Document 3 Complaint Commen— Law Right to Ap perl Cecuatd by the Nlivith Amendmont Lmvchdins an Awlevtioved Abuse of Sucticiel Conterpt PowerUNITED STAVES HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES SUDICTARY COMMTTTE, vartin A, Armstrong ave Judge John M. Walker, Ir wudge Richard Owen ether judges known and unknown Southern District of New York second Clrcuit, Court of Appeals 1 1 1 ! ! 1 1 ‘COMMON-LAW RIGHT 10 APPEAL 0 THE LEGISLATURE SECURED BY THE NINTH AMENDMENT CONCERILING A SERIOUS IMPRACHABLE OFFENSE TIVOLVING AN INTENTIONAL ABUSE OF JUDICIAL CONTEMPT POWER BACKGROUND This petition concorns an abuse of judicial power that was used to create tha longest civil contempt in Averican Jurisprudence {7} years), that resulted in a deliberate extortion post-indictment in direct violatien of Interratienal Law and the Torture Victim Protection Act passed by Congress in 1992, Martin A. Armstrong (herein "Pebttioner". cr "Armstrong") 18 the Longest: held civil contenncr Post-indictnent to comel a cohtession without trial by aay ational govarnnent claiming the mentie of a free civilized scciety. Congress has forbidden "any" nonstatutery detention that the Judiciary clains that does not apoly to then. Aemstrong tried to appeal 3 times but was denied a right to appeal even though Congress established such a right in 28 USC §1626. Judge Richard Owen held.19 USC $4001 (a) ("No citizen ohall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by che United states except pursuant to an Act of Congres: "J, Just did not apply to tha Judiciary. Judgo John i. Walker, Je, sat. on the first panel and denied accepting jurisdiction for a right to appeal, ard thereafter manipulated the docket to ensure that he also obtained the panel for 3 more appeals when in fact hts first denial of jurisdiction was a material ruling on an isaua that allowed indefinite detention,Furthermore, Judge Walker deliberately controlled the appeals of Armstrong he maintains for political reasons, Once Judge Walker xefused to allow any appeal of the civil contampt, he rejected 28 USC §1826 making a material ruling on a key issue that required him to recuse himself pursuant to 28 USC §47 ("'No judge shall hear or detecnine an appeal from the devision of a case or issue tried by him") Jodge Walker knew thet Armstrong had bean solicited te mact with prospective Republican Presidential candidates for the 2000 election by members of the Republican party and to report on their capacity to corarehend gloval economics. Indeed, armstrong was asked to meet: with now President Bush in or about Octcbar 1999 for such purposes. Additionally, because of {legal trading within Republic New York Securities, Philadelphia branch, 1t also became a international incident that for political reascrs given that all alleged victins were in fact Japanese mixiniéers, it becane politically convanient to dafteot blame from the banking systen, and the failure to audit and deduce what was taking place within a regulated Jmerican brokerage and banking house. It was necessary to portray armstrong as the criminal to save face for the regulators that included koth the Securitias Exchange Commission ("SEC and comoarty Futures Trading Comission (“CFTC”). Tt was a political necessity to blame 2rmstrong to cover-up the SEC and CFIC failure to nonitor big houses. It became embarrassing when tha men behind the nstigations of the allegations, anon Safra, was murdered on or aboot December 3rd, 1999. Safra directed the taking of the funde and cane up with the idea to xun to tha US Attorney, SEC, and CFIC knowing that once engaged, they vould never drop charges for they will never adnlt a mistake, Safra was the controlling shareholder of Republic National Bank ("ENB"). Demonstrating no intent, Armstrong turned to Richard Altman, local lawyer, who then notified RNB President Dov Schlien that a suit would be filed within 1 week if the furds vere not returned on August 30th, 1999, Safra also began the Bank of New York affaiz 30 days before ruming to the Feds claiming there was @ $7 billion money-Laun— dering transaction, This was a scam to blacimeil former President Borris Yeltein 2who allegedly stole §7 billion from IMF payments to Russia at the instigation of tvo Russians, Barisnofski and Gazinski who were in league with Safra, Yeltsin turned to Putin when he realized he had heen est up. Putin promised to protact Yeltsin and Bariencfcki and Gazincki fled Russia, while Safre was mysteriously }dlled. Monaco first attenpted te cover-up the murder of Safra chargLng his nurse with setting @ fire to pretend to rescue him. After more than 7 years of false imprisonmant, a high court in Franca ordered his release merely stating that the judge ond the prosecutor conspired to deprive the nurse of a fair trlal. the nurse, who was an American, ves put on a plane to Anerica and released. Armstrong contends that he has suffered a sinilar fate at the hands of a corrupt judiciary in league with the Justice Department, SEC and CFTC to also cover-up the political conse~ quences of false eccusation made by Safra, his staff, and RNB. ‘the obvious problems with the facts on the case at bar is that neither was Antstrong nor the corporate dafendants, Prinoston Esonemics Int'l, Ltd ("PEI") or Princmton Global Management, Ltd ("PG") (collectively "Corporate Defendants"), fund managers, The allegations thet Armstrong comuingled money, conspired with RNB to issue false Net Asset Value Tatters iseued by RNB ("NAV") onily made sense if Armstrong had bean 2 hedge fund. However, the alleged fraud concorned unsecured Private notes issued by foreign corporations, sold exclusively in Japan to only registered Japanese broker-dealers, vho resold the notes into the Secondary Market in Japan, with each note approved by the Japanese Ministry of Finance ("MOR"). The notes ware either (1) flat fixed rate borrowings in Japanese yon, repayable in Japanese yen in which there could be no ownership interest involved Ln any trading in the United states, or (2) variable-rate note svaped for @ pre-existing portfolio of Japanese stocks that wore sold in Japan, the proceeds converted to dollare, and then wired to Philadelphia branch of RNB's broker-dealer. In no case were the notes “wanaged accounts" or a "hedge fund” vith a secured interest belonging to the Japanese noteholders.I it surfaced ata bail hearing en September 13th, 1999 in Trenton, New Jersey where Armstrong had self-surrenfered that there had not been any default nox any zefusal by Armstrong or the Corporate Defendants to repay any note. The vast majority ef notes wene not even due for quite some time. All the original allegations were dropoed. Republic had alleged that the NAV letters were “falsel" in a vain effort to ascape liability. The NAV letters had heen issued by RNB between 1995 and 1999 and were on file in their offices in Philadelphia. ‘They told the govarment that Aumstrorg conspired with their own staff to create false NAV letters, However, the allegation nad= sense only if the accounts belonged to the Jepanese and thus they had title to any trading, Hut this was Just not the case. If the NAV letters wore false, they ware to defraud armstrong and the Corporate Defendants to hide the illegal trading by RB's om staff to vhich they pled guilty, bat there was no Possible allegation that Amstrong was implicated in such activity since he did not benefit and the money was not the property of any client, RNB claverly tried to escape Liability by alleging Armstrong was conchow involved with its om staff instead of baing the victin. Nevertheless, Armstrong was arrested within about 7 days without ary type of investigaticn, The US Attorney conceded that they had never bothered to even contact any alleced noteholder "victim" in Japan to verify any allegation, sce hearing 9/13/99 Trenton, NJ..The CFIC had apother agenda altogether. Prior to the filing of thesa actions, the CFTC had actually subpoenaed Armstrong accusing his of "manipulating the world economy" claiming that ne was so influential in advising governments and major corporations worldwide, that they refused to baliove that anyone could possibly create 2 new method of economic forecasting ‘that was better than 98% accurate. Instead, the CRTC tried to foren Armstrong to Produce a list of al] clients worldwide to Gemonetrate that he vas so influential that ha was manipulating the world economy. Armstrong defended acainst the subpoena and prevailed. 4The CPEC jumped on this allegation from RNB and cared not whether they were true, They used this incident to illegally seize Princeton Economics and to destroy It intentionally. First, the Corporate Defenfanls were mever served with any process, The CONC and SHC cocndinated and corspired with the Justice Department. The criminal charges were filed first amd only when Armstrong was in custody in ‘Trenton, New Jersey, then and only then @id the CFIC and Sec act, running to the SUNY to File civil actions after the criminal case bagan. This was never quthorized by statute, Congress was clear that the GEC was authorized to investigate and then “transnit” all evidence gathered to the Attorney General only to "institute" the criminal proceeding as per 15 USC §78u{d)(1) — not to assist it post-andictwent nullifying the entire foundation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedare. The CFTC and SBC sought the appointment of a equity receiver to usurp the internal management control of foreign corporations praventing any use of funds to hire counsel rendering the entire proceeding without personal jurisdiction, The Receiver deliberately threatened Armstrong with arrest if he attempted to write anything denying him his First Anendwent rights. The CFTC cbjoctive vas clear. They believed Armstrong was manipulating the world economy Jecause they were ignorant of technology treating Acustrong Like Galileo vhe was impriscned for life for nis @iscoveries, or the economist Kondratief! whose fore casts angered Russia and vas imprisoned and then executed after still writing 5 books while in jail. The CFIC files will reveal their chsurd beliefs. dudical immunity requires jurisdiction over both the pexson and subject-matter. The SDNY could not and aid not obtain any personal jurisdiction, but in what court can one sue any judge or the Judiciary? No juige will allow such a suit at all that i against @ judge no less the Judictary. Without a separate court to act as a check against article IIT judges, citizens ean never enjoy constitutional rights sinca & judge could deliberately violate the law and there is nothing one can ds to vindicate a right. 5‘The CFIC's chstinant view that Amstrong manipulated the world sconony only illustrates their own ignorance. Armstrong contends that this has been an abuse of process for Annsirong tas long advocated the merger of the CFIC into the SEC because the competition batueen the tie agencies has caused dranatic problens in the world aconony. Because of the CFIC being separate, funds were driven offshore and the birth of hedge funds began because of over-regulation. Othar nations have a single regulatory body. In the United States, tha vital expartics neaded by the individual is denied then because no fund manager can do his job in lotal for a client. Pomestically, there are countless specialized fimds not because it benefits citizens, only because of milti-regulations. A hedge fund can invest in anything based upon what it believes to ba correct, bonds, stocks, commodities, real estate, OF currencies, Domestically, each is a separate zegulation and there can be no conbined effort, So the expartice ts forted upon the novice citizen to decide what will happen to bonds or stocks and make strategic decisions. If the CFIC had been merged inte the S3¢ back in 1985, there would be onshore hedge funds instead of the offshore unregulated industry that is now exceeding maybe éven $1 trillion. This has harmed the American economy, not enhanced it. The overragulation an’ vicious Drosecutions that can land corporate officers in jail for life over property facts, has driven finance to Zorope nelcing London the new financial capital of the world, In 2002, Anerica had 50% of world 1Pts ~ today it is less than St. Armstrong testified before the House Way & Means Committee in the House back in duly of 1997 or so. Former employees whose jobs ware destroyed by the CFIO's senseless oppression, have revealed that on the Internet that in about September 1998 the CIA requested Armstrong to bulld a geopolitical model after FEI correctly forcast the demise of Russia that even made the front-page of the London Financial Times after a lecture in London. The model developed over 15 years wes based on global capital flows that enabled the model to even forecast the charge in the economy in China and the collapse that caused the fali of the Berlin Mali, é‘The model even correctly forecast well in advance that oil would rise to $100 by 2007, At the hearing in Ue SDNY in the civil SBC and CFIC actions of October 3cd, 2000, an employee James Saith appeared with a proposal from the US Derartment of Energy to create a moda: on oi] prices. Judge Owen, prompted by the CRTC, refused to allow him to testify and sutmarily ordarad the Princeton Eeonomic Institute (only a research company) shut-down, Everything that was forecast back in 1999 that oi] would reach $100 by 2007 came true on target. The CEIC, howaver, takes the position that it was the influence of Armstrong that led to the rise rather than the validity of the research, Like Galileo, the CFIC has sought to indefinitely inprion him, the forecast that the economy would peak 2007.15 (February) wes also correct. and the entixe debt crisis is evident. Journalists have heen amazed that even with Armstrong in jail for more than 7 years, the long-term foracasts vere correct. Sone wrote articles calling it "Ametrong's Revenge.” Recently, the New York Timss revealed how America has more pacple in priser and has the largast population of prisoners even as a percent of population; 2.3 million compared to 1.6 million in China with a population 5 times greater. But where China has a few hundred thousand in administrative detention, the US sunber ds 5 million. Being held in civil contempt, Armstrong was also in administrative detention which the N¥ Times noted was used by China that "often singles cut political activists who have not committed crimes." This is what the CFIC advocated and did achieve for political reasons. Armstrong would never have been counted within that 2.3 million nuther as a civil contennor indiatinguishable fron China's practi.ce. Tt is ironic that Congress is now seriously considering merging the CFTC into the SEC, the very thing he has edvocated for decades and has been a major reason why the CFIC has sought to keep armstrong in prison indefinitely even when the SEC advocated his release back in September 2003. John Stuart Mills wrote in his often celebrated work, On Liberty, “Let us not flatter curselves that we are free from the stain of legal persecution." Tha Judiciary, if investigated for just once, 7would zeveal that the courts have been stacked with Raderalist judges, hell bent ugon ruling only in favor of the govarment that is self-evident oy leoking at the conviction rates. Prior to the Guidelines in 1987, the conviction zate was well below 808. Today, it is higher than-the Star Chamber, Spanish Inguisition, and every tyrannical form of dictatorship known te history except perhaps Stalin who did not even pretend to listen ta defendants. A conviction rate of 98-998 is not an achlevenent to celebrate, but a warning of serious problems and a insult to the Statute of Liberty that once stood as the symbol of our nation. T have personally witnessed racially motivated convictions and unprecedented suicides while in administrative detention - the harshest 1 would contend among civilized rations. I vas held in a high-rise building with no outdoor compound Like at a FCT for nore than 7 years. More than that, Armstrong wae denied dental care and after an nttempt on his life while in the custody of the Department of gustice, I am still avalting medical care that is not afforded to save money. But the worst insult was the denial of the Second Circuit to ever Listen to any right to be heard refusing to follow Congressional commands that afforded the Tight to direct appeal and bail for civil contemors 26 USC §1826. Three times, attenpts were made for a direct appeal and three times the Second Circuit refused to allow any appeal suppocting whatever the government wanted to do denenstrating whe Jack of judicial independence that Thonas Jefferson warned about. After more than 7 years of iniefinite impriscnment, the goverrment covertly axanged behind the scenss to remove then Judge Mcenna and replaced hin with another former peosecutor who denied all discovery pretending to ba an impartial judge. Ordering a trial within two months overruling evarything the formar judge had done, Judge John F. Keenan made it obvious there would be at best a mock trial, GJA appointed lawyers are worthless, for to keep their jobs, they are really friends of the court not advorates for the defendants. Stil) with everything rigged, the 8Government still refused to go to trial. First they offered 15 years. I declined the offer and demanded a trial. The next cay, they came back and offered 10. years. Again I declined. I was then throim into solitary confinenent and told this was the way I would go to trial after they rencved almost my entice legal preparation I had prapared pro se. I was then told the Government did not wart to go to trial and offered me a Form B pleading claiming 1 could argue for tine served. It vas painfully obvious 1 could not. go'to trial froa solitary confinement an gave up. T enterad a plea, but vas not allowed to explain anything in my own words that calls into question the validity'of the plea. I was handad a script Like a hestage held by Iren and ordered to read’ the wards written by the Government te the world. ‘This was the dignity of the United States reduced to its Lowest point, Fearing that I might one-day challenge the script, the Government, carefully chose the very words revealing that in fact, there was no crime, “anong the things that vere roprasented to investors by my agents in Japan on my behalf and with my knowiedge vhen the investments were solicited was that investor's money would be held in accounts at Republic New York Securities, and my agents also told investors that their moneies in those accounts would be sesarate and segregated From Republic's own accounts and would not be available to Republic for its ow benefit." (PesB/VT/06, PAV, LI-14}(99-Cr-997) The Government Lied to the press. The alleged commingling was portrayed as the mixing of client accounts in the favorite characterization ~ a Ponzi schene, But since the accounts did not belong to any client, the whole commingling theory did not work, Thus, the Government recharacterized the fraud as failing to prevent the money from being taken by Republic, not for Armstrong's benefit, but for Republic's "oun benefit." The criminal complaint admitted that Armstrong had no fiduedary éuty. Obviously, since if one Lorrovs money froma bark and invests that monay, one is not suddenly a money manager for the bank, And if one borrows money to buy a hone, the hank doas rot own the capital gains even in a secured loan basis. To further denonstzate how Amnstreng wes 8 hostage and ordered to read a meaningless script 8the Government had himsinte publicly that the trading was not actually even the property of any noteholder, but constructively it benefited them only fran the standpoint that if any borrower was successful, then he would be able to repay a loon. the script Armstrong was forced to read stated: "I did conduct trading in comoditias futures contracts for ‘the benefit of note holdars generally." (Tr 8/17/07, p19-20) (99-Cr-997) (STR) The CFIC would have the world believe that the treding was for the noteholder and thus that is the frand. The CFIC knew tlils is not comedity fraud any more than making a false representation to a client and mailing a letter to your mother is mail fraud, Lf the accounts were not the property of a noteholdar, and the trading was not for the direct benefit of a notsholder whereas every trae was their sole benefit, then there is no commodity fraud. If trading was successful or not, a Joan was still dua and owing. To satisfy the fraud statutes, the Suprema Court. made it clear that the fraud must "be ‘property! in the victin's hands." Cleveland WUS, 531 0S 12, 148 Led2d 221, 234 (2000). The Goverment has lied to the world and the Judiciary has defended the motives of the Governmant attorneys involved. while forced to plead to a conspiracy that carried a statntory maximm of 5 years, the Gndiciary has endorsed the abuse of process by refusing to credit Armstrong any tine for the illegal contenpt nearly Th years thus constructively extending a5 year statute into nearly 15 years without any authority from Congress xendering the voice of the people and the basis of our democracy nothing but a joke. Congress has no ability to pass laws when courts refuse to enforce then as enacted. Armstrong through counsel filed for a petition to the Supreme Court. when that Court ordered the Government to reply, the contempt was vacated ts circumvent the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Hew can the Judiciary be used to covertly alvays abuse its process, and then when it may be reviewed by the only Constitutional Court, then vacate the abuse to render the action moot to protect themselves ? 10hen a citizen cannot appeal to the only constitutional court that has taken the view parsuant to its ow Rule 10 that there is no absolute right to be heard, then the absence of a national appellate court allows political prisoners to be created because there is no one else to review the Second Circuit or te harmonize its ruling with the Constitution and other clroult courts.’ One cizeuit can act ina racist way and claverly avoid review. There can be no right. to equal justice when there is no wight to one system of law for all. Sudge Oven was recused by the Second Circuit only because it was becoming a Anterratioral enbarrassnent to hold a citizen in civil contempt for nore than 7 years — longer than any civilized nation has ever dared to pretend. Judge Castel was assigned, but he was more interested in defending the SDNY against pablic criticlsim, Judge Castel vecated the contempt on April 27th, 2007 stating: "y conclude, based on my individual assessment of Martia Aumsl-rong that. continuing his incarceration o# the civil contempt has no realistic possibility of producing compliarcs with the turnover orders. Therefore, the civil contempt sanction must cume to an end. (1334/22/07, 192, 147-15) While suidenly Judge Castel could see that after mie than 7 years, continued imprisonment was not the answer, he turned instead to the press adnonishing them for questioning vhat vas going on. The Kew York Times questioned whether any plea was voluntary and whether in fact there had been a orine, Thus, Judge Castel took the position that he had to now defend the SUNY denonstrating that once a judge has spoken about the merits of @ case before conclusion, he cannot continue to preside. “Mic. Jamstrong, yos've been in jail for seven years for your refusal to comply with court orders. You now stand convicted Of conspiracy to conmit securieties fraud, commodities fraud, and vire frand, You may no longer claim your innocence because you stood before Judce xeenan and frealy admitted your quilt, Anybody who has any donbt obout that ought to read the stato— ments which Mr. Armstrong stood up ard freely nade under cath before Judge Keenan last August. hose who believe you.are innocent or a victim ave the latest victims of Martin Armstrone's fraud. They are naive and i1- infornea, They haven't read the crines to which Me, Armstrong adnits, his confession of quilt. aq Sepcaysneer ener a/m/ory: 1102-403)Armstrong hed assartod his Speedy Trial xights, and Lastead, the Government retaliated ky (1) stripping Armstrong of all comsel civilly and using the SEC & CFTC ectlons to invade a parallel criminal proceeding to retroactively disgorgs Separate counsel in that proceeding depriving Ammstrong of counsel of choice that was patontly unconstitutional, US v Gonzalez-lopez, 548 US ~ (2006), a right that cannot be enforced because no judge will defend a citicen against another judge on the same kench, and (2) creating the contempt to constructively repeal bail that could not ke revoked without just cause; see SHU v PEI, 84 FSupp2d 443 (SRY 2000). Congress never intended chancery to invade an ongoing eximinal cose, see 18 USC $78u(@) (1). Article TIT nevar authorized under equity that which could never have been done evan wdar the tyranny of the formar King. ARNSTRONG WAS JORTURED RY Stmy Te is unquestionable that civil contempt was invented by the English Qouct Of Chancery and perhaps parfocted by it final incarnation known as the Star Chanber. Civil Inprisonent ves not considered to be “punisiment” in the 15th Century largely because imprisonment was not. a form of punishment until it ums instituted in the United States as a substitute for capital punishwent. the English Court of Chancery Gould not inflict punishment after 1641 and the demise of the Star Chamber. Civil contempt was traditionally not between the King and a citizen in Chancery, but it was for the benefit of the opposing party. Never could an indicted defendant at the King's Bench be hauled by the King into Chancery and held in prison indefinitely wmtil he produced the direct evidence against himself. that is the very definitien that all civilized nations have agreed constitutes torture. In fact, in 1992, all nations agreed in a single voice that “Torture” was the deliberate coercion of a individual regarding the criminal charges against him, Congress jeined with all nations enacting the Torture Viet-im Protection Act, Pub.L. 102-256, March 12, 1992, 106 Stat 73 that expressly prohibited the Judiciary from doing precisely vhat it did to Armstrong for more than 7 years. 12Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub.1. 102-356, March 12, 1992, 106 Stat 73: (b} Torture ~Por the purposes of this Act - (1) the tern ‘torture’ means eny act, directed against an individual in tha offender's custody or physical control, by which severe pain or sutfering (other than pain oF suffecing arising only from oz inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining fran that individual or a third person infor mation or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that, individaal or a third person has conmttted or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coexcing that individval or a third porson, or for any reascn based on discrimination of any kinds ~.. The Judictary cannot now sit in judgment over its ow actions. Rither Acnstxong is entitled to a jury determination, or the Legislature must now order an authoritative investigation against the judges of tha SONY and Second Circuit. ‘The Constitution, of course, favors a public trial, However, the power to impeach lies with a trial in the Senate. .What has been done to armstrong and the very deliberate destruction of Princeton Economics in violation of the First Anendment because the CFIC in particular refuses to believe in advances in technology and lives in the days of the dark ages, is so un-American, one mist ask how often has this been done to others? Oa May 10th, 2007, a detainee in McC, SnNY, attacked Armstrong and attanpted to kill him, and indeed proudly announced thet he id. But. Arestrong was taken to Beelan Hospital where non-Governnent doctors Leeated him in intensive care for at least 5 days. Armstrong survived. He is unaware of any ecininal charges being filed against that detainee (tr, Gearge) calling into question the true independence of the attack. COVERNNENT TKREATENED WEN YORK TIMES Based upon information and belief, the US Attorney Office in the SUNY called tha Now York Times to complain sbout the articles about Amatrong that questioned his quilt written by Gretchen Morganson, a leading journalist at the New York Times. "S. Morganson vas removed from covering the case. whe Us Attorney Office will often call the press and intimidate them by asking for favors. Implicit threats exist by investigation for taxes or who knows what else. 13Based upen speaking with those involved in the publisher level, the US Depart- nent of Justice is not beyond attempting to use its power to subvertly influanco the press. Armstrong believes that the New York Tines was such a victim, However, an investigation questioning the gress is not likely te yield the trath. Tt is those involved in the Department of Justice or the US Attomey Office in the SDNY to be specific that would yield the truth, No doubt armstrong wi be prejudiced for even Filing this petition no less questioning the practices of the US Attorney that would call into question the ability of the free press to really be free. When the decision to criminally indict is beyond review and a grand jury can be even lied to to create an indictment, then what has happaned to the country we alii grew up in these days? Legal Argument Tt is furdamantal that every citizen is entitled to equal protection of the law and it is unguesticnable that the Constitubion established out one court, the Supreme Court. All cther courts are merely statutory creations of the Tegislature. "The Supreme Court alone ‘possesses jurisdiction derived imediately from the Constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot daprive it.'" Stevenson v Fain, 195 US 163, 167 (1904) quoting: US v Hudson & Goodwin, 11 08 32 (7 Cranch), 33 (1812). "ALL other Courts by the general Goverment possess no jur~ iediction but what is given them by the power that creates them, and can he vested ‘with none but what the power ceded to the general. Government vill. authorize them to confer." Hudson & Goodwin, 11 US at 33. ‘The Supreme Court has’ held that it has no Constitutional duty to harmonize tho decision of the inferior court; Rule 10 ("Review on @ weit of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion"). the Constitution dia not create such discretion for thera is no way to guarantee Equal Protection if the Court itselé can refuse to Listen, Lacking the plain ability to obtein any inpartial adjudication cf an abuse of judicial power, then beyond question, the 14"Petitioner" is entitled as a nathar of abeolute right, to petition this Iegislature for a redress of a grievance declared by the First anenineat. This is secured as a common-law right to review and as a writ of right that has indeed been further guaranteed by the Ninth Awandment: that vas intended to secure all rights that formerly existed ab the time of the signing of the Constitution, Tt hada clear that the Federalist has alvays been regarded as entitled to significant weight in any discussion of the true intent and neaning of the provisions of the Constitution, Wheeling P&C Tzansp. Jo v Wheeling, 99 US 273 (1875). Alexander Ram{Lton assured the people that the common-law canon of statutory construction of expressio unins est exclusion alterius ot inclusion mius est exclusio alterius, would not be applied by the courts. Hence the canon that to express one thing implies the exclusion of another or of the alternative and that an inference must be drawn that what is not included by specific reference wes intended to be omitted or oncluded. In other words, "when a statute for the Constitution] Limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes a negative of any other mode.” Christensen ¥ Harris County, 529 US 575, 583 (2000). This was the very purpose of the Ninth Anendment ("he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain righta, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”) “[Tjhe constitution edopts in their full extent the Common and statute law of Great Britain, by which many other rights are expressed in it are equally secured.” Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No:84 ‘The Conmon-Law Right to Appeal to the Lagislature Sir William Blackstone in his celebrated Comentarios of the Laws of England (Pixst Bdition 1765-1768) was widely read and "accepted [by the Framing genaration} as the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of England.” Schick v US, 195 US 68, 69 (1904). Blackstone nade it very clear that there was a substantial major @ifference between decision rendered at lew and those thet ware aricing purely from equity. 8"From this court of equity in chancery, as from the other superior courts, an appeal lies to the house of peers. But there ara thase differences between appeals from a court of equity, and writs of error froma court of law: I, That the former may be hrought upon any interlocutory matter, the Jatter upon nothing but only a definitive judgment. 2, That on writs of error the house of lords Pronounces the jndgnent, on appeals it gives direction to the court below to rectify it’s own decree.” 3 Blackstone, chp 4, p55 Speaking divectly at the question af appeal, any order in chancery (equity) was appealeble on an interlocutory basis, unlike those fram courts of lav at the King's Bench. Congress did recognize that equitable ordars could be appealed on an interlocutory basis pursuant to 28 USC $1292 with respect te injunctions pursuant to §1292(a)(1}, equitable receivers §1292(@)(2}, or in civil mitters that involve @ “controlling question of law.” §1282(b). While this Legislature astablished an absolute right to dizeot appeal in matters of civil, contenpt pursuant to 26 USC $1826, the Petitioner was denied that right arbitrarily, as the SDNY and Second Circuit refused to recognize the regulation of the claimed civil contempt pevar pretending if is inherent and heyand the power of Congress to alter, Civil Contempt is poraly an equitable renedy, not inherent, as Judye Posuer made clear collecting authorities that "[rJather than belng deemed an inherent power ... civil contempt ++ like so many other devicas operating on the person directly rather than on his assets, in equity, ag a device for enforcing compliance with equitable dectess. 4. Ti de still an equity procedure ... subject to equitable defenses." Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings Enpanelied May 1988, 694 F28 881, 864 (7th Cir 1989). Civil con- tempt is between the parties aml is considered "remedial" whereas it is criminal con- tempt that is between the individaal and the court and is the claimed inherent power of self-defense to "vindicate the authority of the court.” Ganpers v Bucks Stove & Range Co, 217 US 418, 441 (1911). Civil contempt terminates with "the main case’! and does not survive because it is not the inherent power of any court beyond the power of requlation by Congress; Lenan v Krantler-Arnold Hinge Last Co, 284 US 448, 453 (1932), 16‘he Second Circuit kept the Petitioner in jail, held inside a high-rise bullding in Manhattan without a qutdoor compound unable to walk around outside as is the situation at any federal prison, FCI. Bacause the Petitioner was also not a" prisoner" he was denied dental care or weekly visitations with his fanily as is the case at Fort Dix Camp, Three times the Petitioner sought: to exercise his absolute statutory right to direct appeal pursuant te 28 USC $1826, ‘Three times this right was flatly rejected, claimlay thece was no authority whatsoever to allow the indefinite imprisonment of a citizen without trial to aver challenge the validity Of his deprivation of Liberty; SEC v Princaton Boonomics Int'l, Ltd, 7 Fed Appx 65 (24 Cie 2001); CeTG y Armstrong, 284 P3d 404 (24 Cir 2002}(per curiam) cert denied 537 US 864 (2002) overruling previous panel CFIC v Armstrong, 269 F3d 109, 114 (28 Cir 2001) ("without such review, a contennor whose claim of inability to comply has been improperly rejected ...{vho) would remain confined indefiritely.") (J Newnan SBC v Amstrong, 88 Fed Appx 460 (2d Clr 2004) (par curian) (denying again Jucisdiction). Finally, forced to file a habess corpus where courts refuse to allow the sane rights to challenge tha jurisdiction ef the court to enter such an arder, again the Second Circuit refused to relent claiming without authoritatively reviewing the history of civil contempt citing that the “court may jail a contemor ‘indefinitely until he complies." Armstrong y Guocione, 470 Fid B9, 110 (2d Cir 2006). The Second Cixcult cited Shillitani v US, 3e4 US 364, 371-72 (1966) claiming that a witness may be held until he complies, which was clted dn dictum by the Supreme court again in It'd Unicn, United Mine Vorkers v Bagvell, 512 US 821, 828 (1994) and relied upon the Second Cincuit refusing to review tha legislative history of §1826 that established a 18 month statutory maximan expressly in response to Shillitanl which wes overruled by Congress, see In re andreys, 469 FSupp 171, 175 (ED Mich 1979} (quoting legistative history that "if that ves the Jaw, then ... it ought to ke changed.") Not oaly was Shillitani explicitly reviewed and overruled by Congress in §1826, but any idea that the Judiciary, evorn to defend the Constitution, would 7clad unlimited powers to imprison citizens without any trial by jury for lige and to allso refuse to allow any right to appeal, is simply in the days of Chief Justice Marshall, treason, "Wie have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given, ‘he one or the other world be treason to the Constitution.” Cohen v Virginfa, 19 US 264, 404 (1021) In another outrageous abuse of the judicial contempt power, a district court Judge threv a litigant in jeil on civil contempt and refused to allow him to be heard in the case In chief and then moved against him for default after striking his very answers. In that case, the Supreme Court heard the case vacating the judgment and stated the cbvious that applies in this petition, "I such authority exists, then, in consequence of their establishment to compel obedience to law, and to enforce justice, courts possess ‘the right to inflict the very wrongs which they ware created to prevent," Hovey v Elliott, 167 US 409, 417-18 (1897) Indeed, Sir William Blackstons ales clearly established interlocutory orders in chancery were always appealable to the Legislature, “An appeal, to parliament, that is, to the house of lords, is the dernier rasort of tha subject who thinks himself aggcieved by any interlocutary order or final determination in thie court fof chancery]: and it is effected by petition to the house of peers, and not by writ of exror, as upon judgments at coumon law, ‘This jurisdiction is said to have begun in 18 Jac. I. and cort- ainly the first petition, which appears in the records of parLia- went, was preferred in that year; and the firet that vas heard and Geternined (thouch the nane Of appeal was then a novelty) vas Eresented in a few months aftec: both levelled against the lord Keeper Bacon for corruption, and other misbehaviour. Tt was after— wards warmly controvertad by the house of ecmons in the reign of Charles the second, But this dispute is now at rest: it being Qbvious to the reason of all mankind, that, when the courts cf equity became principal tribunals for dsciding causes cf proparty, a revision of their decrees (by way of appeal) beoane equally necessary, as a writ of error from the judgmont of a court of law. +++ [Alo appeal to the King in parlianent was always unquestionably allowed," 3 Blackstone, chp 27, pa54-455 18The failure of the Suprene Court to take up its constitutional duty to afford an absolute right to Equal Protection of the Law to all citizens, leaves there no other alternative but to a resort to the common-law right to appeal all equitable orders to the Lagislature when in fact the inferior courts are not Constitutional, but nothing more than statutory creations of Congress, It is then abundantly clear that the President, Executive Officers, Juiicial officers, and all Senators end Congressman take an onth to defend the Constitution first and foremost. "No «+. legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violeting his undertaking to support it." Cooper v Aaren, 358 US 1, 18 (1958). It is “the obligation to due justice [that] rests upon all parsons” including those in Congress, Ward v Board County Comm'rs, 258 US 17, 24 (1920). In the instant matter, the adversary of the Petition is the very court claiming power over him. Since the days of Naga Carta, judges who are competent and willing to uphold the Jaw, Chapter 45, has heen the fundamental and unalienable right of all martcind, One of the greatest lementations of Thomas Jefferson, was the uncontrollable jodiciary. His greatest fears have come true and this petition has made them manifest. ‘Tt has long ... been my opinion ... that the gemn of dissolution of cur Federal goverrment is in the constitution of the federe] indiciary; an irresponsible body, (for impeachment is scarcely a Scaxecrow,) working like gravity by night and by day, gaining a Little today and a little tonorrow, and advancing its noiseless step like a thief, over the field of jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped from the states, and the government of all be consolidated into one. ‘The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, chp x¥, 1331-32 Indeed, Jefferson also warned that "nan is not made to be trusted for life, if secured against all liability to account.” Letter to Corey 10/31/1823. It was first held that judicial immunity did not apply "where the acts are palpably in excess of the jurisdiction of the judges, adare done maliciously or corruptly." Randall v Beighan, 74 US 523, 537 (1859). But judges demandad absolute inmmity even when they knowingly and deliberately violated the right of citizens es hes been done to the 19Petitioner. This cry for tyrannical power was self-appointed by the Supreme Court jast three years later, overruling the Randall decision. "(J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or ccrruptly.” Bradley v Fisher, 80 US 335, 357 (1872) Only a judye could wrongly and knowingly order a person executed for sacret personal gain, and have absolute immnity that not even the President, a Senator, Congreseian, or oven a prosecutor would be entitled to claim, only judges, without statutory authority, have cowed themselves with absolute immnity to violate the jaw. There are no checks and balances for what judge will ever turn against their brother on a issue of this nature, ABUSE OF CONTEMPT POWER IS IMPRACHARLE EE SE SOUTPT POWER 1S IMPEACHABLE Tt is of course obvious that Congress enacted the criminal contempt statute, 18 USC $401, following the impeachment trial for akuse of the contempt power by Federal Judge Janes H. Pack, who threw @ journalist in jail on contempt hecause he personally did not ike an article published about him concerning a decisien ‘he rendered while it was pending appeal. ‘This abuse of the contempt povar led to limitation codified as "Misbehavier of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to cbetruct the adwinistration of justice." §401(1). Tt was also clear that Perhaps the first impeachment of a judce in the United States took place about 1804 also over the contempt issue. "[TJhe Chiet Justice and two associate justices of the Pemsylvania Supreme Court were actually impeached for sentencing a parson to Jail for contempt. In part the impaachment rested cn the feeling ‘that punishment of content by summry process was an exbitrary Bractics of the common law unsuited to this country.” Green v US, 356 US 165, 213, 0.29 (1958)(J.Black dissent) 20dustice Black's dissent in Green argued that those held in criminal contempt were-entitled to the full panoply of criminal rights under the Constituties - some- thing deoply resisted for ainost 200 years. Judges have constantly rejected any sort of restriction upon powers they view to be “inherent” fron a system under the old monarchy that was rejected by the people. Indesd, Justice Black's long championing of the right to trial by jury ws Finally acknowledged as correct in Bloom v Tino: 397 US 194 (1968). & fair impartial ruling in contempt is not possible. A misdemeanor is defined by a loss of liberty up to 1 year, 18 USC $3559. Yet, while contenpt is acknowledged to be a misdeneanor not a felony, US v Galante, 298 F2d 22 (24 Cir 1962), the judiciary has assumed they may sentence anyone for as long as they like well beyond the 1 year limit on misdemeanors. If Congress can- not create a misdemeanor that could Jand a citizen in jail for life, decades, ox even years, then why 1s such @ power still claimed inherent, by judges? Some courts have held that the term of imprisonment lies at the Giscretion af the judce, US _v Seavers, 472 F24 607 (Sth Cir 1973). One court imposed a 42 month consecutive sent— ence for criminal contempt to @ 5 year criminal sentence that vas upheld, US v Tach, 874 F24 1543 (11th Cir 1989), Another court imposed a 5 year sentence that was also uphsid, US vPapadekis, 802 F2d 618 (2d Cir 1986) cert deniad 479 US 1092 (1986)- ‘There vas a 9 year sentence for contempt imposed, but it was reduced to 5 years by the appellate court in US v Garcia, 755 F2d 984 (24 Cir 1985), another Judge inposed a 1G year contempt sentence that was reduced to 25 months in US v Green, 630 F2d 566 (8th Clr 1930) cart denied 449 US 904 (1980). Another court imposed a 3 year contenpt sentence that was reduced to 16 months, US v Bukowski, 435 F24 1094 (7th Cir 1970) cert denied 401 U8 911 11970), An outrageous judge in the Fifth Circuit iNlustrates the need for contempt reform once again, A citizen was sentenced to 35 years in prison for contempt of acourt which was reduced still to 2 years in US v Leyva, 512 F2d 774 (Sth Cir 1975). Again the Fifth Cireuit had to reduce a 15 year sentence for contempt of court to 2 ame in U8 v Gomez, 553 F2d 956 (Sth Cir 1977). Congress has crmmanded that no person shall be imprisoned in this nation or detained without the express statutory authority of Congress, 18 USC §400i(a). In the instant case, the district court Sladmed that did not apply and the Second Cireutt claimed it could use the crimin], contempt statute, reconstruct the elenents and strip avay the due process rights to ‘trial by jury, to pretend that more than 7 years of confinement was somehow Lawful using 18 USC S401 in a civil context relying on the absence of any specifie time duration in $401 for a sentence. But if contempt is not 2 felony, hew can any court Clain that the failure of Congress to specify a sentence under §101 authorizes the Judiciary to allow Life impriccment wtimt tclal? The contempt power cannot be a escape clause to the entire Constitution and to the very cath af office to uphold and defend its very purpose, to secure the Blessings of Liberty, merely because it serves the self-interest of judges. when Concress atttenpted to claim "inherent" contempt powers to try persons that appeared before a committes, the Suprane Court was quick to strike down tha clain as a violaticn of the Soparatien of Powers. Te held that 1t was “unthinkable that in any caso fron a power expressly granted there can be implied the authority to destroy the grant made,” Marshal] v Gordon, 243 US 521, 536 (1917). A roviaw of the cases handled by Judge Owen will reveal a persistent abuse of the contempt power. Before the Petitioner was thrown in jail, Judge Oven already had Donald Sheléen in contempt, also denied comsel, and to cLrounvent 28 USC §1826, ‘he reloased hin about 17 months inte the contempt and’ then sent the US Marshals to arrest him again on the sane allegations. when the BOP moved him to Brooklyn, he filed a habeas under 28 USC $2241. Judge Owen interfered by directing the prison in the FDNY to return Mr. Sheldon to SINY and not to produce him in court. Judge 22Dearic of the EDNY ordered Sheldon released,- Judge Oven usamped the jurisdiction and denied the habeas petition instructing the clerks to assign it to himself, The Second Cireait in that case at least ordered Sheldon released and that an investigation into the events, bat the US attorney protected judge Owen and bacically sandbagged any investigation; In re Donald Sheldon, No-00-3085 (2d Cir Dec 2000). Pro-Goverrment: judges vill never be investigated nor charged by the Attorney General making any pretended criminal deterent a joke, Without 2 definitive right to new appeal to the Congress, then essentially judges are beyond the law and allowed to defy the Constitution without any consequences whatsoever. This renders the entire Constitution nothing but propaganda, With the attorney General eager to charge and investigate politicians, it is an insult to the dignity of a free nation to place the Judictary above the law thay are charged with upholding impartially. The very injory Listed in the Declaration of Independence has merely resurfaced. RECENT AUTHORITY ‘The gudiciary has followed the Second Circuit and naw routinely imprisons white collar defendants on contempt trying to compel the production of testimony and evidence for the criminal case under equity. ‘Ihe SEC, for exemple, will file a civil case Lirst knowing it is cooperating with the US Attcrney and will even lie to citizans and te courts about the covert operations. It is rare to find a Judge not caught up in being sa tough on crime that the Constitution is not milli- fied in the process. Yet, in Oregon, the SEC had liad and hid a coordinated effort to build a criminal case for nearly 2 years. the SBC was spoonfeeding the US Attorney and committing fraud by pretending there vas no criminal case, The district court hald in a rare honest decision, that an “agency may not develop a criminal invest~ ‘gation under the auspices of a civil investigation ... It would be a ‘flagrant disregard of individuals‘ rights! to deliberately deceive, ar even lul2 someone into incriminating thenselves in the civil context when activities of an obvious 23csininal eabure ace under investigation. ... Hare, defondents vere identified as subjects of a criminal imestigation. the goverment tactic to move forward under the guise of a civil investigation, violated defeniants’ due process rights." US v Stringer, 400 FSupp2d 1063, 1089 (DC Or 2006). in the instant case, the SONY jufges and tha Second Cirewit could care less about the integrity of due process. Armstrong was alxeady indicted. They then took a legal fiction pretending that anyone who works for a corporation can be tortured Past-indictment because the corporation has no right. This ruling has stripped all those working for a corporation of avarything the Constitution was inbendad to Erevent. Without an absolute right to be heard by the Suprene Court, citizens can be actually tortured because there is no way to vindicate Constitutional rights when it is not the police violating the law, bat tha judiciary. Six William Blackstone made it clear that at common-law corporations vere not Subject to crininal prosecutions, only thei officers and divsctors, 1 Blackstone, chp 18, 464. It was realistic that corporations could only ba dealt with in a ctwil manror because they could not be imprisoned or hanged. therefore, when the Framers of the Constitution created the Self-Inerimination Clause in the Fifth amend ment, £¢ 45 impossible that they intended it not to apply to thoss who worked for @ corporation, That absurd view repeals the Self-Incrimination Clause even for any government employee because he/she also works for a collective-entity that is not within the Self-tnerimination Clause. This view is abourd, an insult to the only Systan of Justice authorized by Congress and the Constitution, the adversary aystan, and an act of war against: the principles that underly our American way of life. Bub this view, denonstrates that, JafYerann vas right. The Judiciary will eliminate ali Otsticales to expand their oun power to the detriment of all Americans. ‘In onother case, an agency used contanpt and tried to use the case at bar as ‘the new model to torture white collar defandents, However, again there vas at least 24sone sanse of duty that xemined with that judge for when after holding the citizen in civil contempt also beyond 18 wonths an@ the authority of 26 USC $1826, he did vacate the contempt after the indictment suspecting it might he improper to continue to coarea an indicted defendant on the very subject-matter he stood indicted for in the first place, see Tankerley v Elsher, 2008 WL 275876 (ND Fla 1/31/08). again, this decision deawonstrates the inability of the SDNY or the Second Cirewit to ever ‘treat Ametrong fairly. The possibility of Equal Protection of the law just does not exist when there is no absolute right to the Suprene Court and no national appellate court to ensure that citizens are not abused as Armstrong has been in front of the camaras worldwide calling into question the justice in America, Zn another high profile casa, we saw the abuse of the SEC and US Attorney again coordinating the civil prosecution being directed by the criminal proseuuters to create specific venue in a district to further the careers of prosecutors. Again, there was fraud on the court and the defendant hy trying to hide that the SHO wes taking orders from the US Attorney circumventing the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The eciminal court vacated all criminal charges that directly resulted fron the illegal. manipalation. “Because the Goverment nanipalated the simaltaneous investigations for its own purposes, including the transfer of Mr. Socushy's deposition inte this district for venue purposes, the court finds thet the utilization of Wr. Sorushy's depesition in this case Meparts from the proper administration of justice. Therefore, the S,R.C. testinory mst be excluded." US v Scrushy, 265 PSupp2d 1134, 1140 (ND Ala 2005) ‘The parallel civil prosecution also rejected the use of a orand jury and FRI Feeding evidence to the SEC to freeze assets to also try to prevent independent counsel and to severely Limit resources to prepare a case, The district court hed relied upon 15 USC §7Buid)(1) and noted that sharing oF information was only from the Shc te the Attorney General to “institute a criminal prosecution, not from the FBI to use the SEO to strip the defendant of all counsel, 25“Cooperation between the SEC and the U.S. Attomey's office is Peenatted see 15 0.8.C. §78u(8)(1)(1981}. Rowever, this cooperation etree 2 De envisioned as the SEC providing the U.S. Attorney's Office with evidence gamered in the civil proceeding, not the U6. Attorney's Office and the FBI providing the SB vith evidence gathered in pursuit of indictments. See e.g. SEC v Dresser indus., Inc., $28 F2d 1368, 1385 (D.C. Cir 1980); SBC v First versey Securities, Inc., 1987 Wi 8655 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)." SKY keplthsouth Comp, 261 PSupp2d 1298, 1312, n.23 (MD Ala 2003) Tt 1s Clear that when the SEC wae created, §22(c) of the 1933 Act expresaly Srontbited simultaneous and miltisle prosecutions. The SEC was to decide 4f i wes to prosecute civilly, then there could be no crimine) nrosecution, Today, the SHC as joined the US Attorney eliminating everything that: due process of law once Stocd for and wade Srrelovant the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Zven torroriats have sore rights than a white coller defendant. Amstrong was tortuead for more than 7 years Kecause judges no longer defend tha Constitution, but have kecone a tool of the prosecution, Tt is time to xeastablish the rights of citizens. TNABILTTY JO QBTATN A FAIR TRIBUNAL, ARASELEEY 70 OBTAIN A FAIR TRIBUNAL Te ie Becoming painfully obvious that not merely ace the courts being stacked wth pro-coverment judges attempting to change the very Constitution by the sinple refusal to vindieate the Blessings of Liberty, but that prosecutors oe well are out OF eontrol. Evidence is deliberately withheld with no hope of uncovering the Smuth. curt appointed couse] are only interested ia cetatning thelr jobs. In tha SONY a judge or prosecutor can have any lawyer Kiched-off the O7A panel. Self~Interest prevents indepandant advocacy. Then by local mule, judges routinely edit and even alter the transcripts in camera to change events that tock place. Appellate courts wiolate the Seventh Anendrent re-examination clause hy using hamless-error to always excuse prejudicial errors. Prosecutors in fact rely on harnless-error to deny evidence kresing that Appellate Courts will rule in thelr favor denying fair trials, The Supreme Court has rendered trials izrelevant. If one has 19 counts and the jury Finds Fhem guilty of cnly one, Judges use "relevant conduct" to reinstate the very sequited conduct ai preporderance of the evidence standard, Why 90 to trial? 26Never at common-law could a parallel equity court aid a criminal case at the King's Bench, this could rot be circumvented by appointing equity receivers who ‘today are not independant but have also been usurped by the Executive as their alter- egos, Blum v State of Maryland, $6 LPA 322, 94 Nd 375, St A 26 (1902). Article TIT ia not authorize any such covert actions that would allow a receiver to be appointed who then throws an indicted defendant dn jatl indefinitely ana strips him of ali right to comsel. This 1s not the America we all believed was our home. ‘The SEC and CFIC appointed a receiver, wha blocked any use of funds to hire counsel destroying a franchise by placing border watches on partnars to have them arrested 1f they dared to show up to claim any assats, The Receiver stood up and ‘then consented to the SEC complaint within about 30 days uithout any investigation. This 4s what the Second Cireait and the SDNY calle a fair trial ~ the outright denial of access te the court by more than 200 former employees. Where there were public funds managed by PEL, the Receivership had them frozen, and every person who had any funds invested, hed to provide sworn evidence that it wes their money, the SDNY thas endorsed the complete asset freeze of foreign funds controlled by the major Deutsche Bank forcing them-to defend the funds in New York. can anyone even imagine that if armstrong had managed Fidelity public fands in the United States, the SDNY policy is to presume guilt and force every person to prove it is their money! This was the policy of the $20 and CFIC ~ just outrageous. Té General Motors violated some law in Japan, would it not be a violation of international Jaw to allow Japan to install a receiver and then run General Motors from Tokyo? Yet this is vhat the SDNY did, inprisoned Amstrong indefinitely as @ warning to all other owmers do not dare come to America to claim 10 cents. It is mo longer possibie to obatin a fair trial in the SONY any more. ‘The judges are so hostile and view this complaint as an arogant assault upon their powar. Jefferson was correct. ~ "man is not mde to be trusted for life, if secured against all liability te account.” 2ON APRTL 24, 2000 JUDGE OWEN THREY THE ERESS OUT CRDERED THE COURT REPORTER NOT TO RECURD THE EVENES EDITED THE TRANSCRIPT TN CAMERA AND THE SEOOND CIRCUIT REFUSED 10 RECUSE JUDGE OWEN DEMONSTRATED HAT THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS MOST YIEDD TO PRUTECL THE REPUTATION OF & FELLOW JUDGE eee Se Oe ‘The events of April 24th, 2000, demonstrate how the Judiciary is not only out of control, but that the Second Circuit will not comply with the command of Congress to either ensure that the record ig a true and correct copy of all events that take place "verbatim" pursuant to 28 USC §753(b) or to recuse a judge who is deliberately and corruptly violating the Jaw pursuant to 28 usc 455, Tk matters not whet Congress enacts to regulate the Judiciary when the Judiciary views it has tha authority under the Constitution to Just ignore all legislation. This is an ect of war against the Constitution for the Separation of Powers is no longer even respected at least in the Second Ciroult or the SUNY. District Judge Richard Owen @id not dany the fact that he closed the court! nor has he denied secretly editing the transcripts in camera, Despite these public acknowledganents, the second Circuit still refused to ever enforce the law and even claimed it lacked the authority to order judges in the SDNY to stop secretly editing transcripts, us v Zichettello, 208 F3d 72, 98 (2d Cix 2000}. While Judge Owen refused to recuse himsal£! also the Second Circuit refused to allow any appeal or to explain why it would not recuse, There can be no rule of law when courts believe it is theiz prerogative to even rule regarding the law. 1.) In’a published opinion refising to recune himself, Jodge Liclard Own cmcolal Thar he Ral CIS] the coutrom, tailed to eqilain vay the record did not disclase the events, and justified the antics in question 23 his decision to have a ochcdibid hooring in a rebing-roon” cession yet at the sane tine once seria ed to take te stand over a mere letter eritten to tS surt, There covld be no "rebing-roat™ rs Sessicn vhere the defertiant $e divectod to, tests fy en Che stand under cath. The claim is self-serving and frivolous. “[because of Amstroeg's ex perce allegations in a letter to the court] were quite fomatony tO lawpors in several directicns, uot to sraicion the court, the court, determis Co saplorg then in a "robing roah' — type setting, although sing the ‘Se Lee ‘SEC x PEL, 198 FSuppzd 113, 117 (Srv am) crClosure ot the gourt > On April 24th, 2000, District Judge Richard Oven sua sponte closed the court ard threw the press out without any motion or notice to Armstreng whatsoever. It has been definitively held that when the goverment is prosecuting a individual, the arbitrary closure of the court becomes reversable structural error. When another federal judge in the SDNY accepted pleas and imposed criminal sentences in chanbers rather than in a public proceeding, even the Second Circuit held that such decrees were simply void. Strangely encugh, hare we have Judge Oven admitting to closing the court, forcing Armstrong to even take the stand, altering the record to hide the very fact that the court was even closed, yet the second Circuit arbitrarily refused to vindicate Armstrong's rights or aven the rights of the public. “Trials ard pretrial noarings are open to the public under the First Anendnent, unless some extracrdinary cizeunstances requires their closure, Us v Alcantara, 396 F3d 189, 195 (24 cir 2005) quoting: US v Danovarn, 877 Fad 583, 589 (7th Cir 1989) The closing of the court was completely erronecus. The Suprene Court held that a “finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when altheagh there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been comni.tted." U5 v United States Gypsum C2, 233 us 364, 398 (4948). In the instant case, there was no supporting evidence to justify the decision to close the court rendering thé contempt entirely unlawful in addition to the failure to advise of a right to counsel when removing counsel, and leaving Armstrong pro se. ‘The Suprema Court struck dow a contempt that had been imposed in a closed court as a violation of due process for the "traditional Anglo-American Gistriust for secret trials" reflect threughout history have been the behind-the-scene machinations of institutions [that] obvicusly symbolized a menace to Literty." In re Oliver, 333 US 257, 268-69 (1998). 29Daspita the fact the the contenpt: was "civil" to avoid trial by jury, It is alse woll settled that civil contanmors are entitled to the sane due process rights as a ccininal contenmor because Congress has not created any rules for civil contempt only criminal contempt pursuant to Fed.Rules.Crim.P, 42(b). Therefore, the same cules apply civilly, see In_re Sadin, 509 F2d 1252 (2d Cle 1975); US v Alter, 482 F2d 1016 (9th Cir 1973)) In re Grand Jury Investigation, S45 P24 385 (34d Cir 1976). Armstrong maintains that Congress must address the fact that there are no rules of civil procedure for civil centanpt that exposes citizens to wild views of judicial power that threaten the Lives of citizens and allow courts to creat a unique class of political prisoner under the label of civil contempt District Judge Richard Owen actually ordered the removal of the. Associated Press. This is just outrageous behavior for an Article IIL judge and it is even worse that a court of appeale would refuse to vindicate what is the lav, that is unprecedented. "of coursa trials must be public and the public have a deap interest in trials.” Pennekemp. v Florida, 326 US 331, 361 (1946) (J.Peankfurter concurring). "A trial is @ public event, shat transpires in the court room is public property." Ceaig v Harney, 331 US 367, 374 (1947), There is no basis ina free society vhere @ judge can throw out the press, alter the record to hide the events, and then the court of appeals views that the reputation of the Judiciary is more important than uphold the law. ALTERING TRANSCRIPTS 16 IN FACT A FRLOUY Th 4s amazing that the Second Circuit takes the position it Kecks authority to compel judges to obey the law, Zichettallo, supra. If the Second Circuit cannot rule regarding the law when a judge vLolates that law, then how can they rule if a citizen violates the law or even a politican? It is @ felony for one who “willfully and unlew- fully conceals, renoves, mutilates, obliterates, or destorys, ox attempts to do so, vee any record ... or other thing, filed or deposited with any cleck or officer of any court of the United States! 18 USC §2071{a). This folony may ba punished by @ imprisonment for up to 3 years. 30Congress has clearly commanded since §22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, that what takes place in a court must be’ recorded verbatim, Congress has expressly stated that all court proceedings "shall be recorded verbation! in the most recent court reporter act, 26 USC §753(b). The Supreme Court has held that this statute effords no immunity to even court-xeporters because thay “are required by statute to ‘recor[d] verbatim! ... [and t]hey are afforded no discretion in the carrying out of this duty. wee [TJhia [is an} aduinistrative daty ... [that indeed ... [even] judges are not entitled to absolute imumity when action in their administrative capacity." Antoine y Byers & Anderson, 508 US 429 (1993); clting Forrester vihite, 484 U8 219, 229 (1988). ‘The third Circuit has also held that the “preparation of a transcript is an official duty of the court reporter .., It has been held that a court reporter must file the transcript with the court..." US v City of Pittsturghs 757 F2d 43, #7 (34 Cir 1985). AIL transcripts must “conform to the truth.” US v Carter, 347 Fad 220,221 (24 Cir 1958}(per cuciam). Where a transcript was settled ex parte without notice to the defendant, the Gupreme Court held that the “ex parte settlement ... violated petition- er's constitutional right to procadural due process." Chessman v Tests, 354 US 156, 162 (1957). ‘hore has teen a problem in the SDMY with a local mule that allows judges to even alter the transcript in camera, This cama to the Sasond Circuit back in 2000 where it was held that “[clourts do not have puver to alter transcripts in camera and to concea) the alternations from the parties." US v Zichettello, 208 F3d 72, 97-98 (24 Cir 2000). ‘This becomes a critical iseve for as the Supreme: Court has also pointed out, that it "must lock only to the cerlified record in deciding ques- Hions prasented." Lawn v US, 355 US 339, 354 (1958), The failure Lo have provide? a veebatim Eransorypt of a suppression hoaring was held Lo alae constitute reversible error nat: subject to any possible harmless ecror analysis, when the alternative is the denial of a defendant's right to prepare a datense, US v Devlin, 13 Fad 1361, 1264 (9th Cir 1994), FSFor yoars, courts have tried to deprive defendants of their absolute right to transcripts in a criminal matter. They cannot be denied a verbatim transcript no matter what statute Congress enacted, There mast be a verbatin cecord, Bskridge v Washington Prison Pd, 357 US 214 (1958) (per curiam) (judge cannot claim there is no worthwhile errors to deny transcripts); Coppedge v 0S, 369 US 438 (1962) (defendant is entitled to “record of sufficient completeness"); Draper v Washington, 372 US 467, 199 (1963) (judge may not deny transcripts on his personal, opinion that an appaal would be frivolous); Lane v Brown, 372 US 477 (1963) {nck even appointed counsel may deny the right to a defendant to obtain transcripts); Rinaldi v Yeager, 364 US 305 (1966) (hold ing it is unconstitutional to require paymant if appeal is denied); Long v Dist Court £ Towa, 385 US 192, 195 (1965) (transcript of post-conviction hearing mst be supplied] Gardner y California, 393 US 367, 370-71 (1969) (habeas transcript must be supplied); Willions vy Oklahoma City, 305 US 458 (1969) {per curlam)(transcript must be supplied even in petty offenses); Mayer v Chicago, 404 US 189 (1971) {holding a transcript must be provided in a non-felony case: like armstrong in civil contempt); Roberts v ba Vallee, 389 US 40, 42 (1987}(per curian) (transcripts of preliminary hearing must be provided). “olfficials may not interfere with his existing trensoript and other legal papers, which taken as a whole are necessary for effective legal argunent. Bslabin v Scully, 605 FSupp 176, 183 (SCNY 1985) ‘The First Congress made it perfectly clear that every proceeding wae to be recorded verbatin, §22 dudiciary act of 1789. There is no excuse to edit transcripts an camera or to delat recording events. There is no excuse for the Second Circuit to refuse to stop the SDNY from engaging in such a unique practice, While it is tme that Judye Oven aleo admitted altering transeripte in camera and concealing those changes fron Amnstrong, this is a separate issue that goes to heart of the validity of the entire civil proceedings. 32I. _ dUDGE RICHARD OWEN: "I don’t renenber ever aaking any change to a transcript of any substance whatever. T may have stuck in a coma. Tomay have stuck in a cash, But 1 don't remeber ever changing anything of substan: (tr; 9/23/03, p45, WIN Po whotever extent the transcripts have been altered in camera by the court, that also undermined the due process rights of Armstcong for it created a dispute to the factual record as a hole. This rendered by its very nature, the incompetence of Judge Oven to heve presided for it made him a witness to his own acts in secret. Such disputed facts rendered Judge Qwen a witness within the procedural due process rights of Amstrong. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 605 Conpotency of Judge as Witness The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be nade in order to preserve the point Amy dispute to the record edited by the presiding judge renders the entire proceeding void under Rule 605. There can be no practice of modifying transcripts for it is simply unconstitutional, Entsmiger v Tova, 396 US 478 (1967). Hence, the comand of §753(b) is xeqarded as "nerdatoxy.” US v Andiarena, 823 F726 673, 676 (ist cic 1987); US v Calg, 763 F2d 1054, 1530 (6th Clr 19€5)("We agree that the act states a mandatory rule. noe also US v Renton, 700 Fad 184 (Sth Cir 1983) (aane)} US v Selva, 559 F2d 1303, 1205 (Sth Cix 1977)(same). Tt 1s not the hurden cf Armstrong to even show his entitlement to a complete verbatin transeript and it may not be "conjured up by a court in hindsight.” Britt v North Carolina, 40$ US 226, 230 (1971). tith all do respect, the Second Cireuit is out of control. hore is n0 accountability for the judges in the SDNY since the Second Circuit clains it has no suparvisory power to enforce the law, Zichettelle. To whan shell a citizen turn when there is no longer Jegal rights enforced by judess? 33ARTICLE ITT PROGLBITS MUTILPLE PROSECUTIGNS SERIGUE TEE PROWIBITS MUTELPLE PROSECUEIGNS _ Article IIT implictly prohibits by its very nature multiple adjudteations of the same case or controversy between the United States and a individeal. Tt is very clear that Article III inplicitly contains a bar against miltiple prosecutions by not only the Double Jeopardy Clause, butalsathe seventh Amendment ne-examination clause. Additionslly, the Supreme Court has consistently held that any claim of equitable Jurisdiction is confined to the known practices at the time of the 1769 vudielary Act, Grupo Nexicano de Desarrollo v Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 US 308, 318-319 (1899) (collecting authorities). Not only was civil contempt an equitable vemedy confined to known practices at the tine of 1799 that clearly prohibited the use of chancery parallel to @ criminal case at the King’s Bench, but this is also true regarding the use of equity receivers. ‘The Suprene Court of Maryland delivered an important decision that illustrates the aluse to vhich the adminisirative agencies have resorted to working in parallel and Glrectell by the criminal prosecution. In Blum v State of Maryland, 56 JAA 322, 34 Md 375, 51 R26 (1902), it vas squarely held that at common law, with citation fo English precedent, never could there be any ccoperation between a receiver and the criminal prosecution (see exhibit #15). In the instant case, the degeneration Of the entire lawful process ef the SFC and CFIC running parallel to tha criminal case is manifest in the Nemorandum of Agreement (Exhibit $1) vhere the district court of the SDNY under Judye Owen ordared that all evidence gathered by the secelver was to be withheld from Amstrong while it was to feed it to the criminal case parallel in the SDNY (99-Cr-997). Thus, the civil cases (99-Civ-9667; 9569) became @ simultaneous prosecution forcing Armstrong to defand pro se on the very same facts that he was pending a criminal trial to extort from him what his entire defense would be. This was prohibited at common law and thus there can be no juris diction for the SEC or CFIC action in che SDNY, but what judge will ever adnit to their cm abuse? 34