AIDS IN INTERPRETATION

PARAS VS COMELEC

FACTS
Petitioner Paras in an incumbent Punong Barangay who
won during the last regular barangay election in 1994
A petition for his recall was filed by the registered voters in
the barangay
29% of the registered voter signed the petition.
Acting on the petition respondent Comelec resolved to
approved the petition and set recall election date.
To prevent the recall election, petitioner filed before the
RTC with the TC issuing a TRO. Later, TC lifted the TRO and
dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his
counsel to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without Comelec approval

Comelec re-scheduled the recall election on Jan 13, 1996. Hence the
instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction.

CONTENTION/ARGUMENT
Petitioner insists that the recall election is barred by the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of Local
Government Code (LGC) which states that no recall shall take place
within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
He insists that the recall election is barred by the SK election as he
maintained that the SK election is a regular local election hence no
recall election can be had for barely 4 months separate the SK
election from the recall election

RULING (STAT CON):
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment
Evident in the intent of the Sec 74 is to subject a local
official to recall election once during his term.
Subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase
regular local election to include the SK election will unduly
circumscribe the provision on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of people before the end of his
term
If SK elections were to be deemed within the purview of
the phrase regular local election, then no recall election
can be conducted making inutile the recall provision
It is basic precept in stat con that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Consti. Thus the
interpretation of Sec 74 should not be in conflict with Sec
3 Article 10 of the Consti, that is to provide a effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum
Petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to
absurdity
The spirit rather than the letter of the law determines its
construction. Hence, a statute must be read according to
its spirit and intent

DECISION: dismissed for becoming moot and academic; TRO
enjoining the recall election is permanent



EUGENIO VS DRILON

FACTS
Private respondent purchased on installment basis from
petitioner two lots
A complaint for non-development was filed by Delta
Village Homeowners Association and NHA ordered
petitioner to cease and desist from making further sales of
lots in said village or in any project owned by him.
While NHA cases were pending, private respondent filed
with Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs
(OAALA) a complaint against petitioner because petitioner
resold one of the two lots to Relevo spouses. PR
suspended his payments because of petitioner's failure to
develop the village.
OAALA dismissed PRs complaint; on appeal, the
Commission Proper of HSRC reversed the decision applying
PD 957 ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision
development and to reinstate private respondent's
purchase contract over one lot
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed
the decision of the HSRC and denied the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration

CONTENTION/ARGUMENTS
Petitioner Executive Secretary erred in applying PD957; that
inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered into in
1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot
govern the transaction

RULING (STAT CON):
Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion and P.D.
957 is given retroactive effect so as to cover even those
contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its
entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the
unmistakable intent of the law.
According to a leading authority on stat con, The
intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law
itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads
away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature
and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
the act.
It says that the law must favor the weak and the
disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers
and aspiring homeowners
PD was enacted to protect helpless citizens who may fall
to the manipulations and machinations of 'unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers', and such intent is
expressed clearly in the PDs preamble
The legislative intent of the PD must have been to remedy
the alarming situation by having P.D. 957operate
retrospectively even upon contracts already in existence at
the time of its enactment; if it is given prospective
application, the State will not be able to exercise its
regulatory functions and curb fraudulent schemes and
practices entered prior to the PD
Adding force to the argument, Sec 20, 21, and 23 are by
their very terms have retroactive effect and will impact
contracts and transactions prior to the enactment of the
PD

DECISION: petition is denied and dismissed

PP VS ECHAVES

FACTS
Fiscal Ello filed with lower court separate informations
against 16 persons charging them with squatting as
penalized by PD 772
Five of the informations were raffled to Judge Echaves
Before the arraignment, Judge Echaves dismissed the five
informations on the ground that (1) the accused entered
the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under
the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of
force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the landowner"; (2) the decree
does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land
Fiscal amended the information chaning the stealth and
stragety with threat and taking advantage of the absence
of the owner. However, the lower court denied the motion
and insisted that the phrase and for other purposes" in
the decree does not include agricultural purposes
because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of
Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class

RULING (STAT CON):
Lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply
to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was
intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas
made by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained
of involves pasture lands in rural areas
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on
public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in
this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which
makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or
association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural
lands.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species)
invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case.
Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is
intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly
to illegal constructions.
The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory
construction which is resorted to when the legislative
intent is uncertain

DECISION: the TC decision is affirmed

AISPORNA VS CA

FACTS
Petitioner, wife of a duly licensed insurance agent, was charged for
violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act
having acted as agent in the solicitation for insurance in favor of
Eugenio Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc.
without having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such
agent from the office of the Insurance Commission. The evidence
disclosed at the trial was that petitioner merely left a note on top of
her husband's desk informing the latter of Isidro's intention to
renew his policy. The trial court found appellant guilty as charged.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals construing the first paragraph of
Section 189 independent from the two succeeding paragraphs,
affirmed the judgment of conviction and held that the receipt of
compensation for the issuance of an insurance policy is not an
essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189
of the Insurance Act. Hence, the present recourse

ISSUE: w/n a person can be convicted of violating 1
st
paragraph of
Sec 189 of the Insurance Act w/o reference to 2
nd
paragraph. In
other words, w/n agent mentioned in first paragraph of Sec 189 of
Insurance Act is governed by the definition of an insurance agent
found of its 2
nd
paragraph

RULING (STAT CON):
Respondent appellate erred in interpreting the sections.
Respondent court concludes that under 2
nd
paragraph, a
person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains
insurance for compensation but in 1
st
paragraph, there is
no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for
compensation to be called insurance agent.
The definition of insurance agent found in 2
nd
par is
intended to define the word agent mentioned in the 1
st

and 2
nd
par.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second
paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three
paragraphs of Section 189
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
harmonious whole
The meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to
be extracted from any single part, portion or section or
from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but
from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole.
15 Every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context. This means that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts,
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment, not separately and independently
the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis)
provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found or
with which it is associated
Considering that the definition of insurance agent found in
2
nd
par is applicable to first, TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION
BY AGENT IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR VIOLATION OF
THE FIRST PAR.
The receipt of compensation for issuing an insurance
policy is NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT for violation of the
1
st
par of Sec 189.

DECISION: the judgment appealed is reversed and accused is
acquitted of the crime

VERA VS CUEVAS

FACTS
Private respondents are engaged in the manufacture, sale
and distribution of filled milk products throughout the
Philippines. The products of private respondent,
Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under
the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent,
General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand
"Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries
Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent,
Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the
Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal
purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the
standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the
other private respondents are members.
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the
market all of their filled milk products which do not bear
the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Failure
to comply will result to penalties.
Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in
skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all
milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been
removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its
immediate containers, and in all the language in which
such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is
not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one
year of age," or with other equivalent words.
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain
from requiring the respondents to print on the labels of
their product the words "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age."
Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually
restrain from investigating the respondents related to the
manufacture/sale of their filled milk product

RULING
Lower court did not err. Section 169 of the Tax Code has
been repealed by implication. Sec 169 was enacted in 1939
together with Sec 141 (tax on skimmed milk) and Sec 177
(penalizes the sale of skimmed milk w/o specific tax.
However the Sec 141 and 177 has been repealed. With the
express repeal of the two Sec, Sec 169 became merely a
declaratory provision w/o tax purpose or penal sanction

STAT CON
Moreover, Sec 169 does not apply to filled milk. The
general clause is restricted by the specific term skimmed
milk under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that
general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by
the particular terms they follow in the statute.
Skimmed milk is different from filled. The former is milk in
whatever form w/c the fatty part has been removed. The
latter is any milkwhether or not condensed, evaporated
concentrated, powdered, dried, desiccated, to which has
been added or which has been blended or compounded
with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so that the resulting
product is an imitation or semblance of milk cream or skim
milk. DIFFERENCE IS IN SKIM, THE FATTY HAS BEEN
REMOVED WHILE IN FILLED, THE FATTY IS LIKEWISE
REMOVED BUT IS SUBSTITUTED WITH REFINED COCO OIL
OR CORN OI OR BOTH.
The opinion of Board of Food Inspection bolster the
Courts stand that FILLED MILK DOES NOT COME WITHIN
THE PURVIEW OF SEC 169

The Court also believes that the filled milk is suitable for
nourishment for infants of all ages. Being declared as not
suitable for nourishment constitute a deprivation of
property w/o due process of law
With the repeal of Sec 141 and 177, Sec 169 has lost its tax
purpose. Hence, petitioner CIR has lost its authority to
enforce the same. CIR or BIR duties consists on taxes and
Food and Drug Admin of DOH functions to enforce Sec 169
for the promotion of the health of nation.
Petitioners are w/o jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute. It would cause overlapping of powers.

DECISION: decision appealed is affirmed.

DE VILLA VS CA

FACTS
Petitioner De Villa was charged before RTC in NCR with violation of
BP 22
After arraignment and direct examination, petitioner moved to
dismiss the case that (1) respondent court had no jurisdiction and (2)
no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in
dollar
Respondent court denied the motion; Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was denied by respondent court
Petitioner filed a petition in CA reasoning again that the check was
drawn on dollar account with a foreign bank and court had no
jurisdiction; CA dismissed the petition; Petitioner filed motion for
reconsideration but was denied by CA

ISSUE: w/n RTC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:
Jurisdiction is the power w/c the courts are invested for
administering justice that is for hearing and deciding cases
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
statute in force at the time of commencement of action
Sec 10 and 15 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that
jurisdiction of court covers the place of the commission of
the offense and place where the action is to instituted (or
in the court of the territory where the offense was
committed)
In the case of PP vs Manzanilla, the jurisdiction or venue is
determined by the allegations in the info. In the case, the
info alleges that the offense was committed in Makati and
the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction
upon the RTC
In the case of Que vs PP, the determinative factor in
determining the venue is the place of issuance of the
check.
On the matter of violation of BP 22, the Ministry of Justice
laid down the guidelines where the Venue of the offense
lies at the place where the check was executed and
delivered; the place where the check was written, signed
or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was
executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery
thereof which is the final act essential to its
consummation as an obligation
In the case, it is undisputed that the check was executed
and delivered in Makati

STAT CON
Petitioner argues that the checks was drawn against the
dollar account of petitioner w/ foreign bank and not
covered by BP 22
Court the law does not distinguish the currency involved
in the case
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that
where the law does not distinguish courts should not
distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law
does not make any exception, courts may not except
something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it
However, where there is doubt as to what a provision of a
statute means, the meaning put to the provision during
the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted. The records of the Batasan show that the
intention of lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever
currency may be subject

DECISION: petition is dismissed

NAPOLCOM VS DE GUZMAN

FACTS
RA 6975 provides for uniform retirement system for PNP
members (at the age of 56 except for specific officers with
rank w/c the Commission may allow for an unextendible
period of 1 year)
Base on the provision, petitioner sent notices of
retirement to private respondents who are members of
the defunct Philippine Constabulary (PC) and have reached
the age of 56
Private respondents filed a complaint before the RTC and
averred that the age of retirement by Sec 39 of RA 6875
cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by
Sec 89

Contention
Respondents INP includes both the former members of PC and
local police force/INP found in Sec 89 refers to the INP in PD 765.
Petitioners that the 4 year transition period provide in Sec 89
applies only to local police force who previously retire at the age of
60 (police/fire lieutenant or higher) while the PC had already been
set at 56/ the use of the term INP in Sec 89 is not the same meaning
under PD 765

Respondent Judge rendered a decision in favor of
respondent that INP includes all members of the present
PNP
Petitioners filed a petition; Respondent judge ruling in
favor of respondent is it may be the intention of Congress
to refer to the local police forces as the INP but the PNP
Law failed to define who or what constitutes INP

ISSUE: does the law distinguish INP from PC?

RULING
From a careful perusal of the above provisions, it appears
that the use of the term INP is not synonymous with the
PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just
made a uniform reference to the members of the whole
Philippine National Police (PNP) for retirement purposes
and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from
the PC and it cannot be construed that "INP" as used in
Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC
And contrary to respondent judge that the law failed to
define who constitutes the INP, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in
fact defined the same (The Integrated National Police,
which is the civilian component of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police)
STAT CON
If confronted with dubious meaning of a term, the court
should recourse in determining the construction of statute
with the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In case
of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the
meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted
Examining the records of the Bicameral Conference
Committee, we find that the legislature did intent to
exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec.
89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned
In applying the provisions (sec 89 in favor of local police
force as established in PD 765), Court merely gave life to
the real intent of the legislators. T
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner
that Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is applicable only to the local
police force is clear. The question now is whether the
classification is valid. The test for this is reasonableness
such that it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It must not
be limited to existing conditions only; (4) It must apply
equally to all members of the same class
The classification is based upon substantial distinctions.
The PC, before the effectivity of the law (RA 6975), were
already retirable at age 56 while the local police force
were retirable at 60, and governed by different laws
it seems absurd that a law will grant an extension to PC
officers' retirable age from 56 to 60 and then gradually
lower it back to 56 without any cogent reason at all. Why
should the retirement age of PC officers be increased
during the transitory period to the exclusion of other PC
officers who would retire at age 56 after such period? Such
absurdity was never contemplated by the law and would
defeat its purpose of providing a uniform retirement age
for PNP members

DECISION: petition is granted