Point of view

Auditors scope of services

Key messages
There are some services which are clearly a threat to auditor independence. To ensure
clarity and consistency, there should be a globally consistent list of services that are
prohibited based on a set of common principles. These should be reviewed periodically.
The provision of many non-audit services to audit clients can improve the quality of audit
and reduce costs and complexity for businesses without compromising independence.
Audit committees (or their equivalent), as representatives of shareholders and those
responsible for governance, are best placed to decide what services their auditors can
provide beyond the prohibited list.
Attempts to regulate the provision of non-audit services through lists of permitted services
or price caps would prove arbitrary, difcult to implement and could damage audit quality.
PwC
Point of view
02
Point of view
Auditors scope of services
Whats the challenge?
Some people say that allowing auditors to carry out any
non-audit services for their audit clients weakens their
independence, objectivity and professional scepticism.
We disagree.
Certain activities are without doubt in conict with
the independence of the audit and should be
prohibited. For all other services, we believe the
audit committee, as the shareholders representative
charged with governance, is in the best position to
decide whether they are consistent with the companys
own governance, and are in its stakeholders best
interests in relation to the quality, price and efciency of
the non-audit service proposed.
Why is this important?
Independence is the bedrock of the auditing profession
and audit quality, and fundamental to fullling our
public interest role in the capital markets. Regulators
and legislators, particularly in the European Union (EU),
appear to believe that prohibiting some of the services
auditors provide, under existing principles and
frameworks, to the companies they audit will increase
their independence.
Only some of the wide range of services that a
multi-disciplinary professional services rm provides
are recognised to be in conict with independence and
objectivity. We agree that we should be prohibited from
providing those services to the organisations we audit.
This is already the case in many parts of the world.
The involvement of our people and our network with a
broad range of clients across industries and geographies
has helped us develop world class skills that, together
with an independent and objective perspective, are in
demand across the entire marketplace. We believe that
those charged with governance should not be constrained
in their choice of provider where there are no conicts
with independence and objectivity. They should be able
to choose the provider they believe will do the best job -
otherwise their oversight accountability and responsibility
will be undermined, competition reduced and the costs
and complexity to both companies and, in the end,
consumers and investors could increase. Unnecessary
prohibitions or limitations may deprive the company of
the very best skills when it needs them most.
All those involved in financial reporting should have
clarity and a globally consistent way to identify any
services that compromise independence. There are
already a number of frameworks in place that are widely
accepted and have proved to be efective so it makes
sense to adopt one of these frameworks globally.
There needs to be exibility to so the list remains
relevant. This is important because as business models,
technology and accounting standards change, the
auditors skills and their service oferings must change
to reect the evolving market. The audit committee can
then exercise its judgment about what, if any, other
services may be provided.
Where are we now?
Our network has clear, detailed and comprehensive
policies and processes to evaluate the potential impact
of a proposed service on our independence; they give us
comfort that we are independent at all times. We need
to help increase transparency about the current safeguards
and why we believe they are efective.
An auditors independence would be called into question
if they also delivered a service that contravened four core
principles underlying independence frameworks.
Auditors generally should not:
function in the role of management,
audit their own work,
perform work that creates a mutual
or conicting interest with a client, or
act as an advocate for a client.
From a regulatory perspective there are variations in
the way diferent countries apply these principles.
Most follow the International Ethics Standards Board
for Accountants Code of Ethics for Professional
Accountants (the Code). This is built around a
principles-based framework for assessing threats and
safeguards in relation to services that can be provided.
In addition the Code provides greater clarity by explicitly
prohibiting a number of services that are deemed to
compromise independence.
In the US, independence standards are consistent with the
four principles above. They do not identify permissible
services but do prohibit nine specic types of services
PwC
Point of view
03
for audit clients. As an extra safeguard, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act says audit committees have to pre-approve all
auditor services. And, like international standards, it also
prohibits audit rms from compensating audit partners
for selling non-audit services to their audit clients.
In the EU, proposals have been put forward to signicantly
restrict the services audit rms can provide to their
audit clients. The proposals specically dene the
services that would be prohibited, and those that would
be permissible so long as they remain within a dened,
so-called, fee cap. These proposals are being made
against the backdrop of the detailed and complex rules
already in place to safeguard independence.
What does PwC believe?
More international consistency would be helpful and,
based on the important lessons learned from the
current nancial crisis and existing models, certain
additional and meaningful safeguards make sense to
further promote audit quality and demonstrate
independence. We believe:
Audit committees should be responsible for overseeing
auditor independence, including reviewing and
approving services provided by their auditor. Many
audit committees already do this and do it well.
A globally consistent list of services should be
developed, evaluated against the four core principles,
which reect an agreed view of those that compromise
independence. There is already much alignment
between, for example, the US and much of Europe.
A global set of prohibited services would provide a
basis for consistency around the world and clarity
to the marketplace that independence threats have
been eliminated.
A prescribed list of permissible services is
inappropriate. By limiting the auditor to providing
services based on only a small subset of its expertise,
a company is potentially deprived of access to
certain expertise when its needed. The audit
committee should decide whether permissible
non-audit services may be provided by the auditor.
A cap on non-audit fees does not make sense.
Independence is not determined by an arbitrary
monetary amount. When an audit committee is
deciding whether the auditor should provide a
particular service, it will undoubtedly consider
many factors, including the overall quantum of
services. The audit committee is closest to the facts
and circumstances and is in the best position to
decide what is in the stakeholders interests.
There should be more transparency about the
detailed and complex processes and standards
which currently safeguard independence. A discussion
about those safeguards should be included in annual
public transparency reports by the audit rm.
In conclusion
There are some services which are clearly a threat to
independence. These should be agreed and prohibited
worldwide. For all other services, the audit committee
is in the best position to decide who should provide
them. Taking away or limiting its ability to choose its
best provider does not enhance objectivity or scepticism
nor would a dened list of permitted services or an
articial cap on services promote audit quality,
independence or governance. It is bad for those
charged with governance, bad for investors and not
in the public interest.
There are already signicant safeguards and
frameworks in place at both the regulatory, audit
committee and audit rm level to ensure that only
services that do not conict with independence are
provided to audit clients. We follow the Code worldwide,
in many cases applying stricter safeguards, and have
detailed policies and processes so that only appropriate
services are provided. We believe these are efective,
but that their efectiveness is improved through audit
committee oversight and transparency (including
additional reporting) about what those safeguards are
and how they work.
Point of view
Auditors scope of services Continued
2012 PwC. All rights reserved. Not for further distribution without the permission of PwC. PwC refers to the network of member rms of PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited (PwCIL), or, as the context requires, individual member rms of the PwC network.
Each member rm is a separate legal entity and does not act as agent of PwCIL or any other member rm. PwCIL does not provide any services to clients. PwCIL is not responsible or liable for the acts or omissions of any of its member rms nor can it control the
exercise of their professional judgment or bind them in any way. No member rm is responsible or liable for the acts or omissions of any other member rm nor can it control the exercise of another member rms professional judgment or bind another member rm or
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