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Bachelor hesis 0%*05*#011 6ommunicating 6hange at -eneral Motors
Perceptions of Organisational 6ulture: 7 6ase Stu!y
Set 8ithin the 6onte0t of 9ecent :e3elopments in
;igher <!ucation
S7=<S" 9>6;79:
Jay Alix engineered the plan that saved General Motors. Below, he tells his story for the first
time. Credit: Chris Arace for Fores
Editors Note: Lots of peopleincluding President Obamahave trumpeted their role in the
success of the government-backed turnaround plan that saved General otors! the most
important industrial compan" in the histor" of the #nited $tates%
&ut on the fifth anniversar" of the crisis! 'orbes presents an e(clusive! unprecedented look at
)hat reall" happened during Gs darkest da"s! ho) a tin" band of corporate outsiders and
turnaround e(perts convened in *etroit and hatched a radical plan that ultimatel" set the
foundation for the salvation of the compan"%
+uthor ,a" +li(! one of the most respected e(perts on corporate bankruptc" in +merica! )as the
architect of that plan! and no)! for the first time! he reveals -o) General otors .as /eall"
$aved%
By Jay Alix
For months the news was horrific, a po!nding eat of warm"!p oit!aries for what once had
een America#s greatest and most infl!ential corporation: General Motors. At death#s door or
already in the graveyard were Bear $tearns, %ehman Brothers, Merrill %ynch, A&G and Citian'.
(he mood was apocalyptic.
)ith car sales in a free fall from the worst economic downt!rn since the Great *epression, GM
was losing illions and r!nning o!t of cash. By the time the company closed its oo's on +,,- it
wo!ld e in the red y a staggering ./,.0 illion. Chief exec!tive 1ic' )agoner led the a!to
delegation in )ashington see'ing government f!nding to save the ind!stry and 'eep GM o!t of
an'r!ptcy.
Five years later, after an !nprecedented government e2!ity investment, GM is thriving and the
(reas!ry plans to sell its remaining sta'e in the coming months. )ith co!ntless articles and
oo's now written ao!t the GM restr!ct!ring and t!rnaro!nd3not to mention three years of
tr!mpeting y the 4ama Administration ta'ing f!ll credit for the t!rnaro!nd#s s!ccess3the most
startling aspect of the prevailing narrative is that the core of how the restr!ct!ring really
happened, inside GM, is yet to e f!lly told.
&n the pop!lar version of the company#s t!rnaro!nd story, as GM teetered toward li2!idation in
+,,0, an 4ama"appointed $)A( team, led y financier $teven 1attner, swept in and hatched a
radical plan: (hro!gh a novel !se of the an'r!ptcy code they wo!ld save the company y
segregating and spinning o!t its val!ale assets, while )ashington f!rnished illions in taxpayer
f!nds to ma'e s!re the company was viale.
(he real GM t!rnaro!nd story, significant in saving the a!to ind!stry and the economy, is
contrary to the one that has een p!lished. &n fact, the plan that was developed, implemented
and then f!nded y the government was devised inside GM well efore 5resident 4ama too'
office. &n what follows, the inside story of this historic chapter in American !siness !nfolds,
laying are the 'ey facts.
GM#s extraordinary t!rnaro!nd egan long efore )agoner went to )ashington in search of a
massive loan to 'eep GM alive. My involvement in that story egan in GM#s dar'est days, five
years ago on $!nday, 6ov. +/, +,,-, when & visited )agoner at his home that morning,
presenting a novel plan to save General Motors.
As a cons!ltant with expertise in restr!ct!rings and t!rnaro!nds, & had completed a half"do7en
assignments at GM over the years. & had wor'ed with )agoner in 800+ when he ecame chief
financial officer. & was as'ed to come in for a two"year stint as C94 of GM#s 6ational Car
1ental, the first time GM had recr!ited an o!tsider to lead a t!rnaro!nd in one of its s!sidiaries.
By +,,- & had over +, years of experience with the a!to ind!stry and almost /, years of wor'ing
on t!rnaro!nds. B!t for the past eight years & had ac'ed away from !siness and my firm,
Alix5artners, to care for my da!ghters after the death of my wife. & was essentially :retired.; B!t
GM#s enveloping crisis and my friendship with )agoner wo!ld ring me o!t.
9arly on that 6ovemer $!nday & called )agoner at his home in a *etroit s!!r. & as'ed to see
him right away, explaining that & had a new idea that co!ld help save the company.
(hree ho!rs later & wal'ed thro!gh his front door and into his family room. & 'new )agoner
elieved GM co!ld not s!rvive a an'r!ptcy. $t!dies showed cons!mer confidence wo!ld crash.
6o one wo!ld !y a car from a company that was an'r!pt. <owever, what & 'new ao!t the
economic crisis and GM#s rapidly deteriorating li2!idity position told me the company had no
choice !t to prepare for a an'r!ptcy.
=et & agreed with )agoner. For a gloal company as ig and complex as GM, a :normal;
an'r!ptcy wo!ld tie !p the company#s affairs for years, driving away c!stomers, res!lting in a
t!m!lt!o!s li2!idation. &t had happened to other companies a fraction of GM#s si7e. &t wo!ld
mean the end of GM.
:& don#t thin' the company will s!rvive a an'r!ptcy,; he told me. :And no one has shown me a
plan that wo!ld allow it to s!rvive a an'r!ptcy.;
)ar room: )agoner and Alix saved GM with one of corporate America>s greatest <ail Marys,
!t neither stayed with the company.
:Filing an'r!ptcy may e inevitale, 1ic'. B!t it doesn#t have to e a company"'illing
an'r!ptcy,; & said. :& thin' we can create a !ni2!e strategy that allows GM to s!rvive
an'r!ptcy.;
(o e s!re, my idea, s'etched o!t on a few pages, was provocative. & 'new as & pitched it to
)agoner that it might raise eyerows, if not o!tright o?ection, from others who elieved their
plans wo!ld e safer.
&n short, & proposed that GM split into two very separate parts efore filing: :6ewCo,; a new
company with a clean alance sheet, ta'ing on GM#s est rands and operations@ and :4ldCo,;
the leftover GM with most of the liailities. All of the operational restr!ct!ring to ma'e the new
company profitale wo!ld also occ!r efore a an'r!ptcy filing so GM co!ld go thro!gh
an'r!ptcy in a matter of days3not months or years with creditors and other litigants fighting
over the corporate carcass while the reven!e line crashes.
$ee'ing f!nding from the government, or any so!rce, we wo!ld !se Ban'r!ptcy Code $ection
/A/, which allows a company to sell assets !nder a co!rt"approved sale. (ypically, /A/ is !sed to
sell specific assets, from a chair and des' to a factory or division, !t not the entire stand"alone
company. Bnder this strategy GM co!ld postpone filing a plan of reorgani7ation and a disclos!re
statement, which cons!me months and f!el a li77ard of litigation while mar'et share and
enterprise val!e leed away.
)agoner listened, challenging every ass!mption. After disc!ssing it with oard memers, 1ic'
as'ed me to come to GM and wor' on the plan, one of several alternatives GM wo!ld consider. &
vol!nteered to help GM on a pro ono asis. B!t what & co!ld never anticipate was how deep
and strong the opposition to my plan wo!ld !ltimately e.
CCC
On Tuesday, *ec. +, & p!lled into GM#s *etroit head2!arters at D a.m. after most of the
company#s exec!tives had already arrived for wor'. & was given a small c!icle and conference
room on the /-th floor, a spacio!s !t empty place that held GM#s corporate oardroom and a
warren of c!icles reserved for visiting exec!tives and oard memers.
9ach day & wo!ld e the sole person who got off the elevator on /-, one floor down from where
)agoner and his team wor'ed. &t was eerie and 2!iet, the main wall lined with large oil paintings
of GM#s past chairmen. &#d wal' past those gilded frames daily, feeling the f!ll weight of their
ga7e, reminded of the history and past glory of what had een the most powerf!l corporation on
earth.
$pending 8- ho!rs a day digging thro!gh the n!mers in GM#s filings, & egan wor'ing in
greater detail on the o!tlines of the plan and ma'ing some ass!mptions on what assets sho!ld e
transferred to 6ewCo and what wo!ld stay in 4ldCo, which & d!ed Motors %i2!idation. (here
were tho!sands of cr!cial 2!estions that had to e as'ed and answered with management: )hich
rands and factories wo!ld s!rviveE )hich ones wo!ld the company have to give !pE )hat
wo!ld e the endgame strategyE )hat wo!ld e the enterprise val!e of 6ewCoE (he li2!idation
val!e of 4ldCoE
)agoner and C44 Frit7 <enderson were developing three alternative plans. First, they hoped to
avoid an'r!ptcy altogether, elieving the government wo!ld provide eno!gh f!nding to ring
GM thro!gh the crisis. At least two cainet memers in the B!sh Administration and others had
provided ass!rances to 1ic' and oard memers that government help wo!ld e forthcoming.
$econd was a :prepac'aged; an'r!ptcy plan eing developed y general co!nsel 1oert
4sorne with <arvey 1. Miller, the dean of the an'r!ptcy ar and senior partner at )eil,
Gotshal F Manges. Bnder this plan, GM wo!ld prepare a reorgani7ation in cooperation with its
ond creditors that wo!ld ta'e effect once the company went into a Chapter 88 an'r!ptcy. (he
goal of a so"called prepac' is to shorten and simplify the an'r!ptcy process.
Miller commanded great respect in an'r!ptcy circles and in the GM oardroom, and for good
reason. At the age of DG Miller was the only attorney in the co!ntry who had s!ccessf!lly dealt
with as many high"profile an'r!ptcies. Miller was already in the middle of the largest corporate
li2!idation ever, at %ehman Brothers.
And third was the 6ewCo plan, ased on years of Eexperience at Alix5artners, where we had a
ma?or role in G, of the 8-, largest an'r!ptcies over .8 illion in the past 8G years. GM had also
retained Martin Bienenstoc', the restr!ct!ring and corporate governance leader from *ewey F
%eBoe!f, to help develop the 6ewCo plan as well.
&nside and o!tside GM, the press!res mo!nted. 9ach day the company lost more money and got
closer to r!nning o!t of cash. &n )ashington several prominent politicians egan calling for
)agoner#s resignation. 4n *ec. D $enator Chris *odd, the Connectic!t *emocrat, told Face the
6ation# s Bo $chieffer that )agoner had to move on.
(he next day & went to see )agoner to offer enco!ragement and advice. &t is not !n!s!al for a
C94 to lose his ?o when his company is forced into an'r!ptcy and a ma?or restr!ct!ring. &#d
seen this play o!t many times efore and learned the oss sho!ld never vol!nteer his resignation
witho!t first p!tting in place the things that wo!ld help the organi7ation s!rvive. & wanted to help
fortify 1ic'#s resolve and 'eep !s all foc!sed on the endgame.
From my perspective )agoner had een !nfairly treated y many politicians and the media.
$ince ta'ing over as C94 in +,,,, wor'ing closely with Frit7 and vice chairman Bo %!t7, 1ic'
orchestrated large, dramatic changes at the company. (hey closed GM#s 2!ality, prod!ctivity and
f!el"economy gaps with the world#s est a!toma'ers, winning n!mero!s car and tr!c' awards.
(hey !ilt a highly profitale !siness in China, the world#s iggest potential car mar'et. (hey
red!ced the company#s wor'force y 8H/,,,, employees, to +H/,,,,. (hey reached a historic
agreement with the BA) that c!t in half ho!rly pay for new employees and significantly scaled
ac' the traditional retiree enefit pac'ages that had een crippling the company, while also
f!nding over .8,, illion in !nf!nded retiree oligations. And he was ale to accomplish all
these changes witho!t ca!sing massive disr!ptions among GM#s dealers or ma?or stri'es with the
!nions.
Bltimately, those str!ct!ral changes positioned the company not only to s!rvive !t also to ring
ao!t the extraordinary t!rnaro!nd. B!t now, with the economy and the company in free fall, all
of that hard wor' seemed to e forgotten.
&t was late in the day on *ec. -, aro!nd G:/, p.m., when & wal'ed into )agoner#s office.
:1ic', do not resign or even offer to resign,; & told him. :%ater yo! may have to fall on yo!r
sword to get the f!nding deal done with the government, !t don#t do it !ntil we get the three
things we need. &f yo!#re going to e 'illed on the attlefield, we need to ma'e it worth it.;
:And what is that exactlyE; he pressed me.
:)e have to get government f!nding of .H, illion to .G, illion. 5l!s, we need an agreement
with the government and GM#s oard to do the 6ewCo plan. And we m!st p!t a 2!alified
s!ccessor in place. &t m!st e Frit7 and not some government g!y. &t#s going to e painf!l for
yo!, !t yo!#ve got to stay on the horse !ntil we get all three.;
)agoner was already there. <e had no intention of resigning and was determined to complete his
mission. & gave him a ear h!g, letting him 'now he had my f!ll s!pport.
CCC
When we gathered for a telephonic oard meeting on *ec. 8G, the mood was !rgent, the tension
high. 4nly two wee's after arriving at GM & was ao!t to present the plan to the oard of
directors in a conference room o!tside )agoner#s office. Also on the phone were the company#s
lawyers and investment an'ers.
A $piderphone was in the middle of the tale for what wo!ld e a historic meeting of the oard.
4nly three days earlier the $enate had aandoned negotiations to provide f!nding for the a!to
ind!stry. $!ddenly a free"fall an'r!ptcy within days loomed large. Consideration of the 6ewCo
plan, now refined with the help of chief financial officer 1ay =o!ng and other senior finance
staffers, too' on greater !rgency as we were ?!st two wee's away from r!nning o!t of cash.
:& 'now the company has many lawyers and an'ers wor'ing on other approaches,; & said. :&
'now many of the people doing the wor', and &#ve wor'ed with many of them over the years.
B!t & have an alternative strategy for the oard#s consideration. & s!spect there might e some
controversy over it, !t & elieve this co!ld e lifesaving for General Motors.;
After caref!lly laying o!t the details and time se2!ence of the 6ewCo plan, & drew to a close.
:)ell,; one director as'ed over the phone system, :& want to hear what <arvey Miller has to say
ao!t this. &s there a precedent for this, Mr. MillerE;
Miller#s deep aritone voice filled the room, pointing o!t that the idea was !northodox and
lac'ed precedence.
4ther attorneys chimed in, claiming the plan oversimplified the sit!ation and there wo!ld e
ma?or prolems with it. =et another added that this wo!ld not e viewed well y the co!rt and
do!ted any ?!dge wo!ld allow it. Collectively, they characteri7ed it as a long shot, disco!raging
the directors from thin'ing the plan co!ld ever s!cceed.
<earing all the disapproving words amplified from spea'ers in the ceiling, & felt am!shed y
general co!nsel 4sorne, who was strongly advocating for a prepac'aged an'r!ptcy strategy,
which he elieved was the only way to go. Bne'nownst to me he had previo!sly proposed the
idea to GM#s oard, naively elieving GM co!ld complete a prepac' an'r!ptcy in /, days.
GM#s most senior leaders had een wor'ing with me on the 6ewCo plan aro!nd the cloc'. & felt
strongly this alternative approach co!ld s!cceed, and & 'new that any other type of Chapter 88
strategy wo!ld 'ill vehicle sales and lead to the demise of GM. 6ow it seemed as if the 6ewCo
plan co!ld e dead on arrival.
:&f the attorneys feel this is a waste of time and corporate reso!rces, & don#t 'now why we wo!ld
p!rs!e this,; stated another director.
A chilling silence descended !pon the room, ro'en y Ient Iresa, the former C94 of 6orthrop
Gr!mman and a GM oard memer since +,,/.
:& !nderstand this has some ris' attached to it, !t we#re in a very ris'y state right now,; he said.
:And & !nderstand it may even e !n!s!al and !nprecedented. B!t it#s certainly creative, and
2!ite fran'ly, it#s the most innovative idea we#ve heard so far that has real potential in it. & thin'
it deserves f!rther consideration and development.;
1ic' then addressed another lawyer on the call, Martin Bienenstoc'.
:)ell, &#ve act!ally st!died the prolem, too, and there#s a way for this to wor',; said
Bienenstoc'. :Almost all an'r!ptcies are !ni2!e and the Code does allow for the transfer of
assets. & can#t imagine a ?!dge ta'ing on this prolem and not wanting to solve it. )e#ve done a
preliminary analysis, and it#s not as cra7y as it so!nds. &t#s !ni2!e and compelling.;
:4'ay, we#ve heard oth sides of it,; 1ic' said after others spo'e, smartly ringing the deate to
a reasonale close. :& s!ggest we contin!e wor'ing to develop oth the prepac' plan and the
6ewCo option, while see'ing the f!nding to avoid Chapter 88 if at all possile.;
(he meeting ad?o!rned witho!t a vote. & left the room disappointed to hear 4sorne#s legal
chor!s so dead set against 6ewCo and s!rprised their remar's had stopped all real disc!ssion of
the plan. B!t & also was relieved the plan was not completely dead, at least not yet.
CCC
Over the next weeks & wor'ed closely with Bienenstoc', assistant general co!nsel Mi'e
Milli'in, Al Ioch of Alix5artners and GM senior vice president John $mith on the 6ewCo plan.
)e h!ddled do7ens of times with )agoner and <enderson to wor' o!t which rands GM wo!ld
!ltimately have to give !p J<!mmer, $at!rn, $aa and 5ontiacK and which ones it wo!ld 'eep
JChevrolet, Cadillac, GMC and B!ic'K. &nformed deate and deep analysis of str!ct!ral costs led
to decisions ao!t pro?ects, factories, rands and co!ntries.
4n $!nday afternoon, Mar. +0, )agoner called me. &t was a call & had hoped wo!ld never come3
!t here it was.
:Jay,; he said, :& wanted to give yo! a heads"!p. (he Administration wants me to step aside. (he
5resident is going to hold a press conference tomorrow morning.;
)agoner told me <enderson wo!ld e named C94.
:)hat ao!t the an'r!ptcyE; & as'ed.
:(hey#re enamored with the /A/ 6ewCo plan. (hey seem o!nd and determined to ma'e !s file
Chapter 88 and do 6ewCo. L (his is really to!gh,; he said.
:&#m so sorry,; & said, pa!sing, :!t L yo! got the money. (hey#re doing the 6ewCo plan, and
Frit7 is yo!r s!ccessor. L =o!#ve s!cceeded. =o! got the three things.;
1ic' responded with resigned ac'nowledgment, then said, :5lease help Frit7 in any way yo!
can,; efore hanging !p.
1ic'#s personal sacrifice was not in vain. Months of hard wor' had paid off. (he assets and
liailities had een selected. (he 6ewCo legal entities and .HG illion tax"loss strategy had een
developed. (he strategy & pitched to )agoner in his living room fo!r and a half months earlier
was the plan chosen y (eam A!to in a meeting on Apr. /, +,,0 in )ashington. (reas!ry agreed
to f!lly f!nd 6ewCo with e2!ity, and th!s it ecame the chosen path to save the company.
By late April 6ewCo implementation was well !nder way. (he an'r!ptcy filing wo!ld occ!r in
6ew =or' within wee's. My partner, Al Ioch of Alix5artners, wo!ld ecome the chief
restr!ct!ring officer r!nning 4ldCo, now officially named Motors %i2!idation, &nc. &n my notes,
& ?otted: :My wor' is finished L impact from this day forward will e negligile. L (reas!ry#s
in control. (ime to get ac' to my girls.;
4n J!ne 8, +,,0 General Motors filed for an'r!ptcy in 6ew =or', with .-+ illion in assets and
.8D/ illion in liailities. &t was the largest ind!strial an'r!ptcy in history. <arvey Miller and
his team masterf!lly defended and g!ided the 6ewCo plan thro!gh the an'r!ptcy co!rt,
s!ccessf!lly ma'ing it their own. 6ew GM exited an'r!ptcy protection on J!ly 8,, +,,03in a
mere H, days, as designed. Frit7 called and than'ed me.
(here wo!ld e many other twists and t!rns to GM#s narrative, !t the company got its fresh
start !sing the 6ewCo plan, and the ind!stry was saved with government f!nding from oth
5residents B!sh and 4ama. &n March +,,0 5resident 4ama cited a :fail!re of leadership; as
his reason for forcing o!t )agoner. &n fact, it was )agoner#s exercise of leadership thro!gh
years of wrenching change and then sim!ltaneo!sly see'ing government f!nding while
developing three restr!ct!ring plans that p!t GM in position to s!rvive the worst economic
collapse since the Great *epression and complete its t!rnaro!nd, which, ironically, ecame a 'ey
campaign iss!e in the reelection of Barac' 4ama in +,8+.
;o
3.1.
Change Management and Organisational Theory
In the classical and mechanistic theory of organisations, change is viewed
as a planned and controlled activity, in which communication is of low
priority as resistance can be managed, and staeholders only need to be
told the reason for change and what to change inorder to change !Miller,
"##$, pp. 1%& 1%1& Cameron et al. , "##$, pp. 1##'1#1(. This view of
change management is much similar to what )nderson et al.!"##1(
suggested as the developmental approach to change, in which it is
assumed that employees will change if given the appropriate reasons,
resources and motivation !p.3*(. If organisations are viewed as organisms,
then it implies transitional change, which means that change is still viewed
as a process that can be planned, however, it only taes place due to
changes in the e+ternal environment. ,urthermore, staeholders need to be
psychologically aware of the need for change, and the change has to be
well'communicated and Incorporate two'way communication to foster high
employee participation in order to increase commitment, and thus be able
to implement the change !Cameron et al. , "##$, pp. 1#3 '1#*& )nderson et
al., "##1, pp. 3-'3%(.
,inally, scholars and practitioners argue that organisations can be viewed
as comple+ and chaotic entities. This perspective implies transformational
change, which is defined as an uncontrollable event with an uncertain
outcome. Transformational change re.uires management and staeholders
to shift their world view completely and embrace the uncertainty !Cameron
et al., "##$, pp. 1#*'1#-& )nderson et al., "##1, pp. 3$'*-(. )s described
the organisational theory influence how change management is viewed,
and thus how the communication will tae place and what is termed as
successful communication. This thesis will tae departure in the notion of
organisations as organisms because this approach provides a tangible
approach to change management, and maes it possible to create a plan
for the communication. /hereas, the comple+ity approach is more
intangible , as there is noclear method for handling the chaos, and the
mechanistic view seems unrealistic today !Cameron et al., "##$,
pp.1#1&1#-'1#0(.
Therefore, the analysis and the theories used in this thesis will be based on
the view of organisations as organisms.
3.".Organisation al Change Management
Organisational change management is primarily concerned with the large
scale organisational change such as the implementation of new technology,
structural changes, cultural changes or a merger of two companies
!1ichardson et al., 1$$0, p. "#*(. )s mentioned, the focus in this thesis is
on the communication and not 2enderson3s change plan as such.
Therefore, the ne+t section will include adescription of a few models
and a discussion of why these have been discarded as the foundation for
the analysis in this thesis
.
3.".1.
Models for
Organisational Change
Management
Kotter John P. Kotter has developed a well'nown and widely accepted
model for how to lead change in organisations. 4otter !1$$-( proposes that
in order to e+perience successful change organisations must follow eight
steps in a linear manner !pp. -$'0#(.4otter !1$$-( argues that the primary
focus of any change process is to establish a sense of urgency, develop
a vision, communicate the vision clearly , and to empower staeholders to
act on the vision !pp. 0#'05(. 2owever, the model is too prescriptive and
merely provides an overview of how to manage change, thus it does not go
into depth with specific communication strategies, but taes a more generic
approach to communication.
3.".1.".
Connor and Lake Connor et al.
!1$$*( present a model for planned organisational change, which loos at
the destabili6ing forces !the reason for change( and what needs to be
ad7usted !changed( in the organisation to cope well with the destabili6ing
forces. The changes in the organisation e.g. include strategic direction or
organisational culture. Thereafter, the model loos at what methods and
tactics should be used to change the organi6ation, whether the change
hould be implemented in a facilitative, informational or political way !cited in
Miller, "##$, pp. 1%1'1%"(. This model illustrates the comple+ity of change
in organisations as it presents the fact that organisational change can be at
different levels, and that there are different ways for implementing change
in organisations. 2owever, this model focuses on identifying the estabili6ing
forces, and what can be done to ad7ust too these. )s a conse.uence, the
model does not focus on the implementation process, and thus lacs the
communication aspect of change. ,urthermore, the model does not include
different strategies for different stages of change, therefore, the model
implies that change is implemented in the same way from start to end.
)s illustrated it can be a challenge to find a model that encompasses the
comple+ity of change, but at the same time, is relatively simple and include
the communication aspect of change.
Therefore, Kurt Lewins 3'step model for organisational change will be
used as the foundation for the analysis in this thesis.3.".1.3.8ewin 8ewin
!1$-1( proposed that organisational change consists of three steps. The
first step is to unfree6e the organisation, and thus prepare it for change.
The second step is to change the organi6ation to the desired state. The
third, and final step, is to refree6e, and thus stabilise the organi6ation in the
new desired state !cited in Cameron et al., "##$, p. 11#'111(. In addition,
8ewin3s model implies that different communication strategies must be used
at the three different stages !4lein, 1$$0, pp. 30'3%(. ,urthermore, 8ewin
!1$-1( developed the idea of a force field present in any organisational
change. The force field encompasses driving and restraining forces toward
a given change. 8ewin argued that the driving forces, naturally, had to
outweigh the restraining forces in order for the change to be implemented
!cited in Cameron et al., "##$, pp. 11#'111(.
9asically, there are two ways to mae the driving forces outweigh the
restraining forces, and this can either be done by strengthen the driving
forces or by reducing the restraining forces. :cholars and practitioners
argue that an optimal way to increase driving forces or reduce restraining
forces toward any change is through effective communication !;oodman et
al., "##*, p. "15'"1%(.
The reason 8ewin3s model will be used as the foundation for the analysis of
2enderson3s communication efforts is due to the fact that the model divides
any change up into three tangible stages and puts emphasis on the
differences in each stage. Therefore, this model is simple, and at the same
time, it includes the comple+ity of change as it distinguishes between the
three stages. /ith the model in place, the focus will now turn to the
importance of communication during change, from the perspective of
organisations as organisms