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REMEDIAL LAW
by
Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles


Expanded Certiorari Jurisdiction
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two
impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is
discretionary in nature, and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a
preliminary investigation.
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives characterizes the power of
judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court reflects, includes the power to "determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari
jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as
procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether
public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its
discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as
lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the
Court (Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011).

Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

In extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, the rule is upon the
expiration of the one year redemption period, it forecloses the obligors' right to
redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute. The time-honored precept
is that after the consolidation of titles in the buyers name, for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its
issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial
function which cannot be enjoined or stayed, even by an action for annulment of
the mortgage or the foreclosure sale itself. The issuance of the final deed of sale,
therefore, is mere formality.

Thus, in the instant case, the failure of respondent (Atty. John V.
Aquino, Clerk of Court VI, Ex-Officio Sheriff) to issue the final deed of sale for
more than three (3) years clearly shows that he had been remiss in the
performance of his duties. The fact that a Writ of Mandamus was issued
likewise showed that the act of issuing the final deed of sale was ministerial,
therefore, respondent could not exercise discretion as to whether to issue the
same or not; it is not for him to decide the propriety or impropriety of the
issuance of the final deed of sale. More so, considering that no temporary
restraining order or injunctive order was issued to prevent the issuance of the
final deed of sale (Erdenberger v. Aquino, A.M. No. P-10-2739, August 24,
2011).

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Doctrine of Judicial Stability

The Doctrine of Judicial Stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is
founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to
the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all
its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.

Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has
been issued is considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the
execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of
execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct
errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold
otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the
resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction
is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera, the Court penalized two judges for
issuing a TRO against the execution of a demolition order issued by another co-
equal court. The Court stressed that when the respondents-judges acted on
the application for the issuance of a TRO, they were aware that they were
acting on matters pertaining to a co-equal court, namely, Branch 9 of the Cebu
City RTC, which was already exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter in
Civil Case No. 435-T. Nonetheless, respondent-judges still opted to interfere
with the order of a co-equal and coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction, in
blatant disregard of the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established axiom
in adjective law (Cabili v. Judge Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225, September
6, 2011).

Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer

While the court in an ejectment case may delve on the issue of ownership
or possession de jure solely for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession de facto, it has no jurisdiction to settle with finality the issue of
ownership and any pronouncement made by it on the question of ownership is
provisional in nature. A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes
of no other issue than possession and establishes only who has the right of
possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of
who has the right or title of ownership. We have held that although it was
proper for the RTC, on appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of
ownership and receive evidence on possession de jure, it cannot adjudicate
with semblance of finality the ownership of the property to either party by
ordering the cancellation of the TCT (Spouses Manila v. Spouses Manzo, G.R.
No. 163602, September 7, 2011).


Payment of docket fee

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Payment of docket and other fees within the period for taking an appeal
is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the right to appeal is
lost. This is so because a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees regardless of
the actual date of filing of the case in court. The payment of appellate docket
fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential
requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from becomes
final and executory as if no appeal was filed (D. M. Wenceslao and Associates,
Inc. v. City of Paraaque, G.R. No. 170728, August 31, 2011).

The filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading and the payment
of the prescribed docket fee are the acts that vest a trial court with jurisdiction
over the claim. In an action where the reliefs sought are purely for sums of
money and damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate
amount being claimed. Ideally, therefore, the complaint or similar pleading
must specify the sums of money to be recovered and the damages being sought
in order that the clerk of court may be put in a position to compute the correct
amount of docket fees.

If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient in relation to the
amounts being sought, the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy has the
responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the plaintiff will be
required to pay the deficiency. The non-specification of the amounts of damages
does not immediately divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case,
provided there is no bad faith or intent to defraud the Government on the part of
the plaintiff.
The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not
paid at the time of filing, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full
payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring
prescription. The prescriptive period that bars the payment of the docket fees
refers to the period in which a specific action must be filed, so that in every
case the docket fees must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period, as
provided in the applicable laws, particularly Chapter 3, Title V, Book III, of
the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription of actions (Fedman
Development Corporation v. Agcaoili, G.R. No. 165025, August 31, 2011).

Criminal Contempt versus Civil Contempt
Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be
resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any action.
They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or
remedial. A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the
authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully
assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in
doing a duly forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do
something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit
of the opposing party therein. It is at times difficult to determine whether the
proceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the character of the contempt of
whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of the contempt
involved, regardless of the cause in which the contempt arose, and by the relief
sought or dominant purpose.

The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or
remedial.Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order
of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the contempt
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is civil; where the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of
the court, and to protect the interests of the general public, the contempt is
criminal. Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts,
but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private
parties and compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made to
enforce such rights (Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 155849, August 31,
2011)



Judgment on the Pleadings versus Summary Judgment
What distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary
judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the
Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material
allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse
partys pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal
with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other
hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the
complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a
summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. A
genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or
which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial (Basbas v. Sayson, G.R.
No. 172660, August 24, 2011).

EVIDENCE
PEOPLE V. HUBERT WEBB, G.R. NO. 176864, DECEMBER 14, 2010
DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright
acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the States
failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful
suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and,
consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro
identified Webb in her testimony as Carmelas rapist and killer but serious
questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a
possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken
from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise
of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint,
with the exception of identical twins. If, on examination, the DNA of the subject
specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that
simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro
committed perjury in saying that he did.
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Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to
produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in
Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in
Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process
does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be
useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of
the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who
testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the
same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for
conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen
secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not
come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of
preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA
testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two
occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge
alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused. They raised
the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by
the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a
motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication
of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime
passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accuseds lack of interest
in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice
that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs passport since he
did not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best
evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is
exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to
see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent, the practice when a
party does not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to
have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a
faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are
binding on the parties and on the court.

The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webbs
arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated by no less than
the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the
Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb
failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But
this was unnecessary. Webbs passport is a document issued by the
Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official
record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that
passport are presumed true.

The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official
certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S.
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Immigration office on Webbs passport. They have the same evidentiary
value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented
in court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense
of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the
routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of
the record.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over
the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and
foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it
would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines
after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the
U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel
between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about
twelve to fourteen hours.

If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might
as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions,
surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that
official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they state,
are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome
by evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence
to impeach the entries in Webbs passport and the certifications of the Philippine
and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The
prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the
lower courts minds.


Marital Privilege Rule
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by
failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct
that may be construed as implied consent (Judge Lacurom v. Jacoba, A.C.
No. 5921, March 10, 2006).


Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of
privileged communication, to wit: (a) communication between husband and
wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication
between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and
penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however,
other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them
are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of
published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they
voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; and (d)
bank deposits (Air Philippines Corporation v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No.
172835, December 13, 2007).


Circumstantial Evidence
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive
evidence, refers to proof of collateral facts and circumstances whence the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
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produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based
on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved
form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.

A medical examination and a medical certificate are merely corroborative
and are not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case (People v. Gallo,
et al., G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011).


Tender of excluded evidence
At any rate, even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the
introduction as evidence of the CA Decision, petitioner is not left without legal
recourse. Petitioner could have availed of the remedy provided in Section 40, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things
offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the
same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is
oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony.

As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC
admit the CAs Decision for whatever it may be worth, he could have included the
same in his offer of exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is
rejected, the party producing it should ask the courts permission to have the exhibit
attached to the record.

As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part of the records of the case,
thus it has no probative weight. Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must be formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded
and rejected and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal. The rules of
procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value to
evidence which was not formally offered (Catacutan v. People, G.R. No. 175991,
August 31, 2011).


SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Property Rights Not Protected by the Writ of Amparo

A persons right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed
under the general rubric of property rightswhich are no longer protected by
the writ of amparo. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope and
extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights (In the
Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data
in Favor of Melissa C. Roxas, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010).

At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the respondent judge
erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalacks favor. Had he read Section
1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would
have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The present case
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involves concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature
concerns that we have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, we held:

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived
as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds (Salcedo v. Bollozos,
A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2236, July 5, 2010).



Order of Priority of Who May File a Writ of Amparo
Petitioners point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have
the requisite standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call
attention to the fact that in the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and
Karen merely indicated that they were concerned with Manuel Merino as
basis for filing the petition on his behalf.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any
qualified person or entity in the following order:

(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the
spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
or

(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or
institution, if there is no known member of the immediate
family or relative of the aggrieved party.


Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were
no known members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The
exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-quoted provision
must be followed. The order of priority is not without reasonto prevent
the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which
may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the
petition for habeas corpus on Merinos behalf. No objection was raised therein
for, in a habeas corpusproceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf
of the aggrieved party.
It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of
Sherlyn and Karen are precluded from filing the application on Merinos behalf
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as they are not authorized parties under the Rule (Boac v. Cadapan, G.R. Nos.
184461-62 , May 31, 2011).


Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of
the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the
public respondents (public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the
military and police hierarchy) in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if
not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of
substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a
proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.

The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, which was the first to examine command
responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the
doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that:

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its
context in the development of laws of war and armed combats.
According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest
terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form
of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day
precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of
control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is
"an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as
opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal,
underscoring supplied)

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an
imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown
criminalor administrative case rather than in a
summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the
writ itself:

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial
relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may
be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of
violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the
principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of
whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof
had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such
disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or
administrative under the applicable substantive law. The rationale
underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly
set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo:

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x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.

It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure,
preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on
the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of
their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis, the
distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were
given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to
wit:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established
by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this
Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and
civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance (In the Matter of the Petition for
the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C.
Roxas, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010).


Scope of the Writ of Amparo

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)


The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of
the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R.
Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the
enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the
remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling,
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assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse
to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is,
therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo (Canlas v.
NAPICO Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008).


Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy
of individuals. The writ operates to protect a persons right to control
information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of
the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim (In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the
Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C. Roxas, G.R. No. 189155,
September 7, 2010).


Rules of Civil Actions Applicable in Special Proceedings

Petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court
govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be
applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform;
capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the
absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in
special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an
obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it
categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or
merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory
pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the
payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way
obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings
such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case
(Sheker v. Estate of Alice O. Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, December 13,
2007).


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Jurisdiction of the Trial Court as a Probate or an Intestate Court

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the
probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does
not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely
exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate
court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate,
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any
right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.

First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory
of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership
in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to
the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse (Agtarap v. Agtarap, G.R. No.
177099, June 8, 2011).




Money Claim Against the Estate of a Decedent

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints
and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent
money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the
present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of
the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are
mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a
motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in
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the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of
Appeals, the Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new
litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising
in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A
motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to
incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some
question that is collateral to the main object of the action and
is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.
(Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the
claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent
claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an
initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
shopping (Sheker v. Estate of Alice O. Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, December
13, 2007)



Removal of Administrator by a Creditor

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the
administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may
seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a
creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief.
After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of
sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good
faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose (Hilado v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009).



Change of Name

Republic v. Labrador mandates that a petition for
a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to
have any interest that would be affected thereby. It cannot be gainsaid that
change of status of a child in relation to his parents is a substantial
correction or change of entry in the civil registry.

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
mandated (Republic of the Philippines v. Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R. No.
189476, February 2, 2011).

The change of name contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103
must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of ones name
under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to
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justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling
reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced
by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds
invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that
the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes changes of name, the
correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to
say, not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103.
Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.

This rule in names, however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108
to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary
proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for
allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and
paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary
proceeding. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the
truths about the facts recorded therein (Republic of the Philippines v.
Mercadera, G.R. No. 186027, December 8, 2010).

Amp/2011