Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140863 August 22, 2000
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. an PEOPLE O! T"E P"ILIPPINES,
petitioners,
vs.
"ON. ROLAN#O "O$, %n &%s 'a(a'%t) as P*+s%%ng ,ug+ o- t&+ R+g%ona. T*%a.
Cou*t /*an'& 201 o- Pa*a2a3u+ an MA. !E !. /ARREIRO, respondents.
D ! I S I O N
GON4AGA5RE6ES, J.:
The "uestion raised in this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is #hether or
not the trial court can indefinitel$ suspend the arrai%n&ent of the accused until the
petition for revie# #ith the Secretar$ of 'ustice (SO') has been resolved.
The facts of this case are not disputed.
On Ma$ *+, ,---, the !it$ Prosecutor of Para.a"ue filed an Infor&ation
,
for estafa
a%ainst Ma. /e 0arreiro (private respondent) based on the co&plaint
*
filed b$ Solar
Tea& ntertain&ent, Inc. (petitioner). The case #as doc1eted as !ri&inal !ase No.
--2345 entitled 6People of the Philippines vs. Ma. /e /. 0arreiro6 before the Re%ional
Trial !ourt of Para.a"ue !it$, 0ranch *37, presided b$ public respondent 'ud%e
Rolando 8. Ho#.
0efore the scheduled arrai%n&ent of private respondent on 9u%ust 3, ,--- could
ta1e place, respondent court issued an Order
4
dated 'une *-, ,---, resettin% the
arrai%n&ent of private respondent on Septe&ber *, ,--- on the %round that private
respondent had 6filed an appeal #ith the Depart&ent of 'ustice (DO')6.
:
Private
respondent &anifested in the sa&e Order that she #ould sub&it a certification fro&
the DO' %rantin% due course to her appeal on or before the second scheduled
arrai%n&ent.
3
On Septe&ber *:, ,---, respondent court issued an Order
5
den$in%
petitioner;s &otion for reconsideration of the order that previousl$ reset the
arrai%n&ent of private respondent. Said order further rescheduled the arrai%n&ent of
private respondent to Nove&ber ,+, ,---.
On Nove&ber ,<, ,---, private respondent filed another 6Motion to Defer
9rrai%n&ent6.
7
On Nove&ber ,3, ,---, before the scheduled date of the arrai%n&ent
of private respondent and before the date set for the hearin% of private respondent;s
6Motion to Defer 9rrai%n&ent6, respondent court issued an Order
+
further deferrin%
the arrai%n&ent of private respondent 6until such ti&e that the appeal #ith the said
office (SO') is resolved6.
-
Petitioner;s &otion for reconsideration of the order #as
denied b$ respondent court on Nove&ber **, ,---.
,<
Petitioner be#ails the fact that si= &onths have elapsed since private respondent
appeared or sub&itted herself to the >urisdiction of respondent court and up to no#
she still has to be arrai%ned.
,,
Respondent court alle%edl$ violated due process #hen
it issued the assailed order before petitioner received a cop$ of the 6Motion to Defer
9rrai%n&ent6 of private respondent and before the hearin% for the sa&e &otion could
be conducted.
,*
Petitioner points out that despite the order of respondent court dated
Septe&ber *5, ,--- #hich stated that the arrai%n&ent of private respondent on
Nove&ber ,+, ,--- is 6intransferable6, respondent court, in utter disre%ard of its o#n
order, issued the no# assailed order indefinitel$ suspendin% the arrai%n&ent of
private respondent.
,4
Petitioner is convinced that the t#in orders further dela$in% the arrai%n&ent of private
respondent and den$in% the &otion for reconsideration of petitioner violate Section 7,
of the Speed$ Trial 9ct of ,--+ (R9 +:-4) and Section ,*, Rule ,,5 of the Revised
Rules on !ri&inal Procedure.
Petitioner further sub&its that this instant petition raises 6a pure "uestion of la# of
first i&pression6
,:
since 6it involves the application and interpretation of a la# of ver$
recent vinta%e, na&el$ Republic 9ct No. +:-4, other#ise 1no#n as the Speed$ Trial
9ct of ,--+6.
,3
Petitioner &ainl$ relies on Section 7 of said la# that states that?
6Section 7. Ti&e @i&it 0et#een /ilin% of Infor&ation and 9rrai%n&ent and 0et#een
9rrai%n&ent and Trial. A The arrai%n&ent of an accused shall be held #ithin thirt$
(4<) da$s fro& the filin% of the infor&ation, or fro& the date the accused has
appeared before the >ustice, >ud%e or court in #hich the char%e is pendin%, #hichever
date last occurs. ===6
0$ issuin% the assailed order, respondent court alle%edl$ co&&itted %rave abuse of
discretion a&ountin% to lac1Be=cess of >urisdiction.
,5
Hence, this petition for certiorari
and mandamus to nullif$ and set aside the order of respondent court dated
Nove&ber ,3, ,---.
Petitioner li&its the issues to the follo#in%?
I.
RSPONDNT !OCRT RRD IN R/CSIN8 TO 9RR9I8N TH
PRIV9T RSPONDNT DSPIT TH @9PS O/ TH TIM @IMIT O/
THIRTD (4<) D9DS M9ND9TORI@D IMPOSD 0D S!TION 7, O/
RPC0@I! 9!T NO. +:-4, OTHREIS FNOEN 9S 6TH SPDD
TRI9@ 9!T O/ ,--+6G 9ND
1
II.
RSPONDNT !OCRT RRD IN D/DIN8 S!TION ,*, RC@ ,,5, O/
TH RVISD RC@S ON !RIMIN9@ PRO!DCR.
,7
The instant petition is devoid of &erit.
The po#er of the Secretar$ of 'ustice to revie# resolutions of his subordinates even
after the infor&ation has alread$ been filed in court is #ell settled. In Marcelo vs.
Court of Appeals,
,+
reiterated in Roberts vs. Court of Appeals,
,-
#e clarified that
nothin% in Crespo vs. Mogul
*<
forecloses the po#er or authorit$ of the Secretar$ of
'ustice to revie# resolutions of his subordinates in cri&inal cases despite an
infor&ation alread$ havin% been filed in court.
*,
The nature of the 'ustice Secretar$;s po#er of control over prosecutors #as
e=plained in Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals
**
in this #ise?
6Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are sub>ect to appeal to the secretar$ of
>ustice #ho, under the Revised 9d&inistrative !ode,
*4
e=ercises the po#er of direct
control and supervision over said prosecutorsG and #ho &a$ thus affir&, nullif$,
reverse or &odif$ their rulin%s.
Section 4-, !hapter +, 0oo1 IV in relation to SectionHsI 3, +, and -, !hapter *, Title III
of the !ode %ives the secretar$ of >ustice supervision and control over the Office of
the !hief Prosecutor and the Provincial and !it$ Prosecution Offices. The scope of
his po#er of supervision and control is delineated in Section 4+, para%raph ,,
!hapter 7, 0oo1 IV of the !ode?
J(,) Supervision and Control. A Supervision and control shall include authorit$ to act
directl$ #henever a specific function is entrusted b$ la# or re%ulation to a
subordinateG direct the perfor&ance of dut$G restrain the co&&ission of actsG revie#,
approve, reverse or &odif$ acts and decisions of subordinate officials or unitsG = = =
=.;
Supple&entin% the afore"uoted provisions are Section 4 of R.9. 47+4 and Section 47
of 9ct :<<7, #hich read?
JSection 4. = = = =
The !hief State Prosecutor, the 9ssistant !hief State Prosecutors, the Senior State
Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall = = = perfor& such other duties as &a$
be assi%ned to the& b$ the Secretar$ of 'ustice in the interest of public service.;
= = = = = = = = =
Section 47. The provisions of the e=istin% la# to the contrar$ not#ithstandin%,
#henever a specific po#er, authorit$, dut$, function, or activit$ is entrusted to a chief
of bureau, office, division or service, the sa&e shall be understood as also conferred
upon the proper Depart&ent Head #ho shall have authorit$ to act directl$ in
pursuance thereof, or to revie#, &odif$, or revo1e an$ decision or action of said chief
of bureau, office, division or service.6
JSupervision; and Jcontrol; of a depart&ent head over his subordinates have been
defined in ad&inistrative la# as follo#s?
JIn ad&inistrative la#, supervision &eans overseein% or the po#er or authorit$ of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perfor& their duties. If the latter fail or ne%lect
to fulfill the&, the for&er &a$ ta1e such action or step as prescribed b$ la# to &a1e
the& perfor& such duties. !ontrol, on the other hand, &eans the po#er of an officer
to alter or &odif$ or nullif$ or set aside #hat a subordinate officer had done in the
perfor&ance of his duties and to substitute the >ud%&ent of the for&er for that of the
latter.;
Revie# as an act of supervision and control b$ the >ustice secretar$ over the fiscals
and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of e=haustion of ad&inistrative re&edies
#hich holds that &ista1es, abuses or ne%li%ence co&&itted in the initial steps of an
ad&inistrative activit$ or b$ an ad&inistrative a%enc$ should be corrected b$ hi%her
ad&inistrative authorities, and not directl$ b$ courts. 9s a rule, onl$ after
ad&inistrative re&edies are e=hausted &a$ >udicial recourse be allo#ed.6
*:
Procedurall$ spea1in%, after the filin% of the infor&ation, the court is in co&plete
control of the case and an$ disposition therein is sub>ect to its sound discretion.
*3
The
decision to suspend arrai%n&ent to a#ait the resolution of an appeal #ith the
Secretar$ of 'ustice is an e=ercise of such discretion. !onsistent #ith our rulin% in
Marcelo,
*5
#e have since then held in a nu&ber of cases that a court can defer to the
authorit$ of the prosecution ar& to resolve, once and for all, the issue of #hether or
not sufficient %round e=isted to file the infor&ation.
*7
This is in line #ith our %eneral
pronounce&ent in Crespo
*+
that courts cannot interfere #ith the prosecutor;s
discretion over cri&inal prosecution.
*-
Thus, public respondent did not act #ith %rave
abuse of discretion #hen it suspended the arrai%n&ent of private respondent to a#ait
the resolution of her petition for revie# #ith the Secretar$ of 'ustice.
In several cases, #e have e&phaticall$ cautioned >ud%es to refrain fro& arrai%nin%
the accused precipitatel$ to avoid a &iscarria%e of >ustice.
4<
In Dimatulac vs. Villon,
4,

the >ud%e in that case hastil$ arrai%ned the accused despite the pendin% appeal of
the accused #ith the DO' and not#ithstandin% the e=istence of circu&stances
indicatin% the probabilit$ of &iscarria%e of >ustice. Said >ud%e #as re&inded that he
should have heeded our state&ent in Marcelo
4*
6that prudence, if not #isdo&, or at
least respect for the authorit$ of the prosecution a%enc$, dictated that he (respondent
>ud%e therein) should have #aited for the resolution of the appeal then pendin% #ith
the DO'.6
44
2
It bears stressin% that the court is ho#ever not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretar$ of 'ustice since the court is &andated to independentl$ evaluate or assess
the &erits of the case, and &a$ either a%ree or disa%ree #ith the reco&&endation of
the Secretar$ of 'ustice.
4:
Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretar$ of
'ustice #ould be an abdication of the trial court;s dut$ and >urisdiction to deter&ine
prima facie case.
43
Petitioner insists that in vie# of the passa%e of the Speed$ Trial 9ct of ,--+, the
revie# authorit$ of the Secretar$ of 'ustice after an infor&ation has been alread$
filed in court &a$ possibl$ trans%ress the ri%ht of a part$ to a speed$ disposition of
his case, in li%ht of the &andator$ tenor of the Speed$ Trial 9ct of ,--+ re"uirin% that
the accused &ust be arrai%ned #ithin thirt$ (4<) da$s fro& the filin% of an infor&ation
a%ainst hi&. Petitioner then i&presses upon this !ourt that there is a need to
reconcile the revie# authorit$ of the Secretar$ of 'ustice and the Speed$ Trial 9ct of
,--+, and sub&its that 6the Secretar$ of 'ustice &ust revie# the appeal and rule
thereon #ithin a period of thirt$ (4<) da$s fro& the date the infor&ation #as filed or
fro& the date the accused appeared in court (surrendered or arrested)6
45
if onl$ to
%ive &eanin% to the Speed$ Trial 9ct.
Ee are not persuaded. The authorit$ of the Secretar$ of 'ustice to revie# resolutions
of his subordinates even after an infor&ation has alread$ been filed in court does not
present an irreconcilable conflict #ith the thirt$2da$ period prescribed b$ Section 7 of
the Speed$ Trial 9ct.
!ontrar$ to the ur%in%s of petitioner, Section 7 of the Speed$ Trial 9ct of ,--+
prescribin% the thirt$2da$ period for the arrai%n&ent of the accused is not absolute. In
fact, Section ,< of the sa&e la# enu&erates periods of dela$ that shall be e=cluded
in co&putin% the ti&e #ithin #hich trial &ust co&&ence. The pertinent portion
thereof provides that?
6S!. ,<. Exclusions. - The follo#in% periods of dela$ shall be e=cluded in
co&putin% the ti&e #ithin #hich trial &ust co&&ence?
= = =
6(f) 9n$ period of dela$ resultin% fro& a continuance %ranted b$ an$ >ustice or >ud%e
motu propio or on &otion of the accused or hisBher counsel or at the re"uest of the
public prosecutor, if the >ustice or >ud%e %ranted such continuance on the basis of
hisBher findin%s that the ends of >ustice served b$ ta1in% such action out#ei%h the
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speed$ trial. No such period of
dela$ resultin% fro& a continuance %ranted b$ the court in accordance #ith this
subpara%raph shall be e=cludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in
the record of the case, either orall$ or in #ritin%, its reasons for findin% that the ends
of >ustice served b$ the %rantin% of such continuance out#ei%h the best interests of
the public and the accused in a speed$ trial.6
9ccordin%l$, the vie# espoused b$ petitioner that the thirt$2da$ period prescribed b$
Section 7 of the Speed$ Trial 9ct &ust be strictl$ observed so as not to violate its
ri%ht to a speed$ trial finds no support in the la# itself. The e=ceptions provided in the
Speed$ Trial 9ct of ,--+ reflect the funda&entall$ reco%niKed principle that the
concept of 6speed$ trial6 is 6a relative ter& and &ust necessaril$ be a fle=ible
concept.6
47
In fact, in i&ple&entin% the Speed$ Trial 9ct of ,--+, this !ourt issued
S! !ircular No. 4+2-+, Section * of #hich provides that?
6Section *. Ti&e @i&it for 9rrai%n&ent and Pre2trial. A The arrai%n&ent, and the pre2
trial if the accused pleads not %uilt$ to the cri&e char%ed, shall be held #ithin thirt$
(4<) da$s fro& the date the court ac"uires >urisdiction over the person of the
accused. The period of the pendenc$ of a &otion to "uash, or for a bill of particulars,
or oter causes !ustif"ing suspension of arraignment sall be excluded.6 (&phasis
ours)
9s stated earlier, prudence and #isdo& dictate that the court should hold in
abe$ance the proceedin%s #hile the Secretar$ of 'ustice resolves the petition for
revie# "uestionin% the resolution of the prosecutor. The dela$ in such a case is
>ustified because the deter&ination of #hether the dela$ is unreasonable, thus
a&ountin% to a trans%ression of the ri%ht to a speed$ trial, cannot be si&pl$ reduced
to a &athe&atical process. Hence, the len%th of dela$ is not the lone criterion to be
considered, several factors &ust be ta1en into account in deter&inin% #hether or not
the constitutional ri%ht to a speed$ trial has been violated. The factors to consider
and balance are the duration of the dela$, reason thereof, assertion of the ri%ht or
failure to assert it and the pre>udice caused b$ such dela$.
4+
The i&portance of the revie# authorit$ of the Secretar$ of 'ustice cannot be
overe&phasiKedG as earlier pointed out, it is based on the doctrine of e=haustion of
ad&inistrative re&edies that holds that 6&ista1es, abuses or ne%li%ence co&&itted in
the initial steps of an ad&inistrative activit$ or b$ an ad&inistrative a%enc$ should be
corrected b$ hi%her ad&inistrative authorities, and not directl$ b$ courts.6
4-
Ee are not un&indful of the principle that #hile the ri%ht to a speed$ trial secures
ri%hts to the defendant, it does not preclude the ri%hts of public >ustice.
:<
Ho#ever, in
this case, petitioner as private co&plainant in the cri&inal case, cannot deprive
private respondent, accused therein, of her ri%ht to avail of a re&ed$ afforded to an
accused in a cri&inal case. The i&&ediate arrai%n&ent of private respondent #ould
have then proscribed her ri%ht as accused to appeal the resolution of the prosecutor
to the Secretar$ of 'ustice since Section : of DO' Order No. **4 of 'une 4<, ,--4
forestalls an appeal to the Secretar$ of 'ustice if the accusedBappellant has alread$
been arrai%ned.
:,
Hence, in this case, the order suspendin% the arrai%n&ent of
private respondent &erel$ allo#ed private respondent to e=haust the ad&inistrative
re&edies available to her as accused in the cri&inal case before the court could
proceed to a full2blo#n trial. !onversel$, in case the resolution is for the dis&issal of
the infor&ation, the offended part$ in the cri&inal case, herein petitioner, can appeal
the adverse resolution to the Secretar$ of 'ustice.
:*
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals#
this !ourt aptl$ pointed out that?
3
6the trial court in a cri&inal case #hich ta1es co%niKance of an accused;s &otion for
revie# of the resolution of the investi%atin% prosecutor or for reinvesti%ation and
defers the arrai%n&ent until resolution of the said &otion &ust act on the resolution
reversin% the investi%atin% prosecutor;s findin% or on a &otion to dis&iss based
thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal
was taken therefrom to the Department of Justice.6
:4
(&phasis ours)
The fact that public respondent issued the assailed order suspendin% the
arrai%n&ent of private respondent before the 6Motion to Defer 9rrai%n&ent6 of private
respondent could be heard is not tanta&ount to %rave abuse of discretion. It #as #ell
#ithin the po#er of public respondent to %rant the continuance since Section ,< (f) of
the Speed$ Trial 9ct of ,--+ clearl$ confers this authorit$.
Public respondent substantiall$ co&plied #ith the re"uire&ent of Section ,< (f) of the
Speed$ Trial 9ct #hen it stated its reasons for the defer&ent and eventual
suspension of the arrai%n&ent of private respondent in its orders dated Septe&ber
*:, ,---
::
and Nove&ber **, ,---
:3
. In said orders, public respondent reasoned
that the suspension of the arrai%n&ent of private respondent #as to %ive the
opportunit$ to the accused to e=haust the procedural re&edies available,
:5
to allo#
the Secretar$ of 'ustice to revie# the resolution of the !it$ Prosecutor
:7
so as not to
deprive the for&er of his po#er to revie# the action of the latter b$ a precipitate trial
of the case,
:+
and based on the discretionar$ po#er of the trial >ud%e to %rant or den$
the &otion to suspend the arrai%n&ent of the accused pendin% deter&ination of her
petition for revie# at the Depart&ent of 'ustice.
:-
Despite the absence of a la# or
re%ulation prescribin% the period #ithin #hich the Secretar$ of 'ustice &ust dispose
of an appeal, the presu&ption still holds true that in the re%ular perfor&ance of his
functions, the Secretar$ of 'ustice #ill decide the appeal in the soonest possible
ti&e. Recentl$, the Depart&ent of 'ustice issued Me&orandu& Order No. ,* dated
'ul$ 4, *<<< &andatin% that the period for the disposition of appealsBpetitions for
revie# shall be 73 da$s.
3<
In vie# of this &e&orandu&, the indefinite suspension of
proceedin%s in the trial court because of a pendin% petition for revie# #ith the
Secretar$ of 'ustice is no# unli1el$ to happen.
Section ,5 of Rule ,,< of the Rules of !ourt does entitle the offended part$ to
intervene in the cri&inal case if he has not #aived the civil action or e=pressl$
reserved his ri%ht to institute it separatel$ fro& the cri&inal action. Ho#ever, the
prosecution of the cri&inal case throu%h the private prosecutor is still under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor
3,
and such intervention &ust be #ith the
per&ission of the public prosecutor.
3*
In this case, based on the po#er of control and
supervision of the Secretar$ of 'ustice over public prosecutors, the pendenc$ of the
appeal of private respondent #ith the Secretar$ of 'ustice should have i&pelled the
public prosecutor to &ove for the suspension of the arrai%n&ent of private
respondent. !onsiderin% that private respondent had alread$ infor&ed the court of
her appeal #ith the Secretar$ of 'ustice and had &oved for the suspension of her
arrai%n&ent, the public prosecutor should have desisted fro& opposin% the
abe$ance of further proceedin%s.
@astl$, petitioner;s ar%u&ent that the suspension of the arrai%n&ent in this case #as
in violation of Section ,*, Rule ,,5 of the Revised Rules on !ri&inal Procedure is
li1e#ise not tenable. Section ,*, Rule ,,5 of the Revised Rules on !ri&inal
Procedure provides that?
6Section ,*. Suspension of 9rrai%n&ent. A The arrai%n&ent shall be suspended, if at
the ti&e thereof?
(a) The accused appears to be sufferin% fro& an unsound &ental condition
#hich effectivel$ renders hi& unable to full$ understand the case a%ainst
hi& and to plead intelli%entl$ thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
&ental e=a&ination and, if necessar$, his confine&ent for such purpose.
(b) The court finds the e=istence of a valid pre>udicial "uestion.6
There is nothin% in the above2"uoted provision that e=pressl$ or i&pliedl$ &andates
that the suspension of arrai%n&ent shall be li&ited to the cases enu&erated therein.
Moreover, >urisprudence has clearl$ established that the suspension of arrai%n&ent
is not strictl$ li&ited to the t#o situations conte&plated in said provision.
34
In fine, no
%rave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the assailed order suspendin% the
arrai%n&ent of private respondent until her petition for revie# #ith the Secretar$ of
'ustice is resolved.
$"ERE!ORE, the petition is DISMISSD for lac1 of &erit.
SO ORDRD.
4