CHAPTER V- INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

5.01. Generally
A word or phrase used in a statute may have an ordinary, generic, restricted, technical,
legal, commercial, or trade meaning. Which meaning should be given to a word or phrase in
statute depends upon what the legislature intended.
As a general rule, in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a
careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of law, ascertained from a
consideration of the statue as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone,
must be made to determine the real intent of the law.

Term used:
Void for vagueness is a declaration that a law is invalid because it is not sufficiently clear, or
that in terms of legislative delegation the authority is so extensive so as to lead to arbitrary
prosecutions.

5.02. Statutory definition.
The legislative definition controls the meaning of the statutory word, irrespective of any
other meaning the word or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual sense. Where a statute
defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or phrase should not, by construction, be
given a different meaning. When the legislature gives a definition to a word, the meaning is
restricted within the terms of definitions. When the legislature gives meaning to a word as used
in the statute, it doesnt usurp the courts power to interpret the laws but merely legislates what
should form part of the law.
While definition of terms in a statute must be given all the weight due them in the
construction of the provision in which they are used, the terms or phrase being part and parcel of
the whole statue must be given effect in their entirety as a harmonious, coordinate, and integrated
unit.

5.03 Qualification of rule.
The statutory definition of a word or term as used in this Act is controlling only insofar
as the act is concerned. The definition cannot be applied for when the same statue is used in
other statutes.
The general rule that the statutory definition control the meaning of statutory words does
not apply when its application creates obvious incongruities, destroys one of the major purposes
of the act/statute, or becomes illogical as a result of a change in its factual basis. In such case, the
statutory definition will be regarded with the word given a different meaning so as to avoid
consequence.

5.04 Words construed in their ordinary sense.
The general rule in construing words and phrases is that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, words and phrases should be given their plain, ordinary ,and common
usage meaning. The courts therefore assume that the lawmakers know the meaning of words and
the rules of grammar so as to yield its correct sense.
Words in statute should generally be given their ordinary or usual meaning. They should
not be given a strict or limited signification in the absence of a legislative intent to that effect.

5.05. General words construed generally
Maxims:
Generaliaverbasuntgeneraliterintelligenda means what is generally spoke shall be
generally understood.
Generale dictum generaliterestinterpretandum means a general statement is understood in
a general sense.

A word of general significance in a statute is to be taken in its ordinary and comprehensive
sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning.
The rule is expressed in the maxim generaliaverbasuntgeneraliterintelligendaand generale
dictum generaliterestinterpretandum.
Where a word used in a statue has both a restricted and general meaning, the general must
prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter or the context in which it is
employed clearly indicates that the limited is intended.

5.07 General term includes things that arise thereafter.
A word of general signification employed in a statute should be construed, In the absence
of the legislative intent to the contrary, to comprehend not only peculiar conditions at the time of
its enactment but those that may normally arise after its approval.
Such rule of construction is known as progressive interpretation, which extends the
application of a statue to all subjects and conditions within its general purpose or scope that
come into existence following its passage, thus keeping the legislative short-term and transitory.
Hence, statutes framed in general terms apply to new cases that arise, and to new subjects
that are created, and which come within their general scope and policy. It is a rule of statutory
construction that legislative enactments in general and comprehensive terms, prospective in
operation, apply alike to all persons, subjects and businesses within their general purview and
scope.

5.08 Words with commercial trade or meaning.
When words used in business is applied in a statute, it should not be given a new
interpretation, but should be given such trade or commercial meaning as has been general
understood among merchants. In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, trade or
commercial terms are presumed to have been used in their trade or commercial sense.
This is applicable to tariff laws and laws of commerce. These laws should be construed as
universally understood by the importer or trade.

5.09 Words with technical or legal meaning
Words that have technical sense or those judicially construed to have a certain meaning
should be interpreted according to the sense in which they have been previously used although
the sense may vary from the strict or literal meaning of the words.

5.10. How identical terms in same statue are construed.
The general rule is that a word or phrase repeatedly used in a statue will bear the same
meaning throughout the statue.
The same word or substantially the same phrase appearing in different parts of the statue
will be accorded a generally accepted and consistent meaning, unless a different intention
appears or is clearly expressed.
The reason for this is that a word used in a statute in a given sense is presumed to be used
in the same sense throughout the law.

5.11 Meaning of word qualified by purposes of statue.
The meaning of a word or phrase may be qualified by the purpose which induced the
legislature to enact the statue. In construing a word or phrase, the court should adopt that
interpretation that accords best with the manifest purpose of the statue. If the language of the
statue is susceptible of two or more construction, that which gives effect to the manifest intent of
the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted should be adopted, and
the construction that destroys other provisions of the statute or defeats the object the legislator
sought to attain should be rejected
The literal meaning of the word or phrase may be rejected if the result of adopting such
meaning will be to defeat the purpose which the legislature had in mind.

5.12 Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions.
The general rule is at a word, phrase or provision should not be construed in isolation but
must be interpreted in relation to other provisions of the law.

5.13 Meaning of term dictated by context.
Maxim:
Verbaaccipiendasuntsecundummateriam means words are to be accepted or understood
according to the subject matter to which they deal with.
While ordinarily a word or term used in statute may be given the ordinary meaning, the
context in which a term or phrase is used may dictate a different sense. The context in which the
word is used oftentimes determines its meaning. The maxim applied here is
verbaaccipiendasuntsecundummateriam.
The context may also limit the meaning of what otherwise is a word of broad
signification. Finally, the context in which the same word is used in different parts of the statute
may give it a generic sense in one part and a limited meaning in another part.

5.14 Where the law does not distinguish.
When the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Ubilex non
distinguit, necnosdistingueredebemus. The rule is a corollary of the principle that general words
and phrases in a statue should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance.
The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one
part distinguished from another so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. There
should be no distinction in the application of a statue where none is indicated.
A corollary principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts
may not except something therefrom unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to
justify it.
The maxim ubilex non distinguitnecnosdistingueredebemusapplies not only in the
construction of general words and expressions used in the statue but also in the interpretation of
the rule laid down therein.

5.16 Disjunctive and conjunctive words.
The word or is disjunctive signify disassociation and independence of one thing from
other things enumerated. The use of or between two phrases connotes that either phrases
serves as qualifying phrase.
For instance where a tax statute imposes amusement tax on gross receipts of the
proprietor, lessee, OR operator of the amusement place, the word or is used disjunctively
since proprietor, lessee, and operator are implied as three distinct beings and that either of
the three should pay the tax separately and not as a whole.
However, or could sometimes be held to mean and, when the spirit or context of the
law so warrants. Example, in Sec. 2, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, a municipal judge is
authorized to conduct preliminary examination or investigation. The or many mean and
since under the law the municipal judge can both conduct the first and second stages of
preliminary investigation.
Or could also mean that is to say, giving that which precedes it the same significance
as that which follows it.
On the other hand, and is a conjunction pertinently defined as meaning together with
joined with, added to, etc and is used to join word with word, phrase with phrase, clause
with clause. The word and does not mean or; it is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or
union.
And may also be a means to restrict the meaning of a broad word when a restrictive
word is separated by the word and. Thus when two words, one of which is broad and the other
restrictive, the restrictive word limits the meaning of the broad word. For instance in Rumaratevs
Hernandez, when the law speaks of possession and occupation, although and is used, both
are not to be taken as synonymous with one another. Possession is broader than occupation since
the latter includes constructive possession. The word occupation highlights the fact that in order
to qualify for the term occupation a persons possession of the land must exist.
And/or means that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other
will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole state. It
avoids the construction which by the use of or alone will exclude the combination of other
alternatives and by the use of and will not make the others effective when standing alone.

5.17. Noscitur a sociis.
The maxim, noscitur a sociis, states that where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous
in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear
and specific by considering the company of other words with which it is found. This is so
because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases,
and its meaning may thus be modified or restricted by the latter.
In accordance to noscitur a sociis, if most of the words in an enumeration of words in a
statue are used in their generic and ordinary sense, the rest of the words should be construed the
same way.

5.18 Application of rule.
In sec 13(3), Art. XI of the Constitution grants the Ombudsman the power to Direct the
officer concerned to take action against a public official at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution with regard to noscitur a sociis, the word
suspension should be given the same sense as its associated words, all of which are punitive in
nature. Suspension should not be taken as a prevention but as a penalty.
In Carandangvs Santiago, the offended party argues that physical injuries mentioned in
Art. 33 of the Civil Code (In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party) does not include frustrated homicide because it is not under physical injuries as stated
in the Revised Penal Code. However, the court contended that should be understood in its
ordinary sense, such as to mean any form of bodily harm. This is because the other terms,
defamation and fraud are understood in their ordinary sense since they are not specifically
defined in the RPC.

5.19 Ejusdem generis.
The general rule is that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, things, or case, of the
same class as those that were mentioned. This canon of statutory construction is known as
ejusdem generis meaning of the same kind or specie.
The purpose of such is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating
the particular words as indicating of the class and the general words as indicating all that is
embraced in such class.
This is based on the preposition that had the legislature intended the general words to be
used in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would not have enumerated specific words. The
presumption is that legislators are thinking about particularization.

5.20 Illustration of the rule.
Where an act makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda such as gadgets,
pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials and the like, the term and the like
does not include taped jingles for campaign purposes since the enumerated terms are all of the
same class, that is tangible items.

5.21 Limitations of ejusdem generis
To be applicable, the rule of ejusdem generis requires that the following requisites
concur: (1) a statute contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a
general word or phrase; (2) the particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same
kind; (3) the enumeration of the particular ajd specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely
by examples; and (4) there is no indication of legislative intent to give the general words or
phrases a broader meaning.
The general rule that the general term may be restrained by specific words associated
with it is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an
enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class or are of the same nature. If the
enumeration of specific things have no distinguishable common characteristics and greatly differ
from one another, the rule of ejusdem generis does not apply.
Nor does the rule of ejusdem generis apply where the enumeration of the particular and
specific words is exhaustive. If the specific words embrace all persons or objects of the class
designated by the enumeration, the general words should include those comprehended in the
general classification and beyond the specified class.
Where a statute uses a general word, followed by an enumeration of specific words
embraced within the general word merely as examples, the enumeration does not thereby restrict
the meaning of the general word, but should include others of the same class although not
enumerated therein.
Ejusdem generis does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. The rule is
intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is taken in
connection with the other rules of construction. It should been applied so widely so as to defeat
the intention of the law. Thus, the rule shall not apply on consideration of the whole law on the
subject and the purpose sought, it appears that the legislature intended the general words to go
beyond the class designated by the specific and particular words in the enumeration. In short the
rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application, it should be used to carry out, not to
defeat the intent or purpose of the law.
The rule ejusdem generis is used to ascertain the intent of the law. If the intent clearly
appears from other parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the
result which will be reached by applying the rule, the rule must give way in favor of legislative
intent.

5.22 Expressio unnius est exclusion alterius
The maxim expression unnius est exclusio alterius means that express mention of one
person, thing, or consequences implies the exclusion of all others
The rule is formulated in a number of ways. One variation is the principle that what is
expressed puts an end to that which is implied (expressum facit cesare tacitum)
Another variation of the rule is that a general expression followed by exceptions
therefrom implies that those which do not fall under the exceptions come within the scope of the
general expression. It is explained by the maxim exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis,
which means a think not being executed must be regarded as coming within the purview of the
general rule.
Another variation is the axiom that the expression of one or more things of a class implies
that the exclusion of all not expressed, even though all would have been implied had none been
expressed. It is based on the fact that the mind of people usually are addressed specially to the
particularization, and that the generalities, thought broad enough to comprehend other fileds if
they stood alone, are used in the contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are
centered.
The variations of expressio unnius est exclusio alterius are canons of restrictive
interpretation. They are based on rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind.
They preceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations
in a statute if they did not intend to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.
It is the opposite of the doctrine of necessary implication which states that What is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Expression unnius is the
opposite of the doctrine of necessary implication.

5.23 Negative-opposite doctrine.
Negative-opposite doctrine or argmentum a contrario is the principle that what is
expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

5.24 Expressio unnius application
The rule expressio unnius est exclusion alterius and its corollary canons are generally
used in the construction of statutes granting powers, creating rights, and remedies, restricting
common rights and imposing penalties and forfeitures.
Pursuant to this rule, where a statute directs the performance of certain acts by a
particular person or class of persons, it implies that it shall not be done otherwise by a different
person or class. For instance, in actions for libel, the statute which provides that preliminary
investigations for criminal actions for written defamation shall be conducted by the provincial or
city fiscal of the province or city or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province
where such actions may be instituted prohibits all other municipal courts from conducting such
preliminary investigations.
If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must
necessarily, and by implication, be excluded.

5.25 Limitation of the rule
Expressio unnius is not a rule of law. It is a mere tool of statutory construction and is not
universal in application. It is no more than an auxiliary rule which will be ignored if other
circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive. The reason to this
is that there are circumstances indicating that the enumeration is not intended to be exclusive
because fact shows that to exclude the provision and others not mentioned therein would produce
undesirable consequences not intended by its framers.
The maxim expression unnius does not apply where enumeration is by way of example to
remove doubts only, such as in cases where a general term is follow with such as.
The maxim does not apply in cases where a statute appears on its face to limit the
operation of its provision to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but not reason
exists why other persons or things not enumerated should not have been included and manifest
injustice will follow by not including them.
The maxim may also be disregarded if adherence thereto would cause inconvenience,
hardship and injury to the public interest.
Lastly, where the legislative intent shows that the enumeration is not exclusive, the
maxim does not apply.

5.26 Doctrine of casus omissus
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est states that a person, object, or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim operates and pplies
only if and when the omission has been clearly established, and in such a case what is omitted in
the enumeration may not by construction be included therein.
The rule does not apply where it is shown that the legislature did not intend to exclude
the person, thing, or object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly indicated,
the court may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the legislature and
will not do violence to its language.

5.27 Doctrine of last antecedent
Qualifying words, restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated. They do not qualify words or phrases which are distantly or remotely
located. In other words, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, preferential and
qualifying words and phrases must be applied only to their immediate or last antecedent, and not
to the other remote words.
This rule of legal hermeneutics is commonly known as doctrine of last antecedent. It
means that a qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest
antecedent. The maxim expressive of this rule is ad proximum atencendents fiat relatio nisi
impediatar sententia which means that relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the
context otherwise requires.

5.29 Exception of the doctrine
Where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all antecedents embraced in the
provision, the same should be made extensive to the whole. Slight indication of legislative intent
so to extend the relative term is sufficient.

5.30 Reddendo singular singlis
The maxim means referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its
appropriate object or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken
distributively. As a rule, the maxim requires that the antecedents and consequences should be
read distributively to the effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears
by context most appropriately related and to which it is most applicable.

5.31 provisos, generally
The office of proviso is either to limit the application of the enacting clause, section, or
provision of a statue, or to except something therefrom, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or
to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of it, as extending to cases not intended by
the legislature to be brought within its purview. Its primary purpose is to limit or restrict the
general language or operation of the statute, not to enlarge it.
A proviso is commonly found at the end of a section, or provision of a statute, and is
introduced, as a rule, by the word provide or but nothing therein. The use of the word
provided however does not necessarily make the clause or phrase to which it is associated a
proviso.

5.32 Proviso may enlarge the scope,
Sometimes the legislature does not use proviso in its technical correctness so it may
enlarge the scope of law instead of limiting it. Thus where there is ambiguity, the courts must
ascertain the intent of the legislature.

5.33 Proviso as additional legislation
A proviso may assume the role of an additional legislation. It has been held that the
usual and primary office of a proviso is to limit generalities and exclude from the cope of the
statue that which otherwise would be within its terms. But it may sometimes mean simply
additional legislation.

5.34 What proviso qualifies
The proviso qualifies or modifies only the phrase immediately preceeding it or restrains
or limits the generality of the clause that it immediately follows. It should be confined to that
which directly precedes it, or to the section to which it has been appended, unless it clearly
appears that the legislature intended it to have a wider scope.

5.35 Exception
The rule that a proviso should be construed to qualify only the immediately preceding
part of the section to which it is attached is true only if no contrary legislative intent is indicated.

5.36 Repugnancy between proviso and main provision
A proviso should be construed to harmonize with the main provision, not destroy it.
However, where there is irreconcilable repugnancy between a proviso and the main provision,
that which is located in a later portion of the statute prevails, unless there is a legislative intent to
the contrary or such construction will destroy the whole statute.

5.37 Exceptions
An exception consists of that which would otherwise be included in the provision from
which it is excepted. It is a clause that exempts something from the operations of a statute by
express words, such as words as except, unless, otherwise, and shall not apply.

5.38 Exception and proviso distinguished
An exception exempts something absolutely from the operations of a statue by express
words in the enacting clause. A proviso defeats its operation conditionally.
An exception takes out of the statute something that otherwise would be part of the
subject matter. A proviso avoids them by way of defeasance or excuse.
An exception is generally a part of the enactment itself. But when the enactment modified
by engrafting upon it a new provision, by way of amendment, providing conditionally for a new
case, it is in the nature of a proviso.

5.40 Saving clause
A saving clause is a clause in a provision of law which operates to except from the effect
of the law what the clause provides, or to save something which would otherwise be lost. Usually
it is used to except or save something from the effect of a repeal of a statute.
It is to be construed in the light of the intent or purpose which the legislature had in mind
providing it in a statute the principal consideration being to effectuate such intent or carry out
such purpose.