Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159098 October 27, 2006
SPS. HENRY and ROSARIO UY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ARSENIO P. ADRIANO, in his capacity as Pairing Judge of RTC, Br. 64, Tarlac
City, CITY PROSECUTOR ALIPIO C. YUMUL and PIAKAMASARAP CORP., respondents.


D E C I S I O N


CALLEJO, SR., J .:
Challenged in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62103 which affirmed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac
City
2
denying the motion to quash the Information in Criminal Case Nos. 6512-94.
Based on a confidential information that petitioner Henry Uy had been engaged in
manufacturing, delivering, and selling "fake" Marca Pia soy sauce,
3
Orlando S. Bundoc,
Intelligence Officer II of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), applied for a
search warrant
4
for unfair competition which was granted on February 14, 1994. When the
search warrant was implemented on even date, Atty. Francisco R. Estavillo, agent of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac, seized fifty-five (55) bottles of label Marca Pia soy sauce.
5

Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tarlac City on
March 23, 1994, charging petitioner Henry Uy with violation of Article 189 (Unfair Competition) of the
Revised Penal Code.
6

On November 8, 1994, private respondent Piakamasarap Corporation moved to amend the criminal
charge by including Henry's spouse, petitioner Rosario Uy.
7
The court granted the motion in its Order
dated November 15, 1994 and admitted the amended criminal complaint which reads:
The undersigned, LUIS E. GONZALES, Comptroller of PIAKAMASARAP CORPORATION
of 583 Sta. Veronica St., Novaliches, Quezon City, and by authority of the said corporation,
under oath accuses HENRY UY, ROSARIO GUTIERREZ UY and a certain JOHN DOE of
Violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about February 14, 1994, and for sometimes (sic) prior thereto, in Municipality of
Tarlac, Tarlac, Philippines, the said Rosario G. Uy accused, being then the owner of a
business establishment with principal address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subdivision, San
Vicente, Tarlac, Tarlac, and her co-accused, husband, HENRY UY, and a certain John Doe,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously conspire and confederate together and
help one another engaged in unfair competition with the intention of deceiving and
defrauding the public in general and the consuming public in general and PIAKAMASARAP
Corporation, the manufacturer and bottler of soy sauce under the name "MARCA PIA," a
[trademark] duly registered with the Philippine Patent Office and sell or offer for sale soy
sauce manufactured by them with the brand name "Marca Pia" which is a bastard version
of the trademark, and using the bottles of Piakamasarap Corporation and substituted the
contents thereof with those manufactured by the accused and passing to the public that said
products to be the products of Piakamasarap Corporation which is not true, thereby
inducing the public to believe that the above-mentioned soy sauce sold or offered for sale by
said accused are genuine "MARCA PIA" soy sauce manufactured by PIAKAMASARAP
CORPORATION, and of inferior quality to the damage and prejudice of the Piakamasarap
Corporation.
Contrary to law.
Tarlac, Tarlac, November 8, 1994.
8

After preliminary examination of the prosecution witnesses, the court found probable cause to indict
petitioners.
9
On January 30, 1995, the court issued a warrant of arrest against petitioners.
10
They
were released after posting a cash bond on February 1, 1995.
11
On July 10, 1995, petitioners were
arraigned, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.
12
Petitioners, through counsel,
waived the pre-trial conference on October 25, 1995. The initial trial was set on November 27,
1995.
13

However, it was only on February 26, 1996 that the first witness of the prosecution, Atty. Estavillo of
the NBI, testified. In the meantime, in October 1996, this Court issued Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 104-96 providing, inter alia, that the RTC shall have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of
Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 166, as amended,
thus:
VIOLATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SUCH AS, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
VIOLATIONS OF ART. 188 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE (SUBSTITUTING AND
ALTERING TRADEMARKS, TRADE NAMES, OR SERVICE MARKS), ART. 189 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE (UNFAIR COMPETITION, FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION OF
TRADEMARKS, TRADE NAMES, OR SERVICE MARKS, FRAUDULENT DESIGNATION
OF ORIGIN, AND FALSE DESCRIPTION), P.D. NO. 49 (PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS), P.D. NO. 87 (AN ACT CREATING THE
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD), R.A. NO. 165, AS AMENDED (THE PATENT LAW),
AND R.A. NO. 166, AS AMENDED (THE TRADEMARK LAW) SHALL BE TRIED
EXCLUSIVELY BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
ESTABLISHED RAFFLE SCHEME EXCEPT THOSE COVERED BY ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 113-95 DATED 2 OCTOBER 1995, IN WHICH CASE, THE DESIGNATED
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS SHALL CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE PROVISIONS
THEREIN.
CONSIDERING THAT JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS HEREINBEFORE MENTIONED IS NOW CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, THE DESIGNATION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS
AND MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 113-
95 IS DELETED AND WITHDRAWN.
Despite the administrative order of the Court, the MTC continued with the trial. Gloria P. Tomboc,
Analyst of the Bureau of Food and Drugs Administration (BFAD), testified on August 25, 1997. In the
meantime, Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code were amended by R.A. No. 8293,
otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code. Two years thereafter, Alfredo Lomboy,
supervisor of Piakamasarap Corporation, testified on August 30, 1999.
On December 12, 1999, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence.
14
In the meantime, on
October 22, 1999, Atty. Joselito L. Lim had moved to withdraw his appearance as counsel for
petitioners;
15
the court had granted the motion on October 25, 1999;
16
and the new counsel of
petitioners, Balbastro and Associates, had entered its appearance on November 24, 1999.
17

On February 15, 2000, the court resolved to admit the documentary evidence of the prosecution
except Exhibit "E" which was rejected by the court, and Exhibits "I" and "J" which were
withdrawn.
18
The prosecution rested its case.
On March 10, 2000, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
to Evidence.
19
The court granted the motion. In their demurrer,
20
petitioners argued that a judgment of
acquittal is proper since no sufficient evidence was presented to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that they are guilty of the offense charged. The prosecution was not able to establish that they gave
their goods the general appearance of another manufacturer or dealer and that they had the intent to
defraud the public or Piakamasarap Corporation. Moreover, under both R.A. No. 166, as amended,
and its repealing law, R.A. No. 8293, the RTC had jurisdiction over the crime charged; hence, the
amended complaint should be quashed.
The prosecution opposed the demurrer to evidence, contending that it had presented proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of petitioners for the crime charged. The prosecution maintained that,
under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, the MTC had jurisdiction over the crime charged in the light
of the imposable penalty for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
21

In its Resolution dated May 16, 2000,
22
the court held that there was prima facie evidence which, if
unrebutted or not contradicted, would be sufficient to warrant the conviction of petitioners. However,
the court ruled that the RTC was vested by law with the exclusive and original jurisdiction to try and
decide charges for violation of R.A. No. 166 as amended by R.A. No. 8293. Accordingly, the court
denied the demurrer to evidence and ordered the records of the case forwarded to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
The City Prosecutor forwarded the case records to the Clerk of Court of RTC, Br. 63, Tarlac
City.
23
On June 19, 2000, the RTC ordered the City Prosecutor to conduct the requisite preliminary
investigation and to file the necessary Information if he found probable cause against petitioners.
The City Prosecutor found probable cause based on the findings of the MTC in its May 16, 2000
Resolution that there was a prima facie case against petitioners.
24
He filed an Information in the RTC
on July 18, 2000 for violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
25
The Information reads:
That on or about February 14, 1994 and sometime prior thereto, at Tarlac City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, being the owner of a business
establishment with principal address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subd., San Vicente, Tarlac
City, the accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in unfair competition with the intention of deceiving and
defrauding the public in general and the PIAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, the name
"MARCA PIA," and sell or offer for sale soy sauce manufactured by them with the brand
name "Marca Pia," which is a version of the trademark, and using the bottles of
Piakamasarap Corporation and substituted the contents thereof with those manufactured by
the accused and passing to the public the products, thereby inducing the public to believe
that the soy sauce sold or offered for sale by the accused are genuine "MARCA PIA" soy
sauce, to the damage and prejudice of PIAKAMASARAP CORPORATION.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
26

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information,
27
alleging that their rights to due process and
speedy trial had been violated. Other than the notice of hearing sent by the court, they never
received a subpoena which required them to submit their evidence during a preliminary
investigation. Petitioners further averred that certain delays in the trial are permissible, especially
when such delays are due to uncontrollable circumstances or by accident. In this case, the
inordinate delay was obviously brought by the lackadaisical attitude taken by the prosecutor in
prosecuting the case. Petitioners pointed out that there was already a delay of six (6) long years
from the time the initial complaint was filed, and that they had already been prejudiced. Their life,
liberty and property, not to mention their reputation, have been at risk as there has been no
determination of the issue of whether or not to indict them. Thus, the case should be dismissed in
order to free them from further capricious and oppressive dilatory tactics of the prosecution. Indeed,
their right to a speedy trial is part of due process, both of which are guaranteed by no less than the
fundamental law itself. They insisted that they should not be made to unjustly await the prosecution
of the charges against them.
In opposition, the City Prosecutor clarified that subpoenas were sent to the parties during the
preliminary investigation. In fact, petitioner Henry Uy appeared and submitted the case for resolution
without submitting additional evidence. Also, the proceedings in the MTC were not part of
preliminary investigation but the trial on the merits.
28

On September 8, 2000, the court issued an Order denying the motion to quash.
29
The court ruled
that:
While there must have been a protracted trial since the case was originally filed before the
Municipal Trial Court, a period of about six (6) years, as the accused contends, nevertheless
the delay if any, is partly attributable to the accused. [They] allowed the prosecution to rest
the evidence in chief before raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction. Had the accused
immediately raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, this case could have been filed anew
before the RTC. The accused allowed themselves to be arraigned without raising the issue
of jurisdiction. In fact, the prosecution [had] rested its evidence in chief.
The parties may[,] however[,] stipulate in the pre-trial that all the proceedings taken before
the Municipal Trial Court are automatically reproduced and are considered part of the
prosecution's evidence, so that the trial will now be with respect to the reception of defense
evidence.
30

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
31
which the trial court denied.
32
At the same
time, the court granted the oral motion of the prosecution to amend the Information to reflect in its
caption that the law violated by the accused is R.A. No. 8293 and not Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code. On October 12, 2000, the City Prosecutor filed an amended Information. The
inculpatory portion reads:
That on or about February 14, 1994 and sometimes prior thereto, at Tarlac City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, being the owner of a business
establishment with principal address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subd., San Vicente, Tarlac
City, the accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in Violation of Sec. 168 of R.A. No. 8293with the intention
of deceiving and defrauding the public in general and the PIAKAMASARAP
CORPORATION, the name "MARCA PIA," and sell or offer for sale soy sauce
manufactured by them with the brand name "Marca Pia," which is a version of the
trademark, and using the bottles of Piakamasarap Corporation and substituted the contents
thereof with those manufactured by the accused and passing to the public the products,
thereby inducing the public to believe that the soy sauce sold or offered for sale by the
accused are genuine "MARCA PIA" soy sauce, to the damage and prejudice of
PIAKAMASARAP CORPORATION.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
33

Petitioners then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction,
34
on the sole ground that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying their motion to quash based on violation of their right to a speedy trial. They
claimed that there was no active effort on their part to delay the case as they merely attended the
scheduled hearings and participated in the preliminary investigation. On the contrary, it is the
prosecution that has the unmitigated obligation to immediately file the Information with the proper
court. The public prosecutor is supposedly knowledgeable of the existing laws and jurisprudence
since his office has the delicate task of prosecuting cases in behalf of the State. Under the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, he is the officer responsible for the direction and control of criminal
prosecutions. In the case at bar, the public prosecutor failed in his bounden duty by neglecting to file
the case in the court of competent jurisdiction. The prosecution could not advance a single reason to
justify the procedural error and instead pointed its accusing finger to petitioners who are just ordinary
citizens. Their failure to call the attention of the prosecution is neither acquiescence nor consent on
their part. While their former lawyer was obviously lackluster in their defense, the act of the counsel
should not deprive them of their constitutional right to a speedy trial. For petitioners, the
prosecution's blunder in procedure and ignorance of existing laws and jurisprudence far outweigh
whatever minimal participation, if any, they had in the protracted proceedings.
On March 21, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition.
35
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Orders dated September 8, 2000 and October 9, 2000 of the public respondent
are hereby DISMISSED.
36

In dismissing the petition, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
[T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays"
(Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 69, 76); "or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried." (Binay v. Sandiganbayan,
316 SCRA 65, 93)
In the instant case, aside from the fact that it took almost six years for the prosecution to
complete the presentation of its evidence, petitioners failed to show that the delay, if ever
there is any, was caused solely by the prosecution. Neither did the petitioners show that the
proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court was attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays attributable to the prosecution or that unjustified postponements of the trial
were asked for and secured by the prosecution to the prejudice of the petitioners. The fact
alone that the prosecution had consumed six (6) years to complete its presentation of
evidence, without any allegation or proof that the prosecution has caused unreasonable
delays or that the proceeding was attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays,
to Our minds is not sufficient for the application upon the petitioners of their Constitutional
right to speedy trial. "A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would
not be sufficient. In the application of the Constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case." (Binay v. Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 93). In the case at bar, petitioners
failed to present, for Our perusal, the circumstances attending the trial of their case before
the Municipal Trial Court.
The only controversy of the instant case lies in the fact that the Municipal Trial Court which
heard the case has no jurisdiction over the said case. While it may be conceded that the
prosecution erred in not filing the information against the petitioners to a proper court, still,
petitioners are not blameless in this regard. Petitioners, through their counsel, had
actively participated in the proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court. Petitioners
had to wait for almost six (6) years to elapse before they brought to the attention of
the Municipal Trial Court that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case against the
petitioners. Petitioners have, by reason of their participation in the proceedings before
the Municipal Trial Court and also by reason of their silence and inaction, allowed the
Municipal Trial Court to proceed with a case for six (6) years despite absence of
jurisdiction of such court to hear the case. We cannot allow the petitioners to reap from
their acts or omissions. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply
schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the
other." (Fortune Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 355, 364)
"The constitutional privilege was never intended as furnishing a technical means for
escaping trial." (Esguerra v. Court of First Instance of Manila, et al., 95 Phil. 609, 611-612)
"The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution, but the
same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting
criminals. It secures rights to an accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.
(Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, 322 SCRA 655, 667)
37

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied.
38

Petitioners sought relief from this Court on a petition for review, alleging that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
COURT A QUO'S DENIAL OF PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH, BASED ON
VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL (SEC. 16, ART. 3, 1987
CONSTITUTION).
39

Petitioners reiterate their arguments in the CA to support the present petition. They aver that:
In this case, the prosecution took six (6) long and grueling years before it filed an
Information with a competent court, despite the fact that jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts over trademark cases remained unchanged since the birth of the
Trademark Law. Surely, this inordinate delay can be considered a "vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delay" which is constitutionally impermissible in this
jurisdiction pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Indeed, petitioners have been prejudiced. Their lives, liberty and property, not to mention
their reputation have all been put at risk for so long.
The public prosecutor failed to explain the reason for the delay. Truth to tell, even at this last
stage, the public prosecutor chooses to remain silent why it had unjustifiably taken him too
long to file this case before a competent court. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals
deliberately ignored this glaring flaw committed by the public prosecutor and instead focused
on petitioners' alleged negligence in not raising the issue of jurisdiction earlier. It further ruled
that due to this fact, petitioners are thus not entirely blameless for the delay of the trial.
Truth to tell, these findings of the Court of Appeals are palpably erroneous.
Firstly, it is elementary that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. This is because no amount of waiver can confer jurisdiction on a court over
an offense for which such jurisdiction has not been conferred by law in the first place.
Secondly, even assuming that petitioners failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction earlier, still,
they could not be estopped from invoking their right to speedy trial. The delay to be
considered "partly attributable" to the accused (which could work against him in invoking the
right to speedy trial) presupposes an active effort of the defendant to delay the case
(Manabat v. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295). There is no violation of the right to speedy trial where
the delay is imputable to the accused (Solis v. Agloro, 63 SCRA 370). Here, it was the
prosecution that had the unmitigated obligation to file the Information with the correct court,
within a reasonable time. It did not. Such blunder was fatal to its cause.
To emphasize, petitioners need not even call the attention of the prosecution that it had
failed to file the case with the proper court, contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals. x
x x
40

x x x x
Although petitioners agree with the Court of Appeals that mere mathematical reckoning of
time would not be sufficient for the application of the right to speedy trial, still, the public
prosecutor's blunder should already be considered "vexatious, capricious and oppressive"
warranting the dismissal of the case.
Indeed, to condone the public prosecutor's manner of having directed this case, just like
what the Court of Appeals did, might give rise to a disturbing precedent where the
constitutional right of the accused could very well be set aside to justify the mishandling of
the prosecution by officers of the State.
41

Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the accused is
entitled to a speedy, impartial and public trial. Section 2, Rule 119 of the said Rules provides that
trial, once commenced, shall be continuous until terminated:
Sec. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. Trial, once commenced, shall
continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a
reasonable period of time for good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for
continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so
as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty
(180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply
where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.
However, any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court motu proprio, or on
motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance
on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice is served by taking such
action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused on a speedy trial, shall be deducted.
The trial court may grant continuance, taking into account the following factors:
(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would likely make a
continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice; and
(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due to the
number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to expect
adequate preparation within the periods of time established therein.
In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because of
congestion of the court's calendar or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available
witnesses on the part of the prosecutor.
42

Under the Constitution and Section 1(7) of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
accused shall be entitled to have a speedy and impartial trial. "Speedy trial" is a relative term and
necessarily a flexible concept.
43
In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered, in view of the entirety of the proceedings.
44
Indeed, mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice
45
as the realities of everyday life must
be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum.
46

Apart from the constitutional provision and Section 115, Section 1(i) of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, A.O. No. 113-95 of the Court provides that:
The trial of cases for violation of Intellectual Property Rights covered by this Administrative
Order shall be immediately commenced and shall continue from day to day to be terminated
as far as practicable within sixty (60) days from initial trial. Judgment thereon shall be
rendered within thirty (30) days from date of submission for decision.
More than a decade after the 1972 leading U.S. case of Barker v. Wingo
47
was promulgated, this
Court, in Martin v. Ver,
48
began adopting the "balancing test" to determine whether a defendant's
right to a speedy trial has been violated. As this test necessarily compels the courts to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis, the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are
weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to wit: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay;
(3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant
resulting from the delay.
49
None of these elements, however, is either a necessary or
sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered together with other relevant
circumstances. These factors have no talismanic qualities as courts must still engage in a
difficult and sensitive balancing process.
50

A. Length of the Delay
The length of delay is to some extent a "triggering mechanism." Until there is some delay, which is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity to inquire into the other three factors. Nevertheless,
due to the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an
inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.
51

B. Reason for the Delay
Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused have the
burden to prove the factual basis of the motion to quash the Information on the ground of denial of
their right to a speedy trial.
52
They must demonstrate that the delay in the proceedings is vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive; or is caused by unjustified postponements that were asked for and
secured; or that without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the case being tried.
53
On the other hand, the prosecution is required to present evidence
establishing that the delay was reasonably attributed to the ordinary processes of justice, and that
petitioners suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued after an inevitable and ordinary
delay.
54

The records bear out the contention of petitioners that there had been a considerable delay in the
trial in the MTC. Upon motion/agreement of petitioners and the prosecution, or because of the joint
absences, the trial of the case was delayed for more than 11 months.
55
In its own instance, the MTC
also reset some of the trial dates in order to correct mistakes in scheduling or because the witnesses
were not duly notified,
56
thus, delaying the trial of the case for an additional seven months. Even
petitioners contributed to the delay of more than five months they or their former counsel were
either absent or moved for postponements to attend another pending case or due to health
concerns.
57
The delay of about 21 months, covering 15 re-settings, can be attributed to the
prosecution. However, except in five instances, when the trial was reset because the private
prosecutor had to attend to some professional
58
and personal matters,
59
the delays were brought
about because of the recent engagement of legal service,
60
absence of the public prosecutor,
61
and
unavailability of documents
62
and witnesses.
63

Not only the petitioners but the State as well were prejudiced by the inordinate delay in the trial of
the case. It took the prosecution more than four years to rest its case after presenting only three
witnesses. Had the prosecution, petitioner and the trial court been assiduous in avoiding any
inordinate delay in the trial, the prosecution could have rested its case much earlier. The court even
failed to order the absent counsel/prosecutor/witnesses to explain/justify their absences or cite them
for contempt. The speedy trial mandated by the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is as much the responsibility of the prosecution, the trial court and petitioners to the
extent that the trial is inordinately delayed, and to that extent the interest of justice is prejudiced.
The case before the RTC should not be dismissed simply because the public prosecution did not
move for the dismissal of the case in the MTC based on A.O. No. 104-96 declaring that the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over cases under Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; or for failure
of the MTC to motu proprio dismiss the case on that ground. The City Prosecutor then believed in
good faith, albeit erroneously, that under R.A. No. 7691 which amended B.P. Blg. 129, the MTC had
jurisdiction over the crime charged.
The mistake of the City Prosecutor and the failure of the MTC to dismiss the case motu proprio
should not prejudice the interest of the State to prosecute criminal offenses and, more importantly,
defeat the right of the offended party to redress for its grievance. Significantly, petitioners do not
attribute to the prosecution or to the MTC any malice aforethought or conscious disregard of their
right to a speedy trial; nor have substantially proven the same by clear and convincing evidence.
Hence, absent showing of bad faith or gross negligence, delay caused by the lapse of the
prosecution is not in itself violative of the right to a speedy trial.
Different weights should be assigned to various reasons by which the prosecution justifies the delay.
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily
against the prosecution. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with defendant.
64

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,
65
the Court had carefully balanced the societal interest in the case,
which involved the so-called "tax credit certificates scam," and the need to give substance to the
defendants' constitutional rights. In said suit, we upheld the decision of the Sandiganbayan (Special
Fourth Division) that the dismissal of the cases was too drastic, precipitate and unwarranted. While
the Court recognized that defendants were prejudiced by the delay in the reinvestigation of the
cases and the submission of a complete report by the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor to the
Sandiganbayan, we underscored that the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to
prosecute cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor. "An overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a case may enable defendant, who may be
guilty, to go free without having been tried, thereby infringing the societal interest in trying people
accused of crimes by granting them immunization because of legal error."
66

The same observation was made in Valencia v. Sandiganbayan.
67
Here, the Court noted the
haphazard manner by which the prosecutor handled the litigation for the State when he rested the
case without adducing evidence for the prosecution and simply relying on the Joint Stipulation of
Facts, which the accused did not even sign before its submission to the Sandiganbayan. In allowing
the prosecution to present additional evidence and in dismissing the claim of the accused that his
constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated, we ruled:
As significant as the right of an accused to a speedy trial is the right of the State to prosecute
people who violate its penal laws. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays x x x [T]o
erroneously put premium on the right to speedy trial in the instant case and deny the
prosecution's prayer to adduce additional evidence would logically result in the dismissal of
the case for the State. There is no difference between an order outrightly dismissing the case
and an order allowing the eventual dismissal thereof. Both would set a dangerous precedent
which enables the accused, who may be guilty, to go free without having been validly tried,
thereby infringing the interest of the society.
68

Certainly, the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the same would result in a
clear denial of due process to the prosecution. It should not operate in depriving the State of its
inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases or generally in seeing to it that all those who
approach the bar of justice is afforded fair opportunity to present their side.
69
For it is not only the
State; more so, the offended party who is entitled to due process in criminal cases.
70
In essence, the
right to a speedy trial does not preclude the people's equally important right to public justice.
71
Thus,
as succinctly decreed in State v. McTague:
72

The constitutional and statutory provisions for a speedy trial are for the protection of the
defendant, but that does not mean that the state is the only one that may initiate action.
There is really no reason for the courts to free an accused simply because a dilatory
prosecutor has 'gone to sleep at the switch' while the defendant and his counsel rest in
silence. These solicitous provisions are not to be used as offensive weapons, but are for the
benefit of defendants who claim their protection. They are a shield, and they 'must not be left
hanging on the wall of the armory.' It is for the protection of personal rights, not to embarrass
the administration of the criminal law nor to defeat public justice.
Be that as it may, the conduct of the City Prosecutor and the MTC must not pass without admonition.
This Court must emphasize that the State, through the court and the public prosecutor, has the
absolute duty to insure that the criminal justice system is consistent with due process and the
constitutional rights of the accused. Society has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions,
and the society's representatives are the ones who should protect that interest. The trial court and
the prosecution are not without responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal cases. The burden
for trial promptness is not solely upon the defense. The right to a speedy trial is constitutionally
guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant and the knowledgeable.
73

C. Petitioners' Assertion of the Right
The assertion of the right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining
whether defendant is being deprived thereof. Failure to claim the right will make it difficult to prove
that there was a denial of a speedy trial.
74

Except in only one instance in this case,
75
the records are bereft of any evidence that petitioners,
through counsel, have bothered to raise their objection to the several re-setting of the trial dates.
This is not unexpected since, as already shown, the reasons for the delay are not in themselves
totally inexcusable or unreasonable. Moreover, petitioners actively participated in the trial when the
prosecution presented its evidence, as they scrutinized the documentary evidence and cross-
examined the witnesses. Until the filing of the motion to quash in the RTC, they never contested the
prosecutorial proceedings nor timely challenged the pendency of the case in the MTC.
While it is true that lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage of the proceedings, such
defense must be seasonably raised at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, active
participation in the trial would estop a party from later challenging such want of jurisdiction.
76

In the same vein, one's failure to timely question the delay in the trial of a case would be an implied
acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right to question the same. Except when otherwise
expressly so provided, the speedy trial right, like any other right conferred by the Constitution or
statute, may be waived when not positively asserted.
77
A party's silence may amount to laches.
78
The
right to a speedy trial is a privilege of the accused. If he does not claim it, he should not complain.
R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a means of enforcing Section 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution.
79
The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record in the attitude of
demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be held, in law, to have waived
the privilege.
This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' untiring argument that, being "ordinary citizens," they
should not be made to suffer from the "lackluster" performance of their former counsel who failed to
recognize the MTC's want of jurisdiction. Too often we have held that a client is bound by the acts,
mistakes or negligence of his counsel.
80
This is, as it should be, since a counsel has the implied
authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of his client. Any act performed within the scope of his general and
implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the act of the client.
81
If the rule were
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed who
would allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or
learned.
82
It would enable every party to render inutile an adverse order or decision through the
simple expedient of alleging gross negligence on the part of the counsel.
83
Every shortcoming of a
counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is also
found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on
ad infinitum.
84
Proceedings would then be indefinite, tentative and at times, subject to reopening by
the simple subterfuge of replacing counsel.
85

While the rule admits of certain exceptions,
86
we find none present in this case. Other than his
obvious failure to assert lack of jurisdiction, Atty. Lim undeniably represented the cause of his clients
in the MTC proceedings. Interestingly, their new counsel, wittingly or unwittingly, raised the issue of
jurisdiction only four months after it entered its appearance,
87
thus, adding to the delay.
D. Prejudice to the Petitioners
In the Barker case,
88
the different interests of a defendant which may be affected by the violation of
the right to a speedy trial were identified. It was held that prejudice should be assessed in the light of
the interests of a defendant which the speedy trial right was designed to protect, namely: (1) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
(3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also
prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of
memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely
be shown. Even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints
on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility.
89
After all, arrest is
a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not,
and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject
him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and friends.
90

Again, a perusal of the records failed to reveal that the delay in bringing petitioners to trial in a court
of competent jurisdiction caused them any prejudice tantamount to deprivation of their right to a
speedy trial. Petitioners in this case were not subjected to pretrial incarceration, oppressive or
otherwise, thus eliminating the first Barker consideration bearing on prejudice.
As to the minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused, there is no showing that petitioners
suffered undue pressures in this respect. Mere reference to a general asseveration that their "life,
liberty and property, not to mention reputation" have been prejudiced is not enough. There must be
conclusive factual basis, as this Court cannot rely on pure speculation or guesswork. Surely, a
pending criminal case may cause trepidation but, as stressed in Barker, the standard here is
minimization, not necessarily elimination of the natural consequences of an indictment. While this is
not to be brushed off lightly, it is not by itself sufficient to support a claim of denial of the right to a
speedy trial.
There is no factual basis for the claim of petitioners that we are not supplied with any specific
allegation in the record, nor witnesses or evidence may become unavailable because of the delays
in this case. To repeat, the claim of impairment of defense because of delay must be specific and
not by mere conjecture. Vague assertions of faded memory will not suffice. Failure to claim that
particular evidence had been lost or had disappeared defeats speedy trial claim.
As neither the specific types of prejudice mentioned in Barker nor any others have been brought to
the Court's attention, we are constrained to dismiss petitioners' claim. The passage of time alone,
without a significant deprivation of liberty or impairment of the ability to properly defend oneself, is
not absolute evidence of prejudice. The right to a speedy trial is not primarily intended to prevent
prejudice to the defense caused by the passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the
due process clause and the statutes of limitations.
91

In several cases where it is manifest that due process of law or other rights guaranteed by the
Constitution or statutes has been denied, this Court has not faltered to accord the so-called "radical
relief" to keep accused from enduring the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial.
92
In this case,
however, there appears no persuasive, much less compelling, ground to allow the same relief for
absence of clear and convincing showing that the delay was unreasonable or arbitrary and was
seasonably objected to by petitioners.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The March
21, 2003 Decision and July 17, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Tarlac City, is directed to proceed with the trial on the merits of the
criminal case with all reasonable and judicious dispatch consistent with the right of petitioners to a
speedy trial. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 137666 May 20, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARLON ORTILLAS y GAMLANGA, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
On January 6, 1995, an Information
1
was filed against Marlon Ortillas with the Makati Regional Trial
Court, and assigned by raffle to Branch 255 (Las Pias), then presided over by Judge Florentino M.
Alumbres.
2
The Information reads:
The undersigned 3rd Assistant Prosecutor accuses MARLON ORTILLAS Y GAMLANGA of
the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 1994, in the Municipality of Las Pias,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one Jacob Relox whose
true identity and present whereabout is still unknown and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill and without justifiable motive
and evident premeditation and by means of treachery and use of explosive
(pillbox), did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and throw a Pillbox to one Jose Mesqueriola y Labarosa, thereby inflicting
upon the latter serious and mortal wounds, which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Las Pias, Metro Manila
December 28, 1994.
(signed)
APOLINAR C. QUETULIO, JR.
3rd Assistant Prosecutor
3

Despite the fact that it is stated in the title of the Information that appellant was a minor, detained at
the Municipal Jail, Las Pias, Metro Manila, Presiding Judge Alumbres failed to ascertain and verify
the alleged minority of appellant and determine if the provisions of P.D. No. 603, otherwise known as
The Child and Youth Welfare Code should be applied to Ortillas.
After arraignment of appellant who pleaded not guilty to the offense with which he is charged, the
trial court dispensed with the pre-trial and proceeded to trial on the merits.
On June 8, 1995, the prosecution presented Russel
4
Guiraldo, an alleged eyewitness. After
Russels direct examination, Atty. Jose G. de Leon, the then counsel for Ortillas moved for
postponement as he had a very important appointment to keep which Judge Alumbres
granted. Subsequently, Atty. de Leon had to withdraw as counsel because of eye ailment which the
trial court approved. The only other hearing that took place after the testimony of Russel on June 8,
1995, was on September 5, 1995 when NBI Medico-Legal Officer Roberto Garcia testified for the
prosecution. All in all, the continuation of the hearing was postponed thirteen times from June 8,
1995 until May 8, 1996 when the prosecution finally rested its case
5
with the submission of its
documentary evidence.
6
Witness Russel was never presented for cross-examination. The last time
he was subpoenaed was for the hearing set on November 6, 1995,
7
but records do not show that he
appeared on said date. Although several hearings were scheduled thereafter, Russel was not
subpoenaed anymore.
On the basis of the testimonies of Russel and Dr. Garcia, Judge Alumbres rendered a
decision
8
dated September 21, 1998 with the following findings:
Roselle Guiraldo positively identified and pointed to the accused as the one who threw the
pillbox to his companion Jose Mesqueriola in the morning of December 21, 1994. He even
specified the exact location where the accused was at the time he threw the pillbox.
According to him, the accused was standing in front of a gate of a house along Calle Real,
near Plaza Quezon, Las Pias, Metro Manila. He could not be mistaken of the identity of the
accused because they were former classmates at the Las Pias Municipal High School and
members of rival fraternities. As could be deduced from the facts, the pillbox was intended
for Roselle Guiraldo because the accused has the strongest motive of killing him. It will be
recalled that three (3) days after the opening of classes at the Las Pias Municipal High
School, Roselle Guiraldo and the accused could not see eye to eye already because Roselle
Guiraldo was stoned and the stone came from the direction of the accused while seated
inside the classroom. Roselle Guiraldo tried to get even with the accused by waiting for him
outside of the school premises every after classes. Afraid that a personal encounter may
happen and he will be in big trouble, the accused sought transfer to the Las Pias Municipal
High School North, which is located at the Vergonville Subdivision in Barangay Pulanglupa II.
This is now very far from his residence at San Francisco St. in Barangay Aldana. While if he
was not transferred, his school (Las Pias Municipal High School) is only walking distance
from his residence at San Francisco St. His ill-feelings against Roselle Guiraldo became
intense because of the increasing problem he has to face or handle. He has his work and a
common-law wife to support and who was now getting pregnant. But all the while, he has not
severed his relationship with his gangmates, although according to him, he already quit from
being an active member of Crime buster fraternity after he became a working student in July
1993.
9

. . .
The defense put up by the accused is alibi, a very weak defense because it is easy to fabricate. Just
like in the present case, he was still able to tell the authorities that he was in his house when his
friend Jose Mesqueriola was killed. If there was truth that he was in his house when Jose
Mesqueriola was killed, how come not one occupant in his house came forward to testify for him
during the trial. Alibi is considered the weakest defense because it can easily be fabricated and
cannot stand in the light of clear, positive and precise evidence of the prosecution establishing the
identity of the accused (People vs. Magallanes, 218 SCRA 109; People vs. Santos, 221 SCRA 715;
People vs. Bescana, 220 SCRA 93; People vs. dela Cruz, 217 SCRA 283). It is a fundamental
dictum that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused (People
vs. Tanco, 218 SCRA 494).
The charge against the accused is murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659. The commission of the crime in the present case was
attended by the circumstance of explosion (the use and exploding of the pillbox). In the Certificate of
Post-Mortem Examination (Exh. "C") which Dr. Garcia issued, he placed that the cause of death
which is "Traumatic-head injury" was the result of an alleged explosion. On whether there was the
circumstance of evident premeditation, the evidence does not clearly show.
There is present in the circumstancial evidence of flight. As earlier established, the accused was one
of those who escaped from detention in the jail of Las Pias City on April 17, 1997. It is well-settled
rule that flight is indicative of guilt of the accused. Flight is a silent admission of guilt, and is an
indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind (People vs. Martinado, 214 SCRA 712; People vs. Cruz, 213
SCRA 601; People vs. Alabaso, 204 SCRA 458; People vs. Babac, 204 SCRA 968; People vs.
Lorenzo, 204 SCRA 361).
10

The dispositve portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Marlon Ortillas y Gamlanga guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charge against him in the information, and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua; to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law;
to indemnify the heirs of the victim Jose Mesqueriola in the sum of P100,000.00; and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
11

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari with the following Assignment of Errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT COMMITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO THE
CARE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE WHICH SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR HIS APPEARANCE IN COURT WHENEVER REQUIRED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE REQUEST OF ATTY. TERESITA
CARANDANG-PANTUA OF THE PUBLIC ATTORNEYS OFFICE TO CROSS-EXAMINE
THE WITNESS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE HEARING ON JUNE
8, 1995.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ROSELLE GUIRALDO AND IN DISREGARDING THE
TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
12

Anent the first assigned error:
In his Brief, appellant points out that the first counsel of appellant, Atty. Jose de Leon, raised
the minority of appellant and invoked the provisions of P.D. No. 603 during the initial hearing
conducted on June 8, 1995 but Judge Alumbres outrightly denied his request. Atty. de Leon
submitted to the ruling and prosecution witness Russel was called to the witness stand.
There is merit to the complaint of appellant. Judge Alumbres was remiss of his duty to
ascertain the minority of appellant at the onset of the proceedings. The records further
disclose that he likewise ignored the letter of Director Milda S. Alvior of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) filed with his court on January 31, 1996 informing
him that appellant at that time was sixteen years old and alleging that his prolonged stay in
the Las Pias Jail for one year and one month at the time, mixed with hundred criminals
affected him physically, intellectually, emotionally and socially.
13

The Presiding Judge should be sanctioned for his negligence in the performance of his duties with
respect to accused minor - but these particular omissions are not sufficient grounds to merit the
reversal of the assailed decision.
As to the second assigned error:
The Court finds merit to appellants claim that the judgment of the trial court has unduly
deprived him of his constitutional right to meet the witness face to face
14
which includes the
right to cross-examine the witness.
Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the then prevailing Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Rights of the accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights:
. . .
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. . . .
Section 6, Rule 132 of the then prevailing Rules on Evidence provides:
SEC. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters
stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom
from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
As the Court held in People vs. Rivera, to wit:
The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art.
III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that the accused shall have the right to meet the
witnesses face to face and in Rule 115, 1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which states that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront
and cross-examine the witness against him. The cross-examination of a witness is essential
to test his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which
rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate
inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him.
15

Records disclose that there was never a valid waiver on the part of appellant or his counsel to cross-
examine the prosecution witness Russel. The first counsel, Atty. de Leon, in the hearing of June 8,
1995 requested for postponement of the cross-examination of Russel in view of his "professional
engagement", without objection on the part of the prosecution.
16
The next hearing was also
postponed in view of the eye problem of Atty. de Leon.
17
And on August 3, 1995, the hearing was
again postponed due to the withdrawal of appearance of Atty. de Leon on ground of eye-
ailment.
18
Subsequent dates of hearing were postponed because the Presiding Judge went on
leave.
19
It is only on September 25, 1995 that Atty. Leopoldo Macinas appeared as new counsel for
appellant.
20
However, although it appears in the Minutes of the hearing scheduled on said date that
the same is for cross-examination of Russel,
21
there is no showing that Russel was present during
that day. In fact, the Minutes show that Russel had to be notified for the next hearing set on
November 6, 1995.
22
But on November 6, the hearing was again postponed to November 11, 1995
due to typhoon Rosing. The Minutes again does not show that on November 6, Russel appeared in
court as only complaining witness Grace Mesqueriola signed thereon.
23
Thereafter, Russel was never
notified of the hearings set on December 11, 1995, January 17, 1996, January 22, 1996, January 31,
1996, February 26, 1996, March 25, 1996 and May 8, 1996.
Judge Alumbres refusal to give opportunity for Atty. Teresita Carandang-Pantua of the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO), the new counsel for appellant, to cross-examine prosecution witness Russel
on the ground that prosecution had already rested its case, is patently a grave abuse of discretion on
his part. Although Atty. Pantua had adequately explained appellants predicament, on the first
scheduled date of hearing for the presentation of defense evidence, Judge Alumbres, upon the
perfunctory objection of the prosecution, unreasonably refused to heed Atty. Pantuas request.
It was well within the trial courts discretion to allow the recall of witness Russel under the then
prevailing Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, to wit:
SEC. 9. Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both sides has been
concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The Court will grant or
withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require.
Certainly, under the foregoing circumstances, Judge Alumbres should have known that the interest
of justice required that appellant should have been given the opportunity to cross-examine Russel,
as it was not his fault that Russel had not been cross-examined. While a petition for certiorari could
have been duly availed of by counsel for appellant to rectify the judges grave abuse of discretion,
appellant should not be made to suffer for the failure of his counsel to do so; as a layman, he could
not have known better as to what must be done under the circumstances. On this matter, the PAO,
as de oficio counsel for appellant was remiss of its duty to protect the interest of its client.
Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that appellant had not
been given the opportunity to cross-examine the lone prosecution witness. In the absence of
cross-examination, which is prescribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept,
24
the
direct examination of the witness should have been expunged from the records, in which
case, the trial court would have had no valid basis to deny the demurrer to evidence.
Nevertheless, the Court will resolve the third issue so as to put an end to the question whether or not
the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Russel
and in disregarding the testimony of appellant.
The trial court declared that "the issue in this case hinges mainly on credibility of the witnesses, both
of the prosecution and the defense".
25

The prosecution evidence is principally based on the testimony of Russel which is narrated by the
trial court, as follows:
. . . He testified that at around 6:00 oclock in the morning of December 21, 1994, he was
with one Jose Mesqueriola, alias Joey, hearing Misa de Gallo at the Bamboo Organ Church
in Las Pias, Metro Manila. After the mass, he and Jose Mesqueriola were walking side by
side at the side of the road leading to the direction of Quezon Plaza. Upon reaching a point
at the side of the road near Plaza Quezon, and at a distance of about fifteen (15) meters, he
saw the accused in front of a gate of a house threw (sic) a pillbox towards their direction and
the pillbox exploded on the head of his companion Jose Mesqueriola. He was also hit at a
portion of his right face. After the bomb exploded on the head of Jose Mesqueriola, the latter
fell down so he helped him by bringing him to the Las Pias Emergency Hospital which is
just nearby. However, the next day, he died. After the accused threw the bomb, he ran away
and hid. He came to know of the accused since June 1994 (they being classmates in the
Municipal High School, according to the accused). . .
26

On the other hand, the defense evidence consist only of the testimony of appellant which is aptly
narrated by the trial court, as follows:
. . . he testified that on December 21, 1994, at around 6:00 oclock in the morning, he was in
his house at his given address when he heard an explosion. He then ran towards the
direction where the explosion was to find out what was it all about. Reaching the place, he
found some people around and he saw a person lying prostrate on the street and blooded.
He was being assisted and brought to the hospital by his classmate Roselle Guiraldo. After
the wounded person was brought to the hospital, he learned from his neighbors that the
person lying on the street was a victim of pillbox explosion and he came to know that his
name was Joey and his friend. When he ran out of his house, he saw his classmate Jacob
Relox was running away from the scene of the explosion, together with companions, and he
was also told by Aling Itang, one of his neighbors, that the one who threw the pillbox to Joey
was Jacob Relox. He learned also from his neighbor, Aling Itang, that the reason why Jacob
Relox threw pillbox at Joey is because on December 20, 1994, Jacob was mauled by Joey
Mesqueriola and his companions.
The accused revealed during the trial that he was a working student enrolled at the Las
Pias Municipal High School near Saint Joseph Church in Las Pias Poblacion. In their
school, there were two rival fraternities, the Crimebuster and the Taugamma. He was a
member of the Crimebuster together with Roselle Guiraldo and Jose Mesqueriola, his
classmates. He left the Crimebuster because he did not like the rules and he joined the
Taugamma.
After one (1) week of attending classes at the Las Pias Municipal High School, he asked for
transfer to Las Pias North Municipal High School because in the Las Pias Municipal High
School, every after classes, his classmate Roselle Guiraldo always waited for him outside
(inaabangan) and look (sic) for trouble, and this Roselle Guiraldo has a bad blood or grudge
against him. It started when there was stone throwing inside their classroom on the third day
of their classes. Roselle Guiraldo was hit and he thought that he (accused) was the one who
threw the stone because it came from the direction where he was sitting, not knowing that it
was his sitmate (sic) who threw the stone. So that even if he was not the one who threw the
pillbox in the early morning of December 21, 1994 which cause the death of Jose
Mesqueriola, he was the one pointed to by Roselle Guiraldo because of this grudge against
him.
He also testified that Jacob Relox has the motive for killing Jose Mesqueriola because on
December 20, 1994, Jacob Relox was mauled by Jose Mesqueriola and the other members
of the Crimebuster fraternity. Jacob Relox then was a member of the rival fraternity, the
Taugamma.
27

Considering that appellant was unlawfully deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution
witness Russel, his testimony should have been strictly scrutinized and analyzed with utmost care
and any doubt thereon should have been interpreted by the trial court in favor of appellant.
We reproduce hereunder the testimony of Russel on direct examination:
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q How long have you been rather how long have you know (sic) this Marlon Ortillas?
WITNESS
A June, 1994, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, will you please tell us, at around 6:00 oclock in the morning of December 21, 1994,
where were you?
WITNESS
A I was in the church, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Where is that church located, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A Las Pias, Sir.
. . .
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, at around that time also, who were your companions, if any in going to church?
WITNESS
A Joey, Sir. His name, true name is Jose Miscariola, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, where is this Jose Miscariola now, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A He died already, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q When did he die?
WITNESS
A December 22, 1994, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, when you and Jose Miscariola were in the church, was there, at around 7:00 rather
6:00 oclock in the morning of December 21, 1994, was there any unusual incident that
happened?
WITNESS
A Yes, there was, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q What was that incident, if any, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A When we were about to leave the church, Joey or Jose Miscariola was hit with the
pillbox that was thrown by the accused, Marlon Ortillas.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, when this incident happened, how far were you then from the church, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A We were already far from the church because the incident happened in the plaza,
Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, what happened at the plaza, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A The incident was about the throwing of pillbox by Marlon Ortillas, Sir, to Jose Miscariola.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, this pillbox that was allegedly thrown to Joey, what happened to him, if any?
WITNESS
A It exploded in his head, Sir, or in the head of Jose Miscariola, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q And what happened to Joey Miscariola after the pillbox thrown by Marlon Ortillas exploded
in his head?
WITNESS
A He fell down, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q And how about you, what did you do when you saw Joey Miscariola fell down?
WITNESS
A I helped him, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, this Joey Miscariola, when he was hit with the pillbox that exploded in his head, how
far were you then, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A I was beside him, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Were you not also hit by the pillbox, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A I was also hit, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Where were you hit, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A In my face, Sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointing to the right portion of his face.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, Now, where was Marlon Ortillas at that time when you saw him threw (sic) the
pillbox to your direction?
WITNESS
A At the gate located at the opposite side of the street.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q What is this gate, gate of a house or gate of the plaza?
WITNESS
A Gate of house, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, how far was Marlon Ortillas from both of you and Joey when you saw Marlon
throwing the pillbox towards you?
WITNESS
A It is just near, Sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointing to a distance from the chair where he is sitting to the door of the courtroom
which was estimated by the prosecution and counsel for the accused to be about fifteen (15)
meters, more or less.
COURT
Q Do you agree that the distance is about fifteen (15) meters more or less, Fiscal?
FISCAL QUETULIO
A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. DE LEON
No objection, Your Honor.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, you said that you helped Joey when he fell down, what help did you do, Mr.
Witness?
WITNESS
A I brought him to the Las Pias Emergency Hospital which was located nearby, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q What about Marlon Ortillas, after throwing the pillbox or after it exploded, did you notice
what happened to him?
WITNESS
A He hid, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Where did he hide, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A In their house, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Where is this house of Marlon located, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A It was just located nearby, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q How far from the gate where Marlon was standing from where Marlon threw the pillbox up
to his house, how far is that, if you know?
WITNESS
A From here up to that distance, Sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness is pointing to a distance of more or less six (6) meters from the place where he is
sitting.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q More or less six meters, is that agreed, Counsel?
ATTY. DE LEON
A Yes, Your Honor.
28

It is doctrinal that the Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the
credibility of witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misapprehended or
misinterpreted.
29

The trial courts assessment of Russels testimony is not only perfunctorily done but its
decision is also partly based on the evidence presented by the defense, in stark violation of
the well-settled rule that the conviction of appellant must not act on the weakness of the
defense but on the strength of the prosecution.
30

First, it cannot be ove-emphasized that there is no direct, positive testimony that Russel actually saw
appellant throw the pillbox. He only testified that when he and victim Joey or Jose Miscariola
31
were
about to leave the church, Joey "was hit with the pillbox that was thrown by the accused, Marlon
Ortillas". This statement is a conclusion of fact rather than a declaration of what he actually
saw. He did not testify that he actually saw appellant in the act of throwing the pillbox at them. It was
only the Fiscal who expressed in his question or who presumed that Russel saw appellant throw the
pillbox to the place where they were, which although not objected to by counsel for appellant, should
not have been a basis for appellants conviction. The purported eyewitness should at least have
declared, positively and explicitly, having seen appellant throw the pillbox or an unidentified object.
There is not even a testimony that Russel saw appellant holding the pillbox before he threw it.
Second, it is difficult to reconcile the contradiction in the declaration of Russel that it is when they
were about to leave the church that Joey was hit with the pillbox thrown by appellant as against his
succeeding answer to the next question of the Fiscal as to how far were they from the church when
the incident happened and he replied that they were already far from the church because the
incident happened in the plaza. Where did the throwing of the pillbox actually take place, when he
was about to leave the church or in the plaza? Why the discrepancy? Did he really see the actual
throwing of the pillbox? These are questions, the answers to which are not found in the testimony of
Russel.
Third, Russel testified that appellant was fifteen meters away from them at the opposite side of the
street. To be able to testify that he saw appellant throw a pillbox, Russel should have seen the actual
throwing by appellant before the pillbox left the hand of appellant; otherwise, how could Russel say
for certain that it was appellant who threw the pillbox? And if Russel did see the actual throwing of
an object thrown at their direction, how could he not have at least attempted to avoid the same when
the distance between them and appellant is fifteen meters. At the normal speed of a hand thrown
object as big as a pillbox, if Russel had actually seen appellant in the act of throwing the pillbox from
that distance, instinct would have naturally spurred him, at least, to attempt to dodge the same, even
if he would not have succeeded in doing so. As it is, Russel did not testify that upon seeing the
pillbox or the object being thrown by appellant at their direction, he tried to evade the same. Neither
is there any testimony on the part of Russel that when he saw the pillbox being thrown at him and
Joey, there was no time to evade the same.
Fourth, the testimony of Russel that he helped Joey when the latter was hit and fell down, but, at the
same time, he saw appellant run and hide in his (appellants) house that was six meters away from
the place where appellant threw the pillbox, is not credible. It goes beyond human experience for
Russel to be able to follow the movements of a culprit right after Joey, his companion, had been hit
at the same time that he was helping Joey when the latter fell to the ground, not to mention the fact
that he was also hit on the right side of his face. Does it mean that Russel just stood by watching
appellants movements while the latter threw the pillbox at them and hit him and Joey? The failure of
the prosecution to explain this incredible feat is fatal to its cause. No better test has been found to
measure the value of a witness testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common
experience of mankind.
32

Fifth, the motive attributed by the trial court to appellant in throwing a pillbox at Russel is based not
on the testimony of prosecution witness Russel but on the testimony of appellant. It is a hornbook
doctrine that the prosecution must rely on its own evidence to prove the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt
33
and therefore, the trial court should not depend on the evidence of the defense to
support the conviction of appellant. However, considering that the presiding judge had given
probative weight or credibility to the testimony of appellant by using his testimony to establish motive
on his part to commit the crime, the same testimony may be used likewise to prove that witness
Russel had an ill-motive to testify against appellant. And when the evidence admits of two
interpretations, that which is favorable to appellant should prevail.
34

Sixth, while indeed, it is true that flight evidences guilt and a guilty conscience,
35
the escape of
appellant from jail pending trial of his case, cannot, under the attendant circumstances, be
considered as evidence of his guilt in the commission of the offense, or as basis of his conviction in
this case. Appellant had sufficiently explained that he escaped from detention because he got bored
in jail, he wanted to see his first new born child and to look for his own father.
36
It is quite surprising
why the trial judge in his decision only mentioned and denigrated the explanation of appellant that he
wanted to look for his father and not mention at all the other reasons of appellant for bolting out of
jail. At any rate, it is not refuted that appellant subsequently surrendered to a member of the Office of
the Assistant Regional Director, BJMP, because of fear for his life.
37

On the other hand, in denying that he threw the pillbox, no other witness was presented by appellant
to corroborate his testimony. Nonetheless, the testimony of appellant fully explains why Russel
testified against him. Russel was of the belief that appellant was the one who earlier threw a stone at
him in the classroom. Unfortunately, the trial court misapprehended the import of his testimony and
interpreted it against him to explain the latters purported motive in throwing the pillbox at Russel and
Joey.
Although denial, like alibi, can be fabricated, it is not always false and without merit, and when
coupled with the improbabilities and uncertainties of the prosecution evidence, the defense of alibi
deserves merit.
38
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.
39
The weakness of the defense does not
relieve it of this responsibility.
40
And when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of
establishing the guilt of an accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
41
A
judgment of conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty.
42
It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring his innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment.
43
There must be moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant
who committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for
accused-appellant.
44

As the Court declared in People vs. Tajada:
While we strongly condemn the senseless and gruesome crime and sincerely commiserate
with the suffering and emotional stress suffered by the bereaved family of the victim,
nevertheless, we find the pieces of circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. They do not pass the requisite moral certainty,
as they admit of the alternative inference that other persons, not necessarily the accused-
appellant, may have perpetrated the crime. Where the evidence admits of two
interpretations, one which is consistent with guilt and the other with innocence, the accused
must be acquitted. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably
guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.
45

Thus, the Court is constrained to set aside the conviction of appellant.
Had not Judge Alumbres been compulsorily retired in 2001, he together with the Public Attorneys
Office would have been admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of their respective
duties so as to prevent miscarriage of justice.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Another judgment is
entered ACQUITTING appellant MARLON ORTILLAS y GAMLANGA for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from prison,
unless he is being held for some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform
this Court of the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt of copy of herein Decision.
The Public Attorneys Office is admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of its duties
so as to prevent miscarriage of justice. Let copy of herein decision be furnished the Chief Public
Attorney of the Public Attorneys Office so that appropriate steps may be taken to ensure the
improvement of the service of that office.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents.
Nelson Lidua for private respondent.

NARVASA, J .:
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of the right of
an individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III
of the Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for the commission of an offense
. . . to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right," granted by the same provision.
The relevant facts are not disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL),
assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets,
1
the PAL management notified him of an investigation to
be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with
PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the
Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.
2

On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten
notes
3
reading as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000
(APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR
BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86 (s) Felipe Ramos
(Printed) F. Ramos
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City,
Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo
Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of
the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in
writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the
tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that
although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so,
"perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x
x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he
desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be
represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his
statement (as he in fact afterwards did).
4
How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties
at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the
crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January
29, 1987. In that place and during that time, according to the indictment,
5
he (Ramos)
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully ...
defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit:
said accused ... having been entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of
passengers for one-way trip and round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with
the express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale, account for it and/or to
return those unsold, ... once in possession thereof and instead of complying with his
obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate, misapply and
convert the value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated
demands, ... failed and refused to make good his obligation, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter
ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and
supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated
June 21, 1988,
6
which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken
on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as
well as his "handwritten admission x x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which
had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s Evidence."
7
Particularly as
regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a confession,
was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same
reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988,
8
the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the
testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except
Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing
that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket
Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not appear that the
accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he
waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also
declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on
February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear
that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration.
9
It was denied, by Order dated September
14, 1988.
10
In justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v.
Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA
219, and People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations
the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel," and the explicit precept in the present Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation
"cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the investigation
of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the
proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional
provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the investigation was administrative
in character could not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for
certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the
People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson
and Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from proceeding further with the trial
and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance of
any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to the same case,
now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court
also subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The comments of
Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The Solicitor General has
made common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the petition be given due course and
thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to
admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever
impropriety might have attended the institution of the instant action in the name of the People of the
Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue of whether or not it was
grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and
K. It will now proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
11
to which respondent
Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section,
namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled
to be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim
reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that
accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution,
12
and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect
"under investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and
disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self-
incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which
have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.
13

Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding.
14
The right is NOT to "be compelled to
be a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.
15
It prescribes an "option of refusal to
answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry."
16
It simply secures to a witness, whether
he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer
to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when
the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any
other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the
court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey
it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular
question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may
refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge,
or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a
witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of
the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness
can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.
17

The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must
be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into
play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it
at the appropriate time.
18

Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said, group of
rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e.,
"suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different
from that embodied in the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated,
indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the
1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Arizona,
19
a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement."
20

Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an
offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right,
21

2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him;
22
and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
23

In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect.
24

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until
such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained
as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."
25

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons."
26
And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is
meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
27
The situation contemplated has also
been more precisely described by this Court."
28

.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation
arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is brought to an army
camp or police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by
one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He
finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he
considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their
work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have
taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most
detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if
they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an
atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to
remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of
the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for
the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one case,
29
where a person
went to a police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was
giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or
witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional
procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that against self-
incrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary
investigation or already charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under
custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have
been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office).
Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public
prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation"
laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out
in the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to
answer a specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him.
30

Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving testimony
or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness."
Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others-
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself,
31
and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf;
but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his
neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.
32

The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself'
signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he
is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other
process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for
a co-accused, or even for himself.
33
In other words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil
action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a
particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to
testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question.
34
And, as the
law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be
used against him."
35

If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right. But if he does
testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to
any matters stated in his direct examination, or connected therewith .
36
He may not on cross-
examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the
evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is
charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which
might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct
from that of which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of
the right against self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for
murder, the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to answer
any question on the ground that he might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline
to answer any particular question which might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say,
estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its
commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to
wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for
preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the
police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights
rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
37

a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question
which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for
which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature
and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has
taken them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he
has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to
be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of
the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case
before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders
were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and
set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under
custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have
had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the
inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first
day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit
K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to
compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on
his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been
accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the violation of the right of
any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the complaining parties,
complaining companies, or complaining employers because being interested parties, unlike the
police agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their over-
eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give
statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy and undue influence." It
suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary
sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has
been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses
ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The requirement
entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under such administrative
investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues
and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that
is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be
absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent
criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.)
which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the
employee's statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him
precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or
committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed
apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be
brought to bear on an employee under investigation or for that matter, on a person being
interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or
confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of
the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced
statements may not in justice be received against the makers thereof, and really should not be
accorded any evidentiary value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the
respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988,
and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said
Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The
temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus officio, is now declared of
no further force and effect.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.