Edmund Husserl

Edmund Husserl was the principal founder of phenomenologyand thus

one of the most influential philosophers of the 20
th
century. He has made
important contributions to almost all areas of philosophy and anticipated
central ideas of its neighbouring disciplines such as linguistics, sociology
and cognitive psychology.
1. Life and work
2. Pure logic, meaning, intuitive fulfillment and intentionality
3. Indexicality and propositional content
4. ingularity and !ori"on#intentionality
$. %!e p!enomenological epoch
&. Epoch , perceptual noema, hle , time#consciousness and
p!enomenological reduction
'. (mpat!y, intersu)*ectivity and lifeworld
+. %!e intersu)*ective constitution of o)*ectivity
,i)liograp!y
o Primary Literature
o econdary Literature
-cademic %ools
.t!er Internet /esources
/elated (ntries
1. Life and wor
0usserl was )orn in Prossnit" 12oravia3 on -pril +
t!
, 1+$4. 0is parents were
non#ort!odox 5ews6 0usserl !imself and !is wife would later convert to
Protestantism. %!ey !ad t!ree c!ildren, one of w!om died in 7orld 7ar I. In
t!e years 1+'&8'+ 0usserl studied astronomy in Leip"ig, w!ere !e also
attended courses of lectures in mat!ematics, p!ysics and p!ilosop!y. -mong
ot!er t!ings, !e !eard 7il!elm 7undt9s lectures on p!ilosop!y. 17undt was
t!e originator of t!e first institute for experimental psyc!ology.3 0usserl9s
mentor was %!omas 2asaryk, a former student of ,rentano9s, w!o was later
to )ecome t!e first president of :"ec!oslovakia. In 1+'+8+1 0usserl
continued !is studies in mat!ematics, p!ysics and p!ilosop!y in ,erlin. 0is
mat!ematics teac!ers t!ere included Leopold ;ronecker and ;arl 7eierstrass,
w!ose scientific et!os 0usserl was particularly impressed wit!. 0owever, !e
took !is P!< in mat!ematics in =ienna, wit! a t!esis on t!e t!eory of
variations 15an. 1++33. -fter t!at !e returned to ,erlin, to )ecome 7eierstrass9
assistant. 7!en 7eierstrass got seriously ill, 2asaryk suggested t!at 0usserl
go )ack to =ienna, to study p!ilosop!y wit! >ran" ,rentano, t!e aut!or
of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 11+'43. -fter a )rief military
service in =ienna, 0usserl followed 2asaryk9s advice and studied wit!
,rentano from 1++48+&. ,rentano9s lectures on psyc!ology and logic !ad a
lasting impact on 0usserl, as !ad !is general vision of a strictly scientific
p!ilosop!y. ,rentano t!en recommended 0usserl to !is pupil :arl tumpf in
0alle, w!o is per!aps )est known for !isPsychology of Tone 1two volumes,
1++3?4@3. %!is recommendation ena)led 0usserl to prepare and su)mit !is
!a)ilitation dissertation On the Concept of Number 11++'3 wit! tumpf.
%!at t!esis was later integrated into 0usserl9s first pu)lis!ed
monograp!, Philosophy of Arithmetic, w!ic! appeared in 1+41. In t!is work,
0usserl com)ined !is mat!ematical, psyc!ological and p!ilosop!ical
competencies to attempt a psyc!ological foundation of arit!metic 1see 7illard
14+4, pp. 3+811+6 ,ell 144@, pp. 318+43. %!e )ook was, !owever, critici"ed
for its underlying psyc!ologism in a review )y Aottlo) >rege. It seems t!at
0usserl took t!at criticism very seriously 1see >Bllesdal 14$+3, alt!oug! it is
far from clear t!at t!e aut!or of Philosophy of Arithmetic regards logic as a
)ranc! of psyc!ology, as Cstrong psyc!ologismD 12o!anty 14+2, p. 2@3 !as it.
In any case, 0usserl s!arply attacked t!at kind of psyc!ologism 1raising a)out
eig!teen o)*ections in total6 see oldati 1444, pp. 11' ff3 and developed t!e
p!ilosop!ical met!od !e is nowadays famous forE p!enomenology.
In 14@@?@1 !is first p!enomenological work was pu)lis!ed in two volumes,
titled Logical n!estigations. %!e first volume contains a forceful attack
against psyc!ologism, w!ereas t!e 1muc! larger3 second volume consists of
six Cdescriptive#psyc!ologicalD and CepistemologicalD investigations into 1I3
expression and meaning, 1II3 universals, 1III3 t!e formal ontology of parts and
w!oles 1mereology3, 1I=3 t!e CsyntacticalD and mereological structure of
meaning, 1=3 t!e nature and structure of intentionality as well as 1=I3 t!e
interrelation of trut!, intuition and cognition. 0usserl now ad!eres to a version
of platonism t!at !e derived from ideas of 0ermann Lot"e and especially
,ernard ,ol"ano, w!ere !e em)eds platonism a)out meaning and mental
content in a t!eory of intentional consciousness 1see ,eyer 144&3.
In t!e first decade of t!e 2@
t!
century, 0usserl considera)ly refined and
modified !is met!od into w!at !e called Ctranscendental p!enomenologyD.
%!is met!od !as us focus on t!e essential structures t!at allow t!e o)*ects
naively taken for granted in t!e Cnatural attitudeD 1w!ic! is c!aracteristic of
)ot! our everyday life and ordinary science3 to Cconstitute t!emselvesD in
consciousness. 1-mong t!ose w!o influenced !im in t!is regard are <escartes,
0ume and ;ant.3 -s 0usserl explains in detail in !is second ma*or
work, deas 114133, t!e resulting perspective on t!e realm of intentional
consciousness is supposed to ena)le t!e p!enomenologist to develop a
radically unpre*udiced *ustification of !is 1or !er3 )asic views on t!e world
and !imself and explore t!eir rational interconnections.
0usserl developed t!ese ideas in AFttingen, w!ereGt!anks to !is Logical
n!estigations and t!e support )y 7il!elm <ilt!ey, w!o admired t!at work
and recommended 0usserl to t!e Prussian ministry of cultureG!e received an
associate professors!ip 1C(xtraordinariatD, later turned into a CPersFnlic!es
.rdinariatD3 in 14@1. >rom 141@?11 and 1413, respectively, !e served as
founding 1co#3editor of Logos 1in t!e first issue of w!ic! !is programmatic
article CP!ilosop!y as a /igorous cienceD appeared, containing a critiHue of
naturalism3 and of t!e "earboo# for Phenomenology and Phenomenological
$esearch 1opening wit! !is deas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to
a Phenomenological Philosophy3. 0usserl stayed in AFttingen until 141&. It is
!ere t!at !e made !is most important p!ilosop!ical discoveries 1cf. 2o!anty
144$3, suc! as t!e transcendental#p!enomenological met!od, t!e
p!enomenological structure of time#consciousness, t!e fundamental role of
t!e notion of intersu)*ectivity in our conceptual system, t!e !ori"on#structure
of our singular empirical t!oug!t, and more. In later worksGmost nota)ly
in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of nternal
Time 1142+3, %ormal and Transcendental Logic 114243, Cartesian
&editations 114313, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology 114$43 and E'perience and (udgement114343Gt!ese results
were developed furt!er and put into new contexts, suc! as t!e pat!#)reaking
pro*ect of linking t!e )asic notions of science )ack to t!eir conceptual roots in
t!e pre#scientific 1regions of t!e3 ClifeworldD 1Crisis3.
In t!e year 141& 0usserl )ecame 0einric! /ickert9s successor as full professor
1C.rdinariusD3 in >rei)urg?,reisgau, w!ere 1among many ot!er t!ings3 !e
worked on passive synt!esis 1cf. )usserliana, vol. II, IIII3. 0e gave four
lectures on Phenomenological &ethod and Phenomenological Philosophy at
Jniversity :ollege, London, in 1422 1cf.)usserliana, vol. III=3. In 1423 !e
received a call to ,erlin, w!ic! !e re*ected. 0usserl retired in 142+, !is
successor )eing !is 1and /ickert9s3 former assistant 2artin 0eidegger 1w!ose
ma*or work *eing and Time !ad )een pu)lis!ed in 0usserl9s "earboo# in
142'3. In 1424 !e accepted an invitation to Paris. 0is lectures t!ere were
pu)lis!ed as Cartesian &editations in 1431. In t!e same year, 0usserl gave a
num)er of talks on CP!enomenology and -nt!ropologyD, in w!ic! !e
critici"ed !is two CantipodesD, 0eidegger and 2ax c!eler 1cf. 0usserl 144'3.
In 1433 0itler took over in Aermany. 0usserl received a call to Los -ngeles
)ut re*ected. ,ecause of !is 5ewis! ancestors, !e )ecame more and more
!umiliated and isolated. In 143$ !e gave a series of invited lectures in Prague,
resulting in !is last ma*or work, The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology.
(dmund 0usserl died on -pril 2', 143+ in >rei)urg. 0is manuscripts 1more
t!an 4@@@@ pages in total3 were rescued )y t!e >ranciscan 0erman Leo =an
,reda, w!o )roug!t t!em to Leuven 1,elgium3, w!ere t!e first 0usserl
arc!ive was founded in 1434. 1%oday, t!ere are furt!er arc!ives in >rei)urg,
:ologne, Paris, Kew Lork and Pitts)urg!.3 ince 14$@ t!e 0usserl arc!ives
are editing 0usserl9s collected works, )usserliana+
2. !ure logic, meaning, intuitive fulfillment and intentionality
-s a p!ilosop!er wit! a mat!ematical )ackground, 0usserl was interested in
developing a general t!eory of inferential systems, w!ic! 1following ,ol"ano3
!e conceived of as a t!eory of science, on t!e ground t!at every science
1including mat!ematics3 can )e looked upon as a system of propositions t!at
are interconnected )y a set of inferential relations. >ollowing 5o!n . 2ill, !e
argues in Logical n!estigations t!at t!e )est way to study t!e nature of suc!
propositional systems is to start wit! t!eir linguistic manifestations, i.e., 1sets
of3 sentences and 1assertive3 utterances t!ereof.
0ow are we to analyse t!ese sentences and t!e propositions t!ey expressM
0usserl9s approac! is to study t!e units of consciousness t!at t!e respective
speaker presents !imself as !avingGt!at !e Cgives voice toDGin expressing
t!e proposition in Huestion 1for instance, w!ile writing a mat!ematical
text)ook or giving a lecture3. %!ese units of consciousness !e
la)els intentional acts or intentional e'periences, since t!ey always represent
somet!ing as somet!ingGt!us ex!i)iting w!at ,rentano called intentionality.
-ccording to 0usserl, t!ere are non#intentional units of consciousness as well.
10e Huotes pain as an example.3 7!at distinguis!es intentional from non#
intentional experiences is t!e former9s !aving intentional content.
(ven o)*ectless 1i.e., empty3 intentional experiences like your t!oug!t of t!e
winged !orse Pegasus !ave content. .n 0usserl9s view, t!at t!oug!t simply
lacks a corresponding o)*ect6 t!e intentional act is Cmerely as ofD, )ut not
really of, an o)*ect. 0usserl re*ects CrepresentationalistD accounts of
intentionality, suc! as t!e mental image t!eory, according to w!ic! intentional
experiences represent intra#mental pictorial representations of o)*ects, w!ere
like ot!er pictures suc! images may exist wit!out t!ere )eing a depicted
o)*ect in t!e actual world. >or 0usserl, t!is view leads to a Cfalse duplicationD
of o)*ects represented in t!e veridical case6 and it already presupposes w!at an
adeHuate conception of pictorial representation is yet to accomplis!E an
explanation of w!at it is t!at makes t!e underlying Cp!antasy contentD, or
p!antasm, Ct!e NrOepresenting image of somet!ing or ot!erD 10usserl 1444, p.
34'6 )usserliana, vol. IIII, pp. 3@$f3. It is precisely an intentional content
t!at does t!e trick !ere 1as in all cases of intentional consciousness3, according
to 0usserl, in a way to )e explained in more detail )y !is p!enomenology of
consciousness.
In t!e case of propositional acts, i.e., units of consciousness t!at can )e given
voice to )y a complete sentence, 0usserl identifies t!eir content wit! t!e
propositional meaning expressed )y t!at sentence. In t!e case of t!eir non#
propositional )ut still intentional parts, !e identifies t!e corresponding
intentional content wit! a su)#propositional meaning. >or example, t!e
*udgement CKapoleon is a >renc!manD contains an act of t!inking of
Kapoleon w!ose intentional content is t!e su)#propositional meaning
expressed )y t!e name CKapoleonD. 1-ccordingly, t!e *udgement can )e
looked upon as an act of ascri)ing t!e property of )eing >renc! to t!e referent
of t!at name.3 (xperiences like t!is, w!ic! can )e given voice to )y eit!er a
singular or a general term, are called Cnominal actsD 1as opposed to t!e
propositional acts containing t!em3. %!eir contents are called Cnominal
meaningsD.
0usserl regards )ot! propositional and nominal meanings as t!e su)*ect#
matter of Cpure logicD or Clogic in t!e wide senseDGt!e study of 1i3 w!at
distinguis!es sense 1alias meaning3 from nonsense 1t!is part of pure logic
)eing called Cpure grammarD3 and 1ii3 w!ic! of t!e senses delivered )y pure
grammar are logically consistent and w!ic! of t!em are not 1t!is part of pure
logic )eing la)elled Clogic in t!e narrow senseD3.
-n important and still largely unexplored claim of 0usserl9s is t!at any
logically consistent meaning can in principle )e su)*ectively fulfilled, more or
less adeHuately, )y a unified intuition, suc! as an act of continuous perception
or intuitive imagination, w!ere t!e structure and ot!er essential features of t!e
meaning in Huestion can )e read off from t!e respective mode of intuitive
fulfillment. Inconsistent meanings can )e singled out and studied )y means of
1reflection upon3 corresponding experiences of intuitive conflict, like for
instance t!e discrete switc!ing )ack and fort! )etween a duck#!ead#
imagination and a ra))it#!ead#imagination in t!e case of an attempted
intuitive imagination of a duck#!ead t!at is at t!e same time a ra))it#!ead.
ome meanings are inconsistent for formal#logical reasons. -ccording to
0usserl, all analytically false propositions )elong to t!is category. .t!er
meanings are inconsistent )ecause t!ey conflict wit! some general material a
priori trut!, also called Cessential lawD. %!e proposition expressed )y t!e
sentence C%!ere are perceptual o)*ects w!ose surface is )ot! 1visi)ly3
completely green and completely red at t!e same timeD is a case in point.
2eanings generally and propositions in particular exist independently of t!eir
actually functioning as intentional content. %!us, true propositions suc! as t!e
Pyt!agorean t!eorem can )edisco!ered. Propositions and t!eir components are
a)stract, i.e., atemporal, o)*ects. 0owever, w!at does it mean to grasp a
proposition or, more generally, a senseM 0ow can an a)stract o)*ect )ecome
t!e content of an intentional actM :om)ining ideas of ,ol"ano and Lot"e,
0usserl answers t!is Huestion )y taking recourse to t!e notion of an ideal 1i.e.,
a)stract3 species or type, as follows. Propositions and ot!er meanings are ideal
species t!at can )e 1)ut do not !ave to )e3 instantiated )y certain particular
features, i.e., dependent parts, of intentional acts. %!ose species are also called
Cideal mattersD. %!e particular features instantiating an ideal matterG0usserl
refers to t!em as Cmoments of matterDGare laid )are )y p!enomenological
description, a reflection#)ased 1or introspective3 analysis taking into account
)ot! t!e linguistic expression1s3 1if any3 and t!e modes of 1possi)le3 intuitive
fulfillment or conflict associated wit! t!e respective experience.
ince p!enomenological description yields ideal species, it involves w!at
0usserl was later 1nota)ly in deas3 to call Ceidetic reductionD, i.e., an
unfolding of a)stract features s!ared )y appropriate sets of fictitious or real#
life examples, )y way, e.g., of free imaginative variation on an ar)itrarily
c!osen initial example 1for t!e met!od of Cfree variationD, see E'perience and
(udgement, sec. +'3.
P!enomenological description also yields t!e Cmoment of HualityD of t!e
intentional experience under investigation, i.e., t!e particular feature
instantiating its psyc!ological mode 1*udgement, conscious deli)eration,
conscious desire, conscious !ope, etc.3, w!ic! roug!ly corresponds to t!e
speec! act mode of an utterance giving voice to t!at experience. >urt!ermore,
t!e description yields relations of CfoundationD, i.e., one#sided or mutual
relative existential dependencies )etween 113 t!e experience in Huestion and
ot!er experiences and 123 t!e particular descriptive features of t!e experience.
%!us, an experience of pleasure a)out a given event is one#sidedly founded,
relative to t!e stream of consciousness it )elongs to, in a particular )elief#state
to t!e effect t!at t!is event !as occurred. 1%!e relativi"ation to a particular
stream of consciousness makes sure t!at )ot! founded and founding
experience occur in t!e same person9s mind.3 Like all foundation relations,
t!is one !olds in virtue of an essential law, to t!e effect t!at conscious
pleasure a)out some state of affairs reHuires a corresponding 1and
simultaneous3 )elief. Puite generally, a given o)*ect a of type % is founded in
a particular o)*ect b of type , 1w!ere a is different from b and % is different
from ,3 relative to a particular w!ole c of type ) if and only if 1i3 t!ere is an
essential law in virtue of w!ic! it !olds t!at for any o)*ect ' of type % t!ere is
an o)*ect y of type, and a w!ole - of type ), suc! t!at )ot! ' and y are
1proper3 parts of -, and 1ii3 )ot! a and b are 1proper3 parts of c. .f course, t!e
notion of an essential law needs furt!er clarification.
". #nde$icality and propositional content
0owever, as 0usserl was well aware, t!e species#t!eory of content faces at
least one serious o)*ection. %!is o)*ection concerns utterances of Cessential
occasionalD, i.e., systematically context#sensitive, expressions like CI am !ere
nowD and t!e 1as one could call t!em3 indexical experiences t!ey give voice
to. If t!e intentional content of an indexical experience is to serve as a
1su)#3propositional content, it must uniHuely determine t!e o)*ect 1if any3 t!at
t!e respective experience refers to. %!at is to sayE if two indexical experiences
display t!e same intentional content, t!ey must refer to t!e same o)*ect 1if
any3. It seems, t!oug!, t!at t!e moments of matter of two suc! experiences
can instantiate t!e same ideal matterGt!e same type of 1particular3 contentG
w!ilst representing different o)*ects. If you and I )ot! t!ink CI am !ereD, our
respective t!oug!ts s!are t!e same type of content, or so it would seem, )ut
t!ey represent different states of affairs. In order to accommodate t!is
o)servation, 0usserl draws a distinction )etween, on t!e one !and, t!e
Cgeneral meaning functionD of an utterance 1w!ic! corresponds to w!at <avid
;aplan calls Cc!aracterD, roug!lyE t!e linguistic meaning of t!e expression
used3 and, on t!e ot!er !and, t!e Crespective meaningD 1i.e., t!e propositional
or su)#propositional content expressed in t!e relevant context of utterance3.
0owever, it is dou)tful w!et!er t!is distinction really !elps 0usserl overcome
t!e difficulty t!e p!enomenon of context#sensitivity poses for !is species#
t!eory of content. If intentional contents are ideal matters in t!e sense
of types of particular matters, and if t!is kind of type may remain constant
w!ile t!e intentional o)*ect and !ence t!e 1su)#3propositional content differs,
t!en surely intentional contents t!us conceived cannot always function as
1su)#3propositional contents, as 0usserl9s t!eory would !ave it. /at!er, t!ere
must )e anot!er intentional content involved, namely t!e Crespective
meaningD, w!ic! serves as t!e 1su)#3propositional content of t!e indexical
experience. -nd t!is content does not appear to )e an ideal species. 1It may )e
argued, !owever, t!at even 1su)#3propositional contents of indexical
utterances can )e instantiated multiply in t!oug!t and speec!, t!us Hualifying
as ideal species after all. ,ut t!e crucial Huestion is w!et!er t!is !olds true in
complete generalityE consider t!e a)ove example CI am !ere nowD.3
0owever t!at may )e, 0usserl construes 1su)#3propositional contents
1Crespective meaningsD3 as two#factored, wit! t!e general meaning function
plus t!e relevant context of utterance 1if any3 determining t!e content in
Huestion. -nd at least in t!e case of indexical experiences !e seems to identify
t!eir intentional contents wit! t!ese two#factored contents, for !e !olds t!at
intentional content, w!ic! is referred to as Cnoematic senseD or Cnoematic
nucleusD in deas, uniHuely determines reference, i.e., intentional o)*ect. 1>or
t!e claim t!at noematic sense is contextually determined respective meaning
rat!er t!an general meaning functionGw!ic! rules out any internalist reading6
see ection 4 )elowGcf. )usserliana, vol. II?1, pp. '48'+6 see
also )usserliana, vol. II=I, p. 212, fn.3 ome sc!olars even go as far as to
claim t!at 0usserl defines t!e noematic sense as Ca certain person, o)*ect,
event, state of affairs w!ic! presents itself, taken exactly as it present itself or
as it is intendedD 1Aurwitsc! 14+2, pp. &1 f.6 cp. okolowski 14+'6 for a
muc!#discussed critiHue of Aurwitsc!9s interpretation see >Bllesdal 14&43.
%. &ingularity and hori'on(intentionality
0usserl sees Huite clearly t!at indexical experiences 1*ust as experiences given
voice to )y means of genuine proper names3 are c!aracteri"ed, among ot!er
t!ings, )y t!eir singularityE t!ey represent a particular o)*ect, or set of
o)*ects, ', suc! t!at ' is to )e regarded as t!e intentional o)*ect of t!e
respective experience in all relevant possi)le worlds 1i.e., in all actual or
counterfactual circumstances relative to w!ic! we are determining t!e o)*ect
represented )y t!at experience3. %!us, for instance, in sec. 4' of deas, !e
descri)es w!at an experiencing su)*ect, at a given time, in t!e lig!t of !is 1or
!er3 current indexical experiences, considers to )e Ct!e actual worldD as a
Cspecial caseD of a w!ole manifold of Cpossi)le worldsD eac! of w!ic!
corresponds to a possi)le future course of experience 1possi)le, t!at is,
relative to t!e indexical experience in Huestion3. %!ese 1actual or potential3
future experiences can )e said to )e 1more or less3 anticipated )y t!e
experiencing su)*ect at t!e respective time, and t!ey constitute w!at 0usserl
calls t!e Cintentional !ori"onD of t!e indexical experience in t!e lig!t of
w!ose intentional content t!ey are anticipated 1cf. mit! and 2cIntyre 14+23.
>or example, if you see somet!ing as a ta)le, you will expect it to appear to
you in certain ways if you go around and o)serve it.
7!at )inds toget!er t!e intentional !ori"on of a given indexical experienceM
-ccording to 0usserl, all of t!e 1actual or potential3 experiences constituting
t!at !ori"on s!are a sense of identity through time, w!ic! sense !e la)els as
t!e determinable . t!ey )elong to. -s a first approximation, two experiences
of a given su)*ect )elong to t!e same determina)le . if and only if t!e su)*ect
)elieves t!em to represent t!e same o)*ect. 1>or a related criterion
of intersu)*ective identity of determina)le ., see ,eyer 2@@@, sec. '.3 0ence,
experiences )elonging to a determina)le . must )e accompanied )y at least
one !ig!er#order )elief. %!is view fits in well wit! t!e t!esis 1s!ared, at least
in part, )y so#called dispositional !ig!er#order )elief t!eories of
consciousness3 t!at intentional experiences automatically give rise to 1i.e.,
motivate3 momentary dispositions to make a corresponding reflective !ig!er#
order *udgement, )ased on somet!ing like inner perception, t!us constituting a
form of implicit or Cpre#reflective self#consciousnessD 1to use artre9s term3.
%!e motivational )asis of suc! !ig!er#order dispositional )eliefs must,
!owever, already display t!e essential feature of consciousness independently
in order to )e availa)le for !ig!er#order t!oug!t in t!e first place. %!is
)ecomes clear on a close study of 0usserl9s work on Cinner time#
consciousnessD 1see t!e entry on p!enomenological approac!es to self#
consciousness6 also see ection & )elow3.
%!e determina)le . a given indexical experience )elongs to, wit! respect to
certain ot!er experiences, !elps us answer t!e Huestion of w!at determines t!e
reference of t!at experience, if not its ideal meaning species alone. In order to
take t!e role played )y t!e determina)le . into account properly, we !ave to
employ a 0usserlian researc! strategy t!at could )e called t!e dynamic
method+ %!at is to say, we !ave to look upon intentional acts as momentary
components of certain transtemporal cognitive structuresGdynamic
intentional structuresGin w!ic! one and t!e same o)*ect or state of affairs is
represented t!roug!out a period of time during w!ic! t!e su)*ect9s cognitive
perspective upon t!at o)*ect or state of affairs is constantly c!anging 1see,
e.g., deas, sec. +&3. 1%ypical examples of dynamic intentional structures
include continuous o)servationsGw!ic! represent 0usserl9s standard example
Gas well as t!ose totalities of successive *udgements, or momentary )elief#
states, t!at actuali"e one and t!e same continuous )elief. >or instance, my
*udgement t!at yesterday was %!ursday actuali"es t!e same )elief as t!e
*udgement I could !ave given voice to yesterday )y C%oday is %!ursdayD.3
:onseHuently, t!e determina)le .is apt to lead us )ack t!roug! time towards
t!e original situation w!ere t!e reference of t!e relevant unified series of
successive intentional !ori"ons was fixed, like for instance t!e occasion of t!e
su)*ect9s first perceptual encounter wit! a particular o)*ectE t!e corresponding
perceptual experience will )elong to t!e same determina)le . as all of t!e
1remaining3 experiences )elonging to t!e relevant series. In a more recent
terminology, one may say t!at in t!is perceptual situation t!e su)*ect !as
opened a mental file a)out a particular o)*ect 1cf. Perry 14+@3.
In a researc! manuscript from 1413 0usserl refers to mental files associated
wit! proper names as Cindividual notions 1Eigenbegriffe3D 1cf. )usserliana,
vol. II?2, p. 3$+3, c!aracteri"ing t!em as )eing infinitely CopenD and Cin
fluxD 1cf. i)id., p. 3$43. Kow it is t!e CreferentD of t!e relevant mental file, or
individual notion, t!at will normally count as t!e common intentional o)*ect
of t!e experiences )ound toget!er in a unified series of successive intentional
!ori"ons in w!ic! t!e o)*ect Cconstitutes itselfD empirically. 1In cases w!ere
t!e CreferentD of a mental file c!anges across timeGi.e., is unnoticedly
replaced )y anot!er o)*ectGt!e situation )ecomes more complicated. %!e
same goes for cases of perceptual *udgements leading to, or taken )y t!e
respective su)*ect to )e confirming, entries into an already existing file. ee
,eyer 2@@@, sec. '.3 Kote t!at CconstitutionD so conceived does not
mean creation.
.n t!is reading of 0usserl9s notion of t!e determina)le ., t!ere is a link, at
least in t!e case of proper names and in t!e u)iHituous indexical case, )etween
intentional content 1including determina)le .3 on t!e one !and, and extra#
mental reality on t!e ot!er, suc! t!at intentional content t!us understood
determines reference in muc! t!e same way more recent externalist t!eories of
content would !ave it, i.e. in suc! a way t!at t!e referent can in turn )e said to
!elp determine t!e intentional content 1see ,eyer 2@@@, 2@@16 cf. also
0usserl9s discussion of %win (art! in )usserliana, vol. II=I, p. 2123.
Kotice, !owever, t!at 0usserl does not naively take t!e existence of an extra#
mental referent for granted. Instead, !e asks w!ic! structures of consciousness
entitle us to represent t!e world as containing particular o)*ects transcending
w!at is currently given to us in experience 1see ections ' and + )elow3.
0usserl can t!us )e read 1or at least )e rationally reconstructed3 as )ot! an
early direct reference t!eorist 1!eadwordE singularity3 and a non#naive
externalist a)out intentional content and 1respective3 meaning.
%!e dynamic met!od !as us look upon noematic inn under t!e Cfunctional
aspectD of !ow it ena)les us to keep t!e intentional o)*ect Cin mind 1im inn3D
1)usserliana, vol. II?1, pp. 14& ff3, instead of viewing it merely statically as a
psyc!ological type or species to )e instantiated )y isolated moments of
consciousness. It makes us regard any content of t!e latter sort, particularly
Cstatic perceptual contentD, as a mere Ca)straction from dynamic contentD
12ulligan 144$, pp. 14$, 14'3. %!is may !elp to explain w!y t!e species#
t!eory of content !ad )ecome less important to 0usserl )y t!e time !e
wrote deas.
). *he phenomenological epoch
-n externalist reading 1or rational reconstruction3 of 0usserl9s t!eory of
content mig!t, !owever, )e taken to conflict wit! t!e met!odological
constraints posed )y t!e p!enomenological epoch, w!ic!Gtoget!er wit! t!e
dynamic met!od and eidetic reductionG)uilds t!e essential core of t!e
transcendental#p!enomenological met!od introduced indeas.
0usserl developed t!e met!od of epoch or C)racketingD around 14@&. It may
)e regarded as a radicali"ation of t!e met!odological constraint, already to )e
found in Logical n!estigations, t!at any p!enomenological description proper
is to )e performed from a first person point of view, so as to ensure t!at t!e
respective item is descri)ed e'actly as is e'perienced/ or intended, )y t!e
su)*ect. Kow from a first#person point of view, one cannot, of course, decide
w!et!er in a case of w!at one takes to )e, say, an act of perception one is
currently performing, t!ere actually is an o)*ect t!at one is perceptually
confronted wit!. >or instance, it is well possi)le t!at one is !allucinating.
>rom a first#person point of view, t!ere is no difference to )e made out
)etween t!e veridical and t!e non#veridical caseGfor t!e simple reason t!at
one cannot at t!e same time fall !ictim to and detect a perceptual error or
misrepresentation. In t!e non#veridical case, too, a transcendent o)*ect appears
to Cconstitute itselfD in consciousness. It is for suc! reasons t!at 0usserl
demanded 1in deas3 t!at in a p!enomenological description proper t!e
existence of t!e o)*ect1s3 1if any3 satisfying t!e content of t!e intentional act
descri)ed must )e C)racketedD. %!at is to say, t!e p!enomenological
description of a given act and, in particular, t!e p!enomenological
specification of its intentional content, must not rely upon t!e correctness of
any e'istence assumption concerning t!e o)*ect1s3 1if any3 t!e respective act is
a)out. %!us, t!e epoch !as us focus on t!ose aspects of our intentional acts
and t!eir contents t!at do not depend on t!e existence of a represented o)*ect
out t!ere in t!e extra#mental world.
.n closer inspection, !owever, 0usserl actually draws upon two different
versions of t!e epoch, w!ic! versions !e does not separate as clearly as one
mig!t !ave !opedE t!e Cuniversal epochD on t!e one !and, and a weaker
Clocal epochD 1as one could la)el it3 on t!e ot!er. %!e former version 1as
descri)ed in deas3 seems to reHuire t!e p!enomenologist to put all !is
existence assumptions regarding t!e external world into )rackets at once, at
any point, w!ereas t!e weaker version merely reHuires !im to
)racketparticular existence assumptions, depending on t!e respective
Ctranscendental guide 1Leitfaden3D, i.e., on t!e issue to )e clarified
p!enomenologically. %!is is supposed to ena)le t!e p!enomenologist to make
explicit !is reasons for t!e )racketed existence assumptions, or for
assumptions )ased upon t!em, suc! as, e.g., t!e presupposition t!at a given
creature is a su)*ect undergoing suc!#an#suc! an experience. 1In ection ' we
s!all see t!at 0usserl draws upon empat!y in t!is connection.3
.nly t!e universal epoch seems to conflict wit! our externalist readingE if no
extra#mental existence assumptions w!atsoever are admitted at any point, t!en
p!enomenologically t!ere cannot )e o)*ect#dependent intentional contents, as
externalism would !ave it. ,y contrast, t!ere may )e some suc! contents,
even many of t!em, wit!out intentional content generally !aving to )e
dependent on a particular extra#mental o)*ect. 7!ic! leaves enoug! room for
t!e met!od of local epoch to apply to any given particular case, as will
)ecome clear in ection &.
+. Epoch, perceptual noema, hle, time(consciousness and
phenomenological reduction
%!e point of t!e local epoch can per!aps )est )e )roug!t out if we follow
0usserl in applying it to t!e case of perceptual experience. %!e
p!enomenologist is supposed to perform !is descriptions from a first0person
point of !ie1, so as to ensure t!at t!e respective item is descri)ed exactly as it
is experienced. Kow in t!e case of perceptual experience one cannot, of
course, )ot! fall victim to and at t!e same time discover a particular
perceptual error6 it is always possi)le t!at one is su)*ect to an illusion or even
a !allucination, so t!at one9s perceptual experience is not veridical. If one is
!allucinating, t!ere is really no o)*ect of perception. 0owever,
p!enomenologically t!e experience one undergoes is exactly t!e same as if
one were successfully perceiving an external o)*ect.
%!erefore, t!e 1adeHuacy of a3 p!enomenological description of a perceptual
experience s!ould )e independent of w!et!er for t!e experience under
investigation t!ere is an o)*ect it represents or not. (it!er way, t!ere will at
least )e a perceptual content 1if not t!e same content on )ot! sides, t!oug!3. It
is t!is content t!at 0usserl calls t!e perceptual noema. %!anks to its noema,
even a !allucination is an intentional act, an experience Cas ofD an o)*ect.
P!enomenological description is concerned wit! t!ose aspects of t!e noema
t!at remain t!e same irrespective of w!et!er t!e experience in Huestion is
veridical or not. %!us, our p!enomenologist must not employG!e 1or s!e3
must C)racketDG!is )elief in t!e existence of t!e perceptual o)*ect.
0owever, t!is lands !im in a met!odological dilemma. If, on t!e one !and, t!e
p!enomenologist leaves t!e Cnatural attitudeD and )rackets !is corresponding
existence#)elief, !e cannot at t!e same time perform t!e perceptual experience
!e wis!es to investigate. 1%!is is t!e first !orn of t!e dilemma.3 >or, as
0usserl !imself stresses 1cf. deas, sec. 4@, 1@43, t!e existence#)elief is an
indispensa)le part of t!e perceptual p!enomenonE suc! experiences are
essentially thetic, i.e., t!ere can )e no suc! t!ing as a perceptual experience
wit!out C)elief#c!aracterD 1cf. 2
th
Logical n!estigation, sec. 233. If, on t!e
ot!er !and, our p!enomenologist makes use of t!at )elief, t!en !e is )ound to
violate t!e constraints put upon !im )y t!e local epochE !e cannot )ut fail to
assume t!e p!enomenological attitude. 1%!is is t!e second !orn.3
%!ere are at least t!ree possi)le ways out of t!is dilemma. %irst, t!e
p!enomenologist could c!oose t!e first !orn of t!e dilemma, )ut analyse
an earlier perceptual experience of !is, one t!at !e now remem)ers. 0e *ust
!as to make sure !ere not to employ !is earlier 1and per!aps still persisting3
)elief in t!e existence of a perceptual o)*ect. Secondly, !e could again decide
in favour of t!e first !orn and analyse a perceptual experience t!at !e merely
intuitively imagines !imself to !ave. 1>or 0usserl9s view on imagination see
esp.)usserliana, vol. IIIII.3 Thirdly, !e could instead c!oose t!e second
!orn, keep employing !is existence#)elief, )ut make a kind of Cpragmatic
ascentD and describe t!e perceptual experience in suc! a way t!at t!e
description, i.e., t!e speech act t!us performed, does not presuppose t!e
existence of a perceptual o)*ect. 1%!e following sort of description may serve
t!at functionE CI am demonstratively identifying a so#and#soD6 CI am
performing an act of t!is#meaning under t!e aspect so0and0soD.3
It is not entirely clear if 0usserl considers all of t!ese strategies to )e
admissi)le. %!e second one is certainly in line wit! t!e important
met!odological role !e ascri)es to Cp!antasyD, i.e., mere intuitive imagination,
w!en it comes to eidetic reduction, w!ic! in turn constitutes an important part
of t!e p!enomenological met!od. %!e t!ird strategyGpragmatic ascentGfits
in well wit! t!e way !e uses to specify t!e common element of t!e noema of
)ot! veridical perceptions and corresponding !allucinations 1see, e.g., t!e
first#person description of someone9s experience of Ct!is )looming tree t!ere
in spaceD presented in sec. 4@ of deas6 also see i)id., sec. +4 f.3.
Kow we can apply t!e local epoch to specify t!e noema of )ot! veridical
perceptions and !allucinations so as to )ring out t!eir singularity. -lready in
!is 1+44 essay CIntentional .)*ectsD 1cf. )usserliana, vol. IIII6 (nglis!
translation of a somew!at different version of t!e essay inE /ollinger 14443
0usserl stressed t!at o)*ectless representations suc! as !allucinations can in a
sense )e c!aracteri"ed as Crepresenting an intentional o)*ectD, provided t!at
t!is c!aracteri"ation is understood to )e made Cunder an existential
assumptionD, as followsE Cf t!e act of !allucination 1ere veridical,
it 1ould successfully represent suc!#and#suc! an o)*ect 1under suc!#and#suc!
aspects3D. omet!ing similar goes wit! regard to t!e singularity of a
!allucinatory experience9s noemaE if suc! an experience were veridical, it
would, in virtue of its noema, represent a particular perceptual o)*ect in all
relevant possi)le worlds 1see ection 3 a)ove3. %!us, we can provide
an e'istentially neutral specification of t!e noema of a 1veridical, illusory or
!allucinatory3 perceptual experience, *ust as localepoch demands, and still
)ring out t!e singular c!aracter of t!eir content t!at 0usserl !as done so muc!
to uncover, especially in !is investigations into indexicality and t!e role of t!e
determina)le . in our constitution of spatio#temporal reality. %!e specification
mig!t run as followsE %!e noema of a perceptual experience i is suc! t!at
eit!er 113 t!ere is an o)*ect 't!at i represents in virtue of its noema, w!ere ' is
to )e regarded as t!e referent of i in all relevant possi)le worlds, or 123 t!ere
would )e an o)*ect meeting condition 113 if i were veridical. :ondition 123
ena)les us to make sense of t!e )e!aviour of a speaker?t!inker making
counterfactual assumptions a)out an o)*ect w!ic! !e, unknowingly, merely
!allucinates, or of Huantifying into modal statements a)out t!at alleged o)*ect
1cf. ,eyer 2@@@, pp. 2&8313. Kotice t!at on t!e a)ove#proposed externalist
reading of 0usserl9s notion of intentional content, t!e noema will differ
depending on w!et!er condition 113 or 123 is satisfied. Kevert!eless, our
noematic specification meets t!e reHuirements of local epoch, as it does not
rely on t!e existence of a particular perceptual o)*ect. If t!ere is no suc!
o)*ect, condition 123 will )e satisfiedGprovided t!at we are dealing wit! a
perceptual experience. %!e rationale )e!ind condition 123 is t!at even in t!e
non#veridical case an individual notion 1a mental file3 and conseHuently a
unified series of intentional !ori"ons gets activated, on t!e )asis of t!e same
sensory material, or hle 1see t!e following paragrap!3, as in t!e veridical
case.
It s!ould )e noted t!at according to 0usserl t!e complete noema of a
perceptual experience contains an additional element, to )e distinguis!ed from
t!e intentional content, nota)ly its Ct!eticD or CpositingD c!aracter, i.e., its
Huality. 2oreover, t!e manner in w!ic! t!e perceptual o)*ect 1if any3 presents
1or would present3 itself includes t!e sensual matter or ChleD underlying t!e
respective perceptual experience. %ypical examples of hle include sense
impressions 1i.e., sensory experiences3, as opposed to t!e perceptual
experiences )ased upon t!em. %!us, to take 5astrow9s?7ittgenstein9s duck#
ra))it !ead as an example, t!e perception of a duck#!ead may )e founded in
t!e same sense impressions or hle as t!e perception of a ra))it#!ead 1cf.
>Bllesdal 14++, pp. 1@+ f.3. 1>or 0usserl all remaining intuitive acts are
likewise founded in somet!ing like hle, w!ic! !e la)els as t!eir Cintuitive
representational contentD. In t!e case of acts of p!antasy, !e refers to t!e
intuitive representational content as CphantasmaD.3 0usserl regards sense
impressions as non#conceptual in nature. It is only t!e intentional content of a
perceptual experience t!at CformsD its underlying hle so as to yield a
conceptual representation of t!e perceptual o)*ect. 0usserl compares t!is
process of conceptual CformingD of sensual matter to t!e interpretation of a
linguistic expression, )ut t!is comparison s!ould not mislead us to conclude
t!at !e su)scri)es to a sense#datum t!eory of perception 1see ection 2 a)ove,
!eadwordE mental image t!eory3. /at!er, !is view on perception is )est
c!aracteri"ed as a sop!isticated version of direct 1i.e., non#representationalist3
realism.
>inally, we s!ould note t!at on 0usserl9s view t!ere is a furt!er important
dimension to perceptual experience, in t!at it displays a p!enomenological
deep# or micro#structure constituted )y time0consciousness 1)usserliana, vol.
I, IIIIII6 also see 2iller 14+43. %!is merely seemingly unconscious
structure is essentially indexical in c!aracter and consists, at a given time, of
)ot! retentions, i.e., acts of immediate memory of w!at !as )een perceived
C*ust a moment agoD, original impressions, i.e., acts of awareness of w!at is
perceived Crig!t nowD, and protentions, i.e., immediate anticipations of w!at
will )e perceived Cin a momentD. It is )y suc! momentary structures of
retentions, original impressions and protentions t!at moments of time are
continuously constituted 1and reconstituted3 as past, present and future,
respectively, so t!at it looks to t!e experiencing su)*ect as if time were
permanently flowing off.
%!is deep#structure of intentional consciousness comes to lig!t in t!e course
of w!at 0usserl calls t!e Cp!enomenological reductionD 1)usserliana, vol.
IIII, pp. 432 ff3, w!ic! uses t!e met!od of epoch in order to make co!erent
sense, in terms of t!e essential !ori"on#structure of consciousness, of t!e
transcendence of o)*ective reality. %!e most glo)al form ofepoch is
employed w!en t!is reality in total is )racketed. %!ere is still somet!ing left at
t!is point, t!oug!, w!ic! must not, and cannot, )e )racketedE t!e temporal
flow of one9s CpresentD experience, constituted )y current retentions and
original impressions. %!ese recurrent temporal features of t!e !ori"on#
structure of consciousness cannot )e meaningfully dou)ted. %!ey provide a
kind of hle for Cinner perceptionD and corresponding reflective *udgements,
)ut it is a very special kind of hleE one t!at is a proper part of t!e CperceivedD
item and does not get conceptually CformedD in t!e course of perception
1reflecting t!e fact t!at unlike spatio#temporal o)*ects, lived experiences Cdo
not adum)rate t!emselvesD6 cf.)usserliana, vol. III?1, p. ++3. 0ence, t!ere is
no epistemically pro)lematic gap )etween experience and o)*ect in t!is case,
w!ic! t!erefore provides an adeHuate starting point for t!e p!enomenological
reduction, t!at may now proceed furt!er )y using !olistic *ustification
strategies. -fter all, intentional consciousness !as now )een s!own to )e
co!erently structured at its p!enomenologically deepest level.
,. Empathy, intersub-ectivity and lifeworld
.ne of t!e main t!emes of transcendental p!enomenology is intersu)*ectivity.
-mong ot!er t!ings, it is discussed in considera)le detail in t!e $
t!
of
t!e Cartesian &editations and in t!e manuscripts pu)lis!ed in vol. IIII#I=
of )usserliana+ 1- particularly important critiHue of 0usserl9s view on
intersu)*ectivity from a sociological viewpoint is found in c!Qt" 14&&.3
-ccording to 0usserl, intersu)*ective experience plays a fundamental role in
our constitution of )ot! ourselves as o)*ectively existing su)*ects, ot!er
experiencing su)*ects, and t!e o)*ective spatio#temporal world.
%ranscendental p!enomenology attempts to reconstruct t!e rational structures
underlyingGand making possi)leGt!ese constitutive ac!ievements.
>rom a first#person point of view, intersu)*ectivity comes in w!en we undergo
acts of empathy. Intersu)*ective experience is empat!ic experience6 it occurs
in t!e course of our conscious attri)ution of intentional acts to ot!er su)*ects,
in t!e course of w!ic! we put ourselves into t!e ot!er one9s s!oes. In order to
study t!is kind of experience from t!e p!enomenological attitude, we must
)racket our )elief in t!e existence of t!e respective target of our act#
ascription 3ua experiencing su)*ect and ask ourselves w!ic! of our furt!er
)eliefs *ustify t!at existence#)elief as well as our act#ascription. It is t!ese
furt!er )eliefs t!at make up t!e rational structure underlying our
intersu)*ective experience. ince it takes p!enomenological investigation to
lay )are t!ese )eliefs, t!ey must )e first and foremost unconscious w!en we
experience t!e world in t!e natural attitude.
-mong t!e fundamental )eliefs t!us uncovered )y 0usserl is t!e )elief 1or
expectation3 t!at a )eing t!at looks and )e!aves more or less like myself, i.e.,
displays traits more or less familiar from my own case, will generally perceive
t!ings from an egocentric viewpoint similar to my own 1C!ereD, Cover t!ereD,
Cto my leftD, Cin front of meD, etc.3, in t!e sense t!at I would roug!ly look
upon t!ings t!e way !e does if I were in !is s!oes and perceived t!em from
!is perspective. %!is )elief allows me to ascri)e intentional acts to ot!ers
immediately or CappresentativelyD, i.e., wit!out !aving to draw an inference,
say, )y analogy wit! my own case. o t!e )elief in Huestion must lie Huite at
t!e )edrock of my )elief#system. It forms a part of t!e already pregiven 1and
generally unreflected3 intentional )ackground, or ClifeworldD 1cf. Crisis3,
against w!ic! my practice of act#ascription and all constitutive ac!ievements
)ased upon t!at practice make sense in t!e first place, and in terms of w!ic!
t!ey get t!eir ultimate *ustification.
0usserl9s notion of lifeworld is a difficult 1and at t!e same time important3
one. It can roug!ly )e t!oug!t of in two different 1)ut argua)ly compati)le3
waysE 113 in terms of )elief and 123 in terms of somet!ing like socially,
culturally or evolutionarily esta)lis!ed 1)ut nevert!eless a)stract3 sense or
meaning.
113 If we restrict ourselves to a single su)*ect of experience, t!e lifeworld can
)e looked upon as t!e rational structure underlying !is 1or !er3 Cnatural
attitudeD. %!at is to sayE a given su)*ect9s lifeworld consists of t!e )eliefs
against w!ic! !is everyday attitude towards !imself, t!e o)*ective world and
ot!ers receive t!eir ultimate *ustification. 10owever, in principle not even
)eliefs forming part of a su)*ect9s lifeworld are immune to revision. 0ence,
0usserl must not )e regarded as an epistemological foundationalist6 see
>Bllesdal 14++.3
12a3 If we consider a single community of su)*ects, t!eir common lifeworld,
or C!omeworldD, can )e looked upon, )y first approximation, as t!e system of
senses or meanings constituting t!eir common language, or Cform of lifeD
17ittgenstein3, given t!at t!ey conceive of t!e world and t!emselves in t!e
categories provided )y t!is language.
12)3 If we consider su)*ects )elonging to different communities, we can look
upon t!eir common lifeworld as t!e general framework, or Ca priori
structureD, of senses or meanings t!at allows for t!e mutual translation of t!eir
respective languages 1wit! t!eir different associated C!omeworldsD3 into one
anot!er.
%!e term ClifeworldD t!us denotes t!e way t!e mem)ers of one or more social
groups 1cultures, linguistic communities3 use to structure t!e world into
o)*ects 1)usserliana, vol. =I, pp. 12&813+, 14@814$3. %!e respective
lifeworld is claimed to CpredelineateD a Cworld#!ori"onD of potential future
experiences t!at are to )e 1more or less3 expected for a given group mem)er at
a given time, under various conditions, w!ere t!e resulting seHuences of
anticipated experiences can )e looked upon as corresponding to different
Cpossi)le worlds and environmentsD 1)usserliana, vol. III?1, p. 1@@3. %!ese
expectations follow typical patterns, as t!e lifeworld is fixed )y a system of
1first and foremost implicit3 intersu)*ective standards, or conventions, t!at
determine w!at counts as CnormalD or CstandardD o)servation under CnormalD
conditions 1)usserliana, vol. I=, pp. 13$ ff, 1423 and t!us as a source of
epistemic *ustification. ome of t!ese standards are restricted to a particular
culture or C!omeworldD 1)usserliana, vol. I=, pp. 141 f, 22'823&3, w!ereas
ot!ers determine a Cgeneral structureD t!at is Ca prioriD in )eing
Cunconditionally valid for all su)*ectsD, defining Ct!at on w!ic! normal
(uropeans, normal 0indus, :!inese, etc., agree in spite of all relativityD
1)usserliana, vol. =I, p. 1423. 0usserl Huotes universally accepted facts a)out
Cspatial s!ape, motion, sense#HualityD as well as our prescientific notions of
CspatiotemporalityD, C)odyD and CcausalityD as examples 1i)id.3. %!ese
conceptions determine t!e general structure of all particular t!ing#concepts
t!at are suc! t!at any creature s!aring t!e essential structures of intentional
consciousness will )e capa)le of forming and grasping t!em, respectively,
under different lifeworldly conditions.
%!e notion of lifeworld was already introduced in t!e post!umously pu)lis!ed
second volume of deas, under t!e !eading of CJmweltD, to )e translated as
Csurrounding worldD or CenvironmentD. 0usserl t!ere c!aracteri"es t!e
environment as a world of entities t!at are CmeaningfulD to us in t!at t!ey
exercise CmotivatingD force on us and present t!emselves to us under
egocentric aspects. -ny su)*ect taking t!e Cpersonalistic attitudeD )uilds t!e
center of an environment containing suc! o)*ects. %!e personalistic attitude is
Ct!e attitude we are always in w!en we live wit! one anot!er, talk to one
anot!er, s!ake !ands wit! one anot!er in greeting, or are related to one
anot!er in love and aversion, in disposition and action, in discourse and
discussionD 1)usserliana, vol. I=, p. 1+36 0usserl 14+4, p. 1423. %!e central
notion of 0usserl9s CJmweltanalyseD is t!e concept of motivation, w!ose
application !e explains as followsE C!ow did I !it upon t!at, w!at )roug!t me
to itM %!at Huestions like t!ese can )e raised c!aracteri"es all motivation in
generalD 1)usserliana, vol. I=, p. 2226 0usserl 14+4, p. 234, wit! translation
c!ange3. %!e entities exercising motivating force on us owe t!eir
corresponding CmeaningD or significance to certain forms of intentional
consciousness and intersu)*ective processes. %!us, to Huote one of 0usserl9s
examples, CI see coal as !eating material6 I recogni"e it and recogni"e it as
useful and as used for !eating, as appropriate for and as destined to produce
warmt!. N...O I can use Na com)usti)le o)*ectO as fuel6 it !as value for me as a
possi)le source of !eat. %!at is, it !as value for me wit! respect to t!e fact t!at
wit! it I can produce t!e !eating of a room and t!ere)y pleasant sensations of
warmt! for myself and ot!ers. N...O .t!ers also appre!end it in t!e same way,
and it acHuires an intersu)*ective use#value and in a social context is
appreciated and is valua)le as serving suc! and suc! a purpose, as useful to
man, etc.D 1)usserliana, vol. I=, pp. 1+&f6 0usserl 14+4, pp. 14&f3.
.n 0usserl9s view, it is precisely t!is Csu)*ective#relative lifeworldD, or
environment, t!at provides t!e Cgrounding soilD of t!e more o)*ective world
of science 1)usserliana, vol. =I, p. 1343, in t!e twofold sense t!at 1i3
scientific conceptions owe t!eir 1su)#3propositional content and t!us t!eir
reference to reality to t!e prescientific notions t!ey are supposed to
Cnaturali"eD and t!at, conseHuently, 1ii3 w!en t!ings get into flux in science,
w!en a crisis occurs, all t!at is left to appeal to in order to defend new
scientific approac!es against t!eir rivals is t!e prescientific lifeworld, as
manifested in our according intuitive acceptances 1for references cf. >Bllesdal
144@a, pp. 134 f3. %!is view offers an alternative to t!e CnaturalisticD stance
taken )y many analytic p!ilosop!ers today.
.ne of t!e constitutive ac!ievements )ased upon my lifeworldly determined
practice of act#ascription is my self#image as a full#fledged person existing as
a psyc!o#p!ysical element of t!e o)*ective, spatio#temporal order. %!is self#
image can )e *ustified )y w!at (dit! tein, in a P!< t!esis on empat!y
supervised )y 0usserl 1tein 141'3, !as la)elled as iterated empathy, w!ere I
put myself into t!e ot!er su)*ect9s s!oes, i.e., 1consciously3 simulate !im,
under t!e aspect t!at !e 1or s!e3 in turn puts !imself into my s!oes. In t!is
way, I can figure out t!at in order for t!e ot!er su)*ect to )e a)le to ascri)e
intentional acts to me, !e !as to identify me bodily, as a fles!#and#)lood
!uman )eing, wit! its egocentric viewpoint necessarily differing from !is
own. %!is )rings !ome to me t!at my egocentric perspective is *ust one among
many, and t!at from all foreign perspectives I appear as a p!ysical o)*ect
among ot!ers in a spatio#temporal world. o t!e following criterion of
su)*ect#identity at a given time applies )ot! to myself and to ot!ersE one
!uman living )ody, one experiencing su)*ect. 0owever, 0usserl does not at all
want to deny t!at we also ascri)e experiences, even intentional ones, to non#
!uman animals. %!is )ecomes t!e more difficult and pro)lematic, t!oug!, t!e
less )odily and )e!avioural similarity o)tains )etween t!em and ourselves.
,efore finally turning to t!e Huestion of w!at Co)*ectivityD amounts to in t!is
connection, let us notice t!at in 0usserl9s eyes somet!ing like empat!y also
forms t!e )asis of )ot! our practical, aest!etical and moral evaluations and of
w!at mig!t )e called intercultural understanding, i.e., t!e constitution of a
Cforeign worldD against t!e )ackground of one9s own C!omeworldD, i.e., one9s
own familiar 1)ut, again, generally unreflected3 cultural !eritage
1cf. )usserliana, vol. I=3. 0usserl studied many of t!ese p!enomena in
detail, and !e even outlined t!e )eginnings of a p!enomenological et!ics and
value t!eory 1cf. )usserliana, vol. II=III, III=II3. In t!is context, !e
formulates a Ccategorical imperativeD t!at makes recourse to t!e notion of
lifeworld, or environment, as followsE -lways act in suc! a way t!at your
action contri)utes as well as possi)le to t!e )est 1t!e most valua)le3 you
recogni"e yourself to )e a)le to ac!ieve in your life, given your individual
a)ilities and environment 1cf. )usserliana, vol. III=II, pp. 2$1 ff3. Kote
t!at on 0usserl9s view t!e will of a free agent, capa)le of following t!is
imperative, is always already em)edded in a Cvolitional contextD
predelineating t!e open Cfuture !ori"onD of a Cfull individual lifeD t!at t!e
agent is currently a)le to lead 1)usserliana, vol. III=II, p. 2$23, t!us
Hualifying as a dynamic intentional structure.
.. *he intersub-ective constitution of ob-ectivity
(ven t!e o)*ective spatio#temporal world, w!ic! represents a significant part
of our everyday lifeworld, is constituted intersu)*ectively, says 0usserl. 1%!e
same !olds true for its spatio#temporal framework, consisting of o)*ective
time and space.3 0ow soM 0usserl starts 1again, from a first#person viewpoint3
from a CsolipsisticD a)straction of t!e notion of a spatio#temporal o)*ect w!ic!
differs from t!at notion in t!at it does not presuppose t!at any ot!er su)*ect
can o)serve suc! an o)*ect from !is 1or !er3 own perspective. 0is Huestion is
w!at *ustifies us 1i.e., eac! of us for !im# or !erself3 in t!e assumption of an
o)*ective reality consisting of suc! o)*ects, given only t!is CsolipsisticD
conception of a spatio#temporal t!ing 1or event3 as our starting point. .n
0usserl9s view, Ct!e crucial furt!er stepD in order to answer t!is Huestion
consists in disclosing t!e dimension t!at opens up w!en t!e epistemic
*ustification, or CmotivationD, of intersu)*ective experience, or empat!y, is
additionally taken into account and made explicit 1)usserliana, vol. =II, p.
43$3.
/oug!ly, !is argument goes as follows. In order for me to )e a)le to put
myself into someone else9s s!oes and simulate !is 1or !er3 perspective upon
!is surrounding spatio#temporal world, I cannot )ut assume t!at t!is world
coincides wit! my own, at least to a large extent6 alt!oug! t!e aspects under
w!ic! t!e ot!er su)*ect represents t!e world must )e different, as t!ey depend
on !is own egocentric viewpoint. 0ence, I must presuppose t!at t!e spatio#
temporal o)*ects forming my own world exist independently of my su)*ective
perspective and t!e particular experiences I perform6 t!ey must, in ot!er
words, )e conceived of as part of an ob4ecti!e reality. %!is result fits in well
wit!Gin fact, it serves to explainG0usserl9s view, already stressed in deas,
t!at perceptual o)*ects are CtranscendentD in t!at at any given moment t!ey
display an inex!austive num)er of unperceived 1and largely even unexpected3
features, only some of w!ic! will )ecome manifestGwill )e intuitively
presentedGin t!e furt!er course of o)servation.
0owever, according to 0usserl t!is does not mean t!at t!e o)*ective world
t!us constituted in intersu)*ective experience is to )e regarded as completely
independent of t!e aspects under w!ic! we represent t!e world. >or on !is
view anot!er condition for t!e possi)ility of intersu)*ective experience is
precisely t!e assumption t!at )y and large t!e ot!er su)*ect structures t!e
world into o)*ects in t!e same style I myself do. It is for t!is reason t!at
0usserl can )e said to ad!ere to a version of )ot! CrealismD and CidealismD at
t!e same time.
/ibliography
!rimary Literature
%!e collected works of 0usserl were pu)lis!ed in 14$@, in )usserliana5
Edmund )usserl6,esammelte 7er#e, %!e 0ague?<ordrec!tE Ki*!off?;luwer.
%!e following works )y 0usserl !ave )een translated into (nglis!, and t!ey
are listed in t!e c!ronological order of t!e pu)lication dates of t!e Aerman
originals 1if t!ese were originally pu)lis!ed3.
14@@?1 N2nd, revised edition 1413O, Logical n!estigations, trans. 5. K.
>indlay, LondonE /outledge 14'3.
141@, CP!ilosop!y as /igorous cience,D trans. in P. Lauer
1ed.3, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, Kew LorkE 0arper 14&$.
1413, deas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy6%irst *oo#5 ,eneral ntroduction to a Pure
Phenomenology, trans. >. ;ersten. %!e 0agueE Ki*!off 14+2 10 Ideas3.
1424, %ormal and Transcendental Logic, trans. <. :airns. %!e 0agueE
Ki*!off 14&4.
1431, Cartesian &editations, trans. <. :airns, <ordrec!tE ;luwer 14++.
1434, E'perience and (udgement, trans. 5. . :!urc!ill and ;. -meriks,
LondonE /outledge 14'3.
14$4, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, trans. <. :arr. (vanstonE Kort!western Jniversity Press
10 Crisis3 14'@.
14+@, deas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy6Third *oo#5 Phenomenology and the
%oundations of the Sciences, trans. %. (. ;lein and 7. (. Po!l, <ordrec!tE
;luwer.
14+4, deas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy6Second *oo#5 Studies in the Phenomenology
of Constitution, trans. /. /o*cewic" and -. c!uwer, <ordrec!tE ;luwer.
144@, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of nternal Time
89:;<=9;9>?, trans. 5. ,. ,roug!, <ordrec!tE ;luwer.
1444, Early 7ritings in the Philosophy of Logic and &athematics,
trans. <. 7illard, <ordrec!tE ;luwer.
144', Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the
Confrontation 1ith )eidegger 89;@>=9;<9?, trans. %. !ee!an and /. Palmer,
<ordrec!tE ;luwer.
1444, The Essential )usserl, ed. <. 7elton, ,loomingtonE Indiana
Jniversity Press.
&econdary Literature
,ell, <avid, 144@, )usserl, LondonE /outledge.
,ernet, /udolf, wit! Iso ;ern and (duard 2ar)ac!, 1443, An
ntroduction to )usserlian Phenomenology, (vanstonE Kort!western
Jniversity Press.
,eyer, :!ristian, 144&, Aon *ol-ano -u )usserl, <ordrec!tE ;luwer.
888, 2@@@, ntentionalitBt und $eferen-, Pader)ornE mentis.
888, 2@@1, C- Keo#0usserlian %!eory of peaker9s
/eference,D Er#enntnis, $4E 2''824'.
,oe!m, /udolf, 14&+, Aom ,esichtspun#t der PhBnomenologie, %!e
0agueE Ki*!off.
:arr, <avid, 14+', nterpreting )usserl, <ordrec!tE Ki*!off.
:entrone, tefania, 2@1@, Logic and Philosophy of &athematics in the
Early )usserl, <ordrec!tE pringer.
:laesges, Jlric!, 14&4, Edmund )usserls Theorie der
$aum#onstitution, %!e 0agueE Ki*!off.
:ramer, ;onrad and :!ristian ,eyer 1eds.3, 2@11, Edmund )usserl
9:2;0@CC;, ,erlin?Kew LorkE <e Aruyter.
<e ,oer, %!eodore, 14'+, The De!elopment of )usserlEs Thought, %!e
0agueE Ki*!off.
<reyfus, 0u)ert 1ed.3, 14+2, )usserl/ ntentionality/ and Cogniti!e
Science, :am)ridge, 2-E 2I% Press.
<rummond, 5o!n, 144@, )usserlian ntentionality and Non0
%oundational $ealism, <ordrec!tE ;luwer.
>Bllesdal, <agfinn, 14$+, )usserl und %rege, .sloE -sc!e!oug6 trans.
in 0aaparanta 1ed.3 1444.
888, 14&4, C0usserl9s Kotion of Koema,D reprinted in <reyfus 1ed.3
14+2.
888, 14++, C0usserl on (vidence and 5ustification,D in okolowski
1ed.3 14++.
888, 144@, CKoema and 2eaning in 0usserl,D Phenomenology and
Philosophical $esearch, $@E 2&382'1.
888, 144@a, C%!e Lebens1elt in 0usserl,D inE 0aaparanta et al. 144@.
>rank, 2anfred and Kiels 7eidtmann 1eds.3, 2@1@, )usserl und die
Philosophie des ,eistes, >rankfurt?2ainE u!rkamp.
Aander, 0ans#0elmut! 1ed.3, 2@1@, )usserl0Le'i#on, <armstadtE
7issensc!aftlic!e ,uc!gesellsc!aft.
Aurwitsc!, -ron, 14&&, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology.
(vanstonE Kort!western Jniversity Press.
888, 14+2, C0usserl9s %!eory of t!e Intentionality of :onsciousnessD,
inE <reyfus 1ed.3 14+2.
0aaparanta, Leila, wit! 2artin ;usc! and Ilkka Kiiniluoto 1eds.3,
144@, Language/ Fno1ledge and ntentionality, 0elsinki 1Acta Philosophica
%ennica 443.
0aaparanta, Leila 1ed.3, 1444, &ind/ &eaning and &athematics,
<ordrec!tE ;luwer.
0eld, ;laus, 14&&, Lebendige ,egen1art, %!e 0agueE Ki*!off.
888, 144@, C(dmund 0usserl,D in Philosophen des @C+ (ahrhunderts,
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0olenstein, (lmar, 14'2, PhBnomenologie der Asso-iation, %!e 0agueE
Ki*!off.
I*selling, amuel 1ed.3, 144@, )usserl0Ausgabe und )usserl0%orschung,
<ordrec!tE ;luwer.
Ingarden, /oman, 14'$, On the &oti!es 1hich led )usserl to
Transcendental dealism, trans. -. 0anni)alson. %!e 0agueE Ki*!off.
;aplan, <avid, 14+4, C<emonstratives,D in Themes from Faplan, ed. 5.
-lmog and 5. Perry and 0. 7ettstein, Kew LorkE .xford Jniversity Press.
;ern, Iso, 14&4, )usserl und Fant, %!e 0agueE Ki*!off.
;Qng, Auido, 14'2, C%!e 7orld as Koema and as /eferent,D (ournal of
the *ritish Society for Phenomenology, 3E 1$82&.
;Qnne, 7olfgang, 14+&, C(dmund 0usserlE IntentionalitRt,D
in ,rundprobleme der groGen Philosophen5 Philosophie der Neu-eit A, ed. 5.
peck. AFttingenE =anden!oeck S /uprec!t.
2ar)ac!, (duard, 14'4, Das Problem des ch in der PhBnomenologie
)usserls, %!e 0agueE Ki*!off.
2ayer, =erena, wit! :!ristop!er (r!ard and 2arisa c!erini 1eds.3,
2@11, Die A#tualitBt )usserls, >rei)urgE -l)er.
888, 1443, &ental $epresentation and Consciousness, <ordrec!tE
;luwer.
2iller, I"c!ak, 14+4, )usserl/ Perception and Temporal A1areness,
:am)ridge?2ass.E 2I% Press.
2o!anty, 5. K., 14+2, )usserl and %rege, ,loomingtonE Indiana
Jniversity Press.
888, 144$, C%!e <evelopment of 0usserl9s %!oug!t,D in mit! and
mit! 1eds.3, 144$.
2o!anty, 5. K. and 7illiam 2c;enna 1eds.3, 14+4, )usserlEs
Phenomenology5 A Te'tboo#, Lan!amE %!e :enter for -dvanced /esearc! in
P!enomenology and Jniversity Press of -merica.
2ulligan, ;evin and ,arry mit!, 14+&, C0usserl9s Logical
n!estigations,D ,ra-er Philosophische Studien, 2+E 14482@'.
2ulligan, ;evin, 144$, CPerception,D in mit! and mit! 1eds.3 144$.
2urp!y, /ic!ard, 14+@, )ume and )usserl, %!e 0agueE Ki*!off.
Perry, 5o!n, 14+@, C- Pro)lem -)out :ontinued ,elief,D reprinted
in The Problem of the Essential nde'ical, Kew LorkE .xford Jniversity Press
1443.
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/oy 1eds.3, 1444, Naturali-ing Phenomenology, tanfordE tanford Jniversity
Press.
/ang, ,ernard, 14'3, FausalitBt und &oti!ation, %!e 0agueE Ki*!off.
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ntentionalitBt, >rei)urg?,r.E -l)er.
/ollinger, /o)in, 1444, )usserlEs Position in the School of *rentano,
<ordrec!tE ;luwer.
/Fmpp, Aeorg, 1441, )usserls PhBnomenologie der ntersub4e#ti!itBt,
<ordrec!tE ;luwer.
c!u!mann, ;arl, 14'', )usserl0Chroni#, %!e 0agueE Ki*!off.
888, 14++, )usserls Staatsphilosophie, >rei)urg?,r.E -l)er.
c!Qt", -lfred, 14&&, C%!e Pro)lem of %ranscendental Intersu)*ectivity
in 0usserl,D in Collected Papers , %!e 0agueE Ki*!off.
c!wa)e#0ansen, (lling, 1441, Das AerhBltnis !on trans-endentaler
und #on#reter Sub4e#ti!itBt in der PhBnomenologie Edmund )usserls,
.slo?2unic!E olum?>ink.
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Edmund )usserl, %!e 0agueE Ki*!off.
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