APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, VOL.

10, 281-299 (1996)

Diversity within Spatial Cognition: Memory Processes
Underlying Place Recognition
LINDA J . ANOOSHIAN AND PENNIE S. SEIBERT
Boise State University, USA
SUMMARY
We conducted three experiments to explore distinct memory processes involved in
remembering places in spatial environments. The results of all three experiments
demonstrated the viability of the process-dissociation procedure for studying spatial
cognition; that procedure yielded separate measures of the role of familiarity (implicit
memory) and conscious recollection (explicit memory) in recognizing Scenes along a previously
viewed route of travel. Those measures were not affected by whether the participants viewed
videotapes or also physically walked the route of travel. Increasing the delay between encoding
and retrieval led to comparable effects for familiarity and conscious recollection (Experiment
1). In contrast, the adverse consequences of dividing attention during encoding were specific to
conscious recollection; familiarity estimates were unaffected (Experiments 2 and 3). Overall,
the results reinforced the viability of process dissociation as a vehicle for exploring diverse
memory processes underlying place recognition.
This research was designed to explore diversity within spatial cognition, and to
explore different memory processes involved in coming to know large-scale spatial
environments. In addressing this diversity, we focused on place recognition, an
essential component of successful way finding in large-scale environments (Allen,
Siegel and Rosinski, 1978; Chown, Kaplan and Kortenkamp, 1995; Cornell, Heth
and Alberts, 1994; Kirasic, Siegel and Allen, 1980). Emphasis on place recognition in
theories of spatial cognition has a long history-from Siegel and Whites (1975)
seminal theory of the development of spatial cognition to Chown et d . s more recent
scene-based model of cognitive mapping and Cornell et al.s (1994) model of way
finding by place recognition. In the latter model, people rely on the familiarity
associated with particular places when making navigational decisions. For example,
to duplicate a route of travel, one need only approach those places that are most
familiar. To reverse a route, it works best to approach places with intermediate
familiarity. Like Cornell et al.s model, our research reflects the assumption that
successful navigation does not always involve conscious or strategic use of organized
These experiments were supported by a grant from the Faculty Development Committee at Boise State
University to the first author. Special thanks are extended to Edith Meyers for her special help in
coordinating and conducting the testing of subjects and to Gene Williams for developing the computer
programs. Thanks are also due to J an Fletcher, Gaylen Pack, Craig Prescott and Deborah Thiebert.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Linda J. Anooshian, Department of Psychology, Boise State
University, Boise, ID 83725, USA.
CCC 08884080/96/04028 1-19
0 1996 by J ohn Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Received 2 June 1995
Accepted 10 October 1995
I
282 L. J. Anooshian and P. S. Seibert
spatial representations. Specifically, we propose that place recognition can reflect
implicit memory or unconscious retrieval as well as explicit memory or conscious
retrieval (e.g., J acoby, Yonelinas and J ennings, 1995).
The present experiments were designed to disentangle the contributions of
different memory processes to recognizing scenes along routes of travel. Specifically,
we focus on procedures for obtaining measures of both familiarity (implicit or
unconscious retrieval) and conscious recollection (explicit or conscious retrieval) in
place recognition. As one of us has argued elsewhere, spatial knowledge has typically
been assessed with explicit-memory tasks (Anooshian, 1988; see also Schacter &
Nadel, 199 1). With the emphasis on memorability (conscious recollection),
landmarks and landmark knowledge have often been defined and/or measured
with recognition and/or recall tasks (see Presson, 1987a; Siegel, Kirasic and Kail,
1978). For example, memorability appears to be the primary criterion for
determining which of many places in environmental spaces are selected as
landmarks in our cognitive maps; landmarks are the places that people
recognize, places they recall, or places that they recall first-i.e., places with
special status in spatial memory (Presson, 1987a). When researchers ask people to
draw maps, the landmarks in those maps are necessarily the places that people
consciously recollect when deciding what to include in their maps. Much of the
spatial cognition literature has focused on developing more sophisticated methods
for assessing spatial knowledge that, unlike maps or verbal descriptions, are not
confounded by individual differences unrelated to spatial knowledge (e.g., drawing
ability; see Anooshian & Siegel, 1985). Yet, these methods also assume conscious
recollection or explicit memory as a minimal criterion for landmark knowledge (see
Anooshian and Kromer, 1986).
Consistent with Cornell et al.s (1994) emphases on familiarity and place
recognition in way finding, we endorse greater attention to nonstrategic or
implicit uses of memory in studies of spatial cognition (see also Chown et a[.,
1995). For the present experiments, estimates of familiarity were obtained to reflect
implicit or unaware memory retrieval processes; estimates of conscious recollection
reflected explicit or conscious memory-retrieval processes (as in J acoby, 1991;
J acoby and Kelley, 1991). Despite the focus on conscious recollection or explicit
memory in the literature on spatial cognition, everyday experiences emphasize the
importance of familiarity or implicit remembering (Anooshian, 1988; Cornell et al.,
1994). For example, when finding our way along once-familiar routes, we usually
remain confident as long as the surroundings seem familiar. Without such a feeling
of familiarity, we are apt to conclude that we have taken a wrong turn (see also
Cornell et al., 1994). Yet, had we been asked to recall landmarks or to estimate
distances between places (e.g., as in Anooshian and Kromer, 1986; see Siegel, 1981),
specific landmarks just would not have come to mind.
Our research was designed to establish a methodology for disentangling the
contributions of explicit- and implicit-memory processes to place recognition. It
seemed that such a methodology should have a number of significant pay-offs for
spatial-cognition researchers. First, as suggested earlier, a better understanding of
the diversity of processes underlying place recognition is likely to yield a better
understanding of diversity within everyday navigational experiences. Second, this
understanding appears critical in addressing apparent dissociations or independence
among different types of spatial knowledge about the same environmental areas. For
Diversity within Spatial Cognition 283
example, Anooshian and Kromer (1986) reported that the landmarks to which
children made accurate bearing estimates tended to be different than the landmarks
about which they could accurately estimate distance. We often know specific salient
landmarks, but not necessarily the direction of them or the specific route to them.
Dissociations between implicit and explicit memory reflect one possible approach to
accounting for the apparent independence of different types of knowledge about
spatial areas. That is, spatial memories that rely primarily on implicit memory
should appear independent of spatial memories that rely primarily on explicit
memory (Schacter and Nadel, 1991). Dissociations between measures of implicit and
explicit memory have been well documented with various implicit-memory tasks
with normal adults as well as amnesiacs (see reviews by Richardson-Klavehn and
Bjork, 1988; Schacter, 1987). For example, in the case of amnesia, it is common to
find high levels of implicit remembering, evidenced by improved performance after
prior exposure, associated with the inability to remember anything about the prior
exposure-even that it occurred.
Distinct memory processes may also be useful in addressing diversity in
acquisition strategies, and differences in resulting patterns of spatial memory. For
example, Presson (1 987b) distinguishes between primary and secondary uses of
spatial information. Secondary spatial memory guides symbolic uses of space while
primary spatial memory guides practical uses of space such as successful navigation.
Direct experiences with environments appear to promote primary memory while
exposure to maps promotes secondary memory (e.g., as reflected in directional or
Euclidian distance estimates, effects of orientation manipulations; Evans and
Pezdek, 1980; Presson, DeLange and Hazelrigg, 1989; Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth,
1982). Such findings have been taken as evidence that different memory mechanisms
underlie primary and secondary spatial memory (e.g., Schacter and Nadel, 1991). It
certainly seems possible that different ways of representing spaces, as associated with
different acquisition approaches or strategies, are differentially reliant on implicit-
versus explicit-memory processes.
Rather than focusing on dissociations between memory measures derived from
different tasks, we attempted to develop procedures that would provide separate
measures of implicit and explicit processes within the same task. The specific
procedure for doing so, process dissociation (J acoby, 1991), represents a major
departure from the typical research approach used to examine implicit and explicit
memory-the approach of administering different tasks to obtain measures of
different memory processes (see kchardson-Klavehn and Bjork, 1988). J acoby
(1991) argues that no single task can provide a pure measure of memory process;
most task performances reflect some combination of implicit and explicit processes.
For example, when identifying a word as old in a recognition task (usually
considered an explicit memory task), participants may sometimes rely on a general
feeling of familiarity typically associated with implicit remembering. Of course, it is
usually difficult to differentiate between memory processes with a single task since,
for most tasks, both processes facilitate the same performance or yield the same
responses. For example, if asked to identify words or places seen before, either
conscious recollection of the prior episode (explicit memory) or a sense of familiarity
(implicit memory) would yield the same conclusion (Ive seen it before.). Similarly,
in navigating through a large-scale space, conscious recollection of an upcoming
landmark has the same consequence as a feeling of familiarity; in either case, one is
284 L. J. Anooshian and P. S. Seiberi
likely to conclude that one is headed in the right direction. The process dissociation
procedure, developed by J acoby for word recognition, involves comparing levels of
performance when familiarity and conscious recollection yield the same conclusions
and when the effects of the two memory processes act in opposition, yielding
different conclusions.
In our place-recognition task, participants chose between video frames viewed in
earlier exposure to a route of travel and similar video frames that had been changed
through computer editing. Our interest was in the proportion of route frames that
participants selected when instructed to select such frames (inclusion instructions)
and when instructed not to select such frames (exclusion instructions; putting the two
memory processes in opposition). Then, estimates for conscious recollection and
familiarity were based upon the following assumptions about the selection of route
frames in the inclusion (P[INC]) and exclusion conditions (P[EXC]):
P[INC] = P[CONS] + P[FAMIL] - (P[CONS] x P[FAMIL])
The proportion of route scenes selected in the inclusion condition should reflect
the combined probabilities of conscious recollection (P[CONS]) and sense of
familiarity (P[FAMIL]), adjusting for the probability of joint occurrences (already
counted in both other probabilities); and
The proportion of route scenes selected in the exclusion condition should reflect
the probability of the joint occurrence of familiarity and the absence of conscious
recollection. Task instructions for exclusion emphasized this joint occurrence
(e.g., choose a familiar-looking scene as long as you do not specifically remember
it from the original route).
Without providing the details of the algebraic solutions, it should be clear that one
can derive formulae for the probability of familiarity and of conscious recollection
from the algebraic assumptions listed above. As outlined by J acoby (1991),
performances in the two conditions (inclusion and exclusion) are used to derive
estimates for conscious recollection (P[CONS]) and familiarity (P[FAM]):
P[EXC] = P[FAMIL] x (1 - P[CONS])
P[CONS] = P[INC] - P[EXC]
P[FAMIL] = P[EXC]/(l -P[INC] + P[EXC])
A major purpose of our research efforts has been to demonstrate the viability of a
method like process dissociation to the study of spatial task performances. Although
some have questioned the assumption of independence upon which process
dissociation relies, past reviews of literature on implicit and explicit memory provide
ample and compelling evidence of memory processes that are independent and
dissociated (J acoby et al., 1995; Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork, 1988; Schacter, 1987).
In addition to providing measures that reflect diversity within a single task
performance, process dissociation is designed to explore functional dissociations
between different memory processes. Such functional or process dissociations are
demonstrated when specific experimental manipulations have different effects on
measures of familiarity and conscious recollection. For Experiment 1, we manipulated
both the nature of initial exposure to the route of travel and the delay between exposure
and test (with inclusion and exclusion conditions). For Experiments 2 and 3, we
examined the effects of dividing attention on measures of familiarity and conscious
recollection obtained after exposure to different types of environmental areas.
Diversity within Spatial Cognition 285
EXPERIMENT 1
In designing Experiment 1, wepredicted that familiarity estimates, like measures of
primary uses of spatial information (Presson, 1987b), would be more dependent on
direct experiences with the physical environment than would be the case for
conscious recollection. In varying the nature of the initial exposure to the route of
travel in Experiment 1, some participants actually walked the route as well as viewed
it on videotape; others simply viewed the video presentation. We also predicted that
conscious recollection, but not familiarity, would be adversely affected by increasing
delay between exposure and test. Past research has demonstrated that performances
on implicit memory tasks are sometimes considerably more resistant to decay than
explicit-memory measures (e.g., recognition or recall; Mitchell and Brown, 1988;
Musen and Treisman, 1990; Sloman, Hayman, Ohta, Law and Tulving, 1988).
Method
Participants
Participants were volunteers from a General Psychology participant pool of a public
university in the northwest. A total of 12 females was tested in each of 3 delay
conditions (immediate, 2 days, 1 week), with half randomly assigned to each
exposure condition (walk-view versus view-only). We had intended to include both
males and females but failed to get a sufficient number of male volunteers for delay
conditions requiring two testing sessions. We excluded participants who had worked
or taken a class in the technology building from which our experimental materials
were obtained.
Overview of procedure
The three phases of the experimental procedure reflected the essential elements of
process dissociation (J acoby, 1991). In Table 1, we have summarized the general
correspondence between the sequence followed by J acoby (1991) and in this
experiment. As reflected in that table and summarized in later sections, there were a
number of changes or differences required to adopt the J acoby procedure, as
developed for word recognition, to place recognition.
Video materials
Most task materials were derived from a videotape of a route of travel (Route 1)
through two floors of a technology building infrequently visited by university
students. For the original filming, the camera-person sat in a wheelchair that was
moved at average walking speed along the route; the complete video lasted 6
minutes. A total of 80 frames spaced approximately evenly along the route was
captured from this videotape and stored as picture files (on a computer hard drive,
using SVIA software). Half of these 80 frames were randomly selected and
designated for computer-editing to make new items for the third test phase (see
Table 4). This computer editing (using Photostyler software) involved between two
and four minor changes for each frame (e.g., adding/enlarging door, adding/
removing window), thereby insuring that the overall configuration of the original
videotaped scene remained relatively intact. We used edited video frames in lieu of
new frames for two related reasons. First, the video of the route of travel contained
286 L. J. Anooshian and P. S. Seibert
Table 1. Phases of the experimental procedure from J acoby (1991) as adopted for
Experiment 1
Jacoby (1991Fword
Phaseltest recognition Experiment 1-place recognition
Phase I
Phase 2
Phase 3-
Recognition
test
Inclusion
instructions
Exclusion
instructions
READ. . . Read words
LISTEN . . . Listen to
second set of words, to
prepare for later
recognition test
(Phase 1) versus new words
ROUTE 1 . . . View video and/or slide show of
ROUTE 2 . . . View scenes that presumably
Route 1
contain objects from another route, Route 2,
to prepare for later test
Critical trials =read words Critical trials =Route 1 frames (Phase 1)
versus edited Route 1 frames (forced choice)
Select any word in prior Select any scene from Route 1 or any scene
lists . . . select read words containing a Route 2 Object . . . select Route
1 scenes
Object . . . do not select Route 1 scenes. If
remember scene as exactly like scene from
Route 1, it is definitely new or incorrect
Select only words that had Select only scenes that contain a Route 2
been heard . . . do not select
read words. If remember as
word that was read, it is
def ~t el y new choice
near-complete exposure to hallways in the selected buildings. Second, we anticipated
that pairing old scenes with scenes from a different building, even if similar to the
original Phase 1 scenes, would yield ceiling levels of performance often associated
with picture recognition.
The video and video frames described thus far were used for exposure to Route 1
(Phase 1) and for the critical trials of the third test phase (see Table 1). Additional
video segments were taken at diverse locations around the same university campus
for Phase 2. Locations for these segments were selected on the basis of ( 1) general
similarity to Route 1 scenes (e.g., age of fixtures, general architectural style), and (2)
the existence of at least three objects (e.g., door, window, cabinet). Of the 70 frames
captured from these video segments, 50 were randomly selected for use as Route 2
Object scenes for the second exposure phase (Phase 2). Each of these 50 frames
presumably contained at least one object that could be seen somewhere along Route
2. The remaining 20 frames were used as new items in recognition testing. Finally, 20
of the 50 Route 2 Object frames were randomly selected for inclusion in the third test
phase as old items.
As detailed above, the various frames captured from videotapes included 120
frames used in recognition testing: 40 Route 1 frames, 40 edited Route 1 frames, 20
Route 2 Object frames, and 20 new frames. Some additional video frames were
captured (and some edited) for use as examples to supplement task instructions.
Procedure
Individually tested, each participant was exposed to a route of travel in one of two
exposure conditions, walk-view or view-only. The last two phases of the procedure,
separated by one of three delay intervals (lOmin, 2 days, 1 week), allowed for the
Diversity within Spatial Cognition 281
application of Jacobys process-dissociation procedure (J acoby, 199 1) to place
recognition.
Phase I : exposure to Route 1. Participants in the walk-view exposure condition first
followed the experimenter along the entire course of the route of travel with
instructions to pay attention so that they could later find their way along the route
without help from the experimenter. Upon returning to the testing room, the
participant viewed the videotape of the route twice. Finally, the participant led the
experimenter along the actual route of travel; if necessary, the experimenter
corrected wrong turns.
For the view-only condition, video presentations were substituted for actual walks
along the route; participants viewed the videotaped route four times. During the first
viewing, the participant traced a finger along a map of the area that marked the
route with arrows. During the final viewing, the participant traced a finger along a
map of the area without the marked route, presumably as a test of their learning. As
for the walk-view condition, the experimenter corrected wrong turns.
Phase 2: exposure to 50 other scenes-Route 2 Object scenes. With the use of two
example frames, participants were told that they would see many potential Route 2
Objects-that is, doors, windows, cabinets, etc. identical to ones seen somewhere
along the hypothetical Route 2. Specifically, they were told that at least one such
Route 2 Object could be seen in each of the 50 frames that they would view. The task
was explained as a test of a new theory that simple exposure to objects such as
windows or doors along a route of travel, even if intermixed with lots of scenes and
objects not found along the route, would facilitate later route learning. Task
instructions emphasized that the 50 Route 2 Object frames were not scenes from
Route 2; participants were told that these particular frames or scenes had been
selected because they contained at least one object seen somewhere along Route 2.
Each participant saw 50 video frames for 2sec each, with periodic reminders that
only one object in a single frame was an object from Route 2,
Memory for frames from this second exposure phase was not considered when
deriving memory estimates with process dissociation. Rather, memory estimates
were derived entirely from the proportion of Route 1 frames selected over edited
Route 1 frames under different instruction conditions. Under what conditions would
participants select a Route 1 frame when told not to do so-i.e., under exclusion
instructions? Our second exposure phase was designed with this question in mind.
Our intent was to expose participants to a wide array of potential objects; in later
testing, they would be given the difficult task of identifying scenes that contained
some object (e.g., window) from our hypothetical Route 2. We designed Phase 2 such
that, from the participants perspective, almost any video frame seen in a later testing
session (Phase 3Fparticularly if it seemed familiar--could conceivably contain at
least one Route 2 Object. Our intent was to avoid arbitrary response patterns that
could otherwise occur if participants were confident about rejecting both recognition
options (e.g., under exclusion instructions, identifying one as a Route 1 frame but the
other as also incorrect).
Phase 3: testing using process dissociation. Each participant completed both the
inclusion and exclusion tasks. For 20 critical trials in each task, the participant chose
288 L. J. Anooshian and P. S. Seibert
between a Route 1 frame and an edited Route 1 frame. For 10 additional trials in
each task, the options for forced-choice recognition included a Route 2 Object frame
from the second exposure phase and a new frame. Forced-choice recognition was
used because pilot testing had revealed extreme patterns of responding when only
one picture was presented at a time; many participants resorted to either accepting or
rejecting all frames presented to them.
For each participant, half of each type of frame (20 Route 1,20 edited Route 1, 10
Route 2 Object, 10 new frames) was randomly assigned to each of the two tasks
(inclusion, exclusion). Within each task, the specific pairing of frames for recognition
trials (Route 1 with edited Route 1; Route 2 Object scene with new frame), the
position of each frame on the computer screen (top or bottom), and the order of the
recognition trials were also randomly determined for each participant.
Pilot testing had revealed some difficulties in providing clear instructions for the
exclusion task when administered second, following inclusion. It appeared that
participants had difficulty rejecting Route 1 scenes after completing a task in which
they had been designated as correct choices. Hence, for this experiment, the
exclusion task was always administered first.
The exclusion task was the Route 2 Objects task. Consistent with the aims of
process dissociation, this task was designed to estimate how frequently participants
would select Route 1 frames when explicitly instructed not to do so. Specifically, this
Route 2 Objects task was designed so that Route 1 selections reflected the presence
of familiarity and the absence of conscious recollection. Participants were told to
select scenes that contained at least one object that could be seen somewhere along
Route 2 (i.e., seen in one of the Route 2 Object scenes). Given the obvious difficulty
of this task, instructions emphasized that there were only two types of frames about
which participants could be certain: (1) unedited Route 2 Object frames (to be
selected), and (2) unedited Route 1 frames (to be excluded or rejected). Participants
were told again, as in prior instructions, that Route 1 and Route 2 had no specific
objects in common. For other frame possibilities, the experimenter advised
participants to select the one scene that looked most familiar since it probably
contained a Route 2 Object. Task instructions contained repeated reminders that
participants were to select familiar-looking scenes as long as they were not unedited
frames from Route 1.
Our inclusion task was the complete scenes task. Participants were told to select
scenes/frames that they had seen before in either of the two exposure phases.
Examples were used to warn participants about the existence and general nature of
the computer editing of video frames. Participants were told to select only unedited
frames exactly like those seen before.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses revealed no reliable effects involving exposure condition (walk-
view versus view-only). The only effect that approached significance was the effect of
exposure condition on inclusion scores; participants in the walk-view exposure
condition performed more poorly, selecting fewer old route scenes ( M = 0.64) than
did those in view-only condition (M=0.71; P=O. lO). We mention this only to
emphasize that there were no adverse consequences for not being able to experience
the physical environment directly. On the one hand, these results were somewhat
Diversity within Spatial Cognition 289
disappointing in failing to demonstrate a functional dissociation between familiarity
and conscious recollection. On the other hand, the results served an important role in
directing further research. For Experiments 2 and 3, we could be confident that video
presentations served as reasonable simulations of direct experiences with routes of
travel (at least for place recognition). In fact, our results are consistent with other
research indicating that direct experiences are not necessarily more helpful than
simulations in acquiring spatial knowledge (Hunt, 1984; Kirasic and Mathes, 1990).
For further analyses, we used ANOVA designs with a single between-subject
factor for delay between exposure and test (lOmin, 2 days, 1 week). Dependent
measures for memory tasks included an additional within-subject factor for task
(inclusion, exclusion) or derived memory estimate (recollection, familiarity). The
significance level was set at p < 0.05.
Memory measures
Initial dependent measures for the memory tasks reflected the proportion of Route 1
frames selected in the two tasks: inclusion (when participants were told to select
route scenes) and exclusion (when participants were told not to select these route
scenes). Consistent with the aims of process dissociation, these proportions were
used to derive separate estimates for the role of conscious recollection and sense of
familiarity in identifying route scenes. These two estimates were calculated,
individually for each participant, using the following derived formulae:
P[CONS] = P[INC] - P[EXC]
P[FAMIL] =P[EXC]/(l -P[INC] + P[EXC])
These derived estimates were analysed as a within-subject factor in an ANOVA
design. That analysis revealed only a reliable effect for memory estimate,
F(1,33) = 98.80, MSe = 0.02; estimates for familiarity (M=0.57) were higher than
estimates for conscious recollection (M= 0.24). As can be seen in Figure 1, there was
a relatively steady decline in both memory estimates across increasing delay. But the
main effect for delay was only marginally significant (p = 0.06).
Overall, the results of Experiment 1 failed to provide evidence of functional
dissociations between measures of familiarity and conscious recollection.
Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork (1988) pointed out that inconsistent results have
been associated with research on delay effects using explicit and implicit memory
tasks. In discussing such inconsistencies, Musen and Treisman (1 990) suggested that
persistence across delay for implicit measures (e.g., priming) is specific to visual
stimuli with uniqueness, novelty and specificity of visual details. Hence, persistence
across delays for familiarity measures may be more apparent for nonsense stick
figures, as used by Musen and Treisman, than for scenes from everyday
environments, as used in this experiment.
Route 2 selections
Thus far, the analyses of memory scores have been based on performances for the 20
critical trials within each task; that is, measures were based on the proportion of
trials for which the participants selected old Route 1 frames when paired with edited
Route 1 frames. The 10 additional trials within each task provided measures of the
proportion of trials for which participants selected a frame from the second exposure
phase when paired with a new frame. Of course, these Route 2 Object frames were
290 L. J. Anooshian and P. S. Seiberl
Figure 1. Mean memory estimates, for conscious recollection and familiarity, for the
different delay groups of Experiment 1.
correct choices for both the inclusion and exclusion tasks. Analyses of scores for
these additional trials allowed us to evaluate a potential risk or criticism associated
with process dissociation. That is, the procedure is based on the assumption that
conscious recollection and familiarity are invariant across the inclusion and
exclusion tasks. For example, one assumes that participants use the same criterion
for including Route 1 frames in inclusion as they do for excluding the same frames in
exclusion; in each case, the selection or rejection should reflect successful conscious
recollection (J acoby, 1991). An ANOVA on the proportion of trials for which Route
2 Object frames were selected revealed no reliable effects; the proportion of old
frames selected was comparable for the inclusion task ( M= 0.82) and the exclusion
task ( M= 0.86). This result provides suggestive evidence that memory processes were
relatively invariant across the exclusion and inclusion tasks; it is unlikely that
participants were more cautious in accepting old frames in the exclusion compared
to the inclusion task. Although these data are admittedly suggestive rather than
definitive, it is encouraging and relevant that there have been numerous
demonstrations of the correspondence between the empirical findings obtained
from process dissociation and other methodologies (see J acoby et al., 1995;
LeCompte, 1995).
Diversity within Spatial Cognition 29 1
The overall results of this experiment, although providing no evidence of functional
dissociations between familiarity and conscious recollection, were nevertheless
promising in pointing to the viability of process dissociation as a method for
studying diverse memory processes reflected in the completion of a single spatial task.
This viability was further reinforced by the results of our next two experiments.
EXPERIMENT 2
For this experiment, we attempted to demonstrate functional dissociation between
familiarity and conscious recollection by manipulating attention during initial
exposure. J acoby and Kelley (1991) successfully used process dissociation with word
recognition to demonstrate that the effects of dividing attention were specific to
conscious recollection; familiarity estimates were not affected. If this finding
generalized to scene recognition, there would be important implications for place
memory and way finding. If distracted and not attending to a known route of travel,
individuals may still retain a sense of familiarity associated with their surroundings.
Familiarity is often an essential component of successful way finding (Cornell et al.,
1 994).
We suggested earlier that diversity in memory processes was relevant in
accounting for diversity in strategies for acquiring spatial knowledge (e.g.,
Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982). In this experiment, we explored relations
between memory estimates derived from process dissociation and individual
differences in self-reports of spatial strategies. Theories of cognitive mapping
typically emphasize how the encoding of landmarks ultimately leads to
configurational or survey representations of environmental areas. In fact, Kuipers
(1982) described these theories as assuming a map in the head metaphor. At the end
of the testing session for Experiment 2, we asked participants to indicate the extent
to which they had tried to learn the original route in terms of a configuration or map
in the head. This acquisition strategy is assumed to depend on effortful processing
and to be demanding of attention (Anooshian and Siegel, 1985). Hence, weexpected
that reports of learning routes in terms of configurations would be more closely
related to conscious recollection than familiarity.
Method
Participants
A total of 24 participants was selected from the same General Psychology participant
pool used for Experiment 1. Half of the participants (6 males and 6 females) were
assigned to each attention condition; task order was randomly assigned.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as described for Experiment 1 with four major
exceptions. Two of those exceptions are described in later sections on the attention
manipulation and strategy ratings. Thirdly, weused a streamlined exposure sequence
to reduce the boredom that seemed to be generated by the long exposure sequence
for Experiment 1. Rather than four viewings of the videotape or two viewings and
two physical walks, initial exposure to the route consisted of two viewings of the
292 L. J. Anooshian and P. S. Seibert
videotaped route of travel separated by exposure to 80 consecutive graphic images
(captured frames) of the route shown on the computer monitor. This slide show of
the route of travel included the 40 route frames that would be included as old frames
in later recognition trials. Each frame appeared on the monitor for 4sec until
replaced by the next frame. Finally, we conducted extensive pilot testing to work out
procedures that would allow for varying the order of administering the inclusion and
exclusion tasks. To minimize confusion associated with completing the exclusion
task last, as observed in earlier testing, we added a number of specific example
frames that were integrated with instructions. For Experiment 2, participants were
assigned to one of two task orders for the final test phase; inclusion testing was
followed by exclusion, or vice-versa.
Attention manipulation. Participants in the full-attention condition were tested in
the same fashion as described for Experiment 1. The focus was on learning the route
of travel (e.g., as diagrammed in maps of the spatial area). For the dwided-attention
group, the participants attended to a visual-imagery task, the primary task, while
incidentally monitoring turns in the route of travel. For the imagery task, the
experimenter briefly flashed a block letter in front of the participant, with dotted
lines indicating an imaginary walk around the outside of the letter; block letters were
used to increase the number of turns around corners. The participants task was to
call out the directions for turning (e.g., right-left-left-right, etc.) if actually walking
the routes around imaginary letters. If the participant erred, the experimenter
quickly corrected the error and asked the participant to continue. Participants
continued calling out directions of turn in their travel around letters throughout the
video and slide-show presentations of Route 1; participants completed an average of
12.42 letters. Two aspects of the procedure were designed to ensure that participants,
although focusing attention on the primary task, maintained visual fixation on
Route 1. First, the experimenter showed block letters for the imagery task very
quickly and straight-ahead so as to distract minimally from visual focus on the route
of travel. Second, the participants secondary task was to press the button on a
computer mouse whenever they observed a change in camera direction in the route
exposure. Except for this attention manipulation in Phase 1, procedures for
remaining phases were the same for both attention conditions.
Strategy ratings. At the end of the experimental session, participants rated their
level of agreement with statements about using configurations to learn the original
Route 1 (from 1, strongly disagree, to 5, strongly agree). Two statements described
trying to form a map in my head to keep track of directions and locations, and
forming visual images.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses revealed no reliable effects for task order or for gender; males
and females in the two order groups were combined for further analyses. All
dependent measures were analysed with ANOVA designs with a between-subject
factor for attention (full or divided) and a within-subject factor for task (inclusion,
exclusion) or derived memory estimate (recollection, familiarity). The significance
level was set at p < 0.05.
Diversity within Spatial Cognition 293
Initial dependent measures reflected the proportion of Route 1 frames selected in
the inclusion and exclusion tasks. Analysis of these measures yielded a reliable main
effect for task, F( 1,22) = 36.14, MSe = 0.01, and a reliable interaction between task
and attention condition, F( 1,22) = 3 1.72, MSe = 0.01. The dividing of attention led
tofewer Route 1 selections for inclusion instructions (M=0.55 compared to 0.73 for
full attention) and more Route 1 selections for exclusion instructions (M=0.54
compared to 0.34 for full attention); the effect for attention condition was reliable
for both inclusion, F( 1,22) = 16.41, MSe = 0.01, and exclusion scores,
F(1,22)=15.61, MSe=O.Ol.
As for Experiment 1, weused these proportions to derive separate estimates for
conscious recollection and familiarity. The analysis of these memory estimates
revealed reliable effects of attention condition, F(1,22) = 24.20, MSe = 0.02, and
memory estimate, F( 1,22) = 69.35, MSe = 0.02; these effects were interpreted in the
context of a reliable interaction between attention condition and memory estimate,
F( 1,22) = 20.98, MSe = 0.02. As predicted, the dividing of attention had an adverse
effect on conscious recollection (M= 0.02 compared to 0.38 for full attention),
F( 1,22) = 3 1.72, MSe = 0.03, but no reliable effect on familiarity estimates (Ms = 0.54
and 0.55 for full and divided attention, respectively).
An ANOVA on the proportion of trials for which Route 2 Object frames were
selected revealed no reliable effects; the proportion of old frames selected for the
inclusion task (M= 0.87) was comparable to that selected for exclusion (M= 0.83).
Hence, as also observed for Experiment 1, it appeared reasonable to assume that
participants used the same criteria for including Route 1 frames in inclusion as they
did for rejecting the same frames in exclusion. Such findings, together with the
functional dissociation demonstrated for the manipulation of attention, reinforce the
viability of process dissociation as an important approach to exploring the diversity
of memory processes underlying spatial cognition.
Two self-report ratings of attention to configurations or images in learning the
original route were obtained. Correlations with memory estimates were reliable only
for the first statement describing forming a map in the head to keep track of
directions and distances. For that statement, the correlation with conscious
recollection was reliable for the entire group, r (22) = 0.54, and for the full-attention
group, r (10) = 0.47. The same correlation was not reliable (r= 0.16) when calculated
for the divided-attention group. This pattern of correlations suggests that the dividing
of attention may have interefered with the use of effortful strategies for learning routes
of travel. Consistent with this suggestion, average ratings for this statement were
reliably lower for the divided-attention group (M= 2.58) than for the full-attention
group (M= 4.00), F(1,22) = 6.93, MSe = 1.66. These results, although exploratory in
nature, are important in suggesting relations between individual differences in
estimates for conscious recollection and specific approaches to learning spatial
information. In our next experiment, we obtained additional ratings from participants
about the approaches that they had used to learn the original route of travel.
EXPERIMENT 3
Overall, the combined results of Experiments 1 and 2 were quite promising in terms
of reinforcing the viability of process dissociation as an approach for studying the
294 L. f. Anooshian and P. S. Seibert
diversity of basic memory processes underlying specific spatial tasks (e.g., place
recognition). Given those promising results, it seemed important to obtain additional
evidence of their generality. Questions could certainly be raised regarding the extent
to which our findings were specific to the type of environment from which our scenes
had been taken, the campus technology building. Were our results specific or
somehow idiosyncratic to this type of space? To address this question, weselected a
very different kind of environment area for Experiment 3, a route through two floors
of a major metropolitan hospital.
Method
Participants
A total of 24 participants was selected from the same pool as described for
Experiments 1 and 2. Half of the participants (6 males and 6 females) were assigned
to each attention condition. Task order, for the inclusion and exclusion tasks, was
randomly assigned.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as described for Experiment 2 with three major
exceptions. First, the video and video frames for exposure and testing were obtained
from a route through two floors of a metropolitan hospital rather than the campus
technology building. Second, wefurther streamlined the first exposure phase (Phase
1). Participants saw three slide shows of 80 captured frames rather than two video
viewings separated by one slide show. Third, the statements that participants rated at
the end of the experimental session were expanded. Three statements were designed
to tap the use of map-like configurations: the two statements described for
Experiment 2 and an additional statement indicating that the task of learning Route
1 would have been easier with prior study of maps. Three additional statements
focusing on the use of verbal descriptions included (1) making up and remembering
verbal directions for travel, (2) making up verbal descriptions of objects and areas
along the travelled route, and (3) the task would have been easier with prior study of
written directions for travel. These two categories of statements corresponded to two
very different, yet equally effective, means for acquiring spatial information (see
Kirasic and Mathes, 1990).
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses revealed no reliable effects for task order; the two order groups
were combined for further analyses. All dependent measures were analysed with
ANOVA designs with between-subject factors for attention (full or divided) and
gender as well as a within-subject factor for task (inclusion, exclusion) or derived
memory estimate (recollection, familiarity). The significance level was set at p < 0.05.
Analysis of the proportion of Route 1 frame selections yielded reliable main effects
for gender, F(1,20)=5.33, MSe=O.Ol, and task, F(1,20)=22.36, MSe=O.Ol. These
main effects were interpreted in the context of reliable interactions between task and
attention condition, F(1,22) = 19.89, MSe = 0.01, and task and gender,
F(1,20) = 4.46, MSe = 0.01. Consistent with results for Experiment 2, dividing
attention led to fewer Route 1 selections for inclusion instructions (M=0. 56
Diversity within Spatial Cognition 295
compared to 0.72 for full attention) and more Route 1 selections for exclusion
instructions (M=0.55 compared to 0.44 for full attention). The attention effect was
reliable for both inclusion, F( 1,22) = 9.10, MSe = 0.02, and exclusion scores,
F( 1,22) = 8.77, MSe = 0.01. In contrast, the effect for gender was specific to
inclusion scores, F( 1,22) = 4.63, MSe = 0.02; females selected more old Route 1
frames (M= 0.70) than did males (M= 0.57).
The analysis of derived memory estimates (familiarity and conscious recollection)
revealed a reliable main effect for gender, F( 1,20) = 8.45, MSe = 0.02; higher
estimates were obtained for females (M= 0.42) than for males (M=0.3 1). Further
main effects for attention condition, F( 1,20) = 18.3 1 , MSe = 0.02, and memory
estimate, F( 1,20) = 186.07, MSe = 0.01 , were interpreted in the context of the
predicted interaction between attention condition and memory estimate,
F(1,20) = 11.83, MSe =0.01. Strikingly consistent with the results obtained for
Experiment 2, the adverse consequences of dividing attention were specific to
conscious recollection (M= 0.01 compared to 0.28 for full attention), F(1,22) = 8.77,
MSe = 0.07. For the results for both experiments, the interaction between attention
condition and memory estimate reflected floor levels of conscious recollection when
attention was divided. Hence, when our attention has been directed elsewhere-a
common experience in everyday encounters with large-scale environments-we are
likely to retain little explicit awareness of what we have seen. Yet, such adverse
consequences of dividing attention do not necessarily prohibit good place
recognition. Also consistent with the results of Experiment 2, comparable means
were obtained for familiarity (Ms=0.61 and 0.56 for full and divided attention,
respectively). The consistency of findings across experiments bolsters our confidence
that familiarity is fairly resistant to adverse consequences of divided attention and,
hence, is potentially an important component of everyday way finding (see Cornell et
al., 1994). Of course, some may argue that the environments chosen for Experiments
2 and 3 were more similar than different, both being indoor and institutional. Hence,
despite the consistency of findings, definitive statements regarding the generality of
our findings must await further research.
An ANOVA on the proportion of trials for which Route 2 Object frames were
selected, for 10 trials for each task, revealed no reliable effects; the proportion of old
frames selected for the inclusion task (M= 0.78) was comparable to that selected for
exclusion (M= 0.75). Hence, as for the first two experiments, there was no reason to
suspect that participants used memory processes differently (e.g., being more or less
cautious) in the inclusion and exclusion tasks.
Earlier results from Experiment 2 had revealed an association between self-reports
of relying on configurations in learning Route 1 and conscious recollection estimates.
With additional findings from Experiment 3, wewere able to rule out the possibility
that these earlier findings reflected associations between conscious recollection and
the use of any systematic approach to route learning, whether based on
configurations or not. For the additional ratings obtained in this experiment, we
averaged ratings for different questionnaire items to obtain two composite scores:
agreement with statements about relying on configurations or map-like images, and
agreement with statements about relying on verbal descriptions/listings. Consistent
with the results of Experiment 2, higher configuration scores were associated with
higher estimates for conscious recollection, r (22) = 0.44. Also, configuration ratings
were reliably higher for the full-attention (M= 4.11) than for the divided-attention
296 L. J. Anooshian and P. S. Seibert
group (M= 3.00), I;( 1,22) = 1 1.72, MSe = 0.54. (No reliable correlations or effects
were observed for verbal-strategy scores.) Of course, a variety of explanations are
possible in accounting for this pattern of correlational data. Nevertheless, the results
are encouraging in suggesting systematic relations between the memory estimates
derived from process dissociation and participants own self-reports of their
approaches to learning routes of travel. Given that the slide-show exposure for
Experiment 3 may implicate visual memory more than spatial cognition, these
suggestive results are important in confirming place recognition as an important
component of spatial cognition (Chown et al., 1995; Cornell el al., 1994).
The gender differences observed in this study-in the proportion of old Route 1
scenes selected for inclusion and in overall memory estimates-were not expected.
However, in on-going similar research with cartoon stories rather than routes of
travel, wehave obtained evidence of higher familiarity estimates for females than for
males, with no differences for conscious recollection (see Anooshian and Seibert,
1996). A full explanation of these gender differences will, no doubt, need to await
further experimentation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We contend that an adequate understanding of spatial cognition depends on the
development of methodologies designed to assess the combined influences of explicit
(conscious recollection) and implicit memory (sense of familiarity) on spatial
cognition. We developed such a methodology from research on word recognition,
process dissociation (J acoby, 1991; J acoby and Kellery, 1991), and demonstrated its
viability in three experiments on place recognition. Using this method, wefound that
familiarity estimates were unaffected by the dividing of attention, a manipulation
that had fairly dramatic effects on conscious recollection. We suggest that, in a
variety of everyday situations, familiarity can guide navigational efforts even when
there is little or no conscious recollection of landmarks (Cornell et al., 1994).
Overall, our research findings are most important in establishing the nonunity of
spatial cognition (Schacter and Nadel, 1991) and in providing a new framework for
exploring diversity within spatial memory. The significance of this recommended
approach is most apparent in the context of past research on spatial cognition-
research that has largely ignored the diversity of memory processes implicated by the
emerging literature on implicit and explicit memory. As noted by Schacter and Nadel
(1991), standard tests of spatial memory can be characterized by explicit tests: they
require intentional, deliberate retrieval of spatial information that was acquired
during some prior episodes (p. 180). For the most part, the methods and theories on
spatial cognition reflect the assumption that successful navigation relies on conscious
recollection of spatial representations (Anooshian, 1988).
Process dissociation also offers an almost unlimited range of possibilities for
future research. In our experiments, we included manipulations of the nature of
exposure, of delay between exposure and test, and of attention on conscious
recollection and sense of familiarity. Evidence of process dissociation, or different
effects on conscious recollection and familiarity, was obtained only for the
manipulation of attention. The manipulations included in our research are but
just a few examples of the kinds of manipulations that might reveal interesting
Diversity within Spatial Cognition 291
dissociations between different memory measures in future research. As summarized
by J acoby et al. (1995), the strength of the process-dissociation procedure lies in the
consistency of empirical findings associated with diverse manipulations of cognitive
control or conscious intention. For example, beyond the dividing of attention, both
aging and retrieval time-variables identified with cognitive control-are associated
with variation in conscious recollection, but not familiarity. Together with an
extensive research literature documenting dissociations and independence between
implicit- and explicit-memory measures, such evidence supports the somewhat
controversial assumption of process dissociation that implicit and explicit processes
are independent (see J acoby et al., 1995). As also noted by J acoby et al., other
possible assumptions about the relation between memory processes (e.g.,
redundancy or exclusivity) yield results that contradict other empirical findings. In
contrast, process dissociation, based on an assumption of independence, yields
findings quite consistent with those obtained with other methodologies (Jacoby et
al., 1995; LeCompte, 1995). Hence, despite some reservations (see J acoby et al.,
1995), our results are best interpreted as evidence of the viability and promise of
process dissociation in future research on diversity within spatial cognition.
The significance of process dissociation for future research is further reinforced by
our exploratory findings on correlations with self-reports. Some might argue that
methods like process dissociation yield memory measures that are artificial and
narrow, thereby failing to capture the holistic nature of spatial cognition. In
contrast, weargue that such measures are necessary to understand the richness and
complexity of spatial cognition. For both Experiments 2 and 3, estimates of
conscious recollection from process dissociation were associated with participants
self-reports of using configurations to aid their route learning. Our correlation
findings also support the further argument that such measures are indeed reflective
of the processes that are at work in coming to know and in remembering large-scale
environments.
Consistent with our conclusions, Schacter and Nadel (1991) reviewed evidence
from neuropsychology and psychobiology that implicate diversity within spatial
memory. In fact, they argue that research findings from cognitive psychology,
neuropsychology, and psychobiology converge on a common theme-that several
varieties or forms of spatial memory can be distinguished, and hence, spatial memory
should not be viewed as a unitary or monolithic entity (p. 165). In neuropsychology,
Schacter and Nadel reviewed evidence of selectivity in the effects of brain damage.
For example, Landis, Cummings, Benson, and Palmer (1986) reported patients who
had difficulty recognizing and finding their way through familiar environments but
who were adept at using maps (e.g., locating the home on a map). In the context of
our results, we suggest that examples like these reflect the dissociation between
familiarity and conscious recollection.
In concluding, we hope that experimental findings like ours will mark an
important historical juncture in the evolving research tradition on spatial cognition.
We see a research tradition that seemed to gain its initial momentum from
recognition of the diverse things that people knew about environments and from
recognition of the complexities of the methodological issues associated with
measuring that knowledge (see Allen, 1985; Anooshian and Siegel, 1985;
Newcombe, 1985; Siegel, 1981). Later, the focus seemed to shift from content to
structure or organization (see Sherman and Lim, 1991), as exemplified by research
298 L. J. Anooshian and P. S. Seibert
examining the hierarchical organization of spatial information (e.g., Allen, 198 1; Hirtle
and J onides, 1985; McNamara, Hardy and Hirtle, 1989). Of course, such a focus on
organization tends to be a focus on associations or integration rather than
dissociations. Recent research findings have increasingly questioned the extent of
hierarchical organization in spatial memory (e.g., Clayton and Chattin, 1989; Sherman
and Lim, 1991). Similarly, it is likely that future researchers will increasingly recognize
and explore the diversity of processes underlying spatial cognition (see also Schacter
and Nadel, 1991). In appreciating environmental memory as a complex and multiply
determined structure (Sherman and Lim, 1991, p. 292), future research efforts
hopefully will reflect an appropriate balance between the search for integration and
organization and the search for diversity and dissociations.
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