or- General Si r Edmund Ironsi de, duri ng the ti me he served as
commander of the Bri ti sh t roops remai ni ng i n northern Persi a,
strongl y bel i eved that his troops shoul d not be there. As he saw it,
the rugged terrai n on the Indi an northwest frontier provi ded so
effective a defensi ve line that a forward defense of Indi a was un-
necessary, while the l ong line of communi cat i ons requi red in order to
conduct a forward defense of Indi a f rom Persi a rendered such a
strategy i mpract i cal .
6
In the end the argument between the Forei gn Office and the Indi a
Office was settled by the War Office. Si r Henry Wilson, Chief of the
Imperi al General Staff, decisively rul ed agai nst the Forei gn Office
on the grounds that he di d not have the t roops to carry out the
forward policy i n the Mi ddl e Eas t that Lo r d Curzon advocat ed. In
1920 he submi t t ed a paper to the Cabi net reporti ng that Bri tai n had
no reserves whatsoever with which to reinforce garri sons anywhere in
the worl d shoul d the need ar i s e .
7
Th e only feasi bl e policy, i n his
view, was to husband resources and to concentrate Bri tai n' s military
forces i n those areas of greatest i mport ance and concernand neither
Persi a nor the Caucas us frontier was among t hem.
Wi nston Churchi l l , the War Mi ni ster and Secretary for Ai r, argued
in early 1920 that if t roops were avai l abl e for Persi a and the Caucas us
frontier, they shoul d be used i nstead i n Rus s i at o s upport the
Czari st general s i n their bi d to unseat the Bol shevi k government .
8
T H E S O V I E T C H A L L E N G E I N T H E M I D D L E E A S T 473
Churchi l l took the new rul ers of the Kreml i n at their word: he
pi ctured them as i nternati onal i sts and revol uti onari es. He bel i eved
that most of them were not Rus s i an at al l that they were Jews .
Churchi l l therefore di d not believe that they pursued Rus s i an goal s,
whether nationalist or i mperi al i st. He failed to expl ai n why their
objecti ves i n the Mi ddl e East were so uncanni l y si mi l ar to those of
the czars.
Mi nut es of a 1920 conference of Cabi net mi ni sters underl i ned the
parti cul ar menace Churchi l l and s ome of his col l eagues felt the
Bol shevi ks posed i n Mosl em Asi a. "Every day they were maki ng
great stri des t owards the Eas t , i n the di recti on of Bokhara and
Af ghani st an. The y were carryi ng out a regul ar, scientific, and com-
prehensi ve scheme of propaganda i n Central Asi a agai nst the
Bri t i sh. "
9
Th e Chi ef of the Imperi al General Staff warned the mi ni s-
ters that "the Cas pi an woul d fall into the hands of the Bol shevi ks
who coul d . . . create di st urbance i n Nort h Persi a. Th e unrest woul d
spread to Af ghani st an, which was al ready very unsettl ed, and also to
Indi a which was report ed to be in a more dangerous state to-day than
i t had been for the last thirty ye ar s . "
1 0
Echoi ng these fears, Wi nston
Churchi l l wrote to the Pri me Mi ni ster aski ng "what are we to do if
the Bol shevi ks overrun Caucasi a and joi n with the Turki s h Nati onal -
i sts; if they obtai n the command of the Cas pi an and i nvade Nort hern
Persi a; if they domi nat e Turkes t an and join with Af ghani st an in
menaci ng Indi a f rom wi thout and endeavouri ng to raise up a revo-
lution wi t hi n?"
1 1
Th e Bri t i sh- subsi di zed Whi te Rus s i an campai gn i n the Rus s i an
Civil War that broke out between the Bol shevi ks and their adver-
sari es was seen by the publ i c as Churchi l l ' s pri vate war, and when
the White armi es faltered in late 1919, and then fell apart early in
1920, i t was seen as yet another of his costl y fai l ures. Th e Pri me
Mi ni ster wrote to hi m that "I have f ound your mi nd so obsessed by
Rus s i a that I felt I had good ground for the apprehensi on that your
abilities, energy, and courage were not devoted to the reducti on of
expendi t ure. "
1 2
Speaki ng about Churchi l l and Rus s i a a few mont hs
later, the Pri me Mi ni ster was less restrai ned; the Chi ef of the I m-
perial General Staff noted i n his di ary that "He thi nks Wi nston has
gone mad . . . "
1 3
As a Li beral Pri me Minister dependent on a right-wing Conservative
majori ty i n the Hous e of Commons , Ll oyd George nonethel ess felt
obl i ged to allow his War Mi ni ster to s upport the White Rus s i ans
until it was pl ai n that they had failed. But when the Whi tes col l apsed,
the Pri me Mi ni ster felt free to seek an agreement with the Re ds . He
di d not fear their i mperi al ambi t i ons i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . For that
matter he had not feared those of the czars.
In bel i evi ng that an accommodat i on with Russi a coul d be reached,
the Pri me Mi ni ster carri ed on the tradi ti ons of the Li beral Party to
whi ch he bel onged. Hi s former col l eagues, Asqui t h and Grey, had
believed the Russi ans to have l egi ti mate gri evances i n the Mi ddl e
Eas t , such as lack of access to a warm water port, whi ch, if satisfied,
woul d leave t hem content not to advance any further. In the same
vein, Ll oyd George argued that the al l eged Rus s i an threat to Indi a
was a fantasy. Bol shevi k Rus s i a l acked the resources to pose such a
threat, he bel i eved, and even "When Rus s i a was well equi pped, the
Rus s i ans coul d not cross the mount ai ns . "
1 4
He agreed that Bol shevi k
propaganda in Indi a mi ght be a danger, but observed that "you can't
keep i deas out of a country by a mi l i tary cordon. "'
5
Duri ng 1920 and early 1921 Ll oyd George engaged i n the nego-
tiation of a trade agreement with Moscow that was to gi ve the
Bol shevi k regi me de facto recogni ti on and bri ng Rus s i a back into the
fami l y of nati ons. He told Ri ddel l that as a condi ti on prel i mi nary to
negoti ati on he woul d insist that all Bol shevi k propaganda abroad i n
Persi a, Af ghani st an, and el sewhere i n the Eas t shoul d cease; and
Ri ddel l noted i n his di ary that " L . G. thi nks Leni n will agr e e . "
1 6
Qui te the contrary proved to be t rue. Th e Sovi et government , i n a
cabl e of i nstructi ons to its representati ve, i ndi cated that "We can
only agree to concrete concessi ons in the Eas t at a political conference
with Engl and and on condi ti on that we receive si mi l ar concessi ons
from Engl and al so i n the Eas t . What these concessi ons are to consi st
of will be di scussed when the ti me c ome s . "
1 7
Thi s hinted at conti nu-
i ng Russi an i mperi al ambi t i ons i n the Mi ddl e Eas t that were consi der-
ably more far-reachi ng than Ll oyd George had s uppos ed.
55
MOSCOW'S GOALS
i
While Bri tai n' s l eaders were di sagreei ng with one another about the
rel ati onshi p between Bol shevi k communi s m and Russi an i mperi al i sm,
the Bol shevi k l eaders themsel ves were debat i ng the nat ure of that
rel ati onshi p, with all of its i mpl i cati ons for their postwar policy in
the Mi ddl e Eas t .
Unti l the decade before the Fi rst Worl d War, the Rus s i an Empi re
had been expandi ng at the expense of its nei ghbors at a prodi gi ous
rate and for a l ong t i me. It has been cal cul ated that, at the t i me, the
Russi an Empi re had been conqueri ng the terri tory of its nei ghbors at
an average rate of 50 s quare mi l es a day for 4f)0 years .
1
With the
acqui si ti on of foreign territories came foreign peopl es. At the ti me of
the first scientific census in 1897, most of the Rus s i an Empi re' s
subj ect s were not Rus s i ans . Th e Turki s h- s peaki ng peopl es alone
were more than 10 percent of the popul at i on, and Mos l ems were at
least 14 percent .
Now, Leni n' s Rus s i a had to deci de whether to try to reconquer the
Mosl em and other non- Russi an peopl es whom the czars had subj ect ed
to their rul e. Leni n, for years, had argued that the non- Russi an
peopl es shoul d enjoy the right of sel f-determi nati on. In theory he
was a firm opponent of what he called Great Russi an chauvi ni sm. In
1915 he wrote that "We Great Rus s i an workers mus t demand that
our government shoul d get out of Mongol i a, Turkes t an, and Persi a
"2
In 1917 he overcame the resi stance of his col l eagues at the Sevent h
Soci al Democrat i c Congres s and pushed through a resol uti on de-
cl ari ng that the non- Russi an peopl es of the Rus s i an Empi r e shoul d
be free to secede.
The col l eague whom he pl aced i n charge of the nationalities i ssue
was, however, of a different f rame of mi nd. He was the Transcau^
casi an Bol shevi k Jos e ph Dzhugashvi l i , who, after calling hi msel f by
many other al i ases, had gi ven hi msel f the Russi an name of St al i n.
475
Al t hough for a ti me he outwardl y deferred to Leni n' s views on the
nationalities questi on, Stal i n di d not share t hem; i ndeed he was
fiercely at odds with Leni n over the nationalities i ssue and the
consti tuti on of the Sovi et Uni on. Leni n' s proposal was for each of
the Sovi et countri es-Russi a, the Ukrai ne, Georgi a, and the vari ous
ot herst o be i ndependent ; they were to cooperate with one another
as allies do, on the basi s of treaties between t hem. Stal i n' s pl an, on
the other hand, was for the Ukrai ne, Georgi a, and all the others to
adhere to the Russi an st at eand St al i n prevai l ed. On 30 December
1922, the Fi rst Congres s of Sovi et s of the Uni on of Sovi et Soci al i st
Republ i cs approved the formati on of a Sovi et Uni on domi nat ed by
Rus s i a.
I I
How significant i n practi ce were the differences between Leni n and
St al i n?
Leni n argued that the European nati ons within the Russi an Empi re
shoul d be al l owed i ndependenceand, i n that, he certainly di sagreed
with Stal i n. The r e i s some evi dence, however, that he privately
believed that the Mi ddl e East ern nationalities shoul d not be al l owed
i ndependence until a much later date whi ch was different from
Stal i n' s belief that they shoul d never be i ndependent, but i n the
short run came to the s ame thi ng.
Al t hough he was oppos ed to compel l i ng non- Russi ans to submi t to
Russi an rul e, Leni n, like St al i n, had no qual ms about compel l i ng
non-Bol shevi ks to submi t to Bol shevi k rul eand here, too, Leni n' s
pol i cy i n practi ce di d not appear as widely different f rom Stal i n' s as
i t di d i n theory. Under Leni n' s l eadershi p, Sovi et Rus s i a conquered
non- Russi an porti ons of the former Russi an Empi re and i mposed
local Bol shevi k Sovi et regi mes upon t hem by force of arms . In each
case a political police force, acti ng as a branch of Sovi et Russi a' s
secret pol i ce, was establ i shed by Leni n' s government to hel p mai ntai n
the local Sovi et regi me. Thi s was entirely i n line with what Leni n
had done in Rus s i a: his was a mi nori ty regi me that had seized power
The Bashkir leader, Zeki Velidi Togan, wrote (years later) that in 1920 Lenin
had told him that the problem in the colonial countries was that they lacked a
proletariat. In communist theory the proletariat was to dictate and to lead, but the
peasantry of the East did not have an industrial working class to do that for them. In
effect this meant that the peoples of the East were not yet ready to exercise their
right to be free. According to Togan, Lenin said that even after the socialist
revolution had succeeded everywhere in the world, the former colonies of the
European Great Powers would have to remain in tutelage to their former masters
until such time as they developed an industrial working class of their own.
3
MOS C OW' S G O A L S 477
by force and that held on to power by empl oyi ng as many as a
quart er of a mi l l i on secret pol i cemen.
But in Russi an Central Asi a, the Bol shevi k mi nori ty consi sted of
Russi ans, while the non-Bol shevi k majori ty consi sted of nati ves; for
Bol shevi ks to rule non-Bol shevi ks (whi ch was Leni n' s pol i cy) was, i n
practi ce, for Rus s i ans to rul e non- Rus s i ans (whi ch was Stal i n' s
pol i cy).
Ill
In the begi nni ng, the Bol shevi k government promi sed the native
popul at i ons of Cent ral Asi a their f reedom. At the end of 1917, after
sei zi ng power i n Pet rograd, the Sovi et s i ssued an appeal for s up-
port, under the si gnat ures of Leni n and St al i n, recogni zi ng the
Mos l em popul ati on' s right to "Organi ze your national life i n compl et e
f reedom. "
4
Woul d the Bol shevi k l eaders nonethel ess try to reconquer the
Czar' s Mi ddl e East ern col oni es? Thei r policy i n this regard woul d
offer London an i mport ant clue as to whether they were communi st
revol uti onari es or Rus s i an i mperi al i sts.
Th e Russi an Mi ddl e Eas t Rus s i an Turkes t an was a colonial
empi re that the czars had carved out of the previ ousl y i ndependent
Mos l em worl d. Li ke Al geri a, Morocco, the Sudan, or a score of
other tribal areas in Afri ca and Asi a, it had been s ubdued by force of
modern European arms . Li ke other such colonies, i t found that its
economy was expl oi ted for the benefit of its European mast ers. Li ke
t hem, too, i t resented bei ng settled by col oni sts from Eur ope ; there
was nobody that a Turki s h- s peaki ng Mos l em hated more than a
Russi an who came to take possessi on of his soil.
Locat ed deep i n the heart of Euras i a, Turkes t an i s an area that
remai ns little known to the out si de worl d. Th e Russi an- rul ed part of
it is about half the size of the conti nental Uni t ed St at es : about one
and a half million s quare mi l es. Vast mount ai n ranges on its eastern
frontier bl ock the moi st ure- l aden cl ouds f rom the Pacific, so that
most of its terri tory is an ari d, largely unforested, pl ai n. At the ti me
of the Fi rs t Worl d War, about 20 to 25 percent of its popul ati on
coul d be classified as nomads or s emi - nomads , while the rest of its
nearly ten mi l l i on, largely Turki s h- s peaki ng, peopl e lived i n cl usters
around the fertile oasi s towns.
Th e 1914 war and the revol uti ons of 1917 brought confusi on and
anarchy to Cent ral Asi a. In part this was due to the extent and
* Turkestan is used here in its broad geographic sense, rather than in its technical
sense as the governor-generalate ruled from Tashkent under the czars.
t opography of the country and to its mi xed popul at i on. It was a
frontier country, and, even in the best of t i mes, tribal conflicts, as
well as the opposi ti on of the i ndi genous peopl es to Russi an coloni-
zation, kept the area i n di sorder. While Turkes t an was remot e from
the war, it had been the scene of a tribal revolt agai nst warti me
measures; and it had suffered a breakdown in government as a result
of the two revol uti ons in Pet rograd. Soci al conflicts emerged, as a
smal l urban mi ddl e cl ass resi sted an at t empt by feudal l eaders to
reassert authori ty. To o many l eaders and too many causes rai sed
their banners and took to the field. Armi es, armed bands , and
rai di ng parti es swept across the desert s and vast empt y pl ai ns, appear-
i ng out of nowhere and as suddenl y di sappeari ng.
War and revol uti on had thrown up their human wreckage: refugees
seeki ng a way out and advent urers seeki ng a way in. Fr o m the
di sbanded pri soner-of-war camps , Ge r mans , Hungari ans , Czechs,
and sol di ers of a dozen other nationalities st reamed out in search of
one goal or another. In the caravans and in the rickety rai l road
carri ages that l urched across the treel ess l andscape of Central Asi a
were to be found an assort ment of human types whose identities,
mi ssi ons, and moti ves were difficult to f at hom; and the Sovi et regi me
bel i evedor affected to bel i evethat forei gn-i nspi red conspi raci es
were fl ouri shi ng and ri peni ng everywhere i n the semi -tropi cal sun-
shi ne.
Dur i ng the years of post-revol uti onary chaos, new i ndi genous
regi mes procl ai med their exi stence throughout the regi on; and
Moscow treated them as chal l enges to be overcome. At the end of
1917 Mos l ems in Central Asi a set up a regi me in Khokand, seat of
what had once been a khanate in the western Fergana valley, in
opposi ti on to the Tas hkent Sovi et (whi ch was compos ed of Rus s i an
settl ers and di d not i ncl ude a si ngl e Mos l em among its members ) .
Lacki ng money and arms Khokand l ooked for allies but found none.
Stal i n curtl y di smi ssed its cl ai ms to function as a regi me. On 18
February 1918 the Red Ar my capt ured and sacked Khokand, destroy-
i ng most of the city and massacri ng its i nhabi tants. Fr o m its rui ns,
however, arose a loosely organi zed movement of maraudi ng guer-
rilla bands called Bas machi s who pl agued the Rus s i ans for years
afterward.
Dur i ng the next few years Sovi et Rus s i a destroyed one center of
resi stance after another. As the peopl e of the Kaz akh country l earned
i n 1918, no s upport was to be obt ai ned from the Whi te Rus s i ans , for
they, too, were oppos ed to native aspi rat i ons. Th e Kazakhs of the
Central Asi an pl ai ns had procl ai med their aut onomy and asked the
ai d of the Czari st commander, Admi ral Kol chak, i n def endi ng them-
sel ves agai nst the Bol shevi ksonl y to find that he, too, was their
enemy.
MO S C O W' S G O A L S 479
Th e most seri ous threat to Sovi et ambi t i ons was posed by the
"Nati ve St at es" of Khi va and Bukhara, two former Czari st protec-
torates i n Central Asi a. As frontier states nei ghbori ng on Persi a,
Af ghani st an, and Chi na, they enjoyed contact with the outsi de worl d
and coul d serve as a focus of anti -Sovi et al l i ances.
Moscow took advant age of internal stri fe i n Khi va; the Red Army
capt ured it on 13 Sept ember 1920, and installed a regi me that allied
itself with the Sovi et s. Thereaf t er Mos cow ordered a seri es of liqui-
dati ons of the Khi van l eadershi p that paved the way for Khi va' s
eventual i ncorporati on into the Sovi et Uni on.
That left only Bukhara; and in deal i ng with the last basti on of
native Tur ki s h resi stance, i t occurred to the Sovi et s to make use of
the Young Tur ke y leader Enver Pas hawhom Bri ti sh Intel l i gence
had pi ct ured as a member of the conspi racy di recti ng the Bol shevi k
movement all al ong.
56
A DEATH IN BUKHARA
i
Accordi ng to Bri ti sh Intel l i gence, the Young Turkey l eaders were
members of the German and Jewi sh conspi racy that control l ed the
Bol shevi k regi me. Yet from 1918 to 1922, as Bri tai n' s l eaders tried to
fathom the intentions of the Bol shevi k l eaders, so di d the fugitive
l eaders of the Young Tur ks who di d not control the Bol shevi ks or
even know very much about t hem.
In November 1918, Enver Pasha, Dj emal Pasha, and Tal aat Bey
escaped from the rui ns of the Ot t oman Empi re with the ai d of the
retreati ng Ge r mans and f l ed across the Bl ack Sea t oward Odes s a.
Eventual l y Enver and Tal aat found their way to Berl i n and there, i n
the late s ummer of 1919, they visited the Bol shevi k representati ve
Kar l Radek i n hi s jail cell. Radek had been one of the i ntermedi ari es
between the Ge r man General Staff and Leni n i n the Hel phand-
i nspi red f undi ng of the Bol shevi k Part y. In 1919 he was i mpri soned
by the new Ge r man government i n connecti on with the suppressi on
of the communi st upri si ng in Ge r many; but he was treated as a
person of consequence and transacted political busi ness from his cell.
Th e startl i ng political proposal that Radek made t o the Young
Tur k l eaders was that Enver shoul d proceed to Moscow to negoti ate
a. pact between Rus s i an Bol shevi sm and Turki s h nati onal i sm di rected
agai nst Bri tai n. Enver was a lifelong foe of Russi a and no friend to
Bol shevi sm; but Radek assured hi m that "in Sovi et Rus s i a every-
one was wel come who woul d s upport the offensive agai nst Engl i sh
i mperi al i sm. "
1
A close friend of Enver' s in Berl i n was General Hans von Seeckt,
the brilliant creator and head of the new German armyt he much-
reduced and l i mi ted mi l i tary force that the Allies permi t t ed Germany
to mai ntai n pursuant to restri cti ons contai ned in the Treat y of
Versai l l es. With his monocl e and hi s rigid features, the 53-year-ol d
von Seeckt was the prot ot ype of the professi onal Ge r man officer to
480
A D E A T H I N B U K H A R A 481
whom the Young Tur ks f i nal l y had turned for gui dance duri ng the
war; and i ndeed duri ng the fi nal mont hs of the war, von Seeckt had
served as chief of staff of the Turki s h army.
Von Seeckt now agreed to hel p Enver make the difficult and
dangerous tri p to Moscow across chaoti c eastern Europe, where
nationalist forces i n Pol and, Lat vi a, Est oni a, Li t huani a, and Hungary
battl ed agai nst communi st revol uti onari es or Russi an Bol shevi ks, as
the Russi an Civil War conti nued to rage. Enver gave von Seeckt a
new appreci at i on of the possi bi l i ti es afforded by the Bol shevi ks for
stri ki ng at the Al l i es. Kar l Radek later wrote that Enver "was the
first to expl ai n to Ge r man mi l i tary men that Sovi et Rus s i a is a new
and growi ng worl d Power on whi ch they mus t count if they really
want t o f i ght agai nst the Ent ent e. "
2
The s e i deas, passed on by Enver
to von Seeckt, bore fruit when von Seeckt, several years later, moved
toward an alliance between the Ge r man military machi ne and Sovi et
Rus s i a.
An officer on von Seeckt' s staff arranged for Enver to be fl own to
Moscow in Oct ober 1919 in the company ai rpl ane of an aircraft
manuf act urer. But the arrangement s mi scarri ed; there was engi ne
troubl e, and the pl ane was forced to make an emergency l andi ng i n
Li t huani a. Enver carri ed false papers , and his true identity was not
di scovered; nonethel ess, he was kept pri soner for two mont hs i n
Li t huani awhi ch, al ong with Lat vi a and Est oni a, was at war with
Sovi et Rus s i aas a suspect ed spy. Once rel eased, he returned to
Berl i n, and started out on a second effort to reach Moscow, this ti me
bei ng arrested and i mpri soned i n Lat vi a. Accordi ng to his later
account, he was quest i oned repeatedl y by intelligence officers but
succeeded i n persuadi ng t hem that his name was Al t man and that he
was "a Jewi s h Ge r man Communi s t of no i mport ance. "
3
By the
s ummer of 1920 Enver finally reached Moscow, al most a year after
fi rst leaving Berl i n.
Hi s political odyssey away f rom ant i - communi sm and anti-
Rus s i ani s m seemed to have been compl et e. Enver wrote f rom Moscow
to von Seeckt on 26 Augus t 1920 urgi ng hi m to hel p the Sovi et s. He
cl ai med that
There is a party here which has real power, and Trot s ky al so
bel ongs to this party, which i s for an agreement with Germany.
Thi s party woul d be ready to recogni ze the old Ge r man frontier
of 1914. And they see only one way out of the present worl d
chaost hat is, cooperati on with Ge r many and Tur ke y. In order
to strengthen the posi ti on of thi s party and to win the whole
Sovi et Government for the cause, woul d i t not be possi bl e to
gi ve unofficial hel p, and i f possi bl e sell a r ms ?
4
At the s ame ti me Enver report ed to von Seeckt that "The day
before yesterday we concl uded a Turki s h- Rus s i an treaty of fri end-
shi p: under this the Russi ans will s upport us with gol d and by all
means . "
5
( If the Bol shevi k l eaders really i ntended at the ti me to
support Enver' s bi d to as s ume the l eadershi p of the Tur ki s h rebellion,
however, they later changed their mi nds when they were made aware
of the compl exi ty of the Turki s h political si tuati on. )
I I
On 1 Sept ember 1920 the Bol shevi ks convened the "first congress of
peopl es of the east" i n Baku, the capi tal of recently capt ured Mos l em
Azerbai j an. Th e congress brought together 1,891 del egates of vari ous
Asi an peopl es, of whom 235 del egates were Tur ks . Th e congress was
sponsored by the Thi r d (or Communi s t ) Internati onal the
Comi nt ern, as it was cal l edbut a significant percentage of the
del egates were not communi s t s . Enver attended the congress as a
guest of the Comi nt ern, whose representati ves at the congress were
Kar l Radek, Gri gori Zi novi ev, and the Hungari an Bel a Kun.
Zi novi ev, the l eader of the Communi s t Internati onal , acted as presi -
dent of the congress.
Al t hough Enver cl ai med to have been recei ved by Leni n and was
sponsored at the congress by Zi novi ev, he was best known as the
partner of i mperi al Germany and the killer of the Armeni ans; there
was substanti al opposi ti on among the del egates to his bei ng allowed
to part i ci pat e. A compromi s e was reached accordi ng to which a
statement by Enver was read to the congress rather than del i vered i n
person; even so i t was punct uat ed by boos and prot est s. In his
statement Enver cl ai med to represent a "union of the revol uti onary
organi zati ons of Morocco, Al gi ers, Tuni s , Tri pol i , Egypt , Arabi a,
and Hi ndus t an. "
6
More to the poi nt, he aspi red to resume the
l eadershi p of Tur ke y; but Turki s h del egates who s upport ed Ke mal
made it pl ai n to the Sovi et s that Moscow woul d antagoni ze them if it
backed Enver.
Al t hough the invitation to the congress had been phrased i n the
communi st l anguage of worl d revol uti on, Zi novi ev, once at the con-
gress, seemed to be calling on the assembl ed del egates for ai d in a
national st ruggl e between Rus s i a and Bri tai n. In his openi ng address
he cried out "Brot hers, we s ummon you to a holy war, in the first
pl ace agai nst Engl i sh i mperi al i sm! "
7
Si nce many of those who were
called upon to joi n i n the crusade were non- communi st or even anti-
communi st , the Comi nt ern felt obl i ged to defend itself agai nst the
accusati on that it was cynically usi ng them as i nstruments of Sovi et
foreign pol i cy. Kar l Radek told the congress that "The eastern pol i cy
of the Sovi et Government is thus no di pl omat i c manoeuvre, no
pushi ng forward of the peopl es of the east into the firing-line in
order, by bet rayi ng t hem, to win advant ages for the Sovi et republ i c
. . . We are bound to you by a common desti ny . . . "
8
Enver' s
presence as the Comi nt ern' s guest bel i ed thi s; that, at least, i s what
was said i n European socialist ci rcl es wi thi n the next few weeks. Th e
Comi nt ern, accordi ng to a former col l eague of Leni n' s, had suc-
cumbed to a t empt at i on "to regard the peopl es of the east as pi eces
on the chessboard of the di pl omat i c war with the Ent ent e. "
9
A Soci al
Democrat argued that at Baku the Bol shevi ks had gi ven up soci al i sm
i n favor of power pol i t i cs .
1 0
A mont h after the Baku congress, Enver returned to Berl i n. He
began to purchase ar ms pe r haps on his own behalf, for he hoped to
return to Anatol i a to pus h Ke mal asi de and as s ume c ommand of the
forces resi sti ng the Al l i es. He still retai ned support among former
C. U. P. mi l i tants, and he al so control l ed an organi zati on on the
Trans caucas i an fronti er; his hopes of returni ng to power within
Turkey were not entirely unreal i sti c.
Throwi ng its s upport behi nd Enver was an al ternati ve with which
Moscow coul d eventual l y threaten Mus t apha Ke mal , i f and when i t
became necessary to do s o; but for the moment the Bol shevi ks had
nothi ng for Enver to do. * As will be seen presentl y, it was to be a
year before the Sovi et s found a mi ssi on on whi ch to send hi ma
mi ssi on to Bukhara i n turbul ent Turkes t an.
Awai ti ng an assi gnment , Enver settled in Moscow in 1921 as a
guest of the Sovi et government . A pi ct uresque figure in the streets of
the Rus s i an capi tal , he attracted attention by weari ng an enormous
tarboosh that offset his tiny st at ure. He became the social lion of
Moscow, accordi ng to the Ameri can writer Loui s e Bryant , who lived
next door to hi m for half a year and saw hi m every day. She wrote
* However, his colleague Djemal Pasha proved to be of immediate use. In 1920,
at the suggestion (or at any rate with the encouragement) of Moscow, Djemal went
to Afghanistan, where he helped to dispel Afghan suspicions of Russi a. Reportedly,
in a letter to Leni n at the end of 1920, the Afghan monarch remarked that "His
Highness Jemal Pasha has told us of all the noble ideas and intentions of the Soviet
republic in regard to the liberation of the whole eastern world . . . "" As adviser to
the monarch, Amanullah Khan, Djemal helped draft a new constitution and worked
on reorganizing the army. Djemal told a Moslem colleague that his purpose in
reorganizing and strengthening the Afghan army was to add to the Soviet threat
against I ndi a.
1 2
In addition to his work with the army, the Turki sh leader also
founded an organization called the Islamic Revolutionary League, devoted to freeing
India from British rule. Hi s intrigues with the warlike frontier tribes helped to keep
them in a state of anti-British ferment. Over and above these activities, Djemal's
mere presence in Kabul , overlooking the troubled Indian Empi re from a strategic
location about which the British were especially nervous, caused anxiety and concern
in Si ml a and Whitehall.
that he "certainly has charm, in spi te of his very obvi ous opport un-
i sm, . . . cruelty . . . and lack of consci ence. "
1 3
She sensed that,
despi te all the lionizing, he was b o r e d .
1 4
Enver' s star was on the wane in Moscow, because that of his
ri val Mus t apha Ke mal was on the rise. Th e worki ng arrange-
ment that the Kreml i n arri ved at with Mus t apha Kemal ' s Turki s h
Nati onal i st government allowed Sovi et Rus s i a to crush Georgi a,
Armeni a, and Azerbai j an. Kemal ' s overt ant i - communi s mon
28 January 1921 Kemal i s t s killed seventeen Turki s h communi st
l eaders by drowni ng t hem i n the Bl ack Se awas not allowed by
Leni n or Stal i n to stand in the way of agreement . In enteri ng into a
seri es of interlocking pact s with the ant i - communi st nationalist
Mosl em l eaders of Turkey, Persi a, and Af ghani st an, Moscow seemed
to be travel i ng al ong the path marked out at the Baku congress:
abandoni ng revol uti onary goal s i n favor of purs ui ng traditional
Russi an objecti ves i n the Great Ga me . Th e Sovi et s encouraged
revol uti onary Kemal i s t Tur ke y to enter into a pact of her own, in
Moscow, with traditionalist Af ghani st an, the purpose of which (as
i ndi cated i n Arti cl e Two ) was to join hands i n oppos i ng aggressi on
and expl oi tati on by the Bri ti sh Empi r e .
In the s umme r of 1921 Mus t apha Ke mal won the first in a series
of st unni ng successes agai nst the Bri ti sh-backed Greek army. Th e
tide was runni ng with hi m and, i n the aut umn, the Sovi et s moved
further toward alliance with hi m. Enver saw hi msel f l osi ng out to
Ke mal .
In the s ummer of 1921, the Sovi et s, at Enver' s request , provi ded
hi m with transportati on to the Caucas us . Enver assured the Sovi et
Forei gn Mi ni ster that he was not goi ng there to work agai nst Ke mal ,
but broke his word. On arrival i n Trans caucas i a, he establ i shed
himself i n Bat um, i n Georgi a, on the Turki s h frontier. There he
held a congress of support ers, and tried to cross into Tur ke y; but the
Sovi et authori ti es forcibly detai ned hi m. Enver' s conti nued presence
on the Turki s h frontier became an embarrassment to the Sovi et
l eaders, who sent Enver away; either at their request or his, he was
entrusted with a mi ssi on to Central Asi a.
In Central Asi a, Moscow was at t empt i ng to compl et e its re-
conquest of the native Turki s h- s peaki ng Mos l em popul at i ons, and
asked Enver to hel p.
Enver' s mi ssi on was contrary to everythi ng for which he had stood
in pol i ti cs: his goal had been to liberate the Turki s h- s peaki ng peopl es
f rom Russi an rul e. Th e mi ssi on al so ran contrary to what the
Bol shevi ks had preached before comi ng to power: they had cl ai med
that they were in favor of al l owi ng the non- Russi an peopl es of the
Russi an Empi r e freely to go their own way. Comi ng after the Russi an
reconquest of Georgi a, Armeni a, and Azerbai j an, and after the un-
veiling of Moscow' s alliance with ant i - communi st l eaders of I s l am,
the Sovi et i nstructi ons to Enver rai sed the questi on of whether the
Bol shevi ks had subordi nat ed, post poned, or even abandoned
al together the revol uti onary i deal s they had once espoused. Enver
undoubt edl y had his own vi ews about thi s, but he hid t hem from his
Bol shevi k hosts as he set out for Bukhara i n Central Asi a.
Ill
By the s ummer of 1920a year before Enver was sent t here
Bukhara was the last remai ni ng basti on of Tur ki c i ndependence i n
Central Asi a. Occupyi ng about 85, 000 s quare mi l es on the right bank
of the Oxus river, i n the southeast corner of Russi an Turkes t an, back
agai nst the mount ai nous southern and eastern frontiers that run with
Af ghani st an and Chi na, its popul at i on of roughl y two and a half to
three million rai sed it above the level of its sparsel y popul at ed Tur ki s h
nei ghbors. Th e st ruct ure of its Rus s i an protectorate had mel ted away
duri ng the revol uti ons of 1917, and its emi r, Abdul Sai d Mi r Al i m
Khan, last of the Mangi t line, reasserted the i ndependence of Bukhara
and the autocrati c powers that had been exerci sed by his ancestors.
Th e Sovi et s heard rumors of Bri ti sh compl i ci ty i n the Emi r' s defiance
of their authori ty; and in fact Bri ti sh Indi a di d send a hundred camel
l oads of suppl i es to ai d the emi rat e. Bol shevi k Rus s i a attacked
Bukhara i n 1918, but the Emi r' s tiny army, officially numbered at
11, 000 men, was abl e to win the brief war.
At the t i me of the Bol shevi k attack, Bukhara was still weal thy and
well suppl i ed. Th e emi rate had al ways been known for the fertility of
its oases, and its capi tal ci tyal so called Bukhara-remai ned the
most i mportant t radi ng town i n Central Asi a. In the city's seven-mi l e
honeycomb of covered bazaars, busi ness ( accordi ng to at least one
traveler's report ) went on as us ua l .
1 5
The r e was a lively traffic in the
product s of craf t smen, i n preci ous metal s, jewel s, rugs, leather, silks,
currenci es, and all manner of food-stuffs. A center of the commerce
i n rare manuscri pt s and l i brari es i n many oriental l anguages, Bukhara
conti nued to be the pri nci pal book market i n Central Asi a.
But after his victory over the Bol shevi ks i n 1918, the Emi r brought
this commerci al prosperi t y to an end by cutti ng off all t rade with
Rus s i a. At the s ame ti me he al l owed irrigation projects to be di scon-
ti nued. By the s umme r of 1920 Bukhara' s economi c si tuati on was
grave and the country was unabl e to feed i t sel f .
1 6
Popul ar di scontent
and social strife erupt ed as a Young Bukhara movement (whi ch was
opposed to Sovi et i nterventi on) and a smal l er Communi s t Party
(whi ch wel comed it) prot est ed agai nst the unenl i ghtened policies and
medi eval ways of the ruler. Th e Emi r, i n s ome ways, had i ndeed
brought back the Mi ddl e Ages . Th e twelfth-century Kal yan Mi naret ,
or Towe r of Deat h, f rom the top of whi ch condemned cri mi nal s
were thrown, was back i n use. Fr o m his pal aces, among hi s boy and
girl harems, the Emi r rul ed in as arbi trary a way as had any of his
ancestors.
Taki ng advant age of the Emi r' s unpopul ari t y, the Red Ar my inter-
vened. In the s umme r of 1920 the Re d Army attacked agai n, and
Rus s i an t roops under the command of Mi khai l Frunze bombarded
Bukhara. As the Young Bukharans l aunched an upri si ng i n the city,
the Red Army, with its ai rpl anes and armored vehicles, moved
forward on 2 Sept ember, bri ngi ng Bukhara' s medi eval regi me to an
end; the l i brary, contai ni ng possi bl y the greatest collection of Mos l em
manuscri pt s i n the worl d, went up i n fl ames.
Th e Emi r, alerted by a tel ephone call to his pal ace, fl ed, al ong
with his harems and three wagon- l oads of gol d and preci ous stones
f rom his t reasury. A story was told later that, at poi nts al ong the
way, he left one or another of his favori te danci ng boys, in the hopes
of di verti ng and thus sl owi ng his purs uers . Hi s initial st oppi ng poi nt
was the hill country of the east. Fr o m there he sought , and f ound,
sanct uary across the frontier i n Af ghani st an.
After capt uri ng the city of Bukhara, Sovi et Rus s i a recogni zed the
absol ute i ndependence of a Bukharan Peopl e' s Republ i c; but the
recogni ti on was i n f orm only. Frunze' s t roops remai ned, and i mposed
requi si ti ons on the country. Sovi et interference i n Bukhara' s affairs
poi nted toward its eventual i ncorporati on into Sovi et Rus s i a. Le ade r s
of the Young Bukhara movement resi sted the trend toward Russi an
control and at t empt ed to assert their i ndependence.
In the hills of eastern Bukhara, Basmachi groups loyal to the Emi r
began to harass the Rus s i an conquerors. As yet no real links had
been forged between the vari ous Bas machi groups ; nonethel ess the
Bas machi s posed a chal l enge to Sovi et rul e that, even by the end of
1921, the Re d Ar my had been unabl e t o crush.
I V
Enver Pasha reached Bukhara on 8 November 1921, entrusted by the
Rus s i ans with a role in the pacification of Turkes t an.
As he approached the city t hrough gardens of fruit trees, mel ons,
grapevi nes, roses, poppi es, and t obacco pl ants, he entered the Eden
of his pan- Turki s h i deol ogy: the historic homel and of the Turki s h
peopl es. Surrounded by eight mi l es of high crenel l ated stone walls,
with 11 gat es and 181 watch-towers, centuri es-ol d Bukhara was an
archi tectural embodi ment of the Mos l em past in whi ch he gl ori ed.
Once the holiest city of Central Asi a, its 360 mos ques reflected his
f ai t ha faith shared by its i nhabi tants, whose men lived their religion
and whose women wore the veil. Th e men of Bukhara wore t urbans
and the tradi ti onal st ri ped robes called khalats, while Enver arri ved
with his European- cut mi l i tary tuni c; but between hi m and them
there was a bond of brot herhood.
Enver' s affinities ext ended even to the new government of Bukhara.
The Young Bukhara Party was not di ssi mi l ar t o the Young Tur ks
whom Enver had led i n Const ant i nopl e; and reformi st l eaders like
Zeki Velidi To g a n of Bashki ri a had congregat ed there. When Enver
left the city, only three days after enteri ng it, he took with hi m the
key figures i n the government : its Chai rman, and its Commi s s ars of
War and Interi or. Th e story he told the Rus s i ans was that they were
goi ng hunti ng. In fact they made their way to the hill country of
eastern Bukhara, where Enver made contact with part i sans of the
Emi r. The r e , appoi nt ed commander-i n-chi ef by the Emi r, he as-
s umed the l eadershi p of the Bas machi war for i ndependence f rom
Russi a.
With the s upport bot h of the Emi r and of the Young Bukhara
l eaders, he was in a posi ti on to bri ng all factions together. Hi s envoys
sought out Basmachi bands t hroughout Turkes t an t o unify t hem
under his banner. Hi s procl ai med goal was the creati on of an i nde-
pendent Mos l em state i n Central Asi a. As al ways he st ressed the
unity of the Mos l em peopl es. Hi s st rong Isl ami c message won hi m
the support of the mul l ahs, who rallied strongl y to his cause, and of
his i mport ant nei ghbor, the Mos l em Emi r of Af ghani st an.
However Enver' s personal weaknesses reasserted themsel ves. He
was a vai n, strutti ng man who loved uni f orms, medal s, and titles.
For use in s t ampi ng official document s, he ordered a gol den seal that
descri bed hi m as "Commander- i n- Chi ef of all the Armi es of I s l am,
Son- i n- Law of the Cal i ph and Representati ve of the Prophet . "
1 7
Soon he was calling himself Emi r of Turkes t an, a practi ce not
conduci ve to good relations with the Emi r whose cause he served. At
some poi nt in the first half of 1922, the Emi r of Bukhara broke off
relations with hi m, depri vi ng hi m of t roops and much- needed finan-
cial support . Th e Emi r of Af ghani st an al so failed to march to his ai d.
Enver' s revolt scored some initial successes. He l aunched a dari ng
rai d on the city of Bukhara which unnerved his opponent s. But the
extent of his successes remai ns a subj ect of di sput e. Accordi ng to
some account s, he came to control most of the territory of Bukhara.
Accordi ng to others, Enver was merel y one of a number of chiefs,
who led a band of no more than 3, 000 followers (out of an esti mated
16, 000 Bas machi s roami ng the c ount r y) .
1 8
What i s clear i s that,
however effective or ineffective, his activities were a cause of deep
concern to the Kreml i n.
In the late spri ng of 1922, Enver wrote to the government of
Sovi et Rus s i a aski ng i t to wi thdraw Rus s i an t roops and to recogni ze
the i ndependence of his Mos l em state i n Turkes t an. In return he
offered peace and fri endshi p. Moscow refused his offer.
Th e Red Army, assi sted by the secret pol i ce, l aunched a campai gn
of pacification in the s ummer of 1922. In this they were ai ded by
Enver' s weaknesses. As a general he conti nued to be God' s gift to the
other si de. As a politician, he was equal l y mal adroi t : he al i enated the
other Basmachi l eaders, many of whom turned agai nst hi m. By mi d-
s ummer, the Russi ans had reduced his following to a tiny band of
fugi ti ves.
Russi an agents and patrol s searched the narrow mount ai n ravi nes
for traces of hi m, and eventual l y tracked hi m down to his lair in the
hills, where Red Army t roops qui etl y surrounded his forces. Before
dawn on 4 Augus t 1922, the Sovi et sol di ers attacked. Enver' s men
were cut down.
The r e are several accounts of how Enver di e d.
1 9
Accordi ng to the
most persuasi ve of t hem, when the Rus s i ans attacked he gri pped his
pocket Kor an and, as al ways, charged strai ght ahead. Lat er his
decapi tated body was found on the field of battl e. Hi s Kor an was
taken from his lifeless fingers and was filed in the archi ves of the
Sovi et secret pol i ce.
V
Sovi et Russi a' s l i qui dati on of the last of the Tur ki s h i ndependence
movement s i n Central Asi a compl et ed the process by which the
Bol shevi k authori ti es reveal ed that they woul d not keep their promi se
to allow non- Russi an peopl es to secede from Russi an rul e. It was
now evi dent that they i ntended to retain the empi re and the frontiers
achi eved by the czars.
Si r Percy Cox, who had recently returned to London f rom the
Mi ddl e Eas t , told the Cabi net in the s ummer of 1920 that the
Bol shevi ks woul d hold to the old Russi an imperial f ront i erbut that
they were not anxi ous to send their armi es across it in search of new
c onque s t s .
2 0
Wi nston Churchi l l was conspi cuous among those i n
London who bel i eved that Cox was wrong; but events at the ti me
shed little light on the matter one way or the other. Certai nl y the
Kreml i n was active i n subvert i ng the Bri ti sh Empi re i n the Mi ddl e
East , but there i s as little agreement today as there was duri ng the
Ll oyd George admi ni strati on as to the l ong-run intentions with which
the Kreml i n di d so.
Enver Pasha' s postwar advent ures di d, however, shed light on a
number of other i ssues that Bri ti sh officials had rai sed duri ng and
just after the Fi rst World War about the opposi ti on they faced in the
Mi ddl e Eas t . Bri ti sh officials had concei ved of Enver as the sinister
and potent figure who sust ai ned Mus t apha Kemal i n his opposi ti on
to the Al l i es; but events had shown that Enver and Ke mal were
deadl y rivals, and that i t was Ke mal not Enverwho commanded
the more powerful following within Tur ke y, and who therefore coul d
obtai n arms from Sovi et Rus s i a. Bri ti sh officials had al so pi ctured
Enver as a creature of the Ge r man mi l i tary machi ne, but , while he
coul d call on personal fri ends like von Seeckt for favors, in his
Russi an years he acted entirely on his own; and as Enver fought his
last campai gn i n 1922, von Seeckt' s new Ge r man army was secretly
worki ng with the Bol shevi ks, not with Enver.
For years Enver had threatened Bri tai n and Rus s i a with a pan-
Tur k upri si ng, but when he finally i ssued his call to revolt there was
no appreci abl e response to it. Even within the guerri l l a bands that he
led, the Mos l em religion rather than feelings of Turki s hnes s provi ded
the unifying bond. Pan- I s l am, about whi ch Bri ti sh officials conti nued
to write with al arm, was also reveal ed as an empt y sl ogan by the
Bukharan campai gn: the cl anni sh peopl es of the Mi ddl e Eas t were
not gi ven to wi der loyalties, and not one Mosl em l andnot even
friendly Af ghani s t anmarched to Enver' s ai d. It was true that i n
vari ous part s of Turkes t an, Mos l em nati ves reacted agai nst Russi an
settl ers, even as i n Pal esti ne Mos l ems reacted agai nst Jewi s h settl ers,
but each group of Mos l ems responded locally and only for itself:
t hroughout the Mi ddl e Eas t , Mos l ems were acti ng alike rather than
acti ng together.
When Enver j ourneyed to Moscow, the British view was that he
and his new Russi an associ ates were el ements of a l ong- st andi ng
political combi nat i on, and that they woul d work toward the s ame
political goal s. In fact their goal s were far apart . Enver and the
Bol shevi ks tri ed to use each other, but neither succeeded. Th e
Bol shevi ks proved adept at swiftly pi cki ng up anyone they thought
mi ght do t hem good-and at qui ckl y di scardi ng t hem when their
useful ness was at an end. London continually mi sunderst ood, and
i nterpreted as l ong-term combi nat i ons, these emphemeral tactical
alliances into which the Kreml i n entered with such cynical ease. It
mi ght have amus ed Enver, i n the last mi nutes before his head was
cut off by the Rus s i ans , to know that Bri ti sh Intel l i gence had marked
hi m down as Moscow' s man.
Enver' s advent ures had Bri ti sh Intel l i gence known the full story
of them at the t i mewoul d have shown the Bri ti sh that they were
mi staken in their several views of who was in charge of Bol shevi k
Rus s i a. A preval ent Bri ti sh view was that the Bol shevi ks were run
from Berl i n by the Ge r man general s; but when Enver arri ved i n
Berlin in 1919 he found that the Ge r man army was out of touch with
Russi a and took no interest in the new rulers of the Kreml i n. It was
Enver who suggest ed that the Ge r man army mi ght profit f rom est ab-
l i shi ng a rel ati onshi p with the Bol shevi k regi me, not vice versa; and
it was a suggest i on that von Seeckt di d not begi n to i mpl ement until
1921.
Indeed what Enver found was that Leni n and his col l eagues were
men who set their own agenda: that, above all, i s where Bri ti sh
Intel l i gence officers were wrong about t hem. Th e men i n the Kreml i n
were engaged i n gi vi ng orders, not i n taki ng t hem. The y were not
arms of s omebody else's conspi raci es; when i t came to conspi raci es,
they wove their own. Wi nston Churchi l l , who had correctly observed
as much, then spoi l ed his anal ysi s by goi ng on to cl ai m that the
Sovi et l eaders were neither Rus s i an nor pro- Rus s i an. Al ong with so
many other Bri ti sh fantasi es about the forces at work agai nst t hem i n
the Mi ddl e Eas t , it was a theory that ought to have di ed with Enver
Pasha at Bukhara.
r
P ART XI I
THE MIDDLE
EASTERN
SETTLEMENT OF 1922
57
WINSTON CHURCHI LL TAKES
CHARGE
i
Russi a, then, troubl ed after the war by the appearance of i ndepend-
ence movement s i n Mos l em Asi a on her southern frontier, crushed
t hem, and while doi ng so defined herself by charti ng her future
rel ati onshi p with the non- Russi an peopl es of what had once been the
empi re of the czars. So far as she was abl e, she woul d bri ng t hem
under the rul e of the Rus s i an s t at ea policy formally adopt ed on
30 December 1922, when the Fi rst Congres s of Sovi et s of the Uni on
of Sovi et Soci al i st Republ i cs approved the formati on of the Sovi et
Uni on.
France, too, was t roubl ed after the war by the appearance of
i ndependence movement s i n the areas of the Mos l em Mi ddl e East
she sought to control , and crushed t hem, as seen earlier, i n 1920.
Cl emenceau had wanted to preserve France' s posi ti on as a power in
Europe, and had al ways pi ctured the pursui t of overseas empi re as a
dangerous di stracti on; but his successors, by i nvadi ng Syri a, defined
France' s role i n postwar worl d politics i n other, more ambi t i ous and
less realistic, t erms. France' s occupati on of Syri a and Lebanon was
formally val i dated by a Le ague of Nat i ons Mandat e on 24 Jul y 1922.
At the outset of the Fi rst Worl d War, the three Allies had agreed to
parti ti on the post war Mi ddl e East between t hem; but , i n the postwar
years, havi ng lost uni ty of purpos e, each went its own way in over-
comi ng post war di st urbances i n Mos l em Asi a, and each defined its
own vision of its political desti ny in doi ng so. Each followed its own
road to 1922for Bri tai n' s posi ti on in her sphere in the Mi ddl e Eas t ,
like Russi a' s and France' s, was formally embodi ed i n document s
promul gat ed in that year.
Of the three Al l i es, Bri tai n faced the most wi despread chal l enges
across the face of the Mi ddl e East after the war. She met the
chal l enges while in the gri p of an economi c cri si s and at a t i me of
prof ound social and political change at home. Mi ddl e East ern policy
on the road to 1922 was to severely test Bri tai n' s most colorful and
493
494 T H E M I D D L E E A S T E R N S E T T L E M E N T O F 1922
creative pol i ti ci ans, Ll oyd George and Churchi l l . For, as a result of
the postwar troubl es recounted earlier, everywhere f rom Egypt to
Af ghani st an, Bri tai n' s Mi ddl e Eas t policy was i n t at t ersj ust as
Wi nston Churchi l l had sai d all al ong that it woul d bei n the face of
native resi stance, communal stri fe, and local di sorders.
I I
Ever since the end of the war, Churchi l l i nsi de the government
had been the most severe critic of the Pri me Mi ni ster' s Mi ddl e
East ern policy, warni ng that peacet i me Bri tai n di d not have the
t roops and that Parl i ament woul d refuse to spend the money to
coerce the Mi ddl e Eas t . He argued that Bri tai n shoul d therefore
settle for t erms that the Tur ks were willing to accept. On 25 October
1919 he presci entl y expressed concern that Greece mi ght rui n herself
i n her Smyr na venture, and that Bri tai n' s alliance with France mi ght
be i njured by a French i nvasi on of Syri a with hordes of Al geri an
t roops. He worri ed about the Ital i ans "di sturbi ng the Turki s h Worl d"
and about "the Je ws , whom we are pl edged to i ntroduce into Pal esti ne
and who take it for grant ed that the local popul ati on will be cleared
out to suit their conveni ence. " Argui ng that Allied policy in the
Mi ddl e Eas t ought to be compl etel y reversed, he urged that the
Ot t oman Empi r e be restored to its prewar frontiers and suggest ed
that the European powers renounce their cl ai ms to Syri a, Pal esti ne,
and other such terri tori es. "Inst ead of di vi di ng up the Empi r e into
separat e territorial spheres of expl oi tati on, " he argued, "we shoul d
combi ne to preserve the integrity of the Turki s h Empi r e as i t exi sted
before the war but shoul d subj ect that Empi re to a strict form of
international control . . . "'
Keenl y aware of the purpos es served by Bri tai n' s Mi ddl e East ern
strategy duri ng the nineteenth century, Churchi l l mai ntai ned that a
si mi l ar strategy shoul d be adopt ed by the Ll oyd George government .
"We ought to come to t erms with Mus t apha Ke mal and arri ve at a
good peace with Tur ke y, " he argued, i n a me mor andum to the
Cabi net on 23 November 1920, so as to st op est rangi ng "powerful,
durabl e and necessary Tur ki s h and Mohamme dan forces. We shoul d
thus re-create that Turki s h barri er to Russi an ambi t i ons which has
al ways been of the ut most i mport ance to us . "
2
In a letter to the Pri me Mi ni ster written shortly thereafter,
Churchi l l underl i ned his deep resentment at bei ng obl i ged as War
Mi ni ster to ask Parl i ament for vast s ums to s ubdue the Mi ddl e East
when i t was only Ll oyd George' s "vendetta agai nst the Tur ks " that
made the expendi t ure necessary. He wrote that "We seem to be
becomi ng the most Anti Tu r k & the most pro-Bol shevi k power i n the
WI N S T O N C H U R C H I L L T A K E S C H A R G E
495
worl d: whereas i n my j udgement we ought to be the exact opposi t e. "
Poi nti ng out that it was only because of the s upport of the Conserva-
tive Party that the government remai ned in office, he remi nded the
Pri me Mi ni ster that the Conservat i ves were associ ated with the tra-
ditional ni neteenth-century policy of support i ng Turkey agai nst
Rus s i a.
All yr great success & overwhel mi ng personal power have come
from a juncti on between yr Li beral followers & the Conservati ve
party . . . But surel y at this t i mewhen we Coal i ti on Li beral s
are vy weak in the Const i t uenci esi t is addi ng to our difficulties
to purs ue policies t owards the Tur ks & the Bol shevi ks both of
wh are fundamental l y opposed to Conservat i sm [sic] instincts
& t radi t i ons.
3
Movi ng f rom domest i c to foreign pol i cy, Churchi l l wrote his most
broadl y reasoned cri ti ci sm of Bri ti sh Mi ddl e East ern pol i cy some
twelve days later in a memorandum to the Cabi net mai ntai ni ng that
"The unfortunate course of affairs has led to our bei ng si mul t aneousl y
out of sympat hy with all the four Powers exerci si ng local influence"
i n the Mi ddl e Eas t : Rus s i ans , Greeks , Tur ks , and Arabs . A success-
ful policy woul d consi st rather i n "di vi di ng up the local Powers so
that if we have some opponent s we have also at any rate some
fri ends. Thi s is what we have al ways done in the whole of our past
hi story. When Rus s i a was our enemy the Tur k was our fri end: when
Turkey was our enemy Russi a was our f ri end. "
4
Accordi ng t o
Churchi l l ' s anal ysi s, Leni n' s Rus s i a woul d not, and Ki ng
Constanti ne' s Greece coul d not, help Bri tai n to achi eve her goal s;
the only pract i cabl e course, he argued, was to ally with Tur ks and
Arabs .
Si r Henry Wi l son, Chief of the Imperi al General Staff, noted
approvi ngl y in his diary that Churchi l l had "written a good paper for
the Cabi net showi ng that we are now hated by the Bol shevi ks,
Tur ks , Greeks , & Arabs & this must be bad policy & that we ought
to make fri ends with Tur ks & Arabs & enemi es with Bol shevi ks &
i gnore Greeks . Thi s has been my view all al ong. "
5
On an admi ni strati ve level, Churchi l l charged (as had Si r Mark
Sykes in the early days of the worl d war) that Bri tai n' s Mi ddl e
East ern policy was rendered i ncoherent by the number of government
depart ment s runni ng their separat e territories and operat i ons. Thi s
i mpeded progress toward curbi ng costs, he repeatedl y told the
Cabi net Fi nance Commi t t ee. On 31 December 1920, at Churchi l l ' s
suggest i on, the Cabi net deci ded to set up a speci al Mi ddl e East
Depart ment within the Col oni al Office to be in charge of the t roubl ed
mandat ed terri tori es, Palestine (i ncl udi ng Tr ans j or dan) , and I raq.
Lo r d Mi l ner, the Col oni al Secret ary, i n failing health and spi ri ts,
was unwi l l i ng to as s ume such heavy new responsi bi l i ti es and prompt l y
resi gned f rom the government . On 1 January 1921, Ll oyd George
offered the Col oni al Mi ni st ry to Churchi l l who, after s ome hesitation,
agreed to accept it. It was arranged that Mi l ner shoul d hand over the
mi ni stry on 7 February; but Churchi l l i mmedi atel y began involving
hi msel f i n Mi ddl e Eas t depart ment al arrangement s and affai rs.
Churchi l l at once began tryi ng to expand the powers of his new
mi ni stry, seeki ng mi l i tary as well as full civil powers and at t empt i ng
to bri ng all of Arabi a within the ambi t of his depart ment . He also
expressed deci ded views about the future of Egypt . Th e Forei gn
Secret ary, Lo r d Curzon, protested repeatedl y at Churchi l l ' s encroach-
ment s on his perogati ves. Curzon compl ai ned that "Winston . . .
wants to grab everythi ng in his new Dept & to be a sort of Asi ati c
Forei gn Secret ary. "
6
A War Office official cl ai med that Churchi l l ' s
idea was to set up "a sort of War Office of his own. "
7
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster, at Churchi l l ' s suggest i on, appoi nt ed a speci al
i nterdepartmental commi t t ee under the chai rmanshi p of Si r Jame s
Mast erson Smi t h (a career official who had served under Churchi l l )
to cons i derand, Churchi l l hoped, to expandt he powers of the
Col oni al Office's new Mi ddl e Eas t Depart ment .
Churchi l l , who no l onger spoke of restori ng the Ot t oman Empi re,
approached his new responsi bi l i ti es with an open mi nd and with an
evident desi re to obtai n gui dance from the government' s abl est of-
ficials in a program ai med at cutti ng costs while tryi ng to keep
commi t ment s.
Ill
By 1921 the Government of Indi a, under the influence of Gert rude
Bell in Baghdad, had come over to the views of Cai ro. Indi a, like
Cai ro, now bel i eved i n protectorate rather than direct government ,
and s upport ed the sons of Ki ng Hus s ei n as Bri tai n' s candi dat es for
Arab l eadershi p. Thi s brought an end to the l ong civil war within
Bri ti sh ranks and Churchi l l ' s luck was that Bri tai n' s Mi ddl e East old
hands now spoke with one voi ce; unl i ke previ ous mi ni sters, he woul d
not be caught in an official crossfi re.
Churchi l l drew on the resources of other mi ni stri es to recruit an
experi enced and wel l -bal anced staff to deal with his new Mi ddl e
East ern responsi bi l i ti es. In the i nteri m, while his staff was bei ng
assembl ed, Churchi l l relied upon the i nformati on, advi ce, and pro-
fessional gui dance of Si r Art hur Hi rtzel , Assi stant Under- Secret ary
of St at e for Indi a, a career official who had served in the Indi a Office
since 1894. Hi rtzel decl i ned Churchi l l ' s offer to head the new Mi ddl e
East Depart ment ; in his pl ace he sent another career official, John
WI N S T O N C H U R C H I L L T A K E S C H A R G E 497
Evel yn Shuckburgh, who had worked under hi m and who had served
in the Indi a Office si nce 1900. Hi rtzel wrote to Churchi l l that
Shuckburgh was "really fi rst-ratel evel headed, al ways cool, very
accurate & unspari ng of hi msel f: his only fault perhaps a tendency to
excessi ve caut i on. "
8
Churchi l l chose Hubert Wi nthrop Young of the Forei gn Office to
be Shuckburgh' s assi stant. An army maj or duri ng the war, Young
had been i n charge of transport and suppl i es for Fei sal ' s Arab forces.
Hi s appoi nt ment , and Shuckburgh' s , were endorsed i n warm t erms
by the Mast erson Smi t h commi t t ee. Th e commi t t ee found
Shuckburgh to be "the best man" for the j ob and Young' s servi ces to
be "essenti al . "
9
Th e commi t t ee expressed st rong reservati ons, how-
ever, about another appoi nt ment Churchi l l proposed t o make: T. E.
Lawrence, who was t o be an advi ser on Arab affai rs. Th e commi t t ee
cauti oned Churchi l l that Lawrence was "not the ki nd of man to fit
easily into any official machi ne. "
1 0
Lawrence i ndeed had earned a reputati on for i nsubordi nat i on and
for goi ng over the heads of his official superi ors to hi gher authori ti es.
He was also the l eadi ng publ i c critic of Bri ti sh policy t oward the
Arabs of Mes opot ami aa policy of which Churchi l l was now i n
charge. In the s ummer of 1920 Lawrence had wri tten of I raq i n the
Sunday Times that
Our government i s worse than the ol d Turki s h syst em. The y
kept fourteen t housand local conscri pt s embodi ed, and killed a
yearl y average of two hundred Arabs i n mai ntai ni ng peace. We
keep ninety t housand men, with aeropl anes, armoured cars,
gunboat s and armoured trai ns. We have killed about ten
t housand Arabs i n this ri si ng thi s s ummer. We cannot hope
to mai ntai n such an average: it is a poor country, sparsel y
peopl ed . . .
1 1
Lawrence, a one-ti me juni or officer in the Arab Bureau in Cai ro,
had by now become a celebrity, due to the efforts of an Ameri can
named Lowel l Tho ma s . Tho ma s , a 25-year-ol d fledgling s howman
from Ohi o who until then had knocked about Nort h Ameri ca i n
search of f ame, fortune, and advent ure, had been worki ng at a part -
ti me j ob teachi ng publ i c speaki ng at Pri nceton when, at the end of
1917, he rai sed enough money to go to Engl and and then to send
himself and a cameraman to the Mi ddl e Eas t war front in search of a
sal abl e story with romance and local color. The r e he found
Lawrence, weari ng Arab robes, and deci ded to make hi m the hero of
a colorful story he was about to wri t ea story about the Arab
followers of Hus s ei n and Fei sal and the role they had pl ayed in the
war agai nst Tur ke y. Th e story was to f orm the basi s of a show, i n
whi chsacri fi ci ng truth to entertai nment val ue s Thomas woul d
pi ct ure Lawrence as the i nspi rer and l eader of an Arab revolt that
dest royed the Turki s h Empi re.
Thomas ' s show was a l ecture with phot os. It was entitled The Last
Crusade and Tho ma s opened i t at the Cent ury Theat er i n New York
in March 1919, with the backi ng of the New York Globe. A few
weeks later he moved it to the old Madi s on Squar e Garden, a vast
audi t ori um i n which to accommodat e the crowds that Tho ma s hoped
to attract. An Engl i sh i mpresari o then arranged to bri ng the show to
London, where i t pl ayed to the l argest hal l s: the Royal Opera Hous e
at Co vent Garden and the Al bert Hal l .
It was a mast erpi ece of bal l yhoo and it set show busi ness records.
It pl ayed in London for six mont hs and was seen there by perhaps a
million peopl e. Tho ma s then took the show on a road tour around
the worl d. It made young Lowel l Tho ma s rich and f amous ; and i t
converted "Lawrence of Arabi a" into a worl d hero.
Lawrence, t hough embarras s ed by the crudeness of Thomas ' s
account, gl ori ed in its bri ght gl ow. When The Last Crusade pl ayed
i n London, Lawrence frequentl y came up from Oxf ord to see it:
Thomas ' s wife spi ed hi m in the audi ence on at least five different
occasi ons, causi ng hi m to "flush cri mson, l augh i n confusi on, and
hurry away. "
l s
Th e publ i c believed Thomas ' s account ; so that when Lawrence
became an advi ser to Winston Churchi l l , his appoi nt ment over-
shadowed all others. Hi s reputati on grew. He passed off his fantasi es
as hi s t ory,
1 6
and, i n the years to come, Lawrence was to cl ai m far
more credit for his share in Churchi l l ' s achi evements as Col oni al
Secret ary than was his due.
But Lawrence' s indirect influence on policy was consi derabl e, for
his account of the Arab upri si ng was believed by Churchi l l , who
l acked personal knowl edge of the matter, not havi ng been involved in
Mi ddl e East ern affairs duri ng the war after 1916. Unaware of the
* A few years later Thomas wrote a book called With Lawrence in Arabia, based
on the show, repeating the story he had told to his mass audiences of millions
around the world. It was an immensely readable, high-spirited write-up of
Lawrence's service careermuch of it untruethat made its points through hyper-
bole. The Arab Bulletin, which appeared in twenty-six copies, in Thomas' s account
appeared in only f our.
1 2
Feisal's corps of 3,500 men, added to the several thousands
serving under Feisal's brothers during the war, when added up by Lowell Thomas
produced an Arab army of 200, 000.
Pushing Kitchener, Wingate, Clayton, Hogarth, Dawnay, Joyce, Young, and
other important British officials into the shade, Thomas showed young T. E.
Lawrence single-handedly igniting and leading the Hejaz revolt. Thomas placed
Lawrence in the Arabia desert fomenting the Hejaz revolt in February 1916;
1 4
in
fact, Lawrence had a desk job in Cairo at that time, and visited Arabia for the first
time the following October.
I V
Si nce 1918 many of Bri tai n' s l eaders had entirely reversed their views
about the Mi ddl e Eas t . In the heady days when the war was bei ng
brought to a t ri umphant concl usi on, it had seemed i mport ant to seize
and to hol d on to every corner of the Mi ddl e Eas t that offered
strategi c advant age; but , after 1919, Parl i ament and the press cl am-
ored for wi thdrawal from these remot e posi ti ons that cost so much to
mai ntai n.
Churchi l l responded to the changed political mood f rom the day
that he took over the War and Ai r Mi ni stri es at the begi nni ng of
1919; and when he moved to the Col oni al Office at the begi nni ng
of 1921, he once more made cost cutti ng his top pri ori ty. As Col oni al
Secret ary, Churchi l l announced "that everythi ng else that happens i n
the Mi ddl e Eas t i s secondary to the reducti on i n expens e";
1 9
he
tested all proposal s and programs agai nst that one overri di ng cri-
terion. Th e final figures provi de the measure of his success: by
Sept ember 1922, Churchi l l had el i mi nated 75 percent of Bri tai n' s
Mi ddl e East ern expendi t ures, reduci ng t hem f rom forty-five million
pounds t o eleven mi l l i on pounds per a n n u m.
2 0
Churchi l l favored conci l i ati ng Francei n order to save the money
i t woul d cost to oppos e herand he inclined t oward i nstal l i ng Fei sal
and his brot herst he Sheri fi ans, or Has hemi t es as local rul ers of
* Sir Hugh Trenchard, the head of the Royal Air Force, wrote to the R. A. F.
Middle East commander on 5 September 1919 that "I am afraid from your many
telegrams that you have not got the atmosphere that is reigning here. That atmo-
sphere is, economy at all cost . . . "
I 7
His program was to cut commitments ruthlessly in order to cut costs. Indeed
he cut the military budget so radically that his top professional army adviser took
alarm. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff confided to his diary the following
year that Churchill's program "consists in arbitrary reduction of garrisons for financial
reasons wholly regardless of whether or not the residue are liable to be scuppered. "
He concluded that "Winston . . . is playing the fool & heading straight for di sasters. "
1 8
Actually, Churchill was doing no more than keeping in tune with the political
temper of his times in insisting on cutting expenses, cost what it might in non-
money terms. Churchill put financial considerations above all others, except when it
came to dealing with Bolshevik Russi athe one area where Churchill, by his
opinions and conduct, reminded the political world of his past excesses and ex-
travagances.
extent to whi ch Lawrence and Ll oyd George' s staff had exaggerat ed
the role of Fei sal ' s Arabs i n wi nni ng the war, Churchi l l was prepared
to accept Lawrence' s thesis that Bri tai n owed a great deal to Fei sal
and his fol l owers.
much of the Arab worl d because to do so woul d provi de Bri tai n with
an economi cal strategy: i t woul d enabl e "Hi s Majesty' s Government
to bri ng pressure to bear on one Ar ab sphere i n order to obtai n their
own ends i n another. "
2 1
By appl yi ng pressure on just one member of
the fami l y, he bel i eved, Bri tai n coul d extract concessi ons from all of
t hem; if each member of the fami l y rul ed a ki ngdom, Bri tai n woul d
need to threaten only one ki ngdom i n order to bri ng all the Arab
ki ngdoms back into line.
Fr o m ti me to t i me he consi dered partial or compl et e wi thdrawal
f rom the Mi ddl e Eas t and, on 8 Januar y 1921, he cabl ed the Bri ti sh
Hi gh Commi s s i oner i n Mes opot ami a that unl ess the country coul d
be governed more cheapl y Bri tai n woul d have to wi thdraw from i t to
a coastal e nc l ave .
2 2
At another poi nt, taki ng up what he bel i eved to
be a suggest i on of Ll oyd George' s, he propos ed to abandon Pal esti ne
and Mes opot ami a al together by gi vi ng t hem to the Uni t ed St a t e s .
2 3
When he accept ed appoi nt ment to the Col oni al Office, Churchi l l
wrote to the Pri me Mi ni ster that "I feel some mi sgi vi ngs about the
political consequences to myself of taki ng on my shoul ders the burden
& the odi um of the Mes opot ami a entangl ement . . . "
2 4
He was wary
of bei ng bl amed, as he had been over the Dardanel l es expedi ti on, for
the failure of a policy that had been initiated by others. On the other
hand, it ran counter to his nature to order a retreat under fire; his
inclination was to remai n i n Pal esti ne and Mes opot ami a because to
do otherwi se woul d be to default on commi t ment s that, wisely or
unwisely, Bri tai n had al ready made.
Churchi l l , when he took office as Col oni al Secretary, brought with
hi m a broad strategi c concept of how to hold down the Mi ddl e East
i nexpensi vel y. While he was still Secretary of Ai r and War, Churchi l l
had proposed t o cut Mi ddl e Eas t costs by governi ng Mes opot ami a by
means of ai rpl anes and armored cars. A few wel l -protected air bases
(he wrote at the ti me) woul d enabl e the Royal Ai r Force "to operate
in every part of the protectorate and to enforce control, now here,
now there, without the need of mai ntai ni ng l ong lines of communi -
cati ons eati ng up troops and money. "
2 5
Churchi l l recogni zed that this strategy woul d not defend
Mes opot ami a agai nst i nvasi on; its sol e purpose was "mai ntai ni ng
internal s ecuri t y. "
2 6
Churchi l l ' s di agnosi s of Bri tai n' s troubl es in the
Mi ddl e Eas t therefore must have been that the di st urbances were
caused locally. In proposi ng to adopt a military post ure that woul d
be of little use agai nst Rus s i ans , resurgent Ge r mans , or Tur ks , he
* As Secretary for Air since 1919, Churchillin collaboration with Sir Hugh
Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff and father of the Royal Air Forcehad played a
leading role in exploring the revolutionary implications of air power for postwar
British policy.
implicitly acknowl edged that the threat to Bri tai n i n Mes opot ami a
di d not come f rom them. *
Churchi l l ' s strategy i mpl i ed an ol d-fashi oned concept of empi re
much at vari ance with the idealistic vision of Smut s , Amery, Hogart h,
and T. E. Lawrence that i n part had i nspi red wart i me Bri tai n t o seek
control of Arab As i a. Lawrence still cl ung to the vision of a free Arab
Mi ddl e East ern Domi ni on vol untari l y joi ni ng the Bri ti sh Common-
wealth as an equal partner. In a much- quot ed phrase, he wrote in
1919 that "My own ambi t i on i s that the Arabs shoul d be our first
brown domi ni on, and not our last brown col ony. "
2 7
Churchi l l ' s strat-
egy, which was ai med at put t i ng down native revolt, suggest ed that
Bri tai n woul d rule her Arab subj ect s by coerci on rather than consent.
It harked back to his experi ences i n Ki t chener' s Sudan campai gn,
and the ease with which modern European weapons coul d s ubdue
natives armed only with traditional weapons.
In i mposi ng his strategy, he was gui ded by a more recent experi -
ence: the cat ast rophe at the Dardanel l es, where his pol i ci es had been
undermi ned by his depart ment al subordi nat es i n London and by his
officers in the field. It led Churchi l l to go to consi derabl e troubl e to
make his chief officials feel that his program ori gi nated with t hema
precauti on all the more prudent gi ven the st rong opposi ti on from the
War Office and the Hi gh Commi s s i oner i n Mes opot ami a to the
repl acement of t roops by ai rpl anes.
To Si r Percy Cox, Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi ssi oner i n Mes opot ami a,
Churchi l l cabl ed on 7 February 1921 that "The quest i ons at i ssue
cannot be settl ed by i nterchange of t el egrams. I cannot . . . find ti me
to visit Mes opot ami a. I propose therefore a conference in Egypt
begi nni ng duri ng first or second week of March . . . Conf erence
woul d take a week . . . I shall be accompani ed by pri nci pal officers of
new Mi ddl e East ern Depart ment of Col oni al Of f i ce. "
2 8
Churchi l l then s ummone d his field officers from Pal esti ne and the
Persi an Gul f to attend hi m at the conference. On 18 February 1921
he sent his own notes on Mes opot ami a to John Shuckburgh, and
entrusted hi m with the pivotal responsi bi l i ty for establ i shi ng a con-
ference agenda for Mes opot ami a and for Pal esti ne.
V
Egypt , which Churchi l l chose as the meet i ng pl ace, was geographi -
cally conveni ent but inconvenient politically: the Egypt i ans knew
* Churchill was in constant fear that Ll oyd George's anti-Turkish policies
would bring about a Turki sh attack in Iraq, which British forces were not equipped
to meet.
that Churchi l l felt that Egypt shoul d not be grant ed i ndependence.
On 21 February 1921 he wrote to his wife that "The peopl e i n Egypt
are getti ng rather exci ted at my comi ng, as they seem to think it has
somet hi ng to do with t hem. Thi s is, of course, all wrong. I have no
mi ssi on to Egypt and have no authori ty to deal with any Egypt i an
questi on. I shall have to make this qui te clear or we shall be pestered
with demonst rat i ons and del egat i ons. "
2 9
Al l enby, now Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi s s i oner i n Egypt , i ssued an
official denial that Churchi l l was comi ng to consul t about Egypt i an
affai rs. Th e Forei gn Secret ary, Lo r d Curzon, wrote Churchi l l a
confidential letter on 24 February urgi ng hi m to transfer the venue of
the conference to Jerus al em. Curzon cl ai med that Churchi l l ' s pres-
ence in Cai ro mi ght compromi s e the efforts of Al l enby and the
Egypt i an government to reach agreement at a critical mo me nt .
3 0
Churchi l l , however, decl i ned to alter his arrangement s.
Th u s the Cai ro Conference went forward as pl anned, but its
location brought into s harp contrast the pol i ci es pursued by Churchi l l
and those advocat ed by Al l enby: Churchi l l was pl anni ng to hold the
line agai nst Arab nati onal i sm and Al l enby was not. Agai nst the
wei ght of Cabi net opi ni on, agai nst the wi shes of the Pri me Mi ni ster
and of Churchi l l , Al l enbyi n line with the recommendat i ons made
earlier by Lo r d Mi l nerpersi st ed in his efforts to gi ve Egypt a
measure of i ndependence by bri ngi ng the Bri ti sh protectorate i n
Egypt to an end.
By the threat of resi gnati on he eventually prevai l ed and, on
28 February 1922, the Bri ti sh government unilaterally i ssued the
so-cal l ed Al l enby Decl arat i on concedi ng formal i ndependence to
Egypt (subject to far-reachi ng reservati ons which, among other
thi ngs, enabl ed Bri tai n to supervi se Egypt i an foreign policy and to
make unrestri cted use of Egypt i an terri tory for military movement s ) .
Al l enby woul d have preferred a treaty to a unilateral decl arati on, but
no Egypt i an government woul d agree to si gn a document that reserved
so many powers to Bri tai n.
Churchi l l apparentl y feared that Al l enby' s concessi on of even
nomi nal Egypt i an i ndependence woul d undercut his own policy, in
other Arabi c- speaki ng countri es, of conti nui ng to wi thhol d it. By an
acci dent of geography, i n 1921, both Al l enby' s and Churchi l l ' s con-
trary policies were el aborated in the city of Cai ro; and in fact there
was a subst ant i ve si mi l ari ty between them, for both represented
unilateral Bri ti sh deci si ons about how the Arab worl d shoul d be
runand Arab l eaders di d not agree to either one of t hem.
VI
Th e Cai ro Conf erence formally convened at the Semi rami s Hotel
on the morni ng of Sat urday, 12 March 1921. Duri ng the following
WI N S T O N C H U R C H I L L T A K E S C H A R G E
503
days s ome forty or fifty sessi ons were hel d. Accordi ng to one count
there were forty officials in at t endance; "Everybody Mi ddl e East is
here . . . , " wrote T. E. Lawrence to his ol dest brot her.
3 1
Th e i ni ti al and pri nci pal conf erence topi c was how to cut the
cost s of occupyi ng Mes opot ami a. Two commi t t ees, one political and
one mi l i tary, were establ i shed to consi der the matter. Bot h com-
mi ttees worked on the basi s of agendas that Churchi l l and his staff
had drafted on board shi p on their way over. The commi t t ees devoted
their first four days to arri vi ng at a pl an for Mes opot ami a.
Churchi l l and his staff had skillfully anti ci pated the advi ce that
mi ght be t endered by officers i n the field. Gert rude Bell, who came
in from Baghdad with her chief, Si r Percy Cox, wrote afterward that
"Mr. Churchi l l was admi rabl e, most ready to meet everyone half-way
and masterl y alike in gui di ng a bi g political meeti ng and in conduct i ng
the smal l commi t t ees i n which we broke up. Not the least favourabl e
ci rcumst ance was that Si r Percy and I, comi ng out with a definite
programme, found when we came to open our packet that i t coi nci ded
exactl y" with what Churchi l l pr o po s e d.
3 2
On the eveni ng of 15 March Churchi l l di spat ched a tel egram,
which arri ved i n London the fol l owi ng day, reporti ng to the Pri me
Mi ni ster that "All authori ti es . . . have reached agreement on all the
poi nts, both political and mi l i t ary. "
0 3
In itself this was a consi derabl e
achi evement.
Essenti al l y there were four el ements i n the Cai ro Conf erence pl an.
Fei sal was to be offered the throne of Mesopot ami a, but every effort
woul d be made to make i t appear that the offer came from the
i ndi genous popul at i on rather than from Bri tai n. In mai nt ai ni ng a
Bri ti sh presence in the country, the mi l i tary woul d shift to Churchi l l ' s
ai rforce-based st rat egy; but as the head of the Royal Air Force, Si r
Hugh Trenchard, esti mated that the strategy woul d requi re about a
year to i mpl ement Bri t ai n woul d have to rely all the more heavily
on Fei sal to keep the country quiet in the i nteri m. Al t hough Bri ti sh
experts di sagreed intensely among themsel ves as to whether the
Kurdi s h* areas i n the northwest shoul d be abs orbed into the new
state of I raq, or i nstead shoul d become an i ndependent Kurdi s t an, i t
was agreed that for the ti me bei ng they shoul d conti nue to form a
separat e entity within the juri sdi cti on of the Bri ti sh Hi gh Com-
mi ssi oner i n Mes opot ami a. In addi ti on to the Kur ds , there were
The Kurds are a scattered, tribal people who inhabit the plateaus and mountains
where Iraq, Iran, Russian Armenia, and Turkey now overlap. They are mostly
Sunni Mosl ems, speak a language of the Iranian group, and are believed to be of
Indo-European descent. There were perhaps two arid a half million of them in 1921;
there are no reliable figures. There may be seven million of them today. They
continue to fight for autonomy and are a subject of current concern to the govern-
ments of Iraq and Turkey.
other groups whose identity was di sti nct and whose needs posed
probl ems. In the northwest parti cul arl y there were smal l groups with
no pl ace to go, among t hem the Assyri an (or Nest ori an) Chri sti an
refugees, dri ven from their homes i n Turkey duri ng the war because
of their pro-Al l i ed sympat hi es; and about these homel ess groups ,
st ruggl i ng for survi val , the Cai ro conferees felt that there was little
that coul d be done.
Havi ng opt ed for a Hashemi t e sol uti on in I raq, the conference di d
the s amet hough on a t emporary basi sf or Trans j ordan. Di sorder
was endemi c i n that terri tory, and the Chi ef of the Imperi al General
Staff was of the view that Bri tai n coul d not hold onto it without
sendi ng i n two more battal i ons "which of course we have not got . "
3 4
Even as the conference was taki ng pl ace i n Cai ro, al armi ng news was
recei ved that Fei sal ' s brother Abdul l ah, accompani ed by 30 officers
and 200 Bedoui ns, had arri ved i n the Trans j ordan city of Amman,
apparent l y en route to Syri a to attack Damas c us . Abdul l ah cl ai med
that he had come to Amman for a change of air in order to regai n his
health after an attack of j aundi ce. Nobody believed his expl anati on.
Churchi l l ' s solution was, in effect, to buy off Abdul l ah: to offer
hi m a posi ti on in Trans j ordan if he woul d refrain from attacki ng
French Syri a. (It will be recalled that Bri tai n feared that i f Arabs
f rom the terri tory of Bri ti sh Pal esti ne were to attack the French in
Syri a, France woul d retaliate by i nvadi ng Bri ti sh Pal esti ne. ) Th e
posi ti on Churchi l l thought of offeri ng Abdul l ah was t emporary
governor, charged with restori ng order. In proposi ng to make use of
Abdul l ah to restore order east of the Jor dan, Churchi l l hoped to
accompl i sh other objecti ves too. Churchi l l brought with hi m to the
Cai ro Conf erence a memorandum that his staff had prepared at the
end of February that dealt with the cl ai ms of Arabs and Je ws to
Pal esti ne. Th e memorandum, prepared by Shuckburgh, Young, and
Lawrence, const rued the geographi cal t erms empl oyed i n the
McMahonHus s ei n correspondence of 1915 as meani ng that the
area of Arab i ndependence was to stretch no further west than the
Jor dan river. Si nce the Bal four Decl arat i on contai ned no geographi cal
definition, Churchi l l ' s advi sers concl uded that Bri tai n coul d fully
reconcile and fulfill her warti me pl edges by establ i shi ng a Jewi sh
Nati onal Home i n Pal esti ne west of the Jor dan and a separat e Arab
* Thus Churchill's aides accepted the view that meaningful pledges had been
made to Hussein's Arabs during the war. Thi s was an important about-face for
British officialdom; McMahon, Clayton, and other wartime officials who had been
involved in making the supposed promises to Hussein believed at the time that they
were phrasing the promises in such a way that Britain was not committed to
anything. In their view the pledges were meaningless.
entity in Pal esti ne east of the J o r d a n .
3 5
Abdul l ah, if installed in
authori ty i n Trans j ordan, coul d presi de over the creati on of such an
Arab entity.
Several i mport ant objecti ons to Churchi l l ' s Trans j ordan scheme
were voi ced at the Cai ro Conf erence. Si r Herbert Samuel , the Hi gh
Commi ssi oner for Pal esti ne, and his Chief Secret ary, Wyndham
Deedes , poi nt ed out that si nce Tr ans j or dan had been i ncl uded by
the Le ague of Nat i ons in the terri tory of Pal esti ne (for which the
Le ague was offeri ng Bri tai n a Mandat e) , it was not open to Bri tai n
unilaterally to separat e it f rom the rest of Pal esti ne. What Samuel
feared was that a separat e Arab Trans j ordan coul d serve as a base for
anti -Zi oni st agi tati on ai med at western Pal es t i ne.
3 6
A parallel fear
was expressed by Ll oyd George, who worri ed that the Frencht o
whom Fei sal was persona non gratawould regard Bri ti sh pat ronage
of two Hashemi t e brot hersone in Mesopot ami a, and the other in
Trans j ordan, both on their Syri an doors t epas a provocati on. On
22 March the Pri me Mi ni ster sent a t el egram to Churchi l l , i n which
he remarked: "Cabi net . . . di scussed your proposal s for Tr ans -
j ordani a, as to which consi derabl e mi sgi vi ngs were entertai ned.
It was felt that al most si mul t aneous installation of the two brot hers
i n regi ons cont i guous to French sphere of influence woul d be regarded
with great suspi ci on by t hem and woul d be i nterpreted as a menace
to their posi ti on i n Syri a, del i beratel y pl otted by ours el ves . "
3 7
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster appreci at ed the reasons that had led Churchi l l
to propose "an Ar ab rather than a Pal esti ni an sol uti on" to the probl em
of Tr a ns j o r da n,
3 8
but feared that any at t empt to establ i sh a separat e
Arab entity east of the Jordan mi ght involve Bri tai n in costly new
engagement s and ent angl ement s.
Churchi l l succeeded i n persuadi ng the Cabi net that wi thout send-
ing at least a smal l Bri ti sh military force into Trans j ordan, no govern-
ment coul d be establ i shed there at all. He i ndi cated that Abdul l ah
woul d not be expect ed to stay in the country for more than a few
mont hs, but that on a trial basi s Abdul l ah coul d help establ i sh order
and then help choose a local person to serve as governor. Churchi l l
agreed to accept Ll oyd George' s compromi s e concept of Tr ans j or dan:
"while preservi ng Ar ab character of area and admi ni strati on to treat
it as Arab provi nce or adj unct of Pal es t i ne. "
3 9
In Churchi l l ' s view, Abdul l ah woul d hel p to restrai n both the anti-
French and the anti -Zi oni st movement s that otherwi se mi ght est ab-
lish their headquart ers east of the Jor dan. The Hashemi t e sol uti on,
in his view, woul d hel p to solve these probl ems rather than ( as critics
had suggest ed) t o create t hem. Accordi ng t o T. E. Lawrence,
Abdul l ah made an ideal Bri ti sh agent i n the area, because he was "a
person who was not too powerful , and who was not an i nhabi tant of
Tr ans - Jor dani a, but who relied upon Hi s Majesty' s Government for
the retention of his of f i ce. "
4 0
,
A final probl em was the reaction of the rival Hous e of Saud to the
proposed elevation of the Hous e of Has he m to new honors.
Churchi l l ' s proposed sol uti on was to rai se Ibn Saud' s subsi dy to
100, 000 pounds a ye ar .
4 1
On 22 March the Cai ro Conf erence came to an end and, at mi d-
night on 23 March, Churchi l l left Cai ro by train for Pal esti ne. Once
arri ved, he met four ti mes i n Jerus al em with Abdul l ah and arri ved at
an agreement with hi m. Abdul l ah' s "attitude was moderat e, friendly,
and st at esmanl i ke, " wrote Churchi l l in a memorandum to the Cabi -
net. To Arab anti -Zi oni st demonst rat ors, Abdul l ah "mai ntai ned an
absol utel y correct atti tude, reproved the demonst rat ors, stated that
the Bri ti sh were his fri ends, and that the Bri ti sh Government woul d
keep their promi ses to Jews and Arabs al i ke. "
4 2
Abdul l ah agreed to
govern Trans j ordan for six mont hs, with the advi ce of a Bri ti sh chief
political officer and with a Bri ti sh financial subsi dy, but without
Bri ti sh t roops. He agreed also to hel p establ i sh the air bases upon
which, i n Churchi l l ' s pl an, Bri ti sh control woul d ul ti matel y be cen-
tered.
Bri tai n' s i mmedi at e hopes of paci fyi ng Tr ans j or dan rested as
heavily upon Abdul l ah as her hopes of paci fyi ng I raq depended upon
Fei sal . Fr om Cap d'Ail on the French Ri vi era, where he st opped on
the way home, Churchi l l wrote to Lo r d Curzon that "Abdul l ah
turned around compl etel y under our treatment of the Arab probl em.
I hope he won't get his throat cut by his own followers. He is a most
pol i shed & agreeabl e pe r s on. "
4 3
Upon his return to London, Churchi l l secured the s upport both of
the Cabi net and of the Commons for his Mi ddl e East policy. Si nce at
Cai ro he had secured the support of Bri tai n' s officers in the field, the
Col oni al Secret ary had his own country' s l eadershi p behi nd hi mat
least t emporari l yas he at t empt ed to i mpose his new desi gn on the
Mi ddl e Eas t . But The Times, observi ng on 15 June 1921 that there
was "a di sconcerti ng air of t opsy- t urvydom about his st ruct ure, "
presciently poi nted out that his i ngeni ous at t empt to reconcile rival
cl ai ms and to val i date cl ai ms wi thout havi ng the resources to do so
had led hi m to as s ume conti ngent liabilities on Bri tai n' s behalf that
coul d not be redeemed if they were ever presented for payment .
Meanwhi l e, as the Cai ro Conf erence drew to a cl ose, Bri ti sh of-
ficials prepared to st age- manage the selection of Fei sal as monarch of
the about - t o- be- creat ed state of I raq, pl anni ng to remai n behi nd the
scenes and make i t appear that Fei sal had been freely and spon-
taneousl y chosen by the peopl es of I raq. The y had recei ved assurances
that Fei sal was prepared to be cooperati ve.
VI I
Before he took office as Col oni al Secret ary, Churchi l l had taken
advant age of the cl ose rel ati onshi p between T. E. Lawrence and
Fei sal to sound out Fei sal ' s vi ews. Lawrence had report ed to
Churchi l l ' s Pri vate Secretary i n mi d- January that Fei sal was prepared
to enter into di scussi ons with Bri tai n wi thout any reference to French-
occupi ed Syri a; and that Fei sal also agreed to abandon all his father's
cl ai ms to Pal esti ne. Lawrence wrote that "The advant age of his
taki ng this new ground of di scussi on is that all quest i ons of pl edges
& promi ses, fulfilled or broken, are set asi de. You begi n a new
di scussi on on the actual posi ti ons today & the best way of doi ng
somet hi ng constructi ve with t he m. "
4 4
At the Cai ro Conf erence, Lawrence, Cox, Gert rude Bel l , and
others in the Political Commi t t ee had establ i shed a ti metabl e for
Fei sal ' s candi dacy for the throne of I raq. Thei r pl an was for Fei sal to
travel to Mecca, and f rom there to send t el egrams to l eadi ng person-
alities i n I raq. In his cabl e Fei sal was to say he had been urged by
fri ends to come to I raq and that, after di scussi ng the matter with his
father and brot hers, he had deci ded to offer his servi ces to the peopl e
of I raq.
When the Cai ro Conf erence di sbanded, Lawrence sent an urgent
message to Fei sal , who was i n London. "Thi ngs have gone exactly as
hoped. Pl ease start for Mecca at once by qui ckest possi bl e route . . .
I will meet you on the way and expl ai n the detai l s. Say only you are
goi ng to see your father, and on no account put anythi ng i n pr e s s . "
4 5
At about the s ame t i me, Si r Percy Cox received a di squi et i ng
message from the officer he had left in charge of Baghdad. "Si nce
your depart ure the si tuati on has changed consi derabl y, " ran the
message. Sayyi d Tal i b, the domi nant local political leader of Bas ra,
had reached an agreement with the Naqi b, the elderly l eadi ng notabl e
of Baghdad, by the t erms of which the former woul d s upport the
candi dacy of the latter in return for a chance at the successi on. Th e
two "put forward the cl ai ms of an Iraqi ruler for I raq. The r e are
i ndi cati ons that this cl ai m receives a consi derabl e measure of support ,
and there is I think no questi on but that Fei sal ' s candi dat ure will be
strongl y resi sted . . . "
4 6
Cox hurri ed back t o Baghdad t o pers uade
rival candi dat es to wi thdraw f rom the cont est among t hem, Ibn
Saud, who objected to a Hashemi t e candi dacy, but was mollified by
cash and other Bri ti sh favors.
Meanwhi l e Sayyi d Tal i b toured the country, meeti ng wi th tribal
l eaders and speaki ng i n publ i c, affirming the need for cooperati on
with Bri tai n but procl ai mi ng as his sl ogan, "Iraq for the I r a qi s ! "
4 7
Bri ti sh intelligence officers reported with al arm that Tal i b was meet-
ing with "a magnificent recepti on everywhere. "
4 8
Sayyi d Tal i b had a l ong- st andi ng invitation to take tea with Si r
Percy Cox at the Resi dency i n Baghdad i n mi d- Apri l . When he
arri ved, he found that Cox had excused himself, leaving La dy Cox to
entertain the guest s. As he left the Resi dency after the tea party,
Tal i b was arrested by one of his fellow guest s, by order of Si r Percy
Cox, his absent host. Tal i b was then deport ed to the i sl and of
Ceyl on i n the Indi an Ocean. Th e day following Tal i b' s arrest, Si r
Percy Cox announced in a communi que that he had ordered the
deportati on to preserve law and order in the face of Tal i b' s threat to
incite vi ol ence.
Nonet hel ess resi stance to Fei sal ' s candi dacy persi st ed, t hough i t
took other f orms. Proposal s were made in favor of a republ i c, in
favor of a Turki s h ruler, in favor of l eavi ng the provi nce of Bas ra
separat e from the provi nce of Baghdad, and in favor of leaving
mat t ers as they were, under the admi ni strati on of Si r Percy Cox as
Hi gh Commi ssi oner.
Gui de d (at his own request ) by Bri ti sh advi sers, Fei sal meanwhi l e
journeyed f rom London to the Hej az, where he settl ed mat t ers with
his father, and thence onward at Bri t i sh expense to Bas ra, where he
di sembarked on 24 June . While aboard shi p he recei ved the wel come
news that the official native l eadershi pt he Counci l of Mi ni st ers in
Baghdad, presi ded over by the Na qi bha d invited hi m to be a guest
of the nati on.
In publ i c the Bri ti sh government conti nued to mai ntai n the official
fiction that i t was neutral and i mpart i al ; privately, Cox tol d Fei sal to
go out and campai gn for popul ar s upport so that Bri tai n coul d cl ai m
to have accept ed the peopl e' s ve r di c t .
4 9
On 11 Jul y the Counci l of Mi ni st ers unani mousl y adopt ed a reso-
lution decl ari ng Fei sal to be the consti tuti onal monarch of I raq. On
16 Jul y the Counci l authori zed a pl ebi sci te to ratify its choi ce. On 18
Augus t the Mi ni stry of the Interi or announced that Fei sal had won
an overwhel mi ng victory i n the yes-or-no pl ebi sci te. On 23 Augus t
Fei sal ' s coronati on was cel ebrated; and i n official usage I raq ("well-
rooted country") repl aced Mes opot ami a as the name of his new
ki ngdom.
Even before his coronati on, however, Feisal began to troubl e the
Bri ti sh by i nsi sti ng on formal i ndependence and objecti ng to the
It is questionable whether he ever uttered such a threat. What happened is this:
at a private dinner party he gave for the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, Tal i b
said something to the effect that if Britain were not fair and impartial in dealing with
the rival candidacies, the tribes might again rise in revolt. Accounts of the actual
words he used differ. Cox received his account from Gertrude Bell, who was not
present at the dinner herself.
Le ague of Nat i ons Mandat e, whi ch was a t rust eeshi p; he proposed
that relations between Iraq and Bri tai n shoul d i nstead be defined by
a treaty between the two countri es. Th e Bri ti sh cl ai med that they
had no legal right to alter the st at us of I raq without authori zati on
from the Le ague of Nat i ons; but consent ed to negotiate a treaty so
l ong as it referred to the Mandat e. Fei sal objected to i ncl udi ng any
such reference in the treaty. Negot i at i ons that often caused anger
and angui sh in London went on for more than a year.
In the late s ummer of 1922, Churchi l l wrote to Ll oyd George that
"Fei sal is pl ayi ng a very low & treacherous game with u s . "
s o
Churchi l l told the Pri me Mi ni ster that he and his Cabi net col l eagues
ought to meet to di scuss whether to depose Fei sal or whether to
evacuate I raq. A few days later, at a conference of Cabi net mi ni sters,
Churchi l l report ed that
Ki ng Fei sal had been maki ng great difficulties and conf usi ng
the si tuati on i n I raq. He had made objecti ons to the Mandat e
but had st at ed his wi l l i ngness to agree to a Treat y. He was not,
however, prepared to recogni ze the mandat ory basi s as he
thought that the mandat ory syst em was a slur on I raq. No
argument had been of any effect with hi m. He had recently
taken up the Ext remi st s who now regarded hi m as their pat r on.
5 1
Short l y afterward Churchi l l wrote to the Pri me Mi ni ster that "I
am deepl y concerned about I raq. Th e task you have gi ven me i s
becomi ng really i mpossi bl e. " He wrote that there was "scarcely a
si ngl e news paperTory, Li beral , or Labour"t hat was not "consist-
ently hostile" to Bri tai n' s remai ni ng i n I raq. He added that "in my
own heart I do not see what we are getti ng out of i t . "
5 2
He proposed
to send Fei sal an ul t i mat um; if it were not accept ed, "I woul d
actually clear out . "
5 3
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster replied that "On general pri nci pl es, I am
agai nst a policy of scuttl e, in I raq as el sewhere . . . "
5 4
He referred,
too, to the wi del y held belief that l arge reserves of oil mi ght be
di scovered in the area: "If we leave we may find a year or two after
we depart ed that we have handed over to the French and Ameri cans
some of the ri chest oilfields in the worl d . . . "
s s
Si r Percy Cox therefore persevered i n his negoti ati ons. After sev-
eral dramat i c political cri ses had run their course he succeeded in
concl udi ng a treaty, on 10 Oct ober 1922, that i ncorporated many of
the subst ant i ve t erms of the Mandat e. Th e treaty was to last for
twenty years but , as a result of opposi ti on in I raq, a half year later it
was amended so as to reduce its t erm from twenty years to four
years. Even so, Iraqi agi tati on for fuller i ndependence conti nued,
while in London The Times compl ai ned that the treaty was unfai r to
Bri tai n because it i mposed too heavy a burden of obl i gati ons.
Indeed, Bri tai n was called upon i mmedi atel y to shield Iraq from
the growi ng power of Ibn Saud. Th e Arabi an monarch, a dynasti c
enemy of the Hashemi t es, threatened Fei sal as well as his brother
Abdul l ah; and the Bri ti sh government felt obl i ged to protect them
both. At the end of 1922, in a meet i ng at a port called ' Uqai r, Si r
Percy Cox i mposed upon Ibn Saud an agreement defining the Saudi
ki ngdom' s frontiers with Kuwai t and I raq.
Des pi t e their need for Bri ti sh protecti on, Iraqi politicians moved
to assert themsel ves. Th e Angl o- Iraqi Treat y of 1922, like the Al l enby
Decl arati on of formal i ndependence for Egypt the s ame year, marked
a change in the political at mosphere of the Arab Eas t . * Nei ther Iraq
nor Egypt was grant ed more than limited aut onomy, yet both had
been recogni zed as entities possessi ng the attri butes of statehood. In
bot h countri es, political l eaders agi tated for i ndependence, while
Bri t i sh- appoi nt ed monarchs coul d only mai ntai n their posi ti on by
doi ng the s ame.
VI I I
Li ke I raq, Trans j ordan conti nued to be a subject of concern at the
Col oni al Office. But where Fei sal seemed too i ndependent, Abdul l ah
seemed too i nacti ve; the Hashemi t e solution to Trans j ordan' s prob-
l ems was not taki ng hol d.
One reason for empl oyi ng Abdul l ah i n Bri tai n' s servi ce had been
the argument that i t woul d restrai n hi m from attacki ng French Syri a.
T. E. Lawrence later cl ai med t o have reassured Churchi l l that "I
know Abdul l ah: you won't have a shot f i red. "
5 8
The shrewd and
indolent Arabi an pri nce was usual l y not inclined to engage in risky
trials of strength. Indeed, within weeks of Abdul l ah' s empl oyment as
t emporary governor, Bri ti sh observers began to concl ude that he was
* A sign of the times was a proposal by Si r Percy Cox early in 1922 to send the
excavated antiques of Samarra, an ancient town on the Ti gri s river, to the British
Museum before a native government could take office in I r a q.
5 6
For more than a
century, European consuls, travelers, and archaeologists had been taking back with
them ancient objects, structures, and works of art from Middle Eastern sites without
hindrance. Suddenly, in 1922, Cox feared this situation was coming to an end in
Iraq. Similarly, and at roughly the same time, when Howard Carter, in the Valley of
the Ki ngs in Egypt, made the archaeological find of the century in locating the tomb
of Ki ng Tutankhamun, he did what archaeologists had not been driven to do
before. On the night of 26 November 1922, Carter and his associates entered the
tomb secretly and took their selection of objects in it for themselves. They then
resealed it and staged what they claimed was their first entry into the tomb for the
benefit of the authorities of the new Egyptian kingdom the following day. From 27
November onward there was an official of the Egyptian Service of Antiquities on
guard at all times and no further portions of the Ki ng Tut treasure could be
removed by the forei gners.
5 7
too weak to govern. In Apri l , Abdul l ah' s authority was chal l enged
when del egates he had sent to medi at e an intertribal di sput e were
murdered; i nstead of crushi ng the revolt, Abdul l ah appeal ed to the
Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi ssi oner t o do i t for hi m. Th e Hi gh Commi s s i oner
responded by authori zi ng the use of Bri ti sh ai rpl anes and armored
cars, but it had been precisely in order to obvi ate the need for usi ng
Bri ti sh armed forces that Abdul l ah had been installed i n Amman.
At about the s ame t i me, France' s ambas s ador i n London protested
that Abdul l ah' s presence i n Tr ans j or dan acted as an i nci tement to
violence agai nst the French i n Syri a. Th e Bri ti sh contenti on was
that, on the contrary, Abdul l ah woul d prevent such violence. Soon i t
appeared that he was unabl e or unwi l l i ng even to do thi s. In late
June , four men ambus hed and at t empt ed t o assassi nat e General
Henri Gour aud, the French conqueror and governor of Syri a. "It i s
on the Trans j ordani ans that suspi ci on fal l s, " Churchi l l was i nformed
by his Hi gh Commi ssi oner i n Pal es t i ne.
5 9
The French authori ti es
l odged a protest agai nst the failure of Bri tai n and Abdul l ah to prevent
such attacks. The y protested further when the alleged assassi ns were
observed movi ng about freely i n Tr ans j or dan.
Th e Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi ssi oner was unhappy with the resul ts of
the Abdul l ah experi ment , and told Churchi l l so i n June . He report ed
to Churchi l l that one of the many causes of popul ar di scontent was
that native Trans j ordani ans looked upon Abdul l ah' s Syri an associ ates
as wasteful and i ncompet ent .
6 0
At the s ame ti me, the commandi ng
general of the Bri ti sh army in Egypt and Pal esti ne wrote that "in
Tr ans - Jor dani a Abdul l a i s a fraud . . . If anythi ng i s to be made of
hi m he mus t be gi ven a good st rong Engl i shman who will run hi m
entirely and Bri ti sh troops to back hi m u p . "
6 1
A bit later Hubert
Young told Shuckburgh that "What we have got to face is either
conti nued expendi t ure on Abdul l ah, whose influence has gone down
al most to vani shi ng poi nt, and who is no l onger a subst i t ut e for even
a section of Infantry, or to take our courage in both hands and send a
smal l force over, i f only temporari l y . . . "
6 Z
Practi cal l y alone i n the Bri ti sh government at the ti me, T. E.
Lawrence conti nued to di scern usesal bei t t emporary onesf or
Abdul l ah in Tr ans j or dan. "Hi s total cost is less than a battal i on; his
regi me prej udi ces us i n no way, whatever eventual sol uti on we wish
to carry out, provi ded that it is not too popul ar and not too ef-
fi ci ent. "
6 3
As the Bri ti sh government still coul d not deci de whether
to detach Tr ans j or dan permanentl y from Pal esti neei ther by est ab-
lishing it as a separat e entity, or by al l owi ng Ki ng Hus s ei n to annex
i t to the Hej azt he notion that Abdul l ah' s t emporary regi me woul d
post pone the day of deci si on was an attractive one. However,
Lawrence' s cl ai m that the Abdul l ah sol uti on cost the least money was
the argument best cal cul ated to appeal to Winston Churchi l l .
Abdul l ah demonst rat ed that he i ntended to be helpful to Bri tai n
by si gni ng an Angl o- Hashemi t e treaty that Lawrence brought out
with hi m to the Mi ddl e Eas t . Lawrence came as Churchi l l ' s pleni-
potenti ary, and had spent mont hs i n the Hej az at t empt i ng to persuade
Ki ng Hussei n to sign the treaty. Th e treaty was to be a comprehen-
sive settl ement of all the cl ai ms advanced by Hussei n for himself and
the Arabs ever since the early days of the Fi rst Worl d War. Its
t erms i ncl uded confi rmati on that Bri tai n recogni zed hi m as Ki ng of
the Hej az and woul d pay hi m an annual subsi dy of 100, 000 pounds ;
but he, i n turn, was requi red to recogni ze the French Mandat e for
Syri a and the Bri ti sh Mandat e for Pal esti ne. At ti mes Hus s ei n sai d
he woul d sign the treaty, but then he woul d change his mi nd. At one
poi nt, accordi ng to Lawrence, Hussei n demanded "recognition of his
supremacy over all Arab rul ers everywhere. "
6 4
Lawrence bel i eved
that the old man of Mecca had become i mpossi bl e to deal with. He
secured Abdul l ah' s si gnature on the treaty; in view of Hussei n' s
rejection of it the si gned document was rendered meani ngl ess, but
Lawrence seems to have appreci at ed Abdul l ah' s at t empt to be helpful.
After a few mont hs as governor of Trans j ordan, Abdul l ah began to
change his mi nd about future pl ans. At the begi nni ng he had al l owed
the Bri ti sh to underst and that he i ntended to stay in Trans j ordan
only for a short ti me because the terri tory was relatively uni mport ant
to hi m i n view of his l arge ambi t i ons el sewhere. In any event, T. E.
Lawrence was sure he coul d talk Abdul l ah into l eavi ng when the
ti me came. In Oct ober 1921, however, Lawrence report ed that
Abdul l ah i ntended to stay on. Abdul l ah aspi red to ascend the throne
of Syri a and, apparent l y, new devel opment s had encouraged hi m to
believe that within a short ti me France mi ght be ready to negoti ate a
reconciliation that woul d allow hi m to achieve his goal ; so his incli-
nation was to remai n in the vicinity.
At the s ame t i me, the need to repl ace Abdul l ah by a more effective
ruler seemed to become less urgent . H. St John Phi l by, a forceful
Bri ti sh f i gureone of the great expl orers of Arabi abecame the new
official advi ser to Abdul l ah; and, even more i mport ant , Lawrence' s
friend Col onel F. G. Peake began whi ppi ng into shape a Bedoui n
force of regul ar t roops under Bri ti sh command, which l at erunder
his successor, John Gl ubbbe c ame the f ormi dabl e Arab Legi on.
Th e law and order si tuati on seemed to be i mprovi ng al ong the lines
Lawrence had advocat ed, that is to say, without spendi ng a significant
amount of addi ti onal money. Lawrence began to believe it mi ght be
a good i dea for Abdul l ah to stay on after all.
But to mai ntai n Abdul l ahan Arabi anas ruler of Trans j ordan,
and to mai ntai n Trans j ordan as an Ar ab preserve, i n which Je ws
coul d not settle to bui l d their homel and, was to depart from the
Bal four Decl arat i on policy of fosteri ng a Jewi sh Nat i onal Home . If
the Bri ti sh were i ndeed pl anni ng to make Pal esti ne into a Jewi sh
country, i t was hardl y auspi ci ous to begi n by f orbi ddi ng Jews to
settle in 75 percent of the country or by handi ng over local admi ni s-
trati on, not to a Jew, but to an Arabi an. The Bal f our Decl arati on
policy was embodi ed i n the Le ague of Nat i ons Mandat e entrusti ng
Pal esti ne to Bri tai n, and in 19212 the Mandat ecommi s s i oni ng
Bri tai n as trustee of Pal esti ne with the mi ssi on of creati ng a Jewi sh
Nati onal Home while protecti ng the ri ghts of non- Jews as wel l was
in the process of bei ng offered by the Le ague of Nat i ons to the
Bri ti sh Parl i ament for acceptance. Si nce Churchi l l ' s t emporary de-
cision not to encourageor even al l owthe bui l di ng of a Jewi sh
Nati onal Home in eastern Pal esti ne ran counter to the provi si ons of
the Mandat e, he deci ded to change the t erms of the Mandat e, which
was redrafted to provi de that Bri tai n was not obl i ged to purs ue the
Bal four Decl arat i on policy east of the Jor dan river.
Th e Zi oni st l eaders worri ed that shri nki ng their eastern frontiers
woul d cri ppl e their program, the more so because, i n negoti ati ng
with France to fi x a boundary between Pal esti ne and Syri a- Lebanon,
Bri tai n had also surrendered territory on their northern frontier.
Chai m Wei zmann wrote to Churchi l l early in 1921 that the agreement
with France "cut Pal esti ne off from access to the Li t ani , depri ved her
of possessi on of the Uppe r Jordan and the Yar muk and took from
her the fertile pl ai ns east of Lake Ti beri as which had heretofor been
regarded as one of the most promi si ng outlets for Jewi s h settl ement
on a l arge scal e. " Tur ni ng to Trans j ordan, he wrote "that the fields
of Gi l ead, Moab and Edom, with the rivers Arnon and Jabbok . . .
are historically and geographi cal l y and economi cal l y linked to
Pal esti ne, and that it is upon these fields, now that the ri ch pl ai ns of
the north have been taken f rom Pal esti ne and given to France, that
the success of the Jewi s h Nati onal Home mus t largely r e s t . "
6 5
Jus t i ce
Brandei s, the l eader of Ameri can Zi oni sm, sent a cabl ed message to
Bal four toward the end of 1921 maki ng the s ame poi nt, depl ori ng the
loss of the waters of the Li t ani river (in what is now Le banon) and
calling attention to the economi c i mport ance of the Trans j ordan
pl ai ns .
6 6
Yet the Zi oni st l eaders di d not campai gn strongl y agai nst the
admi ni strati ve separati on of Tr ans j or dan; they regarded i tnot with-
out reas onas a merel y provi si onal meas ure. So di d the Col oni al
Office. Vi ews of the l eadi ng officials di ffered, but Shuckburgh s um-
mari zed the agreement he and his col l eagues had reached by sayi ng
that it had been deci ded not to allow Zi oni sm in Trans j ordan for the
present but al so not to bar the door agai nst it for all t i me .
6 7
Churchi l l had not foreseen that by leaving Abdul l ah i n Trans j ordan
he woul d embroi l Bri tai n i n the fi erce Arabi an rel i gi ous war be-
tween the Hous e of Saud and the Hous e of Has he m; but , i n 1922,
only about a year after Abdul l ah' s arri val , the fanatical Wahhabi
Bret hren, the spearhead of Ibn Sa ud, rode across the undefined
desert frontier to attack Abdul l ah. An est i mat ed 3, 000 to 4, 000
Bret hren rai ders came within an hour' s camel ride of Amma n (now
the capital of J or dan) before bei ng crushed by Bri t i sh ai rpl anes and
armored cars. In succeedi ng years Britain was drawn into pl ayi ng
a far mor e direct role in governi ng and defendi ng Tr ansj or dan than
Churchill had intended and Bri t i sh officials soon came to look upon
Abdul l ah as a pr obl em rather than as a sol ut i on.
Nevert hel ess the Colonial Office' s t emporary and merely admi ni s-
trative set of arrangement s for Tr ansj or dan in t i me hardened into an
enduri ng political reality. Th e Ar abi an prince with his foreign retinue
settled in Amma n and became a permanent new factor in the compl ex
politics of the Pal est i ne Mandat or y r egi me. Th e recurri ng suggest i on
that Palestine be partitioned bet ween Ar abs and J ews ran up agai nst
the pr obl em that 75 percent of the count ry had already been given to
an Ar ab dynast y that was not Pal est i ni an. Th e newly creat ed provi nce
of Tr ansj or dan, later to become the i ndependent state of J or dan,
gradual l y drifted into exi st ence as an entity separat e from the rest of
Pal est i ne; i ndeed, t oday it is often forgotten that J or dan was ever
part of Pal est i ne.
* By sheltering and shielding Abdullah, Britain in effect partitioned the world of
desert Arabians between the two contending royal houses, with the Jordanian
frontier marking a dividing line. The only two countries whose names in 1988 still
designate them as family property are the Ki ngdom of Saudi Arabia and the
Hashemite Ki ngdom of Jordan; the international border between them still divides
the two Arabian royal houses.
30 A street scene i n Ba g hda d, whi ch Bri t i sh t roops entered
i n Mar c h 1917
33 General Al l enby' s official entry into Al eppo i n Mar c h 1919
34 Ot t oman sol di ers s urrender i n Nove mbe r 1918
36 Admi ral Cal t horpe' s fl agshi p off Cons t ant i nopl e i n De c e mbe r 1918
38 Ll o y d Ge or ge ( ri ght )
43 A peasant in a Tur ki s h field with unburi ed bodi es of Gr e e k
sol di ers, 1922
i
Mus t apha Ke ma l of Tur ke y
49 So ns of Ki n g Hus s ei n of the Hej az ( seat ed, left t o ri ght ) : Fei sal ,
Ki n g of I r aq; Abdul l ah, Emi r of Tr ans j or dan and later Ki ng of J o r d a n ;
and Al i , briefly Ki ng of the Hej az bef ore its capt ure by I bn S a u d
58
CHURCHI LL AND THE
QUESTION OF PALESTI NE
i
As Col oni al Secret ary i n 19212, Churchi l l encount ered even greater
difficulty in deal i ng with the vexi ng pr obl ems of Palestine west of the
Jor dan river than with those of Tr ansj or dan and I r aq. Th e i ssue i n
Palestine was Zi oni sm, and so intense were the passi ons it aroused
that it was not al ways easy to r emember what was really at i ssue. Th e
Zi oni st s pi ct ured Pal est i necorrect l y, as we now knowas a country
that coul d suppor t at least five or ten t i mes more peopl e than lived
there at the t i me; so that without di spl aci ng any of the per haps
600, 000 Ar ab i nhabi t ant s, there was room to bri ng in millions of
Jewi sh set t l ers.
At the t i me not hi ng like that many J e ws were pr epar ed t o settle as
pi oneers in Pal est i ne, but Zi oni st s hoped and Ar abs feared that they
woul d do so, and the unrest ri ct ed right of J ews to enter the count ry
became the central i ssue in Palestinian politics. Fr i ends of Zi oni sm
cl ai medand later demonst rat edt hat Jewi sh ent erpri se coul d en-
rich the count ry, but i mpoveri shed Ar ab peasant farmers were per-
suaded that they were bei ng asked to share what little they possessed
with forei gners.
As seen earlier, there had been Ar ab anti-Zionist riots in Palestine
a year before Churchi l l became Col oni al Secret ary in Febr uar y 1921.
Not long after he at t empt ed to sol ve the pr obl ems of the Mi ddl e East
at the Cai ro Conference that Mar ch, Palestine erupt ed agai n. In
Jaffa, on May Day 1921, rioting broke out , begi nni ng with looting,
but goi ng on t o mur der : duri ng the fi rst day the Ar ab mobs killed
thirty-five J e ws . In the course of a bl ood-soaked week, fighting
spread t o the entire country as Ar abs besi eged Jewi sh farm colonies
out si de the pri nci pal t owns. Th e original Ar ab riots i n Jaffa were an
expl osi on of anger agai nst a smal l gr oup of Jewi sh communi st s who
marched t hrough the center of town to rival an earlier demonst rat i on
by a larger gr oup of Jewi sh soci al i st s. Th u s the i mpressi on gai ned
gr ound amongst the Bri t i sh that the di sorders were Bol shevi k in
515
ori gi n. Capt ai n C. D. Brunt on, who had served i n the military
admi ni strati on for some ti me, cl ai med that the riots had been caused
by "Bol shevi st Je ws " and argued that "the out breaks of today may
become a revol uti on t omorrow. "
1
Th e Hi gh Commi ssi oner, Si r Herbert Samuel , responded t o the
Arab attacks by temporari l y s us pendi ng Jewi sh i mmi grat i on into
Pal esti ne. Zi oni st l eaders feared that by rewardi ng Arab violence,
Samuel had guarant eed that i t woul d be renewed and that the history
of the Bri ti sh Mandat e for Pal esti ne woul d be a st ormy one.
Samuel ' s admi ni strati on was sl ow to restore order; on 10 Augus t
1921 The Times reported that "Publ i c securi ty, parti cul arl y in the
north, is for all practical purpos es , non-exi stent. Rai ds take pl ace
al most daily from Trans j ordani a . . . " The Times correspondent
cl ai med that "neither Jews nor Arabs have any confidence i n the
authori ti es. " He added that "The ol der i nhabi tants say that publ i c
securi ty was far better mai ntai ned under the Tur ks . "
Al t hough Arab riots seemed likely to recur, Zi oni st l eaders con-
ti nued to seek accommodat i on with the Arabs and to express confi-
dence that most Arabs were i n favor of peace and cooperati on.
II
As Churchi l l recogni zed, one of his greatest probl ems i n quel l i ng the
Arab riots while goi ng ahead with a pro-Zi oni st program was that the
Bri ti sh forces upon whom he relied were unwilling to enforce his
policy.
Th e anti -Zi oni st case was easy for the Bri ti sh i n Pal esti ne to
underst and: Arabs had lived i n the country for ages and di d not want
their life and l andscape changed. Bri ti sh sol di ers and officials worked
every day among Arabs who told t hem so. Of course Jews lived i n
Pal esti ne too, and their connection with the land was even more
l ong- st andi ng; but much of the case for Zi oni sm, st rong though i t
was, was not entirely t angi bl e: it was partl y historical, partl y theo-
retical, and partl y vi si onary (in the sense that it was only in the future
that Jewi sh enterpri se woul d bri ng a much hi gher st andard of living
* Opening the Twelfth Zionist Congress in the summer of 1921, Nahum Sokolow
said that Jews "were determined to work in peace with the Arab nation." Stressing
the historical links between the two peoples, he argued that by cooperating they
could "create a new life of the highest perfection for the people of the East" and that
"Their interests were identical . . . " Di smi ssi ng the recent Arab riots as the work of
a small group of criminals, he assured the Arab community that Jews "were not
going to the Holy Land in a spirit of mastery. By industry and peace and modesty
they would open up new sources of production which would be a blessing to
themselves and to the whole East . "
z
C H U R C H I L L A N D T H E Q U E S T I O N O F P A L E S T I N E 517
to all the peopl es of the count ry) . Th e Zi oni st case was also bas ed on
the sufferi ng of Je ws i n such pl aces as Rus s i a and Pol and; but
members of the Bri ti sh Pal esti ne admi ni st rat i on had never wi tnessed
that sufferi ng and were not necessari l y aware of it.
Accordi ng to Vl adi mi r Jabot i nsky, the militant Zi oni st who had
f ounded the Jewi sh Legi on i n Al l enby' s army, the Bri ti sh military
found Zi oni sm to be a "fancy" theory, far-reachi ng and ai mi ng to
repai r the worl d' s ills, and therefore uns ound. Accordi ng to
Jabot i nsky, such fancy schemes for i mprovi ng the worl d ran counter
to all the i nsti ncts of the average Engl i s hman of the rul i ng cl as s es .
3
Jabot i nsky poi nt ed out, too, that the admi ni strati on was staffed by
professi onal Arabi st s. The s e were peopl e (he wrote) so attracted to
the Arab worl d (as they concei ved it to be) that they underwent the
di sci pl i ne of l earni ng the Arab l anguage and qual i fyi ng themsel ves
for the Civil Servi ce, and were willing to leave Bri tai n to spend their
professi onal lives i n the Arab Mi ddl e Eas t ; and i t was natural that
they woul d not want to see the Arab character of Pal esti ne changed.
Jabot i nsky touched on, but di d not st ress, what may have been the
pri nci pal reason for Bri ti sh opposi ti on to the Bal f our Decl arat i on
pol i cy: i t caused troubl e. It was unpopul ar with the Arabs who
consti tuted the bul k of the popul at i on, while the j ob of the Bri ti sh
colonial admi ni st rat i on was to keep the popul ati on qui et and satisfied.
Bri ti sh civil and mi l i tary personnel in Pal esti ne had reason to believe
that they coul d have enjoyed an easy and peaceful tour of duty in a
contented country, if it were not for London' s policy, adopt ed for
reasons not readily gras ped, that exci ted communal tensi on and
violence and exposed the local Bri ti sh admi ni strati on to difficulty and
even danger.
However di saffecti on in the Bri ti sh ranks led ironically to an
increase i n the difficulty and danger, by encouragi ng Arab resi stance
and i ntransi gence at a ti me when London was not yet prepared to
yield. A parti cul ar epi sode that was to have l asti ng consequences was
the i nterventi on of the Pal esti ne admi ni strati on in the selection of a
new rel i gi ous l eader for the Mosl em communi t y.
Th e epi sode began with the death, on 21 March 1921, of the Mufti
of Jerus al em. A mufti was an official who expounded the Mosl em
rel i gi ous laws, and the Mufti of Jerus al em was the chief such juri st in
his provi nce. Th e Bri ti sh admi ni st rat i onbest owi ng a title appar-
ently of its own i nventi onal so desi gnat ed hi m as the Gr and Mufti
and as the l eader of the Mosl em communi t y i n Pal est i ne.
4
Accordi ng
to the Ot t oman law, which the Bri ti sh i ncorporated into their own,
the government was to select the new Gr and Mufti f rom among
three candi dat es nomi nated by a Mos l em electoral col l ege.
Al though he was not among the three candi dates nomi nat ed, Ami n
al - Hussei ni , a political agi tator in his mi d-twenti es who had been
sentenced to ten years' i mpri sonment (though later pardoned) for his
l eadershi p role i n the 1920 ri ots, was named as the new Gr and Mufti
as a resul t of an i ntri gue by a violently anti -Zi oni st official named
Ernest T. Ri chmond, a member of the Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi ssi oner' s
secretari at.
Ri chmond was an architect who had served before the war i n the
Egypt i an Publ i c Works Admi ni st rat i on and owed his j ob i n Pal esti ne
to Ronal d St orrs , a cl ose friend with whom he shared a house for a
ti me in Jerus al em. In the Pal esti ne admi ni strati on he served as a
liaison with the Mos l em communi t y, acti ng ( accordi ng to General
Gi l bert Cl ayt on) "as to some extent the counterpart of the Zi oni st
Organi sat i on. "
5
Accordi ng to an official of the Col oni al Office in
London, Ri chmond was "a decl ared enemy of the Zi oni st policy" of
the Bri ti sh government .
6
He crus aded agai nst that pol i cy, and several
years l ateri n 1924wrote to the Bri ti sh Hi gh Commi s s i oner i n
Pal esti ne that i n pursui ng Zi oni sm, the Hi gh Commi s s i oner and his
officials, the Mi ddl e Eas t Depart ment of the Col oni al Office in
London, and the Zi oni st Commi s s i on i n Pal esti ne "are domi nat ed
and i nspi red by a spi ri t whi ch I can only regard as evi l . "
7
When he secured the posi ti on of Gr and Mufti and leader of the
Pal esti ni an Mos l ems for Ami n al - Hussei ni i n 1921, Ri chmond must
have bel i eved that he was stri ki ng a bl ow agai nst Zi oni sm. As ti me
woul d show, he had st ruck a c r ude r , more destructi ve bl ow agai nst
Pal esti ni an Ar abs , whom the Gr and Mufti was to l ead into a bl oody
bl i nd alley. An al l -or-nothi ng advent urer, the Gr and Mufti pl aced
Arab l ands and lives at risk by rai si ng the stakes of the Arab- Jewi s h
conflict such that one or anot herJews or Arabs woul d be driven
out or destroyed. Eventual l y the Gr and Mufti ' s road was to lead hi m
to Nazi Germany and alliance with Adol ph Hi tl er. While Ami n
al - Hussei ni di d not control Arab Pal est i nehe had many rivals for
l eadershi phi s posi ti on as Gr and Mufti gave hi m an advant age i n
the contest for the al l egi ance of the deepl y di vi ded Arab communi t i es
in Pal esti ne.
Whether Pal esti ni an Mos l ems woul d have followed other l eaders
had the Bri t i sh admi ni strati on used its power and influence i n other
ways can never be known; but to the extent that Ri chmond' s anti-
Zi oni st initiative had an effect, it was not helpful to the Arab c aus e
or to that of Churchi l l and the Bri ti sh government in at t empt i ng to
bri ng peace and progress to t roubl ed Pal esti ne.
I l l
Churchi l l approached the compl ex, emoti on-l aden and muddl ed ques -
tion of Pal esti ne with a si mpl e, rational, and clear program. He
bel i eved in tryi ng the Zi oni st experi ment , and thought that it woul d
benefit everyone. When he visited Pal esti ne after the Cai ro Confer-
ence, he tol d a Pal esti ni an Arab del egati on on 30 March 1921 that
it is mani festl y right that the scattered Jews shoul d have a
national centre and a national home to be re-uni ted and where
else but i n Pal esti ne with whi ch for 3, 000 years they have been
i nti matel y and profoundl y associ ated? We think it will be good
for the worl d, good for the Je ws , good for the Bri ti sh Empi re,
but al so good for the Arabs who dwell i n Pal esti ne and we
i ntend i t to be so; . . . they shall share i n the benefits and
progress of Zi oni s m.
8
Churchi l l had always shown sympat hy for Jewi s h aspi rati ons and
for the pl i ght of Jews persecuted by the czars. Li ke Bal f our, he felt
that the persecuti on of Jews in Rus s i a and el sewhere had created a
probl em for the entire worl d, which the creati on of a Jewi s h homel and
in Pal esti ne woul d sol ve.
In Churchi l l ' s view, there were three ki nds of politically active
Je ws : those who parti ci pated in the political life of the country in
which they l i ved; those who t urned to the violent and subversi ve
international creed of Bol shevi sm; and those who followed Dr Chai m
Wei zmann al ong the path of Zi oni sm. For the majori ty of the world's
Jews , who had grown up i n countri es such as Rus s i a whi ch -refused
t hem full and equal ci ti zenshi p, the questi on (as he saw it) was
whether they woul d become Bol shevi ks or Zi oni sts. An ardent patriot
himself, he consi dered Jewi sh nati onal i sm a healthy phenomenon
that ought to be encouraged.
If, as may well happen, there shoul d be created i n our own
lifetime by the banks of the Jor dan a Jewi sh St at e under the
protecti on of the Bri ti sh Crown which mi ght compri se three or
four mi l l i ons of Je ws , an event will have occurred in this history
of the worl d which woul d from every poi nt of view be beneficial
and woul d be especially in harmony with the truest i nterests of
the Bri ti sh Empi r e .
9
So Churchi l l had wri ttenbefore taki ng office as Col oni al
Secret aryearl y in 1920.
Churchi l l was not unmi ndful of the opposi ti on to Zi oni sm among
Pal esti ni an Ar abs , but he bel i eved that it coul d be overcome by a
program that combi ned basi c fi rmness with attractive i nducement s
and compromi s es . As Col oni al Mi ni ster, he at t empt ed to appease
Pal esti ni an Arab senti ment by scal i ng down Bri tai n' s support of
Zi oni sm. As i ndi cated earlier, he deci ded that Zi oni sm was to be
tried first only in the quarter of Pal esti ne that lay west of the Jor dan
river, and nothi ng was to be deci ded for the moment about extendi ng
it later into the other t hree- quart ers of the count ryTrans j ordan.
Moreover, Churchi l l at t empt ed to redefine the Bri ti sh commi t ment :
he proposed to establ i sh a Jewi sh Nati onal Home in Pal esti ne rather
than at t empt to make Pal esti ne herself into a Jewi sh entity, and he
cl ai med that that was what the l anguage of the Bal four Decl arati on
meant. ( In a pri vate conversati on at Bal four' s house in the s ummer
of 1921, both Bal four and the Pri me Mi ni ster contradi cted hi m and
told Churchi l l that "by the Decl arati on they al ways meant an eventual
Jewi sh St a t e . ")
1 0
Churchi l l further at t empt ed to allay Arab suspi ci ons by demon-
strati ng that their economi c fears were groundl ess. Jewi sh i mmi -
grant s, he argued repeatedl y, woul d not seize Arab j obs or Arab
l and. On the contrary, he sai d, Jewi s h i mmi grant s woul d create new
j obs and new wealth that woul d benefit the whole communi t y.
In June 1921 Churchi l l told the Hous e of Commons that "There
really is nothi ng for the Arabs to be fri ghtened about . . . No Jew
will be brought i n beyond the number who can be provi ded for by
the expandi ng weal th and devel opment of the resources of the
count ry. "
1 1
In Augus t he repeated to an Arab del egati on that had
come to London that
I have told you agai n and agai n that the Je ws will not be
allowed to come into the country except i nsofar as they bui l d up
the means for their livelihood . . . The y cannot take any man' s
l ands. The y cannot di spossess any man of his ri ghts or his
propert y . . . If they like to buy peopl e' s land and peopl e like to
sell it to t hem, and if they like to devel op and cul ti vate regi ons
now barren and make them fertile, then they have the right . . .
[to do s o ] .
1 2
"There is room for all . . . , " he told t he m.
1 3
"No one has harmed
you . . . The Je ws have a far more difficult task than you. You only
have to enjoy your own possessi on; but they have to try to create out
of the wi l derness, out of the barren pl aces, a livelihood for the peopl e
they bri ng i n. "
1 4
In the s ame statement he compl ai ned to the Arabs that it was not
fair of them to refuse to negoti ate: "it is not fair to come to a
di scussi on thi nki ng that one si de has to gi ve nothi ng and the other
si de has to gi ve l arge and i mport ant concessi ons, and wi thout any
security that these concessi ons will be a means of peace. "
IV
Churchi l l had spent a lifetime i mmersed in the political cul ture of
Europe, in which it was normal when put t i ng forth a proposal to take
account of the needs and desi res of all i nterested parti es, i ncl udi ng
adversari es. Thus when Ki tchener, Cl ayt on, and St orrs i n 191415
cont empl at ed excl udi ng France f rom the postwar Arab Mi ddl e East ,
they noted that Bri tai n woul d have to compensat e France for doi ng
so by seei ng that she obtai ned territorial gai ns el sewhere in the
worl d; and while this may not have been a realistic appreci ati on of
what France woul d accept, it was a realistic recogni ti on that if
Bri tai n made territorial gai ns France woul d insist on mat chi ng t hem.
Si mi l arl y, i n postwar Turkey, Ke ma l a st at esman with a
European cast of mi ndf ormul at ed territorial demands for Turki s h
nati onal i sm not merel y on the basi s of his appreci ati on of what
Turkey needed but also on his underst andi ng of what Turkey' s
nei ghbors coul d accept.
Thi s was the sort of st at esmanshi p to which Churchi l l was accus-
t omed; but he di d not find it in the Pal esti ni an Arab del egati on in
London, which di d no more than repeat its demands . Pal esti ne was
and i s an area of compl ex and compet i ng cl ai ms, but the Arab
del egati on took account of no cl ai ms, fears, needs, or dreams other
than its own. Unl i ke the Zi oni st l eaders, who sought to compensat e
Arab nati onal i sm by support i ng Arab versus French cl ai ms t o Syri a,
who envi saged areas of Arab aut onomy within Pal esti ne, and who
pl anned economi c and other benefits for Arabs who chose to live
within the confines of the Jewi sh homel and, the Arab l eaders made
no effort to accommodat e Jewi sh aspi rati ons or to take account of
Jewi s h needs.
Deal i ng with Mi ddl e East erners such as these was far more frus-
trati ng than had been i magi ned i n wart i me London when the pros-
pect of admi ni st eri ng the postwar Mi ddl e Eas t was first rai sed. In
Churchi l l ' s eyes, the members of the Arab del egati on were not doi ng
what politicians are s uppos ed to do: they were not ai mi ng to reach an
agreement any agreement . Apparent l y unwi l l i ng to offer even 1
percent in order to get 99 percent, they offered no incentive to the
other si de to make concessi ons. Churchi l l remonstrated with the
Arab l eaderst o no effect.
V
Th e Arab del egati on t o London, which was headed by Mus a Kaz i m
Pasha al - Hussei ni , presi dent of the Arab Execut i ve, apparentl y re-
fused to underst and what Churchi l l was sayi ng. Members of the
del egati on woul d ask a questi on, and then when Churchi l l had
answered it, woul d ask the same questi on agai n, as t hough they had
* Not to be confused with his relative, the youthful Grand Mufti.
not heard Churchi l l ' s repl y. Churchi l l showed si gns of frustrati on
and anger at this tactic, but conti nued to repeat his answers in the
evident hope of finally maki ng hi msel f underst ood. It was in this
spirit that he repeated that l and was not bei ng taken away from
Arabs ; that Arabs sol d l and to Je ws only i f they chose to do so.
In the Mi ddl e Eas t , thi ngs rarely were what they seemed to be,
and the l and i ssue i n Pal esti ne was a case i n poi nt. Th e Arab
del egati on to London di d i n fact underst and what Churchi l l meant
about Arabs wanti ng to sell l and to Je ws , for Mus a Kaz i m Pasha, the
presi dent of the del egati on, was hi msel f one of those who had sol d
l and to the Jewi sh s et t l ers .
1 5
So had other members of the Arab
del egati ons that he brought with hi m to London in 19212 and in
succeedi ng years.
Pri nce Fei sal and Dr Chai m Wei zmann had agreed i n 1918 that
there was no scarci ty of l and in Pal est i ne: the probl em, rather, was
that so much of it was control l ed by a smal l group of Arab l andowners
and us ur e r s .
1 6
The great mas s of the peasant ry st ruggl ed to eke out a
bare living from low-yielding, much- eroded, poorly i rri gated pl ots,
while large hol di ngs of fertile l ands were bei ng accumul at ed by
influential fami l i es of absentee l andl ords.
Th e Zi oni st pl an, as outl i ned by Wei zmann to Fei sal i n 1918, was
to avoi d encroachi ng on l and bei ng worked by the Arab peasantry
and i nstead to recl ai m unused, uncul ti vated l and, and by the use of
scientific agri cul tural met hods to restore its fertility. Th e l arge Arab
l andhol ders, however, turned out to be eager to sell the Jewi sh
settl ers their fertile l ands, t ooat very consi derabl e profits. * Indeed
Jewi sh purchasers bi d l and pri ces up so that, not untypi cal l y, an
Arab family of Bei rut sol d pl ots of l and in the Jezreel valley to
Jewi sh settl ers in 1921 at pri ces rangi ng from forty to eighty ti mes
the original purchase pr i c e .
1 7
Far from bei ng forced by Je ws to sell,
Arabs offered so much l and to Je ws that the only l i mi ti ng factor on
purchases became money: the Jewi s h settlers di d not have enough
money to buy all the l and that Arabs offered to t he m.
1 8
Not merel y non-Pal esti ni an Arabs but the Pal esti ni an Arab leader-
shi p cl ass itself was deepl y i mpl i cated in these land sal es that it
publ i cl y denounced. Ei ther personal l y or through their fami l i es, at
* For a variety of reasons, the economic yield on Palestinian agricultural landhold-
ings had sunk to low levels during the First World War and just afterward, and the
Arab propertied classes were enabled to maintain their level of income only because
of the bonanza provided by Jews purchasing land at inflated prices. Jewish settlement
was a boon to wealthy Arabs, whatever they said in public to the contrary, and their
claim that Jews were forcing them to sell was fraudulent. The genuine grievance was
that of the impoverished Arab peasantry. As socialists, the Jewish farmers were
opposed to the exploitation of others and therefore did all their own work; when
Jews bought Arab farms the Arab farm laborers therefore lost their jobs.
least a quart er of the elected official l eadershi p of the Arab Pal esti ni an
communi t y sol d l and to Jewi sh settl ers between 1920 and 1928.
1 9
Th e Zi oni st l eadershi p may have been mi sl ed by such deal i ngs
into underest i mat i ng the dept h of real local opposi ti on to Jewi s h
settl ement. Th e Bri ti sh government , on the other hand, mi sj udged
not merel y the dept h but also the nature of the Arab response: i n
treati ng the l and i ssue as if it were val i d rather than the f raud it was,
Churchi l l and his col l eagues either mi sunderst ood or pret ended to
mi sunderst and the real basi s of Arab opposi t i on to Zi oni sm. Arab
opposi ti on to Jewi s h settl ement was rooted in emoti on, in religion, in
xenophobi a, in the compl ex of feelings that tend to overcome peopl e
when newcomers flood i n to change their nei ghborhood. Th e Arabs
of Pal esti ne were defendi ng a threatened way of life. Th e Arab
del egati ons that went to see Wi nston Churchi l l di d not arti cul ate this
real basi s for their objecti on to Zi oni sm. Inst ead they argued that the
country coul d not sustai n more i nhabi t ant s; and Churchi l l took them
at their word. He accepted their st at ement that they were objecti ng
on economi c grounds ; and then he went ahead to prove that their
economi c fears were unjusti fi ed.
VI
In a deci si on that had l asti ng i mpact and that showed that Arab
economi c fears were unjusti fi edChurchi l l in 1922 approved a con-
cessi on for hydro-el ectri c schemes i n the Auj a and Jor dan river
valleys to Pi nhas Rut enberg, a Jewi sh engi neer from Rus s i a. Thi s
put into mot i on a far-reachi ng pl an to provi de power and irrigation
that woul d make possi bl e the recl amati on of the l and and its economi c
devel opment al ong twenti eth-century lines. It was the first gi ant step
al ong the road t oward provi ng the Zi oni st cl ai m that Pal esti ne coul d
support a popul ati on of mi l l i ons and not as Arab spokesmen
cl ai medmerel y of hundreds of t housands.
Churchi l l was especially i mpressed by the fact that the scheme was
put forward and financed on a noncommerci al basi s, and was moved
to tell the Hous e of Commons that only Zi oni sts were willing to
undertake such a project on such a basi s.
I am told that the Arabs woul d have done it for themsel ves.
Who i s goi ng to believe that? Lef t to themsel ves, the Arabs of
Pal esti ne woul d not in a t housand years have taken effective
st eps t oward the irrigation and electrification of Pal esti ne. The y
woul d have been qui te content to dwel l a handful of phi l o-
sophi c peopl ei n the wasted sun- scorched pl ai ns, letting the
waters of the Jordan conti nue to fl ow unbri dl ed and unharnessed
into the De ad S e a .
2 0
Churchi l l conti nued to warn the Ar a bs a s he di d f rom the very
begi nni ngt hat they had better make the best of i t because Bri tai n
was goi ng to carry t hrough on her commi t ment s i n any event. In the
s ummer of 1921 he had told the recal ci trant Pal esti ni an Arab del-
egati on i n London that "The Bri ti sh Government mean to carry out
the Bal f our Decl arat i on. I have told you so agai n and agai n. I told
you so at Jerus al em. I told you so at the Hous e of Commons the
other day. I tell you so now. The y mean to carry out the Bal four
Decl arat i on. The y do . "
2 1
But , i n Pal esti ne, officers of the Bri ti sh admi ni strati on encouraged
Arab l eaders to believe otherwi se. Churchi l l gl oomi l y esti mated that
90 percent of the Bri ti sh army i n Pal esti ne was arrayed agai nst the
Bal four Decl arat i on pol i c y.
2 2
On 29 Oct ober 1921 General W. N.
Congreve, the commander of the Bri ti sh armi es i n Egypt and
Pal esti ne, sent a ci rcul ar toall t roops stati ng that, while "the Army
officially is s uppos ed to have no pol i ti cs, " it di d have sympat hi es,
and "In the case of Pal esti ne these sympat hi es are rather obvi ousl y
with the Arabs , who have hitherto appeared to the di si nterested
observer to have been the vi cti ms of an unj ust policy forced upon
t hem by the Bri ti sh Government . " Poi nti ng to Churchi l l ' s much
narrowed i nterpretati on of the Bal f our Decl arat i on, Congreve ex-
pressed confi dence that "The Bri ti sh Government woul d never gi ve
any s upport to the more gras pi ng pol i cy of the Zi oni st Ext remi st ,
which ai ms at the Est abl i shment of a Jewi sh Pal esti ne in which
Arabs woul d be merel y t ol erat ed. "
2 3
In passi ng the ci rcul ar on to
Churchi l l , John Shuckburgh noted "It i s unfortunatel y the case that
the army i n Pal esti ne i s largely anti -Zi oni st and will probabl y remai n
so whatever may be sai d to i t . "
2 4
Shuckburgh' s deput y, Hubert Young, wrote a me mor andum i n
the s ummer of 1921 that Churchi l l ci rcul ated to the Cabi net , advo-
cati ng "the removal of all anti -Zi oni st civil officials, however highly
pl aced. "
2 5
Thi s di d not get at the probl em of mi l i tary officials,
however; and even the presence of Si r Herbert Samuel and Wyndham
Deedes at the head of the civil admi ni strati on di d not seem to affect
the political orientation of officials lower down.
In the Jewi sh communi t y, too, there were those who despai red of
obtai ni ng s upport from the Bri ti sh authori ti es. Vl adi mi r Jabot i nsky,
founder of the Jewi s h Legi on, argued that Jews were goi ng to have
to protect themsel ves because the pol i ce and the army were not goi ng
to do the j ob. On 27 March 1922 the Near East ern correspondent of
The Times report ed that "certain of the more extreme Zi oni sts have
commi t t ed the cri mi nal error of s muggl i ng arms into the country and
formi ng a secret defence force called the ' Hagana' . "
In turn, as ti me wore on, influential figures in Bri tai n began to
wonder whether their country coul d afford to conti nue occupyi ng
Pal esti ne i n s upport of a Zi oni st program that had come to seem so
difficult of realization. The Times had been an enthusi asti c backer of
the Bal four Decl arat i on policy, which i t had t ermed (on 27 Apri l
1920) "the only sound policy the Allies coul d adopt toward the
Jewi sh peopl e, " but its ardor waned as the difficulties mul ti pl i ed. In
the spri ng of 1922, The Times ran a si x-part seri es of articles by
Phi l i p Graves , who had served i n the Ar ab Bureau duri ng the war,
to expl ai n Bri tai n' s growi ng unpopul ari t y i n Pal esti ne; and Graves
blamed Palestine's Jews for bei ng ri oted agai nst rather more than he
bl amed the army for sympat hi zi ng with the ri oters. He argued that
the Bri ti sh army was war-weary. So, i n fact, was the Bri ti sh publ i c.
In the i ssue of 11 Apri l 1922, in whi ch the Graves seri es was
concl uded, The Times ran a l eadi ng article f rom the poi nt of view of
"the Bri ti sh t axpayer, " in which it recal l ed the val ue of the Zi oni st
experi ment i n Pal esti ne, but wondered whether Bri tai n coul d afford
to conti nue support i ng it. "It i s an i nteresti ng experi ment , but the
questi on i s whether we have count ed the cost. "
Thus the Col oni al Secret ary found that his government' s Pal esti ne
policy was bei ng undermi ned in Bri tai n herself, where it had formerl y
enjoyed wi de s upport . On 21 J une 1922 a moti on was i ntroduced i n
the Hous e of Lo r ds decl ari ng that the Pal esti ne Mandat e (whi ch
embodi ed the pol i cy of the Bal f our Decl arat i on) was unaccept abl e; it
was carri ed by sixty votes to twenty-ni ne. Th e nonbi ndi ng Hous e of
Lo r ds moti on served to focus attention on the Col oni al Office debate
in the Hous e of Commons , which took pl ace on the eveni ng of
4 Jul y. Churchi l l was attacked by a number of speakers for at t empt i ng
to carry the Bal f our Decl arati on into effect. Many of those who
attacked Churchi l l had formerl y support ed the Bal f our Decl arati on,
and he used their earlier statements agai nst t hem with telling effect.
Churchi l l read out a dozen st at ement s support i ng the Bal four
Decl arat i on that had been made at the ti me of its i ssuance. He told
the Hous e that he coul d prol ong the list by readi ng out many more
such st at ement s. He told his opponent s that, havi ng support ed the
maki ng of a national commi t ment , they had no right to turn around
and attack hi m for endeavori ng to fulfill that c ommi t me nt .
2 6
As he di d on a number of other occasi ons, Churchi l l spoke warml y
of the need for Bri tai n to honor her pl edges. He told the Hous e that
the Bal four Decl arat i on had been i ssued "not only on the meri ts,
t hough I think the meri ts are consi derabl e, " but because it was
bel i eved at the ti me that Jewi sh s upport "would be a definite pal pabl e
advant age" i n Bri tai n' s struggl e to win the wa r .
2 7
He poi nted out that
he had not been a member of the War Cabi net at the t i me and had
pl ayed no role i n the del i berati ons f rom which the Bal f our Decl arati on
had emerged. However, like other Members of Parl i ament (he con-
t i nued) , he had loyally support ed the policy of the War Cabi net and
the opposi t i on to the official Zi oni st l eadershi p throughout the 1920s
and theni n the late 1930sseceded to found his own rival Zi oni st-
Revi si oni st organi zati on, denounci ng Churchi l l ' s deci si on in 1922 to
remove Trans j ordan f rom the territory of the Jewi sh Nati onal Home
and demandi ng the establ i shment of a Jewi s h state on both si des of
the Jor dan. Th e schi sm persi sts to thi s day i n the politics of the state
of Israel , in which the Labor Part y cl ai ms the heri tage of Ben-
Guri on and the Herut Party, that of Jabot i nsky.
What also persi sts in Israel , especi al l y in Herut ranks, is the view
that Jor dan either i s or shoul d be an Arab Pal esti ni an st at e: that
Churchi l l ' s separati on of Trans j ordani a (as it was then cal l ed) from
the rest of the Pal esti ne Mandat e in 1922 was not l egi ti mate.
VI I I
Th e Arabi c- speaki ng section of the Ot t oman Empi re had now been
politically redesi gned. Th e Tur ks no longer rul ed it. In the east,
Kur di s h, Sunni , Shi ' i te, and Jewi sh popul ati ons had been combi ned
into a new Mesopot ami an country named I raq, under the rule of an
Arabi an pri nce; i t l ooked like an i ndependent country, but Bri tai n
regarded it as a Bri ti sh protectorate. Syri a and a greatl y enl arged
Lebanon were rul ed by France. A new Arab entity that was to
become Jor dan had been carved out of Pal esti ne; and west of the
Jor dan river was a Pal esti ne that was to contain a Jewi sh Nati onal
Home . It was far from the restored Ot t oman Empi re Churchi l l had
once espoused.
Churchi l l had, however, achi eved the pri nci pal objecti ves that he
had set for hi msel f i n the Mi ddl e Eas t when he became Col oni al
Secret ary. Hi s overri di ng goal had been to cut costs, and he had
done so drasti cal l y. Moreover, he bel i eved that he had created a
syst em that coul d be operat ed economi cal l y in the future. Hi s line of
air bases stretchi ng from Egypt to Iraq allowed hi m to keep the
Mi ddl e East ern countri es under control with a mi ni mum of expense.
Hi s other goal had been to demonst rat e that Bri tai n kept her
pl edges. He had not fully achi eved this with respect to Zi oni sm, but
he had done so i n regard to whatever mi ght have been owi ng to the
dynasty of Ki ng Hussei n. T. E. Lawrence, formerl y the government' s
severest Bri ti sh critic on this score, j udged that he had more than
done so. At the end of 1922, referri ng back to the warti me corre-
spondence between Hussei n and Si r Henry McMahon, then Bri ti sh
Hi gh Commi s s i oner i n Egypt , concerni ng the frontiers of Arab i nde-
pendence, Lawrence wrote that "He (Churchi l l ) executed the whole
McMahon undert aki ng (called a treaty by some who have not seen it)
for Pal esti ne, for Trans j ordani a and for Arabi a. In Mes opot ami a he
went far beyond its provi si ons . . . I do not wish to make long
expl anati ons, but mus t put on record my convi cti on that Engl and i s
out of the Arab affair with clean hands . "
3 4
But it was not the Arab affair that was Churchi l l ' s pri nci pal
concern i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , even t hough i t was his pri nci pal responsi -
bility. Hi s mai n concern was for the Turki s h- s peaki ng remnant of
the Ot t oman Empi r e ; Ll oyd George' s policy i n that area wasi n
Churchi l l ' s vi ewdangerousl y wrong, and threatened to bri ng down
i n rui n the entire Bri ti sh posi ti on i n the Mi ddl e Eas t .
59
THE ALLI ANCES COME APART
i
Churchi l l ' s mi sgi vi ngs about Ll oyd George' s Turki s h pol i cy went
unheeded, for the Pri me Mi ni ster, in the pri de of his posi ti on, of his
victories, of his record of havi ng been proven right when all the
experts around hi m had sai d he was wrong, di d not pay due attention
to the opi ni ons of his col l eagues. Ll oyd George pl ayed a lone and
lordly hand, without accommodat i ng the di verse political groupi ngs
at home and abroad f rom whom his power s t emmed.
For years Ll oyd George had been the star of a sol ar syst em of
coal i ti ons. As head of a parl i ament ary coalition of Conservat i ves and
his own group of Li beral s , he conti nued to command the support of
a majori ty in the Hous e of Commons , which sustai ned hi m in office
as leader of a coalition Cabi net . As Pri me Mi ni ster of Bri tai n he also
exerci sed l eadershi p of a di verse coalition that i ncl uded the empi re
and the sel f-governi ng Domi ni ons of Canada, Newf oundl and, Sout h
Afri ca, Aust ral i a, and New Zeal anda coalition that had joi ned the
continental European Allies to oppos e the Central Powers i n the
Fi rst Worl d War. As of 1921, Ll oyd George was the sol e leader of
the warti me alliance who still remai ned in office. It was in the still
uns ubdued domai ns of the Ot t oman Empi re that this syst em of
coalitions started to come apart .
Rus s i a had been the first of the European Allies to wi thdraw from
the wart i me coal i ti onand then to fight agai nst it. Even before the
war ended the new Bol shevi k regi me had moved into conflict with
Russi a' s former Allies all al ong a southern tier in the Mi ddl e East
and Central Asi a.
Conversel y, the Sovi et government moved into a worki ng alliance
with a wart i me enemy, Turkey, in the years i mmedi atel y following
the armi sti ces, col l aborati ng both with Enver Pasha and with
Mus t apha Ke mal . It suppl i ed arms and money that hel ped Ke mal
conti nue his st ruggl e agai nst the Al l i es. In 1921 the Sovi et govern-
ment s of Rus s i a and its satellite regi mes entered into comprehensi ve
530
T H E A L L I A N C E S C O ME A P A R T 531
agreement s with Kemal ' s Turki s h regi me, establ i shi ng a frontier and
a worki ng rel ati onshi p between t hem.
In 1921, too, Sovi et Russi a al so moved into a worki ng rel ati onshi p
with another of the former enemy st at es. Act i ng upon Enver Pasha' s
suggest i on, the l eaders of the new Ge r man army entered into a secret
part nershi p with the Sovi et regi me. Th e head of the army, Enver' s
friend General von Seeckt, establ i shed "Speci al Branch R" i n the
War Mi ni stry to admi ni ster the rel ati onshi p, which encompas s ed war
product i on, mi l i tary trai ni ng, and the devel opment of new weaponry.
Ge r man officers were permi t t ed to st udy weapons f orbi dden to t hem
by the vi ctori ous Al l i est anks and ai rpl anes, i n part i cul aron
Russi an soi l .
1
Ge r man i ndustri al enterpri ses establ i shed factori es i n
Rus s i a to manuf act ure poi son gas, expl osi ve shel l s, and mi l i tary
ai rcraft. Th e Ge r man army establ i shed trai ni ng academi es for its
tank commanders and fighter pi l ots on Sovi et territory. At the s ame
t i me, Sovi et Rus s i a sent officers to Germany to be school ed i n the
met hods that had been devel oped by the feared and admi red Ge r man
General Staff. The s e cl andesti ne arrangement s were sancti oned by
the German government i n secret provi si ons of the Treat y of Rapal l o*
in 1922. It was symbol i c of the new state of affairs that General Hans
von Seeckt, who served in Const ant i nopl e as chief of staff of the
Ot t oman army at the end of the war, and who had served as head of
the Ge r man army si nce 1919, was report i ng to the Russi an General
Staff on the mi l i tary si tuati on in the Dardanel l es in 1922. It was a
measure of how far Rus s i a had travel ed si nce her 1914 war agai nst
Germany and Tur ke y; all three nati ons were now ranged together
agai nst Bri tai n.
I I
Italy was the next to change si des. As soon as the armi sti ce was
si gned, she began to show sympat hy for the pl i ght of the Ot t oman
Empi re, influenced perhaps by the tradi ti on of comradeshi p between
nationalist movement s that s t emmed from the teachi ngs of the
ni neteenth-century Italian patri ot Gi us e ppe Mazzi ni , as well as a
desi re to preserve and expand the prewar Ital i an economi c presence
i n Turkey. Count Carl o Sf orza, who was appoi nt ed Ital i an Hi gh
Commi ssi oner in Const ant i nopl e at the end of 1918, was a practi cal
st at esman of wi de and humane pri nci pl es who i mmedi atel y took the
initiative in establ i shi ng a worki ng rel ati onshi p with Mus t apha Ke mal
and i n encouragi ng the Tur ks to resi st the more ext reme demands of
* An agreement between Russia and Germany on 16 April 19Z2, that provided for
the building up of political and consular contacts between the two countries.
the Allies. Th e Ital i ans made no secret of this opposi ti on within
Al l i ed counci l s to the peace t erms proposed by Bri tai n and France.
In 1920, when the Sul t an, forced by Bri tai n and France, was on the
verge of si gni ng the Tr e at y of Sevres , a hi gh-ranki ng official of the
Bri ti sh War Office report ed that Italy was movi ng to s upport Ke mal ,
who rejected the treaty. A mont h before the Treat y of Sevres was
si gned, Lo r d Curzon reproached Count Sf orza with the "unloyal
atti tude" of Ital y i n the Mi ddl e Ea s t .
2
Fr o m the ti me of the armi sti ce onward, the di vergence between
Italy's goal s in the Mi ddl e East and those of her Allies wi dened. As a
practi cal mat t er there was little incentive for her to support their
program, especially after they sent the Greek army into the Smyrna
encl ave to pre- empt the Ital i an cl ai m. To successi ve Ital i an govern-
ment s, Allied pol i cy seemed desi gned chiefly to profit Greecea
purpos e that Rome had no interest i n servi ng. Especi al l y after Count
Sf orza became Forei gn Mi ni ster i n 1920, Italy treated Greece as a
rival whose gai ns had to be mat ched rather than an ally whose cl ai ms
had to be s upport ed. In asserti ng her own cl ai ms, Italy received no
hel p from the Al l i es. A cl ash with Kemal i s t forces at Konya in
central Anatol i a left the Italian authori ti es with the feeling that in
their sector of occupi ed Turkey they woul d be left to face a Kemal i s t
advance by t hemsel vesand that they mi ght be beaten. Det eri orat i ng
economi c, financial, and social condi ti ons at home finally led Italy to
abandon her cl ai ms to Turki s h terri tory and evacuate her forces from
Anat ol i a: her hope was that Kemal ' s Angora regi me woul d reward
her for doi ng so by agreei ng to economi c concessi ons. Sf orza entered
into a secret accord with the Kemal i s t s whereby Italy woul d suppl y
t hem with substanti al shi pment s of mi l i tary equi pment if such con-
cessi ons were forthcomi ng.
As Forei gn Mi ni ster, Count Sf orza conti nued to press the Bri ti sh
and French government s for revision of the Treat y of Sevres and
warned Lo r d Curzon that unl ess the Allies succeeded i n comi ng to
an underst andi ng with Ke mal , the Angora regi me woul d be driven
into alliance with Mos cowa possi bi l i ty, he sai d, fraught with peri l .
3
For a number of reasons, then, the Italian government conti nued to
di ssent from the pol i cy embodi ed i n the Treat y of Sevres, yet made
no overt move to oppos e it, not dari ng to risk an open confrontati on
with Bri tai n.
Within Italy there were demands for a more forceful approach to
the realization of the country' s ambi t i ons. Th e rapt ent husi asm that
had greeted Gabri el e D' Annunzi o' s sei zure of the Dal mat i an port of
Fi ume i n 1919the f amous author and nationalist had led his s up-
porters to take over the t ownshowed the wel l spri ngs of senti ment
that were there to be t apped. Beni to Mussol i ni used his newspaper,
the Popolo d'Italia, to exploit the bi tterness of those who felt cheated
out of the rewards of victory. An agi tator who, in turn, had advocated
the ext reme posi ti ons of al most all secti ons of the left and the
ri ght i n his own words, "an advent urer for all roads"he charged
that Italy was bei ng cheated out of the "booty" i n the Mi ddl e Ea s t .
4
Procl ai mi ng a "great imperial desti ny" for his country, he asserted
that it had a right to become the domi nant power in the
Medi t erranean.
5
Th e Great Power that st ood i n the way, accordi ng
to hi m, was Bri t ai n; Mussol i ni proposed to hel p i nsurgent forces i n
Egypt , Indi a, and Irel and.
When Mussol i ni , support ed by his political followers, known as
fascisti, became Pri me Mi ni ster of Italy in 1922, Italy's local di sagree-
ment s with Bri tai n about territorial cl ai ms i n Turkey and the eastern
Medi t erranean evol ved into a more general and permanent estrange-
ment. Mussol i ni ' s political program called for Bri tai n to be chased
out of the Medi t erranean al t oget her.
6
Under his l eadershi p, Italy,
like Rus s i a, moved from ally to enemy of the Bri ti sh Empi r e .
Ill
Th e Uni t ed St at es wi thdrew f rom the Al l i ed coalition i n 191920,
when the Senat e rejected the Treat y of Versai l l es and members hi p i n
the Le ague of Nat i ons and refused to accept a Mandat e to govern
Armeni a. In repl y to a note from the French ambas s ador, the Sec-
retary of St at e, on behalf of Presi dent Wilson, set forth the new
Ameri can posi ti on in a note of 24 March 1920: the Uni t ed St at es
woul d not send a representati ve to the Peace Conference and woul d
not parti ci pate in or si gn the peace treaty with the Ot t oman Empi re,
but it expect ed the peace treaty to take account of Ameri can views.
In addi ti on to Presi dent Wilson's vi ews on specific Mi ddl e East ern
mat t ers menti oned i n the note, the Uni t ed St at es i nsi sted on an
Open Door policy, on nondi scri mi nati on agai nst nonsi gnatori es of
the treaty, and on the mai ntenance of exi sti ng Ameri can ri ghts in the
area.
In 1919 the Depart ment of St at e commenced a program of legally
asserti ng Ameri can ri ghts i n the occupi ed Ot t oman terri tori es, in-
cl udi ng not only those deri vi ng from the Capi t ul at i on agreement s
governi ng the ri ghts and pri vi l eges of Ameri cans i n Turkey, but also
freedom of navi gati on of the Dardanel l es, protection of Ameri can
mi ssi onary col l eges and endeavors, and adequat e opport uni t y to carry
out archaeol ogi cal activities and commerci al activities. Th e most
conspi cuous i nterests asserted by the Uni t ed St at es were those of
* Which is to say that markets in the region were to be fully open to American
businessmen.
Ameri can oil compani es. It was these that brought the Uni t ed St at es
and Bri tai n into collision.
Th e oil i ssue was rai sed for the fi rst ti me on behalf of the St andard
Oil Company of New York ("Socony"), whi ch had been engaged i n
oil expl orati on in the Mi ddl e Eas t before the war and held (from the
Ot t oman regi me) concessi onst hat i s to say, excl usi ve licenses to
expl ore for oil in desi gnated areasi n Pal esti ne and Syri a. It held no
concessi ons i n I raq, however, and wanted to establ i sh concessi ons
there because it was the pri nci pal suppl i er of petrol eum product s in
the area; the company' s market i ng strategy called for it to obtai n
suppl i es for its market i ng organi zati on at or near the poi nt of sal es.
In Sept ember 1919 Socony sent two geol ogi sts to prospect for oil
in I raq. One of t hem i ncauti ousl y sent a letter to his wife telling her
"I am goi ng to the bi ggest remai ni ng oil possi bi l i ti es in the worl d"
and "the pi e i s so very bi g" that whatever had to be done shoul d be
done to "gain us the ri ghts which properl y bel ong to Ameri can
Ci t i zens. "
7
Th e letter was i ntercepted i n Al l i ed-occupi ed Const an-
ti nopl e by Bri ti sh censors, who f orwarded a copy of it to the Bri ti sh
government i n London. London i mmedi atel y sent orders t o Si r
Arnol d Wilson, Hi gh Commi ssi oner i n I raq, to forbi d the geol ogi sts
to prospect . At Socony' s request the Depart ment of St at e protested,
but Lo r d Curzon, the Forei gn Secret ary, put the Ameri cans off with
a pl ausi bl e but not entirely true tal e: wart i me restri cti ons appl i cabl e
to all nationalities f orbade such activities until peace was concl uded.
Th e St andard Oil Company of New Jersey was the next to enter
the pi ct ure. In 1910 its head geol ogi st had concl uded that there was
oil potential i n I raq; but until after the war, New Jers ey St andard
di d nothi ng about it. In February 1919 the company' s presi dent
suggest ed to the board of di rectors that an effort be made to look for
oil in I raq; and a mont h later the company' s head of forei gn pro-
ducti on was sent to Pari s to take up the questi on with the Ameri can
del egati on to the Peace Conf erence.
Lat er the chai rman of the board of New Jersey St andard, A. C.
Bedf ord, went to Europe to deal with the matter personal l y. Th e
vari ous wart i me arrangement s negoti ated between Bri tai n and France
to share the postwar oil wealth of the Mi ddl e Eas t remai ned secret
the Ameri can government had been put off with false assurances that
nothi ng had been deci ded upon that excl uded the Uni t ed St at es'
i nt erest sand these were matters that he looked into. On 27 Apri l
1920, at the Conf erence of San Remo, Bri tai n and France fi nal l y
concl uded a secret oil bargai n, agreei ng in effect to monopol i ze the
whole future out put of Mi ddl e East ern oil between t hem. Bedf ord
obtai ned a copy of the agreement from a member of the French
del egati on, and turned i t over to the Ameri can embassy.
In view of the magni t ude of the proposed Angl o- French monopol y,
the Ameri can government looked upon the San Re mo agreement as
harmful , not merel y to one or more Ameri can compani es, but to the
Uni t ed St at es' i nterests as a nati on. Th e war had focused attention
for the first ti me on the vital mi l i tary and naval i mport ance of
pet rol eum, and in the aftermath of the war the Uni t ed St at es had
undergone an oil-scarcity scare. The pri ce of crude oil rose, and fears
were expressed widely that domesti c oil reserves were bei ng depl eted.
The economi c advi ser to the Depart ment of St at e wrote that "It i s
economi cal l y essential . . . to obtai n assured foreign suppl i es of pe-
trol eum" in order to assure suppl i es of bunker oil to the merchant
mari ne and the navy, and in order to perpet uat e the Uni t ed St at es'
posi ti on as the world's l eadi ng oil and oil product s s uppl i er.
8
In the s ummer of 1920, the San Re mo agreement was made publ i c
and the Uni t ed St at es abl e finally to acknowl edge that it knew of
the agreement prot est ed. Forei gn Secret ary Curzon repl i ed that
Bri tai n control l ed only 4. 5 percent of worl d oil product i on while the
Uni t ed St at es control l ed 80 percent and that the Uni t ed St at es
excl uded non- Ameri can i nterests from areas under its cont rol .
9
Sec-
retary of St at e Bai nbri dge Col by countered that the Uni t ed St at es
possessed only one-twelfth of the worl d' s known oil reserves, that
demand for pet rol eum exceeded suppl y, and that only unhampered
devel opment of exi sti ng resources coul d meet the growi ng need for
Consci ous of havi ng estranged the Uni t ed St at es, Bri ti sh officials
suspect ed that Ameri can oil interests were behi nd the anti -Bri ti sh
i nsurrecti on i n I raq and the Kemal i s t movement i n Tur ke y. Al l egedl y
an i nsurrecti onary leader arrested by Bri ti sh securi ty officers in Iraq
was found to have in his possessi on a letter from one of the St andard
Oil compani es showi ng that Ameri can f unds were bei ng di spensed
by the Ameri can consul in Baghdad to the Shi'ite rebel s centered in
the holy city of Ka r b a l a .
1 1
Th e Ameri can consul i n Baghdad was i ndeed opposed to Bri ti sh
rule i n Iraq, but Washi ngton was not. Qui te the reverse was t rue:
both the Depart ment of St at e and the oil compani es were in favor of
Bri ti sh hegemony i n the area. Th e oil compani es were prepared to
engage in expl orati on, devel opment, and product i on only in areas
governed by what they regarded as stabl e and responsi bl e regi mes.
The presi dent of New Jersey St andard reported t o the St at e Depart -
ment that I raq was a collection of warri ng tri bes; accordi ng to hi m
an Iraqi government domi nat ed by Bri tai n offered the only hope of
law and o r de r .
1 2
Al l en Dul l es, chief of the Near East ern Affairs
Di vi si on of the Depart ment of St at e, was one of the many officials
who expressed di smay at the thought that Bri tai n and France mi ght
rel i nqui sh control of their Mi ddl e East ern conquest s, and who ex-
pressed fear for the fate of Ameri can interests shoul d they do s o .
1 3
Dul l es report ed that Guy Wel l man, attorney for the Ameri can oil
compani es that were seeki ng a share in Iraqi devel opment , was of the
opi ni on that his clients woul d be much better off negoti ati ng a
partnershi p with Bri ti sh interests rather than at t empt i ng to operate
on their o wn.
1 4
A solution to the conflict between Bri tai n and Ameri ca began to
emerge i n the s ummer of 1920 when geol ogi sts advi sed the Bri ti sh
government that oil prospect s i n I raq were more specul ati ve than
had been s uppo s e d.
1 5
At the s ame t i me the Forei gn Office was
advi sed that the prospect si f they di d materi al i zewere so vast that
Bri tai n l acked the capi tal resources to devel op t hem by herself and
woul d have to invite Ameri can part i ci pat i on.
1 6
For these, and for
political reasons, Si r John Cadman, an i mportant fi gure i n the Bri ti sh
oil i ndustry, was del egated to go to the Uni t ed St at es to initiate
di scussi ons. On 22 June 1922 A. C. Bedf ord of the St andard Oil
Company of New Jersey called on the Depart ment of St at e to report
that on behalf of seven Ameri can oil compani es he proposed to
negoti ate a parti ci pati on in the Bri ti sh-owned concessi onary corpo-
rati on i n I raq. Th e Depart ment of St at e responded that i t had no
objecti on to his doi ng so, provi ded no qualified Ameri can oil com-
pani es that wi shed to parti ci pate were excl uded. Negot i at i ons there-
upon went forward.
Th u s the di sput e with the Uni t ed St at es was resol ved. But the
burden of i mposi ng European control over the Mi ddl e Eas t was left
by Ameri ca to Bri tai n, unai ded.
I V
France, Bri tai n' s closest major ally, was the last to desert the alliance.
Th e l ong quarrel about whether the Sykes-Pi cot Agreement woul d
be honored had taken its toll, as had Bri tai n' s sponsorshi p of the
Hashemi t e family's political cl ai ms. With the reti rement of
Cl emenceau, Ari sti de Bri and, a veteran left-wing politician who had
served several ti mes as Premi er, was regarded as the leader of those
who were loyal to the Bri ti sh al l i ance; yet, when he became Premi er
agai n i n Januar y 1921, the rupt ure between the two countri es fi nal l y
occurred.
It occurred because Bri and saw no way to mai ntai n his country' s
position in Ci l i ci a, the southern provi nce of Turkey whi ch then was
still occupi ed by France. France' s 80, 000 occupati on t roops were a
The final accord, the so-called Red Li ne agreement, was not reached until 31
Jul y 1928.
T H E A L L I A N C E S C O M E A P A R T
537
drai n on resources that coul d no l onger be af f orded; the French
Parl i ament was unwilling to conti nue payi ng for t hem. Cilicia proved
to be an awkward location for a French army to occupy, caught as it
was between Kemal i s t Tur ks and t roubl esome Syri a. In the spri ng
of 1921, Premi er Bri and therefore sent the Turkophi l e Senat or
Henri Frankl i n- Boui l l on on a mi ssi on to Angora to negoti ate a way
out. Frankl i n- Boui l l on, a former presi dent of the Forei gn Affai rs
Commi s s i on of the Chamber of Deput i es, was a leader of the colonial-
ist group and strongl y believed in the i mport ance of Turkey as a
Mos l em ally.
On his second mi ssi on to Angora, i n the aut umn of 1921, Frankl i n-
Boui l l on succeeded in arri vi ng at an agreement . It brought the war
between France and Turkey to an end, and effectively recogni zed the
Nati onal i st Angora regi me as the l egi ti mate government of Turkey.
For the Nati onal i sts, the Angora Accord was the greatest of di pl o-
mati c t ri umphs . Accordi ng to Mus t apha Ke mal , i t "proved to the
whole worl d" that the Treat y of Sevres was now "merely a r a g . "
1 7
Th e Bri ti sh saw it as a betrayal : it was a separat e peace, and it freed
the Tur ks t o attack Bri tai n' s cl i ent sGreece and Iraq. As the Bri ti sh
suspect ed, the French also turned over to the Angora regi me quan-
tities of mi l i tary s uppl i e s .
1 8
Th u s Tur ks suppl i ed by France were at
war with Greeks backed by Bri tai n and the former Ent ent e Powers
found themsel ves ranged on opposi t e si des of the Ot t oman war that
they had entered together as allies in 1914.
On 26 Oct ober 1921, i n a me mor andum to the Cabi net al erti ng
t hem to news of the ai d France woul d provi de the Kemal i s t s ,
Churchi l l comment ed that "It seems scarcel y possi bl e to credi t this
i nformati on, whi ch, if true, woul d unquest i onabl y convict the French
government of what in the most di pl omat i c appl i cati on of the phrase
coul d only be deemed an 'unfriendly act ' . "
1 9
It shoul d be underst ood
that, accordi ng to a st andard reference book, in the di pl omat i c lexicon
"When a St at e wi shes to warn other St at es that certain acti ons on
their part mi ght l ead to war, it is usual to state that such action
'would be regarded as an unfri endl y act ' . "
2 0
Thus Churchi l l was
maki ng a very st rong statement i ndeed; his words i mpl i ed that the
Angora Accord mi ght l ead to a war between France and Bri tai n.
Churchi l l had feared for some ti me that Nati onal i st Turkey woul d
turn east to attack Fei sal ' s fragile regi me in Iraq, and bel i eved that
Fr anc e by al l owi ng Turkey to use the Baghdad Rai l way section i n
Ci l i ci awas now about to facilitate such a move. Accordi ng to
Churchi l l ' s memorandum, "clearly the French are negoti ati ng,
through M Frankl i n- Boui l l on, a treaty desi gned not merel y to safe-
guard French i nterests i n Turkey, but to secure those interests
wherever necessary at the expense of Great Bri tai n. The y apparentl y
believe that we have a si mi l ar ant i - French arrangement with the
Greeks . The y are, of course, very angry about Ki ng Fei sal " havi ng
been pl aced by Bri tai n on the throne of I r a q .
2 1
Accordi ng to
Churchi l l , France woul d have liked nothi ng better than to have seen
the col l apse of Fei sal and of Bri ti sh policy in the area, whi ch also
woul d have meant the destructi on of his own handi work.
Premi er Bri and failed to appreci at e how strongl y the Angora Ac-
cord woul d affect Bri ti sh policy i n Eur ope . In 1921 Bri and t urned to
Bri tai n to guarant ee France agai nst a revival of the Ge r man chal l enge,
havi ng become aware that the Ameri can government was funda-
mental l y out of sympat hy with the whole trend of postwar French
policy regardi ng Germany. * Fearf ul that France mi ght be i sol ated,
he approached Ll oyd George and Curzon with a proposal for a
bilateral alliance between Bri tai n and France to provi de the latter
with securi ty agai nst Germany. The Bri ti sh l eaders refused to con-
si der formi ng such an alliance unl ess France resol ved the quarrel i n
the Mi ddl e East st emmi ng from the Angora Accord. Fol l owi ng the
Bri ti sh refusal , the Bri and government fell.
Former Presi dent Raymond Poi ncare took office as the new Pre-
mi er. He represented the opposi t e pol e f rom Bri and; he was not a
great friend of Bri tai n. Hi s di pl omacy proposed doi ng without Bri tai n
and i nstead goi ng it alone as a Great Power by creati ng a network of
alliances with less powerful countri es i n central and eastern Europe
that i ncl uded Pol and, Rumani a, Yugosl avi a, and Czechosl ovaki a. It
est ranged Bri tai n further, by suggest i ng to Bri tai n' s l eaders that
France ai med at establ i shi ng hegemony on the continent of Europe,
as she had done under Loui s XI V and Napol eon. Th e prospect of an
alliance between Bri tai n and France di ed i n June 1922, when Bri tai n
s us pended the negoti ati ons; and the breach between the two countri es
wi dened thereafter.
V
To some extent the di pl omati c isolation of Bri tai n was the result of
Mus t apha Kemal ' s adroi t di pl omacy. Th e Angora regi me had deliber-
ately pl ayed off one ally agai nst another.
Fundament al l y, however, i t was Bri tai n' s deci si on to i mpose
* In the immediate aftermath of the armistice, Marshal Foch had counted on
moving the French boundary with Germany to the Rhine, so that natural frontiers
would provide France with security. In the face of Woodrow Wilson and his
Fourteen Points, France had been obliged to surrender this claim in return for a
treaty of guarantee by her principal Allies. The treaty never took effect; it was
rejected by the U. S. Senate on 19 November 1919. Moreover, the likelihood that
France in fact could look to the United States for future support began to dim.
European rule on the former Ot t oman Empi r e that led to the break-
up of the alliance ort o the extent that there were other contri buti ng
f act orsat any rate caused the breakup to l ead i n such dangerous
di recti ons. It i s here that the contrast between Bri tai n' s Mi ddl e
East ern pol i cy before and after 1914 can be gl i mpsed most vividly.
It was not merel y that in the nineteenth century Bri tai n had often
kept conflict f rom flaring up between the European powers by
securi ng mut ual agreement that none of t hem woul d encroach on the
Mi ddl e Eas t . It was also the process by which she di d so that
contri buted to the mai ntenance of international stabi l i ty. Th e fre-
quent reference of i ssues to the concert of the powers of Europe, and
the habi t of mul ti l ateral consul tati on and cooperati on that it bred,
hel ped to make worl d politics more civilized. In that sense the
Mi ddl e East ern questi on, despi te its inherent di vi si veness, contri b-
uted to international harmony.
But once the As qui t h government agreed to Russi an territorial
demands in 1915, the Mi ddl e Eas t became a source of di scord. If the
Czar were to control the Turki s h- s peaki ng northern part of the
Ot t oman Empi re, then Bri t ai naccordi ng t o Lo r d Ki t chenerwoul d
have to as s ume hegemony i n the Arabi c- speaki ng sout h. In t urn, that
brought into pl ay French cl ai ms to Syri a and Pal esti ne. Th u s one
cl ai m led to another, each power bel i evi ng the others to be over-
reachi ng. Even if Bri tai n, after the war, had i mmedi atel y parti ti oned
the Ot t oman Empi r e among the Al l i es, al ong the hard- bargai ned
lines of the pl edges she had made to t hem, there woul d have been
some risk of future conflict among t hem if any of t hem purs ued
future expansi oni st desi gns. But conflict was made i nevi tabl e when,
i nstead, Ll oyd George at t empt ed not merel y to renege on the pl edges
but to take everythi ng for the Bri ti sh Empi r e . It was worse still that
he tried to do so wi thout havi ng the resources to back up hi s move.
Al l i ances tend to break up at the end of a war. Moreover, the part-
ners with whom Bri tai n had worked toward international harmony
before the war were l osi ng control of worl d politics. Yet it was the
Mi ddl e East ern questi on at the end of the war that led to the first
cl ashes between Bri tai n and her former allies, Russi a, Ital y, France,
and the Uni t ed St at es. It was bi tterness engendered by Mi ddl e
East ern policy that hampered Bri ti sh efforts to find common ground
with her former allies on policy el sewhere in the worl d, and that
eventually led to the alliances falling apart .
60
A GREEK TRAGEDY
i
Ll oyd George had been too proud i n 1919 and 1920 to remember
that his power deri ved from al l i ances and coalitions over whi ch he
presi ded, but which he di d not control . Event s now provi ded hi m
with a remi nder, and in 1921, as hi s foreign alliances fell apart , the
Pri me Mi ni ster found himself i ncreasi ngl y isolated within his own
government i n his war policy agai nst Turkey. Bonar Law, after the
change i n monarch and government i n Greece, i n whi ch the pro-
Allied Veni zel os was overthrown, was in favor of comi ng to terms
with the Tur ks . Bonar Law coul d not be i gnored; he led the party
with a majori ty of seats in Parl i ament, and had he remai ned in the
government he mi ght have succeeded in forcing a change in policy.
Hi s support ers were pr o- Tur k and, so long as he served i n the
government , he remi nded Ll oyd George of their views. But Bonar
Law retired f rom publ i c life in the winter of 1921 due to ill health,
depri vi ng the Pri me Mi ni ster of a political partner who coul d keep
hi m i n line. With Bonar Law' s depart ure, the Pri me Mi ni ster drifted
i ncreasi ngl y out of touch with senti ment in the Hous e of Commons .
Aware that Cabi net col l eagues, the Forei gn Office, and the War
Office were also oppos ed to his Greek- Turki s h policy, he di sre-
garded their vi ews.
As the London Conference adj ourned i n March 1921the confer-
ence at whi ch the Al l i es, the Greeks , and the Kemal i s t s failed to
arri ve at any agreement Ll oyd George sent Mauri ce Hankey round
to Cl ari dge' s Hotel to tell the Greek l eaders, who were stayi ng there,
that if they felt i mpel l ed to attack Kemal ' s forces, he woul d not stand
i n their way.
1
Th e Greek government took this as permi ssi on to
resume the war, and l aunched a new offensive on 23 March 1921.
Despi t e faulty staff work and stiff opposi ti on, the Greek army moved
up from the pl ai n to the pl ateau.
Arnol d Toynbee, the hi stori an and scholar of international re-
lations, accompani ed the Greek army as a reporter for the Man-
chester Guardian. He reported that as his vehicle moved up from
A G R E E K T R A G E D Y 541
the pl ai n "I began to realise on how narrow a margi n the Greeks had
gambl ed for a mi l i tary deci si on in Anatol i a, and how adverse were
the ci rcumst ances under which they were pl ayi ng for victory over
Ke ma l . "
2
At the end of the week, the Greeks were repul sed by
Kemal ' s General Ismet at the village of Inonu and retreated.
Th e Greek government bl amed its military commanders and on
7 Apri l Gounari s now Pri me Mi ni s t erand his col l eagues met with
Ioanni s Met axas , Greece' s out st andi ng mi l i tary figure, to ask Met axas
to l ead the next offensive i n Anatol i a. Met axas refused and tol d the
politicians that the war i n Turkey coul d not be won. Th e Tur ks had
devel oped a national feeling, he sai d, "And they mean to fight for
their f reedom and i ndependence . . . The y realize that Asi a Mi nor is
their country and that we are i nvaders. For t hem, for their national
feelings, the historical ri ghts on whi ch we base our cl ai ms have no
influence. Whether they are right or wrong i s another quest i on. What
matters is how they feel. "
3
Th e pol i ti ci ans told Met axas that i t woul d now be politically
i mpossi bl e for their regi me to abandon the war: with eyes open to
the risk they woul d run, they felt compel l ed to gambl e everythi ng on
the success of one last offensive, schedul ed for the s ummer.
On 22 June the Allies sent a mes s age to the Greek government
offeri ng medi ati on in the war, but Greece repl i ed with a polite
refusal . Preparat i ons for an offensive were so far al ong, wrote the
Greeks, that it woul d be i mpracti cal to call t hem off.
Ki ng Const ant i ne and Gounari s had left themsel ves with no opti on
but to l aunch their crusade, and Ll oyd George' s fortunes rode with
t hem. Th e Bri ti sh leader coul d do no more than watch and wait as
foreign armi es cl ashed i n the obscure interior of Asi a Mi nor. Hi s
secretary and mi st ress noted that he
has had a great fight in the Cabi net to back the Greeks (not in
the field but moral l y) and he and Bal f our are the only pro-
Greeks there . . . [ He] has got his way, but he i s much afrai d
lest the Greek attack shoul d be a fai l ure, and he shoul d have
proved to have been wrong. He says his political reputati on
depends a great deal on what happens i n Asi a Mi nor . . . [I]f
the Greeks succeed the Treat y of Versai l l es i s vi ndi cated, and
the Turki s h rul e is at an end. A new Greek Empi re will be
f ounded, friendly to Bri tai n, and it will hel p all our i nterests in
the Eas t . He i s perfectly convi nced that he i s right over this,
and i s willing to stake everythi ng on i t .
4
On 10 Jul y 1921 the Greek army l aunched a brilliantly successful
t hree- pronged offensi ve. Th e Greek commanders had l earned f rom
the mi stakes commi t t ed i n January and i n March, and di d not repeat
t hem. Th e offensive was crowned with the capt ure of Eski shehi r, a
rail center consi dered to be the strategi c key to western Anatol i a.
Ll oyd George, jubi l ant, unl eashed his powers of rhetoric and wit
agai nst his opponent s. To his War Mi ni ster he wrot e:
I hear from Greek quart ers that Eski Shehi r has been capt ured
and that the Turki s h Army is in full retreat. Whi ch ever way
you look at the matter this is news of the first i mport ance. Th e
future of the Eas t will very largely be det ermi ned by this
st ruggl e, and yet as far as I can see, the War Office have not
taken the slightest troubl e to find out what has happened . . .
Th e Staff have di spl ayed the most amazi ng sl ovenl i ness i n this
mat t er. Thei r i nformati on about the respecti ve st rengt h and
qual i ty of the two Armi es t urned out to be hopel essl y wrong
when the facts were i nvesti gated, at the i nstance of the despi sed
pol i ti ci ans.
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster saved his best sal vo for l ast: "Have you no
Depart ment whi ch i s known as the Intel l i gence Depart ment i n your
Office? You mi ght find out what it is doi ng. It appears in the
Est i mat es at qui te a substanti al figure, but when it comes to infor-
mati on it is not vi si bl e. "
5
Near Eski shehi r the overwhel med Turki s h commander, General
Ismet , coul d not bri ng himself to retreat. Ke mal took the burden
from his shoul ders. "Pasha i s comi ng, " Ismet , relieved, told a com-
pani on, as a grey-faced Mus t apha Ke mal arri ved to take personal
responsi bi l i ty for orderi ng the ret reat .
6
Ke mal acknowl edged that his
peopl e woul d feel a "moral shock" when they l earned that he was
goi ng to abandon western Anatol i a to the enemy.
7
In the event, there
was an uproar i n the Nati onal As s embl y, as political enemi es, per-
sonal ri val s, Enver' s followers, and defeati sts joi ned hands agai nst
hi m. After a t i me, Ke mal called the Nati onal As s embl y into secret
sessi on, and proposed a Roman course of acti on: the del egates shoul d
elect hi m di ctator for a peri od of three mont hs, and that shoul d he
then fail as s upreme commander, the bl ame woul d fall entirely on
hi m. Th e proposal brought together those who bel i eved i n victory
and those who were certain of defeat, and was adopt ed.
Ke mal pul l ed his forces back to within fifty mi l es of his capital at
Angora, and depl oyed t hem behi nd a great bend i n the Sakarya
river. In the t i me avai l abl e to hi m he requi si ti oned resources from
the entire popul at i on, commandeeri ng 40 percent of househol d food,
cloth, and leather suppl i es, confi scati ng horses, and prepari ng for
total war. He ordered his t roops to entrench i n the ri dges and hills
that rose steepl y up f rom the near bank of the river toward Angora.
By mi d- Augus t his army had dug into thi s powerful natural defensi ve
posi ti on, ci rcl i ng Angora for sixty mi l es behi nd the l oop i n the
Sakarya, domi nat i ng from hi gh ground the passage of the river.
On 14 Augus t 1921 the Greek army started its t ri umphal march on
Angora. At staff headquart ers, the chief of the suppl y bureau had
warned that the Greek army' s l ong line of communi cat i ons and
transportati on woul d break down i f i t advanced beyond the Sakarya
ri ver; but his col l eagues concl uded that there was no cause for
concern i n as much as they di d not i ntend to advance much further
than t hat .
8
Th e Greek commanders bel i eved that they had beaten
the enemy and were now about to finish hi m off. The y invited the
Bri ti sh liaison officers who accompani ed t hem to attend a victory
cel ebrati on in Angora after the battl e.
Th e advanci ng Greek army made first contact with the enemy on
23 Augus t and attacked all al ong the line on 26 Augus t . Crossi ng the
river, the Greek infantry fought its way foot-by-foot up toward the
hei ghts, dri vi ng the enemy from one ri dge- t op line of ent renchment s
to another above it. Th e savage combat went on for days and then
for weeks, with the Greeks gai ni ng ground on the average of a mile a
day. Eventual l y they gai ned control of the key hei ghts, but victory
el uded t hem; they were cut off f rom their suppl i es of food and
ammuni t i on by Turki s h caval ry rai ds, and s uccumbed t o exhausti on.
Unabl e to conti nue fighting, the Greeks descended f rom the hei ghts
and crossed back over the Sakarya river on 14 Sept ember and re-
treated back to Eski shehi r, where they had started their march a
mont h bef ore. Th e campai gn was over.
In Angora the grateful Nati onal As s embl y promot ed Mus t apha
Ke mal to the rank of field marshal and endowed hi m with the title of
"Ghazi "t he Tur ki s h Mosl em equi val ent of "warrior for the Fai t h"
or "Crus ader. "
I I
Between the s umme r of 1921 and the s ummer of 1922, a lull prevai l ed
on the battlefield, duri ng which Pri me Mi ni ster Gounari s and his
Forei gn Mi ni ster journeyed west to seek ai d from the Al l i es. On the
continent of Eur ope they met with little sympat hy. In London they
sat in the ambas s adors ' wai ti ng room at the Forei gn Office, hat in
hand, wai ti ng for Lo r d Curzon somehow to solve their probl ems.
Ll oyd George tol d t hem "Personally I am a fri end of Greece,
but . . . all my col l eagues are agai nst me. And I cannot be of any use
to you. It i s i mpossi bl e, i mpos s i bl e. "
9
The Bri ti sh Pri me Mi ni ster no l onger had anythi ng to offer the
Greeks, but exhorted t hem to fight on nonethel ess. Hi s policy (such
as it was) was for Greece to stay the course in the hope that thi ngs
woul d change for the better. In the spri ng of 1922 he tol d Veni zel os
(who was in London as a pri vate citizen and had come to see hi m in
the Hous e of Commons ) that, when Ki ng Const ant i ne eventually
di sappeared from the scene, publ i c opi ni on i n the Al l i ed countri es
woul d swi ng back toward s upport of Greece. "Meanwhi l e Greece
must stick to her pol i cy, " sai d Ll oyd George, addi ng that, "this was
the testi ng ti me of the Greek nati on, and that if they persevered now
their future was assured . . . Greece must go t hrough the wi l derness,
she mus t live on manna pi cked up f rom the stones, she mus t st ruggl e
t hrough the stern trial of the present t i me. " He sai d that he "would
never shake hands with a Greek agai n who went back upon his
country' s ai ms i n Smy r na . "
1 0
Ll oyd George found himself i ncreasi ngl y i sol ated, even within his
own government , and the Forei gn Secret ary, Lo r d Curzon, took
effective control of Bri ti sh efforts to resol ve the cri si s; in col l aborati on
with the Al l i es, he moved toward an accommodat i on with Nati onal i st
Turkey.
Feari ng that the Allies were about to betray hi m that s ummer,
Ki ng Const ant i ne wi thdrew three regi ment s and two battal i ons from
the Greek army i n Anatol i a and sent t hem to Thr ac e , the European
provi nce of Turkey opposi t e Const ant i nopl e. Hi s government then
announced that Greece woul d occupy Const ant i nopl e i n order to
bri ng the war to an end. Hi s desperat e cal cul ati on was that this
threat woul d i mpel the Allies to take some action to resolve the
Greek- Turki s h conflict, pres umabl y in a manner favorabl e to
Greece. He gambl ed that, at the very least, the Allies woul d consent
to let his forces i n Thr ac e pass t hrough Const ant i nopl e to link up
with and rejoin his weakened armi es defendi ng the Anatol i an coast.
But , i nstead, the Al l i ed army of occupat i on i n Const ant i nopl e barred
the road to the Greeks .
Constanti ne' s wi thdrawal of the Greek units from the Anatol i an
coast meanwhi l e prompt ed Ke mal to hasten an attack on the weakened
and overextended Greek defensi ve line there. Mas s i ng his forces i n
great secrecy, he l aunched an attack on the southern front at dawn
on 26 Augus t . After two days of fierce fighting the Greeks retreated
i n di sorder. Th e commander-i n-chi ef of the Greek army i n Asi a
Mi nor "was al most uni versal l y sai d to be mad" ( accordi ng to a
Bri ti sh report from At hens) and later was t ermed a "mental case" by
Ll oyd Ge or ge ; whether or not these were exaggerat i ons, he was
i ncapabl e of copi ng with the s i t uat i on.
1 1
On 4 Sept ember the Greek
government appoi nt ed a new commander-i n-chi ef in his pl ace, but so
compl et e had been the breakdown in communi cat i ons that it di d not
know that the general i t now pl aced i n s upreme command was
al ready a pri soner in Turki s h hands ; he is sai d to have heard the
news of his appoi nt ment from Ke ma l .
1 2
Lo r d Ri ddel l was with Ll oyd Ge or ge on Sunday, 3 Sept ember,
when the Pri me Mi ni ster recei ved a communi cat i on f rom fri ends of
Greece
beggi ng L. G. to do somet hi ng for the Greeks . He expl ai ned . . .
at length the i mpossi bi l i ty [of doi ng anythi ng] and strongl y
criticised the action of Ki ng Const ant i ne, who, he sai d, was
responsi bl e for what had happened. Among other thi ngs he had
appoi nt ed a most inefficient and unsui tabl e general . L . G .
further sai d that as far as he coul d make out, he, Bal f our, and
Curzon were the only three peopl e i n the country who were i n
favour of the Greeks . He depl ored the si tuati on, but coul d do
not hi ng.
1 3
Greece assembl ed a fl eet to evacuate her army from Asi a Mi nor,
and al ong the coast t hrongs of sol di ers headed t oward the shi ps i n
hopes of finding pas s age. Th e mas s at t empt at escape was a race
agai nst t i me: agai nst the comi ng Sept ember rai ns and agai nst the
advanci ng, vengeful Turki s h army.
Th e anci ent Greek communi t y of Asi a Mi nor was sei zed with
dread. Th e Archbi shop of Smyr na wrote to Veni zel os on 7 Sept ember
that
Hel l eni sm i n Asi a Mi nor, the Greek state and the entire Greek
Nat i on are descendi ng now to a Hel l from which no power will
be abl e to rai se t hem up and save t hem . . . I have j udged i t
necessary . . . out of the flames of catastrophe in whi ch the
Greek peopl e of Asi a Mi nor are suf f eri ngand it is a real ques-
tion whether when Your Excel l ency reads this letter of mi ne we
shall still be alive, desti ned as we are . . . for sacrifice and
mart yrdom . . . t o direct this last appeal t o y o u .
1 4
Appeal s, however, were i n vai n. Veni zel os was powerl ess to gi ve ai d,
and two days later the archbi shop was sent to the mart yred death
that he foresaw: the local Turki s h commander turned hi m over to a
mob of several hundred knife-wielding Mos l ems who took hi m to a
barber' s shop and muti l ated hi m before killing hi m.
Al l - consumi ng rel i gi ous and national tensi ons met their rendezvous
with history in Smyrna, the greatest city of Asi a Mi nor, at summer' s
end in 1922. Hat red ignited into flame in the Armeni an quart er of
* Since the beginning of the war the atrocities between the Moslem and Christian
communities had escalated. When the Greek army first landed in Smyrna in 1919,
soldiers butchered unarmed Turks. Arnold Toynbee reported that in visiting Greek
villages that had been destroyed by the Turks, he noticed that the houses had been
burned to the ground one by one, deliberately; it appeared that the Turks had
savored the doing of i t .
1 5
Ki ng Constantine claimed that Greek corpses had been
skinned by the other s i de .
1 6
Toynbee charged that in the 1921 campaign the Greek
army deliberately drove whole villages of Turki sh civilians from their homes.
the city on Wednesday, 13 Sept ember. Lat er the fires s preador
were s preadt o the Greek and European quart ers. Between 50 and
75 percent of the ancient metropol i s was dest royed; the Turki s h
quart er, however, remai ned unt ouched. Hundreds of t housands of
peopl e had lived in the Chri sti an city, and it proved i mpossi bl e to
cal cul ate how many of t hem di ed in its final agony. A correspondent
of the Chi cago Daily News was the first to pound out the story on his
port abl e typewri ter ami dst the rui ns: "Except for the squal i d Turki s h
quart er, Smyr na has ceased to exi st. Th e probl em of the mi nori ti es
is here sol ved for all ti me. No doubt remai ns as to the origin of the
fire . . . Th e torch was appl i ed by Tur ki s h regul ar s ol di ers . "
1 8
Pro-
Turki s h schol ars to this day conti nue to deny this widely believed
accus at i on.
1 9
Ameri can, French, Bri ti sh, and Ital i an naval vessel s evacuated
their respecti ve nati onal s from the burni ng quay. At first the
Ameri cans and the Bri ti sh refused to ai d anyone else, while the
Ital i ans accepted on board anyone who coul d reach their shi ps and
the French accepted anyone who sai d he was Frenchs o l ong as he
coul d say i t i n French. Event ual l y, t hough, the Bri ti sh and
Ameri cans came to the ai d of refugees wi thout regard to nationality.
In the next few weeks Greece and the Al l i es, in response to a threat
by Ke mal to treat all Greek and Armeni an men of mi l i tary age as
pri soners-of-war, organi zed the evacuati on of masses of civilians as
Greece compl et ed her mi l i tary evacuati on as well.
By the end of 1922 about 1, 500, 000 Greeks had fled or been
dri ven out of Turkey. Ernest Hemi ngway, then a war correspondent
for the Toront o Star, wrote that he had watched a processi on of
desti tute Greek refugees that was s ome twenty miles long and that he
coul d not get i t out of his mi nd. Hi s Croat i an l andl ady, who was
more familiar with such si ghts, quot ed a Turki s h proverb to hi m: "It
is not only the fault of the axe but of the tree as wel l . "
2 0
It was an
easy sayi ng, and in the weeks to come it was followed by a number of
others, equal l y easy, as Al l i ed st at esmen searched their consci ences
and di scovered, each in his own way, that bl ame for the catastrophe
shoul d be pl aced on s omebody else.
In Bri tai n, i t was common to bl ame France, Ital y, and Bol shevi k
Russi a, but, above all, the Uni t ed St at es. As the Bri ti sh ambas s ador
in Washi ngt on expl ai ned to the Ameri can Secretary of St at e in
October, the Allies had agreed to parti ti on the Mi ddl e East i n the
novel and t i me- consumi ng form of recei vi ng Mandat es f rom the
Le ague of Nat i ons and had done so solely i n order to pl ease the
The atrocities at Smyrna provided him with the background for "On the Quai
at Smyrna, " one of the memorable stories in his first collection, The Fifth Column
and the First Forty-Nine Stories.
Uni t ed St at es, which then had wi thdrawn from the Mi ddl e East
peace process entirely. The Uni t ed St at es had al so agreed t o accept
Mandat es t o occupy and saf eguard Const ant i nopl e, the Dardanel l es,
and Armeni a, and then had gone back on her word two years later.
By i mpl i cati on, the ambas s ador i ndi cated that the Allies coul d have
i mposed their own kind of settl ement in 1919 and woul d then have
had done with it; but to accommodat e and secure the cooperati on of
the Uni t ed St at es, Bri tai n had wai ted for years, and had as s umed
novel responsi bi l i ti es, and now was left entirely on her own to carry
the heavy burden of havi ng to defend the Ameri can i dea of
Ma nda t e s .
2 1
Secret ary of St at e Charl es Evans Hughes repl i ed that
he woul d say that he coul d not for a moment assent to the view
that this Government was i n any way responsi bl e for the exi sti ng
condi ti ons . . . Th e Uni t ed St at es had not sought to parcel out
spheres of influence . . . had not engaged in i ntri gues at
Const ant i nopl e . . . was not responsi bl e for the cat ast rophe of
the Greek armi es duri ng the last year and a half . . . di pl omacy
in Europe for the last year and a half was responsi bl e for the
late di s as t e r .
2 2
Behi nd the mut ual recri mi nati on was the fundamental shift i n
Ameri can forei gn policy that occurred when Presi dent Woodrow
Wilson was repl aced by Warren Gamal i el Hardi ng. A pri nci pal object
of Presi dent Wilson's Mi ddl e East ern pol i cy had been to s upport
Chri sti ani ty and, i n parti cul ar, Ameri can mi ssi onary col l eges and
mi ssi onary acti vi ti es; but Presi dent Hardi ng di d not share these
i nterests. When the Tur ks advanced on Smyrna, such Ameri can
church groups as the conference of the Met hodi st Epi scopal Church
called for the Ameri can government to send t roops to st op the
massacre of Chri st i ans; but Presi dent Hardi ng told Secret ary of
St at e Hughes , "Frankl y, i t i s difficult for me to be consi stentl y
patient with our good fri ends of the Church who are properl y and
earnestl y zeal ous i n promot i ng peace until i t comes to maki ng warfare
on someone of the contendi ng religion . . . "
2 3
The other pri nci pal object of Woodrow Wilson's Mi ddl e East ern
policy had been to ensure that the peopl es of the regi on were rul ed
by government s of their choi ce. Presi dent Hardi ng di d not share
these concerns either. He limited his admi ni strati on' s efforts to the
protecti on of Ameri can i nterests. In the Mi ddl e Eas t , that mostl y
meant the protecti on of Ameri can commerci al i nterests whi ch were
pri mari l y oil i nterests. In Turkey the Kemal i s t government was
prepared to grant oil concessi ons to an Ameri can group, and seemed
likely to be abl e to provi de the internal securi ty and stabl e busi ness
envi ronment that oil compani es requi re. Tur ki s h wi l l i ngness to open
the door to Ameri can compani es was wel comed by the Depart ment
of St at e and may well have col ored its percepti on of the Kemal i s t
regi me.
Th e pl i ght of Greek, Armeni an, and other Chri st i ans i n the wake
of Smyrna' s destructi on was addres s ed by the Secretary of St at e in a
speech he del i vered in Bost on in Oct ober. "While nothi ng can excuse
in the sl i ghtest degree or palliate the barbari c cruelty of the Tur ks , "
he sai d, "no just apprai sement can be made of the si tuati on which
fails to take account of the i ncursi on of the Greek army into Anatol i a,
of the war there waged, and of the terri bl e i nci dents of the retreat of
that army, i n the burni ng of towns, and general devastati on and
cruel ti es. " Havi ng noted that atroci ti es had been commi t t ed by both
si des, the Secret ary of St at e rejected the contenti on that the Uni t ed
St at es shoul d have i ntervened. He poi nted out that the entire si tuati on
was the result of a war to whi ch the Uni t ed St at es had not been a
part y; if the Al l i es, who were closely connected to the si tuati on, di d
not choose to intervene, it certainly was no responsi bi l i ty of Ameri ca' s
to do s o. He told hi s audi ence that the Uni t ed St at es qui te properl y
had l i mi ted its efforts to the protecti on of Ameri can i nterests in
Tu r k e y .
2 4
I l l
Const ant i nopl e and European Turkeyeas t ern Thracewere the
next and final objecti ves on Kemal ' s line of march. Th e supposedl y
neutral Al l i ed army of occupati on st ood between hi m and his objec-
tives. As the Nati onal i st Turki s h armi es advanced to their posi ti ons,
the Allies pani cked. Hi therto the war had been far away from t hem;
but if Ke mal attacked, they themsel ves woul d have to fight.
In Bri tai n the news was startl i ng for the s ame reason. As late as 4
Sept ember, The Times had report ed that "The Greek Ar my unques-
ti onabl y sustai ned a reverse, but its extent is undul y exaggerat ed. "
But on 5 Sept ember, a headl i ne read " G R E E K ARMY' S D E F E A T " ; on 6
Sept ember, a headl i ne read "A GRAVE S I T UAT I ON" ; and f rom mi d-
Sept ember on, the headl i nes " N E A R E A S T P E R I L " and " N E A R E A S T
C R I S I S " appeared with terri bl y insistent regul ari ty. Photos of burni ng
Smyr na took the pl ace of soci ety weddi ngs, theater openi ngs, and
golf champi onshi ps. Bri t ons, four years after the armi sti ce, were
shocked to be suddenl y told that they mi ght have to fight a war to
defend far-off Const ant i nopl e. It was the last thi ng in the worl d that
most Bri t ons wanted to do, and an i mmedi at e inclination was to get
rid of the government that had got t hem into such a si tuati on.
But Const ant i nopl e and the Dardanel l es, because of their world
i mport ance for shi ppi ng, and eastern Thrace, because i t i s i n Europe,
were posi ti ons that occupi ed a speci al st at us in the mi nds of Bri ti sh
l eaders. Wi nston Churchi l l , hitherto pro- Turki s h, agai n came to the
rescue of Ll oyd George' s policy and tol d the Cabi net i n Sept ember
that "The line of deep water separat i ng Asi a f rom Eur ope was a line
of great si gni fi cance, and we mus t make that line secure by every
means within our power. If the Tur ks take the Gal l i pol i Peni nsul a
and Const ant i nopl e, we shall have lost the whole fruits of our vic-
tory . . . "
2 S
Ll oyd George voi ced his st rong agreement , sayi ng that
"In no ci rcumst ances coul d we allow the Gal l i pol i Peni nsul a to be
held by the Tur ks . It was the most i mport ant strategi c posi ti on i n
the worl d, and the cl osi ng of the St rai t s had prol onged the war by
two years. It was i nconcei vabl e that we shoul d allow the Tur ks to
gai n possessi on of the Gal l i pol i Peni nsul a and we shoul d fight to
prevent tfieir doi ng s o . "
2 6
By mi d- Sept ember the last Greek t roops st andi ng between the
Tur ks and the Allies had di sappeared and a direct armed clash
seemed i mmi nent . Th e Cabi net met i n a seri es of emergency sessi ons
commenci ng 15 Sept ember, when Churchi l l told his col l eagues that
"The mi sf ort unes of the Allies were probabl y due to the fact that
owi ng to the del ay on the part of Ameri ca i n decl ari ng their posi ti on,
their armi es had apparent l y mel ted away. " Armi es were needed, i n
his view, for he "was wholly opposed to any at t empt to carry out a
bluff wi thout f orce. "
2 7
He st ressed the necessity of securi ng support
from the Domi ni ons and from France i n rei nforci ng the Bri ti sh
t roops faci ng Kemal ' s armi es.
On 15 Sept ember 1922 the Cabi net i nstructed Wi nston Churchi l l
t o draf t f or Ll oyd George' s s i gnat urea t el egram t o the Domi ni ons
i nformi ng t hem of the Bri ti sh deci si on to defend the Neut ral Zone i n
Turkey and aski ng for their mi l i tary ai d. Shortl y before mi dni ght
the t el egram, in ci pher, was sent to each of the Domi ni on pri me
mi ni sters.
Th e Cabi net deci ded that the publ i c also ought to be i nf ormed of
the seri ousness of the si tuati on; and to this end Churchi l l and Ll oyd
George prepared a press rel ease on 16 Sept ember that appeared that
* The need for securing support from the Dominions arose from the change in
their position that had come about afterand as a result ofthe First World War.
At the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, Jan Christian Smut s of South Africa,
Prime Minister Robert Borden of Canada, and Prime Minister William Hughes of
Australia successfully asserted the claim of their Dominions to be seated as sovereign
nations on a plane of equality with Britain and the other Allies. When, at that time,
Britain offered France a treaty of guarantee, Smuts and South African Prime
Minister Loui s Botha had wrung from Ll oyd George a concession that such a treaty
would not be binding upon them. They wrote that, from then on, it would be
theoretically possible for Britain to go to war while one or more Dominions remained
neutral .
2 8
In 1922 the theoretical possibility was put to the test.
eveni ng i n the newspapers. No members of the Cabi net other than
Ll oyd George and Churchi l l had seen i t pri or t o publ i cati on. The
communi que expressed the desi re of the Bri ti sh government to con-
vene a peace conference with Turkey, but stated that no such confer-
ence coul d convene under the gun of Turki s h threats. It expressed
fear of what the Mos l em worl d mi ght do if comparati vel y weak
Mos l em Tur ke y coul d be seen to have inflicted a maj or defeat on the
Al l i es; pres umabl y the rest of the Mos l em worl d woul d be encouraged
to throw off colonial rul e. Th e communi que made reference to
Bri ti sh consul tati ons with France, Ital y, and the Domi ni ons with a
view t oward taki ng common mi l i tary action to avert the Kemal i s t
t hr e at .
2 9
Th e bel l i gerent tone of the communi que al armed publ i c opi ni on i n
Bri tai n. Th e Daily Mail ran a banner headl i ne: " S T O P T H I S NE W
WA R ! "
3 0
Th e communi que also caused al arm abroad. Furi ous that
the Bri ti sh government appeared to be speaki ng for hi m, French
Premi er Poi ncare ordered his t roops to be wi thdrawn f rom the front
line of the Neut ral Zone; the Ital i ans followed forthwi th, and the
Bri ti sh forces were left al one to face the enemy.
Th e Domi ni on pri me mi ni sters were also offended. The
communi quewhi ch was of course written i n pl ai n Engl i s hwas
publ i shed i n Canadi an, Aust ral i an, and New Zeal and newspapers
before the pri me mi ni sters had a chance to decode the ci phered
cabl es they had recei ved. It suggest ed that Churchi l l and Ll oyd
George were tryi ng to rush t hem into somet hi ng wi thout gi vi ng them
ti me to think. In repl y, Canada and Aust ral i a refused to send t roops.
A revol uti on had occurred in the consti tuti on of the Bri ti sh Empi r e :
it was the first ti me that Bri ti sh Domi ni ons had ever refused to
follow the mother country into war. Sout h Afri ca remai ned silent.
Onl y New Zeal and and Newf oundl and responded favorabl y.
On 22 Sept ember Ll oyd George called upon Churchi l l t o take
charge as chai rman of a Cabi net Commi t t ee to oversee mi l i tary
movement s i n Tu r k e y .
3 1
Churchi l l ' s brilliant friend, F. E. Smi t h,
now Lo r d Bi rkenhead and servi ng as Lo r d Chancel l or, had previ ousl y
been critical of Churchi l l for changi ng over to an ant i - Turki sh po-
sition, but at the end of Sept ember joi ned Ll oyd George and
Churchi l l as a l eader of the bel l i gerent faction. It was a questi on of
presti ge, Bi rkenhead felt; Bri tai n mus t never be seen to gi ve in to
f or c e .
3 2
In Bri tai n the press campai gn agai nst the war conti nued. Publ i c
protest meet i ngs were hel d. Tr a de uni on del egates went to Downi ng
Street to deliver their protest to the Pri me Mi ni ster personal l y.
Th e Forei gn Secret ary, Lo r d Curzon, crossed over t o Pari s t o
at t empt to concert a strategy with the Allies. On 23 Sept ember he
finally agreed with Poi ncare and Sf orza on a common program that
yi el ded to all of Kemal ' s demands eas t ern Thr ac e , Const ant i nopl e,
and the Dardanel l es s o l ong as appearances coul d be preserved; i t
was to appear to be a negoti ated settl ement rather than a surrender.
It was not a happy meeti ng for the Bri ti sh Forei gn Secret ary; after
bei ng exposed to Poi ncare' s bitter denunci ati ons, Curzon broke down
and retired to the next room i n t ears.
Meanwhi l e, the Bri ti sh and Turki s h armi es confronted one another
at Chanak (today called Canakkal e) , a coastal town on the Asi ati c
si de of the Dardanel l es that today serves as the poi nt of depart ure for
t ours to the rui ns of Tr oy. Th e French and Ital i an conti ngents
havi ng retired to their tents, a smal l Bri ti sh conti ngent st ood guard
behi nd barbed wi re, with orders not to fire unl ess fired upon. Th e
fi rst det achment of Turki s h t roops advanced to the Bri ti sh line on 23
Sept ember. Th e Tur ks di d not open fire, but stood their ground and
refused to wi t hdraw. A few days later more Tur ki s h t roops arri ved.
By the end of Sept ember, there were 4, 500 Tur ks i n the Neut ral
Zone, tal ki ng t hrough the barbed wi re to the Bri ti sh, and hol di ng ^
their rifles but t - f orward to demonst rat e that they woul d not be the
fi rst to fire. It was an eerie and unnervi ng confrontati on. On 29
Sept ember Bri ti sh Intel l i gence report ed to the Cabi net that Ke mal ,
pushed on by Sovi et Russi a, pl anned to attack the next day. Th e
report, t hough fal se, was bel i eved. With the approval of the Cabi net ,
the chiefs of the mi l i tary servi ces drafted a stern ul t i mat um for the
local Bri ti sh commander to deliver to Ke mal , threateni ng to open
fire.
Th e local Bri ti sh commander, di sregardi ng the i nstructi ons from
Londonwhi ch coul d have led Bri tai n into wardi d not deliver the
ul t i mat um. Inst ead he reached an agreement with Ke mal to negoti ate
an armi st i ceand so brought the cri si s to an end. For many reas ons
i ncl udi ng fear of what Ll oyd George and Churchi l l i n their reckl ess-
ness mi ght do Ke ma l was prepared to accept a f ormul a that allowed
the Allies to save face by post poni ng Turkey' s occupati on of some of
the terri tori es she was eventual l y to occupy. Had Ke mal i nvaded
Europe i t woul d have meant war. Th e belligerent post ure of the
Bri ti sh l eaders appeared to have st opped hi m. Gi ven the actual
weakness of their posi ti on, this represented a brilliant t ri umph for
Ll oyd George and Churchi l l .
After much hard bargai ni ng, negoti ati ons for an armi sti ce were
concl uded at the coastal town of Mudanya on the morni ng of 11
Oct ober, to come into effect at mi dni ght , 14 Oct ober. Significant
subst ant i ve i ssues remai ned; consi derati on of them was put off until
a peace conference coul d convene. Essenti al l y, Ke mal obtai ned
the t erms he had outl i ned i n the Nati onal Pact and had adhered to
ever si nce: an i ndependent Turki s h nati on-state to be establ i shed i n
Anatol i a and eastern Thr ac e . Bef ore l ong, Kemal ' s Turkey took
physi cal possessi on of Const ant i nopl e, the Dardanel l es, and eastern
Thr ac e f rom the depart i ng Al l i es.
In November 1922, the Kemal i s t Nati onal As s embl y depos ed the
Sul t an. Th e Sul t an fled from Const ant i nopl e into exile. Th u s i n
1922 the centuri es-ol d Ot t oman Empi r e came t o an end; and Turkey,
whi ch for 500 years had domi nat ed the Mi ddl e Eas t , depart ed from
Mi ddl e East ern hi story to seek to make herself European.
I V
Two aspect s of the crisis and of the armi sti ce negoti ati ons made an
especially marked i mpressi on i n Bri tai n. One was that the French
representati ve at the armi sti ce conference had pl ayed an adversary
role by urgi ng the Tur ks t o resi st Bri ti sh demands . Thi s proved t o
be the cl i max of a line of French conduct throughout the Turki s h
cri si s that was regarded i n Bri tai n as t reacherous. Jus t as Bri tai n' s
Mi ddl e East ern pol i cy had led France to re-eval uate and eventual l y
to repudi at e her alliance with Bri t ai n, so now France' s policy caused
the l eaders of the Bri ti sh Empi re to look at France t hrough new and
apprehensi ve eyes. A short ti me later the Pri me Mi ni ster of Sout h
Afri ca wrote to the then Pri me Mi ni ster of Bri tai n that "France i s
once more the l eader of the Conti nent with all the bad old instincts
fully alive in her . . . Th e French are out for worl d power; they have
pl ayed the most dangerous anti-ally game with Ke mal ; and inevitably
in the course of their ambi t i ons they mus t come to realise that the
Bri ti sh Empi re i s the only remai ni ng enemy. "
3 3
Another unnervi ng aspect of the cri si s was the apparent l y reckl ess
conduct of the inner group i n the Cabi net : Ll oyd George,
Bi rkenhead, Churchi l l , Chancel l or of the Exchequer Si r Robert
Ho me , and the Conservati ve l eader Aust en Chamberl ai n. Not merel y
to the publ i c and to the press, but al so to their political col l eagues,
they gave the i mpressi on of bei ng anxi ous to provoke another war.
Th e Fi rst Lo r d of the Admi ral t y sai d that he had the feeling that
" L . G. , Wi nston, Bi rkenhead, Ho me , and even Aust en positively
want hostilities to break out . "
3 4
Mauri ce Hankey, Secret ary to the
Cabi net , recorded in his di ary on 17 Oct ober 1922, that Wi nston
Churchi l l "qui te frankly regretted that the Tur ks had not attacked
us"; Ll oyd George agreed with Churchi l l about thi s, Hankey
bel i eved.
3 5
Attacki ng the Cabi net mi ni sters as "Rash and vacillating and in-
capabl e, " The Times on 2 Oct ober had warned that "if this country
once begi ns to suspect them, or any among them, of any di sposi ti on
to make political capi tal at home out of a course which woul d l and us
in war, it will never forgi ve t hem. "
St anl ey Bal dwi n, a juni or Conservat i ve member of the government
who pri vatel y had come to view the Pri me Mi ni ster as "demoni acal , "
confided t o his wife that "he had f ound out that . . . L . G . had been
all for war and had schemed to make thi s country go to war with
Tur ke y so that they shoul d have a ' Chri sti an' . . . war v. the
Mahomedan . . . On the strength of that they woul d call a General
El ecti on at once . . . whi ch, they cal cul ated, woul d return t hem t o
office for another peri od of ye ar s . "
3 6
Bonar La w expressed the op-
posi te fear: that the Pri me Mi ni ster woul d make peace i n order to
win the elections, but that once he had been re-elected he woul d go
back t o maki ng wa r .
3 7
Ll oyd George' s friend Lo r d Ri ddel l tol d the Pri me Mi ni ster "that
the country will not stand for a fresh war. " "I di sagree, " sai d the
Pri me Mi ni ster. "The country will willingly s upport our action re-
gardi ng the St rai t s by force of arms i f need be . "
3 8
Decades later,
wri ti ng of the Chanak cri si s i n his memoi rs , Ll oyd George avowed
that "I certainly meant to fi ght and I was certain we shoul d wi n. "
3 9
V
As the Chanak cri si s moved toward its denouement , a mi l i tary revo-
lution broke out in Greece, l aunched by a tri umvi rate of officers in
the field: two army col onel s and a naval captai n. The r e was much
confusi on but , i n the end, no resi stance. Th e government resi gned
on 26 Sept ember. Ki ng Const ant i ne abdi cat ed the following morni ng;
his son mount ed the throne as George II that afternoon. Th e mai n
body of revol uti onary troops marched into At hens on 28 Sept ember.
Th e t ri umvi rat e of revol uti onary officers as s umed authori ty, and
at once ordered the arrest of the l eaders of the previ ous government .
Gounari s and several other ex-mi ni sters were brought before a mili-
tary court marti al on 13 November, despi te protests f rom the Bri ti sh
government . Th e lengthy charges, t hough cl othed i n legalistic
l anguage, were of little legal validity. Essenti al l y, they amount ed to a
political i ndi ctment of Gounari s and hi s associ ates for havi ng brought
about a national cat ast rophe.
At dawn on 28 November the presi dent of the court marti al
announced its verdi ct. All eight of the accused persons were convi cted
of high t reason. Two of t hem were sentenced to life i mpri sonment .
Th e other si x, i ncl udi ng former Pri me Mi ni ster Gounari s , were
sentenced to deat h. Th e six condemned men, within hours, were
dri ven to an executi on ground east of Athens, in the shadow of
Mount Hymet t us . Smal l buri al holes had al ready been dug at inter-
vals of twelve met res. In front of each of the condemned men, at a
di stance of fifteen paces, stood a firing s quad of five sol di ers. Th e
executi on took pl ace before noon. Havi ng refused to wear bandages,
Gounari s and his associ ates went to their death with their eyes
VI
On 8 Oct ober 1922 Andrew Bonar La w, the retired leader of the
Uni oni st Conservat i ve Party, wrote a letter to The Times and the
Daily Expresspublished the next dayi n which he appeared to
express s upport for the st rong st and the Ll oyd George government
had taken agai nst Turkey at Chanak. On the other hand, he poi nted
out that the i nterests that Bri tai n appeared to be defendi ng, such as
the f reedom of the Dardanel l es and the preventi on of future mas-
sacres of Chri st i ans, were not uni quel y Bri ti sh i nterests but worl d
i nterests. Theref ore, he wrote, "It i s not . . . right that the burden of
taki ng acti on shoul d fall on the Bri ti sh Empi r e al one. " He cl ai med
that "We are at the St rai t s and in Const ant i nopl e not by our own
action al one, but by the will of the Al l i ed Powers which won the war,
and Ameri ca i s one of those Powers. "
In much- quot ed sentences, Bonar La w argued that i f the Uni t ed
St at es and the Allies were not prepared to share the burden of
responsi bi l i ty, Bri tai n shoul d put it down. "We cannot al one act as
the pol i ceman of the worl d. Th e financial and social condi ti ons of
thi s country make that i mpossi bl e. " He proposed t o warn France
that Bri tai n mi ght walk away f rom enforci ng the settl ement with
Germany, and mi ght i mi tate the Uni t ed St at es i n reti ri ng into an
excl usi ve concern with her own national i nterests, if France failed to
recogni ze that a st and had to be taken in Asi a as well as in Eu r o p e .
4 1
Read as a whol e, Bonar Law' s letter di d not call into questi on the
policy purs ued until then by the government ; it merel y offered
advi ce for the future. Its isolationist tone, however, and the sentence
about not bei ng the worl d' s pol i cemanwhi ch was often quot ed out
of cont ext st ruck a responsi ve chord in the ranks of those who
found Ll oyd George' s policies dangerous and overly ambi t i ous.
Moreover, Bonar Law' s wi l l i ngness to take a publ i c stand suggest ed
that, with his health apparent l y restored, he mi ght be persuaded to
re-enter pol i ti cswhi ch threatened to alter the delicate bal ance of
forces within the Conservat i ve Party and endanger the Coal i ti on.
Bonar La w had chosen his foreign policy i ssue shrewdl y. Tor y
senti ment was traditionally pr o- Tur k and had been alienated by the
Pri me Mi ni ster' s pro- Greek crusade. "A good understanding with
Turkey was our old policy and it is essential . . . " (original emphas i s ) ,
wrote the chief of the recalcitrant Tori es on 2 Oc t obe r .
4 2
It was yet
another i nstance in whi ch rank-and-file Conservati ves found that
their pri nci pl es and prej udi ces were bei ng di sregarded by the
Coal i ti on government . Comi ng after the concessi on of i ndependence
to Irel and and after the recogni ti on of Bol shevi k Rus s i a, Ll oyd
George' s ant i - Turki sh policy threatened to be one i nstance too many.
Th e Pri me Mi ni ster had di ssi pat ed hi s credi t with t hem. He had
done so at a t i me when the col l apse of the economy, mas s unem-
pl oyment, a s l ump in export s, scandal s concerni ng the sal es of honors
and titles to political contri butors, and a seri es of forei gn policy
fiascos cul mi nat i ng in the Chanak cri si s had left hi m a much di mi n-
i shed electoral asset . The Conservat i ves no l onger felt compel l ed to
follow hi m in order to survi ve at the pol l s.
The Pri me Mi ni ster viewed mat t ers differently. Hi s government ' s
firmness at Chanak had brought Turkey' s armi es to a hal t; it was, in
his view, a personal t ri umph for hi m and for Churchi l l , and he
mi stakenl y bel i eved that the el ectorate recogni zed it as such. On this
erroneous as s umpt i on he proposed to call a snap election in the flush
of vi ctory, as he had done at the end of 1918 after the Fi rst Worl d
War had been won.
Aust en Chamberl ai n and Lo r d Bi rkenhead, the Conservat i ve
l eaders i n the government , agreed to join with Ll oyd George i n
fighting the elections once agai n on a coalition basi s. To def end that
deci si on, Chamberl ai n, as leader of the part y, s ummoned the Con-
servati ve members of the Hous e of Commons and of the government
to a meet i ng the morni ng of Thur s day, 19 Oct ober, at the Carl t on,
the l eadi ng To r y cl ub.
Bonar La w was the person best pl aced t o oppos e Chamberl ai n,
bri ng down the Coal i ti on, and repl ace Ll oyd George as Pri me Mi ni s-
ter. He hesi tated; yet there was a st rong press campai gn urgi ng hi m
on, led by The Times and by the Beaverbrook newspapers.
Lo r d Beaverbrook was Bonar Law' s most i nti mate political fri end.
He was largely responsi bl e for havi ng created the Ll oyd George
Coal i ti on government duri ng the war; now he acted to bri ng i t
down. On 11 Oct ober Beaverbrook wrote to an Ameri can friend that
We are now in the throes of a political cri si s. Th e failure of the
Pri me Mi ni ster' s Greek policy had resul ted in a compl et e col-
l apse of his presti ge with the Conservat i ves . . . Th e i mmedi at e
future will deci de whether the Conservat i ve Party is to remai n
intact, or whether the Pri me Mi ni ster i s st rong enough to split
it. It will have been a great achi evement to have s mas hed two
parti es in one short admi ni st rat i on. Yet that is what he can
cl ai m i f he succeeds i n destroyi ng the To r i e s .
4 3
Beaverbrook succeeded i n overcomi ng Bonar Law' s doubt s and i n
maki ng sure that the former Tor y l eader actual l y at t ended the deci si ve
meeti ng at the Carl t on Cl ub. At the meeti ng, La w spoke agai nst the
Coal i ti on, and though he spoke badl y his intervention proved deci-
si ve. By an overwhel mi ng vote of 187 to 87, the caucus deci ded to
contest the comi ng elections on a strai ght party basi s.
Upon recei vi ng the news, Davi d Ll oyd George i mmedi at el y ten-
dered his resi gnati on t o Ki ng George. Soon afterward Andrew Bonar
La w took office as Pri me Mi ni ster and called elections for 15
November.
Th e popul ar vote on 15 November was cl ose, but i n the winner-
take-all Bri ti sh parl i amentary syst em the resul ts were a t ri umph for
the Conservat i ves, who won a majori ty of seats in the new Hous e of
Commons . Ll oyd George was repudi at ed; neither he nor Asqui t h
commanded a l arge enough fol l owi ng to qualify even as Le ade r of
the Opposi t i on, for La bo ur had beaten the Li beral s to take second
pl ace.
Duri ng the electoral campai gn, the Beaverbrook press mount ed a
fi erce attack on the Mi ddl e East ern pol i cy of the Coal i ti on govern-
ment, and demanded that Bri tai n wi thdraw from her new acqui -
si ti ons: I raq, Pal esti ne, and Tr ans j or dan. Al t hough Beaverbrook' s
crusade was i n fact l aunched wi thout Bonar Law' s sancti on, i t seemed
to i mpl i cate the new admi ni st rat i on in a blanket condemnat i on of
Bri tai n' s postwar policy i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . It al so cal l ed into questi on
Bri tai n' s commi t ment to conti nue to s upport Arab and Jewi sh aspi -
rati ons there.
As a resul t, duri ng the election campai gn the Col oni al Secret ary
Wi nston Churchi l l was drawn into publ i c controversy with Lo r d
Curzon (who had deserted to Bonar Law) over the record of the past
few years i n the Mi ddl e Eas t . Churchi l l charged that Curzon was "as
responsi bl e as any man alive for the promi ses that were gi ven to the
Je ws and t o the Ar a b s . "
4 4
T. E. Lawrence wrote t o the editor of the
Daily Express in support of his former chief that "If we get out of
the Mi ddl e Eas t Mandat es with credi t, i t will be by Wi nston' s bri dge.
Th e man' s as brave as six, as good- humoured, shrewd, self-confident,
& consi derate as a st at esman can be : & several ti mes I've seen hi m
chuck the statesmanl i ke course & do the honest thi ng i ns t ead. "
4 5
In the general ruin of Coal i ti on fortunes, Churchi l l was defeated
for re-election i n his consti tuency of Dundee. T. E. Lawrence wrote
"I' m more sorry about Wi nston than I can say. I hope the Press
Comment i s not too mal evol ent. It's sure to have hurt hi m t hough.
What bl oody shi ts the Dundeans must be . "
4 6
Al one among the Coal i ti on Li beral l eaders, Davi d Ll oyd George
retai ned his parl i ament ary seat ; but he never held Cabi net office
agai n. Li ke Lo r d Ki t chener and Wi nston Churchi l l at the
Dardanel l es, he saw his political posi ti on rui ned by the Mi ddl e Eas t .
For nearly a quart er of a century after 1922 the once al l -powerful
mi ni ster who had presi ded over the desti ni es of the worl d l i ngered on
i n political i mpot ence and isolation, feared and mi st rust ed by men of
lesser abilities, and looked down upon by t hem for havi ng conduct ed
a moral l y shabby admi ni strati on. In part due to his own flaws, he
was deni ed a chance to appl y his fertile geni us to the political
chal l enges of the Great Depressi on, the appeasement years, and the
Second Worl d War. Hi s political devi ousness and his moral and
financial l axness were never forgotten. It was not sufficiently remem-
bered that si ngl e- handed he had kept Bri tai n f rom l osi ng the Fi rst
Worl d War, and that his col l eagues had once cl ai med that they were
content to let hi m be Pri me Mi ni ster for life. He di ed i n 1945.
In his later years Ll oyd George devoted himself to re-fighting the
old battl es i n hi s highly sl anted, far f rom factual , but beauti ful l y
written memoi rs . As he present ed it, his last, lost crusade i n the
Mi ddl e Eas t was i ntended to make the worl d a fundamental l y better
pl ace. Of the deci si on reached at the Carl t on Cl ub, he wrot e: "So the
Government fell, and with it went first the liberation of Armeni a and
Asi ati c Greece, and i n the sequel the Le ague of Nat i ons and all the
projects for subst i t ut i ng conciliation for armament s . "
4 7
*
* Ll oyd George and the Coalition Conservatives fell from power because they had
failed to pay attention to political sentiment amongst the Parliamentary rank and
file. To make sure that on their side there would be no such failure again, the
Conservatives thereafter established an organization of backbench Members of Par-
liament to make their views known to the leadership. It exists to this day, and is
called the 1922 Committee.
61
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE
MI DDLE EASTERN QUESTION
i
Eas t of Suez, Ll oyd George and his col l eagues were the aut hors of a
maj or chapter i n hi story. Th e establ i shment of Al l i ed control i n the
Mi ddl e Eas t marked the cl i max of Europe' s conquest of the rest of
the worl d. It was the last chapt er in a tale of high advent ureof
sai l ors dari ng to cross uncharted oceans, of expl orers tracki ng ri vers
to their source, and of smal l bands of sol di ers marchi ng into the
interior of unknown conti nents to do battl e with the vast armi es of
remot e empi res. Th e venture had begun centuri es before, i n the
wake of Col umbus ' s gal l eons, as Europeans st reamed forth to s ubj u-
gat e and col oni ze the l ands they had di scovered i n the Ameri cas and
in the waters to the east and west of t hem. It conti nued t hrough the
nineteenth century, as Bri tai n as s umed the empi re of Indi a, and as
the Great Powers di vi ded the continent of Afri ca between t hem. By
the dawn of the twentieth century, Eas t Asi a apart , the Mi ddl e Eas t
was the only native basti on that the Europeans had not yet st ormed;
and, at the end of the Fi rs t Worl d War, Ll oyd George was abl e to
proudl y poi nt out that his armi es had finally st ormed it.
For at least a century before the 1914 war, Europeans had regarded
i t as axi omati c that someday the Mi ddl e East woul d be occupi ed by
one or more of the Great Powers. Thei r great fear was that di sput es
about their respecti ve shares mi ght l ead the European powers to fight
rui nous wars agai nst one another.
For the government of Bri tai n, therefore, the settl ements arri ved
at by 1922 were a doubl y crowni ng achi evement. Bri tai n had won a
far larger share of the Mi ddl e Eas t (and Bri tai n' s rival, Russi a, a
much smal l er one) than had seemed possi bl e bef orehand; but even
more i mport ant , the powers seemed prepared to accept the territorial
di vi si on that had emerged i n the early 1920s without further recourse
to arms .
Th u s the t roubl i ng and potentially expl osi ve Mi ddl e East ern Ques-
tion, as it had exi sted in worl d pol i ti cs si nce the ti me of Bonapart e' s
558
T H E M I D D L E E A S T E R N Q U E S T I O N 559
Egypt i an expedi ti on, was successful l y settl ed by the post war arrange-
ment s arri ved at by 1922. A maj or i ssue that had been at stake was
where Russi a' s political frontier i n the Mi ddl e Eas t woul d be drawn.
By 1922 the quest i on was sol ved: the Russi an frontier was finally
drawn to run with a northern tier of states that stretched f rom
Tur ke y to Iran to Af ghani st ancount ri es that maneuvered to remai n
i ndependent both of Rus s i a and the West, al ong a line that conti nued
to hol d firm for decades. Th e other great i ssue at stake si nce
Napol eoni c t i mes had been what woul d eventual l y become of the
Ot t oman Empi r e an i ssue that was resol ved i n 1922 by the termi -
nati on of the Ot t oman Sul t anat e and the parti ti on of its Mi ddl e
East ern domai ns between Turkey, France, and Bri tai n. Suc h was the
settl ement of 1922.
I I
Th e settl ement of 1922 was not a si ngl e act or agreement or docu-
ment ; rather, i t was the desi gn that emerged from many separat e
acts and agreement s and document s that date mostl y f rom that year.
Russi a' s territorial frontier i n the Mi ddl e Eas t was establ i shed by
the draft consti tuti on of the U . S . S . R . promul gat ed at the end of
1922, while her political frontier emerged from the treaties she
si gned with Tur ke y, Persi a, and Af ghani st an, and, to some extent,
f rom the t rade agreement she si gned with Bri tai n i n 1921.
Th e deposi ng of the Ot t oman Sul t an and the establ i shment of a
Turki s h national state (confined to the Turki s h- s peaki ng porti on of
the di ssol ved empi re) were effected by unani mous votes of the
Turki s h Gr a nd Nati onal As s embl y on 1 and 2 November 1922.
Turkey' s eventual frontiers i n l arge part grew out of the armi sti ce
she si gned with the Allies in the aut umn of 1922, followed by a
peace treaty with the Allies si gned at the Swi s s city of Laus anne the
following year.
Th e rest of the former Ot t oman domai ns i n the Mi ddl e Eas t were
parti ti oned between Bri tai n and France by such document s as
France' s Le ague of Nat i ons Mandat e t o rule Syri a and Le banon
( 1922) , Bri tai n' s Le ague of Nat i ons Mandat e to rule Pal esti ne i ncl ud-
i ng Trans j ordan ( 1922) , and the treaty of 1922 with I raq whi ch
Bri tai n i ntended to serve as an affirmation of a Mandat e to rul e that
newly created country.
Within her own sphere of influence in the Mi ddl e Eas t , Bri tai n
made her di sposi t i ons i n acts and document s that al so, for the most
* Some frontier questions remained unresolved. Turkey's frontier with Syria,
example, was established only at the end of the 1930s.
part, date from 1922. She pl aced Fua d I on the throne of Egypt i n
that year, and made Egypt a nomi nal l y i ndependent protectorate by
the t erms of the Al l enby Decl arat i on of 1922. She establ i shed a
protectorate in I raq by her treaty that year with that count ry: a
country that she had created and upon whose throne she had pl aced
her own nomi nee, Fei sal . By the t erms of the Pal esti ne Mandat e of
1922 and Churchi l l ' s Whi te Paper for Pal esti ne i n 1922, Trans j ordan
was set on the road to a political exi stence separat e from that of
Pal est i neAbdul l ah, appoi nt ed by Bri tai n, was to permanent l y pre-
si de over the new entity by a deci si on made in 1922whi l e west of
the Jor dan, Je ws were promi sed a Nati onal Home and non- Jews
were promi sed full ri ghts. Independence or aut onomy for the Kur ds ,
whi ch had been on the agenda i n 1921, somehow di sappeared from
the agenda in 1922, so there was to be no Kur di s t an: it was a
nondeci si on of 1922 that was, in effect, a deci si on. In 1922, too,
Bri tai n i mposed frontier agreement s upon Ibn Saud that establ i shed
boundari es between Saudi Arabi a, I raq, and Kuwai t .
Thus Bri t ai nl i ke France i n her sphere of the Mi ddl e Eas t , and
Rus s i a i n hersest abl i shed st at es, appoi nt ed persons to govern t hem,
and drew frontiers between t hem; and di d so mostl y i n and around
1922. As they had l ong i ntended to do, the European powers had
taken the political desti ni es of the Mi ddl e East ern peopl es in their
hands and they di d so by the t erms of what I have called the
settl ement of 1922.
Ill
Everywhere else i n the worl deverywhere outsi de of As i aEur ope an
occupati on had resul ted in the destructi on of native political st ruc-
t ures and their repl acement by new ones of European desi gn. Th e
Ameri cas, Aust ral i a, New Zeal and, and Afri ca were no longer
di vi ded i n t erms of t ri bes; they were di vi ded, as Europe was, into
countri es. Government al admi ni strati on of most of the pl anet was
conduct ed i n a European mode, accordi ng to European precept s, and
i n accordance with European concept s.
Still, there was some reason to questi on whether European occu-
pati on woul d produce qui te so deep or l asti ng an i mpressi on i n the
Mi ddl e Eas t as i t had el sewhere. It was not only that the Mi ddl e Eas t
was a regi on of proud and ancient civilizations, with beliefs deepl y
rooted i n the past , but al so that the changes Europe proposed to
i ntroduce were so prof ound that generati ons woul d have to pass
before the changes coul d take root. The s e matters take ti me. Anci ent
Rome shaped Europe, and renascent Europe shaped the Ameri cas,
but in both cases it was the work of centuri es; and in 1922 western
Eur ope was i n no moodand i n no condi t i ont o embark on an
undert aki ng of s uch magni t ude.
Th e l ong-expected European i mperi al adventure i n the Mi ddl e
Eas t had therefore begun too l ate; Europeans coul d no l onger pursue
it either with adequat e resources or wi th a whole heart. Eur ope itself,
its antebellum worl d swept away in the cat acl ysm of 191418, was
changi ng more rapi dl y in weeks or mont hs than it had before in
decades or centuri es, and to a growi ng number of Europeans , i mperi -
al i sm seemed out of pl ace i n the modern age.
In the first years of the war it had still sounded accept abl e openl y
to avow an intention to annex new col oni es; but as Wilson's Ameri ca
and Leni n' s Rus s i a, with their anti -i mperi al i st rhetori c, chal l enged
old Europe, mi nds and political vocabul ari es began to change. Si r
Mark Sykes, ever sensi ti ve to shifts i n the current of opi ni on, recog-
nized i n 1917 that the i mperi al concept s he and Picot had empl oyed
only a year before in their Mi ddl e Eas t pact al ready bel onged to a
bygone era.
By the t i me that the war came to an end, Bri ti sh soci ety was
general l y i ncl i ned to reject the idealistic case for i mperi al i sm (that it
woul d extend the benefits of advanced civilization to a backward
regi on) as qui xot i c, and the practi cal case for it (that it woul d be of
benefit to Bri tai n to expand her empi re) as unt rue. Vi ewi ng i mperi -
al i sm as a costl y drai n on a society that needed to invest all of its
remai ni ng resources in rebui l di ng itself, the bul k of the Bri ti sh
press, publ i c, and Parl i ament agreed to let the government commi t
itself to a presence i n the Arab Mi ddl e Eas t only because Wi nston
Churchi l l ' s i ngeni ous strategy made i t seem possi bl e to control the
regi on i nexpensi vel y.
Th u s the belief, widely shared by Bri ti sh officials duri ng and
after the Fi rst Worl d War, that Bri tai n had come to the Mi ddl e
Eas t to s t ayat least l ong enough to re- shape the regi on i n line with
European political i nterests, i deas, and i deal swas based on the
fragile assumpt i on that Churchi l l ' s ai rcraf t - and- armored- car strategy
coul d hol d local opposi t i on at bay indefinitely. In turn, that as s ump-
tion was another expressi on of the underest i mat i on of the Mi ddl e
Eas t that had typified Bri ti sh policy all al ong. It had shown itself
when Grey di sdai ned the offer of an Ot t oman alliance i n 1911; when
Asqui t h in 1914 regarded Ot t oman entry in the war as bei ng of no
great concern; and when Ki t chener, in 1915, sent his armi es to their
doom agai nst an entrenched and forewarned foe at Gal l i pol i i n an
attack the Bri ti sh government knew woul d be sui ci dal i f the def endi ng
troops were of European qual i t yKi t chener' s fatal assumpt i on bei ng
that they were not.
In 1922 the Bri ti sh government had arri ved at a political compro-
mi se with Bri ti sh soci ety, by the t erms of which Bri tai n coul d assert
her mast ery i n the Mi ddl e Eas t so l ong as she coul d do so at little
cost. To Bri t i sh officials who underest i mat ed the difficulties Bri tai n
woul d encounter i n governi ng the regi onwho, i ndeed, had no
concepti on of the magni t ude of what they had undert akent hat
meant Bri tai n was i n the Mi ddl e Eas t to stay. In retrospect, however,
it was an early i ndi cati on that Bri tai n was likely to leave.
I V
Fr o m a Bri ti sh poi nt of view, the settl ement of 1922 had become
largely out of dat e by the t i me i t was effected. It embodi ed much
of the program for the post war Mi ddl e Eas t that the Bri t i sh govern-
ment had f ormul at ed (mostl y t hrough the agency of Si r Mark
Sykes) between 1915 and 1917. But the Bri ti sh government had
changed, Bri t i sh official thi nki ng had changed, and i n 1922 the
arrangement s arri ved at i n the Mi ddl e Eas t di d not accuratel y
reflect what the government of the day woul d have wi shed.
Gi vi ng France a Le ague of Nat i ons Mandat e i n 1922 to rule
Syri a (i ncl udi ng Lebanon) was a case i n poi nt. In 1915 and 1916
Forei gn Secret ary Si r Edward Gr e y and the Bri ti sh negoti ator Si r
Mark Sykes had vi ewed with sympat hy France' s cl ai m t o Syr i aand
had accept ed it. But i n 1922 Bri tai n' s Pri me Mi ni ster, Forei gn
Secret ary, and officials in the field were all men who had sai d for
years that to allow France to occupy Syri a was to invite di saster.
Even within its own sphere i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , the Bri ti sh
government was unhappy about the di sposi ti ons i t was maki ng i n
1922. In 1914, 1915, and 1916, Lo r d Ki t chener and his l i eutenants
had chosen to sponsor the Has hemi t es Hus s ei n of Mecca and his
s ons as l eaders of the postwar Arab Mi ddl e Eas t . By 1918 Bri ti sh
officials had come to regard Hus s ei n as a burden, who was i nvol vi ng
t hem i n a l osi ng conflict with Ibn Saud. By 1922 Bri ti sh politicians
and officials had come to view Hussei n' s son Fei sal as treacherous,
and Hussei n' s son Abdul l ah as lazy and ineffective. Yet , i n Iraq
and Trans j ordan, Fei sal and Abdul l ah were the rul ers whom Bri tai n
had i nstal l ed; Bri tai n had commi t t ed herself to the Hashemi t e cause.
Pal esti ne was another case in poi nt: in 1922 Bri tai n accepted a
Le ague of Nat i ons Mandat e to carry out a Zi oni st program that she
had vi gorousl y espoused in 1917but for which she had lost all
ent husi asm in the early 1920s.
It was no wonder, then, that in the years to come Bri t i sh officials
were to govern the Mi ddl e Eas t with no great sense of di recti on or
convi cti on. It was a consequence of a peculiarity of the settl ement
of 1922: havi ng destroyed the old order i n the regi on, and havi ng
depl oyed t roops, armored cars, and mi l i tary aircraft everywhere from
Egypt to I raq, British policy-makers imposed a settlement upon the
Middle East in 1922 in which, for the most part, they themselves no
longer believed.
V
Th e Mi ddl e Eas t became what i t i s today both because the
European powers undertook to re- shape i t and because Bri tai n and
France failed to ensure that the dynast i es, the states, and the political
syst em that they establ i shed woul d permanent l y endure. Dur i ng and
after the Fi rst Worl d War, Bri tai n and her Allies dest royed the old
order i n the regi on i rrevocabl y; they s mas hed Tur ki s h rul e of the
Arabi c- speaki ng Mi ddl e Eas t beyond repai r. * To take its pl ace, they
created countri es, nomi nat ed rul ers, del i neated fronti ers, and intro-
duced a state syst em of the sort that exi sts everywhere el se; but they
di d not quel l all significant local opposi ti on to those deci si ons.
As a resul t the events of 191422, while bri ngi ng to an end
Europe' s Mi ddl e East ern Questi on, gave bi rth to a Mi ddl e East ern
Questi on i n the Mi ddl e Eas t itself. Th e settl ement of 1922 ( as i t i s
called here, even t hough some of the arrangement s were arri ved at
a bit earlier or a bit later) resol ved, as far as Europeans were
concerned, the questi on of what as well as whoshoul d repl ace
the Ot t oman Empi r e ; yet even today there are powerful local
forces within the Mi ddl e East that remai n unreconci l ed to these
arrangement s and may well overthrow t hem.
So me of the di sput es, like those el sewhere i n the worl d, are
about rul ers or fronti ers, but what i s typical of the Mi ddl e East i s
that more f undament al cl ai ms are also advanced, drawi ng into
questi on not merel y the di mensi ons and boundari es, but the right to
exist, of countri es that i mmedi atel y or eventual l y emerged from the
Bri ti sh and French deci si ons of the early 1920s: I raq, Israel , Jor dan,
and Lebanon. So at this poi nt i n the twentieth century, the Mi ddl e
Eas t is the regi on of the worl d in whi ch wars of national survi val are
still bei ng fought with some frequency.
Th e di sput es go deeper still: beneat h such apparent l y i nsol ubl e,
but specific, i ssues as the political future of the Ku r d s or the
political desti ny of the Pal esti ni an Arabs , lies the more general
questi on of whether the t ranspl ant ed modern syst em of pol i ti cs
" Which is not to deny that the Turks also played a role in the destruction of their
empire, and that, in any event, there were forces within the Middle East making
for change.
i nvented i n Europecharact eri zed, among other thi ngs, by the di -
vision of the earth into i ndependent secul ar states bas ed on national
ci ti zenshi pwi l l survi ve i n the forei gn soil of the Mi ddl e Eas t .
In the rest of the worl d European political as s umpt i ons are so
taken for grant ed that nobody thi nks about t hem anymore; but at
least one of these assumpt i ons, the modern belief in secul ar civil
government , is an alien creed in a regi on most of whose i nhabi tants,
for more than a t housand years, have avowed faith in a Hol y La w
that governs all of life, i ncl udi ng government and pol i ti cs.
European st at esmen of the Fi rst Worl d War era di dt o some
ext ent recogni ze the probl em and its si gni fi cance. As soon as they
began to pl an their annexati on of the Mi ddl e Eas t , Al l i ed l eaders
recogni zed that Isl am' s hol d on the regi on was the mai n feature of
the political l andscape with whi ch they woul d have to contend.
Lo r d Ki t chener, it will be remembered, initiated in 1914 a policy
desi gned to bri ng the Mos l em faith under Bri tai n' s sway. When i t
l ooked as t hough that mi ght not workf or the Sheri f Hussei n' s
call to the Fai thful in 1916 fell on deaf ears Ki t chener' s associ ates
proposed i nstead to sponsor other loyalties (to a federati on of
Arabi c- speaki ng peopl es, or to the fami l y of Ki ng Hussei n, or to
about - t o- be- creat ed countri es such as I raq) as a rival to pan- I s l am.
Indeed they f ramed the postwar Mi ddl e East settl ement with that
object ( among others) i n view.
However, European officials at the ti me had little underst andi ng
of I s l am. The y were too easily pers uaded that Mos l em opposi ti on
to the pol i ti cs of moderni zat i onof Europeani zat i onwas vani shi ng.
Had they been abl e to look ahead to the last half of the twentieth
century, they woul d have been astoni shed by the fervor of the
Wahhabi faith in Saudi Arabi a, by the passi on of rel i gi ous belief in
warri ng Af ghani st an, by the conti nui ng vitality of the Mos l em
Brot herhood i n Egypt , Syri a, and el sewhere i n the Sunni worl d, and
by the recent Khomei ni upheaval i n Shi'ite Iran.
Cont i nui ng local opposi ti on, whether on rel i gi ous grounds or
others, to the settl ement of 1922 or to the fundamental assumpt i ons
upon whi ch it was based, expl ai ns the characteri sti c feature of the
region's pol i ti cs: that in the Mi ddl e East there is no sense of
legitimacyno agreement on rul es of the game and no belief,
universally shared in the regi on, that within whatever boundari es,
the entities that call themsel ves countri es or the men who cl ai m to
be rul ers are entitled to recogni ti on as such. In that sense, suc-
cessors to the Ot t oman sul tans have not yet been permanentl y
i nstal l ed, even t houghbet ween 1919 and 1922i nstal l i ng t hem
was what the Allies bel i eved themsel ves to be doi ng.
It may be that one day the chal l enges to the 1922 set t l ement t o
the exi stence of Jor dan, Israel , I raq, and Lebanon, for exampl e, or
to the institution of secul ar national government s in the Mi ddl e
East wi l l be wi thdrawn. But if they conti nue in full force, then
the twenti eth-century Mi ddl e East will eventual l y be seen to be in
a si tuati on si mi l ar to Europe' s in the fifth century AD, when the
col l apse of the Roman Empi re' s authori ty in the West threw its
subj ect s into a cri si s of civilization that obl i ged t hem to work out a
new political syst em of their own. Th e European experi ence suggest s
what the di mensi ons of such a radi cal crisis of political civilization
mi ght be.
It took Europe a mi l l enni um and a half to resol ve its post-
Roman cri si s of social and political identity: nearly a t housand
years to settle on the nati on-state f orm of political organi zati on,
and nearly five hundred years more to determi ne whi ch nati ons
were entitled to be states. Whether civilization woul d survi ve the
rai ds and conflicts of rival warri or bands ; whether church or state,
pope or emperor, woul d rul e; whether Cathol i c or Protestant woul d
prevail i n Chri s t endom; whether dynasti c empi re, national state, or
city-state woul d command fealty; and whether, for exampl e, a
t ownsman of Di j on bel onged to the Burgundi an or to the French
nation, were i ssues pai nful l y worked out t hrough ages of searchi ng
and stri fe, duri ng which the l oserst he Al bi gensi ans of southern
France, for exampl ewere often anni hi l ated. It was only at the
end of the nineteenth century, with the creati on of Ge r many and
Ital y, that an accepted map of western Europe finally emerged,
some 1,500 years after the old Roman map started to become
obsol ete.
Th e conti nui ng crisis i n the Mi ddl e Eas t i n our ti me may prove
to be nowhere near so prof ound or so l ong-l asti ng. But its i ssue i s
the s ame: how di verse peopl es are to regroup to create new politi-
cal identities for themsel ves after the col l apse of an ages- ol d i m-
perial order to which they had grown accust omed. Th e Allies
proposed a post - Ot t oman desi gn for the region in the early 1920s.
Th e conti nui ng questi on i s whether the peopl es of the regi on will
accept it.
Th e settl ement of 1922, therefore, does not bel ong entirely or
even mostl y to the pas t ; it is at the very heart of current wars,
conflicts, and pol i ti cs i n the Mi ddl e Eas t , for the quest i ons that
Ki t chener, Ll oyd George, and Churchi l l opened up are even now
bei ng contested by force of arms , year after year, in the rui ned
streets of Bei rut , al ong the banks of the sl ow- movi ng T i g r i s -
Euphrat es, and by the waters of the Bi bl i cal Jor dan.
VI
Bri ti sh pol i ti ci ans and officials of the early 1920s di d not foresee
the probl emati cal future of the 1922 settl ement. The y di d not even
566
T H E M I D D L E E A S T E R N S E T T L E M E N T O F 1922
foresee the i mmedi at e political future of those personal l y i nvol ved
in i t among t hem, Wi nston Churchi l l , a pri nci pal architect of the
set t l ement al t hough these were mat t ers closer at hand, and with
whi ch they were more intimately fami l i ar than the politics of the
Mi ddl e Eas t .
In 1922 it was al most uni versal l y agreed in Bri tai n that Churchi l l
was politically finished. Churchi l l , who had lost his seat in the
Cabi net i n Oct ober and his seat i n the Commons i n November,
appeared crushed. While he di d not doubt that he coul d re-enter
Parl i ament at some poi nt, it seemed unlikely that he woul d ever
agai n be invited to serve in a government at least in any maj or
capaci ty.
A di nner compani on of Churchi l l ' s at the end of November later
remembered that "Winston was so down i n the dumps he coul d
scarcel y speak the whole eveni ng. He t hought his worl d had come
to an endat least his political worl d. I thought his career was
over. "
1
Th e new Parl i ament assembl ed on 27 November 1922, but
Churchi l l was not a member of it, so there was nothi ng to keep hi m
in Bri tai n. At the begi nni ng of December, he sai l ed for the
Medi t erranean. It was only a decade si nce, in the early s ummer of
his career, he had crui sed the Medi t erranean aboard Enchantress
with young Violet As qui t h and her father; but that earlier crui se
had taken pl ace, politically speaki ng, i n another cent uryi ndeed,
in another worl d.
Once he had arri ved in the south of France, Churchi l l settled in
a rented villa near Cannes and res umed work on his war memoi rs a
project that he had commenced earlier. He was far enough al ong
with it so that he bel i eved the openi ng secti ons woul d be ready for
newspaper serialization in about a mont h. It was to be a work in
many vol umes.
In the course of compos i ng his memoi rs, he reflected on the
unaccount abl e run of bad luck he had encountered i n all that touched
and concerned the Turki s h Eas t . He recalled the acci dents, con-
fusi ons, and bl unders that had allowed the Goeben to reach
Const ant i nopl e and help push the Ot t oman Empi re into the wara
war for whi ch he, Churchi l l , had been personal l y bl amed. He re-
flected on the al most unbel i evabl e behavi or of his admi ral s at the
Dardanel l es i n fl eei ng the Narrows t he day before they mi ght have
won the Tur ki s h war, and earned hi m the laurels of vi ctory, i nstead
of di sgrace and di smi ssal . He told his readers how a monkey bit the
Ki ng of Greece and caused the renewed Turki s h war that brought
down the Ll oyd George government and himself with it.
Once he had compl eted and publ i shed the first vol ume of these
memoi rs, Churchi l l returned to Bri tai n, in the mi ddl e of 1923, to
the apparent l y hopel ess political wars. In the late aut umn he stood
for Parl i ament once agai n, was conti nuousl y heckled about the
warti me Dardanel l es fai l ure, and was defeated by the Labour
candi dat e. In late winter he stood for election agai n, in another
consti tuency, and was agai n defeated, this ti me by a Conservat i ve.
But Churchi l l ' s si tuati on was changi ng. In late 1924 he returned
to Parl i ament ; and the political worl d was ast ounded to hear that
Wi nston Churchi l l f ar from bei ng politically fi ni shedhad become
Chancel l or of the Exchequer, a posi ti on usual l y deemed to be the
second most i mport ant i n the Cabi net .
Th e cl ouds began to part, and a former col l eague on the Li beral
benches, George Lambe r t , wri ti ng to congratul ate hi m on the new
appoi nt ment , foresaw an even more astoni shi ng eventual i ty. "Winston
my boy, " he wrot e, "I have got a fair instinct for pol i ti cs. I think I
shall live to see you Pri me Mi ni st er. "
2

A Peace To End All Peace The Fall of The Ottoman Empire and The Creation of The Modern Middle East

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The Independence of Nations

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