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Y, Ying-Shih. 'O Soul, Come Back!` A Study in the Changing Conceptions oI the Soul
and AIterliIe in Pre-Buddhist China. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 47, no. 2
(December 1987): 363-395.
Theo Lyons
Love and Rhetoric in Plato`s !"#$%&'(
Plato`s Phaedrus touches on a broad variety oI topics, ranging Irom rhetoric, to love,
and eve to writing. Moreover, throughout the course oI the discussion, the two participants in the
dialogue, Socrates and Phaedrus, adopt changing and seemingly inconsistent positions concerning
these topics. As a result oI this inconsistency, it can at times be diIfcult to understand the text as a
logical and cohesive discourse. Despite that, when viewed as a whole, the Phaedrus does appear
to reach clear conclusions about the natures oI love and truth. In the Gorgias, Socrates makes a
distinction between what we see as ft, and what we want, arguing that while a tyrant will oIten do as
he sees ft (what is most pleasing) he will rarely do what he wants (what is best Ior his soul). In the
Phaedrus, this system oI dual interests is Iurther elaborated, and it is revealed that were it not Ior the
appeal oI that which is pleasing, we would rarely be able to reach the truth that our soul really wants.
This paper will suggest that the dynamic that exists between what is pleasing and what is good is the
key to understanding the relationship between both rhetoric and philosophy, and also lust and love in
the Phaedrus. Specifcally, I will draw upon both the explicit statements made by Socrates, and the
implicit logic that emerges Irom Plato`s structuring oI the text itselI in order to argue that the central
(and uniIying) aim oI the Phaedrus is to suggest a theoretical Iramework in which philosophy and
love are inextricably linked to, and even dependent upon, their lower Iorms: rhetoric and lust.
BeIore moving into the substantive deIence oI this thesis, it would be useIul to consider
some oI the complications inherent to such an analysis oI Plato`s dialogues. There are a number oI
signifcant issues which make it diIfcult to rigidly defne the specifc meanings and intentions oI
Plato`s work, and these problems must at least be mentioned beIore embarking on an analysis. First
and not least there is the classic problem oI trying to separate the voice oI Socrates Irom that oI Plato.
Since the Platonic discourses were all written years aIter the death oI Socrates, one must acknowledge
that the Iorm and style oI the conversations is largely the work oI Plato. This opens the possibility
that Socrates` arguments are not always meant to be taken at Iace value, and that they are in Iact
oIten structured specifcally Ior the purpose oI showing the Iailure oI a particular line oI reasoning,
or the inadequacy oI a Iorm oI the dialectic. This is clearly visible in the Socrates` second speech in
the Phaedrus, where the voice oI Socrates is used to demonstrate a highly unsocratic Iorm oI speech-
making, and Plato actively signals to the reader that Socrates` statements are not intended to be taken
as actual refections oI his personality.
This issue is closely related to the second point on interpretation worth noting: the dialogue
structure oI Plato`s work naturally makes it diIfcult to analyse specifc statements clearly. Texts
such as the Phaedrus use a lively and dramatic dialogue between a number oI speakers in order to
recreate the quest Ior knowledge. This Iorm thus puts a signifcant emphasis on the processes oI
philosophical reasoning, and gives relatively little weight to the actual conclusions that are reached
at every stage oI the dialogue. This makes it diIfcult to cite particular statements as solid evidence
oI a conclusion about the positions taken by Socrates and the individuals with whom he is speaking.
Finally, there is the problem oI translation, which Umberto Eco has aptly reIerred to as 'the
art oI Iailure. Any given translation oI the Greek manuscripts refects the bias and understanding oI
its translator, and the nuanced meanings which are actively and contextually created around particular
words are oIten lost when the translator attempts to render the speeches into stylistically pleasing
English. This is particularly problematic when the translator prioritizes readability by choosing not
Bibliography
Primary Sources:
Homer. The Odvssev. Trans. Richmond Lattimore. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers,
1999.
Secondary Sources:
Beazley, J.D. Attic White Lekuthoi. London: OxIord University Press, 1938.
Bokenkamp, Stephen R. Ancestors and Anxietv. Daoism and the Birth of Rebirth in China.
Berkeley, CA: University oI CaliIornia Press, 2007.
Buck, David D. 'Three Han Dynasty Tombs at Ma-Wang-Tui. World Archaeologv 7, no. 1 (June,
1975): 30-45.
Cook, R.M. Greek Painted Potterv. London and New York: Rutledge, 1997.
Ebrey, Patricia Buckley, ed. Chinese Civili:ation. A Sourcebook. New York: Free Press, 1993.
Harris, Stephen L. and Gloria Platzner. Classical Mvthologv. Images & Insights. Boston,
McGraw-Hill, 2008.
Kurtz, Donna. 'Attic red-fgure: Phiale Painter Hermes` White Lekythos. Classical Art Research
Centre. The Bea:lev Archive. November 30, 2010. http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/pottery/
painters/keypieces/redfgure/phiale.htm. Accessed
----------------- 'Charon. Classical Art Research Centre. The Bea:lev Archive. Accessed
November 30, 2010. http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/dictionary/Dict/ASP/dictionarybody.
asp?nameCharon.
Kurtz, Donna C. and John Boardman. Greek Burial Customs. Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1971.
Museum oI Fine Arts. 'Collections: Jar (Pelike). Accessed November 30, 2010. http://www.mIa.
org/collections/object/jar-pelike--153840 (accession number 34.79).
Puett, Michael. 'Humans and Gods: The Theme oI SelI-Divination in Early China and Early
Greece. In Earlv China/Ancient Greece. Thinking Through Comparisons, edited by
Steven Shankman and Stephen W. Durrant, 55-74. Albany, NY: State University oI New
York Press, 2002.
Silbergeld, Jerome. 'Mawangdui, Excavated Materials, and Transmitted Texts: A Cautionary
Note. Earlv China 8 (1982-83): 79-92.
Sima, Qian. Records of the Grand Historian. Han Dvnastv II. Translated by Burton Watson. New
York: Renditions-Columbia University Press, 1993.
The Exhibition of the Mawangdui Han Tombs. Changsha, China: Hunan sheng bo wu guan, 2004.
The Metropolitan Museum oI Art. 'Heilbrunn Timeline of Art Historv: Lekythos (oil fask).
Accessed November 30, 2010. http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-oI-art/21.88.17
(accession number 21.88.17).
Wu, Hung. 'Art in Ritual Context: Rethinking Mawangdui. Earlv China 17 (1992): 111-144.
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to render signifcant Greek words (such as logos, mimesis, or delanoia) into a clear and consistent set
oI English terms.
Plato himselI explicitly raises some oI these issues toward the end oI the Phaedrus, when
the discussion turns to the nature oI writing. Socrates makes a strong case against the utility oI
literacy as a means oI learning and sharing knowledge, complaining that written texts can speak
'as iI they had some understanding, but iI you question anything that has been said because you
want to learn more, it continues to signiIy just that same thing Iorever.
1
Such a work 'can neither
deIend itselI nor come to its own support.
2
As a result, the dynamic process oI learning through
reasoning, which Socrates sees being Iundamentally interactive, is crippled by the written Iorm. It is
only able to oIIer the reader a static and invariably incomplete image oI the truth. One must remain
conscious oI these challenges and oI Socrates` own warnings regarding writing when working with
the Platonic discourses, in order to engage in a constructive analysis oI Plato`s theories. In response
to the diIfculty oI assigning fnality and meaning to individual phrases in the dialogue, this paper will
seek to establish a broad deIence Ior its thesis, looking to textual, structural, and logic-based sources
oI evidence.
The relationship between lust and love is one oI the central concepts in the Phaedrus, and
is the chieI concern oI all three oI the key speeches in the discourse (Lysias` speech, and Socrates`
frst and second speeches). When these speeches, and especially Socrates` second (the palinode)
are considered in detail, the degree to which love is dependent upon the existence oI lust becomes
clear. In the mythical portion oI the palinode, Socrates introduces a tripartite division oI the soul,
comparing 'the soul to the natural union oI a team oI winged horses and their charioteer.
3
The
relationship between the two horses and their driver is explained when Socrates states that 'our
driver is in charge oI a pair oI horses... one oI his horses is beautiIul and good and Irom stock oI the
same sort, while the other is the opposite and has the opposite sort oI blood-line. This means that
chariot-driving is inevitably a painIully diIfcult process.
4
Here it is already apparent that the human
soul is naturally driven by two separate Iorces, one good-natured and the other unruly. The process
oI learning or achieving anything (chariot-driving) is dependent upon our ability oI maintaining a
balance between the two Iorces which motivate our soul.
Socrates proceeds to discuss this analogy at length, frst describing a divine procession
oI the souls in the heavenly realm, and then later using the image oI the soul-as-chariot to explain
worldly love. In the frst case, he describes how 'the heaviness oI the bad horse drags its charioteer
toward the earth and weighs him down iI he has Iailed to train it well, and this causes the most
extreme toil and struggle that a soul will Iace.
5
Here the dark` horse is described in a negative
sense: it appears to be an obstacle which the rational part oI the soul must overcome in order to see
the true Iorms. While a the image oI the dark horse Iunctions primarily to demonstrate the diIfculty
oI acquiring knowledge, the dark horse in Iact plays a very complex part in Socrates` account oI the
nature oI the soul, and is signifcant as more than a mere obstacle to the acquisition oI knowledge.
1 Pl. Phdr. 257D Trans. Grube
2 Ibid, 257E
3 Ibid, 246A
4 Ibid, 246B
5 Ibid, 247B
Love and Rhetoric in Plato`s !"#$%&'( Theo Lyons
The fgure oI the dark horse enables the reader to understand that the soul is by nature dualistic, and
that both parts oI the soul must be controlled in such a way as to allow them to serve their (essential)
purposes.
This is made clear when Socrates proceeds to apply the image oI the soul-as-chariot to
worldly love. Socrates describes love as the Iourth, and divine kind oI madness, occuring when
someone 'sees the beauty we have down here and is reminded oI true beauty.
6
This is 'the best and
noblest oI all the Iorms |oI| possession... and when someone who loves beautiIul boys is touched by
this madness he is called a lover.
7
By likening love to madness and possession, Socrates is already
suggesting that divine love is by no means the exclusive domain oI the rational part oI the soul (the
driver). Socrates detailed description oI the process which takes place within the lover upon the sight
oI his beloved will reveals that the dark horse (or appetitive side) oI the soul that initiates and drives
each phase oI love, and the charioteer works merely to control and
guide the two horses.
Socrates suggests that love is a process oI recollection, in which the beauty oI the beloved
is in Iact a refection, or image, oI the true Iorm oI divine beauty. True love is attained when the soul
looks upon the boy`s 'Iace |and| his memory is carried back to the real nature oI Beauty, and he sees
it again where it stands on the sacred pedestal next to SelI-control.
8
This process oI recollection,
though, is entirely dependent upon the active Iorce oI the dark horse. While the white horse is
restrained by its 'modesty and selI-control
9
the dark horse 'leaps violently Iorward literally
Iorcing the lover to approach their beloved until 'they are close to him... and they are struck by the
boy`s Iace as iI by a bolt oI lightning.
10
It is at this very moment that the process oI recollection is
able to take place, while, having remembered the true Iorm oI Beauty, the rational part oI the lover`s
soul will 'pull the reigns back so fercely that both horses are set on their haunches.
11
The white
horse is inspired with such 'shame and awe that it 'drenches the whole soul with sweat.
12
The dark
horse must also be actively and repeatedly restrained in order to prevent it Irom bringing about the
act oI sexual consummation that the rational part oI the soulhaving recalled the true Iorm oI
Beautyknows would be shameIul.
Achieving true love in Socratic sense is thus a very diIfcult process. It is dependent both
upon the dark (or appetitive) side oI the soul initiating the sequence oI recollection by dragging
the soul toward the lover, and also upon the driver (or rational part) oI the soul remembering the
divine Iorm oI beauty, and violently restraining and taming the dark horse. Socrates does not suggest
that everyone will be able to achieve this balance, and in Iact argues that only those whose souls
have recently been initiated into the realm oI the Iorms (particularly the philosophers) will be able
to remember the true Iorm oI Beauty, and prevent the lustIul dark horse Irom 'surrender|ing| to
6 Pl. Phdr., 249D, Trans. Grube.
7 Ibid, 249E
8 Ibid, 254B
9 Ibid, 253D
10 Ibid, 254B
11 Ibid, 254C
12 Ibid
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pleasure... in the manner oI a Iour-Iooted beast, eager to make babies.
13
Just as the mythical portion oI the palinode demonstrates that lust is a prerequisite to real
love, an analysis oI the overarching structure oI the Phaedrus appears to suggest that philosophy is
in many ways dependent upon the existence oI rhetoric. Just as it is the active Iorce oI lust (what
is pleasing) that motivates the dark horse and initiates the process oI recollection that defnes
Socrates` account oI love, it is the appeal oI rhetoric, and the pleasure oI making and listening to
beautiIul speeches that initiates the discourse between Socrates and his Iriend. When Phaedrus
frst encounters Socrates in the streets oI Athens, he quickly recognises that Socrates is 'sick with
passion Ior hearing speeches.
14
Phaedrus takes advantage oI his Iriend`s condition, and uses the
tempting prospect oI hearing a new speech Irom Lysias, the great orator, as 'a potion to charm
|Socrates| into leaving
15
Athens. Socrates` love oI oratory thus draws him out oI the city, initiates
the dialogue between the two Iriends, and later drives him to go so Iar as to give a speech oI his own,
in which he responds to and expands upon the arguments that Lysias` speech raised against ros.
In Socrates` frst speech, the reader is given a clear example oI the consequences oI Iailing to
harness one`s passions. Socrates allows himselI to be carried away by his love oI oratory and makes a
speech in which he attempts to persuade an imagined boy that 'he should never |give| his Iavours to a
man who |is| in love
16
since such a man will not care Ior his best interests in the long term. Socrates
soon realises, though, that his and Lysias` speeches have oIIended Eros, the god oI love, and that they
have compounded this error 'with their utter Ioolishness in parading their dangerous Ialsehoods and
preening themselves over perhaps deceiving a Iew silly people.
17
Upon realising this error, Socrates
experiences a shame which clearly parallels the shame experienced by the soul Iailing to curb the
advances oI its dark horse and acting upon its lust Ior the object oI their aIIections. It is mentioned that
he spoke with his head covered, in order to hide his embarrassment.
18
When Socrates decides to make
an apology speech to Eros, in which he will deIend love as the best kind oI madness, he is clearly
aware oI the shameIul nature oI his Iailure to control his passions: 'I will try to oIIer my Palinode to
Love beIore I am punished Ior speaking ill oI himwith my head bare, no longer covered in shame.
19
The specifc Iunction played by rhetoric, and its connection to philosophy is revealed in the
palinode, where eikos, the rhetorical technique oI arguing on the basis oI what is likely, is introduced
as a means oI transcending the limits oI the dialectic method. Socrates uses the dialectic techniques
oI defnition, division, and deduction in his prooI oI the immortality oI the soul at the beginning
oI the speech. When he attempts to move into a discussion oI the structure oI the soul, though, he
fnds that 'to describe what the soul actually is would require a very long account, altogether a task
Ior a god in every way; but to say what it is like is humanly possible.
20
Using the dialectic Iorm
to achieve knowledge oI metaphysics is thus not humanly possible. Socrates proceeds to introduce
13 Ibid, 250D
14 Ibid, 228B
15 Ibid, 230D
16 Ibid, 241B
17 Ibid, 242E-243A
18 Ibid, 237A
19 Ibid, 243B
20 Ibid, 246A
Love and Rhetoric in Plato`s !"#$%&'( Theo Lyons
the simile oI the soul-as-chariot, which he uses to create an image oI the truth, which will ideally
Iacilitate the recollection oI the actual true Iorms previously seen by the soul oI the philosopher.
Just as the dark horse serves to drag the soul to a position where it may recall the
true Iorm oI Beauty and pull back on the reigns, rhetoric and oratory, through the use oI eikos,
are able to create a likeness oI the truth which can help the listener to remember the truth itselI.
While Socrates does extensively criticize rhetoriticians, who only care about what is convincing,
and exercise their powers without regard to, or knowledge oI, what is good and bad, at the end
oI his and Phaedrus` discussion on rhetoric, he explains how a certain type oI rhetoric can indeed
help philosophers. Socrates fnally justifes his use oI rhetoric, and eikos, by arguing that 'people
get the idea oI what is likely through its similarity to the truth. And |...| in every case the person
who knows the truth knows best how to determine similarities.
21
He goes on to add that 'No
one will ever possess the art oI speaking, to the extent that any human being can, unless he
acquires the ability to enumerate the sorts oI characters to be Iound in any audience, to divide
everything according to its kinds, and to grasp each single thing frmly by means oI one Iorm.
22
Here it is clear that Socrates does not see rhetorical techniques as an absolute evil. In Iact
he believes that they can be, and indeed are, highly useIul tools. What the Phaedrus attempts to stress
is thus not that techniques such as eikos, attractive structure, and awareness oI the audience should be
totally avoided, but that they must be used wisely, by those who have already mastered the techniques
oI dialectic, and have a knowledge oI good and bad. To believe that rhetoric, working through the
appetitive side oI the soul and concerned with that which is pleasing, has no place in philosophical
enquiry, would be to miss the message oI the Phaedrus. Similarly, to believe that it is possible (let alone
desirable) to achieve platonic love without frst experiencing, and conquering, Ieelings oI lust would be
to accept the argument raised in Lysias speech when he essentially proposes a love without attraction.
When Lysias tells the imagined boy, 'I will... give you my time with no immediate thought oI immediate
pleasure; I will plan instead Ior the benefts that are to come, since I am master oI myselI and have not
been overwhelmed by love,
23
the critical reader should understand the impracticality oI his proposition.
Just as lust is essential to the realisation oI true love, the rhetorical methods Socrates employs
in order to transcend the limits oI the dialectic (to describe the structure oI the soul and the nature oI love)
are essential to the development oI Plato`s argument. The creation oI this dualistic vision oI love and
philosophy, in which each is linked to, and even dependent upon, its lower Iorm, is the central project
oI the Phaedrus. Moreover, when seen in the context oI this relationship, the structuring oI the text is
logical and consistent. The shiIt Irom Phaedrus and Socrates`ecstatic love oI oratory to their cautioning
discussion on rhetoricians, and Socrates` speeches Ior and against love, as well as the content oI the
mythical section oI the palinode can all be understood as parts oI Plato`s argument on this matter.
Despite the advantages oI this reading oI the Phaedrus, one might respond by asking
whether the suggestion that rhetoric and lust, through their appeals to what is pleasing, are essential
to the realisation oI whether true love or philosophy is consistent with the positions taken by Plato in
other works, in the Republic, Ior example, Socrates clearly suggests that in order to be just and happy
an individual must have a well-ordered soul, in which the rational part dominates over the spirited
21 Ibid, 273D
22 Ibid, 273D-E
23 Ibid, 233B
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and appetitive parts. This is emphasized in Book X, where Socrates suggests that the rational part 'is
the best part oI the soul.
24
Socrates seems to be equally critical oI all aspects oI the appetitive side
oI the soul when he argues Ior a ban on all imitative poetry, suggesting that,

In the case oI sex, anger, and all the desires, pleasures, and pains that we say
accompany all our actions, poetic imitation has the very same eIIect on us. It
nurtures and waters them and establishes |our appetites| as rulers in us when
they ought to wither and be ruled, Ior that way we`ll become better and happier
rather than worse and more wretched.
25

Here Socrates appears to suggest that it would be wiser to completely avoid all Iorms
that appeal to the appetitive side oI the soul than to risk admitting them into the city.
While this does pose a clear challenge to the suggestion that Socrates sees lust,
and the pursuit oI pleasure, as instrumentally necessary Ior recollection and divine love to
be achieved, an analysis oI the larger argument oI the Republic will reveal that this position
is in Iact consistent with the interpretation oI the Phaedrus deIended in this paper. Plato
uses the Republic to argue that the soul (and city) must be well-ordered iI it is to be just
and eudaimonaic. He suggests that Ior the right order to exist, the rational soul must Iully
control the appetitive and spiritual parts oI the soul, and argues that extensive systems oI
censorship, socialisation, and education must be put in place in a just city so as to ensure that
this balance is maintained. Despite that, Plato does not suggest that rhetoric, and aspects oI
the appetitive side oI the soul such as lust, are oI no use whatsoever. He argues that they are
dangerous, and must be kept within the control oI the rational part oI the mind. This is in
Iact quite consistent with the way in which lust and rhetoric are depicted in the Phaedrus.
Socrates concludes in the Phaedrus that the methods oI rhetoric must be used
careIully by one who already has knowledge oI good, bad, and the dialectic technique, and
that the lustIul side oI the soul must be controlled by the rational side Ior true, divine, love
to be achieved. The argument oI the Republic in Iact parallels this suggestion that, in certain
circumstances, rhetorical devices might be useIul. When Socrates describes how music and
stories can be used to shape children into good citizens, he does not suggest that only stories
appealing directly to the rational side oI the children`s souls will be useIul in achieving this
end. In Iact, the inclusion oI tales such as the Myth oI the Metals and the Myth oI Er in
Socrates` program Ior the education oI the citizens oI the kallipolis is highly signifcant.
This suggests that, even within the theoretical Iramework oI the Republic, there are many
instances in which it may be useIul, or even necessary, to tell stories that are believable and
produce a desired eIIect in the audience, regardless oI whether or not they are actually true.
In these cases, as with rhetoric and philosophy and lust and love in the Phaedrus,
24 Pl. Pl. Rep. 603ATrans. Nehamas and WoodruII
25 Ibid, 606D
Love and Rhetoric in Plato`s !"#$%&'( Theo Lyons
what is essential is that the rational part oI the soul (or city) is able to remain in control. In
the Republic this means that only the philosopher-kings should have the power to engage
in potentially dangerous practices such persuasion through rhetoric. While it would be
relatively easy to argue that Plato`s discourses suggest that the appetitive side oI the soul is
oI no use in the pursuit oI knowledge, a careIul reading oI the Phaedrus will in Iact suggest
otherwise. The Iact that we must make every eIIort to keep the rational part oI the soul in
control does not necessarily mean that lust and rhetoric (which both appeal to the appetitive
side oI the soul) cannot be instrumentally useIul, and indeed necessary in allowing us to
use reason to see the truth. In the case oI the Phaedrus, love and philosophy are closely
related to, and occasionally depend upon the Iunctions oI, lust and rhetoric.
Theo Lyons
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Bibliography
Primary Sources:
Plato. Republic. Trans Grube. Ed Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992.
Plato. Phaedrus. Trans Alexander Nehamas and Paul WoodruII. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 1995.
Kylie Flynn
The Context of the Summoning of the Magna Mater to
Rome in 205 BCE
The summoning oI the Magna Mater has been a controversial topic oI academic study Ior
years, particularly the cause oI her introduction to Rome Iollowing the consultation oI the Sibylline
Books in 205. Many theories have been put Iorward As to why the goddess brought over Irom Greece
at this point in Roman history. One is that the Romans wished to improve their reputation in Greece
aIter a breakdown oI their prestige, that it was owed to a spirit oI gratitude Ior the turning oI the
tide` in the Hannibalic War, or rather that it was due to a spirit oI anxiety and unease at a particularly
stressIul situation in Italy. The examination oI each oI these assumptions will attempt to determine
their suitability as the Ioremost explanation Ior the arrival oI the Magna Mater. This question will be
unraveled through an analysis oI ancient sources and oI the atmosphere both in Rome and abroad.
Erich Gruen, in his book Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policv, puts Iorth the
theory that contemporaneous events occurring outside oI the Italian peninsula were the root cause
oI the Magna Mater`s arrival. In the same year as that oI the Magna Mater`s summoning, the First
Macedonian War was concluded when Rome`s allies, the Aetolian League, arranged a treaty with
Philip oI Macedon without Rome`s consent. Livy attributes this deIection to their extreme Irustration
with Rome`s lack oI involvement and Iailure to dispatch aid to their cause.
1
As Gruen explains,
Rome Iought the war with Philip mostly by proxy, enlisting the aid oI Hellenistic allies in order
to prevent Philip Irom profting Irom his alliance with Carthage. This leIt Rome Iree to deploy
the vast majority oI its troops against Punic threats in Italy and Spain.
2
Appian confrms Rome`s
desire to remain largely absent Irom the confict, claiming that they were already stretched extremely
thin by engaging with the Punic Iorces and were thereIore hesitant to commit Roman troops to
other international conficts.
3
By 207, Rome had already reduced its contingents almost entirely, in
eIIect ceasing military involvement directly and Iorcing its Greek allies to oppose Philip unaided.
4
Regardless oI Rome`s absence Irom the confict, the League`s deIection still came as a
shock. Rome attempted to draw the Aetolian armies back into war by dispatching a Iormidable army
to the area, but to no avail.
5
The Romans were Iorced to draw up the Peace oI Phoenice owing to
their lack oI allies, available troops and disposable resources while engaged in Carthage.
6
Gruen
concludes, 'the whole experience had been unsatisIactory, Irustrating, and generally ignominious.
7

1 Liv. 29.12: 'For the last two years the aIIairs oI Greece had been neglected. Accordingly, as the Aetolians
were deserted by the Romans, on whom alone they depended Ior assistance, Philip compelled them to sue Ior
and agree to a peace on whatever conditions he pleased.
2 Erich S. Gruen, Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policv (Berkeley, CaliIornia: University oI CaliIornia
Press, 1990), 27.
3 Ibid.; cI. App. Mac. 3.1.
4 Gruen 27.
5 Ibid.
6 Liv. 29.12: 'Because now that the operations oI the war were removed into AIrica, |the Romans| were desir-
ous to be relieved Ior the present Irom all other wars.
7 Gruen 28.