,_ .-..-. _....

I :_
A MS C N 3 0 7 4
MI L- STD- 1629A
24 NOVEMBER 1980
~-
SUPERSEDI NG
MI L- STD- 1629 ( SHI PS)
1 NOVEMBER 1974
MI L- STD- 2070 ( AS)
12 JUNE 1977
MILITARY STANDARD
PROCEDURES FOR PERFORMING
A FAILURE MODE,
EFFECTS AND CRlTlCALliV ANALYSIS
l=SC RELI
MIL-STD-1629A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Washington, DC 20301
Procedures for performing a Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality
Analysis
MIL-STD-1629A
1. This Military Standard is approved for use by all Departments
and Agencies of the Department of Defense.
2. Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions)
and any pertinent data which may be of use in improving this
document should be addressed to: Commanding Officer, Engineering
Specifications and Standards Department (Code 93), Naval Air
Engineering Center, Lakehurst, NJ 08733, by using the self-
addressed Standardization Document Improvement Proposal (DD
Form 1426) appearing at the end of this document or by letter.
ii
MTl,-STD- 1629A
FOREWORD
The failure mode, effects,
I
and criticality analysis (FMFCA) is an essential
funytion in design,from concept through development. To be effective,
the8mCA'must be iterative to correspond with the nature of the design
probess itself. The extent of effort and sophistication of approach
used in the FMECA will be dependent upon the nature and requirements of
the individual program. This makes it necessary to tailor the requirements
for an FMECA to each individual program. Tailoring requires that,
regardless of the degree of sophistication, the FMECA must contribute
meaningfully to program decision. A properly performed FMECA is invaluable
to those who are responsible for making program decisions regarding the
feasibility and adequacy of a design approach.
The usefulness of the FMECA as a design tool and in the decision making
process is dependent upon the effectiveness with which problem information
is communicated for early design attention. Probably the greatest
criticism of the FMECA has been its limited use in improving designs.
The chief causes for this have been untimeliness and the isolated performance
of the FMECA without adequate inputs to the design process. Timeliness
is perhaps the most important factor in differentiating between effective
and ineffective implementation of the FMECA. While the objective of an
FMECA is to identify all modes of failure within a system design, its
first purpose is the early identification of all catastrophic and critical
failure possibilities so they can be eliminated or minimized through
design correction at the earliest possible time. Therefore, the FMECA
should be initiated as soon as preliminary design information is available
at the higher system levels and extended to the lower levels as more
information becomes available on the items in question.
Although the FMECA is an essential reliability task, it also provides
information for other purposes. The use of the FMECA is called for in
maintainability, safety analysis, survivability and vulnerability,
logistics support analysis, maintenance plan analysis, and for failure
detection and isolation subsystem design. This coincident use must be a
consideration in planning the FMECA effort to prevent the proliferation
of requirements and the duplication of efforts within the same contractual
program.
iii
MTT,-STD- 162912
CONTENTS
Paragraph Page
1. SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Application .....................
1.3 Numbering system ..................
1.4 Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4.1 Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4.2. Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.5 Method of reference .................
2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 Issues of documents .................
3. DEFINITIONS _. ....................
3.1 Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.1 Contractor .....................
3.1.2 Corrective action ..................
3.1.3 Compensating provision ...............
3.1.4 Criticality .....................
3.1.5 Criticality analysis (CA) ..............
3.1.6 Severity ......................
3.1.7 Damage effects ...................
3.1.7.1 Primary damage effects ...............
3.1.7.2 Secondary damage effects ..............
3.1.8 Damage mode .....................
3.1.9 Damage mode and effects analysis (DMEA) .......
3.1.10 Detection mechanism .................
3.1.11 Environments ....................
3.1.12 Failure cause ....................
3.1.13 Failure effect ...................
3.1.13.1 Local effect ....................
3.1.13.2 Next higher level effect ..............
3.1.13.3 Endeffect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.14 Failure mode ....................
3.1.15 Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) ......
3.1.16 FMECA-Maintainability information ..........
3.1.17 Indenture level ...................
3.1.17.1 Initial indenture level ...............
3.1.17.2 Other indenture levels ...............
3.1.18 Interfaces .....................
3.1.19 Single failure point ................
3.1.20 Threat mechanism ..................
3.1.21 Undetectable failure ................
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ................
4.1
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Implementation ...................
4.3 FMECA planning ...................
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5 L_
5
iv
M-IL-STD-1629A
CONTENTS (Continued)
Paragraph Page
4.3.1
4.3.2
4.3.3.
4.3.4
4.3.5
4.3.6
4.4
4.4.1
4.4.1.1
4.4.1.2
4.4.1.3
4.4.1.4
4.4.2
4.4.3
4.5
4.5.1
4.5.2
4.5.2.1
4.5.2.2
Worksheet formats ..................
Ground rules and assumptions ............
Indenture level ...................
Coding system
Failure definitiin'
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coordination of effoit'
..............................
General procedures .................
Contributing information ..............
Technical specifications and development plans ....
Trade-off study reports ..............
Design data and drawings ..............
Reliability data ..................
FMEAprocess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Severity classification ...............
FMECAReport ....................
Summary ......................
Reliability critical item lists ...........
Category I and Category II failure mode list ....
Single failure points list .............
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
9
10
10
10
11
11
5. DETAIL REQUIREMENTS ................. 11
5.1 Tasks ....................... 11
Tasks
101
102
103
104
105
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS .......... 101-l
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS ................ 102-L
FMECA-MAINTAINABILITY INFORMATION .......... 103-L
DAMAGE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS .......... 104-l
FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS PLAN. 105-l
FIGURES
Figure
Task 101
101.1 Example of a functional block diagram ........ 101-g
101.2 Example of a reliability block diagram ....... 101-10
101.3 Example of FMEA worksheet format .......... 101-11
Task 102
102.1
102.2
Example of CA worksheet format . . . . . . . . . . . 102-6
Example of criticality matrix . . . . . . . . . . . 102-7 L
Figure
Tasklo
103.1
Task 104
104.1 Example of damage mode and effects analysis format t 104-5
APPENDIX A. APPLICATION AND TAILORING GUIDE . . . . . . . . . . A-l
Paragraph
10.
10.1
10.2
10.3
20. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS (not applicable) . . . . . . . A-l
30. DEFINITIONS (not applicable) . . . . . . . . . . . . A-l
40. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ............... A-l
40.1 Ordering data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R- L
40.2 Data item descriptions (DID) ............ A-2
50.
50.1
50.1.1
50.1.2
50.1.3
50.2
50.3
50.4
50.5
50.6
MIL-STD-162912
CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Example of FMECA-maintainability information
worksheet format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103-3
APPENDIX
GENERAL ...................... A-l
Scope
Tailoring'requirements ....................................
A-l
A-l
Duplication of effort ............... A-l
APPLICATION CRITERIA ................ A-2
General considerations ............... A-2
Level of detail .................. A-2
Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-2
Intended use .................... A-3
FMEA (task 101)
CA (task 102) 1
A-3
FMECA-maintainability"i~for~ation'(task*103) .................................
A-3
A-4
DMEA (task 104) .................. A-4
Criticality number (C,) calculation example .... A-4
vi
MIL-STD-1629A
1. SCOPE
1.1 Scope. This standard establishes requirements and procedures
for p.erforming a failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA)
to systematically evaluate and document, by item failure mode analysis,
the potential impact of each functional or hardware failure on mission
success, personnel and system safety, system performance, maintainability,
and maintenance requirements. Each potential failure is ranked by the
severity of its effect in order that appropriate corrective actions may
be taken to eliminate or control the high risk items.
1.2 Application. This standard applies to the acquisition of
all designated DoD systems and equipment. It primarily applies to.the
program activity phases of demonstration and validation and full-scale
engineering development; e.g., design, research and development, and
test and evaluation. This standard also can be used during production
and deployment to analyze the final hardware design or any major modifica-
tions. The FMRCA tasks contained in this standard apply to all items of
equipment. This standard does not apply to software. Appendix A contains
additional application and tailoring guidelines.
1.3 Numbering system. The tasks are numbered sequentially as
they are introduced into this standard with the first task being number
101.
1.4 Revisions.
1.4.1 Standard. Any general revision of this standard which
results in a revision of sections 1, 2, 3, or 4 will be indicated by
revision letter after this standard number, together with date of revision.
1.4.2 Tasks. Any revisions of FMECA tasks are indicated by a
letter following the task. For example, for task 101, the first revision
is 101A, the second revision is 101B. When the basic document is
revised, those requirements not affected by change retain their existing
date.
1.5 Method of reference. The tasks contained herein shall be
referenced by specifying:
a. This standard number.
b. Task number(s).
C . Other data as called for in individual task.
2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS
2.1 Issues of documents. The following documents of the
issue in effect on the date of invitation for bid or request for proposal,
are referenced in this standard for information and guidance.
MIL-STD-1629A
SPECIFICATIONS
Military
MIL-M-24100
STANDARDS
Military
MIL-STD-280
MIL-STD-470
MIL-STD-721
MIL-STD-756
MIL-STD-780
MIL-STD-785
MIL-STD-882
MIL-STD-1388
M-IL-STD-1591
MIL-STD-2072
MIL-STD-2080
HANDBOOKS
Military
MIL-HDBK-217
Manual, Technical; Functionally Oriented Maintenancs_
Manuals for Systems and Equipment
Definitions of Item Levels, Item Exchangeability,
Models and Related Terms
Maintainability Program Requirements (for
Systems and Equipment)
Definitions of Effectiveness Terms for Reliability,
Maintainability, Human Factors and Safety
Reliability Prediction
Work Unit Codes for Aeronautical Equipment;
Uniform Numbering System
Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment
Development and Production
System Safety Program Requirements
Logistics Support Analysis
8n Aircraft, Fault Diagnosis, Subsystems,
Analysis/Synthesis of
Survivability, Aircraft; Establishment and
Conduct of Programs for
Maintenance Plan Analysis for Aircraft and
Ground Support Equipments
Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment
(Copies of specifications, standards, drawings, and publicalions
required by contractors in connection with specific procurement functions
should be obtained from the procuring activity or as directed by the
contracting officer.)
MTL-STD-1629h
3. DEFINITIONS
3.1 Terms. The definitions of terms
accordance with the'definitions in MIL-STD-280,
721, MIL-STD-780, MIL-STD-785, MIL-STD-882, and
exception and addition of the following:
used herein are in
MIL-STD-470, MlL-STD-
MIL-STD-1388, with the
3.1.1 Contractor. A private sector enterprise engaged to
provide services or products within agreed limits specified by a procuring
activity. As used in this standard, the term "contractor" includes
government operated activities developing or producing military systems
and equipment.
3.1.2 Corrective action. A documented design, process, procedure,
or materials change implemented and validated to correct the cause of
failure or design deficiency.
3.1.3 Compensating provision. Actions that are available or
can be taken by an operator to negate or mitigate the effect of a failure
on a system.
3 . 1 . 4 Criticality. A relative measure of the consequences of a
failure mode and its frequency of occurrences.
3.1.5 Criticality analysis (CA). A procedure by which each
potential failure mode is ranked according to the combined influence of
severity and probability of occurrence.
3.1.6 Severity. The consequences of a failure mode. Severity
considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by
the degree of injury, property damage, or system damage that could
ultimately occur.
3.1.7 Damage effects. The result(s) or consequence(s) a damage
mode has upon the operation, function, or status of a weapon system or
any Component the,reof. Damage effects are classified as primary damage
effects and secondary damage effects.
3.1.7.1 Primary damage effects. The result(s) or consequence(s)
a damage mode has directly upon a weapon system or any components thereof.
3.1.7.2 Secondary damage effects. The result(s) or consequence(s)
indirectly caused by the interaction of a damage mode with a system,
subsystem, or component thereof.
3.1.8 Damage mode. The manner by which damage is observed.
Generally describes the way the damage occurs.
MIL-STD-1629A
3.1.9 Damage mode and effects anasis (DMEA). The analysis of
a iystem or equipment conducted to determine t-he extent of damage sustained
from given levels of hostile weapon damage mechantis and the effects of
such damage modes on the continued controlled operation-and mission
completion capabilities of the system or equipment.
3.1.10 Detection mechanism. The means or method by which a
failure can be discovered by an operator under normal syt tern operation
or can be discovered by the maintenance crew by some diagnostic action.
3.1.11 Environments. The conditions, circumstances, influences,
stresses and combinations thereof, surrounding and affecting systems or
equipment during storage, handling, transportation, testing, installation,
and use in standby status and mission operation.
3.1.12 Failure cause. The physical or chemical processes,
.design defects, quality defects, part misapplication, or other processes
which are the basic reason for failure or which initiate the physical
process by which deterioration proceeds to failure.
3.1.13 Failure effect. The consequence(s) a failure mode has on
the operation, function, or status of an item. Failure effects are
classified as local effect, next higher level, and end effect.
3.1.13.1 Local effect. The consequence(s) a failure mode has on
the operation, function, or status of the specific item being analyzed.
3.1.13.2 Next higher level effect. The consequence(s) a failure
mode has on the operation, functions, or status of the items in the next
higher indenture level above the indenture level under consideration.
3.1.13.3 End effec/t. The consequence(s) a failure mode has on the
operation, function,
I
or status of the highest indenture level.
3.1.14 Failure plode. The manner by which a failure is observed.
Generally describes the!way the failure occurs and its impact on equipment
operation.
3.1.15 Failure!mode and effects analysis (FMEA). A procedure by
which each potential failure mode in a system is analyzed to determine
the results or effects thereof on the system and to classify each potential
failure mode according to its severity.
3.1.16 FMECA-Maintainability information. A procedure by which
each potential failure is analyzed to determine how the failure is
detected and the actions to be taken to repair the failure.
3.1.17 Indenture levels. The item levels which,identify or
describe relative complexity of assembly or function. The levels progress
from the more complex (system) to the simpler (part) divisions.
.-
MIL-STD-1629A
3.1.17.1 Initial indentgre level. The level of the total, overall
item which is the subject of lhhe FMECA.
3.1.17.2 Other indenture levels. The succeeding indenture levels
(second, third, fourth, etc() which represent an orderly progression to
the simpler division of the item.
3.1.18 Interfaces. The systems, external to the system being
analyzed, which provide a common boundary or service and are necessary
for the system to perform its mission in an undegraded mode; for example,
systems that supply power, cooling,, heating, air services, or input
signals.
3.1.19 Single failure point. The failure of an item which would
result in failure of the system and is not compensated for by redundancy
or alternative operational procedure.
3.1.20 Threat mechanism. The means or methods which are embodied
or employed as an element of a man-made hostile environment to produce
damage effects on a weapon system and its components.
3.1.21 Undetectable failure. A postulated failure mode in the
FMEA for which there is no failure detection method by which the operator
is made aware of the failure.
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
4.1 General. The failure mode, effects, and criticality
analysis (FMECA) shall be planned and performed in accordance with the
general requirements of this standard and the task(s) specified by the
procuring activity.
4.2 Implementation. The FMECA shall be initiated early in
the design phase to aid in the evaluation of the design and to provide a
basis for establishing corrective action priorities. The FMECA is an
analysis procedure which documents all probable failures in a system
within specified ground rules, determines by failure mode analysis the
effect of each failure on system operation, identifies single failure
points, and ranks each failure according to a severity classification of
failure effect. This procedure is the result of two steps which, when
combined, provide the FMFCA. These two steps are:
a. Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA).
b. Criticality analysis (CA).
4.3 FMECA planning. Planning the FMECA work involves the
contractor's procedures for implementing the specified requirements of
this standard, updating the FMECA to reflect design changes, and use of
MIT,-STD-1629A
the analysis results to provide design guidance.
Worksheet formats,
ground rules, analysis assumptions, identification of the lowest indenture
level of analysis, coding system description, failure definitions, and
identification of coincident use of the FMECA by the contractor's reliability
organization and other organizational elements shall be considered in
the FMECA planning.
4.3.1 Worksheet formats. The contractor's formats, which
organize and document the FMECA and other analysis methods contained
herein, shall include the information shown in the example formats.in
Figures 101.3, 102.1, 103.1 and 104.1. The initial indenture level of
analysis shall be identified (item name) on each worksheet, and each
successive indenture level shall be documented on a separate worksheet
or group of worksheets.
4.3.2 Ground rules and assumptions. The contractor shall
develop ground.rules and analysis assumptions. The ground rules shall
identify the FMECA approach (e.g., hardware, functional or combination),
the lowest indenture level to be analyzed, and include general statements
of what constitutes a failure of the item in terms of performance criteria
and allowable limits. Every effort should be made to identify and
,record all ground rules and analysis assumptions prior to initiation of
the analysis; however, ground rules and analysis assumptions may be
added for any item if requirements change. Additional ground rules and
analysis assumptions shall be documented and separately identified for
inclusion in the J?MECA report.
4.3.3 Indenture level. The indenture level applies to the
system hardware or functional level at which failures are postulated.
Unless otherwise specified, the contractor shall establish the lowest
indenture level of analysis using the following guidelines:
a. The lowest level specified in the LSA candidate list
to assure complete inputs for each LSA candidate.
b. The lowest indenture level at which items are assigned
a catastrophic (Category I) or critical (Category
11) severity classification category (see 4.4.3).
C . The specified or intended maintenance and repair
level for items assigned a marginal (Category III)
or minor (Category IV) severity classification
category (see 4.4.3).
4.3.4 Coding system. For consistent identification of system
functions and equipment and for tracking failure modes, the contractor
shall adhere to a coding system based upon the hardware breakdown structure,
work unit code numbering system of MIL-STD-780, or other similar uniform
numbering system. The coding system shall be consistent with the reliability
and functional block diagram numbering system to provide complete visibility
of each failure mode and its relationship to the system.
6
MIT,-STD-1629A
4 . 3 . 5 Failure definition. The contractor shall develop general
statements of what constitutes a failure of the item in terms -of performance
parameters and allowable limits for each specified output. The contractor's
general statements shall not conflict with any failure definitions
specified by the procuring activity.
4.3.6 Coordination of effort. Consideration shall be given to
the requirements to perform and use the FMECA in support of a reliability
program in accordance with MIL-STD-785, maintainability program in
accordance with MIL-STD-470, safety program in accordance with MIL-STD-
882, survivability and vulnerability program in accordance with MIL-STD-
2072, logistics support analysis in accordance with MIL-STD-1388, maintenance
plan analysis (MPA) in accordance with MIL-STD-2080, fault diagnosis
analysis in general accordance with MIL-STD-1591, and other contractual
provisions. The contractor shall identify the program organization
responsible for performing the FMECA and assure that the FMECA results
will be used by other organizational elements to preclude duplication of
effort.
4.4 General procedure. The FMECA shall be performed in
accordance with the requirements specified herein to systematically
examine the system to the lowest indenture level specified by the procuring
activity. The analysis shall identify potential failure modes. When
system definitions and functional descriptions are not available to the
specified indenture level, the initial analysis shall be performed to
the lowest possible indenture level to provide optimum results. When
system definitions and functional definitions are complete, the analysis
shall be extended to the specified indenture level.
4.4.1 Contributing information. System definition requires a
review of all descriptive information available on the system to be
analyzed. The following is representative of the information and data
required for system definition and analysis.
4.4.1.1 Technical specifications and development plans. Technical
specifications and development plans generally describe what constitutes
and contributes to the various types of system failure. These will
state the system objectives and specify the design and test requirements
for operation, reliability, and maintainability. Detailed information
in the plans will provide operational aild functional block diagrams
showing the gross functions the system must perform for successful
operation. Time diagrams and charts used to describe system functional
sequence will aid in determining the time-stress as well as feasibility
of various means of failure detection and correction in the operating
system. Acceptable performance limits under specified operating and
environmental conditions will be given for the system and equipments.
Information for developing mission and environmental profiles will
describe the mission performance requirements in terms of functions
describing the tasks to be performed and related to the anticipated
environments for each mission phase and operating mode. Function-time
.L
relationships from which the time-stress relationship of the environmental
MIL-STD-1629h
conditions can be developed shall be presented. A definition of the
operational and env&ronmental stresses the system is expected t o undergo,
as well as failure d,!zfinitions, will either be provided or must be
developed.
4.4.1.2 Trade-off study reports. These reports should identify
areas of marginal and state-of-the/&t design and explain any design
compromises and operating restraints agreed upon.. This information will
aid in determining the possible and most probable failure modes and
causes in the system.
4.4.1.3 Design data and drawings. Design data and drawings
identify each item and the item configuration that perform each of the
system functions. System design data and drawings will usually describe
the system's internal and inter6ace functions beginning at system level
and progressing to the lowest indenture level of the system. Design
data will usually include either functional block diagrams or schematics
that will facilitate construction of reliability block diagrams.
4.4.1.4 Reliability data. The determination of the possible and
probable failure modes requires an analysis of reliability data on the
item selected to perform each of the system internal functions. It is
always desirable to use reliability data resulting from reliability
tests run on the specific equipment to be used with the tests performed
under the identical conditions of use. When such test data are not
available, reliabil?ty data from MIL-HDBK-217 or from operational experience
and tests performed under similar use conditions on items similar to
those in the systems should be used.
4.4.2 FMEA-process. The FMEA shall be initiated as an integral
part of early design process of system functional assemblies and shall
be updated to reflect design changes. Current FMEA analysis shall be a
major consideration at each design review from preliminary through the
final design. The analysis shall be used to assess high risk items and
the activities underway to provide corrective actions. The FMEA shall
also be used to define special test considerations, quality inspection
points, preventive maintenance actions, operational constraints, useful
life, and other pertinent information and activities necessary to minimize
failure risk. All recommended actions which result from the FMEA shall
be evaluated and formally dispositioned by appropriate implementation or
documented rationale for no action. Unless otherwise specified, the
following discrete steps shall be used in performing an FMEA:
-
a. Define the system to be analyzed. Complete system
definition includes identification of internal and
interface functions, expected performance at all
indenture levels, system restraints, and failure
definitions. Functional narratives of the system
should include descriptions of each mission in terms
of functions which identify tasks to be performed
8
MIT,-STD-162912
b.
C .
d.
e.
f.
g=
h.
for each mission, mission phase, and operational
mode. Narratives should describe the environmental
profiles, expected mission times and equipment
utilization, and the functions and outputs of each
item.
Construct block diagrams. Functional and reliability
block diagrams which illustrate the operation,
interrelationships, and interdependencies of functional
entities should be obtained or constructed for each
item configuration involved in the system's use.
All system interfaces shall be indicated.
Identify all potential item and interface failure
modes and define their effect on the immediate
function or item, on the system, and on the mission
to be performed.
Evaluate each failure mode in terms of the worst
potential consequences which may result and assign
a severity classification category (see 4.4.3).
Identify failure detection methods and compensating
provisions for each failure mode.
Identify corrective design or other actions required
to eliminate the failure or control the risk.
Identify effects of corrective actions or other
system attributes, such as requirements for logistics
support.
Document the analysis and summarize the problems
which could not be corrected by design and identify
the special contiols which are necessary to reduce
failure risk.
4.4.3 Severity classification. Severity classifications are
assigned to provide a qualitative measure of the worst potential con-
sequences resulting from design error or item failure. A severity
classification shall be assigned to each identified failure mode and
each item analyzed in accordance with the loss statements below. Wllere
it may not be possible to identify an item or a failure mode according
to the loss statements in the four categories below, similar loss statements
based upon loss of system inputs or outputs shall be developed and
included in the FMECA ground rules for procuring activity approval.
Severity classification categories which are consistent with MIL-STD-882
severity categories are defined as follows:
9
MIL-STD-1629A
a.
b.
c.
d.
Category I -
Catastrophic - A failure which may
cause death or weapon system loss (i.e., aircraft,
tank, missile,,ship, etc.)
Category II - Critical - A failure which may cause
severe injury, major property damage, or major
system damage which will result in mission loss.
Category III - Marginal - A failure which may cause
minor injury, minor property damage, or minor system
damage which will result in delay or loss of availability
or mission degradation.
Category IV - Minor - A failure not serious enough
to cause injury, property damage, or system damage,
but which will result in unscheduled maintenance or
repair.
4.5 FMECA Report. The results of the FMEA and other related
analyses shall be documented in a report that identifies the level of
analysis, summarizes the results, documents the data sources and techniques
used in performing the analysis, and includes the system definition
narrative, resultant analysis data, and worksheets. The worksheets
shall be organized to first display the highest indenture level of
analysis and then proceed down through decreasing indenture levels of
the system. The ground rules, analysis assumptions, and block diagrams
shall be included, as applicable, for each indenture level analyzed.
Interim reports shall be available at each design review to provide
comparisons of alternative designs and to highlight the Category I and
Category II failure modes, the potential single failure points, and the
proposed design corrections. The final report shall reflect the final
design and provide identification of the Category I and Category II
failure modes and the single failure points which could not be eliminated
from the design.
4.5.1 Summary. The report shall contain a summary which provides
the contractor's conclusions and recommendations based upon the analysis.
Contractor interpretation and comments concerning the analysis and the
initiated or recommended actions for the elimination or reduction of
failure risks shall be included. A design evaluation summary of major
problems detected during the analysis shall be provided in the final
report. A list of items omitted from the FMEA shall be included with
rationale for each item's exclusion.
4.5.2 Reliability critical item lists. Reliability critical
item lists extracted from the FMEA shall be included in the summary.
The information provided for each item listed shall include the following:
a. Item identification and F'MEA cross-reference.
1 0
MIL-STD-1629A
b. ripqion of design features which minimize the
rrence of failure for the listed item.
a. Des ription of tests accomplished that verify design
4c1 feat res and tests planned at hardware acceptance or
dur g operations and maintenance that would detect
the ailure mode occurrence.
d. Descrkptiq n of planned inspections to ensure hardware
is being b ilt to design requirements, and inspections
planned du
uf
ing down-time or turnaround or during
maintenance, that could detect the failure mode or
evidence of conditions that could cause the failure
mode.
e. A statement relating to the history of this particular
design or a similar design.
f. Description of the method(s) by which the occurrence
of the failure mode is detected by the operator, and
whether a failure of a redundant or alternative
operating mode, when available, can be detected.
g*
Rationale for not eliminating the related failure
mode(s).
4.5.2.1 Category I and Category II failure mode list. A list of
all Category I (catastrophic) and Category II (critical) failure modes
shall be provided. The information described above shall be provided
for each Category I' and Category II failure mode listed such that it is
possible to identify directly the FMEA entry and its related drawings
and schematics.
4.5.2.2 Single failure points list. A separate list of all
single failure points shall be provided. The information described
above shall be provided in the sunnnary for each single failure point
listed such that it is possible to identify directly the FMEA entry and
its related drawings and schematics. The criticality classification for
each single failure point shall be included in the listing.
5. DETAIL REQUIREMENTS
5.1 Tasks. The detail tasks for performing an FMEA and other
related analyses follow. The tasks for the related analyses supplement
and are dependent upon performing an FMEA in accordance with Task 101.
Custodians: Preparing Activity
Army - CR Navy - AS
Air Force - 17 (Project No. RELI-0003)
Review Activities:
Navy - SH, OS
Army - EA, AR
11
I
1
,
.
MTTrSTTb 1629/I
TASK 101
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
1. Purpose. The purpose of the l?MEA is to study the results
or effects of item failure on system operation a&to classify each
potential failure according to its severity.
2. Documents referenced in Task 101:
SPECIFICATIONS
Military
MIL-M-24100 Manual,ITechnical, Functionally Oriented Maintenance
Manuals] (FOMM) for Equipment and Systems
STANDARDS
Military
MIL-STD-756 Reliability Prediction
M-IL-STD-780 Definitions of Item Levels, Item Exchangeability,
Models and Related Terms:
3. Analysis approach. Variations in design complexity and
available data will generally dictate the analysis approach to be used.
There are two primary approaches for accomplishing an FMEA. One is the
hardware approach which lists individual hardware items and analyzes
their possible failure modes. The other is the functional approach
which-recognizes that every item is designed to perform a number of
functions that can be classified as outputs. The outputs are listed and
their failure modes analyzed. For complex systems, a combination of the
functional and hardware approaches may be considered. The FMEA may be
performed as a hardware analysis, a functional analysis, or a combination
analysis and may be initiated at either the highest indenture level and
proceed through decreasing indenture levels (top-down approach) or at
the part or assembly level and proceed through increasing indenture
levels (bottom-up approach) until the FMEA for the system is complete.
3.1 Hardware approach. The hardware approach is normally
used when hardware items can be uniquely identified from schematics,
drawings, and other engineering and design data. The hardware approach
is normally utilized in a part level up fashion (bottom-up approach);
however, it can-tteinitiatedat any level of indenture and progress in
either direction. Each identified failure mode shall be assigned a
severity classification which will be utilized during design to establish
priorities for corrective actions. .L
101-I
TASK 101
24 November 1980
M-IL-STD-1629h
3.2 Functional approach.
The functional approach is normally
used when hardware items cannot be uniquely identified or when system
complexity requires analysis from the initial indenture level downward
through succeeding indenture levels. The functional approach is normally
utilized in an initial indenture level down fashion (top-down approach);
however, it can be initiated at any level of indenture and progress in
either direction. Each identified failure mode shall be assigned a
severity classification which will be utilized during design to establish
priorities for corrective actions.
3.3 Failure mode severity classification. Severity classifications
'are assigned to each failure mode and each item t o provide a basis for
establishing corrective action priorities. First priority shall be
given to the elimination of the identified Category I (catastrophic) and
Category II (critical) (see General Requirements, 4.4.3) failure modes.
Where the loss of input or output at a lower indenture level is critical
to the operational success of a higher indenture level, action shall be
taken to eliminate or control the identified failure modes. When identified
Category I and Category II failure modes cannot be eliminated or controlled
to levels acceptable to the procuring activity, alternative controls and
recommendations shall be presented to the procuring activity.
4. Procedure. Each single item failure, as its effects are
analyzed, is to be considered the only failure in the system. Where a
single item failure is non-detectable, the analysis shall be extended to
determine the effects of a second failure, which in combination with the
first undetectable failure, could result in a catastrophic or critical
failure condition. Passive and multiple failures which may result in
catastrophic or critical conditions shall also be identified. When
safety, redundant, or back-up items exist, failure assumptions shall be
broadened to include the failure conditions which resulted in the need
for the safety, redundant, or back-up item. Design changes or special
control measures shall be identified and defined for all catastrophic
(Category I) and critical (Category IT) failure modes. All single
failure points identified during the analyses shall be uniquely identified
on the FMEA worksheets to maintain visibility of these failure modes.
4.1 System definition. The first step in performing the FMEA
is to define the system to be analyzed. Functional narratives shall be
developed for each mission, mission phase, and operational mode and
include statements of primary and secondary mission objectives. The
narratives shall include system and part descriptions for each mission
phase and operational mode, expected mission times and equipment utilization,
functions and output of each item, and conditions which constitute
.- system and part failure.
4.1.1 Mission functions and operational modes. The system
definition shall include descriptions of each;mission in terms of functions
which identify the task. to be performed and the functional mode of
3
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101-2
MIL-STD-1629A
operation for performing the specific function. Mission functions and
operational modes shall be identified starting at the highest system
level and progressing to the lowest indenture level to be analyzed.
When more than one method of performing a particular function is available,
the alternative operational modes shall be identified. All multiple
functions utilizing different equipment or groups of equipment also
shall be identified. The functions and outputs for each indenture level
also may be presented in a function-output list or in narrative form.
4.1.2 Environmental profiles. The environmental profiles which
present the anticipated environmental conditions for each mission and
mission phase shall be defined. When a system will be utilized in more
than one environment each different environmental profile shall be
described. The intended use, through time, of the system and its equipments
shall be developed from the mission time statements for each environmental
profile. The use time-environment phasing is used in determining the
time-stress relationships and the feasibility of failure detection
methods and compensating provisions in the operating system.
4.1.3 Mission time. A quantitative statement of system function-
time requirements shall be developed and included in the system definition.
Function-time requirements shall be developed for items which operate in
different operational modes during different mission phases and for
items which function only if required.
4.1.4 Block diagrams. Block diagrams which illustrate the
operation, interrelationships, and interdependencies of functional
entities of a system shall be constructed to provide the ability for
tracing failure mode effects through all levels of indenture. Both
functional and reliability block diagrams are required to show the
functional flow sequence and the series dependence or independence of
functions and operations. Block diagrams may be constructed in conjunction
with or after defining the system and shall present the system as a
breakdown of its major functions. More than one block diagram will
usually be required to display alternative modes of operation, depending
upon the definition established for the system. All inputs and outputs
of the item as a whole shall be shown on the diagram and clearly labeled.
Each block shall be designated by a consistent and logical item number
that reflects the functional system breakdown order. A uniform numbering
system developed in functional system breakdown order is required to
provide traceability and tracking through all levels of indenture. MIL-
STD-780 provides an example of a uniform numbering system for aeronautical
equipment that can be used as a guide in the development of a consistent
and logical identification code for block diagrams. Figures 101.1 and
101.2,depict examples of functional and reliability block diagrams.
4.1.4.1 Functional block diagrams. A functional block diagram
illustrates the operation and interrelationships between functional
entities of a system as defined in engineering data and schematics. A
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101-3
MTL-STD-1629A
functional block diagram will provide a functional flow sequence for the
system and each indenture level of analysis and present hardware indenture
and can be used for both hardware and functional method FMRA's. MIL-M-
24100 procedures and techniques for developing major function diagrams
may be used for guidance in developing functional block diagrams.
4.1.4.2 Reliability block diagrams. A reliability block diagram
defines the series dependence or independence of all functions of a
system or functional group for each life-cycle event. The reliability
block diagram will provide identification of function interdependencies
for the system and can be used for a functional method FMEA. MIL-STD-
756 procedures illustrate a method which may be used to develop reliability
block diagrams.
5. FMEA worksheet. The documentation of the FMRA is the
next step and is accomplished by completing the columns of the approved
FMRA worksheet. An example of an FMEA worksheet format is shown in
Figure 101.3.
5.1 Identification number. A serial number or other reference
designation identification number is assigned for traceability purposes
and entered on the worksheet. A uniform identification code in accordance
with General Requirements, 4.3.4, shall bz used to provide consistent
identification of system functions an equipment and provide complete
visibility of each failure mode and its relationship to the system
function identified in the applicable block diagram.
5.2 Item/functional identification. The name or nomenclature
of the item or system function being analyzed for failure mode and
effects is listed. Schematic diagram symbols or drawing numbers shall
be used to properly identify the item or function.
5.3 Function. A concise statement of the function performed
by the hardware item shall be listed. This shall include both the
inherent function of the part and its relationship to interfacing items.
5.4 Failure modes and causes. All predictable failure modes
for each indenture level analyzed shall be identified and described.
Potential failure modes shall be determined by examination of item
outputs and functional outputs identified in applicable block diagrams
and schematics. Failure modes of the individual item function shall be
postulated on the basis of the stated requirements in the system definition
narrative and the failure definitions included in the ground rules. The
most probable causes associated with the postulated failure mode shall
be identified and described. Since a failure mode may have more than
one cause, all probable independent causes for each failure mode shall
be identified and described. The failure causes within the adjacent
indenture levels shall be considered. For example, failure causes at
&
the third indenture level shall be considered when conducting a second
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101- L
MTL-STD-1629h
indenture level analysis. Where functions shown
on a blodk diagram are
performed by a replaceable module in the system,
a separate FMJ3A shall
be performed on the internal functions of the module, viewing the module
as a system. The effects of possible failure modes in the module inputs
and outputs describe the failure modes of the module when it is viewed
as an item within the system. To assist in assuring that a complete
analysis is performed, 'each failure mode and output function shall, as a
minimum, be examined in relation to the following typical failure conditions:
a.
b.
C .
d.
e.
f.
go
Premature operation.
Failure to operate at a prescribed time.
Intermittent operation.
Failure to cease operation at a prescribed time.
Loss of output or failure during operation.
Degraded output or operational capability.
Other unique failure conditions, as applicable,
based upon system characteristics and operational
requirements or constraints.
5.5 Mission phase/operational mode. A concise statement of
the mission phase and operational mode in which the failure occurs.
Where subphase, event, or time can be defined from the system definition
and mission profiles, the most definitive timing information should also
be entered for the assumed time of failure occurrence.
5.6 Failure effect. The consequences of each assumed failure
mode on item operation, function, or status shall be identified, evaluated,
and recorded. Failure effects shall focus on the specific block diagram
element which is affected by the failure under consideration. The
failure under consideration may impact several indenture levels in
addition to the indenture level under analysis; therefore, "local,"
"next higher level," and "end" effects shall be evaluated. Failure
effects shall also consider the mission objectives, maintenance requirements
and personnel and system safety.
5.6.1 Local effects. Local effects concentrate specifically on
the impact an assumed failure mode has on the operation and function of
the item in the indenture level under consideration. The consequences
of each postulated failure affecting the item shall be described along
with any second-order effects which result. The purpose of defining
local effects is to provide a basis for evaluating compensating provisions
and for recommending corrective actions. It is possible for the "local"
effect to be the failure mode itself.
&
TASK 101
24 Novcmbcr 1980
101-5
- ^,^_.. -.._ ..__-_ . .._ I . . . ._ .,.
MIL-STD-1629h
5.6.2 Next higher level. Next higher level effects concentrate
on the impact an assumed failure has on the operation and function of
the items in the next higher indenture level above the indenture level
under consideration. The consequences of each postulated failure affecting
the next higher indenture level shall be described.
5.6.3 End effects. End effects evaluate and define the total
effect an assumed failure has on the operation, function, or status of
the uppermost system. The end effect described may be the.result of a
double failure. For example, failure of a safety device may result in a
catastrophic end effect only in the event that both the prime function
goes beyond limit for which the safety device is set and the safety
device fails. Those end effects resulting from a double failure shall
be indicated on the FMEA worksheets.
5.7 Failure detection method. A description of the methods
by which occurrence of the failure mode is detected by the operator
shall be recorded. The failure detection means, such as visual or
audible warning devices, automatic sensing devices, sensing instrumen-
tation, other unique indications, or none shall be identified.
5.7.1 Other indications. Descriptions of indications which are
evident to an operator that a system has malfunctioned or failed, other
than the identified warning devices, shall be recorded. Proper correlation
of a system malfunction or failure may require identification of normal
indications as well as abnormal indications. If no indication exists,
identify if the undetected failure will jeopardize the mission objectives
or personnel safety. If the undetected failure allows the system to
remain in a safe state, a second failure situation should be explored to
determine whether or not an indication will be evident to an operator.
Indications to the operator should be described as follows:
a. Normal. An indication that is evident to an operator
when the system or equipment is operating normally.
b. Abnormal. An indication that is evident to an
-~
operator when the system has malfunctioned or failed.
C . Incorrect. An erroneous indication to an operator
due to the malfunction or failure of an indicator
(i.e., instruments, sensing devices, visual or
audible warning devices, etc.).
7
5.7.2 Isolation. Describe the most direct procedure that
allows an operator to isolate the malfunction or failure. An operator
will know only the initial symptoms until further specific action is
taken such as performing a more detailed built-in-test (BIT). The
failure being considered in the analysis may be of lesser importance or
likelihood than another failure that could produce the same symptoms and
this must be considered. Fault isolation procedures require a specific
-*
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101-6
MIL-STD-1629A
action or series of actions by an operator, followed by a check or-cross
reference either to instruments, control devices, circuit breakers, or
combinations thereof. This procedure is followed until a satisfactory
course of action is determined.
5.8 Compensating provisions. The compensating provisions,
either design provisions or operator actions, which circumvent or mitigate
the effect of the failure shall be identified and evaluated. This step
is required to record the true behavior of the item in the presence of
an internal malfunction or failure.
5.8.1 Design provisions. Compensating provisions which are
features of the design at any indenture level that will nullify the
effects of a malfunction or failure, control, or deactivate system'items
to halt generation or propagation of failure effects, or activate backup
or standby items or systems shall be described. Design compensating
provisions include:
a. Redundant items that allow continued and safe operation.
b. Safety or relief devices such as monitoring or alarm
provisions which permit effective operation or
limits damage.
C . Alternative modes of operation such as backup or
standby items or systems.
5.8.2 Operator actions. Compensating provisions which require
operator action to circumvent or mitigate the effect'of the postulated
failure shall be described. The compensating provision that best satisfies
the indication(s) observed by an operator when the failure occurs shall
be determined. This may require the investigation of an interface
system to determine the most correct operator action(s). The consequences
of any probable incorrect action(s) by the operator in response to an
abnormal indication should be considered and the effects recorded.
5.9 Severity classification. A severity classification
category (see 4.4.3) shall be assigned to each failure mode and item
according to the failure effect. The effect on the functional condition
of the item under analysis caused by the loss or degradation of output
shall be identified so the failure mode effect will be properly categorized.
For lower levels of indenture where effects on higher indenture levels
are unknown, a failure's effect on the indenture level under analysis
shall be described by the severity classification categories.
5.10 Remarks. Any pertinent remarks pertaining to and clarifying
any other column in the worksheet line shall be noted. Notes regarding
recommendations for design improvements shall be recorded and
.&.
TASK 101
101-7
24 November 1980
MTl,-STD-1629h
further amplified in the FMECA report, General Requirements, 4.5. This
entry also may include a notation of unusual conditions, failure effects
of redundant items, recognition of particularly critical design features
or any other remarks that amplify the line entry. Since it is improbable
that all failure modes in Category I and Category II can be designed
out, information shall be provided that other reasonable actions and
considerations are or have been accomplished to reduce occurrence of a
given failure mode and provide a qualitative basis or rationale for
acceptance of the design. The rationale for acceptance of Category I
.and Category II.faiZure modes shall address the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Design. Those features of the design that relate to
the identified failure mode that minimize the occurrence
of the failure mode; i.e., safety factors, parts
derating criteria, etc.
Test. Those tests accomplished that verify the
design features and tests at hardware acceptance or
during ground turnaround or maintenance that would
detect the failure mode occurrence.
Inspection. The inspection accomplished to ensure
that the hardware is being built to the design
requirements and the inspection accomplished during
turnaround operations or maintenance that would
detect the failure mode or evidence of conditions
that could cause the failure mode.
History. A statement of history relating to this
particular design or a similar design.
6. Ordering data. The following details shall be specified
in the appropriate contractual documents:
a. FMECA plan, if required (see Task 105).
b. Indenture level (see General Requirements, 4.3.3).
C . DI-R-7085 (FMECA Report should be specified when
deliverable data is desired in conjunction with
general requirements, Section 4.5).
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101-8
e TEMPERATURE d PRESSURE READOUT
dl
Qj AI R PRESSURE RELI EF
c PRESSURE a TEM P E R A T U RE
AUTOMATI C SHUTDOWN
=ln
r - - -
- _- - __ - 5
SENSOR OUTPUT
SIGNALS (TEMPERATURE B
w:!
f
OIL PRkSSUREI
fE .
I
2,
is
L
r---- --7
.
I
I
i
ELECTRI CAL I
ELECTRIC POWER
MOTOR
TORQUE
CONTROL
[- -44av, 3 0
10
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HIGH PRESSURE
I
(3510 R/MINI
SO
-_-I
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t
Figure 101.1 Example of a functional block diagram
M
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1
2
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1
I 1 I I I I I I I I I I / I I ;
w
0
+ 0
MI L- STD- 1629A
Not i ce 2
28 November 1984
MILITARY STANDARD
PROCEDURES FOR PERFORMI NG
A FAI LURE MODE
EFFECTS AND CRI TI CALI TY ANALYSI S
To al l hol der s of MI L- STD- 1629A
1. The f ol l owi ng pages of MI L- STD- 16299 have been r evi sed and super sede t he
pages l i st ed:
P a g e New Da&? Super seded Page Da&?
V 24 November 1980
V i 28 November 1984
A- l 28 November 1984
A- 2 28 November 1984
A- 3 28 November 1984
A-4 28 November 1984
V
V I
A- l
New
New
A- 2
Repr i nt ed w/ o change
7 J une 1983
24 November 1980
24 November 1980
2. Make t he f ol l owi ng pen and Ink changes:
Exi st i ng page A- 3, change page number t o A- 5.
i : Exi st i ng page A- 4, Change page number t o A- 6.
Exi st l ng page A- 5, change page number t o A- 7.
i : Exi st i ng page A- 6, change page number t o A- 8.
3. RETAI N THIS.NOTICE AND I NSERT 8EFORE TABLE OF CONTENTS.
4. Hol der s of MI L- STD- 1629A wi l l ver i f y t hat t he page changes i ndi cat ed
her ei n have been ent er ed. Thi s not i ce wi l l be r et ai ned as a check sheet .
Thi s i ssuance I s a separ at e publ i cat i on. Each not i ce i s t o be r et ai ned by
st ocki ng poi nt s unt i l t he Mi l i t ar y St andar d i s compl et el y r evi sed or cancel ed.
Cust odi ans:
Ar my - CR
Ai r For ce - 17
Pr epar i ng Act i vi t y
Navy - AS
( Pr oj ect No. RELI - 0037)
Revi ew Act i vi t i es:
Navy - SH, OS
Ar my - EA, AR
AMSC N3388
FSC RELI
M&T&1629h
TASK iO5
FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS PLAN
1. Purpose. The purpose of the FMECA plan is to document
the contractorl's planned activities implementing the Failure Mode,
Effects, and Criticality dialysis Tasks.
1.1 InterrelaQonship. The FMECA plan shall not be required
/
unless Task 181 is required.
1.2. Application. This plan is used to evaluate planned FMECA
Task efforts by a contractor prior to plan approval. When approved.by
the procuring activity, the plan is used for monitoring and evaluating
contractor implementation of the FMECA tasks.
When a Reliability Program
Plan, as a selected task from ML-STD-785, has been proposed by the
procuring activity, the requirements of this Task shall be satisfied by
incorporating the FMECA plan in the Reliability Program Plan.
2. Documents referenced in Task 105:
STANDARDS
Military
MIL-STD-470
MIL-STD-780
MIL-STD-785
MIL-STD-1388 Logistics Support Analysis
MIL-STD-1591 On Aircraft, Fault Diagnosis, Subsystems,
Analysis/Synthesis of
MIL-STD-?072
MIL-STD-2080
HANDBOOKS
Military
MIL-HDBK-217
Maintainability, Human Factors and Safety
Work Unit Codes for Aeronautical Equipment;
Uniform Numbering System
Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment
Development and Production
Survivability, Aircraft; Establishment and
Conduct of Programs for
Maintenance Plan Analysis for Aircraft and
Ground Support Equipments
Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment -&
TASK 105
24 November 1980
105-l
MTL-STU-1629A
3. Content. The FMECA plan shall describe the contractor's
+procedures for .im@lementing the specified requirements of thisstandard
updating the FMECA to reflect design changes, and use of the analysis
results to provide design guidance. Sample worksheet formats, ground
rules, analysis assumptions, identification of the lowest indenture
level of analysis, coding system description, failure definitions, and
identification of coincident use of the FMECA by the contractor's reliability
organization and other organization elements shall be included in the
plan.
3.1 Worksheet formats. The contractor's formats, which
organize and document the FMECA and other analysis methods contained
herein, shall include the information shown in the example formats.in
Figures 101.3, 102.1, 103.1, 104.1. The initial indenture level of
analysis shall be identified (item name) on each worksheet, and each
successive indenture level shall be documented on a separate worksheet
or group of worksheets. A sample of the contractor's worksheet formats
shall be included with the FMECA plan.
3.2 Ground rules and assumptions. The contractor shall
develop ground rules and analysis assumptions and include them in the
FMECA plan. The ground rules shall identify the FMECA approach (e.g.,
hardware, functional, or combination), the lowest indenture level to be
analyzed, and include general statements of what constitutes a failure
of the item in terms of performance criteria and allowable limits.
Every effort should be made.to identify and record all ground rules and
analysis assumptions prior to initiation of the analysis; however,
ground rules and analysis assumptions may be added for any item if
requirements change. Addit%onal ground rules and analysis assumptions
shall be documented and separately identified for inclusion in the FMECA
report.
3.3 Indenture levell. The indenture level applies to the
system hardware or functional level at which failures are postulated.
:
Unless otherwise specified, the contractor shall establish the lowest
indenture level of analysis using the following guidelines:
a. The lowest level specified in the LSA candidate list
to assure complete inputs for each LSA candidate.
b. The lowest indenture level at which items are assigned
a catastrophic (Category I) or critical (Category
II) severity classification category (see 4.4.3).
C . The specified or intended maintenance and repair
level for items assigned a marginal (Category III)
or minor (Category IV) severity classification
category (See 4.4.3).
TASK 105
24 November 1980
105-2
MIL-STD-1629A
3.4 Coding system. For consistent identification of system
functions and equipment and for trac
shall adhere to a coding system base
work unit code numbering system of
i
ing failure modes, the contractor
upon the hardware breakdown structure,
L-STD-780, or other similar uniform
numbering system. The coding system shall be consistent with the reliability
and functional block diagram numbering system to provide complete visibility
of each failure mode and its relationship to the system. The contractor
shall describe the coding system to be used in the FMECA plan.
3.5 Failure definition. The contractor shall develop general
statements of what constitutes a failure of the item in terms of performance
parameters and allowable limits for each specific output. Failure
definitions shall be included in the ground rules submitted with the
FMECA plan. The contractor's general statements shall not conflict with
any failure definitions specified by the procuring activity.
3.6 Coordination of effort. The coincident performance and
use of the FMECA by reliability and other porgram elements shall be
identified in the FMECA plan. Consideration shall be given to the
requirements to perform and use the FMECA in support of a reliability
program in accordance with MIL-STD-785, maintainability program in
accordance with MIL-STD-470, survivability and vulnerability program in
accordance with MIL-STD-2072, logistics support analysis in accordance
with MIL-STD-1388, maintenance plan analysis (MPA) in accordance with
MIL-STD-2080, fault diagnosis analysis in general accordance with MIL-
STD-1591, and other contractual provisions. The contractor shall
identify the program organization responsible for performing the FMECA
and show how the FMECA results will be used by other organizational
elements t o preclude duplication of effort.
3.7 Failure rate data sources. The failure rate data source
shall be the same as that used for the other reliability and maintainability
analyses required by the contract. MIL-HDBK-217 shall be the primary
source of failure rate data for electronic parts. Failure rate data for
parts not covered by MIL-HDBK-217 shall be selected from alternative
data sources. The failure rate data sources shall be identified in the
FMECA plan and shall be approved by the procuring activity prior to use.
4. Ordering data. The following details shall be specified
in the appropriate contractual documents:
a. Task 101 (See 1.1 of Task 105).
b. Other requirements as necessary for tailoring.
C . DI-R-7086 (FMECA Plan) should be specified when
deliverable data is desired in conjunction with this
task. x-
TASK 105
24 November 1980
105-3
MIL-STD-1629A
TASK 101
101-I I
MIL-STD-1629A
TASK 102
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
1. Purpose. The purpose of the criticality analysis (CA) is
to rank each potential failure mode identified in the FMEA Task 101,
according to the combined influence of severity classification and its
probability of occurrence based upon the best available data.
1.1 Application. The CA, Task 102, supplements the FMEA,
Task.101, and shall not be imposed without the imposition of Task 101.
2. Documents referenced in Task 102:
HANDBOOKS
Miiitary
MIL-HDBK-217 Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment
3. Analysis approach. One approach from the two specified
in 3.1 and 3.2 of Task 102 shall be selected. The availability of
specific parts configuration data and failure rate data will determine
the analysis approach to be used. The qualitative approach is appropriate
when specific failure rate data are not available. The failure probability
levels, when used, should be modified as the system is better defined.
As parts configuration data and failure rate data become available,
criticality numbers should be calculated and incorporated in the analysis.
3.1 Qualitative approach. Failure nodes identified in the
FMEA are assessed in terms of probability of occurrence when specific
parts configuration or failure rate data are not available. Individual
failure mode probabilities of occurrence should be grouped into distinct,
logically defined levels, which establish the qualitative failure probability
level for entry into the appropriate CA worksheet column. Probability
of occurrence levels are defined as follows:
a.
b.
Level A - Frequent. A high probability of occurrence
during the item operating time interval. High
probability may be defined as a single failure node
probability greater than 0.20 of the overall probability
of failure during the item operating time interval.
Level B - Reasonably probable. A moderate probability
of occurrence during the item operating time interval.
Probable may be defined as a single failure mode
probability of occurrence which is more than 0.10
but less than 0.20 of the overall probability of
failure during the item operating tine. .A
TASK 102
24 November 1980
102-l
MTT,-STD-1629A
C . LevelC - Occasional. An occasional probability of
occurrence during item operating time interval.
Occasional.probability may be defined as a single
failure mode probability of occurrence which is more
than 0.01 but less than 0.10 of the overall probability
of failure during the item operating time.
h. Level D - Remote. An unlikely probability of occurrence
during item operating time interval. Remote,probability
may be defined as a single failure mode probability
of occurrence which is more than 0.001 but less than
0.01 of the overall probability of failure during
the item operating time.
e. Level E - Extremely Unlikely. A failure whose
probability of occurrence is essentially zero during
item operating time interval. Extremely unlikely
may be defined as a single failure mode probability
of occurrence which is less than 0.001 of the overall
probability of failure during the item operating
time.
3.2 Quantitative approach. The failure rate data source used
for the quantitative approach shall be the same as that used for the
other reliability and maintainability analyses required by contract.
When other analyses are not required by contract or a failure rate data
source has not been specified by the procuring activity, failure rates
and failure rate adjustment factors (e.g., environmental and quality T-
factors) shall be derived as follows:
a. MIL-HDBK-217 shall be the primary source of failure
rate data for electronic parts. Both the base
failure rate and all failure rate adjustment factors
shall be identified.
b. When parts are similar to those listed in MIL-HDBK-
217, base failure rates shall be selected from MIL-
HDBK-217 and shall include other adjustment factors,
such as special quality J-factors, as may be required
to modify the MIL-HDBK-217 data for applicability to
the particular part.
C . Failure rate data for parts not covered by MIL-HDBK-
217 shall be selected from alternative data sources.
3.2.1 CA worksheet. Items in this section and related subsections
apply when a quantitative approach has been specified. The calculation
of a criticality number or assignment of a probability of occurrence
level and its documentation are accomplished by completing the columns
of the approved CA worksheet. An example of a CA worksheet format is
,?
TASK 102
24 November 1980
102-2
NIL-STD-16 9A 3,
i shown in Figure 102.1. Completed CA worksheets shall be included in the
FMRCA report, General Requirements, 4.5, following the FMJU worksheet
I for the same indenture level. The following information is the same as
given in the FMRA worksheet and shall be transferred to the CA worksheet:
a. Identification number
b. Item/Functional identification
C . Function
d. Failure modes and causes
e. Mission phase/operational mode
f. Severity classification
3.2.1.1 Failure probability/failure rate data source. When
failure modes are assessed in terms of probability of occurrence, the
failure probability of occurrence level shall be listed. When failure
rate data are to be 'used in the calculatioti of criticality numbers, the
data source of the failure rates used in each calculation shall be
listed. When a failure probability is listed, the remaining columns are
not required and the next step will be the construction of a criticality
matrix (see 4 of Task 102).
3.2.1.2 Failure effect probability (6). The @ values are the
conditional probability that the failure effect will result in the
identified criticality classification, given that the failure mode
occurs. The B values represent the analyst's judgment as to the conditional
probability the loss will occur and should be quantified in general
accordance with the following:
Failure effect f3 value
Actual loss
Probable loss
Possible loss
No effect
1.00
>O.lO to Cl.00
>o to = 0.10
0
3.2.1.3 Failure mode ratio (n). The fraction of the part failure
rate (1,) related to the particular faiIure mode under consideration
shall be evaluated by the analyst and recorded. The failure mode ratio
is the probability expressed as a decimal fraction that the part or item
will fail in the identified mode. If all. potential failure modes of a
particular part or item are listed, the sum of the cx values for that
part or item will equal one. Individual failure mode mu7tipliers may be
derived from failure rate source data or from test and operational data.
If failure mode data are not available, the u values shall represent the
analyst's judgement based upon an analysis of the item's functions.
TASK 102
24 November 1980
102-3
MTL-STD-1629A
3.2.1.4 Part failure rate (A,). The Dart failure rate
the appropriate reliability prediction or as calculated using
(A,) from
the procedure
described in MIL-HDBK-217, shall be listed. Where appropriate, application
factors (a ),
R
environmental factors (TK), and other T-factors as..may be
required s all be applied to the base failure rates (lb) obtained from
handbooks or other reference material to adjust for differences in
operating stresses.
be listed.
Values of q-factors utilized in computing 1, shall
3.2.1.5 Operating time (t). The operating time in hours or the
number of operating cycles of the item per mission shall be derived from
the system definition and listed on the worksheet.
3.2.1.6 Failure mode criticality number (C,,,). The value of 'the
failure mode criticality number (Cm) shall be calculated and listed on
the worksheet. Cm is the portion of the criticality number for the item
due to one of its failure modes under a particular severity classification.
For a particular severity classification and operational phase, the Cm
for a failure mode may be calculated with the following formula:
%I=
where:
Cm =
f3=
Ci=
x, =
t =
BcrXpt
Criticality number for failure mode.
Conditional probability of mission loss
(3.2.1.2 of Task 102).
Failure mode ration (3.2.1.3 of Task 102).
Part failure rate (3.2.1.4 of Task 102).
Duration of applicable mission phase usually
express in hours or number of operating
cycles (3.2.1.5 of Task 102).
3.2.1.7 Item criticality numbers (C,.). The second criticality
number calculation is for the item under analysis. Criticality numbers
(Cr) for the items of the system shall be calculated and listed on
the worksheet. A criticality number for an item is the number of
system failures of a specific type expected due.to the item's failure
modes. The specific type of system failure is expressed by the
severity classification for the item's failure modes. For a particular
severity classification and mission phase, the Cr for an item is the
sum of the failure mode criticality numbers, Cm, under the severity
classification and may also be calculated using the following formula:
n = 1,2,3,-.-j
TASK 102
24 November 1980
102-4
*L-STD-1629A
(
TASK 103
PMECA-MABNTILWQABILITY INFORMATION
1. -- Purpose. The purpose of the PMECA-maintainability infor-
mation analysis is to provide early criteria for maintenance planning
analysis @PA), logistics support analysis (LSA), test planning,
inspection and checkout rqquirements, and to identify maintainability
design features requiring corrective action.
1.1 Application. The FMECA-maintainability information
analysis, Task 103, supplements the PMKA, Task 101, and shall not be
imposed without imposition of Task 101.
41.2 'PliuniIi&. Planning for the PMECA-maintainability infor-
mation analysis includes the contractor's procedures for assuring the
coincident use of this analysis when logistic support analysis in accordance
with MIL-STD-1388 and the maintenance planning analysis in
accordance with MIL-STD-2080 are required by contract.
2. -Documents referenced in Task 103:
STANDARDS
Military
MIL-STD-2080 Maintenance Plan Analysis for Aircraft and
Ground Support Equipments
3. FMECA-maintainability information worksheet. Documentation
of the maintainability information is accomplished by completing the
approved FMECA-maintainability information worksheet. An example of an
FMECA-maintainability worksheet format is shown in Figure 103.1.
Completed worksheets shall be included in &he FMECA report, General
Requirements, 4.5, following the FMEA worksheet for the same indenture
level. The following information is the same as that given in the FMEA
worksheet and shall be transferred to the FMECA-maintainability information
worksheet:
a.
b.
Identification number
Item/functional identification
C . Function
d.
e,
f.
Failure modes and causes
Failure effects (local, next higher level, end)
Severity classification
TASK 103
24 Nove:nber 198(
103-l
M-IL-STD-162912
3.1 Failure predictability. Enter information on known
incipient failure indicators (e.g., operational performance variations)
which are peculiar to the item failure trends and permit predicting
failures in advance. When a failure is predictable in advance, describe
the data that must be collected, how it will be used to predict failure,
and identify any tests or inspections that may be accomplished to detect
evidence of conditions which could cause the failure mode.
3.2 Failure detection means. Identify how each failure mode
will be detected by the organizational level maintenance technician and
to what indenture level they will be localized. Describe the method by
which ambiguities are resolved when more than one failure mode causes
the same failure indication. Describe any monitoring or warning device
,that till1 provide 'a'n indication of impending failure and any planned
tests or inspections which could detect occurrence of the failure mode.
Identify to what indenture level failures can be isolated by the use of
built-in-test features and indicate when ancillary test equipment will
be required for fault isolation.
3.3 Basic maintenance actions. Describe the basic actions
which, in the analyst's judgement, must be taken by the maintenance
technician to correct the failure. Identify the special design provisions
for modular replacement and the probable adjustment and calibration
requirements following repair.
3.4 Remarks. Any pertinent remarks pertaining to and clarifying
any other columns shall be noted. Notes regarding recommendations for .
design improvement shall be recorded and further amplified in the EMECA
report, General Requirements, 4.5.
4. Ordering data. The following details shall be specified
in the appropriate contractual documents:
a. Task 101 (see 1.1 of Task 103).
b. Logistic support analysis (See 1.2 of Task 103).
C. Maintenance planning analysis (see 1.2 of Task 103).
TASK 103
24 November 1980
103-z
MIL-STD-1629A
where:
cl* = Criticality number for the item.
n = The failure modes in the items that fall under
a particular criticality classification.
j
= Last failure mode in the item under the criticality
classification.
4. Criticality matrix. The criticality matrix provides a
means of identifying and comparing each failure mode to all other failure
modes with respect to severity. The matrix is constructed by inserting
item or failure mode identification numbers in matrix locations representing
the severity classification category and either the probability of
occurrence level or the criticality number (C;) for the item's failure
j -modes. The resulting matrix display shows the distribution of criticality
\
of item failure modes and provides a tool for assigning corrective
action priorities. As shown in Figure 102.2, the further along the
diagonal line from the origin the failure mode is recorded, the greater
the criticality and the more urgent the need for implementing corrective
action. The example criticality matrix in Figure 102.2 was constructed
to show how either the criticality number (Cr) or probability of occurrence
level can be used for the vertical axis. The completed criticality
matrix shall be included in the FMECA report, General Requirements, 4.5.
5. Ordering data. The following details shall be specified
in the appropriate contractual documents:
a. Task 101 (see 1.1 of Task 102).
b. Analysis approach (see 3 of Task 102).
C . Failure rate data source(s) (see 3.2 of Task 102)
if quantitative approach is specified.
1
102-5
TASK 102
24 November 1980
J < v . l
-
-
z v
u
.
0
T
A
S
K
1
0
2
2
4
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
0
M
I
L
-
s
T
D
-
1
6
2
9
A
/
.
3
1
0
2
-
6
1
(HIGH)-
-.I
(LOW)
MIL-STD-1629A
/
/
/
/
/
nz
I
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
III II
1
/
/
/
/
I
SEVERI TY CLASSI FI CATI ON
(I NCREASI NG L E V E L O F SEVERI TY --+ 1
* NOTE: BOTH CRITICALITY NUMBER (C, ) AND PROBABILITY OF
OCCURRENCE LEVEL ARE SHOWN FOR CONVENIENCE.
Figure 102.2 Example of criticality matrix
1
INCREASING
CRITICALITY
TASK 102
24 November 1980
102-7
MI L- STD- 1629A
MI L- STD- 1629A
CONTENTS ( Conti nued)
Fi gure
Task 103
Page
103. 1 Exampl e of FMECA- mai ntai nabi l i ty i nf ormati on
worksheet f ormat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103- 3
Task 104
104. 1 Exampl e of damage mode and ef f ects anal ysi s f ormat .
APPENDI X
104- S
APPENDI X A. APPLI CATI ON AND TAI LORI NG GUI DE . . . . . . . . . . A- l
Paragraph
10.
10. 1
10. 2
10. 3
A- l
A- l
A- l
A- l
20.
A- l
40
40. 1
40. 2
GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scope
Tai l ori ng ; e, ui remen~s
.........
................ i .....
Dupl i cati on of ef f ort ...............
REFERENCED DOCUMENTS ( not appl i cabl e) .......
. GENERAL REQUI REMENTS ................ A- l
Orderi ng data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A- l
A- 2
50.
50. 1
50. 1. 1
50. 1. 2
50. 1. 3
50. 2
50. 3
50. 4
50. 5
50. 6
50. 7
Data i tem descri pti ons ( DI D) ............
APPLI CATI ON CRI TERI A ................
General consi derati ons ...............
Level of detai l ..................
Ti mi ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I ntended use ...................
FMEA ( task 101) ..................
CA ( task 102) ...................
FMECA- mai ntai nabi l i ty i nf ormati on ( task 103) ....
DMEA ( task 104) .............. : ...
FMECA Pl an ( task 105) ...............
Cri ti cal i ty number ( 0) cal cul ati on exampl e ...
A- 2
A- 2
A- 2
A- 2
A- 3
A- 3
A- 3
A- 3
A- 4
A- 4
A- 4
APPENDI X A FI GURES
Fi gure
Al Basi c card entry i nstructi ons . . . . . . _ . . . .
A- 2
V i
28 November 1984
MI L- STD- 1629A
CONTENTS ( Conti nued)
Paragraph
Page
4. 3. 1
4. 3. 2
4. 3. 3
4. 3. 4
4. 3. 5
4. 3. 6
4. 4
4. 4. 1
4. 4. 1. 1
4. 4. 1. 2
4. 4. 1. 3
4. 4. 1. 4
4. 4. 2
4. 4. 3
4. 5
4. 5. 1
4. 5. 2
4. 5. 2. 1
4. 5. 2. 2
5.
5. 1
Tasks
101
102
103
104
105
Worksheet f ormats
..................
Ground rul es and assumpti ons
............
I ndenture l evel
...................
Codi ng system
...................
Fai l ure def i ni ti on .
Coordi nati on of ef f ort : : : 1 : : : : : : : : : : :
General procedures
.................
Contri buti ng i nf ormati on
..............
Techni cal speci f i cati ons and devel opment pl ans ...
Trade- of f study reports
..............
Desi gn data and drawi ngs
..............
Rel i abi l i ty data
..................
FMEA process
....................
Severi ty cl assi f i cati on
...............
FMECA Report
....................
Summary ......................
Rel i abi l i ty cri ti cal i tem l i sts
...........
Category I and Category II f ai l ure mode l i st ....
Si ngl e f ai l ure poi nts l i st
.............
DETAI L REQUI REMENTS
.................
Tasks
........................
FAI LURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSI S . . . . . . . . . .
CRI TI CALI TY ANALYSI S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FMECA- MAI NTAI NABI LI TY I NFORMATI ON . . . . . . i . . .
DAMAGE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSI S . . . . . . . . . .
FAI LURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRI TI CALI TY ANALYSI S PLAN.
FI GURES
Fi gure
Task 101
101. 1 Exampl e of a f uncti onal bl ock di agram ........ 101- 9
101. 2 Exampl e of a rel i abi l i ty bl ock di agram ....... 101- 10
101. 3 Exampl e of FMEA worksheet f ormat .......... 101- 11
Task 102
102. 1 Exampl e of CA worksheet f ormat ........... 102- 6
102. 2 Exampl e of cri ti cal i ty matri x ........... 102- 7
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
9
; :
10
10
11
11
11
101- l
102- l
103- l
104- l
105- l
MIL-STD-1629A
APPENDIX A
APPLICATION AND TAILORING GUIDE
10. GENERAL
10.1 Scope. This appendix provides notes for the guidance of
the procuring activity in generating the contractual requirements for a
failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA).
.10.2 Tailoring requirements. Each provision of this standard
should be reviewed to determine the extent of applicability. Tailoring
of requirements may take the form of deletion, addition, or alteration
to the statements in Sections 3 and 4 and any specified tasks to adapt
the requirements to specific system characteristics, procuring activity
options, contractual structure, or acquisition phase. The tailoring
FMECA requirements are specified in the contractual provisions to include
input to the statement of work, contract data item list (CDRL), and
other contractual means.
10.3 Duplication of effort. It is incumbent upon the procuring
activity to review the contractual requirements to avoid duplication of
effort between the reliability program and other program efforts such as
safety, maintainability, human engineering, test and evaluation, survivability
and vulnerability, maintenance planning, and integrated logistics support.
Identification of the coincident use of FMECA results by the reliability
program and other disciplinary areas is required in the FMECA plan or
other appropriate,program documentation to avoid duplication of effort
by the procuring activity and the contractor.
20. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS (not applicable)
30. DEFINITIONS (not applicable)
40 GENERAL REQUIREMEN'AS
. 40.1 Ordering data. The procuring activity shall specify the
following:
a. Title, number and date of this standard.
b. Task number(s) required.
C . FMECA plan (Task 105) if required.
d. Indenture level of analysis (4.3.3) required.
e. Steps to be used in the FMECA process (4.4.2).
f. FMECA report (4.5) if required.
A-l
MIL-STD-1629A
40.2 Data item descriptions (DID). The following listed DIDs
provide a source of possible data it&m d&cription and format require-
ments for required data.
SOURCE DATA REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE DID
Task 105 Failure Mode, Effects and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Plan
DI-R-7086
General Failure Mode, Effects and DI-R-7085
Requirements Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Report
Section 4-5.
and Task 101
50. APPLICATION CRITERIA
50.1 General considerations. This standard has been structured
to facilitate the tailoring of FMECA requirements based upon individual
program needs. Program variables such as system complexity, funding,
and schedule influence the level of detail and timing of the FMECA and
must be considered when tailoring the requirements. All programs do not
require the same level of detail and all programs should not wait until
full scale development to implement the FKECA requirements.
50.1.1 Level of detail. The level of detail applies to the
level of indenture at which failures are postulated. The FMECA can be
accomplished at various levels of indenture from system to part level
depending upon the information available and the needs of the program.
The lower the indenture level, the higher the level of detail since more
failure modes will be considered. The choice of the level of indenture
must be compatible with the program cost and schedule constraints and
the system reliability requirements. A less detailed analysis which is
available in time to contribute to system reliability is more valuable
than a more detailed analysis which is late and makes changes costly and
unfeasible. In general, the FMECA should not be performed below the
level necessary to identify critical items or to the level required by
the LSA candidate list,,whichever is lower. The depth and detail of the
FMECA effort must be defined in appropriate contractual and program
documentation.
50.1.2 Timing. The objective of the FMECA is to support the
decision making process. If the analysis fails to provide usable infor-
mation at or before a project decision point, then it has made no contribution
and is untimely. The time-phasing of the FMECA effort is important and
should be identified in the FMECA plan to assure that analysis results
will be available to support the project decision points during system
development. Since program cost and schedule constraints require that
available resources be used where they are most cost effective, the
earliest possible availability of FMECA results is important so that the
impact on cost and schedule can be minimized.
A-2
MI L- STD- 1629A
50. 1. 3 I ntended use. The FMECA i s potenti al l y one of the most
benef i ci al and producti ve tasks i n a wel l structured rel i abi l i ty program.
Si nce i ndi vi dual f ai l ure modes are l i sted i n an orderl y, organi zed f ashi on and
eval uated, the FMECA serves to veri f y desi gn i ntegri ty, i denti f y and quanti f y
sources of undesi rabl e f ai l ure modes, and document the rel i abi l i ty ri sks.
FMECA resul ts can be used to provi de the rati onal e f or changes i n operati ng
procedures f or amel i orati ng the ef f ects or f or detecti ng the i nci pi ence of the
undesi rabl e f ai l ure modes. Al though the FMECA i s an essenti al rel i abi l i ty
task, i t suppl ements and supports other engi neeri ng tasks through
i denti f i cati on of areas i n whi ch ef f ort shoul d be concentrated. The FMECA
resul ts are not onl y used to provi de desi gn gui dance, but they are. used
advantageousl y i n and f or mai ntenance pl anni ng anal ysrs, l ogi sti cs support
anal ysi s, survi vabi l i ty and vul nerabi l i ty assessments, saf ety and hazards
anal yses, and f or f aul t detecti on and i sol ati on desi gn. Thi s coi nci dent use
of the FMECA must be consi dered i n FMECA pl anni ng and every endeavor made to
prevent dupl i cati on of ef f ort by the programel ements whi ch uti l i ze FMECA
resul ts.
50. 2 FMEA ( Task 101) . The FMEA i s an essenti al desi gn eval uati on
procedure whi ch shoul d notbe l i mi ted to the phase tradi ti onal l y thought of as
the desi gn phase. The i ni ti al FMEA shoul d be done earl y i n the conceptual
phasewhen desi gn cri teri a, mi ssi on requi rements, and conceptual desi gns are
bei ng devel oped to eval uate the desi gn approach and to compare the benef i ts of
competi ng desi gn conf i gurati ons. The FMEA wi l l provi de qui ck vi si bi l i ty of
the more obvi ous f ai l ure modes and i denti f y potenti al si ngl e f ai l ure poi nts,
some of whi ch can be el i mi nated wi th mi ni mal desi gn ef f ort. As the mi ssi on
and desi gn def i ni ti ons become more ref i ned, the FMEA can be expanded to
successi vel y more detai l ed l evel s. When changes are made i n systemdesi gn to
remove or reduce the i mpact of the i denti f i ed f ai l ure modes, the FMEA must be
repeated f or the redesi gned porti ons to ensure that al l predi ctabl e f ai l ure
modes i n the new desi gn are consi dered.
50. 3 CA ( Task 102) . The CA i s a procedure f or associ ati ng f ai l ure
probabi l i ti es wi th each f ai l ure mode. Si nce the CA suppl ements the FMEA and
i s dependent upon i nf ormati on devel oped i n that anal ysi s, i t shoul d not be
i mposed wi thout i mposi ti on of the l VEA. The CA i s probabl y most val uabl e f or
mai ntenance and l ogi sti cs support ori ented anal yses si nce f ai l ure modes whi ch
have a hi gh probabi l i ty of occurrence ( hi gh cri ti cal i ty numbers) requi re
i nvesti gati on to i denti f y changes whi ch wi l l reduce the potenti al i mpact on
the mai ntenance and l ogi sti c support requi rements f or the system. Si nce the
cri ti cal i ty numbers are establ i shed based upon subj ecti ve j udgments, they
shoul d onl y be used as i ndi cators of rel ati ve pri ori ti es.
50. 4 FMECA- mai ntai nabi l i ty i nf ormati on ( Task 103) . Thi s anal ysi s i s an
extensi on of the t- MECA and IS dependent upon7MtA generated i nf omati on;
theref ore, the FMECA- mai ntai nabi l i ty i nf ormati on anal yses shoul d not be
i mosed wi thout i mposi ti on of the FMEA.
P
The i denti f i cati on of howeach
f a l ure wi l l be detected and l ocal i zed wi l l provi de i nf ormati on f or eval uati ng
i temtestabi l i ty. The f ai l ure mode l i sti ng whi ch i s i ncl uded on the compl eted
worksheet shoul d be uti l i zed to provi de thi s requi red data f or l ogi sti cs
support anal yses (LSA), mai ntenance pl an anal ysi s ( MPA) , and rel i abi l i ty
centered mai ntenance (RCM).
A- 3
MIl_ - STD- 1629A
50. 5 DMEA ( Task 104) . The DMEA provi des essenti al i nputs f or the
vul nerabi l i ty assessment of a weapon systemto ai d i n the i denti f i cati on of
def i c' i enci es and the eval uati on of desi gns f or enhanci ng survi vabi l i ty. Si nce
the DMEA uti . l i zes the f ai l ure mode i nf ormati on f romthe FMEA, i t shoul d not be
i mposed wi thout i mposi ti on of the f MEA. The DMEA, l i ke the i ni ti al FMEA, .
shoul d he done earl y i n the conceptual phase to provi de data rel ated to the
capabi l i ty of the conceptual weapon systemdesi gn to survi ve the ef f ects of
the speci f i ed hosti l e threats. Devel opment of thi s data bef ore weapon system
desi gn conf i gurati on i s f i nal i zed wi l l provi de si gni f i cant survi vabi l i ty
benef i ts wi th mi ni mal i mpact on cost and schedul , e.
50. 6 FMECA pl an ( Task 105) . The FMECA pl an provi des the contractor' s
pl ans and acti vi ti es f or i mpl ementi ng the FMECA tasks. The pl an i s used by
the procuri ng acti vi ty to eval uate the pl anned FMECA task ef f orts, and when
approved, i s used f or moni tori ng contractor i mpl ementati on of the tasks. The
pl an can be requi red as a separate document submi ttal or i t can be i ncl uded as
part of the Rel i abi l i ty ProgramPl an. The FMECA pl an i ncl udes a descri pti on
of the contractor' s procedures f or i mpl ementi ng the tasks and provi des a cross
i ndex showi ng the rel ati onshi p of coi nci dent perf ormance and use of the FMEA
tasks to precl ude dupl i cati on of ef f ort. Sampl e contractor f ormats used i n
perf ormance of each FMECA task are ti i cl uded as a part of each task speci f i ed
i n the contract statement of work.
50. 7 Cri ti cal i ty number ( C, ) cal cul ati on exampl e. Cal cul ati on of
meani ngf ul cri ti cal i ty numbers requi res the use of speci f i c f ai l ure rate and
part conf i gurati on data. When part conf i gurati ons are known, f ai l ure rate
data can be obtai ned f rom the appropri ate rel i abi l i ty predi cti on, f i el d data
f rompast systems of si mi l ar desi gn and envi ronmental use, or f ai l ure rate
data sources such as MI L- HDBK- 217. Wi th known f ai l ure rates, the cri ti cal i ty
number f or an i temi s the number of f ai l ures of a speci f i c type expected per
mi l l i on hours due to the i tem' s f ai l ure modes under a parti cul ar severi ty
cl assi f i cati on as di scussed i n Task 101. A f ai l ure mode cri ti cal i ty number,
Cm, f or a parti cul ar severi ty cl assi f i cati on i s gi ven by the expressi on:
%ll
= Bah,t
(1)
The i temcri ti cal i ty number, C
F'
under a parti cul ar severi ty cl assi f i cati on,
i s then cal cul ated by summi ng he Cmf or each f ai l ure mode under that severi ty
cl assi f i cati on. Thi s summati on i s gi ven by the expressi ons:
j
c, = c (Cmln
or
n=l
J
c, = c (f3aXpt X 105,
n=l
(2)
7 June 1983
A- 4
MIL-STD-1629A
50.1.3 Intended use.
The FMECA is potentially one of the most
beneficial and productive tasks in a well structured reliability program.
Since individual failure modes are listed in an orderly, organized
fashion and evaluated, the F'MECA serves to verify design integrity,
identify and quantify sources of undesirable failure modes, and document
the reliability risks. FMECA results can be used to provide the rationale
for changes in operating procedures for ameliorating the effects or for
detecting the incipience of the undesirable failure modes. Although xhe
FMJXA is an essential reliability task, it supplements and supports
other engineering tasks through identification of areas in which effort
should be concentrated. The FMEXA results are not only used to proyide
design guidance, but they are used advantageously in and for maintenance
planning analysis, logistics support analysis, survivability and vulnerability
assessments, safety and hazards analyses, and for fault detection and
isolation design. This coincident use of the FMECA must be considered
in FMECA planning and every endeavor made to prevent duplication of
effort by the program elements which utilize FMECA results.
50.2 FMEA (task 101). The FMEA is an essential design evaluation
procedure which should not be limited to the phase traditionally thought
of as the design phase. The initial FMEA should be done early in the
conceptual phase when design criteria, mission requirements, and conceptual
designs are being developed to evaluate the design approach and to
compare the benefits of competing design configurations. The FMEA will
provide quick visibility of the more obvious failure modes and identify
potential single failure points, some of which can be eliminated with
minimal design effort. As the mission and design definitions become
more refined, the FMJZA can be expanded to successively more detailed
levels. When changes are made in system design to remove or reduce the
impact of the identified failure modes, the FMEA must be repeated for
the redesigned portions to ensure that all predictable failure modes in
the new design are considered.
50.3 CA (task 102). The CA is a procedure for associating
failure probabilities with each failure mode. Since the CA supplements
the FMEA and is dependent upon information developed in that analysis,
it should not be imposed without imposition of the FMEA. The CA is
probably most valuable for maintenance and logistics support oriented
analyses since fa'ilure modes which have a high probability of occurrence
(high criticality numbers) require investigation to identify changes
which will reduce the potential impact on the maintenance and logistic
support requirements for the system. Since the criticality numbers are
established based upon subjective judgments, they should only be used as
indicators of relative priorities.
A-3
MTL-STD-1629A
50.4 FMECA-maintainability information (task 103). The J?MECA-
maintainability information analysis is utilized to provide early design
criteria for test methods, accessibility, and repairability for the item
being analyzed. This analysis is an extension of the FMEA and is dependent
upon J!MEA generated information; therefore, the FMECA-maintainability
information analyses should not be imposed without imposition of the
FMEA. The identification of how each failure will be detected and
localized by the operational level maintenance technician will provide
information for evaluating. the effectiveness of built-in-test. Descriptions
of the basic organizational level maintenance actions required for
failure localization and correction will identify potential accessibility
problems permitting early design correction. The failure mode listing
which is included on the completed worksheets should be utilized to,
provide this required data for both the maintenance plan and logistics
support analyses.
50.5 DMEA (task 104). The DMEA provides essential inputs for
the vulnerability assessment of a weapon system to aid in the identification
of deficiencies and the evaluation of designs for enhancing survivability.
Since the DMEA utilizes the failure mode information from the FMEA, it
shou1.d not be imposed without imposition of the F'MEA. The DMEA, like
the initial FMEA, should be done early in the conceptual phase to provide
data related to the capability of the conceptual weapon system design to
survive the effects of the specified hostile threats. Development of
this data before weapon system design configuration is finalized will
provide significant survivability benefits with minimal impact on cost
and schedule.
50.6 Criticality number (Cr) calculation example. Calculation
of meaningful criticality numbers requires the use of specific failure
rate and part configuration data. When part configurations are known,
failure rate data can be obtained from the appropriate reliability
prediction, field data from past systems of similar design and environmental
use, or failure rate data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217. With known
failure rates, the criticality number for an item is the number of
failures of a specific type expected per million hours due to the item's
failure modes under a particular severity classification as discussed in
Task 101. A failure mode criticality number, Cm, for a particular
severity classification is given by the expression:
'rn
= BcfXpt (1)
The item criticality number, Cr, under a particular severity classification,
is then calculated by summing the Cm for each failure mode under that
severity classification. This summation is given by the expressions:
c, = c (Cm>n or
n=l
j
c,= c @aApt x 106) * n = 1,2,3,.--j (2)
n=l
A-4
MIL-STD-1629A
Where:
C, = Criticality number for the item.
cm =
Criticality number for a failure
mode under a particular
severity classification (see 4.4.3).
6 = Conditional probability of mission loss given that the
.a =
xp =
It should
failure mode has occurred.
Failure mode ratio.
The probability, expressed as a decimal
fraction, that the part or item will fail in the identified
mode.
Part failure rate.
be noted that failure rates are usually defined in terms of
failures per million hours (fxlO-h) and, for simplification purposes,
equation (1) may be multiplied by a factor of LO6 to eliminate an
unnecessary degree of arithmetic precision in worksheet entries. That
is, it is easier to enter criticality number on the worksheets as 1.08
than to enter 1.08 x 10-6 or 0.00000108. The importance of the criticality
number is in providing a relative ranking of the failures or failure
modes and not-in the absolute value of the numeric.
For example, the calculations for Cm and C, for a given mission phase
under severity classification Category II is as follows:
Given: Base failure rate
'b
= 0.10 failures per million hours = (0.10 x 10-6)
Solve for xp using typical part failure rate model from MIL-HDBK-217.
lp. = Xb (TA x 7TE x ITC)
'rA
= 1.5; TE = 40; 7rQ = 1,2
lP
= 0.10 x 10-6 (I.5 x 40 x 1.2)
IP
= 7.2 x 10
-6
For a specific mission phase there are two (2) failure modes under
severity classification Category II and one (1) failure mode severity
classification Category IV.
al = 0.3 for first failure mode under severity classification
Category II.
:a2= 0.2 for second failure mode under severity classification
Category II.
A-5
MIL-STD-1629A
0L3
= 0.5 for failure mode under severity classification Category IV.
Find: C, and Cr for the mission phase under severity classification
Category II.
Let B = 0.5 and t = 1.0 hour for the mission phase.
For cq:
Cm = (&Apt x 106) = (0.5 x 0.3) (7.2 x 10-6) (1) x lo6
Cm = 1.08
For ~2:
Cm = Ba2Xpt x 106) = (0.5 x 0.2) (7.2 x 10-6j (1) x 10
6
'rn
= 0.72
Then:
.
c, = c (Cm),
n=l
c, = = 1.08 + 0.72 = 1.80
n=l
.
2
or cr = "c (&Apt x 106) = c
n=l
n
n=l
(&Apt x 106)
cr = (BalXpt x 106) f (Ba2Xpt x 106)
Cr = (0.5 x 7.2 x 1O-6 x 1) (0.3 + 0.2) x 10
6
'r
= (3.6 x lo+) (0.5) x LO6
Cr = 1.80 under severity classification Category II.
A-6
MI L- STD- 1629A
1. SCOPE
1. 1 Sco e.
- - +-
Thi s standard establ i shes requi rements and procedures
f or perf ormi ng a ai l ure mode, ef f ects, and cri ti cal i ty anal ysi s ( FMECA) to
systemati cal l y eval uate and document, by i tem f ai l ure mode anal ysi s, the
potenti al i mpact of each f uncti onal or hardware f ai l ure on mi ssi on success,
personnel and system saf ety, system perf ormance, mai ntai nabi l i ty, and
mai ntenance requi rements. Each potenti al f ai l ure i s ranked by the severi ty of
i ts ef f ect i n order that appropri ate correcti ve acti ons may be taken to
el i mi nate or control the hi gh ri sk i tems.
1. 2
V
Thi s standard appl i es to the acqui si ti on of al l
desi gnated DOD sys ems and equi pment. I t pri mari l y appl i es to the program
acti vi ty phases of demonstrati on and val i dati on and f ul l - scal e engi neeri nq
devel opment; e. g. , desi gn, research and devel opment, and test and eval uati on.
Thi s standard al so can be used duri ng producti on and depl oyment to anal yze the
f i nal hardware desi gn or any maj or modi f i cati ons. The FMECA tasks contai ned
i n thi s standard appl y to al l i tems of equi pment. Thi s standard does not
appl y to sof tware. Appendi x A contai ns addi ti onal appl i cati on and tai l ori ng
gui del i nes.
1. 3 Numberi ng system. The tasks are numbered sequenti al l y as they
are i ntroduced i nto thi s standard wi th the f i rst task bei ng number 101.
1. 4 Revi si ons.
1. 4. 1 Standard. Any general revi si on of thi s standard whi ch resul ts
i n a revi si on ofons 1, 2, 3, or 4 wi l l be i ndi cated by revi si on l etter
af ter thi s standard number, together wi th date of revi si on.
1. 4. 2 Tasks. Any revi si ons of FMECA tasks are i ndi cated by a l etter
f ol l owi ng the task. For exampl e, f or task 101, the f i rst revi si on i s l Ol A,
the second revi si on i s 101B. When the basi c document i s revi sed, those
requi rements not af f ected by change retai n thei r exi sti ng date.
1 . 5
ref erenced by
Method of ref erence. The tasks contai ned herei n shal l be
speci f yi ng:
a. Thi s standard number.
b. Task number( s) .
C. Other data as cal l ed f or i n i ndi vi dual task.
2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS
2. 1 I ssues of documents. The f ol l owi ng documents of the i ssue i n
ef f ect on the date of i nvi tati on f or bi d or request f or proposal , are
ref erenced i n thi s standard f or i nf ormati on and gui dance.
1
MI L- STD- 1629A
SPECI FI CATI bNS
Mi l i t ary
MI L- M- 24100
STANDARDS
Mi l i t ary
MI L-STD-280
MI L- STD- 470
MI L- STD- 721
MI L- STD- 756 Rel i abi l i ty Predi cti on
MI I_-STD-780 Work Uni t Codes f or Aeronauti cal Equi pment;
Uni f orm Numberi ng System
MI L- STD- 785
MI L- STD- 882
MI L- STD- 1388
MI L- STD- 1591
MI L- STD- 2072
MI L- STD- 2080
Manual , Techni cal ; Functi onal l y Ori ented
Mai ntenance Manual s for Systems and Equi pment
Def i ni ti ons of I temLevel s, I tem
Exchangeabi l i ty, Model s and Rel ated Terms
Mai ntai nabi l i ty ProgramRequi rements ( f or
Systems and Equi pment)
Def i ni ti ons of Terms f or Rel i abi l i ty and
Mai ntai nabi l i t
Rel i abi l i ty Programf or Systems and
Equi pment Devel opment and Producti on
SystemSaf ety ProgramRequi rements
Logi sti cs Support Anal ysi s
On Ai rcraf t, Faul t Di agnosi s, Subsystems,
Anal ysi s/ Synthesi s of
Survi vabi l i ty, Ai rcraf t; Establ i shment and
Conduct of Programs f or
Mai ntenance Engi neeri ng, Pl anni ng, and
Anal ysi s"the f or Aeronauti cal Systems,
Subsystems, Equi pment and Support Equi pment
HANDBOOKS
Mi l i tary
MI L- HDBK- 217 Rel i abi l i ty Predi cti on of El ectroni c
Equi pBent
MI L- HDBK- 266 Appl i cati on of Rel i abi l i ty Centered
Mai ntenance to Naval Ai rcraf t, Weapon
Systems and Support Equi pment
( Copi es of speci f i cati ons, standards, drawi ngs, and publ i cati ons requi red
by contractors i n connecti on wi th speci f i c procurement f uncti ons shoul d be
obtai ned f romthe procuri ng acti vi ty or as di rected by the contracti ng
of f i cer. )
7 June 1983
2
MI L- STD- 1629A
TASK 103
FMECA - MAI NTAI NABI LI TY I NFORMATI ON
ki tern
FMECAmai ntai nabi l i ty i nf omati on suppl i es earl y cri teri a f or
anni ng Anal ysi s ( MPA) , Logi sti c Support Anal ysi s ( LSA) , test
pl anni ng, i nspecti on and checkout requi rements, and i denti f i es mai ntai nabi l i ty
desi gn f eatures that requi re correcti ve acti on, and suppl i es i nf ormati on f or
the Rel i abi l i ty- Centered Mai ntenance ( RCM) process requi red by
MI L- H>BK- 266( AS) .
1. 1 Appl i cati on.
the F@A Task 101.
The FMECA mai ntai nabi l i ty i nf ormati on requi res data f rom
Task 103 shal l not be done wi thout f i rst doi ng Task 101.
1: 2 Pl anni ng. Pl anni ng f or the FMECA - mai ntai nabi l i ty i nf ormati on anal ysi s
i ncl udes the contractor' s procedures f or assuri ng the coi nci dent use of thi s
anal ysi s when l ogi sti c support anal ysi s i n accordance wi th MI L- STD- 1388, the
mai ntenance pl anni ng anal ysi s i n accordance wi th MI L- STD- 2080( ASS) , and
mai ntai nabi l i ty anal ysi s i n accordance wi th MI L- STD- 470 are requi red by
contract.
2. Documents Ref erenced i n Task 103:
STANDARDS
Mi l i tary
MI L- STD- 470
MI L- STD- 1388
MI L- STD- 2080( AS)
Mai ntai nabi l i ty programrequi rements ( f or
systems and equi pment)
Logi sti cs Support Anal ysi s
Mai ntenance Engi neeri ng, Pl anni ng and Anal ysi s
f or Aeronauti cal Systems, Subsystems, Equi pment
and Support Equi pment
HANDBOOKS
MI L- H) BK- 266( AS) Appl i cati on of Rel i abi l i ty- Centered Mai ntenance
i n Naval Ai rcraf t, Weapon Systems and Support
Equi pment
3. FMECA - Mai ntai nabi l i ty I nf ormati on Worksheet. Mai ntai nabi l i ty
i nf ormati on i s documented on the approved FMECA - mai ntai nabi l i ty worksheet.
Fi gure 103. 1 i s a sampl e worksheet. Compl ete worksheets wi l l be- i ncl uded i n
the FMECA report, General Requi rements, 4. 5, f ol l owi ng the FEA worksheet f or
the same i ndenture l evel . The f ol l owi ng i nf ormati on can be f ound and copi ed
f romthe FEA worksheet:
a. I temI denti f i cati on Number
b. I tem Nomencl ature
C . Functi on
Task 103
7 J une 1983
103- l
MI L- STD- 1629A
d. Functi onal Fai l ure ( Fai l ure Mode ( Task 101) )
e. Engi neeri ng Fai l ure Mode ( Fai l ure Causes ( Task 101) )
f . Fai l ure Ef f ects ( l ocal , next hi gher l evel , end)
9.
Severi ty Cl ass
h. Mi ssi on Phase
3. 1 System/ Subsystem Descri pti on. Provi de a conci se descri pti on of the
sytemor subsystemi n terms of i ts general f uncti on and maj or assembl i es or
components.
3. 2 Compensati ng provi si ons. Thi s entry shal l speci f i cal l y address
redundanci es and protectmeatures i n rel ati on to f uncti ons and f uncti onal
f ai l ures. An i temi s consi dered redundant i f i ts purpose i s to dupl i cate the
f uncti on of another i tem. Al so l i st the protecti ve or warni ng devi ces, or
f ai l - saf e desi gn, that act to mi ti gate seri ous consequences upon f ai l ure of a
cri ti cal i tem.
3. 3 Functi ons. Functi ons and subf uncti ons shoul d be transf erred f romTask
101 worksheets. A number shal l be pl aced i n the smal l col umn next to each
f unct i on. The f i rst f uncti on wi l l be numbered 1, the second 2, and so on.
3. 4 Functi onal Fai l ures. Record the f uncti onal f ai l ure ( f ai l ure mode f rom
Task 1Ul )
wi th "A". l
kuncti onal f ai l ures shal l be l ettered al phabeti cal l y begi nni ng
Note that a f uncti on may have more than one f uncti onal f ai l ure
( f ai l ure mode, Task 101) .
3. 5 Engi neeri ng Fai l ure Mode. Record the engi neeri ng f ai l ure modes ( f ai l ure
causes f romTask 1011 . Engi neeri ng f ai l ure modes shal l be numbered begi nni ng
wi th "1 ' I . Note that a f uncti onal f ai l ure may have more than one engi neeri ng
f ai l ure mode ( f ai l ure cause, Task 1011.
3. 6 Mi ni mumEqui pment Li st. Speci f y i f the ai rcraf t or end i temof
equi pment can be di spatched on i ts assi gned mi ssi on wi th the anal ysi s i tem
i noperati ve. If the answer i s "yes", speci f y any l i mi tati on.
3. 7 Fai l ure Detecti on Method. A descri pti on of the methods by whi ch
occurrence of a speci f i c f uncti onal f ai l ure ( f ai l ure mode) i s detected and
l ocal i zed by the operator or mai ntai nance techni ci an shal l be recorded.
Descri be the warni ng devi ces, i f appl i cabl e, and other i ndi cati ons whi ch make
evi dent to the operator or techni ci an that an i temhas mal f uncti oned or
f ai l ed. I f no i ndi cati on exi sts, state whether or not the undetected f ai l ure
wi l l j eopardi ze the mi ssi on obj ecti ves or personnel saf ety, and i f the
undetected f ai l ure al l ows the i temto remai n operati onal i n a saf e state, a
second f ai l ure si tuati on shal l be expl ored to determi ne whether or not an
i ndi cati on wi l l be evi dent to the operator or mai ntenance techni ci an. Proper
correl ati on of an i temmal f uncti on or f ai l ure may requi re i denti f i cati on of
normal , abnormal and i ncorrect i ndi cati ons. Normal i ndi cati ons are those that
are evi dent to an operator or mai ntenance techni ci an when the i temi s
operati ng normal l y. I ncorrect i ndi cati ons are those that are evi dent to the
operator or mai ntenance techni ci an when the i temhas mal f uncti oned or f ai l ed.
Task 103
7 June 19E3 103-2
M
I
L
-
S
T
D

1
6
2
9
A
1n c K L
1
E u K
0 3
i
L i E
i
u
w
0 d
.
m 0
,
.
i

-
1
T
A
S
K
1
0
3
1
0
3
-
3
2
4
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
0
,

FAILURE MODE EFFECTS AND CRITICALIN ANALYSIS - HAINTAINABILITV INFORMATION

SYSTMlSUBSYSTM NO?tENCU.TURE SYSTEM IDmTIFICATION NWBER DATE: PREPARED BY:
SHEET_OF_ APPROVED BY:
COXPENSATING PROVISH INS
INDENTURE LEVEL REFERENCE DRAWING MISSION
1
SYSTFX/SllBSYSTM DESCRIPTION
ITEN
NONFINCLATURFZ
N
_I
.TR
-
HISSIO~
PHASE
FAI
-izzx-
EFFECTS
RE EFF
NEXT
HICHEA
LEVEL
I3
END
EFFECTS
FUNCTION SFSXRITY
CLASS
EW.XNEERINC FAIL!JRE
MODE KI'BF AND
RONAL
LURE
INEERING
LURE MODE.
ITEM
IDW
NO.
FAILURE
XTECTION
MTHOD
HINIhlJM
EqJIPKENl
LIST REXARKS
FIGURE 103. 1 Example of FMECA - maintainability information worksheet format.
.
MI L- STD- 1629A
3. 8 Engi neeri ng Fai l ure Mode MTBF and Remarks. Cal cul ate and provi de MTBF
data f or each engi neeri ng f ai l ure mode ( f ai l ure cause) devel oped as part of
Task 101. Al so i ncl ude any remarks pertai ni ng to and cl ari f yi ng any other
col umns. Notes regardi ng recommendati ons f or desi gn i mprovements shal l be
recorded and f urther ampl i f i ed i n the FMECA report, General Requi rements, 4. 5.
3. 9 Orderi ng Data. The f ol l owi ng detai l s shal l be speci f i ed i n, , the
appropri ate contractual documents:
a. Task 101 ( see 1. 1 of Task 103)
b. 01 -R-7085
C. 01 -R-7086
d. The Statement of Work
e. Other requi rements as necessary f or tai l ori ng.
Task 103
7 June 1983
103- 3
Paragraph
4. 3. 1
4. 3. 2
4. 3. 3
4. 3. 4
4. 3. 5
4. 3. 6
4. 4
4. 4. 1
4. 4. 1. 1
4. 4. 1. 2
4. 4. 1. 3
4. 4. 1. 4
4. 4. 2
4. 4. 3
4. 5
4. 5. 1
4. 5. 2
4. 5. 2. 1
4. 5. 2. 2
5.
5. 1
Tasks
101
102
103
104
105
MI L- STD- 1629A
CONTENTS ( Conti nued)
Worksheet f ormats ...............
Ground rul es and assumpti ons .... . ....
I ndenture l evel ................
Codi ng system.................
Fai l ure def i ni ti on
Coordi nati on of ef f %: : : : 1 : : : 1 : : :
General procedures ..............
Contri buti ng i nf ormati on ...........
Techni cal speci f i cati ons and devel opment pl ans.
Trade- of f study reports ............
Desi gn data and drawi ngs ...........
Rel i abi l i ty data ...............
FMEA process .................
Severi ty cl assi f i cati on ............
FMECA Report .................
Summary ...................
Rel i abi l i ty cri ti cal i tem l i sts ........
Category I and Category II f ai l ure mode l i st .
Si ngl e f ai l ure poi nts l i st ..........
DETAI L REQUI REMENTS ..............
Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FAI LURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS . . . . . . .
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fl4ECA4lAINTAINABILITY INFORMATION . . . . . . .
DAMAGE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSI S . . . . . . .
FAI LURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRI TI CALI TY
ANALYSI S PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FI GURES
Fi gure
Task 101
101. 1 Exampl e of a f uncti onal - bl ock di agram . . . . .
101. 2 Exampl e of a rel i abi l i ty bl ock di agram. . . .
101. 3 Exampl e of FMEA worksheet f ormat . . . . . . .
Task 102
101- 9
101- 10
101- 11
102. 1 Exampl e of CA worksheet f ormat . . . . . . . . 102- 5
102. 2 Exampl e of cri ti cal i ty matri x . . . . . . . . . 102- 7
Page
6
6
6
6
5
5
7
8
:
8
9
; :
; :
11
11
11
101- l
102- l
103- l
104- l
, 105- l
w
V
Fi gure
Task 103
103. 1 Exampl e of FMECAmai ntai nabi l i ty i nf ormati on
worksheet f orm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103- 4
Task 704
104. 1 Exampl e of damage mode and ef f ects anal ysi s
f o r ma t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104- 5
APPENDI X
APPENDI X A. APPLI CATI ON AND TAI LORI NG GUI DE . . . . . . , . A- l
Paragraph
10.
10. 1
10. 2
10. 3
20.
30.
4"00: 1
40. 2
50.
50. 1
50. 1. 1
50. 1. 2
50. 1. 3
50. 2
50. 3
50. 4
50. 5
50. 6
50. 7
GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tai l ori ng requi rements ............
Dupl i cati on of ef f ort .............
REFERENCED DOCUFl ENTS ( not appl i cabl e) .....
DEFI NI TI ONS ( not appl i cabl e) .........
A- l
A- l
A- l
A- l
A- l
A- l
- 1
GENERAL REQUI REMENTS .............
Orderi ng data .................
Data i tem descri pti ons ( DI D) .........
APPLI CATI ON CRI TERI A .............
General consi derati ons ............
Level of detai l ................
Ti mi ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I ntended use .................
FMEA ( task 101) ................
CA ( task 102) .................
FMECA- mai ntai nabi l i ty i nf ormati on ( task 103) .
DMEA ( task 104) ................
FMECA Pl an ( task 105) .............
Cri ti cal i ty number (cr) cal cul ati on exampl e . .
A- l
A- l
A- 2
A- 2
A- 2
A- 2
A- 2
A- 3
A- 3
A- 3
A- 3
A- 4
A- 4
A- 4
MI L- STD- 1629A
CONTENTS ( Conti nued)
vi
7 June 1983
MI L- STD- 1629A
APPENDI X A
APPLI CATI ON AND TAI LORI NG GUI DE
10. GENERAL
10. 1 Scope. Thi s appendi x provi des notes f or the gui dance of the
procuri ng acti vi ty i n' generati ng the contractual requi rements f or a f ai l ure
mode, ef f ects, and cri ti cal i ty anal ysi s (FMECA).
10. 2 Tai l ori ng requi rements. Each provi si on of thi s standard shoul d
be revi ewed to determi ne the extent of appl i cabi l i ty. Tai l ori ng of
requi rements may take the f ormof del eti on, addi ti on, or al terati on to the
statements i n Secti ons 3 and 4 and any speci f i ed tasks to adapt the
requi rements to speci f i c system characteri sti cs, procuri ng acti vi ty opti ons,
contractual structure, or acqui si ti on phase. The tai l ori ng FMECA requi rements
are speci f i ed i n the contractual provi si ons to i ncl ude i nput to the statement
of work, contract data i teml i st (CDRL), and other contractual means.
10. 3 Dupl i cati on of ef f ort. It i s i ncumbent upon the procuri ng
acti vi ty to revi ew the contractual requi rements to avoi d dupl i cati on of ef f ort
between the rel i abi l i ty programand other programef f orts such as saf ety,
mai ntai nabi l i ty, human engi neeri ng, test and eval uati on, survi vabi l i ty and
vul nerabi l i ty, mai ntenance pl anni ng, and i ntegrated l ogi sti cs support.
I denti f i cati on of the coi nci dent use of FMECA resul ts by the rel i abi l i ty
programand other di sci pl i nary areas i s requi red i n the FMECA pl an or other
appropri ate program documentati on to avoi d dupl i cati on of ef f ort by the
procuri ng acti vi ty and the contractor.
20. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS ( not appl i cabl e)
30. DEFI NI TI ONS ( not appl i cabl e>
40 GENERAL REQUI REMENTS
40. 1 Orderi ng data. The procuri ng acti vi ty shal l speci f y the
f ol l owi ng:
a. Ti tl e, number and date of thi s standard.
b. Task number( s) requi red.
C . FMECA pl an ( Task 105) i f requi red.
d. I ndenture l evel of anal ysi s (4. 3. 3) requi red.
e. Steps to be used i n the FMECA process (4. 4. 2).
f . FMECA report (4. 5) i f requi red. Code A i n bl ock
8 of DD1423 i f prel i mi nary draf t i s requi red. An
automated LSAR output report LSA- 060 or a
nonautomated LSAR report, i f requi red.
I f an
automated LSAR output report i s requi red, the
i nf ormati on at f i gure Al must be speci f i ed.
A- l
28 November 1984
MI L- STD- 1629A
LSA- 060, LCN Master Fi l e.
Basi c Card Entry I nstructi ons.
CARD COLUMN DESCRI PTI ON I NSTRUCTI ONS
1 Sel ect i on I ndi cat or Mandatory entry of "S".
( SEL I ND)
2- 4 Report Sel ecti on Number
( RSN)
Mandatory entry of "060" whi ch i s
report number i denti f yi ng the out-
put report requested.
5
7
8- 18
19
Report Control Code (RCC) Mandatory entry of an al phanumeri c
code; "A"- "Z", "0"- "9", whi ch wi l l
uni quel y i denti f y thi s report
number sel ecti on. If a trai l er or
opti on card i s associ ated wi th thi s
report sel ecti on, i t must match the
RCC on the basi c sl ecti on card.
(If necessary, i nstructi ons f or
trai l er cards wi l l be provi ded
by the requi ri ng authori ty>.
Type Card ( TYPE)
Sequence Code (SEQ CD) Leave bl ank.
Start Logi sti c Support
Anai ysi s Control Number
( START LCN)
Mandatory entry of "A" ( basi c
card>. If a l i sti ng of the enti re
content of the LCN Master Fi l e i s
desi red, no f urther data i s
requi red to be entered on thi s
card wi th the excepti on of cc 35.
Enter the LCN i denti f yi ng the
f i rst i temto be i ncl uded i n the
report. I t i denti f i es the system,
subsystem, or component f or whi ch
the report i s desi red. Data
el ement def i ni ti ons (DED> are
contai ned i n appendi x F of
MI L- STD- 1388- 2A. See DED 197
f or a compl ete def i ni ti on of LCN.
Al ternate LCN Code ( AL0 I f the report i s requi red f or an
al ternate desi gn or mai ntenance
concept of an associ ated LCN, en-
ter the ALC. See DED 023 f or a
compl ete def i ni ti on of ALC.
FI G Al Basi c card entry i nstructi ons
4 ?
MI L- STD- 1629A
20- 30 Stop LCN
31- 33
34
35
36
37
Useabl e on Code ( UOC)
Servi ce Desi gnati on Code
B Sheet
Opti on Code
Header Pri nt
Opti on ( HEADER)
Magneti c Tape Opti on
Enter the Stop LCN to i ndi cate the
poi nt where the LSAR ADP system
wi l l stop extracti ng i nf ormati on
f romthe f i l e. If no Stop LCN i s
entered, al l data f romand
subordi nates to the Start LCN wi l l
be consi dered as appl i cabl e f or
the report. See DED 197.
Enter the UOC f or the model of
the equi pment f or whi ch the
report i s to be devel oped.
The UOC must match a UOC en-
tered on the record of the
Start LCN. Data not matchi ng
the UOC entered wi l l be omi t-
ted f romthe report. A bl ank
UOC wi l l resul t i n sel ecti on
of al l UOCs wi thi n the speci -
f i ed Start and Stop LCN
range. See DED 536 f or a
compl ete def i ni ti on of UOC.
Enter "A", Army; F", Ai r
Force; "N", Navy; "M", Mari ne
Corps' "O", Other and "X", al l
when the output report deal s
wi th speci f i c task rel ated data
to be reported and output re-
port headers.
Mandatory entry of "F" to
obtai n the FMECA data onl y. An "F"
entry wi l l al ways resul t i n Header
Pri nts.
I f the output i s requi red to
have data el ement headers f or
each record type, enter "X".
Leave bl ank.
FI G Al ( cont' d) Basi c card entry i nstructi ons
A- 3
28 November 1984
MI L- STD- 1623A
40. 2 Data i temdescri pti ons (DID). The f ol l owi ng l i sted DI Ds provi de
a source of possi bl e data i temdescri pti on and f ormat requi rements f or
requi red data.
SOURCE DATA REQUI REMENTS APPLI CABLE DI D
Task 105 Fai l ure Mode, Ef f ects and
Cri ti cal i ty Anal ysi s ( FMECA) Pl an
DI - R- 70B6
General Fai l ure Mode, Ef f ects and 01- R- 708SA
Requi rements Cri ti cal i ty Anal ysi s ( FMECA) Report
Secti on 4- 5
and Task 101
50. APPLI CATI ON CRI TERI A
50. 1 General consi derati ons. Thi s standard has been structured to
f aci l i tate the tai l ori ng of FMECA requi rements based upon i ndi vi dual program
needs. Program vari abl es such as system compl exi ty, f undi ng, and schedul e
i nf l uence the l evel of detai l and ti mi ng of the FMECA and must be consi dered
when tai l ori ng the requi rements. Al l programs do not requi re the same l evel
of detai l and al l programs shoul d not wai t unti l f ul l scal e devel opment to
i mpl ement the FMECA requi rements.
50. 1. 1 Level of detai l . The l evel of detai l appl i es to the i evel of
i ndenture at whi ch f ai l ures are postul ated. The FMECA can be accompl i shed at
vari ous l evel s of i ndenture f romsystemto part l evel dependi ng upon the
i nf ormati on avai l abl e and the needs of the program. The l ower the i ndenture
l evel , the hi gher the l evel of detai l si nce more f ai l ure modes wi l l be
consi dered. The choi ce of the l evel of i ndenture must be compati bl tr wi th the
program cost and schedul e constrai nts and the system rel i abi l i ty
requi rements. A l ess detai l ed anal ysi s whi ch i s avai l abl e i n ti me to
contri bute to systemrel i abi l i ty i s more val uabl e than a more detai l ed
anal ysi s whi ch i s l ate and makes changes costl y and unf easi bl e. I n general ,
the FMECA shoul d not be perf ormed bel owthe l evel necessary to i denti f y
cri ti cal i tems or to the l evel requi red by the LSA candi date l i st, whi chever
i s l ower. The depth and detai l of the FMECA ef f ort must be def i ned i n
appropri ate contractual and program documentati on.
50. 1. 2 Ti mi ng. The obj ecti ve of the FMECA i s tc support the deci si on
maki ng process. If the anal ysi s f ai i s to provi de usabl e i nf ormati on at or
bef ore a proj ect deci si on poi nt,
then i t has made no contri buti on and i s
unti mel y. The ti me- phasi ng of the FMECA ef f ort i s i mportant and shoul d be
i denti f i ed i n the FMECA pl an to assure that anal ysi s resul ts wi l l be avai l abl e
to support the proj ect deci si on poi nts duri ng systemdevel opment. Si nce
programcost and schedul e constrai nts requi re that ava' l abl e resources be used
where they are most cost ef f ecti ve,
the earl i est possi bl e avai l abi i i ty of
FMECA resul ts i s i mportant so that the i mpact on cost and schedui e can be
mi ni mi zed.
A- 4
MIL-STD-1629A
TASK 104
DAMAGE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
1. Purpose.
The purpose of the damage mode and effects
analysis (DMEA) is to provide early criteria for survivability and
vulnerability assessments. The DMEA provides data related to damage
caused by specified threat mechanisms and the effects on weapon system
operation and mission essential functions.
1.2 Application. The DMEA, Task 104, utilizes the results of
Task 101, and shall not be imposed without imposition of Task 101.
1.3 Planning. Planning the DMEA includes the contractoris
procedures for assuring the timeliness of the analysis and its utilization
in the vulnerability assessments of the weapon system.
2. Analysis approach. The DMEA is an expansion of the FMEA
to include the generation of data required for vulnerability assessments.
It is primarily applicable to new weapon system acquisitions but may be
applied to developed (existing) weapon systems where data is required to
provide criteria for a survivability enhancement program.
2.1 New weapon systems. The DMEA is an expansion of the FMEA
conducted and maintained for the weapon system design during conceptual,
validation, and full scale development. The DMEA shall consider all
failure modes and damage modes that can occur to each item and the
effect each has on the weapon system. The relationship between the
weapon system essential functions, mission capabilitiesi hostile threat
capabilities, and hostile weapon effects shall be analyi.ed to provide
design criteria for survivability enhancement.
2.2 Developed weapon systems. When specified, a DMEA is
conducted to identify all subsystems and components in a @veloped
(existing) weapon system to the level defined by the procuring agency.
The DMEA is used to provide data related to the impact of Engineering
Change Proposals (ECPs) and retrofit programs on total weaponsystem
survivability. Threats should be periodically assessed.to'determine if
the weapon system is still capable of operating effepdvely in a hostile
environment.
3. Procedure. The FMEA shall be expanded to provide data
related to the damage caused by threat mechanisms and the effects upon
weapon system operation and mission essential functi ns.
4
The damage
mode(s) for each essential component as caused by th specified threat
mechanism(s) shall be identified and the effect on the essential function(s)
of the weapon system determined. The analysis shall include
TASK 184
24 November 1980
104-l
MIL-STD-1629A
I
t
I
I
all identified operation and mission essential subsystems &nd components.
'The type of'damage'&odC. that each component can experience (i.e., fire,
explosion, engine fuel ingestion, toxic fumes, smoke-corrosive materials,
etc.) and the primary and secondary damage effects to which each'component
can be exposed shall be identified. Each nonessential component also
shall be examined to determine if a hazardous environment may be created
by its sustaining the-type or level of damage identified. This shall
also include any cascading effect on other subsystems from an initial
system or component response. The essential components that may be
exposed to the hazardous environments shall be identified.
3.1 Weapon system operation and mission essential functions.
requirements for weapon system operation and mission essential
shall be determined for each mission phase and included in the
narrative developed in 4. of Task 101. The weapon system
eration and mission essential functions shall be established down to
e indenture level that individual subsystems and major components
perform the function can be identified.
3.2 Identification of critical components. Using the system
schematic or functional block diagram, the assigned severity codes, and
thel established weapon system operation and mission essential functions,
each subsystem and major bomponent required to perform each mission
essential function shall be identified. The reliability block diagram
shall be used to identify subsystem and function redundancies. A critical
components listing shall be included with the functional narrative and
with the DMEA worksheets in the FMECA report, General Requirements, 4.5.
4. DMEA worksheet. Documentation of the DMEA is accomplished
by completing the columns of the approved DMEA worksheet. An example of
a DMEA worksheet format-is shown in Figure 104.1. Completed DMEA work-
sheets shall be included in the FMECA report, General Requirement, 4.5,
following the FMEA worksheet for the same indenture level. The following
information is the same as given in the FMEA worksheet and shall be
transferred to the DMEA worksheet:
a.
b.
C .
d.
e.
f.
Identification number
Item/functional identification
Function
Failure modes and causes
Mission phase/operational mode
Severity classification
TASK 104
24 November 1980
104-2
MIT,-STD-162911
I
4\1 Damage modes. All possible damage modes which could
resultifrom exposure to the specified threat mechanism(s) shall be
determi\ped through analysis of each subsystem, component, or part. The
analysib shall include both primary and secondary damage effects.
Damage modes of individual item functions shall be postulated on the
basis of the stated mission requirements, specified threats, and system
descriptions. The effects of the possible damage mode shall include
performance degradation as well as total item failure. To assist in
assuring that a corn lete damage mode analysis is performed, each damage
mode and function s all, x as a minimum, be examined in relation to the
following typical damage conditions.
a. Penetration
b. Severed
C . Shattered, cracked
d. Jammed
e. Deformed
f. Ignited, detonated
EC-
Burned out (i.e., electrical overload)
h. Burn through (i.e., threat caused fires)
4.2 Damage effects. The consequences of each assumed damage
mode on item operation, function or status shall be identified, evaluated,
and recorded. Damage effects shall focus on the specific block diagram
element which is effected by the damage condition under consideration.
The damage mode under consideration may impact several indenture levels
in addition to the indenture level under analysis; therefore, "local,"
"next higher level," and "end" effects shall be evaluated.
4.2.1 Local effects. Local effects concentrate specifically on
the impact an assumed damage mode has on the operation and function of
the item in the indenture level under consideration. The consequences
of each postulated damage mode affecting the item shall be described
along with any second-order effects which results. Potential conditions
where the damage of one item results in a conditional failure probability
or effect of a second item which differs from the failure probability or
effect when the second item is considered independently shall be identified.
The purpose of defining local effects is to provide a basis for evaluating
compensating provisions and for recommending survivability enhancement.
It is possible for the "local" effect to be the damage mode itself.
104-3
TASK 104
24 November 1980
MTL-STD-1629h
' 4.2.2 Next higher level. Next higher level effects concentrate
on the impact an assumed damage mode has on the operation and function
of the items in the next higher indenture level above the indenture
level under consideration. The consequences of each postulated damage
mode affecting the next higher indenture level shall be described.
4.2.3 End effects.
4
End effects evaluate and define the total
effect an assumed damage m,de has on the operation, function, or status
of the uppermost system. The effect of each damage mode upon the essential
function(s) affecting weapon system operating capability and mission
completion capability shall be determined. The end effect described may
be the result of a double failure. For example, failure of a safety
device may result in a catastrophic end effect only in the event that
both the prime function goes beyond limit for which the safety device is
set and the safety device fails. Those end effects resulting from a
double failure shall be indicated on the DMEA worksheets.
4.3 Remarks. Any pertinent remarks pertaining to and clarifying
any other column in the worksheet line shall be noted. Notes regarding
recommendations for design improvement shall be recorded and further
amplified in the FMECA report, General Requirements, 4.5. This entry
also,may include a notation of unusual conditions, damage effects of
redundant items, recognition of particularly critical design features or.
any other remarks that amplify the line entry. Information shall be
provided that reasonable actions and considerations are or have'been
accomplished to enhance survivability through recommended design changes.
Information provided shall address the following:
a. Design. Those features of the design that relate to
the identified damage mode that minimize the vulnerability
with respect to the specified threat mechanisms;
i.e., redundancy, separation of components, lines,
and structure, elimination of fire paths, integral
armor, etc.
b. Test. Those tests recommended to verify the design
features recommended or incorporated for survivability
enhancement.
C . History. Identification of previous testing and
analysis relating to this particular case which will
be used to support the validity.
5. Ordering data. The following details shall be specified
in the appropriate contractual documents:
a. Task 101 (see 1.2 of Task 104).
,
.3
b. Threat mechanisms (see 3. of Task 104).
TASK 104
24 November 1980
104-4
M
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9.
MI L- STD- 1629A
Noti ce 1
7 J une 1983
MI LI TARY STANDARD
PROCEDURES FOR PERFORMI NG
A FAI LURE MODE
EFFECTS AND CRI TI CALI TY ANALYSI S
To al l hol ders of MI L- STD- 1629A
1. The f ol l owi ng pages of MI LSTD- 1629A have been revi sed and supersede the
pages l i sted:
New Page Date Superseded Page ' % Date
V 24 November 1980 V
vi 7 J une 1983 Vi
Repri nted w/ o change
:
24 November 1980
24 November 1980 1
7 J une 1983 2
Repri nted w/ o change
24 November 1980
103- l thru 1033 7 J une 1983 103- l thru 1033
1034
24 November 1980
7 J une 1983 New
A 3 7 J une 1983 A 3 24 November 1980
A4 7 J une 1983 A4 24 November 1980
2. Make the f ol l owi ng pen and i nk changes:
a. Page 105- 1,
Engf neeri ng !
aragraph 2, change ti tl e of MI L STD- 2080 to "Maf ntenance
l anni ng and Anal ysi s f or Aeronauti cal Systems,
Subsystems, Equf pment and Support Equi pment. "
b. Page 1053, paragraph 3. 6, l i ne 2, change "PORGRAM" to "PROGRAM. "
C . Page Ad, paragraph 50. 7, l i ne that starts wi th "For a2: add
CONTENTS.
parenthesi s bef ore B.
3. RETAI N THI S NOTI CE AND I NSERT BEFORE TABLE OF
/
4. Hol ders of MI L - STD- 1629A wi l l veri f y that the
have been entered. Thi s noti ce wi l l be retai ned
i ssuance i s a separate publ i cati on. Each noti ce
poi nts unti l the Mi l i tary Standard i s compl etel y
page changes i ndf cated herei n
as a check sheet. Thf s
i s to be retaf ned by stockf ng
revi sed or cancel ed.
Cust odi ans:
Army - CR
Af r Force - 17
Revi ew Acti vi ti es:
Navy - SH, OS
AmY
- EA, AR
Prepari ng Actf vf ty:
Navy - AS
( Proj ect No. RELI - 0037)
4. TYPE OF ORGANI ZATl ON (Mar k OM)
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VENDOR
USER
n. NAME OF Su6MI l Tl NG ORGA N I Z A T I ON
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, DDCUMENT NJ MSSR 2 DOCUMENT T I T L E
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STANDARDI ZATI ON DOCUMENT I MPRO=ENT PROPOSAL
(Sec i nsmc c t i ons - RpcrieSide)
. REMARK S
a. NAME OF SUBMI TTER hart. Fht. MI)- Opt l ord b. WORK TELEPHONE NUM8ER ~I nc l ude Ar w
C&J - Optiond
, MA I L I N G AOORESS (Street. Cfty. State. ZI P Coda) - Opt l ond S. DATE OF SUSMIS%OU (YYYYDD)
DO
at;zn 1426
PREVI OUS EOI TI ON 19 -LETE.
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( F ol d al one thb I l nc)
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Commanding Officer
Naval Air Engineering Center
Systems Engineering Standardization Department
(SESD), Code 93
Lakehurst, NJ 08733
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Naval Air Engineering Center
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