SCIENCE AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (AN INTRODUCTION)

To understand any complex human activity we must grasp the language and approach of the
individuals who pursue it. So it is with understanding science and scientific research, one must
know and understand, scientific language and the scientific approach to problem solving.
One of the most confusing things to the student of science is the special way the scientist uses
ordinary words. To make matters worse, he invents new words. However there are good reasons
for this specialized use of language. Suffice it to say now that we must understand and learn the
language used by physical social scientists. !hen a researcher tells us about his independent
and dependent variables we must know what he means. !hen he tells us that he has
randomized experimental procedures, and he is conducting a piece of research in absolute
controlled condition we must not only know what he means" we must understand why he does
and what he does. Such understanding leads us to understand the scientific approach the
researcher adopts.
#et us begin our study by considering how the scientist approaches his problems and how
this approach differs from what night be called a commonsense approach.
Science and Common Sense
$ distinguished researcher in mathematics has pointed out that in creative thought common
sense is a bad master. %&ts sole criterion for 'udgment is that the new ideas shall look like the
old ones.% This is well said. (ommonsense may often be a bad )aster for the evolution of
knowledge. *ut how are science and common sense alike and how are they different+ ,rom
one viewpoint, science and common sense are alike" This view would say that science is a
systematic and controlled extension of common sense, since common sense is a series of
concepts and conceptual schemes satisfactory for the practical uses of mankind. *ut
these concepts and conceptual schemes may be seriously misleading in modern science "
and particularly in many social sciences. ,or example it was self"evident to many educators
of the last century " it was only commonsense " to use punishment as a basic tool of pedagogy.
-ow we have evidence that this older commonsense view of motivation may be .uite
erroneous. /eward seems more effective than punishment in aiding learning. Similarly, it may be
a commonsense that advertising expenditure increases the sale volume in the market. *ut one
has to explore this and try to find out whether such relation is universal. &t may be commonsense
that every increase in price of a commodity is followed by decline in its demand. *ut we find
that for some commodities it may not be true. Therefore it appears that extrapolating 0beliefs1 on
the basis of commonsense could be dangerous2
The above discussions and situations poses .uestions in our minds that whether we can relate
variables on the basis of our own commonsense extrapolate for the future and on the basis of
these arrive at certain conclusions or whether we could distinguish between commonsense
approach and scientific approach while observing behaviour of variable3s4 and their relationships.
The difference in approach:
Scientists opine that commonsense and scientific approach differs sharply in five ways while
observing behavior of variable3s4 and their relationships. These disagreements revolve around
the words %systematic% and %controlled%
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,irst, the uses of conceptual schemes and theoretical structures are strikingly different. !hile the
man in the street uses 5theories% and 5concepts6, he ordinarily does so in a loose fashion. He
often blindly accepts fanciful explanations of natural, human and socio economic phenomena. $n
illness, for instance, may be thought to be a punishment for sinfulness. $n economic
depression may be attributed to 7ews. 8isparity in income and wealth may be attributed to
globalization. Significant 'ump in the sale volume of a commodity could be attributed to the
effective media advertising. &ncrement in the production could be attributed to the use of fertilizer.
The scientist, systematically builds his theoretical structures, tests them for internal consistency,
and sub'ects aspects of them to empirical test. ,urthermore, he realizes that the concepts he is
using are man"made terns that may or may not" exhibit a close relation to reality.
Second, the scientist systematically and empirically tests his theories and hypotheses. The
man in the street tests his %hypotheses% too, but he tests them in what might be called a
selective fashion. He often %selects% evidence simply because it is consistent with his
hypothesis. (onsider the example9" *lacks are musical. &f a person believes this, he can easily
%verify% his belief by noting that many blacks are musicians. :xceptions to the stereotype, the
unmusical or tone deaf black, for example, are not perceived. Other examples could be9 certain
ethnic group is more enterprising. There might be people in the same group who are lazy. !omen
are generally religious. There might be atheist amongst women. The sophisticated social
scientist, knowing this %selection tendency% to be a common psychological phenomenon,
carefully guards his research against his own preconceptions and predilections and against
selective support of his hypotheses, for one thing, he is not content with armchair exploration of
a relation ; he must test the relation in the laboratory or in the field. He is not content, for
example, with the presumed relations between variables like methods of teaching and
achievement, between intelligence and creativity between values and administrative
decision, between advertising and sales. He insists upon systematic, controlled, and
empirical testing of these relations.
$ third difference lies in the notion of control. &n scientific research, control means several things.
,or the present let it mean that the scientist tries systematically to rule out variables other
than the variables that he has hypothesized to be the %causes%. The layman seldom bothers
to control his explanations of observed phenomena in a systematic manner. He ordinarily makes
little effort to control extraneous sources of influence. He tends to accept those explanations
that are in accord with his preconceptions and biases. &f he believes that slum conditions
produce delin.uency, he will tend to disregard delin.uency in non"slum neighborhoods. The
scientist, on the other hand , seeks out and %controls% delin.uency incidence in different kinds
of neighborhoods. The difference of course is profound. &n this connection let us consider a
researcher is trying to forecast the demand for a high priced consumer durables say car. He
relates future demand. &n such an exercise he controls the sample to include a certain section of
the society. Obviously, he is not considering sample points from the lowest income bracket of the
society.
$nother difference between science and common sense relates to the type degree of
relationship between variables. &t was said earlier that the scientist is constantly preoccupied
with relations among phenomena. So is the layman who invokes common sense for his
explanations of phenomena. *ut the scientist consciously and systematically pursues relations.
The layman1s preoccupation with relations is loose, unsystematic, uncontrolled. He often
seize, for example, on the fortuitous occurrence of two phenomena and immediately links them
indissoluble as cause and effect. ,or example9" take the relation tested in a study 9 <ositive
reinforcement 3reward4 produces greater increments of learning than does negative
reinforcement 3punishment4 or no reinforcement. The relation is between reinforcement 3or
reward and punishment4 and learning. :ducators and parents of the nineteenth century often
assumed that negative reinforcement 3punishment4 was the more effective agent in learning .
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:ducators and parents of the present often assume that positive reinforcement 3reward4 ia
more effective. *oth may say that their viewpoints are %only common sense%. &t is obvious,
they may say, that if you reward 3or punish4 a child he will learn better. The scientist, on the
other hand would probably insist on systematic and controlled testing of both 3and other4
relations. $ researcher can take examples from the economy and argue in this line. Taking
examples from the economy a man may think that a positive relationship exists between sales
and advertising expenditures. The scientist explores the relationship and comes out with the
exact relationship between the variables with the help of empirical data.
$ final difference between common sense and science lies in different explanations of observed
phenomena. The scientist, when attempting to explain the relations among observed
phenomena, carefully rules out what have been called %metaphysical explanations%. $
metaphysical explanation is simply a proposition that cannot be tested. To say, for example, that
people are poor and starving because =od wills it, that studying hard sub'ects improves the
child1s moral character, or that it is wrong to be authoritarian in the classroom, is to talk
metaphysically.
-one of the above propositions can be tested; This does not mean that a scientist would
necessarily spurn such statements, rule them out of life, say they are not true, or claim they
are meaningless. However, metaphysical explanation for relationship between variables is ruled
out from scientific research since these relationships can not be tested .
&n short, science is concerned with things that can be publicly observed and tested , &f
propositions or .uestions do not contain implications for such public observation and testing, they
are not scientific .uestions.
Four mehods of !no"in#:
&t is believed by some philosophers that there are four general ways of knowing or fixing belief.
The first is the method of tenacity. Here men hold firmly to the truth, the truth that they know to be
true because they hold firmly to it, because they have always known it to be true. ,re.uent
repetition of such %truths% seems to enhance their validity.
$ second method of knowing or fixing belief is the method of authority. This is the method of
established belief. &f the *ible says it, it is so. &f a noted physicist says there is a =od it is so. &f an
idea has the weight of tradition and public sanction behind it, it is so.
The a priori method is the third way of knowing or fixing belief. &t is also known as the method of
intuition. &t rests its case of superiority on the assumption that the propositions accepted by the
5a priorist% are self"evident. -ote that a priori propositions %agree with reason% and not
necessarily with experience. The idea seems to be that men by free communication and
intercourse, can reach the truth because their natural inclinations tend toward truth.
The fourth method is the method of science9 The scientific approach has one characteristic that
no other method of attaining knowledge has 9 self"correction. There are built"in cheeks all along
the way to scientific knowledge. These checks are so conceived and used that they control and
verify the scientist1s activities and conclusions to the end of attaining dependable knowledge
outside himself. The checks used in scientific research are anchored as much as possible in
reality lying outside the scientist and his personal beliefs, perceptions, biases, values, attitudes,
and emotions. <erhaps the best single word to express this is ob'ectivity. The point is that
more dependable knowledge is attained through science because science ultimately appeals
to evidence 9 propositions are sub'ected to empirical test. Sub'ective beliefs are tested against
ob'ective reality.
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$ie"s and Funcion of Science:
&n the scientific world itself there are two broad views of science9 the static and the dynamic. The
static view, the view that seems to influence most laymen and students is that science is an
activity that contributes systematized information to the world. The scientist1s 'ob is to discover
new facts and to add them to the already existing body of information. &n short, science is
even conceived to be a body of facts. Science, in this view, is also a way of explaining
observed phenomena. The emphasis, is on %the present state of knowledge and addition to it%
on the extent of knowledge, and on the present set of laws, theories, hypotheses, and principles.
The dynamic view, on the other hand, regards science more as an activity, what scientists do.
The present state of knowledge is important, of course. *ut it is important mainly because it is
a base for further scientific theory and research. This has been called a heuristic view. The
word %heuristic% meaning serving to discover or reveal, now has the notion of self"discovery
connected with it. $ heuristic method of teaching, for instance, emphasizes students1
discovering things for themselves. The heuristic view in science emphasizes theory and inter"
connected conceptual schemata that are fruitful for further research. $ heuristic emphasis is
a discovery emphasis. &t may also be called problem"solving but the emphasis is on imagina"
tive and not routine problem"solving. This view in science stresses problem"solving rather
than facts and bodies of information. :stablished facts and bodies of information are important
to the heuristic scientist because they help lead to further theory, further discovery, and further
investigation.
!e now look at the function of science. Here we find two distinct views. The practical man,
the nonscientist generally, thinks of science as a discipline or activity aimed at improving things,
at making progress. Some scientists, too, take this position. The function of science, in this view,
is to make discoveries, to learn facts, to advance knowledge in order to improve things.
*ranches of science that are clearly of this character receive wide and strong support. !itness
the strong support in the last forty to fifty years of medical research, military research and
research in the field of electronics and telecommunication. This function of science, to improve
man>s lot seems to be supported by most laymen and many scientists. The criterion of practicality
is prominent here.
$ very different view of the function of science is well expressed by *raithwaite 9 %The function
of science... is to establish general laws covering the behaviors of the empirical events or
ob'ects with which the science in .uestion is concerned, and thereby to enable us to
connect together our knowledge of the separately known events, and to make reliable
predictions of events as yet unknown% The connection between this view of the function of
science and the dynamic"heuristic view discussed earlier is obvious, except that an important
element is added 9 the establishment of general laws or theory.
The Aims of Science% Scienific E&p'anaion% and Theor()
The basic aim of science is theory. <erhaps less cryptic, the basic aim of science is to explain
natural phenomena. Such explanations are called theories. &nstead of trying to explain each and
every separate behavior of events, scientists observe the behaviour in general and the general
interrelationship between events. The scientific psychologist seeks general explanations that
encompass and link together many different behaviors. /ather than trying to explain individual
children1s methods of solving arithmetic problems, for example, he seeks general explanations
of all kinds of problem"solving. He might call such a general explanation a theory of problem"
solving. Similarly, the theory of (onsumer *ehaviour established how the consumers in general
behave to changes in economies variables.
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This discussion of the basic aim of science as theory may seem strange to the student, who
has probably been inculcated with the notion that human activities have to pay off in practi cal
ways. &f we said that the aim of science is the betterment of mankind, most readers would
.uickly read the words and accept them" *ut the basic aim of science is not the betterment
of mankind. &t is theory.
Other aims of science that have been stated are9 explanation, understanding, prediction and
control. &f we accept theory as the ultimate aim of science, however, explanation and under"
standing become simply sub aims of the ultimate aim. This is because of the definition and
nature of theory9
$ theory is a set of interrelated constructs 3concepts4, definitions and propositions that presents a
systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of
explaining and predicting the phenomena.
This definitions says three things. One, a theory is a set of propositions consisting of defined
and interrelated constructs. Two, a theory sets out the interrelations among a set of variables
3constructs4, and in so doing , presents a systematic view of the phenomena described by the
variables. ,inally, a theory explains phenomena. &t does so by specifying what variable are
related to what variables and how they are related, thus enabling the researcher to predict from
certain variables to certain other variables.
&t is obvious that explanation and prediction can be subsumed under theory. The very nature of a
theory lies in its explanation of observed phenomena. Take reinforcement theory. $ simple
proposition flowing from this theory is9 &f a response is rewarded 3reinforced4 when it occurs, it will
tend to be repeated. The psychological scientist who first formulated some such proposition did
so as an explanation of the observed repetitious occurrences of responses. !hy did they occur
and reoccur with dependable regularity+ *ecause they were rewarded. This is an explanation,
although it may not be a satisfactory explanation to many people. Someone else may ask why
reward increases the likelihood of a response1s occurrence. $ full"blown theory would have the
explanation. Today, however, there is no really satisfactory answer. $ll we can say is that, with a
high degree of probability, the reinforcement of a response makes the response occur and
reoccur. &n other words, the propositions of a theory, the statements of relations constitute
the explanation, as far as that theory is concerned, of observed natural phenomena.
-ow, about prediction and control. &t can be said that scientists do not really have to be
concerned with explanation and understanding . Only prediction and control are necessary.
<roponents of this point of view may say that the ade.uacy of a theory is its predictive power. &f
by using the theory we are able to predict successfully, then the theory is confirmed and this is
enough. !e need not necessarily look for further underlying explanations. Since we can
predict reliably, we can control because control is deducible from prediction.
The prediction view of science has validity and it is considered to be an aspect of theory. *y
its very nature a theory predicts. That is, when from the primitive propositions of a theory we
deduce more complex ones, we are in essence %predicting%. !hen we explain observed
phenomena, we are always stating a relation between , say. variable ? and variable @.
Scientific explanation boils down to specifying the relations between one class of empirical
events and another, under certain conditions. !e say9 &f ? then @, ? and @ referring to classes of
ob'ects or events. *ut this is prediction, prediction form ? to @. Thus a theoretical explanation
implies prediction.
There is no intention here to discredit or denigrate research that is not specifically and
consciously theory"oriented . )uch valuable social scientific research is preoccupied with the
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shorter"range goal of finding specific relations; that is, merely to discover a relation is part of
science. The ultimately most usable and satisfying relations, however, are those that are the
most generalized, those that are tied to other relations in a theory. Thus, the notion of
generality is important. Theories, because they are generally applied to any phenomena and to
many people in many places . $ specific relation, of course, is less widely applicable.
Scienific Research * a Definiion
The foregoing discussions may not lead to a specific definition of scientific research and more
importantly, it would not be easy, however, to get scientists and researchers to agree on such a
definition. However many scientists will agree on the following 9
Scientific research is systematic, controlled, empirical, and critical investigation of
hypothetical propositions about the presumed relations among observed phenomena.
This definition re.uires little explanation since it is mostly a condensed and formalized
statement of much that was said earlier. Two points need emphasis, however. ,irst, when we
say that scientific research is systematic and controlled, we mean, in effect, that scientific
investigation is so ordered that investigators can have critical confidence in research outcomes.
This means that the research observations are tightly disciplined . $mong the many alternative
explanations of a phenomenon, all but one are systematically ruled out. One can thus have
greater confidence that a tested relation is as it is than if one had not controlled the observations
and ruled out alternative possibilities.
Second, scientific investigation is empirical. &f the scientist believes something is so, he must
somehow or other put his belief to a test outside himself. Su+,eci-e +e'ief% in oher "ords%
mus +e chec!ed a#ains o+,eci-e rea'i(. The scientist must always sub'ect his notions to the
court of empirical in.uiry and test. He is hypercritical of the results of his own and others
research results.
Thus, the scientific approach is a special and systematized form of all reflective thinking and
in.uiry.
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Noe o he Sudens:
This note is adapted from a book viz., ,oundations of *ehavioral /esearch by ,.-. Berlinger.
The students are advised to fit in examples from other disciplines to the theoretical concepts
discussed in this note.

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