[G.R. No. 162994.

September 17, 2004]

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DTAI!"AN#$TG%O &'( $DRO A. TCSON, petitioners, vs. G!A)O
%!!CO" $*I!I$$INS, INC. respondent.
R S O ! U T I O N
TINGA, J.+
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with constitutional overtones, involving the
validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any
competitor company.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated May 1, !""# and
the Resolution dated March !$, !""% of the Court of &ppeals in C&'(.). *+ ,o. $!%#%.[!]
+etitioner +edro &. Tecson -Tecson. was hired by respondent (la/o 0ellcome +hilippines, 1nc. -(la/o. as
medical representative on 2ctober !%, 13, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study
and abide by e/isting company rules4 to disclose to management any e/isting or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co'employees or employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
The 5mployee Code of Conduct of (la/o similarly provides that an employee is e/pected to inform
management of any e/isting or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co'employees or employees
of competing drug companies. 1f management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between
such relationship and the employee6s employment with the company, the management and the employee will
e/plore the possibility of a 7transfer to another department in a non'counterchec8ing position9 or preparation for
employment outside the company after si/ months.
Tecson was initially assigned to mar8et (la/o6s products in the Camarines *ur'Camarines ,orte sales area.
*ubsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with :ettsy, an employee of &stra
+harmaceuticals[#] -&stra., a competitor of (la/o. :ettsy was &stra6s :ranch Coordinator in &lbay. *he
supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared mar8eting strategies
for &stra in that area.
5ven before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his ;istrict Manager regarding the
conflict of interest which his relationship with :ettsy might engender. *till, love prevailed, and Tecson married
:ettsy in *eptember 1<.
1n =anuary 1, Tecson6s superiors informed him that his marriage to :ettsy gave rise to a conflict of
interest. Tecson6s superiors reminded him that he and :ettsy should decide which one of them would resign
from their >obs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he was
performing his >ob well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company. ?e e/plained that &stra, :ettsy6s employer, was planning to merge with
@eneca, another drug company4 and :ettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy pac8age to be offered by
&stra. 0ith :ettsy6s separation from her company, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. &t the
same time, they would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy pac8age from &stra.
1n &ugust 1, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. 1n *eptember 1, Tecson
applied for a transfer in (la/o6s mil8 division, thin8ing that since &stra did not have a mil8 division, the
potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. ?is application was denied in view of (la/o6s 7least'
movement'possible9 policy.
1n ,ovember 1, (la/o transferred Tecson to the :utuan City'*urigao City'&gusan del *ur sales
area. Tecson as8ed (la/o to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.
Tecson sought (la/o6s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to (la/o6s (rievance
Committee. (la/o, however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until Aebruary B, !""" to comply
with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the
Camarines *ur'Camarines ,orte sales area.
;uring the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but was not issued samples
of products which were competing with similar products manufactured by &stra. ?e was also not included in
product conferences regarding such products.
:ecause the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter
for voluntary arbitration. (la/o offered Tecson a separation pay of one'half -C. month pay for every year of
service, or a total of +3","""."" but he declined the offer. 2n ,ovember 13, !""", the ,ational Conciliation and
Mediation :oard -,CM:. rendered its Decisiondeclaring as valid (la/o6s policy on relationships between its
employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming (la/o6s right to transfer Tecson to
another sales territory.
&ggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of &ppeals assailing the ,CM: Decision.
2n May 1, !""#, the Court of &ppeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on the
ground that the ,CM: did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate court held that (la/o6s policy
prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid
e/ercise of its management prerogatives.[%]
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court6s Decision, but the motion was denied by
the appellate court in its Resolution dated March !$, !""%.[3]
+etitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that -i. the Court of &ppeals erred in affirming the
,CM:6s finding that the (la/o6s policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an employee of a competitor
company is valid4 and -ii. the Court of &ppeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred to a new sales territory, and deprived of the opportunity to attend products
seminars and training sessions.[$]
+etitioners contend that (la/o6s policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among employees
on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees6 right to marry.[B]
They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by the following circumstancesD -1. he
was transferred from the Camarines *ur'Camarines ,orte sales area to the :utuan'*urigao'&gusan sales area,
-!. he suffered a diminution in pay, -#. he was e/cluded from attending seminars and training sessions for
medical representatives, and -%. he was prohibited from promoting respondent6s products which were competing
with &stra6s products.[<]
1n its Comment on the petition, (la/o argues that the company policy prohibiting its employees from
having a relationship with andEor marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid e/ercise of its
management prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection clause4 and that Tecson6s reassignment from
the Camarines ,orte'Camarines *ur sales area to the :utuan City'*urigao City and &gusan del *ur sales area
does not amount to constructive dismissal.[]
(la/o insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of pharmaceutical products, it has a
genuine interest in ensuring that its employees avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict with
their responsibilities to the company. Thus, it e/pects its employees to avoid having personal or family interests
in any competitor company which may influence their actions and decisions and consequently deprive (la/o of
legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its
secrets, procedures and policies.[1"]
1t li8ewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes e/isting or future
relationships with employees of competitor companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal protection
clause. 1t maintains that considering the nature of its business, the prohibition is based on valid grounds.[11]
&ccording to (la/o, Tecson6s marriage to :ettsy, an employee of &stra, posed a real and potential conflict
of interest. &stra6s products were in direct competition with $BF of the products sold by (la/o. ?ence, (la/o6s
enforcement of the foregoing policy in Tecson6s case was a valid e/ercise of its management prerogatives.[1!] 1n
any case, Tecson was given several months to remedy the situation, and was even encouraged not to resign but to
as8 his wife to resign from &stra instead.[1#]
(la/o also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy because when he
signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein. 1n said contract, he also
agreed to resign from respondent if the management finds that his relationship with an employee of a competitor
company would be detrimental to the interests of (la/o.[1%]
(la/o li8ewise insists that Tecson6s reassignment to another sales area and his e/clusion from seminars
regarding respondent6s new products did not amount to constructive dismissal.
1t claims that in view of Tecson6s refusal to resign, he was relocated from the Camarines *ur'Camarines
,orte sales area to the and &gusan del *ur sales area. (la/o asserts that in effecting the reassignment, it also
considered the welfare of Tecson6s family. *ince Tecson6s hometown was in &gusan del *ur and his wife traces
her roots to , (la/o assumed that his transfer from the :icol region to the sales area would be favorable to him
and his family as he would be relocating to a familiar territory and minimiGing his travel e/penses.[13]
1n addition, (la/o avers that Tecson6s e/clusion from the seminar concerning the new anti'asthma drug was
due to the fact that said product was in direct competition with a drug which was soon to be sold by &stra, and
hence, would pose a potential conflict of interest for him. Hastly, the delay in Tecson6s receipt of his sales
paraphernalia was due to the mi/'up created by his refusal to transfer to the sales area -his paraphernalia was
delivered to his new sales area instead of because the supplier thought he already transferred to :utuan..[1$]
The Court is tas8ed to resolve the following issuesD -1. 0hether the Court of &ppeals erred in ruling that
(la/o6s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not
holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution4 -!. 0hether Tecson was
constructively dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The stipulation in Tecson6s contract of employment with (la/o being questioned by petitioners providesD
I
1". Jou agree to disclose to management any e/isting or future relationship you may have, either by
consanguinity or affinity with co'employees or employees of competing drug companies. *hould it pose a
possible conflict of interest in management discretion, you agree to resign voluntarily from the Company as a
matter of Company policy.
I[1B]
The same contract also stipulates that Tecson agrees to abide by the e/isting company rules of (la/o, and to
study and become acquainted with such policies.[1<] 1n this regard, the 5mployee ?andboo8 of (la/o e/pressly
informs its employees of its rules regarding conflict of interestD
1. Conflict of 1nterest
5mployees should avoid any activity, investment relationship, or interest that may run counter to the
responsibilities which they owe (la/o 0ellcome.
*pecifically, this means that employees are e/pectedD
a. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial or otherwise, in any competitor supplier or other
businesses which may consciously or unconsciously influence their actions or decisions and thus deprive
(la/o 0ellcome of legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in (la/o 0ellcome or 8nowledge of Company plans to advance their
outside personal interests, that of their relatives, friends and other businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for income which would impair their effective >ob
performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities or relationships that may lead to conflict of interest.
1.1. 5mployee )elationships
5mployees with e/isting or future relationships either by consanguinity or affinity with co'employees of
competing drug companies are e/pected to disclose such relationship to the Management. 1f management
perceives a conflict or potential conflict of interest, every effort shall be made, together by management and the
employee, to arrive at a solution within si/ -$. months, either by transfer to another department in a non'counter
chec8ing position, or by career preparation toward outside employment after (la/o 0ellcome. 5mployees must
be prepared for possible resignation within si/ -$. months, if no other solution is feasible.[1]
,o reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of &ppeals when it ruled that (la/o6s policy prohibiting an
employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid e/ercise of
management prerogative.
(la/o has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, mar8eting strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and &stra are rival companies in
the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon
(la/o6s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise
the interests of the company. 1n laying down the assailed company policy, (la/o only aims to protect its
interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That (la/o possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. ,o less than the
Constitution recogniGes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to
reasonable returns on investments and to e/pansion and growth.[!"] 1ndeed, while our laws endeavor to give life
to the constitutional policy on social >ustice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute
will be decided in favor of the wor8ers. The law also recogniGes that management has rights which are also
entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.[!1]
&s held in a , K.*.& case,[!!] it is a legitimate business practice to guard business confidentiality and
protect a competitive position by even'handedly disqualifying from >obs male and female applicants or
employees who are married to a competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an employer that discharged an
employee who was married to an employee of an active competitor did not violate Title L11 of the Civil )ights
&ct of 1$%.[!#] The Court pointed out that the policy was applied to men and women equally, and noted that
the employer6s business was highly competitive and that gaining inside information would constitute a
competitive advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as
petitioners erroneously suggest. 1t is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are
addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. [!%] Corollarily, it has been held in a long
array of K.*. *upreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.[!3] The only e/ception occurs when the state[!$] in any of its
manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct.
[!B] 2bviously, however, the e/ception is not present in this case. *ignificantly, the company actually enforced
the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. 1ndeed, the application of the
policy was made in an impartial and even'handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
1n any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handboo8, it is
clear that (la/o does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those
of competitor companies. 1ts employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own
choosing. 0hat the company merely see8s to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationships. &s succinctly e/plained by the appellate court, thusD
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. &n employee of the company remains free to
marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs
only to the individual. ?owever, an employee6s personal decision does not detract the employer from e/ercising
management prerogatives to ensure ma/imum profit and business success. . . [!<]
The Court of &ppeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which forms part of
respondent6s 5mployee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by Tecson,
was made 8nown to him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he
signed his employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with :ettsy. *ince Tecson 8nowingly
and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with (la/o, the stipulations therein have the force of law
between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith.9[!] ?e is therefore estopped from questioning
said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners6 contention that Tecson was constructively dismissed when he was
transferred from the Camarines ,orte'Camarines *ur sales area to the :utuan City'*urigao City'&gusan del *ur
sales area, and when he was e/cluded from attending the company6s seminar on new products which were
directly competing with similar products manufactured by &stra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting,
an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or
unli8ely4 when there is a demotion in ran8 or diminution in pay4 or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.[#"] ,one of these conditions are present in the
instant case. The record does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of
such transfer. &s found by the appellate court, (la/o properly e/ercised its management prerogative in
reassigning Tecson to the sales areaD
. . . 1n this case, petitioner6s transfer to another place of assignment was merely in 8eeping with the policy of the
company in avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus validI,ote that [Tecson6s] wife holds a sensitive
supervisory position as :ranch Coordinator in her employer'company which requires her to wor8 in close
coordination with ;istrict Managers and Medical )epresentatives. ?er duties include monitoring sales of &stra
products, conducting sales drives, establishing and furthering relationship with customers, collection, monitoring
and managing &stra6s inventoryIshe therefore ta8es an active participation in the mar8et war characteriGed as it
is by stiff competition among pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, and this is significant, petitioner6s sales
territory covers Camarines *ur and Camarines ,orte while his wife is supervising a branch of her employer in
&lbay. The pro/imity of their areas of responsibility, all in the same :icol )egion, renders the conflict of
interest not only possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the other6s mar8et strategies in the region
would be inevitable. [Management6s] appreciation of a conflict of interest is therefore not merely illusory and
wanting in factual basisI[#1]
1n Abbott Laboratories -Phils.., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[#!] which involved a
complaint filed by a medical representative against his employer drug company for illegal dismissal for allegedly
terminating his employment when he refused to accept his reassignment to a new area, the Court upheld the right
of the drug company to transfer or reassign its employee in accordance with its operational demands and
requirements. The ruling of the Court therein, quoted hereunder, also finds application in the instant caseD
:y the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical representative is e/pected to travel. ?e
should anticipate reassignment according to the demands of their business. 1t would be a poor drug corporation
which cannot even assign its representatives or detail men to new mar8ets calling for opening or e/pansion or to
areas where the need for pushing its products is great. More so if such reassignments are part of the employment
contract.[##]
&s noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by (la/o impartially and disinterestedly for a
long period of time. 1n the case at bar, the record shows that (la/o gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the
conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with :ettsy. 0hen their relationship was still in its initial
stage, Tecson6s supervisors at (la/o constantly reminded him about its effects on his employment with the
company and on the company6s interests. &fter Tecson married :ettsy, (la/o gave him time to resolve the
conflict by either resigning from the company or as8ing his wife to resign from &stra. (la/o even e/pressed its
desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory performance and suggested that he as8 :ettsy to
resign from her company instead. (la/o li8ewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to resolve the
conflict of interest. 0hen the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting, (la/o was
constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for &stra. ,otably, the
Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home
province, &gusan del *ur, was included. 1n effecting Tecson6s transfer, (la/o even considered the welfare of
Tecson6s family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of (la/o.
[#%]
%*RFOR, the Petition is ;5,15; for lac8 of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDRD.
AustriaMartine! and Calle"o, #r., $$., concur.
Puno %Chairman&, $., in the result.
ChicoNa!ario, $., on leave.
SCOND DI,ISION
STAR $A$R COR$ORATION, G.R. No. 164774
-OS$*IN ONGSITCO .
S/ASTIAN C*UA,
+etitioners, +resentD
+K,2, $., Chairman,
*&,;2L&H'(KT15))5@,
,
&@CK,&, and
'versus' (&)C1&, $$.

+romulgatedD

RONA!DO D. SI"/O!,
%I!FRDA N. CO"IA .
!ORNA . STR!!A,
)espondents.
/ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '/
D C I S I O N
$UNO, J.+
0e are called to decide an issue of first impressionD whether the policy of the employer banning spouses
from wor8ing in the same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Habor
Code or is a valid e/ercise of management prerogative.

&t bar is a +etition for )eview on Certiorari of the ;ecision of the Court of &ppeals dated in C&'(.). *+ ,o.
B#%BB reversing the decision of the ,ational Habor )elations Commission -,H)C. which affirmed the ruling of
the Habor &rbiter.

+etitioner *tar +aper Corporation -the company. is a corporation engaged in trading M principally of paper
products. =osephine 2ngsitco is its Manager of the +ersonnel and &dministration ;epartment while *ebastian
Chua is its Managing ;irector.

The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents )onaldo ;. *imbol -*imbol., 0ilfreda ,. Comia
-Comia. and Horna 5. 5strella -5strella. were all regular employees of the company.[1]

*imbol was employed by the company on . ?e met &lma ;ayrit, also an employee of the company, whom
he married on . +rior to the marriage, 2ngsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of
them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 13,[2] vi!.D
1. ,ew applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case heEshe has [a] relative,
up to [the] #
rd
degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
!. 1n case of two of our employees -both singles [sic], one male and another female.
developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get
married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.[0]
*imbol resigned on pursuant to the company policy.[4]

Comia was hired by the company on . *he met ?oward Comia, a co'employee, whom she married on .
2ngsitco li8ewise reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get
married. Comia resigned on .[1]

5strella was hired on . *he met Huisito @uNiga -@uNiga., also a co'wor8er. +etitioners stated that @uNiga, a
married man, got 5strella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality
but she opted to resign on .[6]

The respondents each signed a )elease and Confirmation &greement. They stated therein that they have no
money and property accountabilities in the company and that they release the latter of any claim or demand of
whatever nature.[7]
)espondents offer a different version of their dismissal. *imbol and Comia allege that they did not resign
voluntarily4 they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. &s to respondent 5strella, she
alleges that she had a relationship with co'wor8er @uNiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated
man. &fter he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with
him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. 2n , she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at
the to recuperate for twenty'one -!1. days. *he returned to wor8 on but she found out that her name was on'
hold at the gate. *he was denied entry. *he was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff
handed her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. *he
refused to sign the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty'one -!1. days and has not been given a
chance to e/plain. The management as8ed her to write an e/planation. ?owever, after submission of the
e/planation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. ;ue to her urgent need for money, she later
submitted a letter of resignation in e/change for her thirteenth month pay.[2]

)espondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and
attorney6s fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes &rticle 1#$ of
the Habor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to their union membership.

2n , Habor &rbiter Melquiades *ol del )osario dismissed the complaint for lac8 of merit, vi!.D
[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent corporation perceived as
management prerogative. This management prerogative is quite broad and encompassing for it
covers hiring, wor8 assignment, wor8ing method, time, place and manner of wor8, tools to be
used, processes to be followed, supervision of wor8ers, wor8ing regulations, transfer of
employees, wor8 supervision, lay'off of wor8ers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of
wor8ers. 5/cept as provided for or limited by special law, an employer is free to regulate,
according to his own discretion and >udgment all the aspects of employment.[9] -Citations
omitted..
2n appeal to the ,H)C, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Habor &rbiter on . [10]
)espondents filed a Motion for )econsideration but was denied by the ,H)C in a )esolution[11] dated .
They appealed to respondent court via +etition for Certiorari.
1n its assailed ;ecision dated , the Court of &ppeals reversed the ,H)C decision, vi!.D
0?5)5A2)5, premises considered, the May #1, !""! -sic.[12] ;ecision of the
,ational Habor )elations Commission is hereby )5L5)*5; and *5T &*1;5 and a new one is
entered as followsD
-1. ;eclaring illegal, the petitioners6 dismissal from employment
and ordering private respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former positions
without loss of seniority rights with full bac8wages from the time of their
dismissal until actual reinstatement4 and
-!. 2rdering private respondents to pay petitioners attorney6s fees
amounting to 1"F of the award and the cost of this suit.[10]
2n appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of &ppeals erred in holding thatD
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[14]

0e affirm.
The 1<B Constitution[11] states our policy towards the protection of labor under the following provisions, vi!.D
&rticle 11, *ection 1<. The *tate affirms labor as a primary social economic force. 1t shall
protect the rights of wor8ers and promote their welfare.
/ / /
&rticle O111, *ec. #. The *tate shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organiGed and unorganiGed, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.

1t shall guarantee the rights of all wor8ers to self'organiGation, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to stri8e in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of wor8, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision'ma8ing processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.
The *tate shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between wor8ers and
employers, recogniGing the right of labor to its >ust share in the fruits of production and the right
of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to e/pansion and growth.
The Civil Code li8ewise protects labor with the following provisionsD
&rt. 1B"". The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are
so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore,
such contracts are sub>ect to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, stri8es and
loc8outs, closed shop, wages, wor8ing conditions, hours of labor and similar sub>ects.
&rt. 1B"!. 1n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The Habor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor. The case at bar involves
&rticle 1#$ of the Habor Code which providesD
&rt. 1#$. 1t shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to
stipulate e/pressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise pre>udice a
woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

)espondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision. +etitioners allege that its policy 7may
appear to be contrary to &rticle 1#$ of the Habor Code9 but it assumes a new meaning if read together with the
first paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the woman employee to resign. The employee spouses have
the right to choose who between them should resign. Aurther, they are free to marry persons other than co'
employees. ?ence, it is not the marital status of the employee, per se, that is being discriminated. 1t is only
intended to carry out its no'employment'for'relatives'within'the'third'degree'policy which is within the ambit of
the prerogatives of management.[16]

1t is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from wor8ing in the same company ta8es
the nature of an anti'nepotism employment policy. Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of
unqualified persons based on their status as a relative, rather than upon their ability.[17] These policies focus
upon the potential employment problems arising from the perception of favoritism e/hibited towards relatives.

0ith more women entering the wor8force, employers are also enacting employment policies specifically
prohibiting spouses from wor8ing for the same company. 0e note that two types of employment policies involve
spousesD policies banning only spouses from wor8ing in the same company 3'o#4po54e emp6o7me't po6898e4:,
and those banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from wor8ing in the same company 3&'t8#
'epot84m emp6o7me't po6898e4:.[12]
Knli8e in our >urisdiction where there is no e/press prohibition on marital discrimination,[19] there are
twenty state statutes[20] in the prohibiting marital discrimination. *ome state courts[21] have been confronted
with the issue of whether no'spouse policies violate their laws prohibiting both marital status and se/
discrimination.

1n challenging the anti'nepotism employment policies in the , complainants utiliGe two theories of
employment discriminationD the (84p&r&te tre&tme't and the(84p&r&te 8mp&9t. Knder the (84p&r&te tre&tme't
&'&67484, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. ,o'spouse
employment policies requiring an employee of a p&rt8956&r 4e; to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially
discriminatory. Aor e/ample, an employment policy prohibiting the employer from hiring wives of male
employees, but not husbands of female employees, is discriminatory on its face.[22]

2n the other hand, to establish (84p&r&te 8mp&9t, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral
policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class. Aor e/ample, although most employment policies do
not e/pressly indicate which spouse will be required to transfer or leave the company, the policy often
disproportionately affects one se/.[20]

The state courts6 rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope of marital status
discrimination within the meaning of their respective civil rights acts. Though they agree that the term 7marital
status9 encompasses discrimination based on a personPs status as either married, single, divorced, or widowed,
they are divided on whether the term has a bro&(er meaning. Thus, their decisions vary.[24]

The courts '&rro<67[21] interpreting marital status to refer only to a personPs status as married, single,
divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader definition it would have either chosen
different language or specified its intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than to
whom one is married. They construe marital status discrimination to include only whether a person is single,
married, divorced, or widowed and not the 7identity, occupation, and place of employment of onePs spouse.9
These courts have upheld the questioned policies and ruled that they did not violate the marital status
discrimination provision of their respective state statutes.

The courts that have bro&(67[26] construed the term 7marital status9 rule that it encompassed the identity,
occupation and employment of onePs spouse. They stri8e down the no'spouse employment policies based on the
broad legislative intent of the state statute. They reason that the no'spouse employment policy violate the marital
status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present employees without regard to
the actual effect on the individualPs qualifications or wor8 performance.[27] These courts also find the no'spouse
employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any evidence of b548'e44 'e9e448t7 other than
the general perception that spouses in the same wor8place might adversely affect the business.[22] They hold
that the absence of such a bo'& =8(e o995p&t8o'&6 >5&68=89&t8o'[29] invalidates a rule denying employment to
one spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the same office.[00] Thus, they rule that unless
the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status
and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an
employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employee6s spouse.[01] This is
8nown as the bo'& =8(e o995p&t8o'&6 >5&68=89&t8o' e;9ept8o'.

0e note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification >ustifies an employer6s no'spouse
rule, the e/ception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these state courts. There must be a compelling business
necessity for which no alternative e/ists other than the discriminatory practice.[02] To >ustify a bona fide
occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factorsD -1. that the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the >ob involved4 and, -!. that there is a factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of
the >ob.[00]

The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our >urisdiction. 0e employ the
standard of re&4o'&b6e'e44 of the company policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification
requirement. 1n the recent case of D5'9&' A44o98&t8o' o= Det&86m&'#$TG%O &'(
$e(ro Te94o' ?. G6&;o %e669ome $@868pp8'e4, I'9.,[04] we passed on the validity of the policy of a
pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company. 0e
held that (la/ohas a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, mar8eting strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors. 0e considered the prohibition against personal or
marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon (la/o6s employees re&4o'&b6e under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of (la/o. 1n laying down the
assailed company policy, we recogniGed that (la/o only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a
competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.[01]
The requirement that a company policy must be re&4o'&b6e under the circumstances to qualify as a valid
e/ercise of management prerogative was also at issue in the 1B case of $@868pp8'e Te6eAr&p@ &'( Te6ep@o'e
Comp&'7 ?. N!RC.[06] 1n said case, the employee was dismissed in violation of petitioner6s policy of
disqualifying from wor8 any woman wor8er who contracts marriage. 0e held that the company policy violates
the right against discrimination afforded all women wor8ers under &rticle 1#$ of the Habor Code, but established
a permissible e/ception, vi!.D
[&] requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be >ustified as a
7bo'& =8(e o995p&t8o'&6 >5&68=89&t8o',9 or :A2Q, where the particular requirements of the >ob
would >ustify the same, but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of
spreading wor8 in the wor8place. & requirement of that nature would be valid provided it
reflects an inherent quality re&4o'&b67 'e9e44&r7 for satisfactory >ob performance.
[07] -'mphases supplied..
The cases of D5'9&' and $T.T instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must be 96e&r67 established
to uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the e/istence of a reasonable
business necessity. The burden was successfully discharged in but not in +TRT.
0e do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
+etitioners6 sole contention that 7the company did not >ust want to have two -!. or more of its employees related
between the third degree by affinity andEor consanguinity9[02] is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to
give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule[09] is evidently not the valid reasonable business
necessity required by the law.
1t is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the >ob, but
were as8ed to resign when they married a co'employee. +etitioners failed to show how the marriage of *imbol,
then a *heeting Machine 2perator, to &lma ;ayrit, then an employee of the )epac8ing *ection, could be
detrimental to its business operations. ,either did petitioners e/plain how this detriment will happen in the case
of 0ilfreda Comia, then a +roduction ?elper in the *electing ;epartment, who married ?oward Comia, then a
helper in the cutter'machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will
be less efficient. 1f we uphold the questioned rule without valid >ustification, the employer can create policies
based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the e/pense of an employee6s right to security of
tenure.
+etitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co'employee, but they are free
to marry persons other than co'employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate &rticle 1#$ of the
Habor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could
pass >udicial scrutiny is a showing that it is re&4o'&b6e despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect.
The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot
pre>udice the employee6s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married
persons wor8ing together in one company.[40]
Hastly, the absence of a statute e/pressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our >urisdiction cannot benefit the
petitioners. The protection given to labor in our >urisdiction is vast and e/tensive that we cannot prudently draw
inferences from the legislature6s silence[41] that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and
declare valid a policy based on a pre>udice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed
proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid e/ercise of management
prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents *imbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become
moot and academic.
&s to respondent 5strella, the Habor &rbiter and the ,H)C based their ruling on the singular fact that her
resignation letter was written in her own handwriting. :oth ruled that her resignation was voluntary and thus
valid. The respondent court failed to categorically rule whether 5strella voluntarily resigned but ordered that she
be reinstated along with *imbol and Comia.
5strella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter because she was in dire need of money. 0e
e/amined the records of the case and find 5strella6scontention to be more in accord with the evidence. 0hile
findings of fact by administrative tribunals li8e the ,H)C are generally given not only respect but, at times,
finality, this rule admits of e/ceptions,[42] as in the case at bar.
5strella avers that she went bac8 to wor8 on but was dismissed due to her alleged immoral conduct. &t first, she
did not want to sign the termination papers but she was forced to tender her resignation letter in e/change for her
thirteenth month pay.
The contention of petitioners that 5strella was pressured to resign because she got impregnated by a married man
and she could not stand being loo8ed upon or tal8ed about as immoral[40] is incredulous. 1f she really wanted to
avoid embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone bac8 to wor8 at all. ,or would she have filed a
suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. 0e have held that in voluntary resignation, the employee
is compelled by personal reason-s. to dissociate himself from employment. 1t is done with the intention of
relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. [44] Thus, it is illogical for 5strella to resign
and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. (iven the lac8 of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that
the resignation was voluntary, 5strella6s dismissal is declared illegal.
IN ,I% %*ROF, the ;ecision of the Court of &ppeals in C&'(.). *+ ,o. B#%BB dated is AFFIR"D.
SO ORDRD.
Rep5b6 8 9 o= t@e
S5preme Co5rt
T*IRD DI,ISION
M2,T5 , (. ). ,2. 13#%BB
1,C. ,
+et i t i oner,
+resent D
J,&)5*'*&,T1&(2, J . ,
Chai rperson,
' ver sus ' &K*T)1&'M&)T1,5@,
C&HH5=2, *). , S
C?1C2',&@&)12, and
,&C?K)&, JJ .
H2H1T& L5H&*C2, +romul gat edD
)espondent . March $, !""B
/'' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' /
D C I S I O N
AUSTRIA#"ARTINB, J. +
:efore t hi s Court i s a +et i t i on for Cert i orari under )ul e %3 see8i ng t o reverse and set asi de
t he ;eci si on[1] dat ed =ul y !#, !""1 of t he Court of &ppeal s -C&. i n C&'(. ). *+
,o. 3$3B1 whi ch affi rmed t he ;eci si on dat ed of t he ,at i onal Habor )el at i ons Commi ssi on
-,H)C.4 and t he C& )esol ut i on[!] dat ed whi ch deni ed t he pet i t i onerP s Mot i on for
)econsi derat i on.
The fact s of t he case, as st at ed by t he C&, are as fol l owsD
Hol i t a M. Lel asco -respondent . st art ed wor8i ng wi t h ;el Mont e -pet i t i oner.
on as a seasonal empl oyee and was regul ari Ged on . ?er l at est assi gnment
was as Ai el d Haborer.
2n , respondent was warned i n wri t i ng due t o her absences. 2n , respondent,
t hru a l et t er, was agai n warned i n wri t i ng by pet i t i oner about her absences
wi t hout permi ssi on and a forfei t ure of her vacat i on l eave ent i t l ement for t he
year 1"'11 was i mposed agai nst her.
2n , anot her warni ng l et t er was sent t o respondent regardi ng her absences
wi t hout permi ssi on duri ng t he year 11'1!. ?er vacat i on ent i t l ement for
t he sai d empl oyment year affect ed was consequent l y forfei t ed.
1n vi ew of t he sai d al l eged absences wi t hout permi ssi on, on , a not i ce of
heari ng was sent t o respondent not i fyi ng her of t he charges fi l ed agai nst her
for vi ol at i ng t he &bsence 0it hout 2ffi ci al Heave rul eD t hat i s for e/cessi ve
absence wi t hout permi ssi on on &ugust 13'1<, !'#1 and . The heari ng was set
on .
)espondent havi ng fai l ed t o appear on heari ng, anot her not i ce of heari ng was
sent t o her reset t i ng t he i nvest i gat i on on . 1t was agai n reset t o .
2n , aft er heari ng, t he pet i t i oner t ermi nat ed t he servi ces of respondent
effect i ve due t o e/cessi ve absences wi t hout permi ssi on.
Aeel i ng aggri eved, respondent fil ed a case for i l l egal di smi ssal agai nst
pet i t i oner assert i ng t hat her di smi ssal was i l l egal because she was on t he
fami l y way sufferi ng from uri nary t ract i nfect i on, a pregnancy'borne, at t he
t i me she commi t t ed t he al l eged absences. *he e/pl ai ned t hat for her absence
from wor8 on &ugust 13, 1$, 1B R 1<, 1% she had sent an appl i cat i on for
l eave t o her supervi sor, +ri ma JbaNeG. Thereaft er, she went t o t he company
hospi t al for chec8'up and was advi sed accordi ngl y t o rest i n quart ers for four
-%. days or on . *t i l l not feel i ng wel l , she fai l ed t o wor8 on and was agai n
advi sed t wo days of rest i n quart ers on . Knabl e t o recover, she went t o see an
out si de doct or, ;r. Mari l yn Casi no, and t he l at t er ordered her t o rest for
anot her fi ve -3. consecut i ve days, or from . *he decl ared she di d not fi l e t he
adequat e l eave of absence because a medi cal cert i fi cat e was al ready suffi ci ent
per company pol i cy. 2n she fai l ed t o report t o wor8 but sent an appl i cat i on
for l eave of absence t o her supervi sor, +ri ma JbaNeG, whi ch was not anymore
accept ed. [#]
2n , t he Habor &rbi t er di smi ssed t he Compl ai nt for l ac8 of meri t . The Habor &rbi t er hel d
t hat t he respondent was an i ncorri gi bl e absent ee4 t hat she fai l ed t o fil e l eaves of absence4
t hat her absences i n 1<$ and 1<B were wit hout permi ssi on4 t hat t he pet i t i oner gave t he
respondent several chances t o reform hersel f4 and t hat t he respondent di d not > ust i fy her
fai l ure t o appear duri ng t he schedul ed heari ngs and fai l ed t o e/pl ai n her absences.
)espondent appeal ed t o t he ,H)C. 2n , t he ,H)C i ssued i ts )esol ut i on,
t he di sposi t i ve port i on of whi ch readsD
0?5)5A2)5, foregoi ng consi dered, t he i nst ant deci si on i s
hereby L&C&T5; and a new one ent er ed decl ari ng t he di smi ssal of
compl ai nant as1HH5(&H. 1n consonance wi t h &rt . !B of t he Habor [Code],
her rei nst at ement wi t h ful l bac8wages from t he dat e of her t ermi nat i on from
empl oyment t o her act ual rei nst at ement i s necessari l y decreed. [%]
The ,H)C hel d t hat , under t he company rul es, t he empl oyee may ma8e a subsequent
> ust i fi cat i on of her absent eei sm, whi ch she was abl e t o do i n t he i nst ant case4 t hat whi l e i t
i s not di sput ed t hat t he respondent i ncurred absences e/ceedi ng si / -$. days wi t hi n one
empl oyment year M a ground for di smi ssal under t he company rul es M t he pet i t i oner act ual l y
admi t t ed t he fact t hat t he respondent had been pregnant , hence, negat i ng pet i t i oner 6s
assert i on t hat t he respondent fai l ed t o gi ve any e/pl anat i on of her absences4 t hat t he records
bear t he admi ssi on of pet i t i oner 6s offi cer of t he recei pt of t he hospi t al record showi ng t he
cause of her absences -7)1Q advi ce9 or 7rest 'i n'quart ers9. for &ugust 1'!", 1% whi ch, i n
t urn, coul d al ready serve as reference i n resol vi ng t he absences on &ugust 13 t o 1<4 t hat t he
pet i t i oner furt her admi t t ed t hat t he respondent was under 7)1Q advi ce9 on *ept ember !'#,
1% and yet i nsi st ed i n i ncl udi ng t hese dat es among respondent 6s 1$ purport ed une/pl ai ned
absences4 t hat i t i s suffi ci ent not i ce for t he pet i t i oner, 7a pl ai n l aborer9 wit h
7unsophi st i cat ed > udgment , 9 t o send word t o her empl oyer t hrough a co'wor8er on &ugust
13 t o 1$, 1% t hat she was frequent l y vomi t i ng4 t hat t he sheer di st ance bet ween
respondent 6s home and her wor8pl ace made i t di ffi cul t t o send formal not i ce4 t hat
respondent even sent her chi l d of t ender age t o i nform her supervi sor about her absence on
*ept ember 3, 1% due t o st omach ache, but her chi l d fai l ed t o approach t he offi cer because
her chi l d fel t ashamed, i f not mort i fi ed4 t hat respondent 6s narrat i on t hat she had t o bear
pai ns duri ng her absences on *ept ember !1 t o !B, 1% i s credi bl e4 t hat she dared not
vent ure t hrough t he roads for fear of forest creat ures or predat ors4 t hat t he pet i t i oner i s
gui l t y of unl awful l y di schargi ng respondent on account of her pregnancy under &rt i cl e
1#B-!. of t he Habor Code4 and, t hat pet i t i oner 6s reference t o t he previ ous absent eei sm of
respondent i s mi spl aced because t he l at t er had al ready been penal i Ged t herefor.
+et i t i oner 6s Mot i on for )econsi derat i on was deni ed on .
The pet i t i oner t hen appeal ed t o t he C&. 2n , t he C& promul gat ed i t s ;eci si on t he
di sposi t i ve port i on of whi ch st at esD
L1505; 1, T?5 H1(?T 2A &HH T?5 A2)5(21,(, t he i nst ant
pet i t i on i s ;1*M1**5;, t he )esol ut i ons, dat ed May !B, 1 and *ept ember
#", 1 of t he ,at i onal Habor )el at i ons Commi ssi on i n ,H)C C& ,o. M'
""#!$'<, are hereby &AA1)M5; i n t ot o.
*2 2);5)5;. [3]
1n affi rmi ng t he ,H)C, t he C& hel d t hat absences due t o a > ust i fi ed cause cannot be a
ground for di smi ssal 4 t hat i t i s undi sput ed t hat t he respondent was pregnant at t he t i me she
i ncurred t he absences i n quest i on4 t hat t he cert i fi cat i on i ssued by a pri vat e doct or dul y
est abl i shed t hi s fact 4 t hat i t was no l ess t han pet i t i oner 6s company doct or who advi sed t he
respondent t o have rest 'i n'quart ers for four days on account of a pregnancy' rel at ed
si c8ness4 t hat i t had been dul y est abl i shed t hat respondent fi l ed l eaves of absence t hough
t he l ast had been refused by t he company supervi sor4 t hat t he di smi ssal of an empl oyee due
t o prol onged absence wi t h l eave by reason of i l l ness dul y est abl i shed by t he present at i on of
a medi cal cert i fi cat e i s not > ust i fi ed4 t hat i t i s undi sput ed t hat respondent 6s si c8ness was
pregnancy'rel at ed4 t hat under &rt i cl e 1#B-!. of t he Habor Code, t he pet i t i oner commi t t ed a
prohi bi t ed act i n di schargi ng a woman on account of her pregnancy.
2n , t he C& deni ed pet i t i oner 6s Mot i on for )econsi derat i on.
?ence, t he i nst ant +et i t i on rai si ng t he fol l owi ng i ssuesD
1 .
T?5 C2K)T 2A &++5&H* *5)12K*HJ 5))5; 1, C2,*1;5)1,(
)5*+2,;5,T6* 5OC5**1L5 &02+s &* =K*T1A15; *1M+HJ 2,
&CC2K,T 2A ?5) +)5(,&,CJ.
11.
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T?&T )5*+2,;5,T6* H&T5*T *T)1,( 2A &:*5,C5* 1,CK))5;
01T?2KT &,J +)12) +5)M1**12,, &,; &* &:2L5 *?20,, 01T?2KT
&,J L&H1; =K*T1A1C&T12,, T&T5, T2(5T?5) 01T? ?5) ;&M&(1,(
&02+ ?1*T2)J, 5*T&:H1*?5; ?5) ()2** &,; ?&:1TK&H ,5(H5CT
2A ;KT15*, & =K*T &,; L&H1; ()2K,; A2) ;1*M1**&H.
111.
T?5 C2K)T 2) &++5&H* *5)12K*HJ 5))5; 1, ?2H;1,( T?&T
)5*+2,;5,T6* ;1*M1**&H 0&* 1, L12H&T12, 2A &)T1CH5 1#B
-+)2?1:1T1,( &, 5M+H2J5) T2 ;1*C?&)(5 &, 5M+H2J55 2,
&CC2K,T 2A ?5) +)5(,&,CJ..
1L.
T?5 C2K)T 2A &++5&H* *5)12K*HJ 5))5; 1, &0&);1,( AKHH
:&CT0&(5* 1, A&L2) 2A )5*+2,;5,T ,2T01T?*T&,;1,(
+5T1T12,5)6* 5L1;5,T (22; A&1T?. [$]

The essent i al quest i on i s whet her t he empl oyment of respondent had been val i dl y
t ermi nat ed on t he ground of e/cessi ve absences wi t hout permi ssi on. Corol l ary t o t hi s i s t he
quest i on of whet her t he pet i t i oner di scharged t he respondent on account of pregnancy, a
prohi bi t ed act .
The pet i t i oner posi t s t he fol l owi ng argument sD -a. The evi dence proffered by t he
respondent , t o wi t D -1. t he ;i scharge *ummary i ndi cat i ng t hat she had been admi t t ed t o t he
+hi l l i ps Memori al ?ospi t al on &ugust !#, 1% and di scharged on &ugust !$, 1%, and t hat
she had been advi sed t o 7rest i n quart ers9 for four days from &ugust !B, 1% t o &ugust #",
1%, and -!. t he Medi cal Cert i fi cat e i ssued by ;r. Mari l yn M. Casi no st at i ng t hat
respondent had sought consul t at i on on *ept ember %, !""! because of spasm i n t he l eft i l i ac
regi on, and was advi sed t o rest for fi ve days -from *ept ember %, 1% up t o *ept ember <,
1%., due t o uri nary t ract i nfect i on, al l i n al l est abl i sh respondent 6s si c8ness onl y from
&ugust !#, 1% up t o &ugust #", 1% and from *ept ember %, 1% up t o *ept ember <,
1%. 1n ot her words, respondent was absent wi t hout permi ssi on on several ot her days
whi ch were not support ed by any ot her proof of i l l ness, speci fi cal l y, on &ugust 13, 1$, 1B,
1<, #1, 1% and *ept ember 1, !, #, , and 1", 1%, and, hence, she i s gui l t y of t en
un> ust i fi ed absences4 -b. +er (i l f l e) Indust ri al and Manuf act uri n* Co. v. Nat i onal Labor
Rel at i ons Commi ssi on %(i l f l e)& , [B] i f t he medi cal cert i fi cat e fai l s t o refer t o t he speci fi c
peri od of t he empl oyee6s absence, t hen such absences, at t ri but abl e t o chroni c ast hmat i c
bronchi t i s, are not support ed by compet ent proof and, hence, t hey are un> ust i fi ed. :y pari t y
of reasoni ng, i n t he absence of evi dence i ndi cat i ng any pregnancy'borne i ll ness out si de t he
peri od st at ed i n respondent 6s medi cal cert i fi cat e, such i l l ness ought not t o be consi dered as
an accept abl e e/cuse for respondent 6s e/cessi ve absences wit hout l eave4 -c. )espondent 6s
l at est st ri ng of absences, t a8en t oget her wit h her l ong hi st ory of absent eei sm wi t hout
permi ssi on, est abl i shed her gross and habi t ual negl ect of dut i es, as est abl i shed by
> uri sprudence4 -d. The respondent was di smi ssed not by reason of her pregnancy but on
account of her gross and habi t ual negl ect of dut i es. 1n ot her words, her pregnancy had no
beari ng on t he deci si on t o t ermi nat e her empl oyment 4 and, -e. ?er st at e of pregnancy per
se coul d not e/cuse her from fi l i ng pri or not i ce for her absence.
+et i t i oner 6s argument s are wi t hout meri t .
(i rst . The (i l f l e) Indust ri al and Manuf act uri n* Co. case i s not appl i cabl e, pri nci pal l y
because t he nat ure and gravi t y of t he i ll ness i nvol ved i n t hat case M chroni c ast hmat i c
bronchi t i s M are di fferent from t he condi t i ons t hat are present i n t he i nst ant case, whi ch
i s pre*nanc+ and i t s rel at ed i ll nesses.
The Court t a8es > udi ci al not i ce of t he fact t hat t he condi t i on of ast hmat i c bronchi t i s may
be i ntermi t tent , i n cont rast t o pregnancy whi ch i s acont i nui n* condi t i on accompani ed by
vari ous sympt oms and rel at ed i l l nesses. ?ence, as t o t he former, i f t he medi cal cert i fi cat e
or ot her proof proffered by t he wor8er fai l s t o correspond wi t h t he dat es of absence, t hen i t
can be reasonabl y concl uded t hat , absent any ot her proof, such absences are un> ust i fi ed.
Thi s i s t he rul i ng i n (i l f l e) whi ch cannot be appl i ed i n a st rai ght 'hand fashi on i n cases of
pregnancy whi ch i s a l on*t erm condi t i onaccompani ed by an assort ment of rel at ed
i l l nesses.
1n t hi s case, by t he measure of subst ant i al evi dence, what i s cont rol l i ng i s t he fi ndi ng of t he
,H)C and t he C& t hat respondent was pregnant and suffered from rel at ed ai l ment s. 1t woul d
be unreasonabl e t o i sol at e such condi t i on st ri ct l y t o t he dat es st at ed i n t he Medi cal
Cert i fi cat e or t he ;i scharge *ummary. 1t can be safel y assumed t hat t he absences t hat are
not covered by, but whi ch nonet hel ess appro/i mat e, t he dat es st at ed i n t he ;i scharge
*ummary and Medi cal Cert i fi cat e, are due t o t he cont i nui ng condi t i on of pregnancy and
rel at ed i l l nesses, and, hence, are > ust i fi ed absences.
&s t he C& and t he ,H)C correct l y not ed, i t i s not di sput ed t hat respondent was pregnant
and t hat she was sufferi ng from uri nary t ract i nfect i on, and t hat her absences were due t o
such fact s. The pet i t i oner admi t s t hese fact s i n i t s +et i t i on for )evi ew. [<] &nd, as t he C&
apt l y hel d, i t was no l ess t han t he company doct or who advi sed t he respondent t o have
7rest 'i n'quart ers9 for four days on account of a pregnancy'rel at ed si c8ness. []
2n t hi s not e, t hi s Court uphol ds and adopt s t he fi ndi ng of t he ,H)C, t husD
1n t hi s > uri sdi ct i on t ardi ness and absent eei sm, l i 8e abandonment , are
recogni Ged forms of negl ect of dut i es, t he e/i st ence of whi ch > ust i fy t he
di smi ssal of t he erri ng empl oyee. )espondent 6s rul e penal i Gi ng wi t h di scharge
any empl oyee who has i ncurred si / -$. or more absences wi t hout permi ssi on
or subsequent > ust i fi cat i on i s admi t t edl y wi t hi n t he purvi ew of t he for egoi ng
st andard.
?owever, whi l e i t i s not di sput ed t hat compl ai nant i ncurred absences
e/ceedi ng si / -$. days as she act ual l y fai l ed t o report for wor8 from &ugust
13'1<, !#'!$, !'#1, *ept ember 1'#, 3'1", 1!'1B, !1'!%, !$'#", and 2ct ober 1'
#, 1%, @er be8 'A preA'&'t &t t@e t8 me t@e4e &b4e'9e4 <ere 8 '95rre( 8 4 'ot
>5e4t8 o'e( &'( 8 4 e?e' &(m8 tte( b7 re4po'(e't . 1t t hus puGGl es us why
respondent assert s compl ai nant fai l ed t o e/pl ai n sat i sfact ori l y her absences on
&ugust 13'1<, !'#1, *ept ember 1'# and 3'1", 1%, yet reconsi dered t he rest
of her absences for bei ng covered wi t h 7rest 'i n'quart ers9 -)1Q. advi ce from
i t s hospi t al personnel when t hi s advi ce was unquest i onabl y i ssued i n
consi derat i on of t he physi ol ogi cal and emot i onal changes compl ai nant , a
concei vi ng mot her, nat ural l y devel oped. "e(8 9&6 &'( @e&6 t@ report4
&b5'(&'t6 7 (8 496 o4e t@&t (5r8 'A t@e =8 r4t tr8 me4ter o= preA'&'97, e;pe9t&'t
mot@er4 &re p6 &A5e( <8 t@ mor'8 'A 48 9C'e44, =re>5e't 5r8 '&t8 o', ?om8 t8 'A
&'( =&t8 A5e &6 6 o= <@8 9@ 9omp6 &8 '&'t <&4 48 m8 6 &r6 7 p6 &A5e( <8 t@. U'8 o'
o==8 98 &6 I// !e4'&D4 ob4er?&t8 o' o' 9omp6 &8 '&'t be8 'A [48 9] &pp&re't6 7 'ot
=ee6 8 'A <e6 6 (5r8 'A t@e 8 '?e4t8 A&t8 o' 9o'(59te( b7 re4po'(e't o' O9tober
1, 1994 e?e' rem&8 '4 8 ' t@e re9or(4 o= 4&8 ( pro9ee(8 'A4. For re4po'(e't to
8 4o6 &te t@e &b4e'9e4 o= 9omp6 &8 '&'t 8 ' A5A54t &'( m8 (#September, 1994
=rom t@e &b4e'9e4 4@e 8 '95rre( 6 &ter 8 ' 4&8 ( mo't@ <8 t@o5t 45bm8 tt8 'A &'7
e?8 (e'9e t@&t t@e4e <ere (5e to 9&54e4 'ot 8 ' m&''er &44o98 &te( <8t@ @er
[ ] 9o'(8 t8 o' re'(er4 8 t4 E54t8 =8 9&t 8 o' o= 9omp6 &8 '&'tD4 (8 4m8 44&6 96 e&r6 7
'ot 9o'?8 '98 'A 5'(er t@e 98 r95m4t&'9e4.
De4p8 te 9o'tr&r7 (e96 &r&t8 o', t@e re9or(4 be&r t@e &(m8 448 o' o=
re4po'(e'tD4 $FA Nort@ S5per?8 4or, $/ Gb&'eH, o= @er re9e8 pt o= t@e
@o4p8 t&6 re9or( 4@o<8 'A 9omp6 &8 '&'tD4 RII &(?8 9e =or A5A54t 19#20, 1994
<@8 9@ 9o56 ( &6 re&(7 4er?e &4 re4po'(e'tD4 re=ere'9e 8 ' re4o6 ?8 'A t@e
6 &tterD4 &b4e'9e4 o' A5A54t 11 to 12, 1994. Re4po'(e't =5rt@er &(m8 tte(
9omp6 &8 '&'t <&4 5'(er RII &(?8 9e o' , 7et, 8 '48 4te( 8 ' 8 '96 5(8 'A t@e4e
(&te4 &mo'A @er 16 p5rporte( 5'e;p6 &8 'e( &b4e'9e4 E54t8 =78 'A term8 '&t8 o'
o= @er emp6 o7me't . [1"] -emphasi s suppl i ed.
+et i t i oner 6s cont ent i on t hat t he cause for t he di smi ssal was gross and habi t ual negl ect
unrel at ed t o her st at e of pregnancy i s unpersuasi ve.
The Court agrees wi t h t he C& i n concl udi ng t hat respondent 6s si c8ness was pregnancy'
rel at ed and, t herefore, t he pet i t i oner cannot t ermi nat e respondent 6s servi ces because i n
doi ng so, pet i t i oner wi l l , i n effect , be vi ol at i ng t he Habor Code whi ch prohi bi t s an empl oyer
t o di scharge an empl oyee on account of t he l at t er 6s pregnancy. [11]
&rt i cl e 1#B of t he Habor Code provi desD
&rt . 1#B. Prohi bi t ed act s. M 1t shal l be unl awful for any empl oyerD
-1. To deny any woman empl oyee t he benefi t s provi ded for i n t hi s Chapt er
or t o di scharge any woman empl oyed by hi m for t he purpose of prevent i ng her
from en> oyi ng any of t he benefi t s provi ded under t hi s Code4
-!. To (8 49@&rAe 459@ <om&' o' &99o5't o= @er preA'&'97, <@8 6 e o'
6 e&?e or 8 ' 9o'=8 'eme't (5e to @er preA'&'97J or
-#. To di scharge or refuse t he admi ssi on of such woman upon ret urni ng t o
her wor8 for fear t hat she may agai n be pregnant . -5mphasi s suppl i ed.
#econd. The pet i t i oner st r esses t hat many women go t hrough pr egnancy and yet
manage t o submi t pri or not i ces t o t hei r empl oyer, especi al l y i f 7t here i s no evi dence on
record i ndi cat i ng a condi t i on of such gravi t y as t o precl ude effort s at not i fyi ng pet i t i oner of
her absence from wor8 i n seri es. 9 [1!] :ut i t must be emphasi Ged t hat under pet i t i oner 6s
company rul es, absences may be subsequent l y > ust i fi ed. [1#] The Court fi nds no cogent
reason t o di st urb t he fi ndi ngs of t he ,H)C and t he C& t hat t he respondent was abl e t o
subsequent l y > ust i fy her absences i n accordance wi t h company rul es and pol i cy4 t hat t he
respondent was pregnant at t he t i me she i ncurred t he absences4 t hat t hi s fact of pregnancy
and i t s rel at ed i l l nesses had been dul y proven t hrough subst ant i al evi dence4 t hat t he
respondent at t empt ed t o fi l e l eaves of absence but t he pet i t i oner 6s supervi sor refused t o
recei ve t hem4 t hat she coul d not have fi l ed pri or l eaves due t o her cont i nui ng condi t i on4 and
t hat t he pet i t i oner, i n t he l ast anal ysi s, di smi ssed t he respondent on account of her
pregnancy, a prohi bi t ed act .
,hi rd. +et i t i oner 6s rel i ance on t he > ur i sprudent i al rul e t hat t he t ot al i t y of t he
i nfract i ons of an empl oyee may be t a8en i nt o account t o > ust i fy t he di smi ssal , i s t enuous
consi deri ng t he part i cul ar ci rcumst ances obt ai ni ng i n t he present case. +et i t i oner put s much
emphasi s on respondent 6s 7l ong hi st ory9 of unaut hori Ged absences commi t t ed several years
beforehand. ?owever, pet i t i oner cannot use t hese previ ous i nfract i ons t o l ay down a pat t ern
of absent eei sm or habi t ual di sregard of company rul es t o > ust i fy t he di smi ssal of
respondent . The undeni abl e fact i s t hat duri ng her compl ai ned absences i n 1%, respondent
was pregnant and suffered rel at ed i l l nesses. &gai n, i t must be st ressed t hat respondent 6s
di scharge by reason of absences caused by her pregnancy i s covered by t he prohi bi t i on
under t he Habor Code. *i nce her l ast st ri ng of absences i s > ust i fi abl e and had been
subsequent l y e/pl ai ned, t he pet i t i oner had no l egal basi s i n consi deri ng t hese absences
t oget her wi t h her pri or i nfract i ons as gross and habi t ual negl ect .
The Court i s convi nced t hat t he pet i t i oner t ermi nat ed t he servi ces of respondent on
account of her pregnancy whi ch > ust i fi ed her absences and, t hus, commi t t ed a prohi bi t ed act
renderi ng t he di smi ssal i l l egal .
1n fi ne, t he Court fi nds no cogent reason t o di st urb t he fi ndi ngs of t he C& and t he
,H)C.

%*RFOR, t he pet i t i on i s DNID for l ac8 of meri t . The ;eci si on dat ed and t he
)esol ut i on dat ed of t he Court of &ppeal s ar e AFFIR"D.
,o pronouncement as t o cost s.
SO ORDRD.


!AK$U DRUG, INC., !A (.). ,o. 1$$#B
CROSUS $*AR"A, INC.,
TRO$ICA! /IO!OGICA! $*I!S.,
INC. 3&66 C'o<' &4 !AK$U GROU$
OF CO"$ANIS: &'(For NRIIU
CASTI!!O, -R.,
+etitioners, +resentD

;avide, =r., C.$. -Chairman.,
' versus ' Quisumbing,
Jnares'*antiago,
Carpio, and
&Gcuna, $$.
"A. !OURDS /!GA,
)espondent. +romulgatedD

2ctober !", !""3
/ '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' /

DECISION


GNARS#SANTIAGO, J.D

:efore us is a petition for review of the =uly !<, !""% ;ecision[1] of the Court of &ppeals in C&'(.). *+
,o. <"$1$ which reversed and set aside the &pril 1%, !""# ;ecision[!] of the ,ational Habor )elations
Commission -,H)C. in ,H)C ,C) ""'"'"%<1'"14 and its ;ecember 1B, !""% )esolution[#] denying the
motion for reconsideration.

+etitioner Tropical :iological +hils., 1nc. -Tropical., a subsidiary of Ha8pue (roup of Companies, hired on
March 1, 13 respondent Ma. Hourdes :elga -:elga. as boo88eeper and subsequently promoted as assistant
cashier. 2n March 1, !""1, :elga brought her daughter to the +hilippine (eneral ?ospital -+(?. for treatment
of broncho'pneumonia. 2n her way to the hospital, :elga dropped by the house of Marylinda 2. Legafria,
Technical Manager of Tropical, to hand over the documents she wor8ed on over the wee8end and to give notice
of her emergency leave.

0hile at the +(?, :elga who was pregnant e/perienced labor pains and gave birth on the same day. 2n
March !!, !""1, or two days after giving birth, Tropical summoned :elga to report for wor8 but the latter replied
that she could not comply because of her situation. 2n March #", !""1, Tropical sent :elga another
memorandum ordering her to report for wor8 and also informing her of the clarificatory conference scheduled on
&pril !, !""1. :elga requested that the conference be moved to &pril %, !""1 as her newborn was scheduled for
chec8'up on &pril !, !""1. 0hen :elga attended the clarificatory conference on &pril %, !""1, she was
informed of her dismissal effective that day.

:elga thus filed a complaint with the +ublic &ssistance and Complaint Knit -+&CK. of the ;epartment of Habor
and 5mployment -;2H5.. &ttempts to settle the case failed, hence the parties brought the case before the
,H)C',C).

Tropical, for its part, averred that it hired :elga on March 1, 13 as a boo88eeper and later promoted to
various positions the last of which was as 7Treasury &ssistant9. Tropical claimed that this position was not
merely clerical because it included duties such as assisting the cashier in preparing deposit slips, bills purchased,
withdrawal slips, provisional receipts, incoming and outgoing ban8 transactions, postdated chec8s, supplier6s
chec8list and issuance of chec8s, authorities to debit and doing liaison wor8 with ban8s.

Tropical also alleged that :elga concealed her pregnancy from the company. *he did not apply for leave
and her absence disrupted Tropical6s financial transactions. 2n March !1, !""1, it required :elga to e/plain her
unauthoriGed absence and on March #", !""1, it informed her of a conference scheduled on &pril !, !""1.
Tropical claimed that :elga refused to receive the second memorandum and did not attend the conference. *he
reported for wor8 only on &pril %, !""1 where she was given a chance to e/plain.

2n &pril 1B, !""1, Tropical terminated :elga on the following groundsD -1. &bsence without official
leave for 1$ days4 -!. ;ishonesty, for deliberately concealing her pregnancy4 -#. 1nsubordination, for her
deliberate refusal to heed and comply with the memoranda sent by the +ersonnel ;epartment on March !1 and
#", !""1 respectively.[%]

The Habor &rbiter ruled in favor of :elga and found that she was illegally dismissed, thusD

0?5)5A2)5, the termination of complainant is hereby declared illegal. &CC2);1,(HJ,
she should be reinstated with full bac8wages, which as of May #1, !""!, now amounts to +1!!,
!%<.B1.

Ten -1"F. percent of the total monetary award as attorney6s fees is li8ewise ordered.

*2 2);5)5;.[3]

Tropical appealed to the ,H)C, which reversed the findings of the labor arbiter in its ;ecision dated &pril
1%, !""#, thusD

0?5)5A2)5, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed ;ecision is )5L5)*5; and *5T
&*1;5. 0e thereby render >udgmentD

-1. declaring complainant'appellee6s dismissal valid4 and
-!. nullifying complainant'appellee6s monetary claims.

*2 2);5)5;.[$]

Kpon denial of the motion for reconsideration on *eptember !%, !""#,[B] :elga filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of &ppeals which found in favor of :elga, thusD

0?5)5A2)5, premises considered, the ;ecision promulgated on &pril 1%, !""# and the
)esolution promulgated on *eptember !%, !""# of the public respondent ,ational Habor
)elations Commission are hereby )5L5)*5; and *5T &*1;5. The decision of the Habor
&rbiter dated =une 13, !""! is hereby )51,*T&T5;.

*2 2);5)5;.[<]

?ence, Tropical filed the instant petition claiming thatD

1.

T?5 ?2,2)&:H5 C2K)T 2A &++5&H* C2MM1TT5; ()&L5 5))2) 1, ?2H;1,(
T?&T )5*+2,;5,T 0&* 1HH5(&HHJ ;1*M1**5;.

11.

T?5 ?2,2)&:H5 C2K)T 2A &++5&H* C2MM1TT5; ()&L5 5))2) 1,
;1*)5(&);1,( T?5 A1,;1,(* 2A T?5 ,&T12,&H H&:2) )5H&T12,*
C2MM1**12,.[]

The petition lac8s merit.

Tropical6s ground for terminating :elga is her alleged concealment of pregnancy. 1t argues that such non'
disclosure is tantamount to dishonesty and impresses upon this Court the importance of :elga6s position and the
gravity of the disruption her une/pected absence brought to the company. Tropical also charges :elga with
insubordination for refusing to comply with its directives to report for wor8 and to e/plain her absence.

Tropical cites the following paragraphs of &rticle !<! of the Habor Code as legal basis for terminating
:elgaD

&rticle !<!. ,ermination b+ emplo+er. U &n employer may terminate an employment for any of
the following causesD

-a. *erious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his wor84

....

-c. Araud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly authoriGed representative4 ....

0e have defined misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in >udgment. The
misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and
unimportant. *uch misconduct, however serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection with the employee6s wor8
to constitute >ust cause for his separation.[1"]

1n the instant case, the alleged misconduct of :elga barely falls within the situation contemplated by the
law. ?er absence for 1$ days was >ustified considering that she had >ust delivered a child, which can hardly be
considered a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty4 much less does it imply wrongful intent on the part of :elga.
Tropical harps on the alleged concealment by :elga of her pregnancy. This argument, however, begs the
question as to how one can conceal a full'term pregnancy. 0e agree with respondent6s position that it can hardly
escape notice how she grows bigger each day. 0hile there may be instances where the pregnancy may be
inconspicuous, it has not been sufficiently proven by Tropical that :elga6s case is such.

:elga6s failure to formall+ inform Tropical of her pregnancy can not be considered as grave misconduct directly
connected to her wor8 as to constitute >ust cause for her separation.

The charge of disobedience for :elga6s failure to comply with the memoranda must li8ewise fail. ;isobedience,
as a >ust cause for termination, must be willful or intentional. 0illfulness is characteriGed by a wrongful and
perverse mental attitude rendering the employee6s act inconsistent with proper subordination.[11] 1n the instant
case, the memoranda were given to :elga two days after she had given birth. 1t was thus physically impossible
for :elga to report for wor8 and e/plain her absence, as ordered.

Tropical avers that :elga6s >ob as Treasury &ssistant is a position of responsibility since she handles vital
transactions for the company. 1t adds that the nature of :elga6s wor8 and the character of her duties involved
utmost trust and confidence.

Time and again, we have recogniGed the right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust
and confidence. ?owever, we emphasiGe that such ground is premised on the fact that the employee concerned
holds a position of responsibility or trust and confidence.[1!] 1n order to constitute a >ust cause for dismissal, the
act complained of must be 7wor8'related9 such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue
wor8ing for the employer.[1#] More importantly, the loss of trust and confidence must be based on the willful
breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. & breach of trust is willful if it is done
intentionally, 8nowingly and purposely, without >ustifiable e/cuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.[1%]

:elga was an assistant cashier whose primary function was to assist the cashier in such duties as
preparation of deposit slips, provisional receipts, post'dated chec8s, etc. &s correctly observed by the Court of
&ppeals, these functions are essentially clerical. Aor while ostensibly, the documents that :elga prepares as
&ssistant Cashier pertain to her employer6s property, her wor8 does not call for independent >udgment or
discretion. :elga simply prepares the documents as instructed by her superiors sub>ect to the latter6s verification
or approval. ?ence, her position cannot be considered as one of responsibility or imbued with trust and
confidence.

Aurthermore, Tropical has not satisfactorily shown how and to what e/tent it had suffered damages
because of :elga6s absences. Aor while it may be true that the company was caught unprepared and unable to
hire a temporary replacement, we are not convinced that :elga6s absence for 1$ days has wrea8ed havoc on
Tropical6s business as to >ustify her termination from the company. 2n the other hand, it is undisputed that :elga
has wor8ed for Tropical for B years without any blemish on her service record. 1n fact, the company admitted in
its petition that she 7has rendered seven -B. years of service in compliance with [the company6s] rules9.[13] &nd
her fidelity to her wor8 is evident because even in the midst of an emergency, she managed to transmit to the
company the documents she wor8ed on over the wee8end so that it would not cause any problem for the
company.

&ll told, we find that the penalty of dismissal was too harsh in light of the circumstances obtaining in this
case. 0hile it may be true that :elga ought to have formally informed the company of her impending maternity
leave so as to give the latter sufficient time to find a temporary replacement, her termination from employment is
not commensurate to her lapse in >udgment.

5ven assuming that there was >ust cause for terminating :elga, her dismissal is nonetheless invalid for
failure of Tropical to observe the twin'notice requirement. The March !1, !""1 memorandum merely informed
her to report for wor8 and e/plain her absences. The March #", !""1 memorandum demanded that she report
for wor8 and attend a clarificatory conference. :elga received the first memorandum but allegedly refused to
receive the second.

1n 'lectro #+stem Industries Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[1$] we held that, in
dismissing an employee, the employer has the burden of proving that the wor8er has been served two noticesD -1.
one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and -!. the other to
inform him of his employer6s decision to dismiss him. The first notice must state that the dismissal is sought for
the act or omission charged against the employee, otherwise the notice cannot be considered sufficient
compliance with the rules. 1t must also inform outright that an investigation will be conducted on the charges
particulariGed therein which, if proven, will result to his dismissal. Aurther, we held that a notation in the notice
that the employee refused to sign is not sufficient proof that the employer attempted to serve the notice to the
employee.

&n employee who was illegally dismissed from wor8 is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights, and other privileges and to his full bac8wages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.[1B] Thus, :elga is entitled to be reinstated to her former or equivalent position and to the
payment of full bac8wages from the time she was illegally dismissed until her actual reinstatement.

%*RFOR, the instant petition is DNID. The =uly !<, !""% ;ecision of the Court of &ppeals in
C&'(.). *+ ,o. <"$1$ and its ;ecember 1B, !""% )esolution areAFFIR"D in toto.

SO ORDRD.
"A. T. DO"INGO,
+etitioner,
' versus '
ROG!IO RAGA!A,
)espondent.
/ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' /
ROG!IO RAGA!A,
+etitioner,
' versus '
OFFIC OF T* $RSIDNTJ
RONA!DO ,. BA"ORA, 8' @84 9&p&98t7
&4 ;e95t8?e Se9ret&r7J ROG ,.
SNRS, 8' @84 9&p&98t7 &4 C@&8rm&'
o= t@e N&t8o'&6 !&bor Re6&t8o'4
Comm8448o' 38' 68e5 o= RAU! T.
AIUINO, 8' @84 9&p&98t7 &4 A9t8'A
C@&8rm&' o= t@e N&t8o'&6 6&bor Re6&t8o'4
Comm8448o':J &'( "A. T. DO"INGO,
)espondents.
/ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' /
T@e , repre4e'te( b7 t@e OFFIC OF
T* $RSIDNTJ &'( A!/RTO G.
RO"U!O, 8' @84 9&p&98t7 &4 ;e95t8?e
Se9ret&r7,
+etitioners,
' versus '
ROG!IO RAGA!A,
)espondent.
G.R. No. 111201
G.R. No. 111240
G.R. No. 112700
+resentD
J,&)5*'*&,T1&(2, $.,
Chairperson,
&K*T)1&'M&)T1,5@,
,S
,&C?K)&, and
)5J5*, $$.
+romulgatedD
Aebruary 1<, !""<
/''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''/
DCISION
NAC*URA, J.+

*e/ual harassment is an imposition of misplaced 7superiority9 which is enough to dampen an employee6s spirit
and her capacity for advancement. 1t affects her sense of >udgment4 it changes her life.[1]
:efore this Court are three +etitions for )eview on Certiorari assailing the 2ctober 1<, !""! )esolution of the
C&6s Aormer ,inth ;ivision[!] in C&'(.). *+ ,o. $1"!$. The )esolution modified the ;ecember 1%, !""1
;ecision[#] of the Court of &ppeals6 5leventh ;ivision, which had affirmed the ;ecision of the 2ffice of the
+resident -2+. dismissing from the service then ,ational Habor )elations Commission -,H)C. Chairman
)ogelio 1. )ayala -)ayala. for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
&ll three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.
2n ,ovember 1$, 1<, Ma. Hourdes T. ;omingo -;omingo., then *tenographic )eporter 111 at the ,H)C, filed
a Complaint for se/ual harassment against )ayala before *ecretary :ienvenido Haguesma of the ;epartment of
Habor and 5mployment -;2H5..
To support the Complaint, ;omingo e/ecuted an &ffidavit narrating the incidences of se/ual harassment
complained of, thusD
/ / / /
%. *a simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang a8o ni Chairman )ayala ng mga
salitang 7Hot, gumaganda 8a yataV9
3. *a ibang mga pag8a8ataon nilalapitan na a8o ni Chairman at hahawa8an ang
a8ing bali8at sabay pisil sa mga ito habang a8o ay nagta'type at habang nagbibigay siya
ng di8tasyon. *a mga pag8a8ataong ito, 8ina8abahan a8o. ,atata8ot na ba8a mangyari
sa a8in ang mga napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na noon tung8ol sa mga
se8retarya niyang nagbitiw gawa ng mga mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.
$. ,oong i8a'1" ng *etyembre, 1<, nang a8o ay nasa <
th
Aloor, may nagsabi sa
a8in na 8ailangan a8ong bumaba sa B
th
Aloor 8ung nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa
may 8ore8syon daw na gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp 8o. :umaba naman a8o para
gawin ito. ?abang ginagawa 8o ito, lumabas si Chairman )ayala sa silid ni Mr. &le/
HopeG. 1nutusan a8o ni Chairman na sumunod sa 8aniyang silid. ,ang nasa silid na
8ami, sinabi niya sa a8inD
Chairman- Lot, I li.e +ou a lot. Naiiba .a sa lahat.
&t pag8atapos a8o ay 8aniyang inusisa tung8ol sa mga personal na bagay sa a8ing
buhay. &ng ilan dito ay tung8ol sa a8ing mga magulang, 8apatid, pag'aaral at 8ung may
boyfriend na raw ba a8o.
Chairman- Ma+ bo+friend .a na ba/
Lourdes- Dati na*.aroon po.
Chairman- Nasaan na si+a/
Lourdes- Na*asawa na ho.
Chairman- 0a.it hindi .a+o na*.atulu+an/
Lourdes- Nainip po.
Chairman- Pa*.atapos mo n* .urso mo a+ .umuha .a n* Law
at a.o an* bahala sa i+o, han**an* a.o pa an* Chairman dito.
+ag8atapos ay 8umuha siya ng pera sa 8aniyang ameri8ana at inaabot sa a8in.
Chairman- 1uhanin mo ito.
Lourdes- 2uwa* na ho hindi .o .ailan*an.
Chairman- 2indi si*e, .uhanin mo. A+usin mo an* dapat
a+usin.
Tinanggap 8o po ang pera ng may pag'aalinlangan. ,atata8ot at 8ina8abahan na 8apag
hindi 8o tinanggap ang pera ay ba8a siya magagalit 8asabay na rito ang pagtapon sa a8in 8ung
saan'saan opisina o 8aya ay tanggalin a8o sa posisyon.
Chairman- Pa*labas mo ita*o mo an* pera. A+aw .o n* ma+
ma.a.aalam nito. $ust the two of us.
Lourdes- 0a.it naman, #ir/
Chairman- 0asta. Maramin* tsismosa di+an sa labas. 0ut I
don3t *ive them a damn. 2indi a.o mamata+ sa .anila.
Tumayo na a8o at lumabas. +umanhi8 na a8o ng <
th
Aloor at pumunta a8o sa officemate
8o na si &gnes Magdaet. 18inwento 8o ang nangyari sa a8in sa opisina ni Chairman. ?abang
8ini8wento 8o ito 8ay &gnes ay binilang namin ang pera na nag8a8ahalaga ng tatlong libong
piso -+?+ #,""".. *inabi ni &gnes na isauli 8o raw ang pera, pero ang sabi 8o ay natata8ot a8o
ba8a magalit si *ir. ,agsabi agad 8ami 8ay 5C +erlita Lelasco at sinalaysay 8o ang nangyari.
*inabi niya na isauli 8o ang pera at noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya a8ong isauli na nga ito
ngunit hindi a8o nag8aroon ng pag8a8ataon dahil marami siyang naging bisita. 1sinauli 8o nga
ang pera noong Hunes, *etyembre 1%, 1<.
B. ,oong huling linggo ng *etyembre, 1<, ay may tinanong din sa a8in si Chairman
)ayala na hindi 8o masi8mura, at sa a8ing palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa a8in.
Chairman- Lot, ma+ .a livein .a ba/
Lourdes- #ir, wala po.
Chairman- 0a.it mala.i an* bala.an* mo/
Lourdes- 1a+o, #ir ha4 Masama sa amin an* ma+ .a livein.
Chairman- 0a.it, ano ba an* relihi+on nin+o/
Lourdes- Catholic, #ir. 1ailan*an i.asal muna.
Chairman- 0a.it a.o, hindi .asal.
Lourdes- #ir, di ma*pa.asal .a+o.
Chairman- 2uh. Ibahin na n*a natin an* usapan.
<. ,oong 28tubre !, 1<, a8o ay pumaso8 sa 8warto ni Chairman )ayala. 1to ay sa
8adahilanang ang fa/ machine ay nasa loob ng 8aniyang 8warto. &ng nag'aasi8aso nito, si )iGa
2campo, ay na8a'leave 8aya a8o ang nag'asi8aso nito noong araw na iyon. ,ang mabigyan 8o
na ng fa/ tone yung 8ausap 8o, pagharap 8o sa 8anan ay na8aharang sa dadaanan 8o si
Chairman )ayala. Tinitingnan a8o sa mata at ang titig niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang
dibdib tapos ay ngumiti na may mahalay na pa8ahulugan.
. ,oong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag'aapply na se8retarya sa opisina,
sinabi 8o ito 8ay Chairman )ayalaD
Lourdes- #ir, si Pin.+ po +un* applicant, ma*papainterview
po +ata sa in+o.
Chairman- #abihin mo ma*papap smear muna si+a
Chairman- 5 si*e, irefer mo .a+ Ale). %Ale) Lope!, Chief of
#taff&.
1". ,oong ,obyembre , 1<, a8o ay tinawag ni Chairman )ayala sa 8aniyang opisina
upang 8uhanin 8o ang di8tasyon niya para 8ay 5H& 2scar Ky. ?indi pa 8ami na8a8atapos ng
unang talata, may pumaso8 na bisita si Chairman, si :aby +angilinan na sinamahan ni )iGa
2campo. +inalabas muna a8o ni Chairman. ,ang ma8a'alis na si Ms. +angilinan, pinapaso8 na
niya a8o ulit. Kmupo a8o. Humapit sa li8uran 8o si Chairman, hinawa8an ang 8aliwang bali8at
8o na pinipisil ng 8anang 8amay niya at sinabiD
ChairmanD *aan na ba tayo nataposV
+ala8ad'la8ad siya sa a8ing li8uran habang nag'didi8ta. ?uminto siya pag8atapos, at
nilagay niya ang 8anang 8amay niya sa a8ing 8anang bali8at at pinisil'pisil ito pag8atapos ay
pinagapang niya ito sa 8anang bahagi ng a8ing leeg, at pinagapang hanggang 8anang tenga at
sa8a 8iniliti. ;ito 8o inalis ang 8aniyang 8amay sa pamamagitan ng a8ing 8aliwang 8amay. &t
sa8a 8o sinabiD
Lourdes- #ir, +un* .ama+ nin+o alisin ni+o4
,atapos 8o rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi 8o na maintindihan ang
na'isulat 8o dahil sa ta8ot at inis na nararamdaman 8o.[%]
&fter the last incident narrated, ;omingo filed for leave of absence and as8ed to be immediately transferred.
Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for se/ual harassment on the basis of &dministrative 2rder ,o. !3",
the Rules and Re*ulations Implementin* RA 6766 in the Department of Labor and 'mplo+ment.
Kpon receipt of the Complaint, the ;2H5 *ecretary referred the Complaint to the 2+, )ayala being a
presidential appointee. The 2+, through then 5/ecutive *ecretary )onaldo @amora, ordered *ecretary Haguesma
to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. 2n ;ecember %, 1<,
*ecretary Haguesma issued &dministrative 2rder -&2. ,o. !<", *eries of 1<,[3] constituting a Committee on
;ecorum and 1nvestigation -Committee. in accordance with )epublic &ct -)&. B<BB, the Anti#e)ual
2arassment Act of 899:.[$]
The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. 2n March !, !""", the Committee
submitted its report and recommendation to *ecretary Haguesma. 1t found )ayala guilty of the offense charged
and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under &2 !3", which it erroneously stated
as suspension for si/ -$. months.
The following day, *ecretary Haguesma submitted a copy of the Committee )eport and )ecommendation to the
2+, but with the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for si/ -$. months and one -1. day, in
accordance with &2 !3".
2n May <, !""", the 2+, through 5/ecutive *ecretary @amora, issued &2 11,[B] the pertinent portions of which
readD
Kpon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, 1 concur with the findings of the Committee
as to the culpability of the respondent [)ayala], the same having been established by clear and
convincing evidence. ?owever, 1 disagree with the recommendation that respondent be meted
only the penalty of suspension for si/ -$. months and one -1. day considering the circumstances
of the case.
0hat aggravates respondent6s situation is the undeniable circumstance that he too8 advantage of
his position as the superior of the complainant. )espondent occupies the highest position in the
,H)C, being its Chairman. &s head of said office, it was incumbent upon respondent to set an
e/ample to the others as to how they should conduct themselves in public office, to see to it that
his subordinates wor8 efficiently in accordance with Civil *ervice )ules and )egulations, and to
provide them with healthy wor8ing atmosphere wherein co'wor8ers treat each other with
respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end the public interest will be benefited -City
Mayor of @amboanga vs. Court of &ppeals, 1<! *C)& B<3 [1"]..
0hat is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline -(ano vs.
Heonen, !#! *C)& [1%].. Thus, a public servant must e/hibit at all times the highest sense
of honesty and integrity, and 7utmost devotion and dedication to duty9 -*ec. % -g., )& $B1#.,
respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and good morals
-*ec. %-c... ,o less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public
trust, and en>oins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency -*ection 1, &rticle O1, 1<B Constitution..
(iven these established standards, 1 see respondent6s acts not >ust [as] a failure to give due
courtesy and respect to his co'employees -subordinates. or to maintain good conduct and
behavior but defiance of the basic norms or virtues which a government official must at all times
uphold, one that is contrary to law and 7public sense of morality.9 2therwise stated, respondent
M to whom stricter standards must apply being the highest official [of] the ,H)C M had shown
an attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to remain in the
service.
%*RFOR, in view of the foregoing, respondent )ogelio 1. )ayala, Chairman, ,ational
Habor )elations Commission, is found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral
conduct and is hereby DIS"ISSD from the service effective upon receipt of this 2rder.
*2 2);5)[5;].
)ayala filed a Motion for )econsideration, which the 2+ denied in a )esolution[<] dated May !%, !""".
?e then filed a +etition for Certiorari and +rohibition with +rayer for Temporary )estraining 2rder under )ule
$3 of the )evised )ules on Civil +rocedure before this Court on =une 1%, !""".[] ?owever, the same was
dismissed in a )esolution dated =une !$, !""" for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
[1"] )ayala filed a Motion for
)econsideration[11] on &ugust 13, !""". 1n its )esolution[1!] dated *eptember %, !""", the Court recalled its
=une !$ )esolution and referred the petition to the Court of &ppeals -C&. for appropriate action.
The C& rendered its ;ecision[1#] on ;ecember 1%, !""1. 1t held that there was sufficient evidence on record to
create moral certainty that )ayala committed the acts he was charged with. 1t saidD
The complainant narrated her story complete with details. ?er straightforward and uninhibited
testimony was not emasculated by the declarations of Commissioner )ayala or his witnesses. /
/ /
Moreover, Commissioner )ayala has not proven any vicious motive for ;omingo and her
witnesses to invent their stories. 1t is very unli8ely that they would per>ure themselves only to
accommodate the alleged conspiracy to oust petitioner from office. *ave for his empty
con>ectures and speculations, )ayala failed to substantiate his contrived conspiracy. 1t is a
hornboo8 doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence -People
v. Noro;a, <=9 #CRA :>= ?=>>>@.. :esides, it is improbable that the complainant would concoct
a story of se/ual harassment against the highest official of the ,H)C and thereby e/pose herself
to the possibility of losing her >ob, or be the sub>ect of reprisal from her superiors and perhaps
public ridicule if she was not telling the truth.
1t also held that )ayala6s dismissal was proper. The C& pointed out that )ayala was dismissed for disgraceful
and immoral conduct in violation of )& $B1#, the Code of Conduct and 'thical #tandards for Public 5fficials
and 'mplo+ees. 1t held that the 2+ was correct in concluding that )ayala6s acts violated )& $B1#D
1ndeed, [)ayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship of the ,ational Habor
)elations Commission, entrusted with the sacred duty of administering >ustice. 2ccupying as he
does such an e/alted position, Commissioner )ayala must pay a high price for the honor
bestowed upon him. ?e must comport himself at all times in such a manner that the conduct of
his everyday life should be beyond reproach and free from any impropriety. That the acts
complained of were committed within the sanctuary of [his] office compounded the
ob>ectionable nature of his wrongdoing. :y daring to violate the complainant within the solitude
of his chambers, Commissioner )ayala placed the integrity of his office in disrepute. ?is
disgraceful and immoral conduct warrants his removal from office.[1%]
Thus, it dismissed the petition, to witD
1, L150 2A &HH T?5 A2)5(21,(, the instant petition is hereby ;1*M1**5; and
&dministrative 2rder ,o. 11 as well [as] the )esolution of the 2ffice of the +resident in 2.+.
Case ,o. ""'5'11< dated May !%, !""" are &AA1)M5; 1, T2T2. ,o cost.
*2 2);5)5;.[13]
)ayala timely filed a Motion for )econsideration. =ustices LasqueG and Tolentino voted to affirm the ;ecember
1% ;ecision. ?owever, =ustice )eyes dissented mainly because &2 !3" states that the penalty imposable is
suspension for si/ -$. months and one -1. day.[1$] +ursuant to the internal rules of the C&, a *pecial ;ivision of
Aive was constituted.[1B] 1n its 2ctober 1<, !""! )esolution, the C& modified its earlier ;ecisionD
&CC2);1,(HJ, the ;ecision dated ;ecember [1%], !""1 is M2;1A15; to the effect that the
penalty of dismissal is ;5H5T5; and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the
ma/imum period of one -1. year is ?5)5:J 1M+2*5; upon the petitioner. The rest of the
challenged decision stands.
*2 2);5)5;.
;omingo filed a +etition for )eview[1<] before this Court, which we denied in our Aebruary 1, !""#
)esolution for having a defective verification. *he filed a Motion for )econsideration, which the Court granted4
hence, the petition was reinstated.
)ayala li8ewise filed a +etition for )eview[1] with this Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act
of se/ual harassment.
Meanwhile, the )epublic filed a Motion for )econsideration of the C&6s 2ctober 1<, !""! )esolution. The C&
denied the same in its =une #, !""# )esolution, the dispositive portion of which readsD
ACCORDING!G, by a ma>ority vote, public respondents6 Motion for )econsideration, -sic.
is DNID.
SO ORDRD.
The )epublic then filed its own +etition for )eview.[!"]
2n =une !<, !""%, the Court directed the consolidation of the three -#. petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
;omingo assails the C&6s resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the 2ffice of the +resident. *he raises
this issueD
The Court of &ppeals erred in modifying the penalty for the respondent from dismissal to
suspension from service for the ma/imum period of one year. The +resident has the prerogative
to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on an erring +residential appointee. The +resident
was well within his power when he fittingly used that prerogative in deciding to dismiss the
respondent from the service.[!1]
*he argues that the power to remove )ayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the +resident who has
control of the entire 5/ecutive ;epartment, its bureaus and offices. The 2+6s decision was arrived at after
affording )ayala due process. ?ence, his dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is entirely with the
+resident.[!!]
&s to the applicability of &2 ,o. !3", she argues that the same was not intended to cover cases against
presidential appointees. &2 ,o. !3" refers only to the instances wherein the ;2H5 *ecretary is the disciplining
authority, and thus, the &2 does not circumscribe the power of the +resident to dismiss an erring presidential
appointee.
G.R. No. 155840
1n his petition, )ayala raises the following issuesD
1. CONTRARG TO T* FINDINGS OF T* COURT OF A$$A!S,
T* ACTS OF *RIN $TITIONR DO NOT CONSTITUT S)UA!
*ARASS"NT AS !AID DO%N /G T* En Ban RU!ING IN T* CAS
OF !"#INO vs. !COS$!, i%id., AS %!! AS IN T* A$$!ICATION OF
)ISTING !A%S.
11. CONTRARG TO T* FINDINGS OF T* *ONORA/! COURT
OF A$$A!S, INTNT IS AN INDIS$NSA/! !"NT IN A CAS FOR
S)UA! *ARASS"NT. T* *ONORA/! COURT RRD IN ITS
FINDING T*AT IT IS AN OFFNS T*AT IS "A!U" $RO*I/ITU".
111. T* IN,STIGATION CO""ITT, T* OFFIC OF T*
$RSIDNT, AND NO%, T* *ONORA/! COURT OF A$$A!S, *AS
"ISA$$!ID AND )$ANDD T* DFINITION OF S)UA!
*ARASS"NT IN T* %ORK$!AC UNDR R.A. No. 7277, /G A$$!GING
DO! A.O. 210, %*IC* RUNS COUNTR TO T* RCNT
$RONOUNC"NTS OF T*IS *ONORA/! SU$R" COURT.[!#]
1nvo8ing AAuino v. Acosta,[!%] )ayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling on what constitutes se/ual
harassment. Thus, he posits that for se/ual harassment to e/ist under )& B<BB, there must beD -a. demand,
request, or requirement of a se/ual favor4 -b. the same is made a pre'condition to hiring, re'employment, or
continued employment4 or -c. the denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee.
)ayala asserts that ;omingo has failed to allege and establish any se/ual favor, demand, or request from
petitioner in e/change for her continued employment or for her promotion. &ccording to )ayala, the acts
imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. 1t was merely ;omingo6s perception of malice in his
alleged acts M a 7product of her own imagination9[!3] M that led her to file the se/ual harassment complaint.
Hi8ewise, )ayala assails the 2+6s interpretation, as upheld by the C&, that )& B<BB is malum prohibitum such
that the defense of absence of malice is unavailing. ?e argues that se/ual harassment is considered an offense
against a particular person, not against society as a whole. Thus, he claims that intent is an essential element of
the offense because the law requires as a conditio sine Aua non that a se/ual favor be first sought by the offender
in order to achieve certain specific results. *e/ual harassment is committed with the perpetrator6s deliberate
intent to commit the offense.[!$]
)ayala ne/t argues that &2 !3" e/pands the acts proscribed in )& B<BB. 1n particular, he assails the definition of
the forms of se/ual harassmentD
R56e I,
FOR"S OF S)UA! *ARASS"NT
*ection 1. &or's o( Se)*a+ ,arass'ent. M *e/ual harassment may be committed in any of the
following formsD
a. 2vert se/ual advances4
b. Knwelcome or improper gestures of affection4
c. )equest or demand for se/ual favors including but not limited to going out on dates, outings
or the li8e for the same purpose4
d. &ny other act or conduct of a se/ual nature or for purposes of se/ual gratification which is
generally annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.[!B]
?e posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not constitute se/ual
harassment as contemplated by the law.[!<] ?e alleges that the rule'ma8ing power granted to the employer in
*ection %-a. of )& B<BB is limited only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the employer the
power to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional forms of se/ual harassment, or to come up
with its own definition of se/ual harassment.[!]
G.R. No. 158-00
The )epublic raises this issueD
%@et@er or 'ot t@e $re48(e't o= t@e $@868pp8'e4 m&7 ?&68(67 (84m844 re4po'(e't R&7&6& &4
C@&8rm&' o= t@e N!RC =or 9omm8tt8'A &9t4 o= 4e;5&6 @&r&44me't.[00]
The )epublic argues that )ayala6s acts constitute se/ual harassment under &2 !3". ?is acts constitute
unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a se/ual nature, which are generally
annoying or offensive to the victim.[#1]
1t also contends that there is no legal basis for the C&6s reduction of the penalty imposed by the 2+. )ayala6s
dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the ,H)C Chairman solely rests
upon the +resident, limited only by the requirements under the law and the due process clause.
The )epublic further claims that, although &2 !3" provides only a one -1. year suspension, it will not prevent
the 2+ from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on )ayala. 1t argues that even though )ayala is a
presidential appointee, he is still sub>ect to the Civil *ervice Haw. Knder the Civil *ervice Haw, disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the acts imputed to )ayala, constitute grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the
service.[#!] The )epublic adds that )ayala6s position is invested with public trust and his acts violated that trust4
thus, he should be dismissed from the service.
This argument, according to the )epublic, is also supported by &rticle !13 of the Habor Code, which states that
the Chairman of the ,H)C holds office until he reaches the age of $3 only during good behavior.[##] *ince
)ayala6s security of tenure is conditioned upon his good behavior, he may be removed from office if it is proven
that he has failed to live up to this standard.
&ll the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namelyD
31: D8( R&7&6& 9omm8t 4e;5&6 @&r&44me'tL
32: I= @e (8(, <@&t 84 t@e &pp689&b6e pe'&6t7L
1nitially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by )ayala. ?e accuses the 2ffice of the *olicitor
(eneral -2*(., as counsel for the )epublic, of forum shopping because it filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision in C&'(.). *+ ,o. $1"!$ and then filed a comment in (.). ,o. 133<%" before this Court.
0e do not agree.
Aorum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse >udgment or order has been rendered in one forum,
of see8ing and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil
action for certiorari.[#%] 1t consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable >udgment.[#3]
There is forum shopping when the following elements concurD -1. identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties
who represent the same interest in both actions4 -!. identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the
latter is founded on the same set of facts4 and -#. identity of the two preceding particulars such that any >udgment
rendered in the other action will amount to res "udicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia.[#$]
)eviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note that the C& rendered the assailed )esolution on
2ctober 1<, !""!. The )epublic filed its Motion for )econsideration on ,ovember !!, !""!. 2n the other hand,
)ayala filed his petition before this Court on ,ovember !1, !""!. 0hile the )epublic6s Motion for
)econsideration was pending resolution before the C&, on ;ecember !, !""!, it was directed by this Court to
file its Comment on )ayala6s petition, which it submitted on =une 1$, !""#.
0hen the C& denied the Motion for )econsideration, the )epublic filed its own +etition for )eview with this
Court on =uly #, !""#. 1t cited in its 7Certification and Lerification of a ,on'Aorum *hopping9 -sic., that there
was a case involving the same facts pending before this Court denominated as (.). ,o. 133<%". 0ith respect to
;omingo6s petition, the same had already been dismissed on Aebruary 1, !""#. ;omingo6s petition was
reinstated on =une 1$, !""# but the resolution was received by the 2*( only on =uly !3, !""#, or after it had
filed its own petition.[#B]
:ased on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the 2*( is guilty of forum shopping. 0e must point out that it was
)ayala who filed the petition in the C&, with the )epublic as the adverse party. )ayala himself filed a motion for
reconsideration of the C&6s ;ecember !1, !""1 ;ecision, which led to a more favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering
of the penalty from dismissal to one'year suspension. The parties adversely affected by this ruling -;omingo and
the )epublic. had the right to question the same on motion for reconsideration. :ut ;omingo directly filed a
+etition for )eview with this Court, as did )ayala. 0hen the )epublic opted to file a motion for reconsideration,
it was merely e/ercising a right. That )ayala and ;omingo had by then already filed cases before the *C did not
ta8e away this right. Thus, when this Court directed the )epublic to file its Comment on )ayala6s petition, it had
to comply, even if it had an unresolved motion for reconsideration with the C&, lest it be cited for contempt.
&ccordingly, it cannot be said that the 2*( 7file[d] multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause
of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable >udgment.9
0e now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.
1t is noteworthy that the five C& =ustices who deliberated on the case were unanimous in upholding the findings
of the Committee and the 2+. They found the assessment made by the Committee and the 2+ to be a
7meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant -;omingo., the respondent
-)ayala., and their respective witnesses.9 [#<] They differed only on the appropriate imposable penalty.
That )ayala committed the acts complained of M and was guilty of se/ual harassment M is, therefore, the
common factual finding of not >ust one, but three independent bodiesD the Committee, the 2+ and the C&. 1t
should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi'>udicial and
administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.[#] The principle, therefore,
dictates that such findings should bind us.[%"]
1ndeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid ground for this Court to review the
factual findings of the C&, the 2+, and the 1nvestigating Committee. These findings are now conclusive on the
Court. &nd quite significantly, )ayala himself admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to him.
?e insists, however, that these acts do not constitute se/ual harassment, because ;omingo did not allege in her
complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a se/ual favor as a condition for her continued
employment or for her promotion to a higher position.[%1] )ayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling
in AAuino v. Acosta.[%!]
0e find respondent6s insistence unconvincing.
:asic in the law of public officers is the threefold liabilit+ rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions
of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. &n action for each can proceed
independently of the others.[%#] This rule applies with full force to se/ual harassment.
The law penaliGing se/ual harassment in our >urisdiction is )& B<BB. *ection # thereof defines wor8'related
se/ual harassment in this wiseD
*ec. #. 0or8, 5ducation or Training'related *e/ual ?arassment ;efined. M 0or8, education or
training'related se/ual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of
the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a wor8 or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any se/ual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the
ob>ect of said &ct.
-a. 1n a wor8'related or employment environment, se/ual harassment is committed whenD
-1. The se/ual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re'
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges4 or the refusal to grant the
se/ual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee4
-!. The above acts would impair the employee6s rights or privileges under e/isting labor laws4
or
-#. The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.
This section, in relation to *ection B on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of se/ual
harassment. The same section, in relation to *ection $, authoriGes the institution of an independent civil action
for damages and other affirmative relief.
*ection %, also in relation to *ection #, governs the procedure for administrative cases, vi!.D
*ec. %. Dut+ of the 'mplo+er or 2ead of 5ffice in a Bor.related, 'ducation or ,rainin*
'nvironment. M 1t shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the wor8'related, educational
or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of se/ual
harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of
se/ual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shallD
-a. +romulgate appropriate rules and regulations in
consultation with and >ointly approved by the employees or
students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation
or se/ual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions
therefor.
&dministrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the
proper courts for unlawful acts of se/ual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section -a.
shall include, among others, guidelines on proper decorum in
the wor8place and educational or training institutions.
-b. Create a committee on decorum and investigation
of cases on se/ual harassment. The committee shall conduct
meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and
employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors
and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent
incidents of se/ual harassment. 1t shall also conduct the
investigation of the alleged cases constituting se/ual
harassment.
1n the case of a wor8'related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one -1.
representative each from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory
ran8, and from the ran8 and file employees.
1n the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at least
one -1. representative from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or
coaches and students or trainees, as the case maybe.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a
copy of this &ct for the information of all concerned.
The C&, thus, correctly ruled that )ayala6s culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of *ection #,
)& B<BB, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of se/ual
harassment.[%%] 1t should be enough that the C&, along with the 1nvestigating Committee and the 2ffice of the
+resident, found substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.
Jet, even if we were to test )ayala6s acts strictly by the standards set in *ection #, )& B<BB, he would still be
administratively liable. 1t is true that this provision calls for a 7demand, request or requirement of a se/ual
favor.9 :ut it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a se/ual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. 1t may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. ?olding and squeeGing ;omingo6s shoulders, running his fingers across her nec8 and tic8ling her ear,
having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school e/penses with a promise of
future privileges, and ma8ing statements with unmista8able se/ual overtones M all these acts of )ayala resound
with deafening clarity the unspo8en request for a se/ual favor.
Hi8ewise, contrary to )ayala6s claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a
condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. 1t is enough that the respondent6s
acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.[%3] That the acts of
)ayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for ;omingo is clearly shown by the common factual
finding of the 1nvestigating Committee, the 2+ and the C& that ;omingo reported the matter to an officemate
and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.
)ayala6s invocation of AAuino v. Acosta[%$] is misplaced, because the factual setting in that case is different
from that in the case at bench. 1n AAuino, &tty. *usan &quino, Chief of the Hegal and Technical *taff of the
Court of Ta/ &ppeals -CT&., charged then CT& +residing =udge -now +residing =ustice. 5rnesto &costa of
se/ual harassment. *he complained of several incidents when =udge &costa allegedly 8issed her, embraced her,
and put his arm around her shoulder. The case was referred to C& =ustice =osefina (. *alonga for
investigation. 1n her report, =ustice *alonga found that 7the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence
that the acts of =udge &costa in greeting her with a 8iss on the chee8, in a Wbeso'beso6 fashion, were carried out
with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or ill motive. 1t is clear from the circumstances
that most of the 8issing incidents were done on festive and special occasions,9 and they 7too8 place in the
presence of other people and the same was by reason of the e/altation or happiness of the moment.9 Thus,
=ustice *alonga concludedD
1n all the incidents complained of, the respondentPs pec8s on the chee8s of the complainant
should be understood in the conte/t of having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and
not the assertion of the latter that she was singled out by =udge &costa in his 8issing escapades.
The busses on her chee8s were simply friendly and innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design.
The fact that respondent >udge 8isses other people on the chee8s in the Pbeso'besoP fashion,
without malice, was corroborated by &tty. Alorecita +. Alores, Ms. =osephine &dalem and Ms.
Ma. Aides :alili, who stated that they usually practice Pbeso'besoP or 8issing on the chee8s, as a
form of greeting on occasions when they meet each other, li8e birthdays, Christmas, ,ew JearPs
;ay and even LalentinePs ;ay, and it does not matter whether it is =udge &costaPs birthday or
their birthdays. Theresa Cinco :actat, a lawyer who belongs to complainantPs department,
further attested that on occasions li8e birthdays, respondent >udge would li8ewise greet her with
a pec8 on the chee8 in a Pbeso'besoP manner. 1nterestingly, in one of several festive occasions,
female employees of the CT& pec8ed respondent >udge on the chee8 where &tty. &quino was
one of =udge &costaPs well wishers.
1n sum, no se/ual harassment had indeed transpired on those si/ occasions. =udge &costaPs acts
of bussing &tty. &quino on her chee8 were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in
nature. ,o evidence of intent to se/ually harass complainant was apparent, only that the
innocent acts of Pbeso'besoP were given malicious connotations by the complainant. 1n fact, she
did not even relate to anyone what happened to her. Kndeniably, there is no manifest se/ual
undertone in all those incidents.[%B]
This Court agreed with =ustice *alonga, and =udge &costa was e/onerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in AAuino does not obtain in the case at bench. 0hile in AAuino, the Court
interpreted the acts -of =udge &costa. as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done during festive or
special occasions and with other people present, in the instant case, )ayala6s acts of holding and squeeGing
;omingo6s shoulders, running his fingers across her nec8 and tic8ling her ear, and the inappropriate comments,
were all made in the confines of )ayala6s office when no other members of his staff were around. More
importantly, and a circumstance absent in AAuino, )ayala6s acts, as already adverted to above, produced a hostile
wor8 environment for ;omingo, as shown by her having reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last
incident, filing for a leave of absence and requesting transfer to another unit.
)ayala also argues that &2 !3" does not apply to him. Airst, he argues that &2 !3" does not cover the ,H)C,
which, at the time of the incident, was under the ;2H5 only for purposes of program and policy coordination.
*econd, he posits that even assuming &2 !3" is applicable to the ,H)C, he is not within its coverage because he
is a presidential appointee.
0e find, however, that the question of whether or not &2 !3" covers )ayala is of no real consequence. The
events of this case unmista8ably show that the administrative charges against )ayala were for violation of )&
B<BB4 that the 2+ properly assumed >urisdiction over the administrative case4 that the participation of the ;2H5,
through the Committee created by the *ecretary, was limited to initiating the investigation process, reception of
evidence of the parties, preparation of the investigation report, and recommending the appropriate action to be
ta8en by the 2+. &2 !3" had never really been applied to )ayala. 1f it was used at all, it was to serve merely as
an au/iliary procedural guide to aid the Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.
,e/t, )ayala alleges that the C& erred in holding that se/ual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. ?e
argues that intent is an essential element in se/ual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done
allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him.
0e reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for se/ual harassment. Thus, whether the crime of
se/ual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
0e also re>ect )ayala6s allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of office
and thus constitute merely political harassment. & conspiracy must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
?is bare assertions cannot stand against the evidence presented by ;omingo. &s we have already ruled, the acts
imputed to )ayala have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has not proven any ill motive on the part of ;omingo
and her witnesses which would be ample reason for her to con>ure stories about him. 2n the contrary, ill motive
is belied by the fact that ;omingo and her witnesses M all employees of the ,H)C at that time M stood to lose
their >obs or suffer unpleasant consequences for coming forward and charging their boss with se/ual harassment.
Aurthermore, )ayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. ?e accuses the Committee on
;ecorum of railroading his trial for violation of )& B<BB. ?e also scored the 2+6s decision finding him guilty of
7disgraceful and immoral conduct9 under the )evised &dministrative Code and not for violation of )& B<BB.
Considering that he was not tried for 7disgraceful and immoral conduct,9 he argues that the verdict is a 7sham
and total nullity.9
0e hold that )ayala was properly accorded due process. 1n previous cases, this Court held thatD
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recogniGed to include the
followingD -1. the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which
may affect a respondent6s legal rights4 -!. a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one6s favor, and to defend one6s
rights4 -#. a tribunal vested with competent >urisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality4 and -%. a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made 8nown to the parties affected.[%<]
The records of the case indicate that )ayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards. &lthough
in the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him,[%] he appeared, personally and with
counsel, and participated in the proceedings.
2n the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the offense is not
controlling, thusD
0hat is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or
the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made
by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to 8now what offense is intended to be charged, and
enable the court to pronounce proper >udgment. ,o information for a crime will be sufficient if it
does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. 5very element of the
offense must be stated in the information. 0hat facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense.[3"]
1t is noteworthy that under &2 !3", se/ual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct.[31] Thus,
any finding of liability for se/ual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral
conduct.

0ith the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that )ayala committed se/ual harassment, we now
determine the proper penalty to be imposed.
)ayala attac8s the penalty imposed by the 2+. ?e alleges that under the pertinent Civil *ervice )ules,
disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of si/ -$. months and one -1. day to
one -1. year. ?e also argues that since he is charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating circumstances
cannot be appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.
Knder &2 !3", the penalty for the first offense is suspension for si/ -$. months and one -1. day to one -1. year,
while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal.[3!] 2n the other hand, *ection !!-o., )ule OL1 of the
2mnibus )ules 1mplementing :oo8 L of the &dministrative Code of 1<B[3#] and *ection 3! &-13. of
the Revised Cniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil #ervice[3%] both provide that the first offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of si/ -$. months and one -1. day to one -1. year.
& second offense is punishable by dismissal.
Knder the Habor Code, the Chairman of the ,H)C shall hold office (5r8'A Aoo( be@&?8or until he or she
reaches the age of si/ty'five, 5'6e44 4oo'er remo?e( =or 9&54e &4 pro?8(e( b7 6&< or becomes incapacitated to
discharge the duties of the office.[33]
1n this case, it is the +resident of the , as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is
a valid cause for the removal of )ayala as ,H)C Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase
7for cause as provided by law.9 Thus, when the +resident found that )ayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the Chief 5/ecutive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the
penalty provided by law for such offense. &s cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the
administrative offense of se/ual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of si/ -$.
months and one -1. day to one -1. year. &ccordingly, it was error for the 2ffice of the +resident to impose upon
)ayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a
second offense.
5ven if the 2+ properly considered the fact that )ayala too8 advantage of his high government position, it still
could not validly dismiss him from the service. Knder theRevised Cniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil #ervice,[3$] ta8ing undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance[3B] and where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the ma/imum
penalty shall be imposed.[3<] ?ence, the ma/imum penalty that can be imposed on )ayala is suspension for one
-1. year.
)ayala holds the e/alted position of ,H)C Chairman, with the ran8 equivalent to a C& =ustice. Thus, it is not
unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him. 1n ,alensDabon v. $ud*e Arceo,[3] this
Court, in upholding the liability of therein respondent =udge, saidD
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he e/ercises control and supervision, he being the e/ecutive >udge. ?e
too8 advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires.
1nstead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one
who preyed on them, ta8ing advantage of his superior position.
1n yet another case, this Court declaredD
&s a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more e/acting wor8 ethics. ?e failed to live
up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. &nd
when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a >ustifiable
ground for his dismissal for lac8 of trust and confidence. 1t is the right, nay, the duty of every
employer to protect its employees from overse/ed superiors.[$"]
1t is incumbent upon the head of office to set an e/ample on how his employees should conduct themselves in
public office, so that they may wor8 efficiently in a healthy wor8ing atmosphere. Courtesy demands that he
should set a good e/ample.[$1]
)ayala has thrown every argument in the boo8 in a vain effort to effect his e/oneration. ?e even puts ;omingo6s
character in question and casts doubt on the morality of the former +resident who ordered, albeit erroneously, his
dismissal from the service. Knfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in the disposition of the case.
1t is his character that is in question here and sadly, the inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.
%*RFOR, the foregoing premises considered, the 2ctober 1<, !""! )esolution of the Court of &ppeals in
C&'(.). *+ ,o. $1"!$ is AFFIR"D. Consequently, the petitions in (.). ,os. 133<#1, 133<%", and 13<B""
are DNID. ,o pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDRD.
R"INGTON INDUSTRIA! SA!S G.R. No4. 169291#96
COR$ORATION,
+etitioner,
+resentD
+K,2, $., Chairperson,
*&,;2L&H'(KT15))5@,
' versus ' ,
&@CK,&, and
(&)C1&, $$.
+romulgatedD
R!INDA CASTANDA,
)espondent. ,ovember !", !""$
/' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' /
; 5 C 1 * 1 2 ,

+K,2, $.D
:efore this Court is the +etition for )eview on Certiorari[1] filed by )emington 1ndustrial *ales Corporation to
reverse and set aside the ;ecision[!] of the Aourth ;ivision of the Court of &ppeals in C&'(.). *+ ,os. $%3BB
and $<%BB, dated =anuary #1, !""3, which dismissed petitioner6s consolidated petitions for certiorari, and its
subsequent )esolution,[#] dated &ugust 11, !""3, which denied petitioner6s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of &ppeals, are as followsD
The present controversy began when private respondent, 5rlinda Castaneda -75rlinda9.
instituted on a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non'payment of
overtime services, non'payment of service incentive leave pay and non'payment of 1#
th
month
pay against )emington before the ,H)C, ,ational Capital )egion, . The complaint impleaded
Mr. &ntonio Tan in his capacity as the Managing ;irector of )emington.
5rlinda alleged that she started wor8ing in &ugust 1<# as company coo8 with a salary of +hp
%,"""."" for )emington, a corporation engaged in the trading business4 that she wor8ed for si/
-$. days a wee8, starting as early as $D"" a.m. because she had to do the mar8eting and would
end at around 3D#" p.m., or even later, after most of the employees, if not all, had left the
company premises4 that she continuously wor8ed with )emington until she was
unceremoniously prevented from reporting for wor8 when )emington transferred to a new site
in
5dsa, Caloocan City. *he averred that she reported for wor8 at the new site in on , only to be
informed that )emington no longer needed her services. 5rlinda believed that her dismissal was
illegal because she was not given the notices required by law4 hence, she filed her complaint for
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, salary differentials, service incentive leave pay,
1#
th
month pay and 1"F attorney6s fees.
)emington denied that it dismissed 5rlinda illegally. 1t posited that 5rlinda was a domestic
helper, not a regular employee4 5rlinda wor8ed as a coo8 and this >ob had nothing to do with
)emington6s business of trading in construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire rope
products. 1t also contended that contrary to 5rlinda6s allegations that the -sic. she wor8ed for
eight -<. hours a day, 5rlinda6s duty was merely to coo8 lunch and 7merienda9, after which her
time was hers to spend as she pleased. )emington also maintained that it did not e/ercise any
degree of control andEor supervision over 5rlinda6s wor8 as her only concern was to ensure that
the employees6 lunch and 7merienda9 were available and served at the designated
time. )emington li8ewise belied 5rlinda6s assertion that her wor8 e/tended beyond as she could
only leave after all the employees had gone. The truth, according to )emington, is that 5rlinda
did not have to punch any time card in the way that other employees of )emington did4 she was
free to roam around the company premises, read magaGines, and to even nap when not doing her
assigned chores. )emington averred that the illegal dismissal complaint lac8ed factual and legal
bases. &llegedly, it was 5rlinda who refused to report for wor8 when )emington moved to a
new location in .
1n a ;ecision[%] dated =anuary 1, 1, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondent
was a domestic helper under the personal service of &ntonio Tan, finding that her wor8 as a coo8 was not usually
necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade and business of the petitioner corporation, which operated
as a trading company, and that the latter did not e/ercise control over her functions. 2n the issue of illegal
dismissal, the labor arbiter found that it was the respondent who refused to go with the family of &ntonio Tan
when the corporation transferred office and that, therefore, respondent could not have been illegally dismissed.
Kpon appeal, the ,ational Habor )elations Commission -,H)C. rendered a ;ecision,[3] dated , reversing the
labor arbiter, ruling, vi!D
0e are not inclined to uphold the declaration below that complainant is a domestic helper of the
family of &ntonio Tan. There was no allegation by respondent that complainant had ever
wor8ed in the residence of Mr. Tan. 0hat is clear from the facts narrated by the parties is that
complainant continuously did her >ob as a coo8 in the office of respondent serving the needed
food for lunch and merienda of the employees. Thus, her wor8 as coo8 inured not for the
benefit of the family members of Mr. Tan but solely for the individual employees of respondent.
Complainant as an employee of respondent company is even bolstered by no less than the
certification dated issued by the corporate secretary of the company certifying that complainant
is their bonafide employee. This is a solid evidence which the Habor &rbiter simply brushed
aside. :ut, such error would not be committed here as it would be at the height of in>ustice if we
are to declare that complainant is a domestic helper.
Complainant6s wor8 schedule and being paid a monthly salary of +%,"""."" are clear indication
that she is a company employee who had been employed to cater to the food needed by the
employees which were being provided by respondent to form part of the benefit granted them.
0ith regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, we believe that there is more reason to believe that
complainant was not dismissed because allegedly she was the one who refused to wor8 in the
new office of respondent. ?owever, complainant6s refusal to >oin the wor8force due to poor
eyesight could not be considered abandonment of wor8 or voluntary resignation from
employment.
Knder the Habor Code as amended, an employee who reaches the age of si/ty years old -$"
years. has the option to retire or to separate from the service with payment of separation
payEretirement benefit.
1n this case, we notice that complainant was already $" years old at the time she filed the
complaint praying for separation pay or retirement benefit and some money claims.
:ased on &rticle !<B of the Habor Code as amended, complainant is entitled to be paid her
separation payEretirement benefit equivalent to one'half -1E!. month for every year of
service. The amount of separation pay would be based on the prescribed minimum wage at the
time of dismissal since she was then underpaid. 1n as much as complainant is underpaid of her
wages, it behooves that she should be paid her salary differential for the last three years prior to
separationEretirement.
/// /// ///
0?5)5A2)5, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby, *5T &*1;5, and a new
one is hereby entered ordering respondents to pay complainant the followingD
1. *alary
differential ' +1!,"!1.1!
!. *ervice 1ncentive Heave
+ay ' !,$3"."" #. 1#
th
Month +ay differential '
1,""1.B$ %. *eparation +ayEretirement
benefit ' #$,"B3.""
Tot&6 # $11,747.22

*2 2);5)5;.
+etitioner moved to reconsider this decision but the ,H)C denied the motion. This denial of its motion
prompted petitioner to file a +etition for Certiorari[$] with the Court of &ppeals, doc8eted as C&'(.). *+ ,o.
$%3BB, on May %, !""1, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac8 or e/cess of >urisdiction on the
part of the ,H)C in -1. reversing in toto the decision of the labor arbiter, and -!. awarding in favor
of respondent salary differential, service incentive leave pay, 1#
th
month pay differential and separation benefits
in the total sum of +31,B%B.<<.
0hile the petition was pending with the Court of &ppeals, the ,H)C rendered another ;ecision[B] in the same
case on . ?ow and why another decision was rendered is e/plained in that decision as followsD
2n , complainant filed a Manifestation praying for a resolution of her Motion for
)econsideration and, in support thereof, alleges that, sometime , she mailed her Manifestation
and Motion for )econsideration registered as )egistered Certificate ,o. 1<<<%%4 and that the
said mail was received by the ,H)C, through a certain )oland ?ernandeG, on . Certifications to
this effect was issued by the +ostmaster of the *ta. Mesa +ost 2ffice bearing the date -&nne/es
& and :, Complainant6s Manifestation..
5vidence in support of complainant6s having actually filed a Motion for )econsideration within
the reglementary period having been sufficiently established, a determination of its merits is
thus, in order.
2n the merits, the ,H)C found respondent6s motion for reconsideration meritorious leading to the issuance of
its second decision with the following dispositive portionD
0?5)5A2)5, premises considered, the decision dated ,ovember !#, !""", is M2;1A15; by
increasing the award of retirement pay due the complainant in the total amount of *1OTJ T02
T?2K*&,; A2K) ?K,;)5; T?1)TJ'*5L5, and 3"E1"" -+$!,%#B.3".. &ll other
monetary relief so ad>udged therein are maintained and li8ewise made payable to the
complainant.
*2 2);5)5;.
+etitioner challenged the second decision of the ,H)C, including the resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration, through a second +etition for Certiorari[<] filed with the Court of &ppeals, doc8eted as C&'
(.). *+ ,o. $<%BB and dated =anuary <, !""!, this time imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac8 of
or e/cess of >urisdiction on the part of the ,H)C in -1. issuing the second decision despite losing its >urisdiction
due to the pendency of the first petition for certiorari with the Court of &ppeals, and -!. assuming it still had
>urisdiction to issue the second decision notwithstanding the pendency of the first petition for certiorari with the
Court of &ppeals, that its second decision has no basis in law since respondent6s motion for reconsideration,
which was made the basis of the second decision, was not filed under oath in violation of *ection 1%, )ule
L11[] of the ,ew )ules of +rocedure of the ,H)C and that it contained no certification as to why respondent6s
motion for reconsideration was not decided on time as also required by *ection 1", )ule L1[1"] and *ection 13,
)ule L11[11] of the aforementioned rules.
Kpon petitioner6s motion, the Court of &ppeals ordered the consolidation of the two -!. petitions, on
=anuary !%, !""!, pursuant to *ection B, par. b-#., )ule # of the )evised )ules of the Court of &ppeals. 1t
summariGed the principal issues raised in the consolidated petitions as followsD
1. 0hether respondent is petitioner6s regular employee or a domestic helper4
!. 0hether respondent was illegally dismissed4 and
#. 0hether the second ,H)C decision promulgated during the pendency of the first petition
for certiorari has basis in law.
2n , the Court of &ppeals dismissed the consolidated petitions for lac8 of merit, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the ,H)C in issuing the assailed decisions.
2n the first issue, it upheld the ruling of the ,H)C that respondent was a regular employee of the petitioner
since the former wor8ed at the company premises and catered not only to the personal comfort and en>oyment of
Mr. Tan and his family, but also to that of the employees of the latter. 1t agreed that petitioner en>oys the
prerogative to control respondent6s conduct in underta8ing her assigned wor8, particularly the nature and situs of
her wor8 in relation to the petitioner6s wor8force, thereby establishing the e/istence of an employer'employee
relationship between them.
2n the issue of illegal dismissal, it ruled that respondent has attained the status of a regular employee in
her service with the company. 1t noted that the ,H)C found that no less than the company6s corporate secretary
certified that respondent is a bonafide company employee and that she had a fi/ed schedule and routine of wor8
and was paid a monthly salary of +%,""".""4 that she served with petitioner for 13 years starting in 1<#, buying
and coo8ing food served to company employees at lunch and merienda4 and that this wor8 was usually necessary
and desirable in the regular business of the petitioner. 1t held that as a regular employee, she en>oys the
constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure and that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of
proving that her dismissal on was for a >ust or authoriGed cause and that the manner of dismissal complied with
the requirements under the law.
Ainally, on petitioner6s other arguments relating to the alleged irregularity of the second ,H)C decision, i.e., the
fact that respondent6s motion for reconsideration was not under oath and had no certification e/plaining why it
was not resolved within the prescribed period, it held that such violations relate to procedural and non'
>urisdictional matters that cannot assume primacy over the substantive merits of the case and that they do not
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac8 or e/cess of >urisdiction that would nullify the second
,H)C decision.
The Court of &ppeals denied petitioner6s contention that the ,H)C lost its >urisdiction to issue the second
decision when it received the order indicating the Court of &ppeals6 initial action on the first petition
for certiorari that it filed. 1t ruled that the ,H)C6s action of issuing a decision in installments was not
prohibited by its own rules and that the need for a second decision was >ustified by the fact that respondent6s own
motion for reconsideration remained unresolved in the first decision. Aurthermore, it held that under *ection B,
)ule $3 of the )evised )ules of Court,[1!] the filing of a petition for certiorari does not interrupt the course of
the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary in>unction has been issued against
the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.
Arom this decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on , which the Court of &ppeals denied through
a resolution dated .
?ence, the present petition for review.
The petitioner raises the following errors of lawD -1. the Court of &ppeals erred in affirming the ,H)C6s ruling
that the respondent was petitioner6s regular employee and not a domestic helper4 -!. the Court of &ppeals erred
in holding that petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal4 and -#. the Court of &ppeals erred when it held that the
issuance of the second ,H)C decision is proper.
The petition must fail. 0e affirm that respondent was a regular employee of the petitioner and that the latter was
guilty of illegal dismissal.
:efore going into the substantive merits of the present controversy, we shall first resolve the propriety of the
issuance of the second ,H)C decision.
The petitioner contends that the respondent6s motion for reconsideration, upon which the second ,H)C decision
was based, was not under oath and did not contain a certification as to why it was not decided on time as
required under the ,ew )ules of +rocedure of the ,H)C.[1#] Aurthermore, the former also raises for the first
time the contention that respondent6s motion was filed beyond the ten -1".'calendar day period required under
the same )ules,[1%] since the latter received a copy of the first ,H)C decision on , and respondent filed her
motion only on . Thus, according to petitioner, the respondent6s motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of
paper and the second ,H)C decision has no basis in law.
0e do not agree.
1t is well'settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be rela/ed to serve the demands of
substantial >ustice, particularly in labor cases.[13] Habor cases must be decided according to >ustice and equity
and the substantial merits of the controversy.[1$] )ules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of >ustice.[1B] Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial >ustice, must always be avoided.[1<]
This Court has consistently held that the requirement of verification is formal, and not >urisdictional. *uch
requirement is merely a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non'compliance with which does not
necessarily render it fatally defective. Lerification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations
in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith.[1] The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lac8ing or
act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with
the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of >ustice may thereby be served.[!"]
&nent the argument that respondent6s motion for reconsideration, on which the ,H)C6s second decision was
based, was filed out of time, such issue was only brought up for the first time in the instant petition where no
new issues may be raised by a party in his pleadings without offending the right to due process of the opposing
party.
,onetheless, the petitioner asserts that the respondent received a copy of the ,H)C6s first decision on , and the
motion for reconsideration was filed only on , or two -!. days beyond the ten -1".'calendar day period
requirement under the ,ew )ules of +rocedure of the ,H)C and should not be allowed.[!1]
This contention must fail.
Knder &rticle !!#[!!] of the Habor Code, the decision of the ,H)C shall be final and e/ecutory after ten -1".
calendar days from the receipt thereof by the parties.
0hile it is an established rule that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by
law is not only mandatory but >urisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the
>udgment final and e/ecutory, it is equally settled that the ,H)C may disregard the procedural lapse where there
is an acceptable reason to e/cuse tardiness in the ta8ing of the appeal.[!#] &mong the acceptable reasons
recogniGed by this Court are -a. counselPs reliance on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the Habor
&rbiter that Xthe aggrieved party may appeal. . . within ten -1". wor8ing daysX4[!%] -b. fundamental
consideration of substantial >ustice4[!3] -c. prevention of miscarriage of >ustice or of un>ust enrichment, as
where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final
decision4[!$]and -d. special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits[!B] or the amount and the
issue involved.[!<]
0e hold that the particular circumstances in the case at bar, in accordance with substantial >ustice, call for a
liberaliGation of the application of this rule. ,otably, respondent6s last day for filing her motion for
reconsideration fell on , which was a *aturday. 1n a number of cases,[!] we have ruled that if the tenth day for
perfecting an appeal fell on a *aturday, the appeal shall be made on the ne/t wor8ing day. The reason for this
ruling is that on *aturdays, the office of the ,H)C and certain post offices are closed. 0ith all the more reason
should this doctrine apply to respondent6s filing of the motion for reconsideration of her cause, which the ,H)C
itself found to be impressed with merit. 1ndeed, technicality should not be permitted to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties for the ends of >ustice are reached not
only through the speedy disposal of cases but, more importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive
evaluation of the merits of a case.
Ainally, as to petitioner6s argument that the ,H)C had already lost its >urisdiction to decide the case when it filed
its petition for certiorari with the Court of &ppeals upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, suffice it to
state that under *ection B of )ule $3[#"] of the )evised )ules of Court, the petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary in>unction has been
issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. Thus, the mere pendency of a
special civil action for certiorari, in connection with a pending case in a lower court, does not interrupt the
course of the latter if there is no writ of in>unction.[#1] Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the ,H)C in issuing its second decision which modified the first, especially since it failed to consider the
respondent6s motion for reconsideration when it issued its first decision.
?aving resolved the procedural matters, we shall now delve into the merits of the petition to determine whether
respondent is a domestic helper or a regular employee of the petitioner, and whether the latter is guilty of illegal
dismissal.
+etitioner relies heavily on the affidavit of a certain Mr. &ntonio Tan and contends that respondent is the latter6s
domestic helper and not a regular employee of the company since Mr. Tan has a separate and distinct personality
from the petitioner. 1t maintains that it did not e/ercise control and supervision over her functions4 and that it
operates as a trading company and does not engage in the restaurant business, and therefore respondent6s wor8 as
a coo8, which was not usually necessary or desirable to its usual line of business or trade, could not ma8e her its
regular employee.
This contention fails to impress.
1n Ape; "8'8'A Comp&'7, I'9. ?. N!RC,[#!] this Court held that a househelper in the staff houses of an
industrial company was a regular employee of the said firm. 0e ratiocinated thatD
Knder )ule O111, *ection 1-b., :oo8 # of the Habor Code, as amended, the terms 7househelper9
or 7domestic servant9 are defined as followsD
7The term Yhousehelper6 as used herein is synonymous to the term Ydomestic servant6 and shall
refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer6s
home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and en>oyment
thereof, and ministers e/clusively to the personal comfort and en>oyment of the employer6s
family.9
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is
employed in the employer6s home to minister e/clusively to the personal comfort and en>oyment
of the employer6s family. *uch definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry
women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and similar househelps.
/// /// ///
The criteria is the personal comfort and en>oyment of the family of the employer in the home of
said employer. 0hile it may be true that the nature of the wor8 of a househelper, domestic
servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the
difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the
family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in
business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the
staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. 1n such instance, they are
employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a
regular employee.
+etitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to
certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may
be considered as such an employee. The Court finds no merit in ma8ing any such
distinction. T@e mere =&9t t@&t t@e @o54e@e6per or (ome4t89 4er?&'t 84 <orC8'A <8t@8' t@e
prem84e4 o= t@e b548'e44 o= t@e emp6o7er &'( 8' re6&t8o' to or 8' 9o''e9t8o' <8t@ 8t4
b548'e44, &4 8' 8t4 4t&==@o54e4 =or 8t4 A5e4t or e?e' =or 8t4 o==89er4 &'( emp6o7ee4, <&rr&'t4
t@e 9o'96548o' t@&t 459@ @o54e@e6per or (ome4t89 4er?&'t 84 &'( 4@o56( be 9o'48(ere( &4 &
reA56&r emp6o7ee o= t@e emp6o7er and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as
contemplated in )ule O111, *ection 1-b., :oo8 # of the Habor Code, as amended.
1n the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper[##] that respondent wor8ed at the
company premises and her duty was to coo8 and prepare its employees6 lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs,
as well as the nature of respondent6s wor8 as a coo8, who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family
but also to that of the petitioner6s employees, ma8es her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee
under the doctrine enunciated in the Ape; "8'8'A case. That she wor8s within company premises, and that she
does not cater e/clusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the e/istence of the
petitioner6s right of control over her functions, which is the primary indicator of the e/istence of an employer'
employee relationship.
Moreover, it is wrong to say that if the wor8 is not directly related to the employerPs business, then the
person performing such wor8 could not be considered an employee of the latter. The determination of the
e/istence of an employer'employee relationship is defined by law according to the facts of each case, regardless
of the nature of the activities involved.[#%] 1ndeed, it would be the height of in>ustice if we were to hold that
despite the fact that respondent was made to coo8 lunch and merienda for the petitioner6s employees, which
wor8 ultimately redounded to the benefit of the petitioner corporation, she was merely a domestic wor8er of the
family of Mr. Tan.
0e note the findings of the ,H)C, affirmed by the Court of &ppeals, that no less than the company6s
corporate secretary has certified that respondent is a bonafide company employee4[#3] she had a fi/ed schedule
and routine of wor8 and was paid a monthly salary of +%,""".""4[#$] she served with the company for 13 years
starting in 1<#, buying and coo8ing food served to company employees at lunch and merienda, and that this
service was a regular feature of employment with the company.[#B]
1ndubitably, the Court of &ppeals, as well as the ,H)C, correctly held that based on the given circumstances, the
respondent is a regular employee of the petitioner.
?aving determined that the respondent is petitioner6s regular employee, we now proceed to ascertain the
legality of her dismissal from employment.
+etitioner contends that there was abandonment on respondent6s part when she refused to report for wor8 when
the corporation transferred to a new location in , claiming that her poor eyesight would ma8e long distance travel
a problem. Thus, it cannot be held guilty of illegal dismissal.
2n the other hand, the respondent claims that when the petitioner relocated, she was no longer called for duty
and that when she tried to report for wor8, she was told that her services were no longer needed. *he contends
that the petitioner dismissed her without a >ust or authoriGed cause and that she was not given prior notice, hence
rendering the dismissal illegal.
0e rule for the respondent.
&s a regular employee, respondent en>oys the right to security of tenure under &rticle !B[#<] of the Habor Code
and may only be dismissed for a >ust[#] or authoriGed[%"]cause, otherwise the dismissal becomes illegal and the
employee becomes entitled to reinstatement and full bac8wages computed from the time compensation was
withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.
&bandonment is the deliberate and un>ustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.[%1] 1t is a
form of neglect of duty4 hence, a >ust cause for termination of employment by the employer under &rticle !<! of
the Habor Code, which enumerates the >ust causes for termination by the employer.[%!] Aor a valid finding of
abandonment, these two factors should be presentD -1. the failure to report for wor8 or absence without valid or
>ustifiable reason4 and -!. a clear intention to sever employer'employee relationship, with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no
more intention to wor8.[%#] The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was
deliberate and un>ustified.[%%] This, the petitioner failed to do in the case at bar.
&longside the petitioner6s contention that it was the respondent who quit her employment and refused to return
to wor8, greater stoc8 may be ta8en of the respondent6s immediate filing of her complaint with the
,H)C. 1ndeed, an employee who loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to have
abandoned her wor8, for it is well'settled that the filing of an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with
a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of her desire to return to wor8, thus, negating the employer6s charge
of abandonment.[%3]
1n termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a >ust and
valid cause4 failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.[%$] The employer6s case
succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the wea8ness of the employee6s defense.[%B] 1f doubt
e/ists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of >ustice must be tilted in
favor of the latter.[%<]
IN ,I% %*ROF, the petition is DNID for lac8 of merit. The assailed ;ecision dated , and the
)esolution dated , of the Court of &ppeals in C&'(.). *+ ,os. $%3BB and $<%BB are AFFIR"D. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDRD.
G.R. No. 106041 September 2, 1994
D!FIN G. ,I!!ARA"A, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONA! !A/OR R!ATIONS CO""ISSION AND GO!DN DONUTS, INC., respondents.
Ro*elio R. Cdarbe for petitioner.
Armando D. Ampil for private respondent.

$UNO, J..
*e/ual harassment abounds in all sic8 societies. 1t is reprehensible enough but more so when inflicted by those
with moral ascendancy over their victims. 0e rule that it is a valid cause for separation from service.
Airst, the facts. 2n ,ovember 1$, 1<B, petitioner ;5HA1, L1HH&)&M& was employed by private respondent
(2H;5, ;2,KT*, 1,C., as its Materials Manager. ?is starting salary was +$,3""."" per month, later
increased to +<,3""."".
2n =uly 13, 1<, petitioner Lillarama was charged with se/ual harassment by ;ivina (onGaga, a cler8'typist
assigned in his department. The humiliating e/perience compelled her to resign from wor8. ?er letter'
resignation, dated =uly 13, 1<, readsD
M). H52+2H;2 ?. +)15T2
+resident
(olden ;onuts, 1nc.
;ear *irD
1 would li8e to tender my resignation from my post as Cler8 Typist of Materials ;epartment
effective immediately.
1t is really my regret to leave this company which has given me all the opportunity 1 long
desired. My five -3. months stay in the company have been very gratifying professionally and
financially and 1 would not entertain the idea of resigning e/cept for the most shoc8ing
e/perience 1 have had in my whole life.
Hast Ariday, =uly B, 1<, Mr. ;elfin Lillarama and Mr. =ess de =esus invited all the girls of
Materials ;epartment for a dinner when in -sic. the last minute the other three -#. girls decided
not to >oin the groupp anymore. 1 do -sic. not have second thought-s. in accepting their invitation
for they are my colle-a.gues and 1 had nothing in mind that would in any manner prompt me to
refuse to what appeared to me as a simple and cordial invitation. 0e went to a restaurant along
Ma8ati &venue where we ate our dinner. Mr. Lillarama, Mr. 2laybar and Mr. =ess de =esus were
drin8ing while we were eating and -they. even offered me a few drin8s and when we were
finished, they decided to bring me home. Bhile on m+ wa+, I found out that Mr. Dillarama was
not drivin* the wa+ to m+ house. I was wonderin* wh+ we were ta.in* the wron* wa+ until I
found out that we were enterin* a motel. I was reall+ shoc.%ed&. I did not e)pect that a somewhat
reputable person li.e Mr. Dillarama could do such a thin* to an+ of his subordinates. I should
have left the compan+ without an+ word but I feel that I would be unfair to those who mi*ht be
similarl+ situated. 1 hope that you would find time to investigate the veracity of my allegations
and ma8e each -sic. responsible for is own deed. -emphasis ours.
Than8 you very much and more power.
Lery respectfully yours,
;1L1,& (2,@&(&
The letter prompted Mr. Heopoldo +rieto, +resident of (olden ;onuts, 1nc., to call petitioner to a meeting on
&ugust %, 1<. +etitioner was then required to e/plain the letter against him. 1t appears that petitioner agreed to
tender his resignation. +rivate respondent moved swiftly to separate petitioner. Thus, private respondent
approved petitionerPs application for leave of absence with pay from &ugust 3'!<, 1<. 1t also issued an inter'
office memorandum, dated &ugust %, 1<, advising Xall concernedX that petitioner was no longer connected
with the company effective &ugust 3, 1<. 1 Two -!. days later, or on &ugust B, 1<, Mr. +rieto sent a letter to
petitioner confirming their agreement that petitioner would be officially separated from the private respondent.
The letter readsD
;ear Mr. LillaramaD
This is to officially confirm our discussion last Ariday, &ugust %, 1<, regarding your
employment with us. &s per our agreement, you will be officially separated from the company
effective &ugust !#, 1<.
May 1, therefore, request you to please submit or send us your resignation letter on or before the
close of business hours of &ugust !!, 1<.
+lease see the +ersonnel R 1ndustrial )elations 2ffice for your clearance.
Lery truly yours,
-*(;.. H52+2H;2 ?.
+)15T2, =).
+resident
1n the interim, petitioner had a change of mind. 1n a letter dated &ugust 1$, 1<, petitioner sought
reconsideration of the managementPs decision to terminate him, vi!.D
;5&) *1)D
M&J 1 )5QK5*T A2) & )5C2,*1;5)&T12, 2, T?5 ;5C1*12, ?&,;5; ;K)1,(
2K) M55T1,( 2A &K(K*T %, 1<, T5)M1,&T1,( MJ *5)L1C5* 01T? T?5
C2M+&,J 5AA5CT1L5 &K(K*T 3, 1<.
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Aor his failure to tender his resignation, petitioner was dismissed by private respondent on &ugust !#, 1<.
Aeeling aggrieved, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case 2 against private respondent.
1n a decision dated =anuary !#, 11, Habor &rbiter *alimar L. ,ambi held that due process was not observed in
the dismissal of petitioner and there was no valid cause for dismissal. +rivate respondent (2H;5, ;2,KT*,
1,C. was ordered toD -1. reinstate petitiner ;5HA1, (. L1HH&)&M& to his former position, without loss of
seniority rights, and pay his bac8wages at the rate of +<,3""."" per month from &ugust 1<, until actual
reinstatement4 -!. pay petitioner the amount of +!%,<$$.$$, representing his unused vacation leave and
proportionate 1#th month pay4 -#. pay petitioner +1"","""."", as moral damages, and +!","""."", as e/emplary
damages4 and -#. pay the attorneyPs fees equivalent to ten percent of the entire monetary award.
+rivate respondent appealed to the ,ational Habor )elations Commission. 2n =uly 1$, 1!, public respondent
reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. The dispositive portion of its )esolution readsD
0?5)5A2)5, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and a new
one entered declaring the cause of dismissal of complainant as valid4 however, for the procedural
lapses, respondent -(olden ;onuts, 1nc.. is hereby ordered to indemnify complainant -petitioner.
in the form of separation pay equivalent to two monthPs -sic. pay -for his two years of service, as
appears -sic. in the records., or the amount of +1B,"""."".
*2 2);5)5;.
?ence, this petition where the following arguments are raisedD
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0e affirm with modification the impugned )esolution.
&t the outset, we note that the +etition was not accompanied by a certified true copy of the assailed =uly 1$,
1! ,H)C )esolution, 0 in violation of Revised Circular No. 877. ,either was there any certification under
oath that Xpetitioner has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
*upreme Court, the Court of &ppeals or different ;ivisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, and that to
the best of his 8nowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the *upreme Court, the Court of &ppeals,
or different ;ivisions thereof or any other tribunal or agency,X as required under Circular No. =798. 1t is settled
that non'compliance with the provisions of )evised Circular ,o. 1'<< and Circular ,o. !<'1, would result in
the outright dismissal of the petition. 4
1n addition, under )ule $3 of the )evised )ules of Court, the special civil action for certiorari is available in
cases where the concerned Xtribunal, board or officer e/ercising >udicial functions had acted without or in e/cess
of its >urisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.X 1n Antonio v. National Labor Relations Commission, 1 we held that the
plain and adequate remedy e/pressly provided by law is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision,
and the resolution thereof, which is not only e/pected to be but would actually have provided adequate and more
speedy remedy than a petition for certiorari. The rationale for this requirement is to enable the court or agency
concerned to pass upon and correct its mista8es without the intervention of a higher court. 6 1n this case, the
assailed =uly 1$, 1! )esolution of the ,ational Habor )elations Commission was received by petitionerPs
counsel on =uly !#, 1!. 7 +etitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration, instead, he commenced this
special civil action for certiorari. :e that as it may, we allowed the petition to enable us to rule on the significant
issues raised before us, vi!.D -1. whether or not petitionerPs right to procedural due process was violated, and -!.
whether or not he was dismissed for a valid or >ust cause.
The procedure for terminating an employee is found in &rticle !BB -b. of the Habor Code, vi!.D
/// /// ///
-b. *ub>ect to the constitutional right of wor8ers to security of tenure and their right to be
protected against dismissal e/cept for a "ust and authori!ed cause and without pre>udice to the
requirement of notice under &rticle !<# of this Code the employer shall furnish the wor8er
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containin* a statement of the
causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunit+ to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his counsel if he so desires in accordance with company rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the ;epartment of Habor and
5mployment. &ny decision ta8en by the employer shall be without pre>udice to the right of the
wor8er to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional
branch of the ,ational Habor )elations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination
was for a valid or authoriGed cause shall rest on the employer. . . . -emphasis supplied.
This procedure protects not only ran8'and'file employees but also managerial employees. :oth have the right to
security of tenure as provided for in *ection #, &rticle O111 of the 1<B Constitution. 1n the case at bench,
petitioner decided to see8 reconsideration of the termination of his service thru his &ugust 1$, 1< letter. 0hile
admitting his error, he felt that its gravity did not >ustify his dismissal. Considering this stance, and in conformity
with the aforequoted &rticle !BB -b. of the Habor Code, petitioner should have been formally charged and given
an opportunity to refute the charges. Knder the facts in field, we hold that petitioner was denied procedural due
process.
0e now come to the more important issue of whether there was valid cause to terminate petitioner.
+etitioner claims that his alleged immoral act was unsubstantiated, hence, he could not be dismissed. 0e hold
otherwise. The records show that petitioner was confronted with the charge against him. 1nitially, he voluntarily
agreed to be separated from the company. ?e too8 a leave of absence preparatory to this separation. This
agreement was confirmed by the letter to him by Mr. +rieto dated &ugust B, 1<. & few days after, petitioner
reneged on the agreement. ?e refused to be terminated on the ground that the seriousness of his offense would
not warrant his separation from service. *o he alleged in his letter to Mr. +rieto dated &ugust 1$, 1<. :ut even
in this letter, petitioner admitted his XerrorX visavis Miss (onGaga. &s a manager, petitioner should 8now the
evidentiary value of his admissions. ,eedless to stress, he cannot complain there was no valid cause for his
separation.
Moreover, loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for dismissing a managerial employee. 1t can be proved
by substantial evidence which is present in the case at bench. &s further observed by the *olicitor (eneralD
. . . assuming ar*uendo that ;e =esus and (onGaga were sweethearts and that petitioner merely
acceded to the request of the former to drop them in the motel, petitioner acted in collusion with
the immoral designs of ;e =esus and did not give due regard to (onGagaPs feeling on the matter
and acted in chauvinistic disdain of her honor, thereby >ustifying public respondentPs finding of
se/ual harassment. Thus, petitioner not only failed to act accordingly as a good father of the
family because he was not able to maintain his moral ascendancy and authority over the group in
the matter of morality and discipline of his subordinates, but he actively facilitated the
commission of immoral conduct of his subordinates by driving his car into the motel.
-Comment, &pril !, 1#, p. .
&s a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more e/acting wor8 ethics. ?e failed to live up to
this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. &nd when such moral
perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides >ustifiable ground for his dismissal for lac8
of trust and confidence. 1t is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from over
se/ed superiors.
To be sure, employers are given wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial
employees on the ground of lac8 of trust and confidence. 2
0e ne/t rule on the monetary awards due to petitioner. The public respondent erred in awarding separation pay
of +1B,"""."" as indemnity for his dismissal without due process of law. The award of separation pay is proper
in the cases enumerated under &rticles !<# and !<% of the Habor Code, 9 and in cases where there is illegal
dismissal -for lac8 of valid cause. and reinstatement is no longer feasible. :ut this is not to state that an
employer cannot be penaliGed for failure to give formal notice and conduct the necessary investigation before
dismissing an employee. 10 Thus, in Benphil vs.NLRC 11 and Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Alon!o, 12 this Court
awarded +1,"""."" as penalty for non'observance of due process.
+etitioner is not also entitled to moral and e/emplary damages. There was no bad faith or malice on the part of
private respondent in terminating the services of petitioner. 10
+etitioner is entitled, however, to his unused vacationEsic8 leave and proportionate 1#th month pay, as held by
the labor arbiter. These are monies already earned by petitioner and should be unaffected by his separation from
the service.
0?5)5A2)5, premises considered, the assailed resolution of public respondent is hereby &AA1)M5; 01T?
M2;1A1C&T12, that the award of separation pay is ;5H5T5;. +rivate respondent is ordered to pay petitioner
the amount of +1,"""."" for non'observance of due process, and the equivalent amount of his unused
vacationEsic8 leave and proportionate 1#th month pay. ,o pronouncement as to costs.
*2 2);5)5;.
Narvasa, C.$., Padilla, Re*alado and Mendo!a, $.$., concur.