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Critical Essay on "On What There Is"

By Nathaniel J. Kan

In "On What There Is," W. V. Quine attempts to develop a method for evaluating the

value of an ontology. Ultimately, Quine decides that any ontology is sound so long as it obeys

certain rules: most importantly, accepts the existence of objects in the domain over which bound

variables in our statements quantify. I believe that this description of an ontology does not go far

enough, and will attempt to show that modifications to Quine's theory would improve it to better

fit our perceptions.

Russell's Theory of Descriptions

Quine's theory relies primarily on Russell's Theory of Descriptions (RTD). RTD (or at

least, Quine's use of it) is a method of description quite similar to modern logic, which explains

objects by quantifying over a bound variable. For example, 'Fred is wearing a hat' is translated by

RTD into 'there is something that is Fred and is wearing a hat'. More generally, if there is a

specific object c to which the predicate P applies, letting C be the predicate which expresses the

set of properties that describe being c, then 'Pc' translates into 'There exists x such that Px and

Cx'.

And so Quine claims all statements can be translated by RTD into statements that do not

presuppose the existence of non-existent objects. 'Pegasus exists' becomes 'There exists x such

that x is-Pegasus (or pegasizes)' which is then a false statement. The only thing required here is

that we now accept an ontological commitment to the contents of the domain of the bound

variable x. Essentially, what this means is that we accept the existence of all possible values of x,

which in this case might be every individual animal, or all collections of particles in the universe.

We can imagine an objection to this. The statement Δ, 'The man is wearing a hat', and its

RTD translation Γ, 'There exists x such that x is a man and x is wearing a hat, and there does not
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exist x such that x is not a man and x is wearing a hat'1, seem to be incorrect statements; there are

surely multiple things to which 'is a man' may be applied, and some of these may not be wearing

hats.2 But these seem to be perfectly reasonable statements. The error in reasoning comes from

the failure to remember that Δ implies we are referring to a specific man, while Γ does not. Thus

in order to correct this mistake, we might translate Δ into Γ', 'There exists x such that x is a man

and x is wearing a hat and x is being referred to by me, and there does not exist x such that x is

not a man and x is wearing a hat and x is being referred to by me'. More generally, if we take our

previous example of c and P, and we are referring to 'this' or 'that' c, then 'Pc' is really 'Pc and

Tc' where T is the predicate which expresses reference to, and this translates into 'There exists x

such that Px and Cx and Tx'.

Now we can say that these statements do presuppose the existence of non-existent

objects. 'That I am referring to' seems to presuppose that the object of my reference exists, else

how can I refer to it? But it is important to look exactly at what is being stated. The statement Ψ,

'There exists x such that Px and Cx and Tx' only requires that there exist the objects in the

domain over which the bound variable quantifies, but the existence of 'Tx' is not required to exist

for us to make the statement Ψ. It might well be the case that 'There does not exist x such that Px

and Cx and Tx'.

Thus we might still accept Quine's rules for ontology, by requiring the existence of the

objects within the domain from which bound variables are drawn. However, before we can

decide whether Quine's theory is valid, we must consider his denial of possible beings.

Possibility

Quine makes the claim that theory of the existence of possible beings is a fallacy, as it

leads to an infinity of possible beings, and an infinity of seemingly unanswerable questions to be

1
The second clause appears because 'the' in 'The man is wearing a hat' implies uniqueness.
2
Inspiration for this line of reasoning comes from Ramachandran's "A Strawsonian Objection to Russell's Theory of
Descriptions", Analysis, 53 (1993) pp. 209-212.
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had about them. Quine admits that a statement as a whole may be 'possible', but denies possible

entities. However let us consider the quantum mechanical case of the hydrogen atom (or any

atom, for that matter; this is just the simplest case). Before measurement, the precise location of

the electron cannot be known, only probabilities of its being found at certain locations. Thus we

might say there is a possible electron at Cartesian coordinates {a1, b1, c1} (we could give its exact

probability, but that would still make it only possible), and there is another possible electron at

coordinates {a2, b2, c2}, and so on for all the locations the electron might be at. So, it seems,

possible beings might be said to exist.

A counterargument would be to claim that all these possible electrons are the same one

electron, and because the electron has a total probability of existing somewhere of 1, it is not

possible, in fact it does fully exist. However we should be able to speak of the electron that is at

{a1, b1, c1}; this electron is different from the electron at {a2, b2, c2}, as it differs in its location

property. Surely two objects with two different sets of properties are not identical.

This does not defeat Quine, however, because of the very fact that he admits possible

statements. We can rephrase 'there is a possible electron at Cartesian coordinates {a1, b1, c1}' with

RTD into 'it is possible that A' where A is 'there exists x such that x is an electron and x is

located at {a1, b1, c1}'.3 In this way the possibility becomes a function of the statement. In fact, it

appears all such possible entities can be regarded this way as possible statements. For example, if

we consider a specific possible centaur, such as the one that may or may not live in my backyard,

we might say 'it is possible that B' where B is 'there exists x such that x is a centaur and x is

located in my backyard'. We then know that this statement is false, because we have looked and

not seen it, we have used infrared detection, etc. The only things that cannot be regarded this way

are possible universals, such as the possible existence of centaurs.

3
I use the multiple statement form 'it is possible that A' and A because it is important to remember that the
possibility applies to a statement, whereas 'it is possible that there exists x such that …' allows the possibility to
apply perhaps to the being.
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This does not pose a problem for Quine, however, as it can be shown that universals do

not exist.

Existence

It is important to first clarify the idea of existence. To say something exists under RTD

means 'there is something that we accept in our ontology that P' where P is the predicate which

describes that thing. I would tighten the definition of exists, however, to 'there is such a thing in

the physical universe that P'. After all, when we discuss ontology and "What there is" it seems

less interesting to ask, "What ontology is best suited for speaking of things?" but rather "What

things exist in the physical world?" (assuming we believe in the existence of things independent

of the mind) or "What things exist in the mind?" (assuming we do not believe in the existence of

thing independent of the mind). Although here we are assuming the existence of things

independently in a physical world, we might apply similar definitions of existence to a

phenomenalistic one.

This conflicts with Quine's previous definition of existence. "When we say that some

zoological species are cross-fertile, we are committing ourselves to recognizing as entities the

several species themselves, abstract though they be. (Quine 32)" Here we would be forced by the

previous definition to recognize non-physical beings. Under our new definition, statements

translated in RTD are only valid if the bound variables in them quantify over sets that contain

objects that exist physically. This, however, is compatible with most statements valid in the

previous definition of existence. Quine's 'Some dogs are white' quantifies over a set that includes,

say, animals, and thus includes white dogs.

Under this definition of 'exists' then, to say a property exists (take red) is to say, "Red is a

thing in the physical universe." But we will find no instances of the physical red, only the

property red. There can be a property that does not exist physically; in fact, all properties are of

this nature: no properties exist. Properties only occur as ideas. If we let Pegasus[idea] represent
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'the idea of Pegasus in one's mind', then it is obvious that Pegasus[idea] exists. Analogously,

red[idea] does exist; what we call red[idea] is just a pattern of neural firings in the human mind.

Universals

Now it becomes clear that universals do not exist (physically), just as properties do not

exist. Universal ideas might be argued to exist, however, as a pattern of neural firings in the

human mind. And thus an idea like this might be said to be a universal, for example, if red[idea]

exists in everyone's mind (or simply more than one man's mind). However, the red[idea] that

exists in my mind (or rather, through my mind, as it exists physically as a pattern exhibited by

my brain) is not identical to the red[idea] that exists through your mind: perhaps your vision is

slightly different than mine due to differing amounts of cones and rods in our eyes, or perhaps

one of us is colorblind, or perhaps it is simply that I have different associations with the idea of

red.

Likewise, we might think of the universal justice. The justice[idea] that exists through my

mind is different from the justice[idea] that exists through your mind. Thus we can speak of a

justice[idea-Nathaniel] that is the idea of justice that exists through my mind, and likewise a

justice[idea-Quine] for the idea of justice that exists through Quine's mind. Thus universals do

not exist.

Conclusion

The incompleteness in Quine's argument is that he accepts the existence of the objects in

the domain over which a bound variable is quantified. So long as one accepts this criterion, he is

allowed to pick and choose his ontology, just as one would pick and choose a system of natural

laws based on its effectiveness to explain physical occurrences. However, deciding on an

ontological system is too closely tied to one's chosen physical system to be done independently.
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A phenomenalistic view of experience still upholds a physical law structure for our experience.

Likewise an ontology must support that same structure.

If we consider Quine's theory (the use of Russell's theory and acceptance of possible

statements) altered so that the bound variables range only over the physically existent, then we

get a plausible ontology that denies universals (which fits within our physical law experience). I

believe Quine to be mostly correct, his theory just does not go far enough, for as Quine states, we

are asking "What is there?" and not simply "What things is it convenient to say there are?"