1

THE ACCOUNT OF 1965 WAR AS FOUGHT

AND SEEN FROM THE AIRBORNE EYES
Brig(Retd) M.M.Mahmud
I have read the account of many an authors, of the 1965 War. It encompasses the rendition
of war as was perceived through the eyes of the Indians, Pakistani and the foreign
authors. Every description has its own ange and sant. !he most comprehensive account
is in the study carried out "y the #irecting $taff and the students of $taff %oege, &uetta
spread over a num"er of years. !his has now "een compied in the form, 'I$!()*
(+I,#(-P./I$!.,0W.) of 1965."y 1ieut 2enera 3ahmud .hmed 4)etd5. It is
"ased on the War #iaries of the units, interviews and "riefings of many who participated
in the war, and em"odies a comparative anaysis of the Indian officia version and the
detais written "y other contemporary writers. !he near to an accurate description, to my
mind, is covered "y 63en of $tee7 an account "ased on war dispatches of 3a8or 2enera
."rar 'ussain. !his again enumerates the detais of the "attes in a chronoogica order,
date wise. 9ut what I fee they a ack in, is "asicay that it does not truy capture the
spirit, the motivation and the passionate grit of mind and heart dispayed "y the gaant
men who fought it on ground. It e:uay audes to some of the panic, confusion and
"ra;en "unders committed. !hese aspects need to "e eicited in some detai and given a
pro8ection, so that the facts stem out in their correct perspective and in rea truth.
It is with these feeings that I em"ark on my hum"e effort, to portray the picture of the
"attefied as reaisticay and accuratey as I saw and witnessed. I was privieged to
watch the operations very cosey, in detai and as such truy refective of the happening
on the ground. E:uay, I had cose and intimate contacts, at different eves of command.
I had seen the operations mosty in the roe of air"orne eyes. It provided a graphic picture
of the detais as on a sand mode. It is my earnest effort to enthuse and entrain that spirit,
$ince, I operated ony in the area of %'.39 and $I.1/(! $ector, my rendition, wi
"e confined to these operations. . "rief description of )<,, (+ /<!%' operations is
incuded as a presage, since one fight of my $:uadron took part in that. (peration.
=
It is a pity that our panners denuded our main strike force in the /'E3 /'.).,
$ector, of its re:uisite eement of command and contro. It was not provided with a fuy
integrated .rmy .viation support. It was aunched in a most hap ha;ard manner and part
of an uncoordinated pan. It proved to "e one of the "iggest mistakes of the war. !he vita
ground that we gained, we coud not hod ony "ecause there was no effective command
and contro. !he vita sector was eft void of fuy integrated .rmy .viation !hey had no
invoved and dedicated .ir "orne eyes to guide them, provide them timey information
and hep in keeping, the cohesion and unity of command. 3ost importanty, the wisdom
of moving of '& > #iv from 9aoki to %ham" area is not understood. It had "een
tasked, with 1 .rmd #iv under its command, to carry out offensive operations in that
sector. I "eieve there were other options too, "ut the pan of attack in the area of /hem
/haran was aso one of the options,

!'E ).,, (+ /<!%'.
$oon after I took over the $:uadron, trou"e started to "rew in the area of )ann of /utch.
!his dispute was centering around the area "etween the former Province of $ind 4India5
and /utch 4India5. !he area is mosty waste marshy ands. Even the dispute dates "ack
to 1?@A.
9efore partition, three attempts were made to sette this dispute. !he detais are as
foowsB C
a5 +irst .ttemptB - !he first attempt was made in 19D? when the /utch 2ovt wanted
to "ring the entire area under their eEcusive contro. !o this the $ind 2ovt
o"8ected. $ome meetings were hed, "ut the :uestion remained undecided due to
the death of )ao of /utch.
"5 $econd .ttemptB - !his time the matter was referred to a commission in 19D?. It
resuted in a kind of compromise, under which the $ind 2ovt agreed to surrender
haf of the area to /utch. ."out the remaining haf, no cear decisions were
A
taken as to the "oundaries and the area remained undemarcated. !his gave rise to
mutifarious administrative difficuties, particuary in the "order
.reas where no effective contro coud "e maintained. !his ed to numerous
incidents ike har"oring of "ad characters "y side, ifting catteFs and other animas,
the poice and the revenue authorities cashing over their 8urisdictions and many other
such ike disputes.
c5 !hird .ttemptB - !he 2ovt of India finay intervened in 19A? and a survey party
was sent to demarcate $ind-/utch "oundaries. !he 3ukhtar of /utch accepted
the caim of 3ukhtar of $ind, to the haf of the territory. !his "ecame infructous
as the authorities of /utch ater "acked out and refused to accept the decision.
!hus conse:uenty, this dispute was inherited "y the 2ovt of Pakistan at the time of
partition. $ind 2ovt maintained its caim over haf of the area. .fter partition India
started to deveop a ,ava 9ase at /.,#.1. ,orth of /utch. !hey aso panned to ink
this "ase, with )a8astan and %entra India, "y )aiway ine via #EE$.. !his )aiway
ine was to pass through the )<,, of /<!%'. When Pakistan reai;ed the strategic
importance of this move, they took up the matter with the 2ovt of India. Whie this
dispute was the su"8ect of correspondence "etween the two 2ovtFs !he Indian forces
occupied %''.# 9E! (, =@G=5 +e"ruary 1956. !his was hitherto, historicay under
the contro of $ind 2ovt. (ur 9order Poice withdrew to WI,2I and the whoe of the
area )<,, of /<!%', came under the contro of India.
!he ,((,-,E')< agreement in 195? and the $heikh $waran $ingh meeting hed from
@ to 11 Hanuary, 196D, coud not resove the matter. 9oth sides decided to continue
studying the reevant materia.
Whie this status :uo was "eing maintained, the Indians decided to "uid up their troop
concentrations in the are a since Hanuary 1965. !here were air vioations of the area "y
the Indian .ir +orce, from +e"ruary 1965. .t this stage .ir 3arsha 3. .sghar /han,
%-I,-%, P.+, caed his counterpart in India. !his had an immediate effect and the
vioations stopped.
@
(n =>G=? 3arch, 1965 the Indians carried a ma8or 8oint eEercise with %om"ined
.rmyG,ava compiments caed 6.rrow 'ead7. #ue to a these moves, Pakistan aso
retaiated and concentrated its troops in the area. ? #iv, under the command of 3a8or
2en !I//. /'.,, was moved in the area. 2.(.%. 3.'.).$!). and 2u8rat area,
3a8or 2enera P.%. 2<P!., 3%, had earier assumed the command of the Indian troops
in the area. 'e had aready undertaken some preiminary operations.
OPERATIONAL DEPLOYYENT
.rmy .viation saw its initia "attefied "aptism in )ann of /atch. (ne fight of ,o.1
.rmy .viation $:uadron remained depoyed there from midde .pri, 1965 to 6
3ay, 1965.
(n arrived at 9adin, the piots immediatey started their famiiari;ation of the area of
operations. !he customs track, 9I.) 9'E! and the entire contro ine of the un-
demarcated internationa "oundary, was eEtensivey fown over. !he navigation in the
area was very difficut. It was a fat with numerous sand dunes, which too were drifting
"ecause of the wind effect. !o provide cose support to the forward troops, two advanced
anding grounds were esta"ished at #IP1( and .1I 9<,#E). !he fight was "ased at
9.#I,, "ut during the day it operated from forward strips.
)eguar recce missions were under taken soon after the arriva. 1iaison was aso
maintained with '& ? #iv, %ommanded "y 3a8or 2enera !I//. /'.,, and the other
formations and units. 3a8. $.3.. !I)3III, "rought an 'J1A heicopter and 8oined the
fight. 2(% ? #iv used the heicopter eEtensivey. Every day, he few out reguary to
visit the troops. 'e used this heicopter to carry ice, fruit and other essentia eements to
the forward troops.
$ome sma skirmishes had aready taken pace. !he ma8or operation was the attack at
9I.) 9'E! position. In the earier attacks on 9 .pri 1965, 51 Inf. 9de. 'ad captured
#I,2 and $.)#.) P($!. I had arrived in the area and had the opportunity to see it.
5
(n =6 .pri, 1965, 6 9de under command of 9rig. I+!I/'.) H.,H<. 41ater 3a8.
2en.5 was ordered to attack and capture 9I.) 9'E!. = ++ 9n, under the command of
1t. %o. I:"a .hmed 41ater 2enera5 ed the attack. !he 9de %ommander was right
"ehind the attacking infantry "attaion. !he attack was supported "y .rtiery fire and the
.rmy .viators successfuy and effectivey under took the artiery shoots. !he Indians
a"andoned the positions, eaving "ehind a ot of e:uipment and ammunition. #uring the
ad8ustment of the artiery fire "y .rmy .viators, a "ig Indian ammunition depot at
#'.)3$.1. was "own up. It was never cear as to whether the #epot "ew up
accidentay or as a resut of artiery fire ad8ustment "y .rmy .viators. .t night a strange
panic gripped the infantry positions at 9I.) 9'E!. . convoy of 1D-15 vehices with
their fu ights was approaching the position from the direction of the enemy. (wn troops
considered these to "e enemy tanks and were totay "affed. !hey considered these to "e
some strange new tactics "y the enemy. (wn troops opened up with a their weapons
incuding the ))Fs. !he artiery o"server 3a8. )ia;-u-'a: 3aik caed for artiery fire.
!his game went on the whoe night. ,either the enemy vehices were advancing forward
nor our own troops woud venture to move and pro"e the positions of the vehices. .t
dawn, it was reveaed that these vehices were part of a convoy. !hese vehices were A
!on 3</!I3., and were carrying rations and suppies and had ost their way during
the night. !he drivers and the other crews had hidden themseves underneath the vehices
the whoe night. !hey did not venture to run "ack to make their escape and were a
captured the neEt morning.
$ince there was no enemy air force operating in the area, the 1-19 were fying at an
atitude of ADDD-5DDD feet. !his provided a very wide coverage of the area and gave the
.rmy .viators a very good over view. .rmy .viation few reguaryK carrying out recce
missions with a the formations and did urgent casuaty evacuations. 1t. %o. ,./.
9.9.), %( A .rmy .viation $:uadron, aso came in the area and vounteered to fy as
a heicopter piot. #uring my visit I was accompanied "y 1t. %o. $aeed &adir, %o 199
Engineering 9attaion, which provided the maintenance support. 2(% ? #iv, the staff
and the other unitGformation commanders were a fu of praise of the support "eing
rendered "y .rmy .viation. $$2 was aso assisted in their recce for any possi"e
aunching in the area.
6
(n the return fight from 9.#I,, I encountered very "ad weather. (n anding at
$.)2(#'., in the met "riefing, I was advised of very adverse weather conditions. 1ow
.nd heavy couds with heavy rain and poor visi"iity were the forecast. I was advised not
to proceed further. %onsidering that it was important to get "ack to "ase, I decided to fy
out from $.)2(#'. to #'.3I.1. .ccompanying me was 3a8. /.$. 2hai" in
another 1-19 and 1t. %o $aeed &adir was sitting on the rear seat in the 1-19 "eing fown
"y me. With great difficuty the sat range was crossed. It was raining very heaviy and
the coud "ase was very ow. .fter cearing the sat range, the fight to #'.3I.1 had to
"e undertaken at a very ow attitude so as to keep visua cose contract with the ground.
!he famiiarity of the area, "eing the oca fying area of #'.3I.1 9.$E heped. With
great difficuty the two aircraft reached the $(W., )iver. .s a sense of compacency
was "eginning to set in, that we have made it to #'.3I.1 9ase, the aircraft suddeny
hit a heavy down pour. !he strong rain 8ust made a thick wa of pouring water with no
forward or downward visi"iity. !he aircraft with great difficuty took a "ind turn "ack. I
had aready "riefed 2hai", who was to foow me, to turn "ack immediatey as soon as
he saw I turn. .s I emerged safey out of the thick and "inding rain. I saw 2hai"Fs
aircraft ahead of me. I was reieved. !here were other cose cas in my .viation career,
"ut this was the cosest to having a fata accident. I was ucky I had accident free fying
career throughout my stay in the .rmy .viation.
#'.3I.1 9.$E, which was so cose, sti proved to "e too far. !he aircraft few "ack
to %'./W.1. !he parking and the security arrangements were made. We took to the
comfort of the hospitaity of .ttock (i )efinery %amp at 9.1/.$$.). We stayed the
night with 3asud, a gofer friend. 'e was a keen gofer and was we known to his
uneEpected guests. !hrough the communication inks of the .ttock (i )efinery,
messages were sent to #hamia 9ase and the famiies of these officers, informing them
that the aircraft had safey anded at %hakwa. !his put at rest a the panic that was
gripping #hamia 9ase due to these missing aircraft.
>
.fter performing reguar and routine missions of recce, iaison, %ommand and %ontro
and some casuaty evacuations, the fight of 1-19 aircraft and the ' J 1A heicopter
returned to #'.3I.1 on 6 3ay, 1965.
7 Div Co!etratio
+irst operationa move that the 1 .rmy .viation $:uadrons made was when it was paced
under %ommand > #iv. !he s:uadron moved to 9aoki 'ead works and remained
depoyed there from end 3ay 1965-end Hune 1965. > #iv with 1 .rmd #iv under
command, had "een assigned the operationa mission in that sector. It was to act as the
main strike force. '& > #iv was ocated at 9aoki 'ead works. 1 $:n was depoyed
aong the 1)9 cana. +or this op, 2(% > #iv carried out a very detaied and thorough
panning. 2(% 1 .rmd #iv however, remained a "it indifferent participant. 1ieut
2enera .taf &adir had compained to me personay, that 2(%1 .rmd #iv did not take
any interest in the pans and often sept during operationa "riefings. 'e personay took
up this matter with 2enera 3usa and re:uested that he "e repaced with some other
%ommander. Why no heed was paid to this advice, wi remain a mysteryL I had earier
seen the shaowness of his command capa"iities, when I had served under him at
/harian. In the aunching of 1 .rmored #ivision at /'E3 /.).,, on ? $ept, 1965,
the fiasco committed coud easiy have "een foreseen and averted. ,o one had any dou"t
a"out the professiona incompetence of 3a8. 2en. ,aseer. Why was he given the
command of the most important and the key strike force of the .rmyM It was the singe
most important "etraya of 1965 war. Where ay the responsi"iityM $urey at the door
steps of 2enera 3usa and 2enera .yu", who had inficted him in command of the most
important and vita formation of the .rmy. I was associated with the pans in some
detais. !hese were on the ines of the ones formuated "y > #iv, when I was 2 II 4(ps5
at that '&. !hey had the "est chance of success. 2(% > #iv, 1t. 2en. .taf &adir,
iteray "urnt midnight oi in the meticuous panning and preparation of his pans. Why
he was suddeny posted to %E,!(, one faied to understandM 9ut when 1t. 2en. .taf
&adir received the orders, he was iteray in tears. !his I term as the second most
important "etraya committed "y the .rmy high command. !he $:n was moved "ack to
#'.3I.1 "y end of Hune 1965. It kept waiting in the wings there.
?
Batt"e #ie"d
!he time for the "attefied test arrived ate in .ugust 1965. I was caed "y the 9ase
%ommander, %oone ..9 .wan, and he asked me to report to 2enera (fficer
%ommanding > #ivision, ocated near 2u8arat at Haapur. !he move of the $:uadron
was carried out on AD .ugust 1965. I with a sma group moved to Haapur and the rest
of the s:uadron was concentrated at 2u8arat .irfied. In the meeting with 2(% >
#ivision, 3a8or 2enera ..3. *ahya /han, I was informed, that > #ivision
'ead:uarters, had "een moved to this sector with a specific mission. I was tod that on 1
$eptem"er 1965, 1= #ivision was to aunch its attack at %ham". !he phase-1, which was
securing of the ine of )iver 3unawar !.WI, was to "e foowed in the phase-11 with the
o"8ective of capture of ./',<). 3a8or 2enera *ahya, further tod me that after the
aunching of the (perations on 1 $eptem"er 1965 "y 1= #ivisions, under the %ommand
of 3a8or 2enera .khtar .i 3aik, 3a8or 2enera *ahya aong with the '& > #ivision,
had "een specificay positioned in the area, to reieve 3a8or 2enera .khtar 3aik and
assume command of the operations in %ham"-Haurian $ector. 'e further tod me, that at
what time and stage of the operations, he wi take over, he did not know. 9ut 2enera
'ead:uarters woud decide the time for change of command.
!his is 8ust a preude to the .rmy .viation earning its "attefied spurs. !he .rmy
.viation had aready seen imited operations in the ,orthern .reas of 1= #iv area of
responsi"iity. %asuaty evacuations, faciitating of %ommand and %ontro were generay
the missions "eing reguary performed. 9ut the drums of war had "egun to "eat ouder.
!he Indians "egan carrying out imited offensive operations across the 1 of %, in
retaiation to the rising activities of the 3u8ahedeen in occupied /ashmir, under the
operationa pan 62I9).1!()7. !hese I,#I., counter operations were assuming
serious proportions. !hey had to "e neutrai;ed. It is in this "ackdrop that the
(PE).,!I(, 62).,# $1.37 had "een dovetaied with 6(PE).!I(,
I9).1!.)7. $o a decision had "een taken to eEercise the option of aunching a ma8or
operation across the 1 of % at %'.39.
9
9efore descri"ing these operations in detai, a "rief summation in essence may provide a
gist of the performance of the Pakistan .rmy in 1965 war. !his may serve to highight the
over a spirit. .nd the way the war was pursued at different eves of command.
+rom a accounts made "y different writers of the 1965 War, none is more descriptive
than that ...Fs saved Pakistan. !he three .Fs were .ah, .ir and .rtiery. !his may "e
rather an over simpification of the account. .rmour may not have payed any key roe in
the other sectors or may "e it performed poory, "ut the "attes of P'I11.).<' and
%'.WI,#. were "asicay armour "atte. 9oth artiery and air are supporting arms and
no dou"t payed their roe admira"y. 9ut the 6.7 for armour cannot "e ignored, at east
in this sector. !hus the tripe 6.Fs7 must read :uadrupe 6.Fs7. It is true, that it is due to
these four eements that the Pakistan .rmy, not ony "unted the Indian attack, "ut after
1> $eptem"er 1965, was in a very strong position to take it to a decisive concusion
"efore cease fire was enforced. !hrough a "od pan it coud em"race even the capture of
$am"a. !his and many others options were ony conceived and panned. Why they were
not eEecuted and a the possi"e panned o"8ectives remained iusiveM !he most
charita"e comments that can "e offered is, that it was ony due to some reasons of
faiings in the :uaities of head and heart, at critica eves of command.
When we discuss the . ...Fs we need some more detaied and specific appraisa. (f the
"essings of .ah the 2od .mighty and his divine wisdom, guidance and the fortitude
provided to this nation "y him in this crisis, we cannot perceive even a comment What
roe #ivine hand payed in these times of nationa destiny, one coud ony fee and "e
inspired, "ut is hard to descri"e. 9ut the contri"utions made "y the .rmour, .ir and
.rtiery in the conduct of 1965 war, needs a coser scrutiny and evauation. Without
taking any credit away from them, we do need to ponder as to whether they received any
cose intimate and effective support from any other organi;ations or :uarters, to render
them so effective or not. .t this stage a "rief comment woud suffice. .s the events of the
War keep unfoding themseves, the roe of the support they received from .rmy .viation
wi keep prove itsef.
1D
%oming to the account of 1965 War and evauating the roe of .rmy .viation, needs
correct miitary perspective. !his can "e "est descri"ed in tandem to the operations on the
ground and specific description of the performance "y the .rmy .viation in support of
these.
.rmy .viation at this stage consisted of 9ase '& and three .viation $:uadrons,
comprising of 1, = and A .rmy .viation $:uadrons. !he entire .rmy .viation had an
integrated maintenance and ogistic support, consisting of 199 .viation E3E 9attaion,
and an (rdnance #epot. !he "ase was "eing commanded "y %oone ..9. .wan. !he
s:uadrons were commanded "y 1ieutenant %oone 3.3. 3ahmud, %ommanding
(fficer ,o 1 .. $:n, 1t. %o 3ohammad /han, %ommanding (fficer ,o = .. $:n and
1t. %o ,.<./. 9a"ar was %ommanding ,o A $:n. ,um"er 1 and ,um"er = s:uadrons
were e:uipped with 1-19 aircraft and ,o.A $:uadron which was raised in 196@ had the
atest induction of ' E 1A heicopters.
.rmy .viation at this stage was totay unarmed and it saw its induction in the 1965 war,
truy in the prover"ia phrase of unarmed into 9atte. !he "attefied spurs that the .rmy
.viation won, were in this modest shape and form. <ndaunted, fu of devotion, these
dedicated officers, who represented a happy "end of professiona sodiers and
technocrats as piots, integrated themseves with the ground troops with ease and fu
understanding of each other.

(n 1 $eptem"er 1965, when at DADD hours with the firing of the guns and the aunching
of the ground offensive at D5DD hours, operations in %'.39 roed offK the .rmy
.viation had fuy assumed its pace in the "atte aong side with the ground troops. !hey
integrated themseves within one day of their arriva in the area. !his proved a happy and
effective "end. !he whoe transition of the s:uadron to form a compementary team with
'ead &uarter > #iv. was made smoothy and amost instantaneousy, as I was fuy
famiiar with a the staff and commanders at the #iv. 'ead:uarters. It proved very
cohesive and paved way for eEceent team work. !he events of war as they unfod
themseves woud provide ampe credence to the statement. . fight of = .. $:ud. 'ad
earier moved to 9'I3E). (n my arriva in the area, it came under my %ommand.
11
!hroughout the %'.39 operations, I carried out a the panning and co-ordination of
the tota .rmy .viation effort in the area. !he fight under 3a8or )a""ani had "een
aready assigned to 1= #iv. and had integrated itsef in the operationa pans of 1= #iv.
9efore recording the historica events of the 1965 War and the roe payed "y the .rmy
.viation in support of it, we shoud pause and refect on the roe assigned to the .rmy
.viation. When we changed the traditiona .ir (P roe to em"race the overa concept of
.rmy .viation roe in 196@, it was a "ig :uantum 8ump. +rom purey the simpe roe of
ad8usting .rty +ire as .ir (P, .rmy .viation was em"arking on a very am"itious roe, as
a fu fedged %om"at .rm of the .rmy. !he different teachings N definitions of the roe
of .rmy .viation can "est "e defined and summari;ed under the foowing parametersB-
a. 9attefied $urveiance
". %ommand and %ontro
c. 3o"iity
d. +ire Power
e. .d8ustment of .rtiery +ire
f. %asuaty Evacuation
!he .rmy .viation in Pakistan was sti in its infancy in 1965. It was in transition. !he
capa"iity for any physica mo"iity to act as a force mutipier none eEisted. !he ony
mo"iity that it coud provide was to enhance the menta a"iity of the fied commanders
to take :uick and timey decisions. !his is a very vita factor. !he .rmy .viation had no
integra firepower capa"iity. !he entire roe that it payed has to "e evauated in the
concepts enunciated and recorded in that conteEt.
No$ the %att"e. .s the tanks and the infantry roed out of their positions from the +<P,
on 1 $eptem"er 1965 at D5DD hours, the .rmy .viation was there aongside with them.
!he pan of attack "y 1= #ivision is encosed as .nE I. !he map of the area is encosed as
.nE =
It was a two pronged attack. In the ,orth ,o. @ $ector, under 9rig. 'ameed, attacked
with 5 N 19 ./ "n and ? ./ 9n was in reserve. .n adhoc armour s:uadron was under
command. ItFs o"8ectives in phase 1 were destruction of enemy WE$! of !.WI, in
1=
1.1E.1, #EW., $./).,. and %'.39 sectors. In the $outh 1D= 9de commanded
"y 9rig. Iafar .i /han, was tasked in the phase 1, to capture area west of !awi,
incuding 3.,#I.1.-<11., W.1I, PI) H.3. in the area. !he 9de attacked with
11 %av, foowed "y 9 and 1A Pun8a" and was to capture %'./ ,.W.,-%'./
P.,#I! "y D9DD 'rs 1 $eptem"er.
In phase 11 was the %apture of %'.39-$./).,. "y 9 Pun8a" supported "y 11
%avary "y 1=DD 'rs. 1 $eptem"er.
!he attacks from "oth the directions proceeded on time and some sporadic resistance and
deay was caused "y enemy positions and pockets at different paces. !he terrain posed
some pro"em to armour and deayed the advance of 11 %avary initiay. 9ut the advance
kept roing. .t paces some strong resistance came from some ocations. !he accurate
and effective fire of the enemy recoiess rifes took some to of our tanks. 9ut the
operations kept making due progress. $ome positions were "y passed and the others
reduced. !he tanks, the infantry and the ground o"servers kept deaing with the resistance
very effectivey. !he roe of .rmy .viation remained rather su"dued. $ome odd arty
shoots were taken. .gain, the roe of "attefied surveiance, command and contro
remained at a very ow key. 3a8. 2en. .khtar 3aik was eading the attack himsef. 'e
remained cose to the front ine troops and perhaps purposey was not in communication
even with his !.% '(. !his did not provide any cose inks for the .rmy .viation with
the fied commanders. !he unduating ground provided reasona"y good o"servation in
the area and the air"orne eyes were not re:uired to suppement that.
!he evening of 1 $eptem"er saw some eEcitement for the .rmy .viation. $ome 1-19
aircraft and ' E 1A heicopters were fying in the area to have an overa view of the
"attefied. !he customary fog of war was there. !he .rmy .viation though was active
"ut did not perceive any cear picture of the "attefied. !he overa mood was so"er.
$uddeny there was a "u;; of eEcitement. .t a"out 16DD 'rs, four enemy aircraft
appeared and started attacking our ground troops. .s these aircraft dived in their attack
runs, our own fighters ma8esticay picked them up. Within, a very short span of time, a
the four Indian aircraft were shot down. !he interception of these aircraft was at such a
1A
very ow atitude that none of the enemy piots coud "ai out and were a kied. !his
thriing encounter of the first air "atte, was witnessed from an 1-19 "y .ir 3arsha ,ur
/han, the %-I,-% of P.+, 1t %o ,.<./. 9a"ar and mysef, fying in '-1A heFs, I aong
with %apt. .skree, the piot of ' E 1A heicopter, anded at one of the sights of the crash
and picked up a piece of the wreckage. It was the insignia of the Indian .ir +orce. !his
was kept as a war trophy.
Hust as this eEcitement was dying out, 1t. %o. ,./.9a"ar, who was miing around in the
area in an 'J1A, inficted upon himsef a totay uni:ue and an unparaeed incident.
!his needs to "e recorded and ea"orated. It was getting to "e the evening of 1 $ep. (ur
troops had approached %'.39. In the process of their advance, they had "y passed
some I,#I., positions on their way. !he enemy troops in those positions were raising
white fags as a gesture of their intention to surrender. 1A 1 and 6 ++ had "y-passed a
position hed "y a company of $I/' )egiment. .s "oth 1A 1 and 6 ++, were pursuing
their advance to their o"8ective %'.39, they coud not spare any effort or time to round
them up, take them prisoners and then transport them to the rear. !his position was
P(<) picket. .n 'E1A heicopter, which had 1t. %o. ,./. 9a"ar, 3a8. ..1. .W., and
%apt. ./).3 on "oard, was ooking around in the area and saw the raising of whie
fags from this position. !he whoe incident is "est descri"ed "y 1t. %o. ,./. 9a"ar
himsef. . compete account of this is re-produced in his own words. !here can "e no
conventionay defined opinions offered on this episode. Was it initiay an act of "ravery
or stupidity to and the heicopter in cose proEimity to this enemy positionL #id this
initia act not ater assume a roe of most uni:ue form of persona "raveryM 1et the
readers form their own opinion and 8udgment.
6A .rmy .viation $:uadron 4)otary Wing5 had "een directed to provide a heicopter for
the transportation of 9rig. I$'.& 4!he then 9de %ommander at ).W.1./(!5 from
3urree to )awaakot on 1 $ep. 65 $ince it was conventiona to dispatch two heicopters
on mission in .I.# /.$'3I), and in this case too, two heicopters were detaied. In
the first heicopter were 1t. %o. 4ater 3a8. 2enera5 ,.$I) <11.' 9.9.), and the
1@
=ic 3a8. 41ater 1t %o5 .9#<1 1.!I+ .W.,. !he second heicopter had %apt. 4ater
%oone5 1ate 3('# ./).3 and one other piot.
(n arriva at 3<))EE it was earnt that the P./I$!., .)3* had aunched an
offensive operation in area %'.39 and that the eading eements 411 %.O5 were in the
vicinity of the town of %ham". !he heicopters took off and on anding at ).W.1./(!
the news remained the same that the eading eements were on the outskirts of %'.39.
.fter having finished their work, it was suggested to 9rig. I$'.& that we shoud
proceed to %'.39. !he 9rig. readiy agreed as it woud afford him an opportunity of
meeting his %ommander 42en. ./'!.) 3.1I/5. )esutanty we eft for %'.39 via
9'I39E) 4'& @ $ector5 so as to o"tain the atest information of the prevaiing overa
situation. .t 9'I39E), the information remained the same. .fter partaking in a :uick
unch, we eft for P.#'.) and anded in the gun position, in P.#'.) ,uah. $ince
we neither had maps nor were famiiar with the area, it was decided to ascertain the
genera direction of %'.39 from the 2P(. .t this stage, 9rig. I$'.& decided to go
"ack to 3<))EE as he had schedued a meeting in the evening. 'e was sent "ack to
3<))EE in the other heicopter.
In the other heicopter, $ef, 3a8. .wan and %apt. ./).3 took off and proceeded
towards the indicated direction. Enroute, we ocated an enemy post, which had not "een
attacked and was on a fank and in considera"e depth. When overhead, I asked 3a8.
.W., to and so that we coud pick up a coupe of weapons as souvenirs. 3a8. .W.,
suggested that we invove in the venture on the return 8ourney. !hus we proceeded
further, "ut coud not ocate a suita"e '& or a %omd vehice and in conse:uence. 3a8.
.W.,, suggested that we return, as it was getting ate in the afternoon.
.s we turned "ack, we earnt on the .)%-@@, that 9rig. 41ater 1t. 2en.5 '.3I# /'.,
had "een am"ushed. We endeavored to inform them that if they coud see the heicopter,
they shoud direct us to their position, so that we coud pick up 9rig. '.3I#. Whie
"usy in this conversation, we again came over the same enemy position and I asked 3a8.
15
.W., to and. 'e mentioned a"out some peope "eing in the post, "ut "eing "usy with
.)%-@@, I did not truy understand the impications.
.s the heicopter touched down, I 8umped out and with the ony weapon one had 4the
fying cap-akin to the current gof cap5, I asked the men to stand up. It then dawned on us
that there was a very arge "ody of troops, in the post 4ater it transpired that it was a
company post of 5
th
$ikh 1ight Infantry and as customary in the Indian 9attaions, they
had the heavy weapons-3ortar, )), and ight 3achine 2un eement from a ).HP<!
9attaion5. $ti carried "y the desire of souvenirs, I informed 3a8. .W., to and on the
main "unker, whie I waked into the post, got a coupe of weapons and we woud take
off in the heicopter. 3a8. .W.,, to his credit, convinced me that there may "e a
minefied around the post. I caed out to a $ikh sodier to come over and on my
ascertaining, he confirmed that there were mines aong the "ar"ed wire. I asked him to
ead the way into the post. .s I waked in, .W., "rought over the heicopter and anded
on the main "unker. (n in:uiry, I was informed that they had "een su"8ected to some
sheing and there were a few wounded ying in the "unker. I moved into the "unker and
ifting the "anket from each man, I found that there were a coupe dead and another
coupe who had "een in8ured. !he %ompany %ommander, 3a8. ,E2I had eft the post on
the pea that he was proceeding to fetch some rations. . su"edar was in charge of the
post.
(n emerging from the "unker, I saw two enemy aircraft approaching from the $(<!'-
possi"y, having seen the heicopter. I immediatey rushed and waived to 3a8. .W.,
a"out the impending air attack. !he Indian aircraft made a pass over "ut did ,(! open
fire and turned around to make the neEt pass as to attack the heicopterGposition. !he
heicopter had in the meantime taken off and eft the position. I then ordered the men to
go to the ground as the aircraft were again approaching on their mission. 'owever, "efore
they coud reach the post they were hit "y one +-?6 $a"re and crashed ahead of the
position.
I then directed the men to pace their rifes on the parapet and move out. .fter having
moved them out, I asked the $ H%( to fa them in ranks. )eai;ing that the main
o"8ective i.e. souvenirs had "een overooked, I asked one of the ()Fs, to go into the
16
position and fetch two rifes 4"rand new 2 IIIs5L ("serving that the )a8puts 4heavy
Weapons5 were a itte suen and may react adversey, they were paced at the head of the
coumn and the march towards the P./I$!., +#1Fs, was made. .fter a"out three mies,
I met 41ate5 3a8. 4ater 3a8. 2en.5 .9#<11.' $.EE# moving forward with his
"attaion. I re:uested him to take over the prisoners "ut he refused, indicating that his
troops were moving forward towards %'.39. !his march continued and at dusk we
arrived at 3(E1 post 4tota distance a"out > mies5. 'ere we stopped and asked for some
tea and as I was anEious a"out the heicopter, I made in:uiries and was informed that it
had safey reached /'.)I.,. .fter tea the march started again towards P.#'.) 4the
9de '&5 a"out A-@ mies away. It was dark "ut there "eing a fu moon, movement was
possi"e. .t a"out =DDD hrs we reached the 9de '& at P.#'.) 4now taken over "y the
'& %orps .rty5. I made the men sit in the voey"a ground and proceeded to the
(fficers 3ess. I met 1ate 9rig. .m8ad %haudhary and his staff and informed them a"out
the men. !hey were in great dis"eief and they came over to see the Indian troops 4around
>5->?5 sitting in the ground. I once again made a re:uest for vehices to move the
prisoners to 9'I39E), "ut the re:uest was turned down on the pea that the %orps .rty
was "eing re-depoyed and in conse:uence ,( vehices were avaia"e. 'owever, I was
informed that some "ridging e:uipment had "een moved to !.WI and on return the
vehices woud "e made avaia"e.
.t around = .3 the vehices arrived and I directed the men to show me their "attaion
em"ossing dri and they compied with great efficiency.
.t around @ .3 we reached the $ector '& at 9'I39E) and the panic a"out escorts etc
started. I handed over the men and went off to seep. .t around 1D .3, the heicopter
arrived and "rought me "ack to #'.3I.1, aong with the souvenirs. 1ate %oone 4ater
1t. 2enera5 .9 .W., received us and admonished me for reckessness. I presented one
of the rifes to the .rmy .viation 3ess and kept the other 4sti remains with me5.
!he ()Fs when interrogated "y the Inteigence, narrated the events. 1ater, that evening
at the PresidentFs Press %onference, the #2 I$I, and 9rig. )I.I "rought the event to the
1>
notice of the President and re:uested that the news "e reeased to the Press, as it woud
hep in raising the morae of our troop.
$ince I had ,(! contacted any one in person, varied reports of the incident were
pu"ished in the Press-some indicating that it was a P.+ heicopter.
$u"se:uenty, in recognition of this singuar act, I was awarded the $itara-e-Hurat. P$ It
ater transpired that the position was a %ompany post 4P.<)5 and as nature acts in its
own mysterious way, I was granted another immediate award of $I!.).-E-H<)..!
4within 1DD yards of the area5 in the 19>1 war. .t that time I was commanding 111 9de7
.s these first eEcitements were dying out, 11 %av had reached %ham". !he accounts are
rather conficting, "ut it appears that "etween 11DD- 1=DD hrs they had reached the out
skirts of %ham". !he enemy ))Fs which had "een we sighted in the %ham" area had
knocked out a few of our tanks. .t what time %ham" was captured, it is not cear. 9ut "y
far from a accounts, the area West of )iver !awi was captured "y the evening and the
operation for the esta"ishment of a "ridgehead across !awi had started. 9y first ight =
$eptem"er, some eements were strugging to make a foothod across the Eastern 9ank of
)iver !.WI. !here was a ot of confusion as many vehices had "ogged down in the "ed
of )iver !.WI. !here was no enemy resistance, "ut the 9ridge 'ead had not "een fuy
esta"ished.
(n the morning of = $eptem"er, %(% > div was fown from his '& at Haapur to
9'(HP<) which was the ocation of !.% '& 1D= 9de in an ' E 1A heicopters. +rom
there the piots of the two heicopters, aong with me few to /harian. 2en. 3usa, %-in-
%, accompanied "y 9rig. .... 9igrammi arrived in a <-?+, fown "y 3a8. /ureshy and.
3a8. 3adni. +rom /harian, 2en. 3usa and 9rig. .... 9igrami, were fown in = ' E 1A
heicopters to '& 1D= 9de, !he 2(% > #iv, had "een earier dropped there. (n arriva
there, 2en. 3usa tried to contact 2en. .khtar .i 3aik, 2(% 1= #iv. 2(% 1= #iv was
not in communication with any one, either on the wireess or on ine. .fter a ot of hectic
efforts, he finay was traced in the area of %ham", where he was "usy eEpediting the re-
depoyment of the guns of @ %orps .rtiery. !his re-depoyment was urgent as after the
crossing of )iver !.WI and for advance "eyond that, the range of the guns was re:uired.
1?
With a ot of efforts, a message was finay conveyed to 2(% 1= #iv through the
'ead:uarters @ %orps .rtiery, to come to '& 1D= 9de. Oery reuctanty he arrived. .t
the '& 1D= 9de, 2en. 3usa gave the orders for 2(% > #iv to assume the %ommand of
the operations. .fter receiving the orders of the change over in command, 3a8. 2enera
.khtar .i 3aik appeared out of the 9unker. I aong with a few other officersF was
standing there. .s he approached us, he had tears in his eyes and remorsey he saidK 6I
wanted to conduct the operation to its fatefu concusion. I have "een tod to proceed to
3urree and take over my command of 1= #iv.7 !he change of %ommand took pace
:uite smoothy and the .rmy .viation did faciitate in the change over. 9ut this change
did resut in some deay in the eEecution of the operations. !he orders for esta"ishment
of 9ridge 'ead, as panned earier and under eEecution, were further ea"orated "y 2(%
> #iv. 9y 19.15 'rs on = $eptem"er, the "ridgehead was esta"ishment "y 1D 9de, with 6
++ and 1A 1ancers in the $outh and "y @ $ector in the ,orth.
It was a fatefu decisionL Was it with any specific intentM #id it have the purpose to
gorify 3a8or 2enera *ahya /han, who was aready "eing groomed as the neEt %-I,-%M
Was 2enera .yu" under some specific instructions, from his masters, not to push the
advance so far as to resut in the inevita"e capture of ./',<)M %oud it possi"y "e
that if 3a8. 2enera .khtar 3aik had captured ./'9<), he woud have "ecome a
,ationa 'eroL #id this impose any aarming signa for 2enera .yu"M !hey a defy
answers, as no one has ever eEpained the reasons for it. 'owever, inaiena"e fact is that
it did cause a definite deay in the progress of the "atte. 3a8or 2enera .khtar 3aik
had envisaged in his panning, the capture of ./',<) within >= hourFs of the start of
the operations. In my estimation it was possi"e, as .khtar 3aik had ceary shown a
his intents and posture of his aggressiveness in command. 'ow critica was this deay, is
a mute point, as no definitive yardstick is avaia"e to determine this. It is ony a
guessing gameL . copy of a etter which 3a8 2enera .khtar 3aik wrote to his "rother
from .,/.)., gives some idea of his frustrations, .ttached as .,J A. It suggests that
the change of command, which he descri"es as defecto, had aready taken pace at the
very first day of the operations after the fa of %ham". 'e descri"es this to the fact that
9rig. .;mat 'ayat, 9rigade %ommander of 1D 9rigade, had "roken of a wireess
communications with him. 'e further descri"es that as he tore into him the neEt day, he
19
sheepishy and nervousy informed him, that, 6'e was *ahyaFs 9rigadier7. 'e cassifies
it as a "etraya of many dimensions. I am personay not incined to agree with this
assessment and anaysis. I was a privy to and was in cose touch with 3a8or 2en. *ahya
/han. I "eieve no such instructions were given "y 3a8. 2en. *ahya to 9rig. .;mat
'ayat, not to receive any further orders from 3a8. 2en. .khtar 3aik. !he conduct of
9rig. .;mat speaks for it a. ,ot ony he remained out of communication with 2(% 1=
#iv. on first $eptem"er 1965, "ut he kept repeating the same practice and act even with
2(% > #iv. ater. In my presence, 3a8. 2en. *ahya, on A
rd
$eptem"er 1965 re"uked him
in the fouest possi"e anguage for remaining out of wireess contact with him. !hat he
peaded with 2en. 3usa and 3a8. 2en. *ahya that he is aowed to go up to ./',<),
even under the command of 3a8. 2en. *ahya, is most pro"a"y true. !here was a
vociferous and I assume even heated discussions inside the "unker, cose to which we
were standing. !here is no dou"t that the change of command definitey deayed in the
capture of ./',<).
(n the morning of A $eptem"er, 2(% > #iv gave orders for the "reak out from the
"ridge head. 'e ordered 1D 9de to secure Haurian "y ast ight on A $eptem"er. (ut ine
pan of %ommander 1D 9de was as foowsB -.nE @
a. 6 ++ 4,orthern 9n5 sp "y 1A 1 ess $:n to "reakout from area
P.1.,W.1. at 1ADD hrs aong gen aEis %'.39-
./',<). Initiay mask /.1I! and adv up to nuahGrd
Hune >A6> and sweep southwards to secure H.<)I.,.
". 1@ P<,H.9 4$outhern 9n5 sp "y one $:n 1A 1 to "reakout at
1=AD hrs. Initiay secure ,.W., '.3I)P<) and there

.fter adv eastwards aong the river to threaten the enemy eft fank
In order to faciitate securing of H.<)I.,.

c. 1A P<,H.9 in res.
=D
In the ,orth 6 ++ and 1A 1 met increasing resistance from enemy armour, ))Fs and
infantry. It advanced "eyond P.1.,W.1.. !he opposition stiffened as own troops
approached !)(!I. Enemy had fooded the paddy fieds which made the movement off
the roads difficut for "oth . and 9 Ech vehices. 9ut despite the odds, 1A1 2P contacted
!)(!I posn. "y 1>AD hrs.
In the $outh 1@ Pun8a" gp met ight opposition from ,.W., '.3I)P<). !he
progress was aso sow "ecause of the "ad going and fooded fieds which separated
infantry from +Ech vehices. #uring the night P $eptem"er, they coud not reach far
enough "eyond ,.W., '.3I)P<) to infuence the situation at !)(!I. !he 9rigade
%ommander 1D 9rigade, 9rigadier .;mat, showed tota ack of wi. In addition to the
factors mentioned a"ove, the responsi"iity for the deay in the capture of ./',<)
9ridge, aid directy on the shouders of %ommander 1D 9rigade. 'e eEercised no
command and contro, acked a initiate and was acting as a sient "ystander to the
events. 'e 8ust aowed the operations to drift aong and take its own course. 'e showed
no sense of purpose and urgency in his command as was dictated "y the situation.
$ince a staemate had ensued at !)(!I, 2(% > #iv ordered 6 9de to take over defense
astride )iver !.WI from 1D= 9de. 1D= 9de was ordered to concentrate at
P.'.)IW.1. 6A6A and %ommence advance through the gap in the 1D 9de positions
and the his to its ,orth.
In the $outh, 1D 9de was ordered to continue cearing en opposition in area Haurian and
cear the ine of $.'.9.,W.1. /'.# without deay. 1D= 9de in the ,orth and 1D
9de in the $outh were further instructed to secure the ine of /.,2.) ,.1. "y ast
ight @ $eptem"er and the ine 2.).'- +.!W.1 Pt 96?4?D6A5 "y first ight D5
$eptem"er.
In support of this operation ea"orate artiery support had "een panned. Enemy
positions at !)(!I and H.<)I., were to "e softened "y heavy artiery support, "efore
attack "y 1D 9de on first ight @ $eptem"er. !he earier pan of capture of H.<)I.,
=1
9y 1D 9de, "y ast ight A $eptem"er, coud not "e accompished. !he main factors
impeding the progress were ack of detaied information a"out the enemy strength and
dispositions occupying !)(!I and H.<)I., positions, the fooded paddy fieds, ack of
ade:uate %ommunications within the formation, ack of functiona chain of %ommand
and %ontro and a"ove a the timid mind of the 9rigade %ommanders.
(n first ight @ $eptem"er, I aong with 2(% > #iv few in an ' E 1A heicopters from
his '& at H.1.1P<) to %'.39. .t the heipad, %ommander @ %orps .rtiery, 9rig.
.m8ad .i %haudhary met 2(% > #iv. When the 2(% in:uired a"out the position on the
ground, %ommander @ %orps .rtiery eEpained that the fire pan was fired on time.
.fter the ifting of the own artiery fire, the main attack had to go in at first ight. 9ut
according to his information, there was no movement on the ground. 2(% > #iv
in:uiringy ooked at me. I tod the 2(%, that I wi go and carry out a detaied recce.
+ying in the ' E 1A heicopter, I and %apt .skree, the piot of ' E 1A, few across !.WI
to the !)(!I position. .s we approached the area, we found the whoe position of
!)(!I and H.<)I., competey covered under a smoke and dust um"rea caused "y
our heavy artiery fire. We carried out a detaied recce of the entire positions at !)(!I
and H.<)I.,. !hrough the gaps in the smoke and dust, devastation caused "y own
artiery fire on the enemy positions was ceary visi"e. . ot of vehices and other
e:uipment were sti "urning and there was hardy any movement in the area. We few
very ow over the enemy position and made a very "rief touch down in an open area. It
was rather ama;ing and surprising that we did not attract any ground fire. !he estimate
and assessment was that as a resut of the heavy artiery fire, Enemy positions at !)(!I
and H.<)I., had "een puveri;ed and paray;ed. Whatever, their strength eft "ehind
in these positionsK the enemy was in no position to offer any stiff resistance. .n overa
opinion and appreciation was made. It suggested, that these positions must "e "y- passed
from the ,orth and the $outh. Whatever, enemy positions had "een eft "ehind in the
areasK they coud "e reduced and mopped up ater. With this cear perception made of the
position as o"tained on the ground, I first anded near !)(!I and met =1 %, 6 ++. (n
in:uiring, 3a8. 41ater 9rig5 .nwar-u-'a: 4,#5 tod me that their + echeons had not
arrived and "ecause of that, they were not in a position to attack !)(!I as panned. I
then few to $outh. !here we first met 1t %o .!., %( ? 3ed and through his guidance
==
ater ocated %ommander 1D 9de, 9rig. .;mat. When I asked him a"out the progress on
the ground, he eEpained that 1@ Pun8a" was ordered to advance aong )iver %hena", "ut
his '& had ost contact with them. With this "reakdown of communications and ack of
ade:uate information a"out his units, he was in no position to advance any further. We
then few and anded in the positions of 1A 1ancers. !hey were a ined up in a nuah.
!he %( 1A 1ancers eEpained that there was heavy enemy fire coming from !)(!I
position and as such their advance was hed up. I then few ,orth and met 1t. %o.
$iddi:ue %( ? 9auch and 9rig. Iafar .i /han in %ommand 1D= 9de. I was "riefed "y
them that due to rough terrain and ight enemy resistance their advance was "ecoming
increasingy difficut. I gave a detaied report and my assessment of the enemy positions
in the area of !)(!I and H.<)I.,, to a the 9de %omdFsG%oFs that I met. I particuary
apprised them of the devastating effect of own arty and tried my "est to infuence the
minds of these 9deGunit commanders. It was strongy "eing advised to them, to "y pass
!)(!I and H.<)I., positions from the )I2'! and 1E+! fank. 9ut there was no
positive response coming from any one. $eeing this staemate on the ground, I few "ack
to %'.39. .t the heipad, the 2(% > #iv and %ommander @ %orps .rtiery were
anEiousy waiting for me. (n arriva at the heipad I gave a detaied report of the recce
carried out "y me. I particuary emphasi;ed the devastating effect of the artiery fire at
!)(!I and H.<)I., positions. I ceary gave out my assessment. In my opinion,
which I perceived as a resut of a detaied recce carried out, I was sure that enemy
positions and whatever enemy troops were in the area, they were truy she shocked "y
the pounding of the .rtiery. In my opinion, I fet that these enemy positions coud not
offer any stiff resistance. I strongy suggested that we need not waste time in aunching
any fresh attacks at these positions. It was ceary advocated, that these positions "e "y
passed, "y 1D 9de from the )I2'! and 1D= 9de from the 1E+! fank. It was my cear
assessment that any enemy eft entrenched in the area, was in such a state that they
cannot pose much threat. I aso tod 2(% > #iv that I had tried my "est to infuence the
minds of a the fied commanders in the area of operations. It was further suggested to
2(% > #iv, that ony he coud personay infuence the situation. 3a8. 2en. *ahya
ceary understood the situation and spontaneousy decided to act. 'e immediatey few
out in the chopper with me to meet the 9de %ommanders. .fter taking off from the
heipad, 2(% was first given a very cear and "road aeria view of the ground, enemy
=A
dispositions, ocation of own troops and the "ig gap "etween H.<)I., and )iver
%hena" on the )I2'! and H.<)I., and /.1I #'.) feature on the 1E+!. Oery
:uicky the 2(% si;ed up the situation. 'e agreed fuy with my earier assessment that
was given at the %'.39, heipad. !he heicopter first anded near the !.% '& of 1D
9de. 2(% was very upset and annoyed with the sow pace of the advance. 'is tone was
rather harsh. In fact he used most a"usive anguage. 'e tod 1D 9de %ommander to go
in the heicopter with me and have the aeria view of the area. 'e further tod him that I
wi "e showing the "ig gap "etween H.<)I., position and )iver %hena". 'e ordered
that 1D 9de shoud "y pass H.<)I., and after having out fanked the enemy position
there, they shoud proceed aong the road H.<)I.,- ./',<). 'e further emphasi;ed,
that any pockets of resistance at !)(!I and H.<)I.,, wi "e mopped up ater. 2(% >
#iv then few to the position of 1A 1ancers and 1D= 9de. %o 1A1, whie eEpaining the
situation on the ground informed 3a8or 2enera *ahya, that the enemy fire from !)(!I
position was hoding his advance. .dmonishingy, 2(% > #iv tod %o 1A 1ancers, 6!he
enemy wi not "e throwing roses petas over you7. 'e firmy ordered him to resume his
advance immediatey. 'is orders were cear and precise. 1D= 9de aong with 1A 1ancers
ess one s:n, were to "y pass H.<)I., position from the 1E+! fank. $oon after these
precise orders, the advance was resumed. It did not proceed at the pace that it was
envisaged "ut a cear outfanking maneuver was deveoped.
Whie 1D= 9de was deveoping the fanking movement from the ,()!' and 1D 9de
from the $(<!', .rmy .viation remained activey and cosey invoved with the
operations. .t this stage heavy enemy gun fire was successfuy hoding the advance of
own troops. 2-II 4ops5 @%orps .rtiery, 3a8or .eem 41ater %oone5 ordered the piot
who was fying in the air, providing cose support, to sience these guns. .s the piot
%apt. /haid $aeed, gave the grid reference and started ad8ustment of arty fire to those
positions, 2-II %orps .rtiery, 3a8or .eem .fridi recame very pertur"ed on the
wireess. )e"uking, he was teing the .eria o"server, that own troops had gone "eyond
the ine of this grid reference. 'e counter post reminded him that this cannot "e the 2rid
)eference of the enemy gun position, which was hoding up our advance. !he piot, %apt.
/haid $aeed, very cooy answered, that since some dou"t had "een created, and he wi
fy over the position 8ust to confirm. .s he few overhead the enemy gun position, sma
=@
arms and automatic weapons opened up. !he aircraft was ridded with "uets. !he right
fue tank was "ady hit and ruptured. !he fue started profusey gushing into the cockpit.
%apt. /haid $aeed, kept his nerves and coo composure. 'e tod 3a8or .eem, 6,ow
there is no dou"t in my mind. !his is the position of the enemy guns, which is
withhoding the advance of own troops. ,ow concentrate a the avaia"e guns on this
position, at which I have aready ad8usted the fire and "ring down maEimum fire7. 'e
aso mentioned, 63y aircraft has "een hit and that the fue is gushing into the cockpit. I
am now rushing "ack to the anding strip est the aircraft catches fire7. %apt. /haid
$aeed was ucky that he anded safey and the aircraft did not catch fire. !he intensive
and accurate concentration of own guns on this position had its teing effect. .s a resut
of this fire and aso the outfanking moves of 1D= 9de and the 1D 9de, the enemy
a"andoned these positions. !hey eft "ehind a compete compiment of =@ guns of their
fied regiment. Eight guns were sti hooked "ehind their towers with their engines
running and siEteen guns remained depoyed in their origina positions. !he enemy
a"andoned them in great haste. In addition, the en eft "ehind .3J tanks, a ot of other
e:uipment, vehices and ammunition. +or this gaant act of %apt. /haid $aeed, his
citation for the award of $H. Was initiated "y me Q Where this citation was ost, one did
not have the time to foow up. 9ut the deed of %apt. /haid $aeed did .rmy .viation
proud. !he events of @ $ep turned out to "e very momentous in the operations of
H.<)I.,. !his position was very strongy hed "y the enemy. +rom some estimates, it
was composed of = 9nFs, a regiment ess one $:n of .3J tanks and supported "y a fied
regiment ocated in the H.<)I., area and additiona medium guns depoyed "ehind that
position. 3a8 2enera !I//. /'.,, aong with 1t %o 41ater 9rigadier5 ,ur 'ussain,
went into the area and coected a the "ooty.
!he outfanking moves of 1D 9de from the )I2'! fank and 1D= 9de from the 1E+!
fank, in addition to the direct attack at !)(!I and H.<)I., "y 6 ++ and 1A 1 had
unnerved the enemy. Its position at !)(!I and H.<)I., "egan to crack. !he enemy
started to a"andon these positions and retreat in great haste. !he earier arty fire aso had
a devastating effect on the en position. 9y the evening of @ $ept, enemy had started itFs
withdrawa from !)(!I and H.<)I.,. 9y the morning of 5 $ep, !)(!I and
=5
H.<)I., positions had "een captured and our troops were advancing on to ./',<).
.nE 5
In the deveopment of the out fanking move, .rmy .viation had payed a very centra
roe. +irst through a detaied, intensive and most accurate assessment of the "attefied
situation, .rmy .viation had performed the key roe of "attefied surveiance. With this
accurate information of en disposition, .rmy .viation had aso very ceary perceived the
tactica panning of "y-passing these positions, rather than attack these frontay. !he
staemate that had ensued at !)(!I and H.<)I., had "rought a"out a somewhat "reak
down of command and contro of the formations. !he + Ech of some units was ost, the
9de commanders had ost contact with some of their units and the momentum of attack at
!)(!I and H.<)I., had not "een fuy deveoped.
.rmy .viation had truy provided the most precise and cear picture of the situation. It
heped in deveoping a reaistic, dynamic and "od pan of deaing with the enemy
opposition at !)(!I and H.<)I.,. 9y fying the 2(% > #iv into the area, giving him a
professiona "riefing aong with the aeria view of the "attefied, a customary eements
of fog of war were ceared very rapidy. In restoring the vita inks of command and
contro, .rmy .viation, greaty heped in "ringing cohesion of Rcommand and thus
further "uiding the momentum of attack. ,o other eEampes coud "etter descri"e the
roe of .rmy .viation in support of 9attefied $urveiance and "ringing in the necessary
inkages in the effective eEercise of %ommand and %ontro. !hese roes were fuy
compimented "y the cassic roe of .rmy .viation in the ad8ustment of arty fire. !he
area was kept under surveiance a the time. . demands of aeria o"servation and
.d8ustment of arty fire was prompty and effectivey answered. !he capture of =@E=5 Pdr
guns and a s:uadron of .3J tanks were the cimaE of the heroic deeds and the
dedication of the .rmy .viators in performance of their main missions, i.e. ad8ustment of
.rty +ire.
=6
Earier in the day, %omd. @ $ector, 9rigadier 'ameed, was given the task of capturing
the /aidhar feature on the eft fank of the route eading to ./',<). Wireess
messages kept pouring in a"out the progress "eing made. It was very heartening and
3a8or 2en. *ahya /han was very happy at the rapid success that was "eing achieved. It
was towards the mid day that the 9rigade %omd personay gave the message of having
captured the peak of the /aidhar feature. 'e was professedy congratuated "y 3a8.
2en. *ahya /han. . itte ater, a ca was made a"out the heavy enemy counter attack on
the positions recenty captured on the main feature. $ometimes ater the news was sent
that in the face of heavy Indian .ttack, the top of the feature has "een a"andoned and our
own troops were now occupying ower sopes on the ridge. !hen again there came the
news of another enemy attack at those positions now hed "y own troops and the story of
having to a"andon this was repeated. .armingy, further messages kept coming in of our
own troops retreating "ack. !owards the evening, @ $ector troops seemed to have
returned to the same point from where they had aunched their attack in the eary
morning. .t this stage 3a8. 2en. *ahya /han, suddeny got into hysterica rage. 'e was
on the wireess himsef. 'e was shouting at 9rig. 'ameed, 6*ou 4ad8ectives used which
cannot "e repeated here5. It is now cear to me that you have "een doing picture painting
to me the whoe day. *ou never ever moved out of your ocation. !he whoe operation
was a farcica description7. Why he did not remove him from his command, I coud not
personay understandM 9ut the most ironica thing was that when 2enera *ahya /han
assumed the %ommand of the .rmy, he promoted him as 3a8. 2en. and then ater as
1ieut. 2en. I was totay disiusionedL In utter shock and dis"eief my confidence in the
higher command of the .rmy was shaken.
$oon after H.<)I., position was captured G "y passed on the morning of 5 $ept, the
advance to ./',<) proceeded. 1D and 1D= 9de spearheaded the advance. In the $outh,
1A P<,H.9 41D 9de5 made a swift movement aong the northern "ank of )iver %hena"
and cut the road H.<)I.,-./',<) in the area of #.1P.! 41D 9de o"85 "y D915 hrs.
!he adv. of 6 ++ and 1A 1 on +.!W.1 was hed up "y enemy rear guards. !hese enemy
posns had to "e rounded up through the advance of 1@ P<,H.9 from the $(<!'. 1ine
of 3.W.W.1I /'.# was reached in the evening of 5 $ept. It was estimated that a
the enemy, which had faen "ack from %'.39, !)(!I and H.<)I., positions, woud
have taken positions in the foothis of ./',<). It was aso estimated that at
=>
./',<), we woud "e up against the main def position. <nder this misconception, the
infantry advancing to ./',<), faied to carry out any aggressive patroing. !he .rmy
.viation was aso handicapped. It was getting dark and the o"servation was very imited.
,o cear positions regarding en defenses at ./',<) emerged. !he ack of this proper
information, proved to "e one of the most vita factors of the 1965 war. We had reached
within A-@ mies of ./',<) 9ridge at )iver %'E,.9. .nE 6 !he "asic principe, of
ruthessy and aggressivey foowing the retreating enemy, was ignored and not
foowed. !he forward eements faied to have any ;eaous approach. 3a8or 2enera
*.'*. /'., was not forward enough, to personay infuence and push them to move
on. It is the irony of fate again, that %omd, 1D 9rig, 9rig. .;mat was in the ead. !rue to
his performance on 1, =, and A $eptem"er, he faied to aggressivey pursue his advance to
capture the "ridge at ./',<).
!he retreating en had not picked up the courage to take positions at ./',<). In fact
they with-drew across the "ridge at )iver %hena". ./',<) was a"andoned and eft
empty and un-occupied during the night of 5G6 $ept. It "eckoned 8ust moving in and 8ust
capturing the area. It is unfortunate that we faied to achieve our vita o"8ective which had
"een so ceary enunciated in a our operationa pans and orders... . crucia mistake was
made... Enemy reai;ing this, occupied ./',<) positions on the morning of 6 $ep. 3a8
2en *.'*., 2(% > #iv, ater reai;ing this, said that it was the "iggest mistake that he
hade made in this war. .fter this detaied and precise description of the events at
./',<), my remarks made in the earier chapters, woud stand out in their correct
perspective. %o .sam %heema whie attending the staff coverage at cam"ery met with
an Indian officer. 'e tod him that they coud not understand as what prevented the
Pakistan .rmy from capturing the ./',<) 9ridge. %heema aso had answered no
eEpanation for that.
(n the first ight of 6 $ept. I as per the routine of the ast few days, I was going to the
mess to have my "reakfast. 2(% > #iv came rushing out of his caravan. (n seeing me,
2en *.'. said that the %-I,-%, 2en 3usa was on the ine a short whie ago. 'e
informed me that 2en 3usa had 8ust tod him that the Indians had attacked P./I$!.,
=?
across the Internationa ine. !he attack had come at the H.$$.) 9r, 9<)/I and
/.$<) $ector. 2en *.'*., further said that the %-I,-% had informed him that
H.$$.) 9r had "een captured "y the enemy. Whie conveying this news to me, 2(% did
not "eieve that the H.$$.) 9r coud have faen and captured so easiy "y the enemy.
(n my in:uiry as to why he did not "eieve in this, 2(% > #iv remarked that we were
too strong in that position. $ince this dou"t was created, I suggested to 2(% > #iv, that I
wi go and fy over the area to see the position on the ground. 2(% > #iv gave a very
enthusiastic approva of this. When I few over the H.$$.) 9r, I ceary saw the fighting
taking pace across the 9ridgeK "eyond our encave on the I,#I., side of the 9ridge. I
few over the whoe of the position of 115 9de. !he cose aeria view gave a very re-
assuring picture. !he assertion of the %-I,-% was proved to "e wrong and the assessment
of 2(% > #iv, turned out to "e correct. !he 9ridge was intact and in firm contro of own
115 9de.
I then few to $I.1/(!. (n my arriva at '& 15 #iv, I noted tota confusion a"out the
position at H.$$.). !he 2(% 9rig Ismai, an officer of .rmy $uppy %ontro, whose
ony caim and eEperience to %ommand was, that he ike 2enera 3usa was Persian
speaking. %o $.2. 3ehdi, who was my %ompany %ommander at P3., was %o 2.$.
When I informed them "oth that I had 8ust fown over this position, there was a hush of
restess await on their faces. (n "eing tod, that the 9ridge was intact and that the
fighting was taking pace across the 9ridge in the area of enemy encave and that 115
9de positions were firmy intact, there was a sudden gush of eEu"erance. %o $.2.3ehdi
picked up the phone. 'e was caing #3( at 2'&. 'e tod him that he had diso"eyed
the orders of '& 1 %orps for the "owing up of the 9ridge at H.$$.). 'e further tod
him that he may "e %ourt 3artiaed, "ut he had wifuy diso"eyed these orders. 'e was
strongy peading with the #3(, that the '& 1 %orps had under some misinformed
8udgment, given these orders. 9rigadier Ismai, was 8ust a passenger at #iv '& and %o
3ehdi appeared to "e in command. I had known him and I hoped that with his
"ackground, he coud grappe with the situation and "ring in sanity and composure at the
#iv '&. It was immediatey cear, that there was a tota ack of proper communications
and understandings "etween %orps '& and the #iv '&.
=9
(n hearing the news of H.$$.), the teephonic conversation with the #3( and the re-
assuring discussions of the overa situation, normacy was suddeny writ arge in the
atmosphere of the #iv '&. %o 3ehdi tod me that on 5 $ept, a #) of the enemy was
captured. In the mai that was carried "y the #), there were some etters addressed to the
1 .rmd #iv. 'e strongy emphasi;ed that it was cear that the enemy 1 .rmd #iv, was
now ocated in this area. %o staff gave some important etters and documents in support
of it to me and asked me to fy these out to 2'&. It was done prompty. 2'& now had
this information on 6 $ept that the enemy 1 .rmd #iv was in the area $.39.. 9ut at
2'& there were some apprehensions, est it was a poy. %o 3ehdi further tod me that I
shoud re-assure 3a8 2enera *.'*. that his od formation wi not et him down.
I few "ack to !.% '& > #iv at %'./ P.,#I!. 2(% > #iv was waiting very
anEiousy for the news. When he was informed that his appreciation of our own strength
at H.$$.) was correct and that the "ridge was intact, he very eEcitedy eEcaimed, 6#id
not I te you that7. 'e further said that he as 2(% 15 #iv had panned the entire defense
of the area. 'e aso eEpained that he had waked the entire area on foot and that he had
conceived and panned the defensive pan of the area to the minutest detais. 'e then
)emarked that these peope are foos, who "eieve that any ma8or enemy offensive wi
come at H.$$.) Emphaticay, he eEpained, 6!he ogica ine of the enemy attack wi
"e %'.)W.-%'(9.).-P'I11().'-%'.WI,#.7. !he mention of the names of
these paces did not ring any "e in my ears, at that time. !he names on 6 $ept were
totay unfamiiar to me. 9ut how propheticay it was correct. It came known ony truy
as the events of the coming days unfoded themseves. When I transmitted the detais of
my discussions at 15 #iv '& and specificay %o 3ehdiFs message to him, he 8ust
scoffed it away. ("viousy %o 3ehdi, for what reasons I do not know, had faen down
in his eyes and estimation.
$I.1/(! $E%!()
With the I,#I., attack across the Internationa 9oundary, some immediate re-grouping
and re-organi;ation of troops was ordered. 1 .rmy .viation $:uadron was ordered to
AD
move to $I.1/(!. !hey were to support the operations of 15 #iv and 6 .rmed #iv oc
in the area.
!he move of 1 .rmy .viation $:uadron to $iakot was competed "y the evening of 6
th
$eptem"er 1965. 1 .rmy $:uadron occupied the strip at the P(1( ground on the )I2'!
side of the $.39)I.1-$I.1/(! )oad. !he fight of 3a8. ).99.,I, eE = .rmy
.viation $:uadron, which had aready come under the operationa contro of 1 .rmy
.viation $:uadron, since 1
st
$eptem"er during %'.39-H.<)I., operations, had "een
earier "ased at .#.3/E strip on @ $eptem"er. !hey were specificay assigned to work
with 6 .rmd #iv, ocated at P.$)<), which was part of 1 %orps reserve. .cross the
road at $I.1/(! strip, where 1 .rmy .viation $:uadron was "ased, ? 3edium
)egiment was aso depoyed.
&AT'ERIN& O# (TORM(
(n the morning of > $ep the $:n em"arked on immediate famiiari;ation of the area.
.so '& 15 #iv and '& 6 .rmd #iv were visited. !here was no noticea"e enemy
activity. 9ut on our own side there was a state of confusion, uncertainty and ack of
ade:uate information even a"out our troops and their ocations. !he mudde of 6 $ept. at
H.$$.) 9ridge and the prevaent conficting reports coming in even ti ate in the
evening, had provoked hasty, and i informed, panicky and iogica assessments and
decisions. !he "asic factor was that many contradictory reports kept emanating from '&
115 9de. !his was "eing further compounded "y the inept reactions of the %orps
%ommander, who was "ased at 2u8ranwaa. !he situation of panic and confusion "eing
so created was earier setted down due to the recce and information provided "y me to 15
#iv on 6 sept. (n the morning of > $ept, there was again a state of tota confusion of
coossa magnitude. !here was a chain of misreporting, panicky reactions, confused and
i informed 8udgane"ts and contradictory decisions. $ome reports were received that the
enemy had esta"ished a foothod on own "ank of )iver %'E,.9. %orps %ommander
personay gave orders for the "owing up of the 9ridge and was personay monitoring
its impementation. There i) a")o a ver)io that &eera" A*u% a")o dire!t"* +hoed.
O,,i!er i !harge o, demo"itio +art*. <timatey, when the 9ridge was "own, two
A1
companies were eft stranded in the encave across the 9ridge they had to wade through
the )iver to return to our own "ank of the river. $ince 115 9de was part of 15 #iv, they
were aso reacting irrationayK hapha;ard and iogica decisions were "eing made
without any authentic and accurate information. It was an out right sardonic act. I earnt
a a"out it, when I visited '& 15 #iv, ate in the evening. $ince we had arrived in the
area on the evening of 6 $ept, the whoe day of > $ept, we spent doing our detaied recce
and famiiari;ation of the area. When I arrived at the 15 #iv '& in the evening, there
was the worst and the most compounded state of hepessness and chaotic confusion. It
was a pandemic situation. =@ 9de aong with =5 %av had "een positioned in area
%'.)W. as part of the defensive pan of 15 #iv. !hey were tasked to defend the most
ikey enemy ine of attack in the area. 9y the evening > $ept. =@ 9de 4minus A ++5 and
=5 %av had "een ordered to move to the area H.$$.) 9r. for any possi"e counter attack.
!he most sensitive corridor of 3.'.).H/E-%'.)W. and %'(9.). had "een
denuded of troops and eft with ony one 9n i.e. A ++ 4ess a coy5 and a %oy of =
P<,H.9 to defend this most vunera"e sector. $ome-times on > $ept neary at =@DD
'ours, the gravity of the "under made, of moving =@ 9de ess one 9n and =5 %av, from
their reguar defensive positions in %'.)W. and %'(9.). area, to H.$$.) 9ridge
was reai;ed. !he harsh truth of this most a"surd and iogica decision suddeny dawned
in the mind of the %ommander 15 #iv. !his was so "ecause at that time the powerfu
sounds of the fire of the guns coud "e heard and the "right ightening due to the roaring
of the I,#I., guns it up the sky. !his coud "e heard and seen a the way from
$I.1/(! to H.$$.) 9ridge. 2(% 15 #iv was at ,.)(W.1 at that time and was
a"out to en8oy his mea served on a ta"e with proper inen and shining siver cutery aid
out. 9rig. 3u;affar, 115 9de %omd, 9rig ."du .i 3aik, %omd =@ 9de and 1t %o
,I$.) .'3.# %( =5 %.O, were a sitting on the ta"e aong with him. !hey sat there
a composed and regardess of the whoe dayFs stupid and im"ecie decisions and acts on
the part of %omd. 115 9de. .nd 2(% 15 #iv. !he sound of the guns and the sight of the
ightening, rather than his own appreciation of the "attefied situation, had deivered the
message to the 2(%.
!he enemy had aunched its attack from the eEpected area of 3.'.).H/E, %'.)W.
and %'(9.).. 2(% 15 #iv a"rupty sat in his 8eep and eft for $I.1/(!. 'e 8ust
A=
generay and vaguey tod the %omd =@ 9de to do something. !he whoe day saw
strange, panicky and amost a"surd se:uences of fase reporting, iogica reactions which
were eading to wrong decisions and at times some defiance of those orders had "een
enacted. !he earier report of 115 9de on 6 $ept that the enemy had captured H.$$.) 9r
had sent shivers a the way to the %ommand at 15 #iv, '& 1 %orps and 2'&. '& 1
%orp gave orders to 15 #iv to "ow up the 9ridge, whie our troops were sti across in
the encave on the I,#I., side. .rmy .viation, through a :uick recce had ceared the
fog and confusion. !he disastrous orders of "owing up the "ridge had "een fouted and
the situation at H.$$.) was sta"ii;ed and "rought fuy under contro. <nfortunatey,
again on > $ept, the same catastrophic se:uence of fase reporting "y 115 9de, triggered
same a"surdity and stupidity of decision-making. '& 1 %orps ordered the "owing up of
the "ridge whie the troops of 115 9de were sti fighting in the encave on the enemy
side. 'ow those orders were given, "y whom and "y what channes, sti defies a
pinning of specific responsi"iities on any person or persons at different eves of
%ommand. 9ut a disastrous situation had "een created. !he 9ridge was "own and it kept
haf hanging, whie the troops were sti fighting across the )IOE) and had to wade
through the water in order to withdraw to own "ank. !hree tanks had to "e eft
a"andoned on the enemy side of the river "ank. !his does "ring out the cassic eEampe
of how the situation was timey ceared and carified on 6 $ept, "y the detaied recce
carried out "y .rmy .viation and correcty reported to '& 15 #iv personay "y me. It is
e:uay strange, that whie the same confusion was re-created on > $ept and 1 .rmy
.viation $:uadron was cosey and fuy operating in support of 15 #iv, no one ever
"riefed them to verify these reports. $ome other missions were ordered, "ut in the area
where vita decisions were "eing taken no effort to use the .rmy .viation were made.
.rmy .viation too remained "acked out of a news of H.$$.) 9ridgeK as they were
"usy the whoe day in the area famiiari;ation of the corridor from $I.1/(! S )IOE)
).OI, "ut with a specific "ias towards the areas of 3.'.).H/E, %'.)W.,
%'(9.). and this ikey ine of the I,#I., attack... .rmy .viation had aso remained
totay o"ivious to the happenings at H.$$.) 9ridge. !he crisis peaked with the
"owing up of H.$$.) 9ridge, "ut aso "y ordering the move of =@ 9de 2p from
%'.)W. S %'(9.). area to H.$$.) 9r for a possi"e counter attack on fa"ricated
and assumed I,#I., penetration in the area. $ince there was no wireess or ine contact
AA
avaia"e, messengerFs had "een sent. !he forma orders for =@ 9de 2roup to return to
their origina positions was given ony when the 2(% 15 #iv arrived "ack at $I.1/(!,
after he rushed from ,.)(W.1. 9ut the main pro"ems were that no one knew as to
where =@ 9de ess 9n and =5 %av were. #uring the visits to 15 #iv, 6 .rmd #iv and at
'& 1 %orps, "y the .rmy .viations, this serious diemma of ack of information a"out =@
9de and =5 %av was the main issue of concern o"served and discussed. !his confusion
persisted the whoe night as no one knew as to what was happening on the ground.
In the evening of >
th
$ep, 15 #iv asked for a sortie of the 1-19 aircraft aong the
Internationa 9order. (rders were given, that without crossing the "oundary, the area
across the I,#I., side shoud "e o"served. (ne wonders through hindsight, as to why
the .rmy .viation was not asked to cear the fog of war prevaent at H.$$.). !he .rmy
.viator was asked to specificay ook for any ma8or concentrations and movements of
the enemy in the area of %'.)W.. %apt. ,I.II was detaied on this mission. 'e few
a aong the "oundary from $I.1/(! to )IOE) %'E,.9, and noticed no movement
or conc. of the enemy. 'e went to '& 15 #iv and "riefed %o staff, %o 3E'#I. .t mid
night >
th
$ept, a ca came from '& 15 #iv. %o 3E'#I tod %apt ,I.II that the
I,#I., attack at %'.)W. had "een aunched. !he piot was tod to fy on first t. ?
th
$ep to confirm this news. 'e was aso tod to o"serve specificay the strength and the
direction of an attack. .s %apt ,I.II few to area 3.'.).H/E, he noticed an enemy
coumn of tanks moving to $I.1/(!, on the track 3.'.).H/E - $I.1/(!. 'e saw
the eading tank reach the vicinity of .I/ ,.#I near +.II.9.# 46@A15. 'e tried to
approach cose to this coumn to make some assessment of their strength. !he aircraft
came under heavy sma arms fire. !he strength coud not "e estimated and %apt ,I.II
returned to $I.1/(! strip and gave the news to %o $taff 15 #iv personay. !he
maintenance personne, 3a8. $aeed, counted A= "uet hoes in the aircraft. 15 #iv
immediatey sent some ))F$ to .I/ ,.#I. .s the enemy tanks arrived near .I/ ,.#I,
))Fs fired upon them. <nder this fire they turned "ack... It seems that it was ony a
diversionary move.
!he morning of ? $ept, saw this issue and the predicament of > $ept, assuming aarming
proportions. When I visited 15 #ivK on the eary morning of ? $ep, %o $taff informed me
A@
that at first ight, the enemy had aunched its attack. !he main aEis of the ine of attack
was 2.#2()-%'.)W.-%'(9.).- P'I11.).<'.
!he news was aarming. .s eEpained earier, =@ 9de 2p had "een ordered to move to
H.$$.) area. 1ater a message had "een sent to them on >
th
$ept, to rush "ack to their
origina defensive positions. ,ow that the enemy had mounted their attack in this sector,
no one knew as to where =@ 9de 2p was. !he entire area which was the def posn. (f =@
9de 2p was hed now "y ony A ++. I decided to fy to the area to see and assess the
situation mysef. I few out in an 1-19 aircraft. I first reached %'.WI,#. and then
started fying towards P'I11.<).'. .t a distance, I saw a coud of dust on the track
%'.)W.-%'(9.).-P'I11.<).'. !he =G1c 3a8. ,a;ir was sitting in the rear seat.
.s we approached this area and started fying aongside with this coumn, we were
aarmed. !here was a ong coumn of enemy vehices, ed "y armoured cars, coming
charging aong this track towards P'I11.<).' at a high speed. ,o estimate of their
strength coud "e made. Earier whie fying from %'.WI,#. to this area, there were
no signs of any of our troops on the ground o"served "y me. It was cear, that =@ 9de 2p
had not yet arrived "ack in this area. It was a critica situation. !his sight was of utter
hepessness. I coud ony instinctivey pray to 2od .mighty for hep. !here was
nothing that an 1-19 coud do. It was ony wait and watch and this was demorai;ing. !he
I,#I., coumn kept charging aong the track towards P'I11.<).'. $uddeny the
=1% gave a shout of "andits to me on the wireess. I took my eyes away from the coumn
and ooked up in the air. I suddeny saw a fight of @ ac. We were aready fying ow. !he
instinctive reaction was to "race mysef for any evasive action that may "e re:uired.
$uddeny, I saw these ac diving towards the enemy coumn. !he rockets fired were very
accurate and a no of enemy vehices were on fire. I fet reieved. .ah had amost
immediatey answered my prayers. !he su"dued mood changed amost spontaneousy.
!hese were our own air force ac and they started taking a very heavy to of the
advancing enemy coumn. !here were puffs of fire and smoke coming out every time
these aircraft were diving in their attack runs and firing their rockets. !hey were
un"eieva"y accurate and had disastrous and teing effect on the Indian advancing
coumns. !here was a great eEcitement and the sight was very re-assuring. !his action of
our .ir force, "etween D>DD hrs and D>AD hrs on the morning of ? $eptem"er 1965,
A5
"rought the I,#I., advance to a scratching hat. !he air strike asted for a"out =5-AD
minute.
!he pounding of our air force on the attacking coumns of en armour had its teing effect.
9etween 15-=D of the armoured vehices were on fire. !he enemy attack had hated and
the en tanks and other vehices were hurriedy dispersing. !hey rushed into the
surrounding viages and "uried themseves into the mud houses. !his form of
camoufage did provide them some refuge. It "ecame the norma pattern in the
su"se:uent operations. Whenever, en formations were pounded "y our heavy
concentrations of arty fire or interdicted "y our air force, they dispersed and su"merged
themseves in the mud houses.
.s soon as the ac eft the area, the enemy forces got respite and started to re-group and
re-organi;e themseves again. !he tota deay caused to the attacking enemy forces was
a"out one hour. !his was the most vita time that our air force had gained for us. $horty,
they regrouped and started their advance on the track to %'.WI,#.. !he 1-19 kept
fying aongside the I,#I., advancing armored cars and tanks. !he need for integra
fire sp capa"iity with the .rmy .viation was never so acutey fet "efore. 9ut sitting
unarmed in an 1-19 aircraft was :uere depressing.
!he advancing enemy coumn came cose to %'.WI,#.. $o far there was no resistance
or opposition to their advance on the ground. $uddeny from the direction of
%'.WI,#., signs of movement on the ground appeared. .s if the prayers were
answered, sure "ut "ehod they were our own Patton tanks. !he eEcitement and the
eEu"erance of the .rmy .viators watching this from the air, is hard to descri"e. !he deay
caused "y the interdiction of our .ir force had proved crucia. !he !anks of =5 %avary
arrived in %'.WI,#. at the nick of the time. (ne 8ust shuddered to think what woud
have happened if the massive force of one .rmored #iv, supported "y three Infantry
#ivisions had reached the area of %'.WI,#. an hour earier, when our own tanks had
sti not reached there. Was it not the .ah and the .ir that saved the day for usL !he
sight of own tanks appearing from the direction of %'.WI,#., created panic in the
A6
ranks of the advancing I,#I., coumns. !he I,#I., inteigence had wrongy
assumed that the P.!!(, tanks were ony in the 1 .rmd #iv of Pakistan. !he sudden
sight of P.!!(, tanks emerging from the direction of %'.WI,#. immediatey ruffed
and "affed the enemy forces. !hey were totay surprised and in tota confusion, wrongy
assumed, that our 1 .rmed #ivision had "een paced in this area. !his was totay against
their earier miitary inteigence reports. !hey turned around immediatey and went
charging aong "ack on the same track that they came on. !he speed of their retreat
appeared fasterL !o compound their sudden fears of strong Pak armour presence in the
area, the sight of 1@ tanks of 9 $:uadron of =5 %.O appearing in eEtended ine a"reast
formation, suggested a "igger force of tanks "ehind the thin ine of own 1@ tanks, as they
appeared in front. !he enemy hardy reai;ed that there was nothing "ehind them. 3a8or
41ater 9rigadier5 .hmed, who was commanding the $:uadron, ater tod me that since he
was unsure of the enemy disposition, he decided to move on a "road front. 'e ined up
a the 1@ !anks and appeared out of %'.WI,#., covering a wide front.
I continued fying around the area, evauating the situation on the ground. It appeared that
=@ 9de gp had arrived "ack 8ust in time. !he sight was very heart warming and the
assessment was that a very precarious situation had "een very dramaticay sta"ii;ed.
!he approEimate one-hour deay imposed "y our .ir force on the advance of enemy
armour had proved one of the singe most critica, vita and significant interventions.
,one of our accounts, even the officia history of the Pakistan .ir +orce, has highighted
this most significant and important event. It has totay gone unrecorded and
unrecogni;ed. 3a8. 3ohammad .hmad arrived with his $:uadron at %'.WI,#. at the
nick of time. Hust another 1D-15 minutes deay in the arriva of own troops or if the own
.ir force had not "rought their advance earier to a grinding hat for neary one hour, the
situation at %'.WI,#. coud we have proved very critica and decisive. $eeing that
the situation had "een sta"ii;ed, I few to $I.1/(! and went straight to '& 15 #iv. 3y
arriva was most anEiousy "eing awaited. !he first accurate news and account of the
arriva of =@ 9de gp in the area of %'.WI,#. "rought a sigh of reief. !he account of
rapid thrust of the I,#I., coumns, the action of our air force, the enemy re-grouping
and resumption of advance to %'.WI,#. and the cimaE of sudden appearance of own
Patton tanks, was "oth chiing initiay, "ut ater e:uay eEhiarating.
A>
+or the second time in two days, the accurate and authentic information provided "y
.rmy .viation sources, proved sautary. (n return to the strip at $I.1/(!, I took off in
a heicopter, which was pioted "y %apt. ,auman 3ahmud. We went to %'.WI,#. and
from there few to P'I11.).<'. .s we were nearing P'I11.).<', at a distance
near 2.#2() a ot of dust was "eing raised "y the heavy movement of tracked
vehices. $ome sounds of tank fire were heard. Watching from the air, I saw the actua
sight of the first tank engagement taking pace. !he advance of enemy tanks which had
reached cose to %'.WI,#., had "een checked and forced "ack and were now "eing
engaged into a fierce tank "atte near 2.#2(). We saw some 8eeps and a few
personne standing near a "uiding, which turned out to "e a schoo "uiding. (n anding,
I was very peasanty surprised to see =@ 9de %omd, 9rig ."du .i 3aik and %( =5
%av, 1t. %o ,isar. %omd =@ 9de, very eEcitingy mentioned that a ma8or tank "atte is
ensuing near 2.#2(). 'e further said that =5 %av was inficting very heavy casuaties
on Enemy tanks. !his news was very heart warming. $ome aeria gimpse of this area of
the "atte had aready "een taken as the heicopter was fying in the area. 9ut this was the
first detaied, intimate and most accurate account I heard. %ommander =@ 9rigade was
eEpaining a these detais with fu confidence and authority of a person who was fuy
in contro of the situation. 'e aong with %( =5 %avary, were directy in grip with the
enemy and had totay sta"ii;ed the situation. 'is message was very cear. !he
catastrophe that had "een inficted upon ourseves "y our higher command had "een
averted "y the timey arriva of =5 %avary and =@ 9rigade, "ack in their origina area of
defense. !he move of =@ 9de gp to H.$$.) and a su"se:uent message for them to
return on > $ep was aso recounted "y him. !he fap so created and the confusion so
caused were aso eEpained. 'e mentioned that they 8ust arrived "ack at %'.WI,#. in
time. %( =5 %.O gave a "rief description of the arriva of =5 %.O at %'.WI,#. and
the su"se:uent maneuver made "y them. 'e eEpained that they had no idea as to what
was happening on ground. $ensing the urgency they "indy decided to move one $:n of
3a8or .hmed through %'.WI,#. in the direction of P'I11.).<'. !his s:n
advanced on a wide front. !he enemy suddeny seeing a arge num"er of tanks appearing
from %'.WI,#. considered that a very "ig armour force had swung into action. !his
fuy eEpained the sudden retreat and charging "ack of the enemy coumn approaching
A?
%'.WI,#., the action aready witnessed from the 1-19 and descri"ed as such earier.
'e further said that the )egiment ess this s:n moved to the area of #<2)I via
%'.WI,#.. . "ind move turned into a cassic armour maneuver. Whie one s:n had
contained the advancing en coumn frontay, the regt. ess one s:n had hit the fank of the
en armour coumns. !he en was advancing on two aEes and it ater transpired that they
were advancing with one regiment aong each aEis. !his resuted in very heavy casuaties
of the enemy tanks. +rom some estimates 1D- 15 enemy tanks had "een destroyed in the
encounter. !he enemy soon ost the initiative and started to withdraw towards %'(9)..
I few "ack to $I.1/(! and gave the news to '& 15 #IO. !here was a great feeing of
8oy and eation. I then few to '& 6 .rmed #iv. !his was my first visit. 1ater, it "ecame
a routine. 2(% 6 .rmed #iv was very peased to see the aviator, as he had a great hope
and eEpectancy of attaining accurate and rea "attefied information. 'e was not
disappointed. !hey had "een moved into the area earier. !hey had carried out their
iaison with 15 #iv and had aso done the recce of the area. 9ut they were totay "ank
a"out the situation at H.$$.) 9ridge and the possi"e ine and penetration of the enemy
attack. When the fu account of the operations was given, there were 8u"iations a over.
3a8or 41ater 2enera5 /3 .rif, who was 2 II 4(ps5 remarked, that it was a typica
armour maneuver. 'e was reminded that it was not panned and eEecuted as such. !he
whoe move, depoyment and advance of =5 %.O was a "ind operation and was "y
accident ony, rather than any part of a pan. ,o one knew where the enemy was. 9y
accident one s:n had moved frontay and the regt ess one $:n had hit the enemy
armoured formation on the fank. )egardess, of where the credit ay for this, the timey
arriva of =5 %.O, proved very momentous. !he courage, determination and fearess
action of the crews of =5 %.O must "e recogni;ed and recorded as such. 1ater in the day,
from the wreckage of one of the en tanks, a copy of the operation orders was recovered.
.ttached as .,J from the capture of the operationa order 6,EP.17, to the utter horror
and surprise of every one, it transpired that it was the fu fedged and even reinforced
I,#I., I .rmed #iv, which had aunched this attack. !he eading regiment was 16 %.O
and on its 1E+! fank was 1> %.O with @ 'orse in reserve. !hat =5 %.O had grapped
with the enemy 1 .rmed #iv singe handed came as a tota surprise, shock and dis"eief,
"ut it was a"soutey true. ,o annas of any 3iitary 'istory can offer any compara"e
action. 9ut with pride it must "e recounted, that it was done very effectivey, "ody and
A9
admira"y. I had a cose ook of the operation from eary morning to ate afternoon.
!here was no more enthraing eEperience than that. I was a privy to watching it most
cosey "oth from the air and on the ground. !he words fai me to descri"e the dayFs
"atte ade:uatey.
!his fu fedged enemy .rmoured #iv attack supported "y three Infantry #ivisions, was
not ony hated after it had gained its momentum, "ut forced to recoi and withdraw "ack
to the positions cose to from where the attack was aunched on the morning of ?
th
$eptem"er. It penetrated up to %'.WI,#. and "y the evening of ? $ept, Enemy fmns
were made to ro "ack to 8ust south of %'(9.).. +rom some accounts one of the tank
troops had even got as far forward as 3.'.).H/E, "ut had to "e pued "ack.
!o the utter dis"eief of every one, =5 %.O had singe handed, not ony stemmed the
eEtent of the enemy advance to up to %'.WI,#., "ut instead roed them "ack to from
where they had em"arked from, in the eary hours of ? $eptem"er. !his attack had
achieved surprise and even gained some momentum. !hat the net resut was that these
forces were recoied "ack to their firm "ase, which was earier secured "y their =6 I,+
#IO, and they sat there now nursing their wounds of the whoe dayFs most am"itious and
adventurous action, which seemed so un"eieva"e. !he enemy attack was reeed "ack
to its track from where they had de"ouched in the eary hours. !he un"eieva"e part was
that this feat was accompished "y the daring of =5 %avary, a "y themseves. =@
9rigade 2roup through their timey arriva and daring action had fuy sta"ii;ed the
"attefied and had taken defensive positions in the area 2.#2()-P'I11.<).' "y
the evening of ? $eptem"er. !he initiative gained "y the enemy on the morning of ? $ept
was ost through the "od action of =5 %.O. !his they did with itte Infantry support and
hardy any .rtiery avaia"e to them. !he spirit of this attack of =5 %avary is hard to
capture in writing. 9ut I watched it, sensed it and emotionay shared with those, who
fought so gaanty, "ravey and doggedy on the ground. I think the annas of 3iitary
'istory have no parae to it. I record this for posterity to remem"er.
In the evening, I went to 2u8ranwaa and "riefed '& 1 %orps, a"out the whoe days
fighting. .t the %orps '&, there was a tota vacuum of the news. !hey even did not
@D
know the ocation of own troops on the ground. !he fiing in of this information was
"oth timey and very usefu at the eve of the %orps '&. !he %orps %omd, 1t. 2en.
9akhtiar )ana asked me to keep visiting %orps '& reguary and keep "riefing them on
the situation, on daiy "asis if possi"e. (n ? $ept, the main task performed "y .rmy
.viation was coection of vita information and "riefings at '& 15 #iv, 6 .rmd #iv and
'& 1 %orps. !hese proved very critica in the formuation of the future pans of these
fmns. !here was not much activity in the way of ad8ustment of arty fire. !his was
essentiay so, "ecause the units of @ %orps .rty kept shutting "etween P.$)<) and
,.)(W.1, in response to the confusing picture at H.$$.) and the conse:uent
conficting orders. What shocked me was the poor communications "etween %orps '&Fs
and its formations and ack of information fitering to %orps '& from any ground
channes. !here was a tota a"sence of the news of the "atte.
!he actions of ? $ept, "y =@ 9de 2roup, most appropriatey were carried out "y =5
%avary through accident and ignorance. It was "iss. ,one on ground coud make any
estimation of the strength of the enemy attack. 9ut '& 15 #iv was fuy aive that it was
the main enemy attack. !he ine of thrust of the ikey offensive in this $ector was
ceary perceived as the route %'.)W.-%(9.).-P'I11.<).'-%'.WI,#.. 3a8
2en *ahaya on 6 $ept had ceary defined this appreciation to me we in advance. $ince
the morning of ? $ept, %o $.2. 3ehdi, was unam"iguousy emphasi;ing this direction of
the enemy thrust. Whie 3ehdi had correcty identified this threatK "ut the unhinging of
the defenses through i perceived and i conceived orders to dispatch =@ 9de 2roup to
H.$$.) on > $ept, were ceary showing on his face. ,ormay I had seen him as a man,
fuy composed, confident, over"earing and assertive. 9ut the hasse and the confusion of
the day "efore had ceary unnerved him. 2ravity of the situation was such that most
others woud have aso panicked. 9rig Ismai, the 2.(.%. 15 #iv, was ony a passenger
there. %o 3ehdi had caed a the shots. !his hapess turning of events eft him
somewhat da;ed, uncertain and confused. .fter my aeria recce of the area and the
"riefing given "y me to him, he recomposed himsef. 9ut he was never the same again.
'e had "uit up a very prominent and important image of his professiona prowess.
3any peope ater descri"ed this as a farce and a shaow coak over his rea sef. 3a8
2en *ahya, had earier on 6 $ept, eEpressed disdainfuy that he fuy knows and
@1
understands him. I had known him as our .d8utant, my company commander at P3.
and ater as 93 of the Infantry 9rigade at Peshawar. I had a very high perception of him.
I woud consider him as "rave, "od, inteigent, and innovative and in particuar a man
who was we versed and read on 3iitary 'istory. I woud not condemn him as most
others did. 9ut in a fairness, my description of him on ? $ept was that he was not the
same man that I had known a these years. !his, I attri"ute essentiay, that he "ecame the
victim of circumstances.
!owards the afternoon of ? $ept, 3a8 2en !I//. /'.,, had taken over the %ommand
of 15 #iv. I was a witness to it. I had 8ust waked out of the dug out 9unker of '& 15 #iv
that I met 3a8 2en !I//. /'.,, as he was arriving towards the 9unker. 'e tod me
that he had come to take over the %ommand of 15 #iv. 'e instructed me not to te any
one yet, I went "ack with him into the 9unker. .s he entered, he was met "y 9rig Ismai
and %o 3ehdi. 'e tod them that he had come 8ust to have the "riefing on the situation
on the ground. %o 3ehdi gave a the "riefing. 'aving istened to a the detais, he then
announced that he had taken over the %ommand of 15 #iv under instructions from %orp
'& and 2'&. 'e accepted "oth 9rig Ismai and %o 3ehdi as part of 15 #iv. 'e showed
no acrimony towards them. !he first act of %o 3ehdi that upset him was on 9 $ep, !he
dug in position of 15 #iv '&, had "een correcty ocated "y the enemy guns. !hey were
pounding these positions heaviy. %o 3ehdi started strongy suggesting that '& 15 #iv
shoud "e moved "ack across the 3)1 cana, towards $.39)I.1. 3a8 2en !I//.
/'.,, very firmy tod %o 3ehdi not to suggest this ever again. 'e ceary said that
'& 15 #iv wi stay in $I.1/(! with the troops regardess of the sheing. !he neEt
episode that took pace was that 3a8or 41ater 3a8or 2enera5 9(/'.)I arrived in '&
15 #iv with his %(9). %ompany. !his was the ony unit with these newy ac:uired anti
tank missies. $oon after they arrived in the area of 15 #iv, orders were given to '& 15
#iv, to dispatch the %ompany to 6 .rmed #iv, which was now facing the main enemy
.rmour threat. %o. 3ehdi caed 3a8or 9(/'.)I and "riefed him to report to '& 6
.rmed #iv aong with his %(9). %ompany. I arrived in '& 15 #iv, towards the
afternoon. !here was a tota confusion regarding the where a"outs of this %ompany.
$ome one 8ust suggested that the 2rid )eference of the ocation of '& 6 .rmd #iv given
"y %o 3ehdi was wrong. !he ocation he gave to 3a8or 9(/'.)I was now in enemy
@=
hands. !his confounded the matters worst. %o 3ehdi picked up the teephone and caed
up some one. 'e asked him, 6#o you remem"er the "riefing that I had given to 3a8or
9okhari.7 'e in particuar, was in:uiring from him, 6#o you reca the 2rid )eference
given "y me at which 3a8or. 9(/'.)I was ordered to report.7 'e then hed the
receiver in his hand and started waiving it. Whie so doing, he asked every one around,
61isten as to what is "eing said on the phone7. $uddeny 3a8or 2en !I//. ost his
patience. 'e angriy shouted 63ehdi I have had enough of your dramatics. $hut up and
get out7. It stunned everyoneB I had never seen 3a8 2en !I//., in such temper and
mood. !he erstwhie a very promising career of %o 3ehdi, came to this rather a"rupt
end. .fter the war, he was posted as $tation %ommander, /arachi. (n one of my visits to
/arachi, I met him at the .irport, 'e asked me to accompany him to his office. 'e paced
"efore me the .%) that 3a8 2en !I//. /'., had given him. I read it very carefuy.
It was strong, damning and damaging. %o 3ehdi was highy emotiona. 'e was asking
me that he coud "e censured for many things, "ut coud he "e descri"ed as a cowardL I
had to te him that I woud not think so. I was a privy to a the important episodes of '&
15 #iv, right from the day of 6 $ept to the day when he was removed as %o $taff. !here
was no act of cowardice on his part. 9ut undou"tedy, the circumstances, the events, the
misreporting of '& 115 9ed, had a couded his mind and 8udgment. I wi not pass any
8udgment "eyond that. !he position at '& 6 .rmed #iv and '& 1 %orps that I visited in
the evening was e:uay not very re-assuring. !his I can most particuary emphasi;e for
'& 1 %orps. !here was a tota ack of information at the carpFs eve.
I had personay seen the "atte range the whoe day, since the eary morning. !he aeria
view gave me an eEceent picture of the operations conducted. In summing up I may say
that my first ook of the intensity of the enemy attack was not too cear. I coud o"serve
two cear coumns of the enemy thrust. !he one on the aEis of %'.)W.-%'(9.).-
P'I11.<).'-%'.WI,#. had ceary outpaced the coumn which was protecting its
eft fank. !he strength I coud not ceary make, "ut it was cear that it was the ma8or
enemy attack. .t that time I had not o"served the enemy coumn that was pressing itsef
to secure the right fank of this main strike force aimed at %'.WI,#.. I had vividy
and graphicay given a these detais at '& 15 #iv, 6 .rmed #iv, and '& 1 %orps. !he
@A
whoe day I kept foowing and o"serving these operations very cosey and I have
aready descri"ed that earier.
#uring the evening of ? $ept, a "atte order of the attack of 16 %av was recovered from a
destroyed tank of this unit. It was rushed to '& 15 #iv at night. !he neEt morning when
I visited, '& 15 #iv, a the detaied information was avaia"e. %o 3ehdi was ceary
9riefing me that it was the ma8or I,#I., thrust which was ed "y their main .rmed #iv
which was supported "y two infantry divisions, which had "een "unted. . copy of this
order was given to me. !his is attached as .,J T T
9y the morning of 9 $ept, it was crysta cear to a and sundries, that the attack of ? $ept,
1965, was the fu fedged Indian attack. !hey had payed their fina punch to achieve a
:uick "reakthrough. It was nothing short of a mirace that =5 %avary had a "y itsef
handed and thwarted it. . %aptured (perationa (rder f @ 'udsonFs 'orse, gives a the
detais .,J T T. !his document was captured much ater "y our @ .rmed 9de, on =D
$ept. !he detais show that the attack was to "e aunched "y three Infantry #ivisions and
one .rmoured #iv. 6 3tn #iv and =6 I,+ #iv were to secure a "ridge head and through
it the 1 .rmd #iv was to aunch the main thrust at D6DD 'rs on ? $ept. !he panned
attack was aong three .Ees. !he )ed )oute, the 9ue )oute and the 2reen )oute. 16
%av 2p which was the unit of 2enera H.,. %'.<#)*, was advancing on route PI,#I-
9'.2(-%'.)W.-%'(9.).-P'I11<).' 4)ed )oute5. !he fanks of this
formation were covered "y 1> 'orse 2p on the eft 49ue )oute5 and @A 1orried I,+ 9de
2p, on the right 42reen )oute5. 1@ #iv was tasked, if in position, to capture Iafarwa.
With the avaia"iity of this information, the murky picture of the whoe dayFs "atte of ?
$ept, as I had o"served from the air "ecame vividy enshrined in my mind. !he two
coumns that I had "een o"serving were the charge of 16 %av 2p and 1> 'orse 2p. !he
pace of 16 %av on )ed )oute had outstripped that of 1> %av on 9ue )oute. !here was
no sign of 1@ #iv movements towards Iafarwa. !he 2reen )oute on which @A 1orried
I,+ 9de 2p was moving, was too far away from the area that I kept fying the whoe day
and as such I coud not see this eement and its movement.
@@
. the detais of the "atte of ? $ept were now ceary and fuy esta"ished. !he Indian
attack of 1 .rmd #iv, supported "y 6 3tn and =6 I,+ #iv had "een roed "ack "y
amosty entirey the effort of =5 %av. It was ony in the evening that a company of 9
Pun8a" arrived in support of =5 %av. %( =5 %av, decided to attack the area "etween
2.#2()-%'(9.). with T%F $:n and a company of = Pun8a" at a"out 16AD hrs. It
was an eEceent eEampe of !kGInf %o-operation. !hey showed a very rare eEampe of
dash, courage and initiative. !he enemy was taken "y surprise and a"andoned the
position in compete confusion. 9y 1?DD 'rs the position was secured. Enemy had eft
siE tanks a"andoned thereK two of these had their engines sti running. E:uay
magnificent was the action of T9F $:n of =5 %av. ,ot ony had they stopped the attack of
enemy 1 .rmd #iv on the .Eis, P'I11.<).'-2.#2(), "ut the enemy was forced to
withdraw towards 3.'.).H/E. $o "od was T9F $:n thrust that one of its troops even
reached 1DDD yards short of 3.'.).H/E. !hey fought their fina "atte of the day in
this area. It was sharp and a short action. .fter inficting additiona casuaties to the
enemy, this troop was withdrawn to 2.#2(), where the $:uadron was. . the minute
detais and the ferocity of the war, I coud not capture from the aeria view. . the
graphic detais were fied in when I met the gaant peope on the ground. <n"eieva"y,
=5 %av had grapped with the attack of enemy 1 .rmd #iv-mosty "y themseves. !hey
first routed the pride of Indian .rmor 16 %av, they then took on 1> 'orse coming on the
9ue )oute and forced them "ack and one troop of T9F $:n disrupted the third thrust "y
the @A 1orried 9de and = 1ancers on the 2reen )oute. !he whoe attack of the Indians
on a the three aEis was "unted and roed "ack "y =5 %av. 9y the evening the enemy
had "een recoied "ack to from where they had de"ouched in the eary hours of ? $ept.
!he gaantry, the "ravado, the determination, the grit and the ;ea with which they fought
to my mind, merits a most iustrious pace in the annas of 3iitary 'istory. =5 %av,
made themseves and the .rmy proud. !he tay of the day was 16-=D en tanks and =
.G!k guns destroyed against the = own !ks destroyed, and two damaged, a of =5 %av.
I was privieged to watch a this action with my own eyes. I cannot forget the deay
imposed earier "y our .ir +orce on the advancing enemy .rmd coumns. !his was a
vita one hour gained. E:uay magnificent was the unmatched action fought
su"se:uenty the whoe day "y =5 %av. 3y reaction then was that it was the divine hand
@5
of .ah that guided and caused it. 9ut sti I had no dou"t that it was the wi of the
peope on ground that accompished it. I have gone into a detais as it was one of our
finest moment and hour of the war.
!he events of ? $ept had confirmed and driven home to a, that the attack was aunched
with the fu weight of a the Indian troops avaia"e in this sector. !his direction and
may "e the magnitude of the attack, had ceary "een perceived. !he appreciations
made earier had determined and defined it. What was not understood then and even to-
day, as to why no thorough and detaied pans were made to meet this threat. 15 #iv was
stretched from $I.1/(!-H.$$.), "ut the corridor of %'.)W.-%'(9.).-
P'I11.<).'-%'.WI,#. was the most sensitive area. =@ 9de 2p was responsi"e
for this, "ut why no proper fortified and ea"orate defensive positions were panned and
prepared for itM E:uay important was that the fa "ack positions shoud aso have "een
prepared. %'.WI,#.-I.+.)W.1 and 9.#I.,. were our natura pivota points.
!hey had to "e thoroughy panned, fortified and prepared to provide strong positions for
the Infantry to hod. When I anded at P'I11.<).' on ? $ept, morning, I met 9rig
."du .i 3aik and 1t %o ,isar, standing in the open neEt to their command 8eep near
the $choo "uiding. !hey had no prepared "unkers. It was "rave of them. 9ut surey
the whoe defenses shoud have "een prepared in much more detais, fuy fortified and
propery mined. When I visited %'.WI,#., I.+.)W.1, 9.#I.,. and )./'
9.9. 9'<)E$'.', it was much worst. !he defenses there were ony hurriedy
prepared and that too after the arriva of 6 .rmd #iv in the area. !his was the
responsi"iity of 15 #iv and they had totay faied in that. 'ad this "een done propery,
we and co-coordinated "efore the war, these strong pivots woud have proved very vita
foca points for Infantry to strongy man and hod these. !he tank forces woud have thus
retained the compete freedom of maneuver and thus kept it initiative. It struck me then
and it was cear that 15 #iv had "een totay in-ept and i prepared for their vita tasks.
!he "unkers and we prepared positions in and around $I.1/(! proved very effective.
Why was the same preparation not eEtended to this vita groundM Whatever "unders had
"een made, fortunatey the positions were fuy sta"ii;ed on ? $ept. (n the morning of 9
$ept, every one was aive to the fact that enemy 1 .rmd #iv. attack had "een "unted.
!hough they had faied, "ut they were now re-grouping and panning their neEt thrust and
@6
move. We had enough time to do our own panning and preparations to meet this
offensive. !hough '& 1 %orps had moved 6 .rmd #iv in this area and they had arrived
during the night on ? $ept in their "atte ocations, sti they were given no pans or
orders. !hey were 8ust vaguey assigned the roe of destroying enemy penetrations E.$!
of 3)1 cana.
!he ocation of our anding strip at the $iakot Poo 2round remained peacefu. .fter the
days hectic activity on 6
th
, >
th
N ?
th
$ept. we had sound rest and seep. .cross the road
was the ocation of ? 3edium )egt. !he ad8utant of the )egiment was %apt. .$1.3
41ater %oone5. 'e "eing an .rmy .viator, there was very fre:uent iaison carried out "y
him and the piots of the s:uadron. !his "ecame rather ominous. .s the hostiities "roke
out throughout the $I.1/(! sector since eary ? $eptem"er, the guns of ? 3edium
)egiment "ecame very active. In retaiation it started attracting heavy enemy %ounter
9om"ardment from the night of ?G9 $eptem"er. $ince ony a thin road divided the
.viation position from medium gun ocation, the strip started receiving a fair degree of
share of the enemy fire. !hough the trenches had "een dug and the aircraft were we
dispersed, "ut the first taste of the enemy fire did provoke hasty, panicky and may even
"e descri"ed as somewhat comica reactions. !he trenches had "een earmarked for
different personne. 9ut in haste, when the piots and the other crews ran to the trenches
to take cover, the principe of first come first served prevaied. Everyone was desperatey
rushing to the nearest trench. 3a8. ,.II), the =1Gc, ran o"iviousy towards the trench
he had earmarked for himsef. (n approaching it, he instinctivey took a eap in the air to
:uicky 8ump into it. .s his heavy frame was sti in the air and he was a"out to drop in
his trench, he noticed that the trench was aready occupied. 'e suddeny "raced himsef
and showed a :uick reaction of his mind. )ather than faing in the trench over the
eEisting occupants, with his fu weight of ==D "s, thus crushing their "ones, he hed his
"ig frame astride the trench "y parting his egs and hands and anded on the top of the
trench. !he two occupants, thanked heavens and aso thanked their ucky stars. !hey
saved themseves from "oth the enemy sheing and the crushing they may have received
from the weight of their own =1Gc dropping over them. !he incident ony attracted
ighthearted comments of a. )emarka"y, it took a the tension away from the first rea
@>
"attefied indoctrination of 1 .rmy .viation $:uadron, due to rea enemy heavy artiery
sheing that it attracted.
(n the morning of 9
th
$eptem"er 1965, the %o asked the permission of 2(% 15 #iv to
move the s:uadron to $.39)I.1. It was foohardy to eEpose the aircraft and the crews
to hostie enemy fire and the 2(% readiy approved. Whie the s:uadron moved to
$.39)I.1 on 9
th
$eptem"er, the tempo of war stepped up. !he focus and the intensity
of the enemy attack had ceary shifted to P'I11.<).' and %'.WI,#. area. !hus a
part of the fight composed of %apt 1ateef 4known as 1.!I+ 9'.I, who ater "ecame a
3a8 2en in 9.,21.#E$'5 and a few other piots on ad hoc "asis, remained in support
of 15 #iv, the rest of the s:uadron "ecame more directy invoved in support of 6 .rmd
#iv. %apt 1ateef remained specificay in support of 15 #iv whie the other piots kept
rotating. !he support of 15 #iv remained "asicay providing "attefied information and
the direction of the artiery fire. 15 #iv was fu of praise of the .rmy .viation efforts
provided and initiated the citations for the gaantry awards of $I!.).- E S H<)..! for
%apt 1.!EE+ and some other piots in recognition of their services. !he %( 1t %o
3.3.3.'3<# kept his routine of iaison with '& 15 #iv reguary.
(n the 9 $ept, some regroupings were done. !he area of responsi"iity "etween 15 #iv
and 6 .rmd #iv were assigned and the inter div "oundaries were defined. =@ 9de 2p
came in the area of responsi"iity of 6 .rmd #iv and was paced under their command.
$ome additiona troops in the form of 1@4P5 9rigade were aso promised and @ %orps
.rtiery was to provide .rtiery support to the whoe area of operations of 6 .rmd #iv.
!his was ocated "etween %'.WI,#.-P.$)<). =@ 9de retained their defensive
positions at P'I11.<).'-%'.)W.-%'(9.).. !hese were further strengthened "y
empoying 9 ++ with under command .%!, in area P'I11.<).'-#E2 ,E#I, with at
east a patoon at Iafarwa. 2uides %av was oc in area 9adiana, eEtending towards
$I.1/(!. == %av was West of 9.#I.,., with their )econnaissance !roops operating
,()!' of 9.#I.,..
@?
$ince the emphasis of the "atte had shifted more directy to the area of responsi"iity of 6
.rmd #iv from 9 $ept onwards, the efforts of 1 .rmy .viation $:uadron too were
argey focused in support of those operations. !he piots were fuy invoved and
remained a"reast of the activities and operations of 6 .rmd #iv. !he %( kept a very
cose contact with '& 6 .rmd #iv and fmns. !he visits to '& 1 corps were aso reguar.
. these activities provided a cear and authentic picture of the "atte at a critica eves
of command. !his proved most usefu in a decision taking.
It was a we "aanced force. !he main defenses at P'I11.<).'-%'(9.). were
hed "y =@ 9de 2p. 9 ++ had given additiona strength and fank protection to =@ 9de.
$trong pivots were hed at 9.#I.,.. 11 %av was hed in reserve at P.$)<). !his
gave a ot of feEi"iity and varied choices to 6 .rmd #iv, to react to any enemy offensive
pans. !hese views were ade:uatey strengthened and ceary proven, when enemy
attacks were repused on 9 and 1D $ept. !he attack of a !k )egt from the direction of
9.'.#<)P<) was repused "y the determined troops on the ground. Enemy ost three
tanks and suffered heavy casuaties in Infantry. =@ 9de even successfuy carried out
imited offensive actions.
Eary on the morning of 1D $ept, again a strong enemy attack was aunched against
2.#2() from the direction of )<)/I /.1.,, H.'), %'(9.). and H($.&'
/(!1I. !his attack again was with the strength of an .rmd )egiment and fuy
supported "y a avaia"e .rty, Infantry and .ir. 9y 1DAD 'rs, this attack was repused.
9y =@ 9de and =5 %ar. !he whoe day, a enemy repeated efforts to form up his .rmour
and Infantry at 9.'.#<)P<), %'(9.). area, to mount any further attacks, were
effectivey "roken up through concentrated and effective .rtiery fire.
I visited %orps '& in the evening of ? $ept, I had given the detaied and the graphic
picture of the whoe dayFs "atte as I had seen and eEperienced with my own eyes. It was
ceary conveyed that it was the, ma8or enemy attack. ,o one knew the detais of the
other Indian formations in this operation, "ut the presence of the Indian 1 .rmd #iv was
ceary esta"ished and was now undisputa"e. !he earier capture of the documents from
the enemy #) on 5 $ept, which were fown over "y us to 2'&, had aso indicated the
@9
presence of enemy 1 .rmd #iv in the area. !his was ignored at 2'& and may "e at the
eve of %orps '& aso. ,ow there was no scope of dou"ts or iusions eft.
'& 1 %orps was sei;ed with the panning of their operations "ased on this information.
What in puts they received from '& 15 #iv and 6 .rmed #iv, I am not aware ofM !hey
aso had the "enefit of studying and anay;ing the operations conducted "y the enemy the
whoe day of 9 $ept. It seems that "y the morning of 1D $ept, '& 1 %orps had made up a
pan. (n 9 $ept, the roes and tasks of 15 #iv and 6 .rmed #iv had "een redefined. !he
Inter #iv "oundaries were aso aid down. .s a resut some ad8ustments in the aocation
of troops had aso "een made. !hese are a descri"ed earier.
.t 11DD hrs on 1D $ept, 2(% 6 .rmd #iv was caed to %orps '&. . concept of
operations, as deveoped "y 3a8or 2enera 3ohammad *aku" /han, the #eputy %orps
%ommander, was presented to the 2(%. It is mentioned that it was "ased in the ight of
the atest 2'& and %orps Inteigence estimates of the enemyFs strength and intentions...
!here are no detais given. In my mind at "oth these eves, they had no cear, definitive
and eEpicit information avaia"e through any of their own channes. . the information
that coud "e gathered, assessed and pans made on, was the one provided "y the ground
troops who had done a the fighting on ? and 9 $ept, !his was suppemented and further
su"stantiated as seen, o"served and communicated "y us from the air.
Enemy attacks at P'I11.<).'-2.#2() defensive positions had "een successfuy
defeated on the ? and 9 $ept. Even on the 1D $ept, their attack had "een repused "y
1DBAD 'rs. Was it not cear that the enemy was trying to either reduces our position in
this area, or woud deveop a pan to out maneuver our defensesM !hey coud not aunch
any ma8or offensive without neutrai;ing or reducing these positions. (ur options were
e:uay cearL We coud either hod P'I11.<).'-2.#2() as strong pivota
positions and use our .rmour and other 3otori;ed Infantry avaia"e to provide strength
to these positions if and when needed, !hese coud "e used in the cassic roe to attack
enemy formations in their fank if they attempted to outmaneuver or "y pass these
positions. !he other option was to hod P'I11.<).'-%'(9). as a thin ine of
5D
defense and prepare the main defensive positions around the strong noda points at
%'.WI,#.-9.#I.,. and possi"y I.+.)W.1.
!he pan that was prepared was a tota 'otch Potch. It envisaged puing out of =@ 9de
2p from these areas and reieving them, "y 9 ++ aready covering the track
P'I11.<).'-I.+.)W.1, and "y 11 %av from P.$)<). 11 %av had aready seen
operations in %'.39 $ector and had depeted strength of tanks. !he hand written
detais of these pans are shown as .,J T Tand .,J T T. !hese are in 3a8or 2enera
*aku"Fs own hand written transcription.
!he neEt aspect is the time and space factor of this reief in ine operations. $taff
%oege, &uetta ays down enough emphasis on this aspect in a its teachings, eEercises
and sand mode discussions. 3a8 2en *aku" had come direct from there, where he was
the %ommandant. It is not understood as to how he coud ignore this vita aspectL I
suppose teaching is one thing, "ut the practica impementation of these pans is a
different "a game. It can ony come through actua command eEperience. !his
eEperience was woefuy acking.
2(% 6 .rmed #iv was caed to %orps '& at 1DDD 'rs. !he pans were given to him
there. Without the 2(% 6 .rmd #iv, returning to his '&, the pans were passed to
#eputy #ivision %ommander to impement. 'e caed =GI% 9 ++ and %( 11 %av and they
were given the orders "y him at a"out 1@DD 'rs. !he #eputy %orps %ommander visited
'& 6 .rmd #iv in the afternoon to discuss the detais of the possi"e pans and the future
%orps (perations in the area. !he o"vious :uestion that arises is, as to where were the
%orps %ommander and 2(% 6 .rmd #iv, in this oop of panning process. ,o ight has
"een thrown "y any :uarters on this important issue. !he ony ogica eEpanation is that
2'& and other higher ups, were fuy cogni;ant of the mistakes and even "unders they
had made in pacing such peope in %ommand. !his they were now trying to rectify, "y
imposing a #eputy %orps %ommander and a #eputy 2(% in 6 .rmd #iv. !hese terms
one had not heard "efore. !hrough activating them, the norma command was now
"eing "y-passed and this new chain was "eing made more effective. 1eaving this
academic discussion apart, the pan, as envisaged and more so, as it was impemented is
51
the most sordid and mor"id chapter of the operations in $I.1/(! $ector. !he reieving
units were given the orders in the afternoon. !he %( 11 %av. was present, "ut the %( 9
++ was asked to stay "ack with the unit and send his =I%. It is rather strange ogic that
the person who was to assume the overa command of these most sensitive positions, is
"eing reayed the orders through =I%. If he had "een present himsef, it is possi"e that
he woud have pointed out to these paper geniuses, the foy of this i-conceived and i
timed orders. !he orders were given at 1@DD 'rs, the =GI% reached the %( 9 ++ at 15AD
'rs and a the pans of the movements of 9 ++ and 11 %av, were put into action at that
time. What time they had avaia"e to move into their new ocations, "efore sunsetM Was
it difficut to assess for a man even with simpe commonsenseM It is reported that %( 11
%av, contacted '& 6 .rmd #iv at =DAD 'rs on the teephone net work of '& =@ 9de. It
is aso presumed that %( 9 ++ was aso present there. !hese discussions took pace in
the presence of %omd =@ 9de. Incidentay, he had no prior information of this reief in
ine operationsL 'e ony earnt it through %( 11 %av, when he arrived there.
.pprehensions are eEpressed "y the reieving units, 9 ++G11 %av 2roup that it might
prove too weak for the task given "ut were "rushed asideK With the comments that
shoud any thing uneEpected happen, the #ivision had enough resources to dea it.
.s records aso ironicay state, that what was significant was the state of mind of the two
%(Fs. .ccusations or may "e inferences are "eing made, that there were non-reveation if
not actua conceaments, of happenings which "ecame known ater. What is "eing
auded to is that no proper panning and conduct of reief in ines was carried outM What
chance and opportunity was given for it to "e conductedM . the detais for a proper
operation of this nature are "eing enumerated now. Was it not crysta cear that it was an
impossi"e taskM =@ 9de 2p was "eing made to pu out simutaneousy with the arriva
of 9 ++G11 %av 2roup in the area. . this was happening at the midde of the night.
Enough detais of how a this was carried out, is ade:uatey covered in most accounts
and detais written. What is "eyond any ogic or reasoning is that how convenienty the
whoe "ame is "eing shifted to the state of minds of the two %(Fs and that they were not
forthcoming with the actua happenings on the ground. If the two %(Fs did not give the
detais, did the #eputy #iv %omd and the reevant staff of '& 6 .rmd #iv ask them as to
how satisfactoriy the reiefs in ine operations were "eing carried outM It is "eieved that
a suggestion was made that =@ 9de 2p shoud stay in their positions and that 9 ++G11 %av
5=
2p shoud further re-enforce them for the night. If the neEt day the situation remained
cam, the reief operations coud easiy "e carried out propery during the day ight
avaia"e. !his was competey ignored and dismissed. In fact it was the most ogica
courseL !he "ame game is now going on "ut it was crysta cear where the faut ies. I
did not know a the detais of this whoe pan. 9ut in the evening of 11 sept, I got the
news that 3a8or 41ater 9rigadier5 3u;affar 3aik, was seriousy in8ured and was
admitted in %3' $I.1/(!. 1ater that day I got to visit him. $eeing me, in pain and
agony that he was in, he coud ony mum"e the words, 6*ou peope hurt too much7 I
coud not understand the meanings. When I met him su"se:uenty, he was in much "etter
condition and frame of mind. 'e eEpained to me that what he was trying to eucidate
was that he was hit "y an .rtiery she, whie he was standing in the open aong with a
group of officerFs. 'e aso eEpained that the entire reief in ine operations was
conducted on the road side, as the 11 %av, which was coming in and =5 %av, which was
moving out, met whie crossing each other on the road and during the midde of the night.
'e aso tod me that %( =5 %av gave a very "rief account of the operations of ? $ept in
particuar, and aso the su"se:uent operations of 9 and 1D $ept. It was aso mentioned
that %( =5 %av, had ceary stated, that it was the entire enemy 1 .rmd #iv attack. !heir
own reaction to this was of dis"eiefL It apparenty was mentioned to %( =5 %av, "y %(
11 %av and =I% 3u;affar 3aik, that, 6.re you trying to suggest that singe handed your
unit had successfuy "atted the whoe .rmd #iv and even pushed them "ack to the area
from where they had de"ouched, on the morning of ? $eptL7 !hey 8ust aughed it away
and did not take a serious notice of this impending threat. !his woud sum up as to how
casuay this reief in ine operation was carried out during the night of 1DG11 $ept.
)ather than put the "ame s:uarey at those, primariy the '& 1 %orps argey and #eputy
#ivision %omd and $taff of '& 6 .rmd #iv partiay, who were responsi"e for this
fiasco, the "uck is "eing passed down to the two %(Fs invoved.
When the enemy started its we conducted and we co-coordinated attack on 11 $ept, we
were in tota disarray. !hey masked and contained our positions frontay and
outmaneuvered them with two .rmd )egiments from the 1E+!. !o compound the
matters further, %( 1 $P was kied and %( and =GI% 11 %av were in8ured "y enemy
.rtiery $heing. !hey were a standing in the open near the P'I11.<).' )est
5A
'ouse. $urey the panners shoud have given them some time to famiiari;e with the are
a and prepare a proper defense pan with proper dug in and fortified positions.
In 3u;affar 3aikFs own words, he tod me, 6(n the first ight of 11 $ept. I went on top
of a cose "y schoo "uiding and took out my "inocuars to have a first ook at the area of
our operations with my own eyes. Hust as I was o"serving and taking my view of the
ground, I was shocked. I saw a huge pie of dust caused "y the movement of the mass of
the enemy armour which was advancing towards our ocation7. 'e immediatey came
down to "rief his %(, 1t. %o. .;i; and 1t. %o. ."dur )ahman, %( 1 $P, a"out the
impending Indian attack . %( 1 $P immediatey got "usy "rining down the fire of his
guns on these advancing enemy armour formations. .t that time an artiy she fe in the
ocation where they were standing in the open. 1t. %o. )ahman achieved $haahadat on
the spot. 9oth the %( and = I% of 11 %avary was seriousy in8ured and was evacuated.
!his fiasco which was aready in the offing, due to the most a"surd reief in ine pans
made "y the #eputy %orps %ommander and the #eputy 2(% 6 .rmd #iv took another
unfortunate turn. !he sudden remova of the other key eements invoved in the
operations in the area, further compounded the situation.
,o one under stood and knew a"out this impending disastrous pan as was prepared and
eEecuted during the night 1DG11 $ept. I coud aso not sense it when the de"ace started
to take pace. It seems that at this stage 2(% 6 .rmd #iv took over the command
himsef, rather than aow his #eputy #iv. %omd to undertake and do a the insane
caingsL 3a8 2en ."rar ordered 2uides %av to charge from the WE$! of
P'I11.<).' to reieve pressure from 11 %av and 9 ++. Earier %( 9 ++, 1t %o 3a8id
made frantic cas to %( 2uides %av to eEtricate them from this predicament that they
had got stuck in.
%( 2uides %av immediatey got a his resources together and gave orders for attack in
the genera direction of 9'.2(W.1. . $:uadron was tasked to attack ,orth East with
%'.') as its o"8ective. 9 $:uadron was to %o-ordinate its attack with T.F $:uadron. It
was to move on the )I2'! fank of T.F $:uadron and attack 1I99E T%F $:uadron which
was e:uipped, with 3A69=, was paced as the reserve. It was a conventiona attack with
5@
two $:uadrons up. In this case the $:uadron woud aso have empoyed may "e one or
two troops ahead. 1t %o 2<1I$!., H.,H<. suddeny reai;ed the gravity of the
situation. +rom different accounts he knew the presence of the enemy 1 .rmd #iv in the
area. If he was to attack in this formation, he hardy woud have siE to tweve tanks in
front and they woud "e attacking the fu .rmd #iv. 'e did :uick rethinking, caed off
the previous orders, and issued fresh orders of his attack. 'e gave these orders on the
)egimenta wireess net. It went in his own words, 6!he )egiment to ine up ine
a"reast, aong the )aiway 1ine. !he attack is to "e aunched in the direction of
9'.2(W.1. !he inter $:uadron "oundary, wi "e the ine 1I99E incusive to T9F
$:uadron. !he tanks to aunch the attack at fu speed, "a;ing a their guns7. 'e
aowed a itte time to a the tanks to re-group and re-aign at the )aiway 1ine. +inay
he ordered the attack, with the sogan of 6,ara-a-!ak"ir .ah-o-.k"ar7. $imutaneousy
a @@ !anks of 2uides %av, "usted out of their positions and went charging aong with
the tank of their %(. It was the most spectacuar sight. It was the utimate of their
courage. !hey went charging at fu "ast, attacking the whoe of Indian 1 .rmd #iv,
which had "y now consoidated themseves in the area.
I was privieged to see this action from the air. !he words are hard to find an apt
description of this most gaant charge. It reminded me of the charge of the 1ight
9rigade. !hundered and voeyed roed the siE hundredL (f course the siE hundred were
repaced "y forty four tanks. .
!his attack of 2uides %av was aunched around 11AD 'rs. T9F $:uadron met stiff
resistance as 1> ' and @ 'udsonFs 'orse had aready consoidated themseves in the area
P'I11.<).'-2.#2(). . mere thousand yards short of its o"8ective 1I99E, the
$:uadron %ommander 3a8or .""asi and his $econd in %ommand were "oth kied. T.F
$:uadron had managed to hit the enemy tank formations on their fanks. . stiff fight
ensued and after inficting heavy casuaties on the enemy armoured formations, which
consisted of 1> ' and @ ', with 16 %av covering their fank, 2uides %av captured
%'.') "y 1@DD 'rs.
55
!his "od and cassic attack of 2uides %av, coud not eEtricate own troops at
P'I11.<).'-2.#(), "ut it having hit the fanks and the depth positions of the
attacking enemy 1 .rmd #iv, managed to partiay unhinge his offensive. Enemy in
running "ack, eft tanks a"andoned in the area. Presuma"y the tank crews of this reserve
unit were having their tea whie they sat there reaEing in the concentration area.
.ccording to %( 2uides %av, 1t %o Han8ua, they tried to start these %enturion tanks, "ut
since they were not famiiar with these, they faied in that. 'e said, they made a mistake
in that they did not destroy these. 'owever, 3a8or +a;i 'a: got enough time to empty
the tanks of their entire stocks of i:uor stacked.
If ony one coud re-enact the scene of 11 $ept, under a different scenario and a more
ogica dispositions of own troopsM It had "een suggested that rather than this hapha;ard
reief operation "eing aunchedK 11 %av shoud have strengthened the aready hed
positions of =@ 9de 2p, during the night 1DG11 $ept. .ny reief operations if needed
coud have "een carried out smoothy and propery during the evening of 11 $ept. In that
eventuaity, the enemy 1 .rmd #iv attack, woud have "een met in a much more
organi;ed and panned manner. It is not difficut to envisage that the fate of this attack
woud have "een much worst, than the imited success achieved "y our troops on 11 $ept.
!he dayFs action of 2uides %av destroyed twenty one tanks of the enemy, against their
own oss of siE PattonFs. 11 %av had much higher osses. !hey had seven PattonFs and
nine 3A69= destroyed in the dayFs action. !he tota osses for the day wereB-
.. (wn == 4incuding thirteen PattonFs, and nine 3A69=5
". Enemy AD-@5 4incuding due to the action of P.+5
9y the evening even =5 %av was again rushed to eEtricate 9++ and 11%av from the area
of P'I11.<).'.
!he day of 9 $ept, was reativey :uiet. !he en was icking his wounds inficted "y P.+
and =5 %.O. !he @ %orps .rty was now fuy depoyed. It covered the entire front,
stretching from 9.#I.,. to #E2 ,.#I 4I.+.)W.15 and "eyond. .ny en attack or
3aneuver woud immediatey attract the hostie fire of neary 9D guns, fied, medium and
heavy cai"er. (n the evening of 9 $ep, =@ 9de 2P positions were attacked "y en tanks
56
and infantry. (wn I,+ hed its ground and the tanks of =5 %.O "roke up the en attack.
!he we directed fire of a the guns avaia"e in the area, "y the .rmy .viators provided
good support. $ince the terrain was fat the ground o"servers had very imited fied of
view. !his is where .rmy .viatorFs usefuness proved very critica. With his "ird eye
view of the "attefied, the air"orne eye, kept the entire area of the operations under their
fu view and surveiance. .ny movement of the en immediatey received due attention
and fu concentration of a guns in range which pounded them. !his was to "ecome the
routine of a the .rmy .viators fying in the area from dawn to dusk. +rom a accounts
a"out >D->5U of a .rty shoots were ad8usted "y .rmy .viators.
1D $ept, was again a reativey :uiet day. Enemy attack on =@ 9de was repused "y =5
%av. !his operation was supported "y a our guns within range. .rmy .viators again
came in handy in support a"out seven enemy tanks were destroyed.
(n the afternoon of 1D
th
$ept, it was ordered that =@ 9de "e reieved "y 11 %.O and 9 ++
during night 1D
th
G11
th
$ept. !he reief caused a ot of confusion. 9 ++ "arey competed its
depoyment at 2.#2() "y D=DD hrs on 11
th
$ept. 9y first ight 11
th
$ept, the fu weight
of the I,#I., .rmd #iv attack came at 2.#2(). #ue to enemy .rtiery sheing, 1t.
%o. ).'3., 4I$P5 was kied and the %( and the =1% of 11 %.O, 1t. %o. .III and
3a8. 3<I.++.) 3.1I/ were seriousy wounded. !he 2.#2() and P'I11.<).'
positions were overrun "y the advancing en armour. !o stem the enemy advance,
2<I#E$ %.O was ordered to counter attack towards the E.$! and reieve pressure on
11 %.O. 1-19Fs fying in the area, were fuy keeping a"reast with the situation on the
ground. !hey kept providing very timey and usefu info a"out the deveopment of the
enemy attack, the ocation of their tanks, its approEimate strength and the direction of the
movement. .rmy .viators were operating on the wireess nets of arty fmns. !his was
usefu for :uick ad8ustment of .rtiery fire. !here was no direct contact with our .rmour
and I,+ units. It was a mistake. !he info to our fied units
'ad to "e reayed through the arty nets. $ometimes, it caused deays and on occasions
confusion. !here were :uarries and counter :uarries to cear the conficting
interpretations and descriptions. .so, the .rmy .viators a"iity to assess the strength and
5>
other detais of enemy movements, were at time :uestioned. 9ut "y far, most accounts
provided "y the .rmy .viators, proved accurate and timey.
With the counter attack of 2uides %.O from the oc at )./' 9.9. 9'<)E $'.'
towards 9'.2(W.1 and P'I11.<).', an intense tank "atte ensued. 2uides %.O
caimed =1 enemy tanks in eEchange for siE of their 3-@?s ost. 2(% 6 .rmd #iv few in
an ' E 1A in the afternoon of 11
th
$ep to assess the situation. 'e anded at %'.WI,#..
!he 9 ++ positions at 2.#2() had "een "y passed. !here was no cear information
emerging a"out the 11 %.O and 9 ++. !he overa osses of our tanks on 11
th
$ep were
estimated "y 6 .rmd #iv, to "e == tanks. .gainst this the en osses were put "etween AD-
@5 tanks.
2(% 6 .rmd #iv, appreciated that he must first consoidate his position at
%'.WI,#., "efore he coud take any offensive action. 2en. ."rar then few to '& 1
%orps and firmed up his pans.
(n 1=
th
$ep, %apt ,I.II, whie fying over I.+.)W.1, noticed some movement of
enemy tanks and infantry towards I.+.)W.1. 'e duy reported this. 6 .rmd #iv
reacted "y ordering 1@4P5 9rigade to occupy I.+.)W.1 and if aready occupied "y
enemy, to re-capture it. @ ++ supported "y . $:n of == %.O, were tasked for it. It was
secured "y D1DD hours 1A
th
$ept.
!he news at I.+.)W.1 was very confusing on 1=
th
and 1A
th
$ep. ironicay they are
sti confusing ti to Sday. !here are so many different and contradictory accounts of the
situation recorded in the war diaries of the different units. It is the account of the .rmy
.viators, of the picture, as they perceived and saw deveop, which is "eing recorded.
!here may "e some gaps, some wrong assessments and deductions drawn and possi"y
$ome mistakes made in the reporting of the actua information. 9ut far main events that
stand out from the memories of .rmy .viators are chroniced. (n 1=
th
$ep .rmy .viator
noticed en movement towards I.+.)W.1 and the info was passed to 6 .rmd #iv. !hey
reacted and I.+.)W.1 was occupied night 1=
th
G1A
th
$ep. (n the morning of 1A
th
$ep
the en attacked I.+.)W.1 $ector. !he main attack came at I.+.)W.1. . $:uadron
5?
of A= !#< 4$'E)3., !anks5 withdrew from that position. !he piot of 1-19 operating
in the area, %apt ,ia;i, was tod on wireess net to give the message to the s:uadron to
immediatey return to I.+.)W.1. In the face of the enemy attack our Infantry positions
were hoding ground and the situation was turning in our favour. !he piot few over the
tanks moving towards #'.3!.1. 'e gestured and kept indicating to them to return to
I.+.)W.1. !here was no response. 'e wrote a message and dropped it. !o !ank
crewsL !hey read the message, "ut sti kept moving towards #'.3!.1. $eeing that a
efforts had faied, the piot anded the ac on the road, in front of the withdrawing tanks. .
)isadar commanded the $:uadron at that time. %apt ,I.II personay eEpained the
position to him and emphaticay persuaded him to return to I.+.)W.1. !he tanks
were thus successfuy sent "ack. !hey ater very effectivey participated against the
enemy attack at I.+.)W.1 $ector and repused this attack. It was a known fact, that
the $:n %omd of A= !#<, 3a8 3.$<#, was ater spotted hiding in a sugar cane crop.
'e had changed to civi dress. +or this despica"e performance, 3a8 3.$<# was %ourt
3artiaed. Whatever the controversy of the events and the contradictory news and
"attefied reports, the .rmy .viator did ensure the timey return of the tanks to their
vitay re:uired positions. !he other versions may vary in the war diaries of different
units, "ut the roe of .rmy .viator anding in the fieds and sending the tanks "ack to
I.+.)W.1 remained undisputed.
With the faing "ack of 11 %.O and 9++ and oosing of ground at 2.#2() and
P'I11.<).', the raiway ine from %'.WI,#.- passing through )./' 9.9.
9'<')E $'.' and 9.#I.,. "ecame the pivot of our defenses for the su"se:uent
operations. !he ine of attack of the I,#I., offensive ceary centered itsef in that
direction. 9ut the enemy .rmoured #iv was not aowed to deveop any momentum of
their attack. !he gaant fight of our own armour on the ground, consisting of 2<I#E$
%.O, 19-1 and =5 %.O, kept the enemy armd coumns engaged in fierce tank to tank
"atte. !hese efforts were fuy supported "y the .eria o"servers, who kept a the enemy
coumns moving in any strength, under the pounding of a the guns avaia"e. Every
time they tried to deveop any maneuver, enemy tanks were idea targets for
concentration of .rty guns. !his thus denied them a opportunities of fuy deveoping a
fu fedged armour maneuver. <nder the intense fire of our guns, en tanks woud disperse
59
and "ury themseves in the mud houses for their camoufage. !he same practice they
woud foow, whenever our .ir +orce pounded them. !his our .ir force was doing very
reguary and effectivey. In this the .%! sets carried in the 1-19, was proving to "e very
hepfu. !he .eria o"servers were most efficienty directing our aircraft on to the enemy
tanks. #espite a the confusion of the intense "atte on the ground, the cose range
engagements of our tanks, in tank to tank "atte, there is not a singe case where our
aircraft attacked any of our own tanks as of mistaken identity. !his does refect the
professionaism of our air force piots. 9ut the .rmy .viators did prove very usefu in
guiding our own piots. !he knowedge of the ground, the eEact ocation of the enemy
armour and the fu famiiarity of our positions greaty heped them in meeting this roe.
Every effort was made "y the .rmy .viators to keep the formations fuy "riefed a"out
a possi"e detais of the deveopment of the "attefied on the ground. )eguary visits
were made to a the fmn '&Fs. .t times some iaison was made even at unit eve,
though the fre:uencies of visits at that eve were not as much as was desira"e, "ut
efforts were made to keep every one informed.
. very significant event happened on 1A
th
$ept. I had sent %apt ,I.II to I.+.)W.1
$ector. !his area came under attack on 1=
th
$ep and it was eEpected that the enemy may
mount another attack in that area. %apt ,I.II was tod to keep a watchfu eye. !he piot
was gone for neary four hours. !he endurance of the aircraft was a"out to finish. !his
was causing a ot of anEiety at .#.3/E strip. $uddeny the 1-19 appeared and
everyone fet very reieved. I was very upset with the piot for having over
$tretched his uck with the endurance of the aircraft. !ruy to his stye, %apt ,I.II, very
innocenty and in his simpistic manner, started descri"ing the detais of the sortie. 'e
eEpained that whie he was fying over I.+.)W.1, he saw no enemy activity in the
area he was "ored. 'e decided to fy ,()!' of our positions at #E2 ,.#I. !he time it
happened, he put was at a"out "etween D?DD-D9DD 'rs. !he sun was in the E.$!.
1ooking at some distance, he was noticing very fashy refections of the rays of the sun.
!his was over a fairy arge area. !his greaty intrigued him and he kept fying in that
direction. 'e crossed the Internationa 9oundary, WE$! of #E2 ,.#I. 2etting nearer
to these refections, he saw a huge concentration of enemy vehices, some @ 3ies WE$!
6D
of $.39.. 'e had a very carefu ook. 'is estimate was some =DDD-ADDD vehices. 'e
further said that whie returning, he had passed this information on the .rty net. !his
graphic and accurate account evoked a very serious attention of a present there. 2auging
the most significant importance of this news, I immediatey few to '& 1 %orps. I
conveyed this information personay to 1t. 2en. 9akhtiar )ana. I further very strongy
suggested to him that he shoud himsef re:uest the .ir '& for an air strike. I iteray
hed his hands so that he shoud personay do so. 'e did this very prompty. !he .ir '&
was very reuctant to accept the authenticity of the news. <nder insistence from the %orps
%omd, initiay ony = fighter reconnaissance air craft were sent. .rriving overhead, they
confirmed this news. (n the air they re:uested for a avaia"e ac to "e sent for strike in
this area. !he target was very ucrative and needed immediate attention. !he whoe
afternoon of 1A
th
$ep, our air force kept pounding them with a weapons avaia"e,
incuding the ,apam "om"s.
It was generay known towards the ate evening of 1A
th
$ep, that our air force had taken a
very heavy to of the en concentrations in their ocations WE$! of $.39.. !he fu
impications of action came to "e known ony a few days ater, when some prisoners were
captured from the area of %'.WI,#.. !hey identified themseves as part of en 1@ #iv.
!he description given "y them of the attack of our .ir +orce, on their concentration area
near $.39., on the afternoon of 1A
th
$ep, was very graphic and teing. !hey narrated
in detai the eEtent of destruction caused to them "y our .ir force. It appeared that this
Important re-enforcement of the enemy 1@ #iv, ceased to effectivey eEist as a formation.
In a the operations after 1A
th
$ep, this formation saw ony a piece mea empoyment.
!hey never had any independent or any vitay important roe assigned to them. !he state
of their morae was very ow. !he pounding that they had received had eft them da;ed.
I,#I., 1@ I,+ #iv was so decimated that they ceased to eEist as a fighting formation.
!hese detais provided the missing cue of the HI2 $.W pu;;e in the operationa orders
recovered earier from a destroyed tank.
!he en operationa orders captured from the tank of 16 %.O in the evening of ? $ep,
gave fu detais of the concentration of forces and their pan of attack in this vita
$I.1/(! $ector. !he attack on ?
th
$ep was ed "y 16 %.O with 1> 1ancers on its 1E+!
61
fank and these units were part of enemy 1 .rmed #iv. !he other enemy formations in
support in this area were 6 3tn #iv, =6 I,+ #iv and 1@ I,+ #iv. !he o"8ective given to
1@ I,+ #iv was 6If in position wi capture I.+.W.1 "y ? $ep and there after advance
to %'.WI,#. to take over from 1 .rmd #iv.7 !his formation did not take part in the
operation on ?
th
$ep. Even su"se:uenty, the operationa order of en 1 .rmd 9de ((
,oA, captured ater, does not mention their 1@ I,+ #iv .,J 6%7. !he prisoners
"eonging to this formation and who were captured ater around 1>
th
G1?
th
$ep, in the
%'.WI,#. $ector, competed this missing cue of the HI2$.W pu;;e-i.e. what
happened to the en 1@ Inf #iv. It was eEpained that the enemy re-enforcing 1@ I,+ #iv,
arrived in $.39. area ate. 1ater on 1A
th
$ep, whie sti in their conc. area, they were
spotted and very "ady maued "y our .ir +orce. !hey ceased to eEist as a proper fighting
formation after that.
+rom the captured en 1.rmd 9de (( ,D A, which was signed on 1A
th
$ep at 1A15 'rs, it
is cear that the main I,#I., .)3# #IO attack was panned to "e aunched sometimes
on or after 1@
th
$ep. Events on the ground confirm the same. It is cear that the attack did
not proceed as panned. !he fierce tank "atte started from 15
th
$ep. onwards. !he cimaE
was 16
th
$ep. +rom the air, the .rmy .viators, operating in the area from #awn to #usk,
had a very cear "irdFs eye view of the "attefied. !his was a "eing reported
Oery professionay to a '&Fs. !he enemy armed formations were not aowed to
deveop the momentum of their attack. ,o dou"t, our own tanks had payed the main
roe. !he heroic and "od fight put up "y our own tank crews, was "unting a very
determined attack of the enemy. !his epoch "atte was very a"y assisted "y the .rmy
.viators. !he effective concentration of a avaia"e guns, on the attacking enemy
armour coumns, was "oth pinching and hurting to them. !his couped with the accurate
and effective direction of our own air force, through the .%! sets in the aircraft, did
highight the hum"e contri"ution that the un-armed 1-19 aircraft were making. +rom the
eary morning of 16
th
$ep, the 1-19 aircraft were o"serving ceary the three main enemy
coumns of attack. (ne coumn was directed towards %'.WI,#., the centre coumn
was making its thrust "etween %'.WI,#. and )./' 9.9. 9'<')E $'.' and
the third enemy coumn was directing its attack WE$! of the )./' towards
9.#I.,.. .rmy .viators kept reguary informing the detais of this operation to the
6=
reevant formations. I personay kept the area under o"servation since first ight. I
estimated the strength of enemy aong each aEis as one armoured regiment. #uring the
visits to 15 #iv and 6 .rmd #iv '&, this appreciation of the direction and the strength of
the enemy attack were ceary and specificay conveyed "y me to the 2(%Fs 15 #IO and
6 .rmd #iv. In my opinion, I had estimated this as a fu fedged enemy .rmoured #iv
attack. 1ater it proved to "e propheticay correct. !he seriousness of this main
determined enemy ma8or offensive was vividy emphasi;ed. (n the ground too, as the
pressure of the main enemy armoured thrust "egan to "uid, it was fuy reai;ed that this
was the most critica moment of the "atte in this sector.
In the evening of 16
th
$ep, I went to '& 1 %orps. Whie I was "riefing %omd 1 %orps, 1t.
2en. )ana and 3a8. 2en. *akoo", who had earier arrived there as #eputy %orps %omd,
on the detais of this main enemy attack, a :uarry was raised. I was asked as to what
troops we had on the ground specificay opposing against each of these coumns. I was
totay shockedL !he "atte had raged in the area since ? $ep and even now on the day of
16 $ep, they hardy had any cue of the disposition of own troops. It was most annoying
and irritating to reai;e that %ops '&, ti now had no effective communication
1inks with its formation. 1eave aone that, it was aso cear, that there was no system of
coation of 9attefied Inteigence, its reevant assessment and finay "uiding a picture
of the "attefied, with a view to make there own pans at the eves of %orps '&. I had
not eEpected anything "etter from 1ient 2enera 9akhtiar )ana, "ut I "eieved that 3a8or
2enera *aku" had much "etter professiona acumen. 'e was an armour officer, was ti
recenty the commandant at the %ommand and $taff %oege, &uetta had seen "atte in
.frica in the Word War II and was considered a very good professiona officer. It ater
proved, his competence was of rather theoretic nature and not given to practica
appication. I was totay disappointed in him. It was eEpained "y me that =5 %.O was at
%'.WI,#., 2<I#E$ %.O was "etween %'.WI,#. and )./' 9.9. 9'<')E
$'.' and 19 1 was in the area of 9.#I.,.. (n hearing this, 3a8. 2en. *.&((9
very confidenty and re-assuringy remarked that if there is a regt of ours against a regt of
the enemy, there woud "e no "reak through. $haring this reaistic and reasona"e
appraisa of the situation, as it o"tained on the evening of 16
th
$ep, I did in:uired if we
had any pans of our own. I was very emphaticay tod, that yes our counter offensive
6A
pans are "eing prepared. %o. +.)3., .1I, 4who ater "ecame 3a8. 2en5, was acting
as 2(1 2$ and he was handing this task.
(n the morning of 1>
th
$ep, 1-19 aircraft fying in the area, coud ceary o"serve, that
the heat of the intense "atte that had raged and deveoped throughout the 16
th
$ep, had
died down very considera"y. I visited '& 6 .rmd #iv on the eary morning of 1>
th
$ep. I
met with 2(%, 3a8. 2en. ."rar, as per the reguar routine. !he feeing of the grimness of
the "atte as it prevaied on 16
th
$ep had changed. !he "eaming faces of the 2(% and the
staff tod it a. !he 2(% was eEpaining that in his opinion the most serious enemy
attack had "een "unted. Enemy had suffered very heavy tank casuaties. (ur own tank
osses were aso high, "ut much ess as compared to the enemy. 2(% 6 .rmd #iv had the
ha"it of monitoring the enemy .rmd #iv wireess net. 'e mentioned that he had heard a
"anket ca on that net. !he ca was 8ust addressing a the tanks, which had survived the
"itter tank action of 16
th
$ep, to withdraw individuay, taking cover in sugar cane crops.
%eary enemy 1 .rmed #iv had ceased to eEist as an +3, and even su" +3,Fs. !he
gravity of the "itter truth had dawned on them 2(% 6 .rmd #iv was e:uay sei;ed with
the situation. 'e started forming up some counter offensive pans in his mind. 'is own
capa"iity was rather imited, as his units were on much depeted tank strengths due to the
proonged "attes. .t this stage, 3a8. 2en. ."raar was firmy of the opinion that he coud
undertake ony imited counter attack pans. 'e fet that any ma8or initiative coud come
ony at the eve of '& 1 %orps.
$eeing the situation I few to '& 1 %orps, a the detais of the accounts as seen "y the
.rmy .viators and the important first hand information and description of the assessment
of 2(% 6 .rmd were conveyed. It was strongy suggested that we shoud at east now
have a counter attacke pan of our own. 9oth the %orps %ommander and the #eputy
%orps %ommander were assertive in stating, that they are working on it. %o 41ater 3a8or
2enera5 )ao +arman .i, who was %o %$ at the %orps '&, was aso present and took
part in the discussion. 'e ater few in a heicopter, with %aptain .i Hawahar the piot, to
have a detaied ook and carry out the re:uired recce and make his own assessment of the
situation.
6@
I few "ack to '& 6 .rmd #iv in the afternoon of 1>
th
$ep. .s I arrived there, 2(% 6
.rmd #iv was very peased to see me. !his he aways was, as he eEpectingy was aways
awaiting for a the atest news of the "attefied. !his time without waiting for any news,
2(% congratuated me. 'e tod him me that the enemy had paid the "est compiment to
the .rmy .viators. 'e said that whie monitoring the I,#I., .rmd #iv net, he 8ust
heard a ca for cose air support. !he targets "eing mentioned specificay for their .ir
+orce were P.!!(, !anks and 1-19 .ircraft. It was very fattering. (ver the ast 1D
days "atte, the enemy was ceary eEpaining its frustrations. !he ethaity of the Patton
tanks was "eing compared with the effectiveness of the support that the 1-19Fs were
providing. !he .rmy .viator had ceary payed a roe. !he accurate and timey
ad8ustments of the artiery fire support "y the .ir (P had made its pinch fet on the
enemy. $o e:uay was the devastating effect of the direction of our aircraft attack
through the air"orne .%! in the 1-19 aircraft. !he pivota roe payed "y .rmy .viation
had "een ceary driven home in the enemy mind.
$ure enough, when the I,#I., .ir +orce came in cose sp, after the re:uest made on the
enemy wireess set, they came targeting the 1-19 .ircraft. %apt ,ia;iFs aircraft was hit.
'is rudder contro was damaged. !he aieron too was hit and it was ony partiay
functiona. I was aso in the air at that time, when I heard this account of the attack and
damage on the wireess, I tod %apt ,I.II to proceed to $I.1/(! strip and and there. I
too foowed him there. !he aircraft crash anded at the od poo ground. It was "ady
damaged. 9ut the piot %apt ,I.II and the rear o"server, %apt .khtar 3ahmud,
manning the .%!, were "oth safe.
!he storm that had gathered since 6 $ep, with the aunching of the Indian attack on
Pakistan, had peaked itsef and attained its maEimum intensity on 15
th
and 16
th
$ep. !his
was weathered so "ravey on the ground. 9arring a few fiascoFs at H.$$.) 9r, the in ine
reief of =@ 9de 2p at P'I11.<).' "y 11 %.O and 9 ++ during night 1DthG11
th
$ep,
the drama and confusion at I.+.)W.1, the performance of the units was most
admira"e. It was an overa team effort. !he tanks, the infantry and the guns had a
payed their part with utmost devotion, fierceessy and utmost "ravery. In this the .rmy
.viation had fuy "ended itsef and payed their part e:uay we. Informed 8udgment
65
and the crucia events a "ear testimony to this. !he main o"servation that was made was
that so far we ony kept reacting to the enemy moves and his attack pan. We met a
thrusts and advance of the enemy frontay. !he "irdFs eye view of the "attefied that the
.rmy .viators had, ceary and strongy suggested that it was time that we pan our own
initiative. !hese views were strongy suggested "y the .rmy .viators, during a visits
and meeting at different head:uarters. 15 #iv and 6 .rmd #iv had remained em"roied in
an intense "atte with the striking enemy formations. !hey had itte capa"iity at their
eves for any ma8or initiative. !his had to come at the eve of the %orps '&.
!his description of the situation as it permeated ti the morning of 1>
th
$ep, is very
important and critica. (n this day not ony the storm had totay died out, "ut a very grim
situation "egan to deveop for the enemy forces that had made the penetration. Enemy
had massed A Infantry #ivisions, namey 6 3tn #iv, =6 #iv and 1@ #iv and 1 .rmd #iv
pus. !hey secured the firm "ase and aunched their attack on ?
th
$ep. 9y the morning of
1>
th
$ep, they coud ony make a sma and modest "udge. !he maEimum penetration
made was when 9<!<) #(2)., #I was captured "y the eading tanks of 1> '()$E.
!he fu weight of this momentum of a these formations put together, gained a depth of
1D-1= 3ies ony. !his was "unted and petered out "y the evening of 16
th
$ep. .t this
stage frantic cas were "eing made "y the Indian 'igh %ommand, to 1t %o !ara par, %o
1> ancers, urging him fanaticay to press home his attack. 'e was tod that 3ahavir
%hakra wi "e on his feet, if he coud capture 3ie $tone A. !he tank of %( 1> '()$E
was eading the attack. 'e certainy was very "od and was fiercey eading the main
offensive. 'e e:uay was matched, as was apty descri"ed ater, "y men of stee. 'ead on
he was met. 'is tank was destroyed and 1t. %o !.).P<) was kied there. 9ut the
main thing is that, the storm that was gathering had "een effectivey and totay "ocked
and "unted very cose to its o"8ective. 'e did get 3ahavir %hakra, "ut it was a
posthumous award. 3any units were caiming the credit for destroying his tank. 9ut it
was never cear who actuay destroy the tank.=5%av, A++ and 1
st
a kept caiming the
credit.
66
!he hori;ons had "egun to cear from 1>
th
$ep onwards. !he enemy made some sma and
desperate imited attacks. !he most significant event was that the %(% 6 .rmd #iv 2en
."rar gave his orders on the night of 1>
th
$ept, for a imited offensive on 1?
th
$ep. !he
area up to HE$$()., was ceared. Indians again aunched their fina desperate attack on
the night of 19 $ept. It was "asicay an Infantry attack. It was totay maued. !he neEt
morning saw hundreds of dead "odies ittering the pace. 3any were captured. .
transformation from a purey defensive posture to a imited counter attack had taken
pace in the panning of 6 .rmd #iv. !he "attefied picture provided "y the .rmy
.viation and the assessment so made did greaty hep in this deveopment. !he critica
eve of %ommand which coud take a "oder and decisive action was '& 1 %orp. . re-
grouping was made. $ome units of 1 .rmd #iv, which had arrived earier from /'E3
/.)., sector were made part of a .rmd #iv and, were re-enforced with some
fmnFsGunits aready in the area of P.$)<) and %'.WI,#.. 3a8. 2en. *a:u" was
made the #iv %omd. $ome operationa pans were chaked out. .gain the advice of .rmy
.viation was an important in put in these pans. Whie the enemy had made a sma
"udge up to %'.WI,#., we were hoding a firm "ase at I.+.)W.1. !his had
)endered the enemy 1E+! fank very vunera"e to any attack from the direction of #E2
,.#I, in particuar near I.+.)W.1. .rmy .viators whie fying were ceary viewing
this typica sand mode description and fuy pro8ecting this in a the routine and utra
routine visits to '& 1 %orps. !he enemy was desperatey trying to disengage and
eEtricate its remnants of the armoured +3,FsGunits from this area. It was "eing ceary
emphasi;ed "y the .rmy .viators that the time to counter attack was now. .ny deay and
time wasted wi ena"e the enemy to eEtricate himsef and re-group. !his was the advice
and the message. %o. +arman .i, %o 2$ 1 %orps, made severa pans. !he pan that
was formay formuated and reduced to writing is "eing attached as .,J6 7. %o
+.)3., .1I did get an aeria view of the area and finai;ed the o"8ectives and the ine
of direction of this attack with the "enefit of this aeria view. Why it was never eEecuted
was a mystery.
9rig. I... /'., 4)etd.5, in his "ook 6 !he Way It W.$ 7, some years ater and through
hindsight, writes in his "ook 6 1 %orps now with 1 .rmoured #ivision, ess 5 .rmoured
9rigade, under its command, panned to recapture P'I11.<).', %'(9.). and
6>
3.'.).H/E. ,o pan to cut the P.!'.,/(!-$.39.-Hammu road "y advancing
,()!' from I.+.)W.1 was made, which woud have the same effect as capture of
./',<)7. Was not this "eing advocated "y the .rmy .viators and "eing emphasi;ed
with a its conviction, su"se:uent to the events of 1>
th
$eptem"er and "eyondL . cease
fire came on =A
rd
$eptem"er, "ut our pan of counter offensive was not eEecuted. ,o one
has eEpained any reasons for this. (ne has heard some muffed eEcuses. $hortage of
ammunition "eing one of those. ,one of the unit %ommanders in the area ever suggested
so. .s suggested in the earier description, was it due to some serious faiings of the
:uaities of head and heart at some critica eves of %ommandL (r was there any other
compeing circumstancesM .t east no one in the fied of operations was aware of it.
Whie the .rmy .viation was fuy integrated with the operations of 1= #iv, > #iv, 15
#iv, 6 .rmed #iv and '& 1 %orps it is unfortunate, that though some .rmy .viation
effort was provided to 1ahore and /asur $ector and the main strike force 1 .rmed #iv,
"ut it never got fuy integrated. It is not understood and there is no pausi"e
EEpanation, that when you pan to aunch a ma8or offensive in /hem /haran, you do not
ensure that it had the services of .ir"orne Eyes, to fuy keep them informed of the rea
time "attefied information. E:uay important was the factor, that when %ommand and
%ontro "ecame difficut through ground channes, why was not the heicopter utii;ed to
effect the necessary inks, co-ordination and "ring a"out cohesion of command. In the
panning, when > #iv and 1 .rmed #iv, were to "e aunched as the main strike forceK to
ensure the success of thrust, "ring a"out co-ordination in command and through that
retain the momentum of attack, my $:uadron was affiiated to this force. We remained
depoyed in 3ayGHune at 9aoki and waited in the wings, for the force to "e aunched
Why this strike force was spit with the move of '& > #iv to %'.39 area, Why the
aunching of the 1 .rmed #iv, which was the main thrust, undertaken through vague and
am"iguous arrangements aong with 11 #iv, ocated in /asur areaM !hese remain a
mysteryK 1ieut 2enera .taf &adir, 2(% > #iv, had done a the panning for this and
some other options. Why was he posted to %E,!(, against his wiM In fact, when the
war was imminent he rushed "ack from .,/.). without any authority or instructions
and peaded at 2'& for the command of > #iv. !his again was refusedL It does not end
at that earier, 3a8or 2enera *ahya /han, had made a the preparations for the defense
6?
of the $iakot area. 'e had done the recee of the whoe area on foot, made a detaied
appreciation of different contingencies and had made a pans for the dispositions of his
own troops and conceived a possi"e reactions and contingencies to meet any enemy
threat. 'e was moved from 15 #iv to take over > #iv. 'e was repaced "y a most
incompetent and i-suited 2.(.%. 9rig Ismai. !he 8oke a"out him was, that at an
eEercise, when he was to give his pan, in his fowery Engish, he said 6!hat when my
formation assumes offensive and em"arks on our thrust at fu throtte, no one shoud stop
me7. 'e was tod very "unty. 6It depends as to in which direction you are moving7.
'e was a stray maverick as a sodier. !he :uestion that arises is as to why he was
inficted as 2.(.%. 15 #iv. E:uay reated are the :uestions of 3a8 2en *ahya /han
moving over to take over > #iv, 1t 2en .taf &adir "eing shunted to %E,!( at this
critica stage, the pacing of '& > #iv in the area of %'.39 and reieving of 3a8 2en
.khtar 3aik from the command of 1= (ps in %'.39 on = $eptem"er 1965. !here are
,o cear answerFs provided to a these :uestions. (ne did not privies any catastrophic
conse:uences emanating from these decisions at that time, "ut the a"ye that we had to
pay coud have "een reasona"y foreseen. In hindsight, a these foies ceary stood
facing us on our face. .s far as the moving over of 3a8 2en *ahya /han to > #iv and
then his taking over the command of %'.39 operations on = $eptem"er 1965, the ony
o"8ective reasons coud "e that he was "eing groomed as the neEt %-I,-%. !his can "e
deduced from a the events eading up to it. 9ut at what priceL
!he most mor"id decisions were, as to how 1t 2en 9akhtiar )an, was given the
command of the ony %orps that we had. 3a8or 2enera ,asir, an Infantry (fficer, was
given the command of the most important 1 .rmed #iv and the hosts of other
:uestiona"e appointments at other eves of command. !he miff that these attracted, had
ceary surfaced in the minds of a we meaning and sincere officerFs. I can ceary
reca the voices of strong, dissent raised "y 1t 2en .taf &adir and many others, even
"efore the war. 9ut the events of 1965 war, ceary "rought out the sins and the a"sonant
nature of these decisions. !he change of command on = $ept, 1965, "rought in its wake
the unpardona"e deay in the capture of ./',<). .t the outset of the war, the higher
command of the .rmy was fuy cogni;ant of the stupidity and the irrationaity of a
these key appointments that they had made. 'urriedy they strived to address and correct
69
these wifu "unders. !hey appoint 3a8 2en 3. *aku" as #eputy %orps %ommander,
2.(.%. 15 #ivK 9rig Ismai is repaced "y 3a8or 2en !ikka /han, 9rig )ia;-u-/arim,
was desperatey dispatched as #eputy #iv %ommander, 6 .rmed #iv. 'e was hurriedy
repaced "y 9rig. Effandi after the fiasco of 11 $ept. 65. Even he was sent packing atter
on. *et these worked ony partiay. 3a8 2en !ikka /han sta"ii;ed the $iakot $ector.
1uckiy, 3a8 2en ."rar stood on his own feet, rather than the crutches provided "y the
appointment of #eputy #iv %ommanderK "ut yet he was handicapped in his handing of
the armoured formations. !he disasterFs at the eve of '& 1 %orps and 1 .rmed #iv sti
prevaied these changed the history of the War.
What were the reasons and the motivating factor for these key decisionsM !hese were
none other than the "aser desire of perpetuating their own rue and command. !hey
needed men with such :uaities of head and heart, who coud ensure that. Why no
)efection or even o"trusivey mention of these, in the #iaries of .yu" /han, and many
other accounts written is madeM #id they a have seective memoriesM 2ohar .yu" is
"usy portraying with effusion, the skifu manipuations and orchestrated presentations,
the iustrious "ackground of his grand parents and the achievements of his father +ied
3arsha .yu" /han. Why does he not throw ight on the damages caused "y a his
am"itions deeds, his demeaning acts and omissions and his penchant for sef gorification
and perpetuationM !he ist is ong. I wi iustrate and draw a synopsis ater. 9ut right
now, I want to "ring out his own conduct and "ehavior. .s a reservist, he was recaed to
8oin the .rmy. 'is unit was depoyed to defend the "orders of Pakistan. 'e shoud have
shown the wi and resove to 8oin his comrades in .rms, ike many other did. 9ut he
preferred to sit in the ap of his father, in the comfort of the PresidentFs 'ouse, rather than
take his pace in the "attefied. 'e now caims great pride and honor in his service and
association with the .rmy. I do not think the .rmy can share these thoughts. It was not
an act and conduct of an honora"e officer. )ather it was a "etraya of the trust that .rmy
had paced in him.
!o finay concude the events of the 1965 War, one may summari;e the command
structure that 2enera .yu" had given to this .rmy, was nothing short of treachery. !he
2eneraship was hardy visi"e in the "attefied. !he main redeeming aspect was the
>D
spirit, resove, grit and determination of the 1t %oFs and "eow. !hey proved to "e the
"ack"one. ,ot ony that they "unted the attack of the Indian forces, "ut they aso
decimated and destroyed them to a eve that we coud and shoud have pursued the fina
act of concuding their defeat, at east in the $iakot $ector. We have "een hearing many
eEpanations and carifications for not aunching our %ounter .ttack pan at
%'.WI,#., "etween 1> $ept. and =A $ept. when the ceasefire came. .ir 3arsha ,ur
/han mentioned ony a few years ago, that 2enera 3usa had "riefed them that it was
due to acute shortages of ammunition. !his he said at the house of .ir %hief 3arsha
Iufikar. I had even there and then tod him that it was not true as far as my knowedge,
assessment and opinion was concerned I ater had it checked up "y many other sources.
3a8 2en +arman .i categoricay tod me that there were no shortages of ammunition.
3any other, who were in the area, aso confirmed. !he account of 6 .rmed #iv, "y 3a8
2en ."rar, in his dispatches in the form of the "ook, 63en of $tee7, aso makes no
mention of any such shortages. In fact he ceary descri"es a preparations and readiness
for aunching it. 'e e:uay was disappointed and de8ected as it was caed off. !he
reasons given "y 1t 2en 2u 'assan in his "ook 63emoirs7 mentioned the fatigue factor
of the eements of 1 .rmed #iv, who had arrived in the area from /'E3 /'.).,
$ector on the 16 $ept. In my meetings hed at %orps '& on most reguar "asis, 3a8 2en
*aku" kept repeating, 6I am doing the detaied panning for it, as I do not want another
/'E3 /.)., fiasco.7 When reminded that the area and the terrain were fuy famiiar
and known to own troops, his reaction woud sti "e of cautious approach. I even
repeatedy kept teing him,7 !hat you shoud come in the heicopter with me and we fy
over the whae area. !his wi give a cear "irdFs eyes view of the area of operation. *ou
can then make your hypothesis, draw your pans and determine your ikey ines of our
own thrusts and o"8ectives.7 'is mute response was that, 6*ou have given a cear picture
of the situation o"taining on the ground and that there is no need for me to carry out any
aeria recee7 %o +arman .i, had made siE different operationa pans. (ne of those was
seected and refined as (peration 6WI,# <P7. 'e tod me, that he has a copy, and that
he wi give it to me. 'e died a few years ago, and I coud not ay my hands on that. 9ut
why was this caed off, no one has given any cear reasonsM !o my mind it was a due
to the ineptness and temerity of command, at %orps '&Fs and at '& 1 .rmed #iv, whose
command had "een given to 3a8 2en *aku", for this vita task.
>1
I have endeavored to descri"e the operation, most particuary in %'.39
and $I.1/(! sector, the way I saw and perceived it from the air, the
thoughts and views that I shared with the commanders in the area and most
importanty an attempt is made to capture the spirit of the troops and the
8unior eadership on the ground, It is essentiay to epitomi;e where the
credit is due and to "ring out serious mistakes made, "oth wifu and
unwittingy.
I personay commanded the .rmy .viation effort in "oth the areas. It was
my passionate invovement as an aviator, to tie in our hum"e efforts towards
making the operations a success. It was in the prover"ia roe of unarmed
into "atte, that we payed our part. !he "oys gave their "est, 'ow far they
succeeded in earning their "attefied spurs, and I cannot stand in 8udgmentL
We served under 1= #iv, > #iv, 15 #iv, and 6 .rmed #iv and with '& 1
%orps. . had nothing "ut praise for the gaant roe payed "y the .rmy
.viators. I was asked to initiate any citations for gaantry awards. !his was
emphaticay re-enforced with the remarks, that they woud 8ust "indy sign
it and forward it to 2'&. !hese remarks were "eing made "y them in a
sincerity and in fu recognition of the roe that the .rmy T.viation had
payed in "oth the sectors. !wo citations for the award of $H were initiated
from > #iv. 3y name was forwarded for immediate award of $H on @ $ept. I
inaited citation for the award of $H for %apt. /haid $aeed for his "rave act
of @ $eptem"er, when he neutrai;ed the Indian gun position and 3a8. 2en,
*ahya endorsed it fuy. !he awards granted were !&. and Imtia;i $anad.
Perhaps, it was reated to the intensity of the "attes in the area and its
importance. 3a8 2en *ahya /han, himsef summed it up ade:uatey. 'e
said 6I think I write good Engish. Where was the purport and the intent
ost, I do not know7. I tod him that it did not matter. It is important that
the dedication and the gaantry of the "oys were fuy recogni;ed. 'e then
recounted the story of the award of O.%. to 1ieut 41ater 1ieut 2en5 9hagat
during WW II. *ahya and 9hagat were in the same 9rigade in the .frican
theatre. 9hagatFs name was recommended "y the 9rigade %ommander for
the award of 3% for the mine cearance operations that he had carried out.
$ome times ater, they were a seated in the 9rigade mess and were istening
to the 99%. It was announced that 1ieut 9hagat $ingh had "een awarded
Oictoria %ross for his "rave deeds. *ahya /han narrated, they were a taken
aghast "y the "reaking of these news. Even 9hagat $ingh coud not "eieve
itL It seemed that somewhere aong the ine of reporting, the citation had
achieved a much higher connotation of this act of veour and gaantry.
>=
!hese are the paradoEes of war. It did not matter to us. !he main thing is
that every one was fuy cogni;ant of the contri"ution made "y the .rmy
.viators.
!he most intense "atte was fought in the $iakot $ectorK and in particuar
the area of responsi"iity of 6 .rmed #iv. It is mot gratifying that the .rmy
.viation received the most profound, precise une:uivoca and spontaneous
aduation of a the troops, units and commands that we worked cosey with.
It can "est "e summed up in the description it received in the war dispatches
of 3a8or 2enera ."rar 'ussain, 2(% 6 .rmd #iv. In the "ook 63en of
$tee7, he descri"es, 6,o record of these crucia "attes of 9adiana-
%hawinda, nor indeed of our other action, woud "e compete without
specia mention of the unfaiing support provided to the forward troops "y
our .rtiery, .rmy .viation and the P.+7. !here coud "e no "etter
compiments to the roe of .rmy .viation, than to e:uate it with the ethaity,
efficiency and efficacy of the roe payed "y our airmen and .rtieryL We
are most gratefu for this. It was the "est tri"ute that coud "e paid to us.
!his is ea"orated and further defined, 6!he .rmy .viation piots did
invaua"e work and defied a ha;ards not ony to accuratey direct artiery
fire over terrain where ground o"servation was restricted, "ut aso few
reconnaissance missions constanty and reported enemy movement7. It is
"eieved that a"out >DU of the artiery shoots conducted was taken "y .ir
(P. 3any aircraft returned from their missions with aircraft ridded with
"uets. 1uckiy we had no fata casuaties. It coud ony "e descri"ed as the
"essings of .ah.
!he record goes on to descri"e, 6!he support from the P.+ was unfaiing,
prompt and accurate. ,o praise can "e too much for the courage and the
fighting efficiency of our airmen-"oth P.+ and .rmy7. Invaria"y the
strikes of our .ir +orce were guided "y the .rmy .viators from the .%!
sets in the 1-19 .ircraft. !he accuracy refected the skis of our P.+ Piots,
"ut the guidance to the concerned targets, stands testimony to the knowedge
of the area, the precise information of the ocations of the enemy and the
daring of .rmy .viators who guided them. !here is not a singe instance,
where our own .ir +orce hit any of our troops as mistaken target. ,o
wonder that on 1> $ept, when the enemy was making drastic re:uests for the
.ir $upport, the targets "eing given were Patton !anks and 1-19 .ircraft.
!he friends and foes, "oth were fuy aive to the contri"ution of the
unarmed "end of the sodierGpiot regime.
>A
!he war of 1965 reached its cimaE in the $iakot $ector. It was a period of
continuous "attes from ? $ept, onwards ti the time of cease fire. !he units
fought fiercey, gaanty and with uni:ue dispay of "ravery. !hey knew the
odds faced "y them. !hese deeds got the unstinted and univoca admiration
and aduation of a. !his was fuy resonant in feeings and reminiscent in
the gaantry award "estowed. !he highest decorated units were A++, =5 %av
and 2uides %av. Eight names were sent for the award of $H from each of
these units. A++ recovered 6 $H, +ive of the gaant sodiers of each of these
other unit received $H. . we deserved tri"ute. It is e:uay fattering that
four names of .rmy .viators got recommended for the award of $H and a
four received this award. !he .viators fought aongside with their comrades
on the ground and they got more than their generous share of gaantry
awards. !he contri"ution made was the coective effort of the entire team
of .rmy .viators. It was difficut to singe out any outstanding efforts of any
one individua. $ti the names of %apt 41.!E) 3.H. 2E,.5 'idayat <ah
/han ,ia;i and %apt. /haid $aeed stood out. I was happy that ,ia;i got
$H, "ut fet e:uay sorry that /haid $aeed was ony awarded Imtia;i $anad.

When the ceasefire came, on =A $ept, 1965 I was sitting at the $:uadron strip near
$.39)I.1. In a pensive mood, I was refecting on my thoughts of utter frustration and
despondency, over the events of the ast =A fatefu days of our "attes. What was echoing
in my mind was, as to how the gaant deeds of our men and 8unior eadership up to the
eve of 1t %o, had "een frittered and "artered away "y our higher command. !hese
thoughts I had e:uay, franky and passionatey shared with 3a8 2en *ahya /han. !his
I had done on many a visits that I made to his '&, which was ocated 8ust across the
)iver %hena", from our ocation at $.39)I.1. .s mentioned earier, he had
summed up his persona reactions with the remarks, 6We have faied to give this .rmy
the 2eneraship that it deserved7.
.s I descri"ed earier, 1t %o Iafar, few in from #'.3I.1 and stayed with me the
whoe day. I gave fu vent to me innate feeings. !hese,he had carried and as narrated
earier, these reached the ears of 2enera .yu" /han. !he neEt day, Iafar was caed to
2'& and orders for his compusory retirement were given to him. I few "ack to
#'.3I.1 to take a "reak from our =5 days hectic activities. !o reaE,R we decided to
pay gof in the evening. .s Iafar and mysef stood at the od tee ,o. 5, we saw 2enera
>@
.yu" with his foursome coming aong the fairway of 'oe 6. .s he saw us teeing off, he
stood in the midde of the fairway, caed 3a8or 2enera 3. )afi, his 3iitary $ecretary,
and pointing his fingers towards us, he was giving some instructions to him. (f course,
we coud not hear. Iafar made ony an inteigent guess. 'e said, 6I suppose you wi
aso "e retired "y this evening7. I was reminded of 9rig 2u 'asan and what he had said
earier at 3.!.,,I. 3y feeing was the same 6I care a damn7. !hat it did not happen,
is I "eieEe on account of a message that 3a8 2en 3.*ahya khan gave to 2enera 3usa.
'e tod him,7If you are going to retire such officers, then who is going to fight the war
for you,7
.fter we finished our game, Iafar and mysef sat down to have a cup of tea, on the awns
of the 2of %u". We saw 2enera .yu" and his foursome aso finish their round of gof.
3a8 2enera, 3. )afi, after seeing the President off, came over to our ta"e and sat down
to have a cup of tea with us. 'e was a smies. 'e was "eing very nice to us. In fact he
compimented us for the roe that the .rmy .viation had payed in the war. .s he eft, we
were wondering as to the purpose and the intent of this nice gestureL Perhaps the high
command had some second thoughts on the rash decision of removing Iafar from the
.rmy.
It is in this "ackground that the $:uadron was moved "ack to #'.3I.1 after the cease
fire. . the frustrations had aready pied up. !o compound the matters further, this so
caed gory of 2enera .yu"Fs roe in the country, was waning away. 'is naked
imposition of 3artia 1aw, his "utchery of the democracy through his i perceived and
i-conceived chain of eectora reformsK a with a view to keep himsef in power, were
ceary discerna"e.
Whie competing the history of the roe of the .rmy .viation to suppement or augment
the efforts on the ground, the description of the account itsef shoud end to pass its
8udgment. Was the .ir, .rmour and .rtiery of the ...Fs assisted "y the .rmy .viatorFs
..Fs M .rmy .viation does not want to ay any caims. We as .viators need to do our
own interna evauation. !here is a need to carry out a fresh appraisa and assessment of
>5
the roe that the.rmy .viation can and need to pay. 'aving chartered that, we then need
to harness and gear our efforts to achieve those goas...
!he technoogy has changed a great dea since. +or the .ir +orce carpet "om"ing and its
sheer weight, the daisy cutters, the custer "om"s and the accurate appication of this
massive power uneashed "y these new weapon systems, their ruthess eEecution "y day
and night, have revoutionai;ed its roe. !he rea time "attefied picture, the organic
airpower capa"iity, the "attefied mo"iity and the overa "end of a professiona sodier
and a technocrat of a piot in the .rmy .viator, sti remain the key and the centra roe
for .rmy .viation. 3ay they keep progressing in that direction. !he fag of .rmy
.viation I am sure, wi keep fying high.