No. 09 15418 BB UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIR€ Sco CAPTAIN CONNIE RHODES, et al, 5 Nov 2 @ 2003 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK Plaintiffs-Appellant, vs. COLONEL THOMAS MACDONATD; et Defendant-Appellees. Appeal from Final Judgment of the United States District Court, Middle District of Georgia, Honorable Clayton Land District Court No. 4:09-cv-00106-CDL APPELLANT ORLY TAITZ’S MOTION FOR STAY OF SANCTIONS DR. ORLY TAITZ JONATHAN H. LEVY CSB #223433 CSB #158032 Co-Counsel in Pro Se 37 Royale Pointe Dr 29839 S. Margarita Hilton Head, SC 29926 Pkwy. Rancho Santa Tel/Fax: 202-318-2406 Margarita CA 92688 jonlevy@hargray.com ph. 949-683-5411 fax 949-586-2082CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that: The attached MOTION FOR STAY is in compliance with the 11th Circuit Rule 27-1 Dated: November 18, 2009. Respectfully submitted, Wwe JONATHAN LEVY ‘Attomey for Appellant CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ‘Appellant is an individual and not a corporation. Dated: November 18, 2009. Respectfully submitted, ‘Attomey for AppellantCERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS In addition to the parties, Appellant certifies the following persons have an interest in this matter: ‘The Honorable Judge Clay D Land USS. District Judge Post Office Box 2017 Columbus, Georgia 31902 Dated: November 18, 2009 Respectfully submitted, nen LEVY Attorney for AppellantREQUEST FOR STAY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS Pursuant to Federal Rules of Procedure Rule 62(d) or 62(g), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 8(a), and Eleventh Circuit Rule 8-1. Appellant Orly Taitz seeks a stay of the attached order and final judgment. Appellant is an attomey in good standing of the California state bar and has never before been disciplined or sanctioned.’ Appellant requests this Court use its inherent powers to stay Rule 11 sanctions under FRCP Rule 62(g) or in the alternative grant supercedeas bond under Rule 62(4) and to stay these Rule 11 sanctions for the pendency of the appeal to prevent irreparable harm from coming to the Appellant’s pro bono legal advocacy practice. FRAP RULE 8(a) Appellant is aware that an initial stay of a Rule 11 sanction should first go to the District Court. But in this case, the District Court has made it abundantly clear it does not want to see the Appellant ever again: “The Court does not suggest that additional due process protections may not be appropriate in other cases depending upon the circumstances, but the Court is convinced that Ms. Taitz has been provided all the process that she is due.” Rhodes v. Macdonald, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95065, *54 (MD. Ga, Oct. 13, 2009). Appellant not only risks further sanctions in a progressive amount but any such attempt would surely be futile before the district court. FRAP Rule ) The Court if it is so inclined may inspect and confirm Appellant’s record directly at the California State Bar’s website: www.calbar.org8(a)(1) wisely uses the term “usually” rather than “shall” regarding the necessity of first approaching the district court for a stay thus indicating occasions may arise where an initial stay application to a district court is just not possible. See: McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 79 F34 1014, 1020 (10th Cir. 1996) wherein futility of approaching a district court for a stay was acknowledged. To better understand the deviation from FRAP 8(a) by way of background this matter involves a Constitutional controversy in the underlying complaint summarized as follows: The Natural Born Status of Mr. Barack H Obama according to the Article 2, section 1 clause 4 of the Constitution and his position as the Commander in Chief and lawfulness of his orders in case he is deemed not to be eligible per the constitution. The controversy stems from the fact that from birth and until now Mr. Obama had citizenship and allegiance to 3 other Nations: Great Britain, Indonesia and Kenya based on his fathers British and Kenyan citizenship and his step-father’s Indonesian citizenship and due to the fact that Mr. Obama has sealed his original birth certificate while the short version Certification of life birth posted on the Intemet does not show the name of the hospital, name of the attending physician or signatures and according to the affidavit of the forensic document expert cannot be considered as genuine. See: Rhodes v. Macdonald, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85485 (M.D. Ga., Sept. 18, 2009) for further details. The matter of the constitutionality of Barack H Obama’s presidency due to lack of Natural Born Status has come before several federal courts and doubtless will be revived in others during the pendency of this appeal. See various Obama birth certificatecases not filed by Appellant: Berg v. Obama, 574 F. Supp. 24 509 (ED PA 2008); Kerchner v. Obama, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97546 (NJ Dist. 2009); Cohen v Obama, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100011 (DC Dist 2008); Stamper v. US, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92938 (ND OH 2008). In the case at hand, the finding the Rhodes matter and the ensuing motions were frivolous has their genesis in the failure to meet the relatively new legal pleading standards of Ashcroft v Igbal 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) requiring factual plausibility which has supplanted the decades; old Warren Court ruling in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) which required only a mere finding of possibility for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. See: Rhodes v. Macdonald, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85485, *12 (MD. Ga., Sept. 18, 2009): “Plaintiff's complaint is not plausible on its face. To the extent that it alleges any "facts," the Complaint does not connect those facts to any actual violation of Plaintiffs individual constitutional rights. Unlike in Alice in Wonderland, simply saying something is so does not make it so.” However “lack of merit” does not necessarily equate to frivolousness nor does lack of plausibility. In Judge Land’s 43 page October 13, 2009 order finding Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte, Judge Land found that the Appellant was deserving of Rule 11 sanctions in part because: “When a lawyer uses the courts as a platform for a political agenda disconnected from any legitimate legal cause of action, that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law.” Rhodes at *2 et seq. Appellant spoke about the dangers of members of the military unquestioningly following unlawful orders. She cited a classic example ofthree younger brothers of her father in law, who as children, during the Holocaust were told to dig their own graves and then were shot to death by Nazi Soldiers, who didn’t question whether such orders were lawful. This foregoing example related to a legitimate legal argument for a need of a military officer to know whether her orders are lawful, it was not abusive and did not warrant a $20,000 sanction. Likewise the Appellant compared her advocacy to that of NAACP attomey Thurgood Marshall fighting for the rights of African Americans just as she is fighting for the right of all the US citizens and particularly members of the military to get access to proper documents, admissible in the court of law, to ascertain the legitimacy of the president and Commander in Chief. Again in context, this was a proper example, relating to a legitimate legal argument. While the purpose of this motion is simply to seek a stay of sanctions under FRCP Rule 62 and not litigate the appeal or underlying case, it is important the Court be aware that Appellant’s position is that she was not sanctioned sua sponte at the time of her alleged inappropriate actions in the district court or for overt disrespect to the judiciary or unethical behavior but in the aggregate for her confrontational pleadings and argumentative style in the district court. Specifically Appellant believes the district court ‘was annoyed by Appellant’s legal arguments which the Court termed political. See Rhodes, October 13, 2009. The Court was galled by Appellant's line of argument and found just about everything Appellant did to be offensive. Rhodes at 39. The District Court was seriously offended by a recusal attempt, a relatively common tactic in state