Sagrada Orden vs.

Nacoco (KEITH)

Facts:

1. On Jan 4, 1942, during the Japanese occupation, Taiwan Tekkosho (Japanese corporation) acquired the
plaintiffs property (land with warehouse in Pandacan, Manila) for Php140K
2. On April 4, 1946, after the liberation, the US took control and custody of the aforementioned enemys land
under Sect 12 of the Trading with the Enemy Act
3. In the same year, the Copra Export Management Company occupied the property under custodianship
agreement with the United States Alien Property Custodian
4. In August 1946, when the Copra Export Management Co. vacated the property, the National Coconut
Corporation (NACOCO), the defendant, occupied it next
5. Sagrada Orden (plaintiff) files claims on the property with the Court of First Instance of Manila and against
the Philippine Alien Property Administrator
6. Plaintiff petitions that the sale of the property to Taiwan Tekkosho should be declared null and void as it was
executed under duress, that the interest of the Alien Property Custodian be cancelled, and that NACOCO be
given until February 28, 1949 to recover its equipment form the property and vacate the premise
7. The Republic of the Philippines is allowed to intervene
8. CFI: the defendant (Philippine Alien Property Administrator) and the intervenor (RP) are released from any
liability but the plaintiff may reserve the right to recover from NACOCO reasonable rentals for the use and
occupation of the premises
9. The sale of the property to the Taiwan Takkesho was declared void and the plaintiff was given the right to
recover Php3,000/month as reasonable rental from August 1946 (date when NACOCO occupied property) to
the date NACOCO vacates the premises
10. the judgment is appealed to the SC

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant is liable to pay rent for occupying the property in question?

Held: No.

Ratio:

Obligations can only arise from four sources: law, contracts or quasi-contracts, crime, or negligence (Art 1089,
Spanish Civil Code).

There were no laws or an express agreement between the defendant or the Alien Property Custodian with the plaintiff
regarding payment of rent. The property was acquired by the Alien Property Administrator through law (Trading with
the Enemy Act) on the seizure of alien property and not as a successor to the interests of the latter. There was no
contract of rental b/w them and Taiwan Takkesho. NACOCO entered possession of the property from the Alien
Property Custodian without any expectation of liability for its use. NACOCO did not commit any negligence or
offense, and there was no contract, implied or otherwise, entered into, that can be used as basis for claiming rent on
the property before the plaintiff obtained the judgment annulling the sale to Taiwan Takkesho. The plaintiff has no
right to claim rent from NACOCO.












Navales v Rias (keith)

Facts:

Vicente Navales filed a complaint with the CFI of Cebu against Eulogia et.al, claiming the latter should be
sentenced to pay him the sum of 1,200 pesos as damages, together with the costs and such other expenses as
the court might consider just and equitable.

The claim was due because of the order of pulling down and destruction of the house erected in Daan
buangan, town of Naga, Island of Cebu.

Breakdown for damages: P1,000 amount of construction and P200 - amount prejudicial to him because no
reimbursement was made.

Defendant denied such allegation. The judge rendered its decision declaring that the decision was illegal,
and that the action of the deputy sheriff Bacayo was illegal, hence they are liable for the damage caused to
the plaintiff worth P500

Issue:

Whether or not defendant is liable for damages?

Held:

No

Ratio:

Assuming that the order for execution of final judgment was issued in accordance with the law, and in view
of the fact that it has not been alleged nor proven that the sheriff when complying with the same had
committed trespass or exceeded his functions, it must be presumed according to section 334 (14) of the said
Code of Procedure, that the official duty was regularly performed. Therefore, it is not possible to impute
liability to the plaintiff who obtained the judgment and the execution thereof, when the same was not
disputed nor alleged to be null or illegal, and much less to compel the payment of damages to the person
who was defeated in the action and sentenced to be ejected from the land which he improperly occupied
with his house.

No proof has been submitted that a contract had been entered into between the plaintiff and the
defendants, or that the latter had committed illegal acts or omissions or incurred in any kind of fault
or negligence, from any of which an obligation might have arisen on the part of the defendants to
indemnify the plaintiff. For this reason, the claim for indemnity, on account of acts performed by the
sheriff while enforcing a judgment, cannot under any consideration be sustained. (Art. 1089, Civil Code.)

The illegality of the judgment of the justice of the peace, that of the writ of execution thereunder, or of the
acts performed by the sheriff for the enforcement of the judgment, has not been shown. Therefore, for the
reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the complaint for
damages filed by Vicente Navales against Eulogia Rias and Maximo Requiroso is dismissed without special
ruling as to costs. So ordered.






G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT
AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)


COMPANY , defendant-appellant:

FACTS: (chronological order)
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a
mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and
promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the
boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the open
space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they
found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground

They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable
explosive power.
After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the
home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into
an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for
a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An
explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a
match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had
his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which
injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his
wounds.
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises, nor how long
they had been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that some months before the accident , during the
construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those found by the boys were used in
sinking a well at the power plant near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or about the time
when these caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to
Fort William McKinley

Two years before the accident , plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports.
Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after
his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a
salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both
mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen

We think also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown
by the company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of
the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and,
however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company or some of its
employees either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public,
including children at play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known
that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play
ISSUE(S): Is defendant liable for damages?

No. The proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries is his own actions.
RATIO: We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine
in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a
recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point
where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it
is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express
permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant
which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and
applied a match to its contents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant
company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in
any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the
caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the
accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the cases of Railroad
Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in
this jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish
instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there
will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed
anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as
inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners
of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly
or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam
about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the
owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his
express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation
or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff,
without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of
opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not,
properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and that the defendant, therefore is not
civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to
entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself
have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case."
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn
P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no
room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap
with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge
the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly
that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the
explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the
time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries
which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and
yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according
to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him,
or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such
circumstances
the immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in
putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:


DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
















004 Philippine National Construction Corp. vs. CA
G.R. No. 159270
PONENTE: Callejo, J.
AUTHOR: Pat
*PASUDECO: Pampanga Sugar Development Company
*TRB: Toll Regulatory Board
*PNCC: Philippine National Construction Corporation
FACTS:
1. Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges, so PASUDECO requested permission from
the TRB for its trucks to pass through NLEX.
2. The TRB furnished the PNCC (the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll facilities in the North and South
Luzon Toll Expressways) with a copy of the said request for it to comment thereon. Eventually, PNCC allowed.
3. TRB and PASUDECO entered into a MOA, where the latter was allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX
4. At around 2:30 a.m., Alex Sendin, the PNCC security supervisor, and his co-employees Ducusin and Pascual were
patrolling Km. 72 going north of the NLEX. They saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and
southbound lanes of the road.They placed lit cans with diesel oil in the north and southbound lanes, including lane
dividers with reflectorized markings, to warn motorists of the obstruction.
5. They proceeded to the PASUDECO office, believing that the pile of sugarcane belonged to it since it was the only
milling company in the area.
6. They requested for a payloader or grader to clear the area. However, Engineer Mallari, PASUDECOs equipment
supervisor and transportation superintendent, told them that no equipment operator was available as it was still very
early. Nonetheless, Mallari told them that he would send someone to clear the affected area.
7. Sendin and company went back to Km. 72 and manned the traffic. At around 4:00 a.m., 5 PASUDECO men arrived,
and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road. The men left
the area at around 5:40 a.m., leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk of the sugarcanes
had been piled and transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic.
8. As dawn was already approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and lane dividers. Sendin went to
his office in Bulacan, and made the necessary report.
9. 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY Marketing, Inc., was driving his
two-door Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour. He was with his
sister Regina Latagan, and his friend Ricardo Generalao; they were on their way to Baguio to attend their
grandmothers first death anniversary. As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and
turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane.
10. Police Investigator Arcilla investigated the matter and saw black and white sugarcanes on the road, on both lanes,
which appeared to be flattened
11. Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint for damages against PASUDECO and PNCC They alleged:
a) that through its negligence, PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe for motorists when it allowed
PASUDECO trucks with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass through it;
b) that PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put up emergency devices to
sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of such spillage; and
c) that the combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries
sustained by Latagan and the damage to Arnaizs car.
12. PNCC admitted that it was under contract to manage the NLEX, to keep it safe for motorists. It averred that the
mishap was due to the "unreasonable speed" at which Arnaizs car was running, causing it to turn turtle when it
passed over some pieces of flattened sugarcane. It claimed that the proximate cause of the mishap was PASUDECOs
gross negligence in spilling the sugarcane, and its failure to clear and mop up the area completely. It also alleged that
Arnaiz was guilty of contributory negligence in driving his car at such speed.
13. The PNCC interposed a compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiffs and cross-claim against its co-defendant
PASUDECO.
14. PASUDECO alleged there were other sugarcane mills in the area, and it was only through the expressway that a
vehicle could access these 3 sugar centrals; and PASUDECO was obligated to clear spillages whether the planters
truck which caused the spillage was bound for PASUDECO, ARCAM or Central Azucarera.
15. PNCC adduced evidence that only planters trucks with "PSD" markings were allowed to use the tollway; that all such
trucks would surely enter the PASUDECO compound. Thus, the truck which spilled sugarcane in January 1993 in Km.
72 was on its way to the PASUDECO compound.
16. RTC: rendered decision in favor of Latagan. It dismissing that of Arnaiz and Generalao for insufficiency of evidence
and dismissed that as to defendant PNCC.
17. CA: affirmed the RTC decision with modification.
a) Arnaiz was negligent in driving his car, but that such negligence was merely contributory to the cause of the
mishap, i.e., PASUDECOs failure to properly supervise its men in clearing the affected area.
b) Its supervisor, Mallari, admitted that he was at his house while their men were clearing Km. 72. Thus, the
appellate court held both PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and severally, liable to Latagan.
18. Petitioners (PNCC) contentions:
a) that PASUDECO should be held liable for the mishap, since it had assumed such responsibility based on the MOA
b) that it had done its part in clearing the expressway of sugarcane piles, and that a few scattered sugarcanes
flattened by the passing motorists were left.
c) Any liability arising from any mishap related to the spilled sugarcanes should be borne by PASUDECO, in
accordance with the MOA which provides that "accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any
activity related to this approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO."
d) the proximate and immediate cause was respondent Arnaizs reckless imprudence or gross negligence
ISSUE(S):
1. WON PNCC failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. YES
2. WON PNCC and PASUDECO are jointly and severally liable. YES
3. WON resp. Arnaizs negligience in driving his car is only contributory. YES
HELD:
1. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the
ground. The highway was still wet from the juice of the flattened sugarcanes. It should have foreseen that the wet
condition of the highway would endanger motorists. PNCC is the grantee of a franchise, giving it the right, privilege
and authority to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities covering the expressways.
2. a) PNCC cannot escape liability under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, since resp. Latagan was not a party
thereto. PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were no piles of sugarcane, but evidence shows
there were still pieces of sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an observance of that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. There should have been sufficient warning devices
considering that there were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along the tollway.
b) PASUDECOs negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing
the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of
Latagans injuries.
c) With PASUDECOs and the petitioners successive negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable
for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code.
3. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Even the
petitioner itself described Arnaizs negligence as contributory.
RATIO:
1. The MOA refers to accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to property or injuries caused
to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA.

2. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently
of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury,
even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the
acts of the other tort-feasor. ...

3. In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that the liability of joint tortfeasors is joint
and solidary: It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole
cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than
plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a
person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to
as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent
tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts
of the other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may
appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No
actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors.
Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

4. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total
damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the
whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

5. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would do. It also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance justly demand, whereby that other person suffers
injury.

6. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

7. The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the
law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.























005 Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. CA
269 SCRA 695
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Hermosisima Jr, J.
AUTHOR: LCV
NOTE: Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with
their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their
clients with the highest degree of care.In the case of banks,
however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a
good father of a family.
FACTS:
1. The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the private respondent Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC for brevity),
represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce
(PBC for brevity), now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International Bank, the sum of P304,979.74 representing
various deposits it had made in its current account with said bank but which were not credited to its account, and were instead
deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner
bank.
2. RMC maintained two (2) separate current accounts, Current Account Nos. 53-01980-3 and 53-01748-7, with the Pasig Branch
of PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances
3. In the ordinary and usual course of banking operations, current account deposits are accepted by the bank on the basis of
deposit slips prepared and signed by the depositor, or the latter's agent or representative, who indicates therein the current
account number to which the deposit is to be credited, the name of the depositor or current account holder, the date of the
deposit, and the amount of the deposit either in cash or checks. The deposit slip has an upper portion or stub, which is
detached and given to the depositor or his agent; the lower portion is retained by the bank. In some instances, however, the
deposit slips are prepared in duplicate by the depositor. The original of the deposit slip is retained by the bank, while the
duplicate copy is returned or given to the depositor.
4. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash
totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC
with PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were instead
deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the
same bank.. During this period, petitioner bank had, however, been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly
statements showing its current accounts balances. Unfortunately, it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check
these monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank.
5. Irene Yabut's modus operandi is far from complicated. She would accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original
and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate
copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena
Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the
original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for
record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and
change the account number written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it appear to be RMC' s account number,
i.e., C.A. No. 53-01980-3. With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms. Yabut and submitted to private respondent
RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's name and account number, she made her company believe
that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth and in fact, they were being
deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. This went on in a span of more than one (1) year
without private respondent's knowledge.
6. Rommels Marketing Corporatiop (RMC), represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana filed a case
against PBCom to recover a sum of money representing various deposits it made with the latter.
7. Such amounts were not credited to its account and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly
due to the Gross and inexcusable negligence of the bank.
8. Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash to his secretary, Yabut. He said that Yabut was to deposit such
amount to PBCom.
9. However, what the secretary did was to deposit it in the account of his husband and only wrote RMCs account number in the
duplicate copy of the deposit slips.
10. This happened for a year without RMC knowing. When it found out about the scam, it filed a collection suit against PBCom.
11. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money, but as its demand went
unheeded, it filed a collection suit before the RTC Br. 160. The trial court found petitioner bank negligent and ruled as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendant Philippine Bank of Commerce, now absorbed by
defendant Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, and defendant Azucena Mabayad to pay the plaintiff, jointly and
severally, and without prejudice to any criminal action which may be instituted if found warranted:
1. The sum of P304,979.72, representing plaintiff's lost deposit, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the
filing of the complaint;
2. A sum equivalent to 14% thereof, as exemplary damages;
3. A sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount due, as and for attorney's fees; and
4. Costs.
12. CA Affirmed decision with modification. The awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees specified therein are eliminated and instead,
appellants are ordered to pay plaintiff, in addition to the principal sum of P304,979.74 representing plaintiff's lost deposit plus legal interest thereon from the filing
of the complaint, P25,000.00 attorney's fees and costs in the lower court as well as in this Court."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Proximate Cause of the loss is the negligence of respondent RMC and Romeo Lipana
HELD: The Proximate Cause of the loss is the negligence of PBCom through its teller in validating the deposit slips notwithstanding
that the duplicate copy is not completely accomplished.
SC: Petition has no merit.
RATIO:
Under the last clear chance doctrine, petitioner bank is the liable party. The doctrine states that where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of he one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or, when it is impossible to determine whose fault it should be
attributed to, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences
thereof. Petitioner bank thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self- imposed validation procedure.

It appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips
prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the
self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms.
Mabayad herself, thus:
"
Q: Now in the handling of current account deposits of bank clients, could you tell us the procedure you follow?
A: The client or depositor or the authorized representative prepares a deposit slip by filling up the deposit slip with the
name, the account number, the date, the cash breakdown, if it is deposited for cash, and the check number, the amount and
then he signs the deposit slip.

Q: Now what do you do upon presentment of the deposit slip by the depositor or the depositor's authorized
representative?
A: We see to it that the deposit slip [9] is properly accomplished and then we count the money and then we tally it with the
deposit slip sir.
Q: Now is the depositor's stub which you issued to your clients validated?
A: Yes, sir. "[10] [Emphasis ours.]

Clearly, Ms. Mabayad failed to observe this very important procedure. The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily
required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone
that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information -- that of the name of the account holder -- should have already put Ms.
Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously
by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that
in the original was filled up. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene
Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up the blank space later on. A
"reasonable man of ordinary prudence" would not have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left
blank be filled up as a condition for validation. Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge
losses to the private respondent.

Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and
supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the
petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know
that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures.

While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC, the latter
would have discovered the loss early on, such cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability. This omission on the part of
the private respondent does not change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of the petitioners' employee in
validating the incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss would not have occurred. Considering,
however, that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) year covering various deposits, common human experience
dictates that the same would not have been possible without any form of collusion between Ms. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. Ms.
Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her duties as bank teller nonetheless. Thus, the petitioners are entitled to claim
reimbursement from her for whatever they shall be ordered to pay in this case.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly
statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by
its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had
exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall
mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The one who had a last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so is chargeable
with the consequences thereof.

Elements of a Quasi-delict.There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence
of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate t he
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The seventy-eight (78)-year old, yet
still relevant, case of Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case which may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, reiterated in the case of Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, defines proximate cause as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. x x x. In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with
impunity.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: (also referred to, at times as supervening negligence or as dis-covered peril), petitioner bank was
indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to
the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the
last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that private respondent RMC
was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as
advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.






















007 VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and AMADEO AZARCON,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 77679 September 30, 1987]
TOPIC: Negligence
PONENTE: PADILLA, J.
AUTHOR:


FACTS:
1. This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code) filed by private respondent against
petitioner.
2. A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo
truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the private respondent, causing damages
thereto which were inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22.
3. Petitioner argued that his driver Martin Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very diligent and careful manner; that
the steering wheel refused to respond to his effort and as a result of a blown-out tire and despite application of his
brakes, the said cargo truck hit the store-residence of private respondent and that the said accident was an act of God
for which he cannot be held liable.
4. The trial court rendered decision in favor of private respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally
with Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, the insurer of petitioners truck.
5. The CA affirmed the decision in toto; hence, this instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict.

HELD: YES. It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar.
RATIO:
These following requisites of quasi-delict have been satisfied: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or
omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
The fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report,
"the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and
went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck
rammed the store warehouse of the private respondent.
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect.
Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be consideration as fortuitous in
character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable.
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of negligence on his
part in the selection and supervision of his driver.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Requisites of quasi-delict: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of
which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and the damages.















008 HEIRS OF TAYAG SR. VS. ALCANTARA
[G.R. NUMBER L-50959; DATE: July 23, 1980]
TOPIC: NEGLIGENCE
PONENTE: CONCEPCION JR., J.

AUTHOR: CARAG, J.R.
NOTES: (if applicable)


FACTS: (chronological order)

1. The petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr. filed a case for damages against the private respondents Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa - alleging among others that while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a
bicycle along MacArthur Highway when he was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Romeo
Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous death.
2. Private Respondents filed to motion to suspend trial on the ground that the criminal case was still pending in said
court, and that Section 3, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil action until the
criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge, Fernando Alcantara, granted the motion, and consequently,
suspended the hearing
3. Respondent Judge, in the criminal case, acquitted Romeo Villa for the crime of homicide on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Based on the acquittal in the criminal case, Private Respondents filed a motion to dismiss in the
civil case for lack of cause of action; which Respondent Judge granted.
4. Petitioner filed for certiorari directly to the Supreme Court

ISSUE(S): Whether or Not Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion
HELD: YES, Petition is meritorious. Acquittal in the criminal case does not bar prosecution of a civil case if based on a
quasi-delict
RATIO:
1. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter
2. The allegations of Petitioner are clearly based on a quasi-delict, as all its elements are present:
(1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent;
(2) damage caused by the said act or ommission;
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and
(4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties
3. Section 3, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court refers only to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only, and not as a
crime, is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused
4. The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver is not a bar to the
prosecution of the civil case
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver is not
a bar to the prosecution of the civil case

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):












009 Gregorio v. CA, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and
EMMA J. DATUIN
G.R. No. 179446, 10 January 2011
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Nachura, J.

AUTHOR: Sarah
NOTES:
Emma Datuin, Lawyer of Sansio, falsely filed a crim case
against Gregorio. Upon dismissal of the crim case, Gregorio
filed a civ case against Emma and Sansio for damages.
FACTS:
1. Emma J. Datuin, as Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts Receivables Department, and upon authority of Sansio
Philippines, Inc. filed an Affidavit of Complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against Zenaida R.
Gregorio and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently
funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio.
2. As the address stated in the complaint was incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the charges against her.
3. She was indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
4. The MeTC issued a warrant
5
for her arrest, and it was served upon her by the armed operatives of the Public
Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
4.1 Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where she was subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots
and was detained.
4.2 She was released in the afternoon of the same upon posting a bond.
5. Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion

for Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation.
5.1 She alleged that she could not have issued the bounced checks, since she did not even have a checking account
with the bank on which the checks were drawn.
5.2 She also alleged that her signature was patently and radically different from the signatures appearing on the
bounced checks.
6. Motion of Arraignment and Reinvestigation was granted.
6.1 MeTC found that Gregorio was not one of the signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecution.
6.2 Case was dimissed.
7. Now, Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin.
7.1 Datuin while acting under authority of SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., she falsely accused Gregorio of estafa
or violation of BP 22.
7.2 By and large, defendants fault or, at the very least, their reckless imprudence or negligence, in filing the three
(3) criminal cases against the plaintiff unequivocally caused damage to the latter and because of defendants
baseless and unjustified accusations, plaintiff was constrained to retain the services of a lawyer to represent
her.
8. Sansio filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious
prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts constituting the elements thereof were not
alleged in the complaint.
9. RTC: ruled in favor of gregorio. Complaint was one for damages based on quasi-delict and not on malicious
prosecution.
10. CA: dismissed the damage suit of Gregorio.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution.
HELD:
1. Quasi-delict.
RATIO:
1. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to
whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred; and (4) that there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.
2. On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief
in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to
personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right
to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.
3. A scrutiny of Gregorios civil complaint reveals that the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill the elements of
Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorios rights to personal dignity,
personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise
the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering
insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of
petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper
notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3)
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76 Pearanda St., Legaspi City, the office
address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed
operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family.
She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time,
effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several honorable
positions in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas,
Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other
hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as employer,
arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.
4. Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorios complaint is based on malicious prosecution. In an
action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that Sansio and Datuin
were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating an action against Gregorio, knowing that the
charges were false and groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her.

As previously mentioned, Gregorio did not
allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the fact that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her
action based on quasi-delict. She might have acted on the mistaken notion that she was entitled to moral damages,
considering that she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation on account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
































010 Corinthian Gardens Association vs. Tanjangco
G.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008
PONENTE: NATCHURA, J.
AUTHOR: De Guzman, Bien

FACTS:
1. Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69, located at Corinthian Gardens
Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On
the other hand, respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the
Tanjangcos lots.
2. Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary. As Geodetic Engineer
Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying,
conducted all the previous surveys for the subdivision's developer, Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the
Cuasos. Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular
inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and
Regulations of Corinthian. Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B.
Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot
69 by 87 square meters.
3. No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos
demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit
against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
4. Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios.
a. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their
house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing
them to litigation.
b. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without
verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The
Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been
involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also
be held answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such construction.
5. On March 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It, however, ruled that the Cuasos
were builders in good faith, and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos the option to buy the
encroaching portion of the land, at a price to be agreed upon by the parties within sixty (60) days from receipt of
the said Decision. In the event that the Cuasos were unable and unwilling to purchase the said portion, the
perimeter wall should be demolished at the latters expense. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly
negligent in not taking into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos lot when it constructed the house. It, thus,
ordered C.B. Paraz to pay moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees to the Tanjangcos and the
Cuasos. The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack
of cause of action.
6. CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the Cuasos acted in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87
square meter-portion of Lot 69 as of April 5, 1989. Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tanjangcos right to demand
the demolition of the offending perimeter wall after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the
preservation of the encroached area. On the third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were
all found negligent in performing their respective duties.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in ruling that Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found negligent in
performing their respective duties?
HELD: No, Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property
despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the
Tanjangcos.
RATIO:
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one
which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third
person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor's
position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not
to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.

The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the
same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias in Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability according to that standard.

By this test, we find Corinthian negligent. Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter wall
into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to
the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in the
approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-going construction projects within the
subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter
walls, which in this case is the subject of dispute between the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. It is not just or equitable to
relieve Corinthian of any liability when, by its very own rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that
"no new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the appropriate cash bond and
pre-construction fees are paid." Moreover, Corinthian can impose sanctions for violating these rules.

Thus, the proposition that the inspection is merely a "table inspection" and, therefore, should exempt Corinthian from
liability, is unacceptable. After all, if the supposed inspection is merely a "table inspection" and the approval granted to
every member is a mere formality, then the purpose of the rules would be defeated. Compliance therewith would not be
mandatory, and sanctions imposed for violations could be disregarded. Corinthian's imprimatur on the construction of
the Cuasos' perimeter wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was in order.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
In every tort case filed under this provision, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond;
and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):



























011 NGO SIN SING and TICIA DY NGO,petitioners,
vs.
LI SENG GIAP & SONS, INC., and CONTECH
CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 170596 November 28, 2008

TOPIC:

PONENTE: Nachura, J.

AUTHOR: Rikki
NOTES:


FACTS:
1. Petitioner spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo owned a lot at 745 Caballero St., Binondo. In 1978, they decided to
construct a 5-storey concrete building thereon, the NSS Building, and for this project, they contracted the services of
Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation (Contech) as their General Contractor.
2. Adjacent to their lot is a semi-concrete building known as the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG Building), owned by Li
Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. (respondent). During the construction of the NSS Building, the respondent, through its general
manager, John T. Lee, received complaints from their tenants about defects in the building. There were cracks
appearing on the floors, the steel door was bent, and concrete slabs of the walls were falling apart.
3. An inspection of the premises revealed that the excavation made by Contech on petitioners' land was close to the
common boundary, exposing the foundation of the LSG Building (respondents building).
4. As a gesture of goodwill to their neighbors, the petitioners assured the respondent that repairs would be undertaken by
their contractor. In December 1979, Contech announced that it had completed repairs on the LSG Building.
Notwithstanding this assurance, more defects in the LSG Building appeared, i.e., tilted floors, cracks in the columns
and beams, distorted window frames.
5. The LSG Building was continuously sagging and the respondent felt that it was no longer safe to occupy the building.
6. Respondents hired building consultants to assess the situation. The consultants concluded that the structural failure of
the LSG Building resulted from the differential settlement caused by the excavation during the construction of the NSS
Building (in short, it was due to petitioners fault).
7. Consultants advised the building be demolished. Respondents acquiesced and reconstructed the same. The
respondents demanded that the petitioners rebuild the LSG Building or pay the cost of the same, which the petitioners
refused.
8. Thus, a complaint for sum of money was filed against Ngo Sin Sing, Ticia Dy Ngo and Contech Construction
Technology Development Corporation with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 83-19367,
praying that the petitioners and Contech be ordered to, jointly and severally the expenses.
9. PETITIONERs arguments: (1) the respondent's building had been structurally unstable and deficient since incipiency,
having been constructed in 1966 without the appropriate provision to vouchsafe its structural integrity including
differential settlements during its economic life; and (2) the structural defects and failure were traceable not necessarily
due to soil erosion but to a number of external forces constantly working upon the building including earthquakes and
improper maintenance. Petitioners filed a cross-claim against Contech averring that pursuant to their construction
contract, all claims of third parties should be answered by said corporation.
10. TC ruled that the NSS (petitioners) owners were negligent. It found that the excavation made on petitioner's lot was
near the common boundary, and that soil erosion would not have taken place if wood sheet piles were properly put in
place along the common boundary. However, the trial court also stated that the respondent was likewise not without
fault. The trial court noted that the LSG Building (respondent was originally a 2-storey building and the plaintiff added
two more floors without providing the necessary foundation and reinforcement causing the building to sag. The trial
court held that it was but fair for the respondent to assume its share of the faults and defects of its property in
this case.
11. The respondent disagreed with the trial court's finding that it was guilty of contributory negligence and that it must
share in the cost of the reconstruction of the LSG Building. It claimed that the LSG Building never exhibited any sign
of structural distress from the time it was completely constructed in 1968, despite the fact that Manila was rocked by
several earthquakes, the most violent of which was in 1969. The defects were experienced only when excavation and
construction of the NSS Building started.
ISSUE(S): Who should be ultimately liable in the damage done to respondents building?

HELD: COMTECH (the construction company of petitioner).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with the modification that Contech Construction Technology Development
Corporation, alone, is ORDERED to pay respondent Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., the sum of P4,010,843.50.


Chan Jr vs Iglesia ni Cristo
GR No. 160283
KC
1. The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner and bounded on the south by a chapel of the
respondent.
2. The gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms.
3. In view of this, the services of Dioscoro Ely Yoro (Yoro), was procured by petitioner, as the former was
allegedly a construction contractor in the locality.
4. Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of Agreement
5. Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner was informed by the members of the
respondent that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter.
RATIO:
In 1966, the LSG building was burned. Thereafter, it was rebuilt with two floors added to the original 2-storey
building. (so naging 4-storey building siya).
The foundation of the LSG Building which was good to support only two floors remained the same and could not
support the weight of the present 4-storey building.
This only goes to show that the additional two floors put up on the LSG Building could have overburdened the
foundation's load-bearing capacity and contributed to the sagging of the building. The possibility of settlement due
to weak foundation cannot, therefore, be discounted.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. In this case,
considering that respondent's negligence must have necessarily contributed to the sagging of the LSG Building, a
reduction of the award is warranted. We, therefore, agree with the trial court that respondent should likewise share
in the cost of the restructuring of its building. This is more in keeping with justice and equity.
LIABILITY OF CONTECH - Contech committed to undertake the construction of the NSS Building, providing
labor and equipment for the project. Work included excavation for foundation, formworks, steel works, etc.
Construction would be completed after 365 days. It was also provided that the petitioners were "released and
relieved of any and all liabilities and responsibilities for any injury to the workers and laborers employed in the
work contracted for, as well as for third-party liabilities." As it turned out in the course of the construction of the
NSS Building, Contech failed to observe the proper procedure prior to excavation.
Clearly, defendant Contech failed to observe his procedure of providing lateral and subjacent support prior to
excavation. Under the doctrine of "supervening negligence" which states that where both parties are negligent but
the negligence of one is appreciably later in time than of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.
Negligence of Contech caused the damages sustained by the building, which did not discharge its duty of
excavating eight (8) inches away from the boundary line from the lot of plaintiff with insufficient lateral and
subjacent support.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
The tortious act was the excavation done without observing the proper safeguards.
It may be stated as a general rule that joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit.
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The persons injured may sue all of them or any number less
than all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one
sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his
participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the others. x x x
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata.
There is basis to re-examine the court's disposition in this case as to the liability of the petitioner in the light of the judgment rendered (1)
holding the petitioner and Contech jointly and severally liable, and (2) giving the right to the petitioner to be reimbursed for whatever
amount it shall pay the respondent.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The requisites of quasi-delict are the following:
(a) There must be an act or omission;
(b) Such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) Such act or omission is caused by fault or negligence; and
(d) There is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

6. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice
of the respondent.
7. On 18 April 1995, a Complaint against petitioner and a certain Teofilo Oller, petitioners engineer, was filed by
the respondent.
8. Petitioner and Oller filed an Answer with Third-Party Complaint impleading Yoro as third-party defendant.
9. Petitioner avers that no liability should attach to him by laying the blame solely on Yoro. He argues that the
MOA executed between him and Yoro is the law between them and must be given weight by the courts.
10. Petitioner relies heavily in Paragraph 4 of the MOA,4. Any damage within or outside the property of the FIRST
PARTY incurred during the digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY.
11. An Amended and Supplemental Complaint was later filed by the respondent already naming Yoro as a party-
defendant.
12. RTC: diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to
construct tunnels to find hidden treasure. The trial court adjudged the petitioner and Yoro solidarily liable to
the respondent on a 35%-65% basis (the petitioner liable for the 35%), and absolving Oller from any liability.
13. CA: It affirmed the trial court but with modifications.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PETITIONER AND YORO HAS
THE EFFECT OF MAKING THE LATTERSOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENT
HELD: No, This written contract, according to the respondent, clearly shows that the intention of the parties therein
was to search for hidden treasure.
1. The aim of the petitioner and Yoro to intrude and surreptitiously hunt for hidden treasure in the respondents
premises should make both parties liable
2. All the requisites of article 2176 are present in this case
3. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to the respondent because it was done
surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on
respondents premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the
petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other.
4. For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. The
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
5. As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit.
6. Petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they
would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside petitioners property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of
exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable.












013 PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM V. JOHN
BORDMAN
G.R. No. 159831, October 14, 2005
TOPIC:
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)


FACTS:

1. Petitioner Pilipinas Shell is a corporation engaged in the business of refining and processing petroleum products.
The invoicing of the products was made by Pilipinas Shell, but delivery was effected through Arabay, Inc., its sole
distributor at the time material to the present case.
2. From 1955 to 1975, Respondent John Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo, Inc. (John Bordman) purchased bunker oil in
drums from Arabay. When Arabay ceased its operations in 1975, Pilipinas Shell took over and directly marketed
its products to John Bordman.
3. August 20, 1980: John Bordman filed against Pilipinas Shell a civil case for specific performance. The former
demanded the latters short deliveries of fuel oil since 1955; as well as the payment of exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit. (for instance, Pilipinas Shell and Arabay had billed it at 210 liters per drum, while
other oil companies operating in Bacolod had billed their customers at 200 liters per drum. When representatives
from John Bordman and Arabay conducted a volumetric test to determine the quantity of fuel oil actually
delivered, the drum used could only fill up to 190 liters, instead of 210 liters, or a short delivery rate of 9.5%)
4. Pilipinas Shell and Arabays answer: denied that fuel oil deliveries had been less than those billed, the drums used
in the volumetric tests were allegedly not representative of the ones used in the actual deliveries, John Bordman
had no cause of action against them (If any existed, it had been waived or extinguished; or otherwise barred by
prescription, laches, and estoppel.
5. RTC in favor of Bordman because he had fully paid their contract price at 210 liters per drum, then the petitioner
should deliver to the respondent the undelivered volume of fuel oil from 1955 to 1974, which is 20 liters per drum;
and 10 liters per drum from 1974 to 1977.
6. CA upheld RTCs ruling

ISSUE(S): Whether respondent Bordmans claims of alleged short deliveries for the period 1955 to 1976 were already
barred by prescription?

HELD: No. Any action to enforce a breach of that Contract prescribes in ten years from the occurrence of breach.
RATIO:

1. Petitioner avers that respondents action -- a claim for damages as a result of over-billing -- has already
prescribed. Respondents claim supposedly constitutes a quasi-delict, which prescribes in four years.
2. It is elementary that a quasi-delict, as a source of an obligation, occurs only when there is no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties. The action of respondent for specific performance was founded on
short deliveries, which had arisen from its Contract of Sale with petitioner, and from which resulted the formers
obligation in the present case. Any action to enforce a breach of that Contract prescribes in ten years.
3. Actions based upon a written contract should be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.
This accrual refers to the cause of action, which is defined as the act or the omission by which a party violates the
right of another.
4. A cause of action in a contract arises upon its breach or violation. Therefore, the period of prescription
commences, not from the date of the execution of the contract, but from the occurrence of the breach.
5. The cause of action in the present case arose on July 24, 1974, when respondent discovered the short deliveries
with certainty. Prior to the discovery, the latter had no indication that it was not getting what it was paying for.
There was yet no issue to speak of; thus, it could not have brought an action against petitioner. It was only after
the discovery of the short deliveries that respondent got into a position to bring an action for specific performance.
Evidently then, that action was brought within the prescriptive period when it was filed on August 20, 1980.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

014 PETER PAUL PATRICK LUCAS, FATIMA
GLADYS LUCAS, ABBEYGAIL LUCAS AND
GILLIAN LUCAS, Petitioners,
vs.
DR. PROSPERO MA. C. TUAO, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 178763 April 21, 2009]
TOPIC:
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

AUTHOR: Kikoy
NOTES: Sorry Mahaba, mahaba talaga yung case.


FACTS:
- Sometime in August 1988, petitioner Peter Paul Patrick Lucas (Peter) contracted "sore eyes" in his right
eye.
-
Luke's Medical Center, for an eye consult.
- th his
right eye began; and that he was already taking Maxitrol to address the problem in his eye.
-
-C eye drops for Peter and told the latter to return for follow-up
after one week.
-
that the "sore eyes" in the latter's right eye had already cleared up an -

-based eye drop called
Maxitrol

- -


withdrawn gradually; otherwise, the EKC might recur.
- Complaining of f -

of Maxitrol at six (6) drops per day.
- On his way home, Peter was unable to get a hold of Maxitrol, as it was out of stock. Consequently, Peter was
told by Dr. Tuano to take, instead, Blephamide, another steroid-based medication, but with a lower
concentration, as substitute for the unavailable Maxitrol, to be used three (3) times a day for five (5) days;
two (2) times a day for five (5) days; and then just once a day .
-
-

resume the maximum dosage of Blephamide.
- To cut the long story short since madaming beses pa sila bumalik sa doctor, nagkaglaucoma si Peter due to
the use of the steroid based eyedrops prescribed by Dr. Tuano. Note that Glaucoma is a side effect of the
said eyedrops.
- Due to the inconvenience Peter went to see another doctor for a second opinion. Peter went to Dr. Mario V.
Aquino, M.D. (Dr. Aquino), another ophthalmologist who specializes in the treatment of glaucoma and who
could undertake the long term care of Peter's eyes. According to petitioners, after Dr. Aquino conducted an
extensive evaluation of Peter's eyes, the said doctor informed Peter that his eyes were relatively normal,
though the right one sometimes manifested maximum borderline tension. Dr. Aquino also confirme

Peter that the latter's condition would require lifetime medication and follow-ups.
- In May 1990 and June 1991, Peter underwent two (2) procedures of laser trabeculoplasty to attempt to
control the high IOP of his right eye.
- - petitioner sued Dr.
Tuano.
- RTC dismissed the case, CA likewise denied the appeal of petitioners.

ISSUE(S): Was Dr. Tuano negligent in prescribing the steroid based eyedrops?
HELD: NO
RATIO:
o's negligence in his improper administration of the
drug Maxitrol; "thus, [the latter] should be liable for all the damages suffered and to be suffered by [petitioners]". Clearly, the present
controversy is a classic illustration of a medical negligence case against a physician based on the latter's professional negligence. In this
type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to
exercise that degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of such
failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.
For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of the medical profession, such claim for
damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi- delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and
the victim. But just like any other proceeding for damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation, 76 must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order to find the physician
negligent and, thus, liable for damages.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by the attending physician when the
patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes the actionable malpractice. Proof of such breach must likewise rest upon the
testimony of an expert witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and diligence
which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.
Even so, proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician is insufficient, for there must be a causal connection between said
breach and the resulting injury sustained by the patient. Put in another way, in order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must
be shown that the "injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between
the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes"; that is, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same
general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon.
- o and Peter when Peter went to
see the doctor on 2 September 1988, seeking a consult for the treatment of h o, an ophthalmologist,
prescribed Maxitrol when Peter developed and had recurrent EKC. Maxitrol or neomycin/polymyxin B sulfates/dexamethasone
ophthalmic ointment is a multiple-dose anti-infective steroid combination in sterile form for topical application. It is the drug which
petitioners claim to have caused Peter's glaucoma.
However, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, "[t]he onus probandi was on the patient to establish before the trial court
that the physicians ignored standard medical procedure, prescribed and administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an
absence of the competence and skills expected of general practitioners similarly situated". Unfortunately, in this case, there was absolute
failure on the part of petitioners to present any expert testimony to establish: (1) the standard of care to be implemented by competent
physicians in treating the same condition as Peter's under similar circumstances; (2) that, in his treatment of Pete o failed in
his duty to exercise said standard of care that any other competent physician would use in treating the same condition as Peter's under
similar circumstances; and (3) that the injury or damage to Peter's right eye, i.e., his glaucom
o. Petitioners' failure to prove the first element alone is already fatal to their cause.
o failed to follow in Peter's case the required procedure for the prolonged use of Maxitrol. But what is
actually the required procedure in situations such as in the case at bar? To be precise, what is the standard operating procedure when
ophthalmologists prescribe steroid medications which, admittedly, carry some modicum of risk?
o under the circumstances, we have no means to determine
whether he was able to comply with the same in his diagnosis and treatment of Peter. This Court has no yardstick upon which to
evaluate or weigh the attendant facts of this case to be able to state with confidence that the acts complained of, indeed, constituted
negligence and, thus, should be the subject of pecuniary reparation.
o should have determined first whether Peter was a "steroid responder".
Yet again, petitioners did not present any convincing proof that such determination is actually part of the standard operating procedure
which ophthalmologists should unerringly follow prior to prescribing steroid medications.
o was able to clearly explain that what is only required of ophthalmologists, in cases such as Peter's, is the conduct
of standard tests/procedures known as "ocular routine examination", 88 composed of five (5) tests/procedures specifically, gross
examination of the eyes and the surrounding area; taking of the visual acuity of the patient; checking the intraocular pressure of the
patient; checking the motility of the eyes; and using ophthalmoscopy on the patient's eye and he did all those tests/procedures every
time Peter went to see him for follow-up consultation and/or check-up.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):








































015 ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under
the name and style COMMUNITY DIAGNOSTIC
CENTER and BU CASTRO RANIDA D. SALVADOR
and RAMON SALVADOR
G.R. No. 168512, March 20, 2007
TOPIC: Duty Need Not Be Alleged and Proved
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
NATURE: Petition for review under Rule 45, ROC
AUTHOR: Loi La Chica
NOTE/S:
FACTS:
1. October 1, 1993 - Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the Accounting Department of Limay Bulk
Handling Terminal, Inc. (the Company)
2. As a prerequisite for regular employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostic
Center (CDC).
3. Garcia (medical technologist), conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test
4. Test result: Ranida was B : R (with name and signature of Garcia - examiner and the rubber stamp
signature of Castro - pathologist)
5. Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter apprised her that the
findings indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease
6. The Company terminated Ranidas employment for failing the physical examination
7. Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at
the Bataan Doctors Hospital.
8. Ranida underwent another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result indicated that she is non-reactive.
9. She informed Sto. Domingo of this development but was told that the test conducted by CDC was more reliable
because it used the Micro-Elisa Method.
10. Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs test conducted on her indicated a
N .
11. Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa Method. The
result indicated that she was non-reactive
12. Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to the Executive Officer of the Company
who requested her to undergo another similar test before her re-employment would be considered.
13. CDC conducted another test on Ranida which indicated a N
14. Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC, issued a Certification correcting the initial result
and explaining that the examining medical technologist (Garcia) interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or
reactive.
15. The Company rehired Ranida
16. July 25, 1994 - Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against Garcia and a purportedly unknown
pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous interpretation of the results of Ranidas examination,
she lost her job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized
and lost business opportunities.
17. September 26, 1994 - amended their complaint, named Castro as the unknown pathologist
18. Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the scientific explanation for the
false positive result in his letter to the respondents
- He followed the appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as dictated by his training and experience
- He did everything within his professional competence to arrive at an objective, impartial and impersonal result
19. Castro claimed that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp signature
20. TC: Complaint dismissed for failure of the respondents to present sufficient evidence to prove the liability of
Garcia and Castro.
- They should have presented Sto. Domingo because he was the one who interpreted the test result issued by
CDC.
- They should have presented a medical expert to refute the testimonies of Garcia and Castro regarding the
medical explanation behind the conflicting test results on Ranida
21. CA: Garcia liable for gross negligence. Denied MR.
- Moral damages -P50,000, exemplary damages - P50,000 and attys fees P25,000
- Garcia liable for damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result
- Exonerated Castro for lack of participation in the issuance of the results
ISSUE:
Whether Garcia is liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an incorrect HBsAG test result

HELD:
YES. CA Affirmed. For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either
fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that
a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if
yes, then he is guilty of negligence.

RATIO:
The elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation. All the elements are
present in the case at bar.

Duty. Owners and operators of clinical laboratories
- To comply with statutes, as well as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health
of the people by preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical
laboratories
- Improve the quality of performance of clinical laboratory exams
- Business is impressed with public interest, high standards of performance are expected
- Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and 25(25.1)(1) of the DOH Admin Order No. 49-B Series of 1988, otherwise known as
the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Registration, Operation and Maintenance of Clinical
Laboratories in the Philippines, on management, reporting and violations.
- Section 29(b) of R.A. No. 5527, The Philippine Medical Technology Act of 1969, on penal provisions: P2K-5K,
6mons-2yrs imprisonment

Breach of duty Garcia failed to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the protection of public
safety and interest:
- Conducted test without the supervision of Castro. It was released to Ranida without the authorization of Castro
- Failed to comply with standard: A clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed
physician authorized by the Secretary of Health, i.e. pathologist to supervise med tech and release test
- Purpose: Protection of the public by preventing performance of substandard clinical examinations by laboratories
whose personnel are not properly supervised
- CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law, but by Ma. Ruby C.
Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist. In the License to Open and Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the
years 1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Naagas, M.D., Undersecretary for Health Facilities, Standards and
Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was named as the head of CDC. But Castro denied such.
- Castros infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative supervision and
control over the activities in the laboratory. Supervision and control means the authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty;
restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or
units.
Injury.
- Ranida was terminated from the service; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo
several more tests
- Mental trauma
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation









AIR FRANCE v RAFAEL CARRASCOSO & CA
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
TOPIC
PONENTE: SANCHEZ, J
AUTHOR: Jade

FACTS:
Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines (PAL) issued Carrascoso a first class round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso travelled in first class, but in Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced
him to vacate the first class seat he was occupying because, according to witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, there
was a white man who had a better right to the seat
Carrascoso refused and told the Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body.
A commotion ensued. Many passengers got nervous that when they found out that Carrascoso was having a
heated discussion with the Manager (a White man), they all came to Carrascoso, pacified him and convinced
him to give his seat to the white man.
Carrascoso relunctantly gave his first class seat in the plane.
Carrascoso sued Air France for damages.
CFI of Manila sentenced Air France to pay Carrascoso P25,000 as moral damages; P10,000 exemplary
damages; P393.20 representing the fare difference between the first class and tourist class, interest at legal
rate from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; P3,000 attorneys fees and costs of suit.
On appeal, CA reduced the amount of refund to P383.10 but affirmed the decision in all other respects.
Air France filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Arguments of Air France:
CA failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues laid before it.
ISSUE: The real issue
Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
Was the award of moral damages proper?
HELD:
Yes, Carrascoso was entitled to the first-class seat.
Yes, the award of moral damages, as well as exemplary damages and attorneys fees were proper.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible
error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

RATIO:

Did CA fail to consider all relevant facts? So long as the decision of the CA contains the necessary facts to warrant its
conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
defense. Only questions of law may be raised in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the CA. That judgment is
conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions
of fact.

Carrascoso and the first class seat It is conceded that on March 28, 1958, Carrascoso received from Air France a
first class ticket.
According to Air France
The ticket did not present the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties.
Carrascoso knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight but he had
Tourist class protection
The issuance of issuance of a first class ticket does not guarantee a first class ride because it would depend on
the availability of first class seats passenger must make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the
necessary first-class reservation.
According to the Court of Appeals
Air France capitalized on the argument that issuance of a first-class ticket does not guarantee accommodation
in the first-class compartment. It is considered an indiscretion for a reputable firm to give out tickets that it
never meant to honor at all.
Air France received the corresponding payment for a first-class ticket yet passengers are still at the mercy of
the employees. The company should know whether or not the tickets are to be honored or not.
According to the Supreme Court
CA is not alone in disposing Air Frances contention even the trial court did.
Air Frances own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a first class accommodation for
Carrascoso was confirmed.

The award of moral damages
According to Air France
To authorize an award for moral damages, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; CA failed to make
a finding of bad faith
Carrascoso only got first-class accommodation after protestations, arguments and/or insistence with Air
France employees
According to the Court of Appeals
Air France failed to provide first-class passage to Carrascoso and instead gave tourist-class accommodations
from Bangkok to Teheran/Casablanca
Carrascoso was forced by Air France employees to leave the first-class compartment after he was already
seated
Carrascoso was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila
to avoid the inconvenience and embarrassments brought about by Air Frances breach of contract.
Carrascoso suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliation causing mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation and the like injury resulting in moral damages of P30,000.00.
According to the Supreme Court
Bad faith is not specifically mentioned in the complaint but there is an inference of bad faith from the facts
and circumstances. It is unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint was cured by the evidence
The purser of the plane made an entry in his notebook that a first-class passenger was forced to go
the tourist class against his will and that the captain refused to intervene
Testimony of eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger
No one on behalf of Air France ever contradicted or denied Carrascosos evidence.
It there was a justified reason for the action Air Frances Manager in Bangkok, Air France could have easily
proven it through the said Managers testimony but it did not do so. The presumption is that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced. The Court is constrained to find that the Manager of Air France
really threatened Carrascoso to be thrown out of the plane if he will not give up his first-class seat so the
white man could be accommodated.
Air Frances Manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first-class seat but he also
forcibly ejected him from his seat, making Carrascoso suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
just to give way to another passenger whose right has not been established (this is bad faith). This act showed
violation of the contract of transportation.
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees is well settled in law. For the willful
malevolent act of Air Frances Manager, as employer, Air France must answer (see Article 21 and Article 2219
(10) of the New Civil Code).
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation
because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling
public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employeenaturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we
have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier
a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The manner of ejectment of Carrascoso
from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. in addition to moral damages.
The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment
for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
attorneys' fees be given. We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised as
it was here should not be disturbed.
Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees.
The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court.

The Court of Appeals did not interfere with
the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION:




























017 Petrophil Corp v CA
G.R. No. 122796. December 10, 2001
TOPIC:
PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J
AUTHOR: Norman
NOTE/S:
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Petrophil Corporation (Petrophil) entered into contract with private respondent Dr. Amanda
Ternida-Cruz, allowing the latter to haul and transport any and all packages and/or bulk products of
Petrophil

2. The contract provided among others, that Petrophil could terminate the contract for breach,
negligence, discourtesy, improper and/or inadequate performance or abandonment. Dr. Cruz was also
required to reserve the use of at least two (2) units of tank trucks solely for the hauling requirements of
Petrophil. It likewise stipulates that the contract shall be for an indefinite period, provided that
Petrophil may terminate said contract at any time with 30 days prior written notice-

3. In a letter dated May 21, 1987, Petrophil, through its Operations Manager, advised Dr. Cruz that it
was terminating her hauling contract. Dr. Cruz appealed to Petrophil for reconsideration but said appeal
was denied on June 5, 1987

4. On June 23, 1987, Dr. Cruz filed with the RTC a complaint against Petrophil seeking the nullity of the
termination of the contract

5. On March 11, 1988, the other private respondents herein all tank truck drivers of Dr. Cruz, also filed a
complaint for damages against Petrophil

6. -RTC ordered Petrophil to pay the plaintiffs

Dr. Cruz alleges in her appeal that the RTC erred in not awarding actual damages and asks the
court to award compensatory, exemplary, and moral damages

7. CA modified the decision, adding legal interest in the award
The termination of the contract was for cause, and that the procedures set forth in
petitioners policy guidelines should be followed
8. Hence this petition
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was guilty of arbitrary termination of the contract, which would entitle Dr. Cruz to
damages.

HELD:
YES. We find all these three elements of abuse of right present in the instant case. Hence, we are convinced
that the termination by petitioner of the contract with Dr. Cruz calls for appropriate sanctions by way of
damages.
RATIO:
Recall that before Petrophil terminated the contract on May 25, 1987, there was a strike of its employees at
the Pandacan terminal. Dr. Cruz and her husband were seen at the picket line and were reported to have
instructed their truck drivers not to load petroleum products. At the resumption of the operation in Pandacan
terminal, Dr. Cruzs contract was suspended for one week and eventually terminated.

Based on these circumstances, the Court of Appeals like the trial court concluded that Petrophil terminated
the contract because of Dr. Cruzs refusal to load petroleum products during the strike.

In respondent courts view, the termination appeared as a retaliation or punishment for her sympathizing
with the striking employees. Nowhere in the record do we find that petitioner asked her to explain her
actions. Petrophil simply terminated her contract. These factual findings are binding and conclusive on us,
especially in the absence of any allegation that said findings are unsupported by the evidence, or that the
appellate and trial courts misapprehended these facts.

In terminating the hauling contract of Dr. Cruz without hearing her side on the factual context above
described, petitioner opened itself to a charge of bad faith. While Petrophil had the right to terminate the
contract, petitioner could not act purposely to injure private respondents.

In BPI Express Card Corporation vs. CA, 296 SCRA 260, 272 (1998), we held that there is abuse of a right under
Article 19 if the following elements are present: 1) there is a legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad
faith; 3) for the sole purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
There is abuse of a right under Article 19 if the following elements are present: 1) there is a legal right or duty;
2) which is exercised in bad faith; 3) for the sole purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.


































018 G.R. No. L-22183 August 30, 1968
THE RECEIVER FOR NORTH NEGROS SUGAR
COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs. PEDRO V. YBAEZ ET AL., respondents.
TOPIC: Award of Damages; What Civil Code
provisions will apply
PONENTE: Zaldivar, J.

AUTHOR: Bea Mationg
NOTES: (if applicable)
Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil
sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or
omissions which were not penalized by the former laws,
are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in
force, may have executed the act or incurred in the
omission forbidden or condemned by this Code.
FACTS:

Pedro V. Ybaez and Rosario V. Ybaez (respondents) are the brother and sister, respectively, and immediate heirs of
Cesar V. Ybaez who was one of two persons who died as a result of the collision between the car, where said Cesar V.
Ybaez was riding and being driven by Gil Dominguez, and train No. 5, owned by the North Negros Sugar Company, Inc.,
in the evening of August 31, 1937 in the railroad intersection at Hacienda Santa Teresa, Manapla, Occidental Negros,
while the car was on its way from Bacolod City to Cadiz.
Criminal prosecution for double homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was instituted
against Gil Dominguez, driver of the car, and Primitivo Gustilo and Loreto Perez, operator and brakeman,
respectively, of the locomotive. The offended parties reserved their right to institute separate civil actions for
damages. Primitivo Gustilo and Loreto Perez were tried together and acquitted of the crime charged. Gil Dominguez
was also acquitted in a separate trial.
Thereafter, a civil action based on culpa aquiliana was instituted by Pedro V. Ybaez and Rosario V. Ybaez against
Primitivo Gustilo, Loreto Perez, and their employer, North Negros Sugar Company seeking to recover damages for
the death of the deceased.
DEFENDANTS CONTENTION: Interposed as special defense the previous acquittal of defendants Primitivo Gustilo
and Loreto Perez in the criminal case, and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
During the pendency of the case, plaintiff Rosario V. Ybaez died, leaving as her only heir, co-plaintiff Pedro V.
Ybaez, to continue the case. On the other hand, the North Negros Sugar Company, Inc. was dissolved and was
accordingly substituted by its receiver Dr. Claudio R. Luzurriaga. One of the defendants, Loreto Perez, also died in
the interim and the case against him was dismissed.
TRIAL COURT: Dismissed the case in favour of North Negros Sugar Company.
CA: reversed the judgment of the lower court and held the North Negros Sugar Company, Inc. liable for the death of
Cesar V. Ybaez, ordering it to pay plaintiff-appellant Pedro V. Ybaez damages consisting of P9,600.00 as
compensatory damages for lost earnings of the deceased; P6,000.00 for death indemnity; P1,000.00 for funeral
expenses; P5,000.00 "as moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by the heir"; P5,000.00 "for attorney's fees,
considering the years and extensive work the protracted litigation had taken; and costs.
ISSUE(S):

W/N the previous provisions of the old CC or the new CC will apply.
W/N the Court of Appeals in so far as it awards moral damages and attorney's fees erred in awarding attorney's
fees in the sum of P5,000 to the heirs of the deceased.

HELD: The old Civil Code is the law applicable to the case at bar; Respondent's argument that the award of attorney's
fees was justified under Article 2208 (11) of the new Civil Code is untenable, because the instant case was filed on May
15, 1940, or before the effectivity of the new Civil Code.



RATIO:
This is so, because the acts and events that gave rise to the instant action took place in 1937, and the action was
commenced in 1940. Article 2253 of the new Civil Code, provides:
The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws, from acts done or
events which took place under their regime; even though this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or
may not recognize them . . . .
The pertinent provisions of the old Civil Code are Articles 1902 and 1903. The first article provides:
Art. 1902. Any person who by act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable
for the damage so done.
and the second article in part, provides:
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
x x x x x x x x x
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by their
employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on the occasion of the performance
of their duties.
The word "damage" in said article, comprehending as it does all that are embraced in its meaning, includes any and all
damages that a human being may suffer in any and all the manifestations of his life: physical or material, moral or
psychological, mental or spiritual, financial, economic, social, political, and religious. It is particularly noticeable that
Article 1902 stresses the passive subject of the obligation to pay damages caused by his fault or negligence. The article
does not limit or specify the active subjects, much less the relation that must exist between the victim of the culpa
aquiliana and the person who may recover damages, thus warranting the inference that, in principle, anybody who
suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana whether a relative or not of the victim, may recover damages from the person
responsible therefor. This Court had granted moral damages not only to the person who himself was injured, but also to
the legitimate children and heirs of the deceased. Parents, even natural, have also been awarded damages for the death
of their children.
Article 2257 of the new Civil Code one of the transitional provisions provides as follows:
Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or
omissions which were not penalized by the former laws, are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in
force, may have executed the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by this Code.
If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe sanction shall be applied.
x x x x x x x x x
It may well be said that culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, is punished both by the old Civil Code the previous legislation
and by the new Civil Code. But, as we have pointed out, a less severe sanction, or penalty, for culpa aquiliana is
provided for in the new Civil Code. It follows, therefore, that Article 2206 of the new Civil Code which provides that
only the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants may demand moral damages for mental anguish
by reason of the death of the deceased caused by quasi-delict should be applied in the instant case. Hence, petitioner
herein, who claims moral damages for the death of his brother Cesar V. Ybaez caused byquasi-delict, is not entitled to,
and should not have been awarded, moral damages, by the Court of Appeals.
"It is not sound public policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate. To compel the defeated party to pay the fees of
counsel for his successful opponent would throw wide the door of temptation to the opposing party and his counsel to
swell the fees to undue proportions, and to apportion them arbitrarily between those pertaining properly to one branch
of the case from the other.
"This Court has already placed itself on record as favoring the view taken by those courts which hold that attorney's fees
are not a proper element of damages." (Tan Ti vs. Alvear, 26 Phil. 566; The Borden Co. vs. Doctors Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
90 Phil. 500).
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or omissions
which were not penalized by the former laws, are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in force, may have
executed the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by this Code.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S): N/A





































019 GARCIA-RUEDA vs. PASCASIO
[G.R. No. 118141. September 5, 1997]
TOPIC:
PONENTE: ROMERO, J
AUTHOR: Kelsey
NOTES:

FACTS:
1. Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical operation at the UST hospital for the
removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr.
Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of complications of
unknown cause, according to officials of the UST Hospital.
2. Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an
autopsy on her husbands body.
3. Consequently, the NBI ruled that Florencios death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering
anaesthesia. Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be
charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence.
4. The case was initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit himself because he was related to the
counsel of one of the doctors. The case was re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono who was, however, disqualified on
motion of the petitioner. The case was then referred to Prosecutor Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending
that only Dr. Reyes be held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be dismissed.
5. Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson, recommended that the case be re-raffled on the ground that Prosecutor
Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, who endorsed that
the complaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and instead, a corresponding information be filed against Dr. Antonio.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba.
6. Pending the resolution of petitioners motion for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor Dimagibas resolution, the investigati ve
pingpong continued when the case was again assigned to another prosecutor, who recommended that Dr. Reyes be
included in the criminal information of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of
Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to
exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G.
Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.
7. Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against
Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before the Office of the
Ombudsman. However, the Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence.
8. In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review the recommendations of
the government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same. Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for, allegedly in
grave abuse of discretion, refusing to find that there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE(S):
1. W/N there was negligence on the part of the physicians which had resulted to the death of petitioners husband
HELD:
1. No less than the NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that there was indeed negligence on the part of the attending
physicians in administering the anaesthesia
RATIO:
The fact of want of competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which can best be passed upon after a full-blown
trial for it is virtually impossible to ascertain the merits of a medical negligence case without extensive investigation, research,
evaluation and consultations with medical experts. Clearly, the City Prosecutors are not in a competent position to pass judgment
on such a technical matter, especially when there are conflicting evidence and findings. The bases of a partys accusation and
defenses are better ventilated at the trial proper than at the preliminary investigation.

There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.

Evidently, when the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes, a physician-patient relationship was created. In
accepting the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in effect represented that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians
and surgeons practicing in the same field, they will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of their patients.

They have a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under
the same circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their improper performance, by a physician
surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice. Consequently, in the event that any
injury results to the patient from want of due care or skill during the operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in damages for
negligence.

Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anaesthesia, the necessity of expert testimony and the
availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff, have been applied in actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the
defendant liable for the death or injury of a patient under excessive or improper anaesthesia. Essentially, it requires two-pronged
evidence: evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical community in the particular kind of case, and a showing that the
physician in question negligently departed from this standard in his treatment.

the anaesthesiologist in
administering the anesthesia, a fact which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal case. To be sure, the
allegation of negligence is not entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI deduced that the attending surgeons did not conduct the
necessary interview of the patient prior to the operation. It appears that the cause of the death of the victim could have been
averted had the proper drug been applied to cope with the symptoms of malignant hyperthermia. Also, we cannot ignore the
fact that an antidote was readily available to counteract whatever deleterious effect the anaesthesia might produce. Why these
precautionary measures were disregarded must be sufficiently explained.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):











































Spouses Flores v Spouses Pineda (Keith)

FACTS
Teresita Pineda (Teresita) was a 51 y/o unmarried woman living in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija
Teresita consulted her townmate, Dr. Fredelicto Flores, regarding her medical condition (general body weakness, loss of
appetite, frequent urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal bleeding)
Dr. Fredelicto initially interviewed the patient and asked the history of her monthly period to analyze the probable
cause of the vaginal bleeding.
Dr. Fredelicto advised the patient to return the following week or to go the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in
Quezon City for a general check-up. He suspected that her other symptoms might be due to diabetes and told her to
continue her medications.
Teresita did not return the next week as advised.
When her condition persisted, she went to further consult Dr. Flores at his UDMC clinic on April 28, 1987. To get there
she traveled for at least 2 hours from Nueva Ecija to Quezon City with her sister, Lucena Pineda. They arrived at UDMC
at around 11:15 am.
Lucena later testified that her sister was then so weak that she had to lie down on the couch of the clinic while they
waited for Dr. Fredelicto to arrive.
When Dr. Fredelicto arrived, he did a routine check-up and ordered Teresitas admission to the hospital. In the
admission slip, he directed the hospital staff to prepare the patient for an on call D&C operation to be performed by
his wife, Dr. Felicisma Flores (Dr. Felicisma).
Teresita was brought to her hospital room at around 12 noon; hospital staff took her blood and urine samples for the
lab tests which Dr. Fredelicto ordered.
Teresita was taken to the operating room at 2:40 pm of the same day. It was only then that she met Dr. Felicisma, an
ob-gyn. The 2 doctors (Dr. Felicisma and Dr. Fredelicto) conferred on the patients medical condition. The resident
physician and the medical intern gave Dr. Felicisma their own briefings.
Dr. Felicisma also interviewed and conducted an internal vaginal examination of the patient which lasted for about 15
minutes.
Dr. Felicisma then called the laboratory for the results of the patients tests. At that time, only the results for the blood
sugar (10.67 mmol/L), uric acid determination, cholesterol determination, and CBC (109 g/L) were available.
Based on these preparations, Dr. Felicisma proceeded with the D&C operation with Dr. Fredelicto administering the
general anesthesia. The D&C operation lasted for about 10-15 minutes. By 3:40 pm, Teresita was wheeled back to her
room.
A day after the operation (April 29, 1987), Teresita was subjected to an ultrasound examination as a confirmatory
procedure. Results showed that she had an enlarged uterus and myoma uteri. Dr. Felicisma, however, advised Teresita
that she could spend her recovery period at home. Still feeling weak, Teresita opted for hospital confinement.
Teresitas complete lab exam results came only on April 29, 1987. Teresitas urinalysis showed a 3+ indicating that the
sugar in her urine was very high. She was then placed under the care of Dr. Amado Jorge, an internist.
By April 30, 1987, Teresitas condition had worsened. She experienced difficulty breathing and was rushed to the ICU.
Further tests confirmed that she was suffering from DM Type II. Insulin was administered to the patient, but the
medication might have arrived too late.
Due to complications induced by diabetes, Teresita died in the morning of May 6, 1987.
Issue:

Whether or not the decision to proceed with the D&C operation was an honest mistake of judgment OR one amounting to
negligence?
The respondents claim for damages is based on their allegation that the decision of the petitioner spouses to proceed
with the D&C operation, notwithstanding Teresitas condition and lab test results, amounted to negligence.
The petitioner spouses contend that a D&C operation is the proper and accepted procedure to address vaginal
bleeding the medical problem presented to them.
Medical Negligence Case type of claim to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional that has caused bodily harm or
the death of a patient.

4 Elements in a Medical Negligence Case:
1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Injury
4. Proximate Causation

Standard of Care and Breach of Duty
D&C is the classic gynecologic procedure for the evaluation and possible therapeutic treatment for abnormal vaginal
bleeding.
Expert witnesses objected to the time the D&C operation was conducted in Teresitas case. Given Teresitas blood sugar
level, her diabetic condition should have been addressed first.
The petitioner spouses contentions (at the time of the operation, there was nothing to indicate that Teresita was
afflicted with diabetes; their principal concern was to determine the cause and to stop the bleeding) missed several
points:
o 1
st
: As early as April 17, 1987, Teresita was already suspected to be suffering from diabetes. The suspicion that
she had diabetes arose again right before the D&C operation on April 28, 1987.
o 2
nd
: The petitioner spouses were duly advised that the patient was experiencing all the classic symptoms of
diabetes. Expert testimonies showed that tests should have been ordered immediately on admission to the
hospital in view of the symptoms presented. Failure to recognize the existence of diabetes constitutes
negligence.
o 3
rd
: The petitioner spouses cannot claim that their principal concern was the vaginal bleeding and should not
therefore be held accountable for complications coming from other sources. This is a very narrow and self-
serving view that even reflects on their competence.
The court finds that reasonable prudence would have shown that diabetes and its complications were foreseeable
harm that should been taken into consideration by the petitioner spouses. If a patient suffers from some disability that
increases the magnitude of risk to him, that disability must be taken into account so long as it is or should have been
known to the physician. When the patient is exposed to an increased risk, it is incumbent upon the physician to take
commensurate and adequate precautions.
Vaginal bleeding is only rarely so heavy and life-threatening that urgent first aid measures are required. Medical
records of Teresita failed to indicate that there was profuse vaginal bleeding.
That the D&C operation was conducted principally to diagnose the cause of the vaginal bleeding leads the court to
conclude that it is merely an elective procedure, not an emergency case.
The prudent move would have been to address the patients hyperglycemic state immediately and promptly before any
other procedure is undertaken.
The patients hyperglycemic condition should have been managed not only before and during the operation, but also
immediately after.
Above facts point to one conclusion, that the petitioner spouses failed to comply with their duty to observe the
standard of care to be given to hyperglycemic/diabetic patients undergoing surgery.
Injury and Causation
Respondents contend that unnecessarily subjecting Teresita to a D&C operation without adequately preparing her
aggravated her hyperglycemic state and caused her untimely demise.
D&C (a form of physical stress) aggravated diabetes. Surgical stress can aggravate the patients hyperglycemia.
Hyperglycemia if prolonged and unchecked, can lead to death. The patient apparently had diabetic ketoacidosis.
The diabetic complication could have been prevented with the observance of standard medical precautions.
The D&C operation and Teresitas death due to aggravated diabetic condition is therefore sufficiently established.
DECISION
The court did not find the petition meritorious.



















021 Lucas vs Tuano
GR. No. 178763; April 21, 2009
TOPIC: Negligence
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario

AUTHOR: Revy Neri
NOTES:

FACTS:
1. Peter complaining of a red right eye and swollen eyelid made use of his Philamcare for a possible consult.
2. Philamcare referred Peter to respondent Dr. Tuano, an ophthalmologist at St. Lukes Medical Center for an eye consult.
3. Upon consultation with Dr. Tuano, Peter narrated that it had been 9 days since the problem with the right eye began; and that
he was already taking Maxitrol to address the problem in his eye.
4. Dr. Tuano conducted the ocular routine examination. On that particular consultation, Dr. Tuano diagnosed that Peter was
suffering from conjunctivitis or sore eyes.
5. Dr. Tuano then prescribed Spersacet-C eye drops for Peter and told the latter to return for follow-up after one week
6. As instructed, Peter went back to Dr. Tuao. Upon examination, Dr. Tuao told Peter that the "sore eyes" in the latters right
eye had already cleared up and he could discontinue the Spersacet-C. However, the same eye developed Epidemic Kerato
Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection. To address the new problem with Peters right eye, Dr. Tuao prescribed to the former
a steroid-based eye drop called Maxitrol, a dosage of six (6) drops per day. To recall, Peter had already been using Maxitrol
prior to his consult with Dr. Tuao.
7. Peter saw Dr. Tuao for a follow-up consultation. After examining both of Peters eyes, Dr. Tuao instructed the former to
taper down the dosage of Maxitrol, because the EKC in his right eye had already resolved. Dr. Tuao specifically cautioned
Peter that, being a steroid, Maxitrol had to be withdrawn gradually; otherwise, the EKC might recur.
8. However, Peter always experience severe pain his eyes and Dr. Tuano keeps on prescribing him of the same medicine.
9. His wife found out the adverse effect of the prolong usage of the said medicine and inform Dr. Tuano about it but disregard it.
10. Dr. Tuano referred the condition of Peter to his fellow doctor, Dr. Agulto, for further examination.
11. Peters friends advice him to seek second opinion.
12. Peter consulted Dr. Lapuz, an ophthalmologist, who in turn, referred Peter to Dr. Aquino, another ophthalmologist who
specializes in the treatment of glaucoma and who could undertake the long term care of Peters eyes.
13. According to petitioners, after Dr. Aquino conducted an extensive evaluation of Peters eyes, the said doctor informed Peter
that his eyes were relatively normal, though the right one sometimes manifested maximum borderline tension. Dr. Aquino also
confirmed Dr. Tuaos diagnosis of tubular vision in Peters right eye. Petitioners claimed that Dr. Aquino essentially told
Peter that the latters condition would require lifetime medication and follow-ups.
14. Claiming to have steroid-induced glaucoma and blaming Dr. Tuao for the same, Peter, joined by: (1) Fatima, his spouse; (2)
Abbeygail, his natural child; and (3) Gillian, his legitimate child with Fatima filed a civil complaint for damages against Dr.
Tuao
15. In their Complaint, petitioners specifically averred that as the "direct consequence of [Peters] prolonged use of Maxitrol, [he]
suffered from steroid induced glaucoma which caused the elevation of his intra-ocular pressure. The elevation of the intra-
ocular pressure of [Peters right eye] caused the impairment of his vision which impairment is not curable and may even lead
to total blindness."
16. RTC dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence
17. CA affirmed the decision of RTC

ISSUE:
WON Dr. Tuano was negligent in prescribing the medicine to Peter for a long period of time causing the latter to develop a
steroid induced glaucoma

HELD:
NO.
RATIO:
For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of the medical profession, such claim for
damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and
the victim. But just like any other proceeding for damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation, must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order to find the physician
negligent and, thus, liable for damages.
When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is generated. And in accepting a case, the
physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he has the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training, care, and skill in the treatment of the patient. Thus, in treating his
patient, a physician is under a duty to [the former] to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same
general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. Stated otherwise, the
physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent physician would use to treat the
condition under similar circumstances.
This standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best addressed by expert medical testimony, because the standard of care in
a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts in the field.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by the attending physician when the
patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes the actionable malpractice.

Proof of such breach must likewise rest upon
the testimony of an expert witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and
diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise
in like cases.
Even so, proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician is insufficient, for there must be a causal connection between
said breach and the resulting injury sustained by the patient. Put in another way, in order that there may be a recovery for an injury,
it must be shown that the "injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes";

that is, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which,
in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same, in order to establish the proximate cause [of the injury] by a
preponderance of the evidence in a medical malpractice action, [the patient] must similarly use expert testimony, because the
question of whether the alleged professional negligence caused *the patients+ injury is generally one for specialized expert
knowledge beyond the ken of the average layperson; using the specialized knowledge and training of his field, the experts role is to
present to the *court+ a realistic assessment of the likelihood that *the physicians+ alleged negligence caused *the patients+ injury.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the
same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to
the expert opinion of qualified physicians *or surgeons+ stems from the formers realization that the latter possess unusual technical
skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating;

hence, the indispensability of expert testimonies.
In the case at bar, there is no question that a physician-patient relationship developed between Dr. Tuao and Peter when Peter
went to see the doctor on 2 September 1988, seeking a consult for the treatment of his sore eyes. Admittedly, Dr. Tuao, an
ophthalmologist, prescribed Maxitrol when Peter developed and had recurrent EKC. Maxitrol or neomycin/polymyxin B
sulfates/dexamethasone ophthalmic ointment is a multiple-dose anti-infective steroid combination in sterile form for topical
application. It is the drug which petitioners claim to have caused Peters glaucoma.
However, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, "[t]he onus probandi was on the patient to establish before the trial court
that the physicians ignored standard medical procedure, prescribed and administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an
absence of the competence and skills expected of general practitioners similarly situated." Unfortunately, in this case, there was
absolute failure on the part of petitioners to present any expert testimony to establish: (1) the standard of care to be implemented
by competent physicians in treating the same condition as Peters under similar circumstances; (2) that, in his treatment of Peter, Dr.
Tuao failed in his duty to exercise said standard of care that any other competent physician would use in treating the same
condition as Peters under similar circumstances; and (3) that the injury or damage to Peters right eye, i.e., his glaucoma, was the
result of his use of Maxitrol, as prescribed by Dr. Tuao. Petitioners failure to prove the first element alone is already fatal to their
cause.
Petitioners maintain that Dr. Tuao failed to follow in Peters case the required procedure for the prolonged use of Maxitrol. But
what is actually the required procedure in situations such as in the case at bar? To be precise, what is the standard operating
procedure when ophthalmologists prescribe steroid medications which, admittedly, carry some modicum of risk?
Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr. Tuao under the circumstances, we have no means to determine
whether he was able to comply with the same in his diagnosis and treatment of Peter. This Court has no yardstick upon which to
evaluate or weigh the attendant facts of this case to be able to state with confidence that the acts complained of, indeed, constituted
negligence and, thus, should be the subject of pecuniary reparation.
Petitioners assert that prior to prescribing Maxitrol, Dr. Tuao should have determined first whether Peter was a "steroid responder."
Yet again, petitioners did not present any convincing proof that such determination is actually part of the standard operating
procedure which ophthalmologists should unerringly follow prior to prescribing steroid medications.
In contrast, Dr. Tuao was able to clearly explain that what is only required of ophthalmologists, in cases such as Peters, is the
conduct of standard tests/procedures known as "ocular routine examination," composed of five (5) tests/procedures specifically,
gross examination of the eyes and the surrounding area; taking of the visual acuity of the patient; checking the intraocular pressure
of the patient; checking the motility of the eyes; and using ophthalmoscopy on the patients eye and he did all those
tests/procedures every time Peter went to see him for follow-up consultation and/or check-up.
We cannot but agree with Dr. Tuaos assertion that when a doctor sees a patient, he cannot determine immediately whether the
latter would react adversely to the use of steroids; all the doctor can do is map out a course of treatment recognized as correct by the
standards of the medical profession. It must be remembered that a physician is not an insurer of the good result of treatment. The
mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a bad result occurs does not in itself indicate failure to exercise due care. The
result is not determinative of the performance [of the physician] and he is not required to be infallible.
Moreover, that Dr. Tuao saw it fit to prescribe Maxitrol to Peter was justified by the fact that the latter was already using the same
medication when he first came to see Dr. Tuao on 2 September 1988 and had exhibited no previous untoward reaction to that
particular drug.
Also, Dr. Tuao categorically denied petitioners claim that he never monitored the tension of Peters eyes while the latter was on
Maxitrol. Dr. Tuao testified that he palpated Peters eyes every time the latter came for a check-up as part of the doctors ocular
routine examination, a fact which petitioners failed to rebut. Dr. Tuaos regular conduct of examinations and tests to ascertain the
state of Peters eyes negate the very basis of petitioners complaint for damages. As to whether Dr. Tuaos actuations conformed to
the standard of care and diligence required in like circumstances, it is presumed to have so conformed in the absence of evidence to
the contrary.
Even if we are to assume that Dr. Tuao committed negligent acts in his treatment of Peters condition, the causal connection
between Dr. Tuaos supposed negligence and Peters injury still needed to be established. The critical and clinching factor in a
medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiffs
injuries. The plaintiff must plead and prove not only that he has been injured and defendant has been at fault, but also that the
defendants fault caused the injury. A verdict in a malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Causation must
be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.
The causation between the physicians negligence and the patients injury may only be established by the presentation of proof that
Peters glaucoma would not have occurred but for Dr. Tuaos supposed negligent conduct. Once more, petitioners failed in this
regard.
Dr. Tuao does not deny that the use of Maxitrol involves the risk of increasing a patients IOP. In fact, this was the reason why he
made it a point to palpate Peters eyes every time the latter went to see him -- so he could monitor the tension of Peters eyes. But to
say that said medication conclusively caused Peters glaucoma is purely speculative. Peter was diagnosed with open-angle glaucoma.
This kind of glaucoma is characterized by an almost complete absence of symptoms and a chronic, insidious course. In open-angle
glaucoma, halos around lights and blurring of vision do not occur unless there has been a sudden increase in the intraocular
vision.
95
Visual acuity remains good until late in the course of the disease. Hence, Dr. Tuao claims that Peters glaucoma "can only be
long standing x x x because of the large C:D ratio," and that "[t]he steroids provoked the latest glaucoma to be revealed earlier" was a
blessing in disguise "as [Peter] remained asymptomatic prior to steroid application."
Who between petitioners and Dr. Tuao is in a better position to determine and evaluate the necessity of using Maxitrol to cure
Peters EKC vis--vis the attendant risks of using the same?
That Dr. Tuao has the necessary training and skill to practice his chosen field is beyond cavil. Petitioners do not dispute Dr. Tuaos
qualifications that he has been a physician for close to a decade and a half at the time Peter first came to see him; that he has had
various medical training; that he has authored numerous papers in the field of ophthalmology, here and abroad; that he is a
Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Ophthalmology; that he occupies various teaching posts (at the time of the filing of the present
complaint, he was the Chair of the Department of Ophthalmology and an Associate Professor at the University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital and St. Lukes Medical Center, respectively); and that he held an assortment of positions in numerous
medical organizations like the Philippine Medical Association, Philippine Academy of Ophthalmology, Philippine Board of
Ophthalmology, Philippine Society of Ophthalmic Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, Philippine Journal of Ophthalmology,
Association of Philippine Ophthalmology Professors, et al.
It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable
presumption that in proper cases, he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to
his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. In making the judgment call of treating Peters EKC with Maxitrol, Dr. Tuao
took the necessary precaution by palpating Peters eyes to monitor their IOP every time the latter went for a check-up, and he
employed the best of his knowledge and skill earned from years of training and practice.
In contrast, without supporting expert medical opinions, petitioners bare assertions of negligence on Dr. Tuaos part, which
resulted in Peters glaucoma, deserve scant credit.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):






































[G.R. No. 122445. November 18, 1997]
DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, respondents.

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)


FACTS: (chronological order)

The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical malpractice suit, which in simplest term is the
type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional
which has cause bodily harm.i[2] In this jurisdiction, however, such claims are most often brought as a civil
action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,ii[3] and in some instances, as a criminal case under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Codeiii[4] with which the civil action for damages is impliedly instituted. It is
via the latter type of action that the heirs of the deceased sought redress for the petitioner's alleged imprudence
and negligence in treating the deceased thereby causing her death.
On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual
Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said
hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day.iv[9] Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the
petitioner who found a "myoma"v[10] in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23,
1991.vi[11] Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be
operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.vii[12] According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic
was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe
the window and the floor with.viii[13] Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her
mother not to proceed with the operation.ix[14] The following day, before her mother was wheeled into the
operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia
into her office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she
must be operated on as scheduled.x[15]
Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two aunts waited outside the operating room
while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and
instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed
when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood from
the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room. After the lapse of
a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. The operating staff then went inside
the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating
room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia.
Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood
available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia.
Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the
oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San
Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived.xi[16] But
at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable
condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator
and further examined.xii[17] The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of
Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance
arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle
and followed the ambulance.xiii[18]
Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision.xiv[19]
The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology
Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock
and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed petitioner and Dr. Ercillo
that there was nothing he could do to help save the patient.

The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCC and upheld the latter's declaration of
"incompetency, negligence and lack of foresight and skill of appellant (herein petitioner) in handling the subject
patient before and after the operation."xv[24] And likewise affirming the petitioner's conviction, the Court of
Appeals echoed similar observations.


ISSUE(S): Should the conviction be sustained? Is Dr. Ercillo liable for damages?
RATIO: This court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The
elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the
failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is
to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good
standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science.

Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert testimony on the
matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar
operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador,
Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not
venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised.
All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the clinic and its untidiness; the lack of
provisions such as blood, oxygen, and certain medicines; the failure to subject the patient to a cardio-pulmonary
test prior to the operation; the omission of any form of blood typing before transfusion; and even the subsequent
transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner. But while it
may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the courts below seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless
imprudence on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived at not through the educated surmises
nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses . For
whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient
is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion.

Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of provisions;
the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo
Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner do indicate, even without expert testimony, that
petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of
these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence:
that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.
In litigations involving medical negligence , the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence
and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon
as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient.xvi[33] In Chan Lugay v. St
Luke's Hospital, Inc.,xvii[34] where the attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the
complainant's wife and newborn baby, this court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the 'injury for which
recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the
negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes.' In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, 'negligence, no matter in
what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.' And
'the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'''

. This court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense
witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC
which, as attested to by an expert witness , cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The
probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of
this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.

The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of evidence this
Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent
manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life has been lost and the circumstances
leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of
their mother up to the present timexviii[46] and this Court is aware that no amount of compassion and
commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one.
Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in
the instant case.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

































023 Rakes. V. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company
G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907
PONENTE: Tracey, J.
AUTHOR: Pat


FACTS:
1. Plaintiff Rake (black man/negro) works for Atlantic Gulf. With 7 other workers, he was transporting iron rails from a
barge in the harbor to the def. Atlantic Gulfs yard.
2. They were using two cars and each car carried the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the
front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars
but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was
alleged that Atlantics foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. While the
cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, at a certain spot at or near the waters
edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff Rake,
breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
3. Plaintiff Rakes witnesses:
a) that a depression of the track, varying from one half inch to one inch and a half, was thereafter apparent to the eye,
and a fellow workman of the plaintiff swears that the day before the accident he called the attention of McKenna,
the foreman, to it and asked by simply straightening out the crosspiece, resetting the block under the stringer and
renewing the tie, but otherwise leaving the very same timbers as before.
4. Defendant Atlantic Gulfs witnesses:
a) That construction and quality of the track proves that if was up to the general stranded of tramways of that
character, the foundation consisting on land of blocks or crosspieces of wood, by 8 inches thick and from 8 to 10
feet long laid, on the surface of the ground, upon which at a right angle rested stringers of the same thickness, but
from 24 to 30 feet in length. On the across the stringers the parallel with the blocks were the ties to which the
tracks were fastened. After the road reached the waters edge, the blocks or crosspieces were replaced with pilling,
capped by timbers extending from one side to the other. The tracks were each about 2 feet wide and the two inside
rails of the parallel tracks about 18 inches apart. It was admitted that there were no side pieces or guards on the car;
that where no ends of the rails of the track met each other and also where the stringers joined, there were no fish
plates.
5. Defendant Atlantic Gulfs contentions:
a) that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory
the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the
tract, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily
by his employer.
b) that the injury resulted to the plaintiff Rake is a risk incident to his employment and, as such, is one assumed by
him.
c) That they specifically ordered their workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the
cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip
d) that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired
6. Lower court: ruled in favor of plaintiff Rakes and is entitled to P5,000 for damages. It held that the cause of the
sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie, which was the immediate occasion of the accident, is not clear in the
evidence, but is the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the water of the bay raised by a recent
typhoon. No effort was made to repair the injury at the time of the occurrence. It has not proven that the company
inspected the track after the typhoon or had any proper system of inspection. In order to charge the defendant with
negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty on its part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to
vehicles transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect
and repair the roadway as soon as the depression in it became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant Atlantic to
repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition.

ISSUE(S):
1. WON there was negligence on plaintiff Rakes part which contributed to the injury. YES.
2. WON def. Atlantic Gulf is liable to plaintiff Rake for damages. YES.

HELD: The judgment of the trial court, fixing the damage incurred at 5,000 pesos, we deduct therefrom 2,500 pesos, the
amount fairly attributable to his negligence, and direct judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff.

1. Rakes could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee who swore he notified the foreman
about said damage. His lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his
part. BUT, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact
there were orders from the company barring workers from standing near the side of the cars.

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes
of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it,
but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it.

This produced the event giving occasion for damages that is, the shrinking of the track and the sliding of the iron
rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an
element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his
act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which
he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors,
he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover
the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.

2. It was the duty of the defendant to build and to maintain its track in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its
workingmen from unnecessary danger. It is plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty, otherwise the
accident could not have occurred; consequently the negligence of the defendant is established.

RATIO:
Nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his
workmen. His obligation therefore is one not punished by the law and falls under civil rather than criminal
jurisprudence.

Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the inured party should seek out
a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.

Two kinds of culpa (Extracontractual or culpa aquiliana & contractual or culpacontractual):

We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two difference senses; either
as culpa, substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two persons not
formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an obligation; or as already existed,
which can not be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already exiting
obligation.

Of these two species of culpa the first one mentioned, existing by itself, may be also considered as a real source of an
independent obligation, and, as chapter 2, title 16 of this book of the code is devoted to it, it is logical to presume that
the reference contained in article 1093 is limited thereto and that it does not extend to those provisions relating to the
other species of culpa (negligence).






































024 Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario
73 Phil 607
TOPIC: Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from
Crimes
PONENTE: Bocobo, J.

AUTHOR: LCV
There is need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual
character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation.

This case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the
present Civil Code. However, the principle enunciated in said
case, that responsibility for fault or negligence as quasi-delict
is distinct and separate from negligence penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, is now specifically embodied in Art. 2177
of the Civil Code.


Quick Summary:
A 16-year old boy, one of the passengers of a caretela, who died as a result of a collision with a recklessly driven taxi. In the criminal
action, the parents of the victim reserved their right to file a separate civil action. After conviction of the driver with the charge of
homicide thru reckless imprudence, they proceeded to file a separate civil action against the taxi-owner based on Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code. The taxi-driver met this with the argument that the driver having been convicted of criminal negligence, Article 100
in relation to Articles 102-o3 of the Revised Penal Code should govern his liability, which, pursuant to said provisions is only
subsidiary, but since the driver has not been sued in a civil action and his property not yet exhausted, the plaintiffs have no recourse
against him.

FACTS:
1. At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there
was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro
Dimapalis.
2. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died
two days later.
3. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
4. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved.
5. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario,
parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as
the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of
Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.
6. CA modified the decision by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is
undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at
high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the
Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be
public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly,
responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
HELD: Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code,
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this principle, and
on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely
anchored.

Barredo is not only subsidiary liable. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent
employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven
that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already
before he hired him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action,
Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his
drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903)

RATIO: - SC ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that a quasi-delict is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.

- Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code of the Philippines is entirely distinct and
independent from a delict or crime under the Revised Penal Code. In this jurisdiction, the same negligent act causing damage
may produce civil liability (subsidiary) arising from a crime under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines;
or create an action for quasi-delicto or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2179 and 2180 of the Civil Code and the parties are free
to choose which course to take. And in the instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla produces two (2) liabilities of Barredo:
First, a subsidiary one because of the civil liability of Fontanilla arising from the latters criminal negligence under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code, and second, Barredos primary and direct responsibility arising from his presumed negligence as
an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Since the plaintiffs are free to choose what remedy to take, they preferred
the second, which is within their rights. This is the more expedious and effective method of relief because Fontanilla was
either in prison or just been released or had no property. Barredo was held liable for damages.

- The Court in that case tried or sought to enlarge the field of tort or culpa aquiliana, believing that the remedy provided by the
penal code for the recovery of damages by the party damaged is more burdensome and difficult, particularly in the amount or
extent of proof to establish his rights to damages, because to establish the guilt of the offender guilty of negligence, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is required, whereas in a purely civil action to recover the same damages under Arts. 1902 and 1903
of the Civil Code, only preponderance of the evidence is required.

- The liability sought to be imposed upon the employer in that case was not a civil obligation arising from a felony or
misdemeanor (crime committed by Pedro Fontanilla) but an obligation imposed by Art. 1903 of the Civil Code because of his
negligence in the selection and supervision of his servants or employees.






























025 Francisco Diana and Soledad Diana vs. Batangas
Transporation Co.
[G.R. No. L-4920; June 29, 1953]
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Bautista Angelo, J.
AUTHOR: RC Alfafara
NOTE/S:
Stemmed from a case instituted in the CFI of Laguna where
plaintiffs seek to recover damages from defendant as a party
subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by an employee
in the discharge of his duty.
FACTS:
1. Plaintiffs are the heirs of Florenio Diana, a former employee of the defendant.
2. While Florenio was riding in Truck No. 14 owned by the defendant and driven by Vivencio Bristol, the truck ran into a
ditch at Bay, Laguna, resulting in the death of Florenio and other passengers.
3. Subsequently, Bristol was charged and convicted of multiple homicide through reckless imprudence. (Ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000.)
4. When the decision became final, a writ of execution was issued. However, the sheriff filed a return stating that the
accused had no visible leviable property.
5. The present case was started when defendant failed to pay the indemnity under its subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of
the RPC. (A complaint was filed.)
6. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. (Ground: Another action was pending between the same parties for the same cause
where the same plaintiffs sought to recover from the same defendant the amount of P4,500 as damages resulting from the
death of Florenio who died while on board a truck of defendant due to the negligent act of the driver Vivencio Bristol. (The
first action was predicated on culpa aquiliana.) >> Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the MTD.
7. CFI: Dismissed the complaint. (MR Denied.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court correctly dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that there was another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause under Rule 8, section 1(d) of the ROC.
HELD:
No, a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. (REMANDED.)

RATIO:
1. Rule 8, section 1(d) of the ROC allows the dismissal of a case on the ground that: "there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause." Former Chief Justice Moran, commenting on this ground, says: "In order
that this ground may be invoked, there must be between the action under consideration and the other action, (1) identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity on the two preceding particulars should be such that any
judgment which may be rendered on the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration."
2. There is no doubt with regard to the identity of parties. In both cases, the plaintiffs and the defendant are the same. With
regard to the identity of reliefs prayed for, a different consideration should be made. It should be noted that the present
case (civil case No. 9221) stems from a criminal case in which the driver of the defendant was found guilty of multiple
homicide through reckless imprudence and was ordered to pay an indemnity of P2,000 for which the defendant is made
subsidiarily liable under article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, while the other case (civil case No. 8023) is an action for
damages based on culpa aquiliana which underlies the civil liability predicated on articles 1902 to 1910 of the old Civil
Code.
3. The two cases involve two different remedies. As this court aptly said: "A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime. . . . A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
4. The other differences pointed out between crimes and culpa aquiliana are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law
clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence
intervenes.
5. Considering the distinguishing characteristics of the two cases, which involve two different remedies, it can hardly be
said that there is identity of reliefs in both actions as to make the present case fall under the operation of Rule 8, section 1
(d) of the Rules of Court.
6. It is a mistake to say that the present action should be dismissed because of the pendency of another action between the
same parties involving the same cause. Evidently, both cases involve different causes of action. In fact, when the Court of
Appeals dismissed the action based on culpa aquiliana, this distinction was stressed. It was there said that the negligent act
committed by defendants employee is not a quasi crime, for such negligence is punished by law. What plaintiffs should
have done was to institute an action under article 103 of the RPC. And this is what plaintiffs have done.
7. To deprive them of this remedy, after the conviction of defendants employee, would be to deprive them altogether of
the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a court decision, which injustice it is our duty to prevent.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:


















026 DIONISIO CARPIO vs. HON. SERGIO
DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV,
Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE
[G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989]
TOPIC: Negligence (Culapa-Aquiliana Dinstinguished
from Crimes)
PONENTE: PARAS, J.

AUTHOR:


FACTS:
1. Private respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio,
bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street. As a consequence, the latter suffered from a fractured left
clavicle as reflected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period
of (3) three months.
2. An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against Edwin.
3. The accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information.
4. The accused was likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00 representing
the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; P200.00 for hospitalization fees; Pl,500.00 for attorney's fees; and, to pay the
cost of this suit.
5. A writ of execution was duly served upon the accused. However, the writ was returned unsatisfied due to the
insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriffs return. Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution
against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle.
6. Petitioner contends that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the judgment, because if a case were
to be filed against said operator, the court has no other function than to render a decision based on the indemnity award
in the criminal case without power to amend or modify it even if in his opinion an error has been committed in the
decision. Petitioner maintains that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same
proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that
said employer was not made a party in the criminal action.
7. Respondent argues that the owner-operator cannot be validly held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons: (a) the
matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b) the injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise from
the so-called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the judgments of appellate courts may not be altered,
modified, or changed by the court of origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party to the criminal proceedings.
8. Petitioners writ of execution against respondent was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of
the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls
under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual."
9. CA affirmed.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding
against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.

HELD: The filing of a separate civil action against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since
his liability is clear from the decision against the accused in the criminal proceeding.


RATIO:
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal Code, which
reads thus: Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is
quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability
emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The
present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be
regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it
should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the
offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent. The subsidiary liability of the employer, however,
arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes
ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency.
Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these requirements.
The Court is not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day in court because the case is not one
wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent upon his employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the
subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case.
Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution
proceedings against the employee. Thus, the argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable
because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and the appellate court's decision made no mention
of such subsidiary liability is of no moment.
As already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is
not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not
indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability
is already implied from the appellate court's decision.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary liability of
employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the
liability emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present
case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a civil action for
the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code.



















027 FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO. VS. CA
[G.R. NUMBER 108164; DATE February 23, 1995]
TOPIC: NEGLIGENCE
PONENTE: VITUG, J.

AUTHOR: CARAG, J.R.
NOTES: (if applicable)


FACTS: (chronological order)

1. Some time in October 1986, private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD
issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC"). Upon his request, the bank also issued a
supplemental card to private respondent Clarita S. Luna.
2. In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost card,
Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy
would appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or
"Cancelled Card" in its master file.
3. In October 6, 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a Filipino-American, and another guest at
the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his
FAREASTCARD to the waiter who promptly had it verified. The card was not honored by the bank upon
verification, and Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by
this incident.
4. Luis sent a letter to the bank, demanding FEBTC to pay damages. The bank expressed their apologies and owned
up to their mistake; and sent a letter also to the Bahia Rooftop, informing them of the misunderstanding
5. Still not satisfied with the apology, Respondent Luna filed a case for damages. The trial court rendered a decision
ordering Petitioners to pay respondents 300,000php in moral damages, and 50,000php in exemplary damages; as
well as attorneys fees
6. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision

ISSUE(S): Whether or not Private Respondents are entitled to moral damages
HELD: No.

RATIO:
1. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or
with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides:
a. Art. 2220.Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
b. Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.
2. Concededly, the bank admits in neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the
findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the
part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal
notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
3. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will
4. Even if Article 21, which states: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage, is applied, it still
contemplates a conscious act to cause harm.
5. Article 21s application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so
deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith.
6. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must, in
any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral
damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith
7. Even if the court applies the doctrine that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that
might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort, it cannot improve private
respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an
actionable tort independently of the contract.
8. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where,
without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable
tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions
to the case.
9. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such
agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an
independent actionable tort.
10. The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made by the court a quo, affirmed by the appellate court,
to be inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable
tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the
case.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):













028Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. v. Glodel
Brokerage Corp.
G.R. No. 179446, 10 January 2011
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.

AUTHOR: Sarah
NOTES:

FACTS:
1. R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric
copper cathodes against All Risks.
2. Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the
subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants.
3. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes
to Columbias warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.
4. The goods were loaded on board twelve trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and
accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Six truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas,
Bulacan, while the other six truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City.
4.1 The cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbias warehouses there. Of the
six trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five reached the destination.
4.2 One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo.
5. Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39. The latter
paid the insurance indemnity.
6. R&B Insurance filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel
6.1 It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed
that it had been subrogated to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held
legally liable for the loss.
7. RTC: Glodel is liable for damages for the loss of the cargo.
8. CA: Since Loadmasters is an agent of Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to R&B Insurance Corporation as
indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by Loadmasters.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not Loadmasters and Glodel are liable to R&B Insurance for the amount of the indemnity paid to
Columbia.
HELD:
1. Yes. Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them
according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. The Court is of the
view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the
subject cargo.

RATIO:
1. Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its
trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally
undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public.
2. In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. In its
Memorandum, it states that it is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines and is engaged in the business of customs brokering.
3. Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them
according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the Court
speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual
prudence and circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property or rights. This exacting
standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the
shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have been lodged for shipment. Thus, in case of
loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This
presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed
extraordinary diligence over the goods.
4. The Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive
them.
5. Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to
R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, the responsibility
of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
6. It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck
driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters
should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned
task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.
7. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or
supervision (culpa in vigilando)of its employees.

To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee,
an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. In this regard, Loadmasters
failed.
8. Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters
would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated destination. It
should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures, such as
providing escorts to accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with
Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):












029 LRTA vs. Navidad
G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003
PONENTE: VITUG, J.
AUTHOR: De Guzman, Bien


FACTS:
1. On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered
the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing
on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how
Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
2. On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed
a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization,
Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against
Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
3. RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin.
4. CA reversed the decision. The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet
boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting
Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad.
It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely
established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the
LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert
evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable to respondents for damages?
HELD:
RATIO:
LRTA Liability
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy,
is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due
regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented
or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent,
andby simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or
of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners,
according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,[10] an exception
from the general rule that negligence must be proved.

The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the
breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail
itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

Prudents Liability
A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in
culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort
may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Romans Liability
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he
must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a
juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or
wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common
carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):














030 SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C.
SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA
LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS
and LEONARDO FERRER,petitioners, vs. HON.
NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN,
and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.,
represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS,
President/Chairman, respondents.

[G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005]

TOPIC:

PONENTE: Tinga, J.

AUTHOR: Rikki
NOTES:



FACTS:
1. 1994 - Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and
Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by
Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its passengers,
including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans passengers.
2. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate
civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision
promulgated on December 17, 1998.
3. 2000 - Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q.
Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil action.
4. Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper service of summons, prescription and
laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as
defendant in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its officers.
5. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the cause of action had already prescribed. According to the
trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from
the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate
civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
6. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the complaint is not based on quasi delict but
on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the
judgment.
7. The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reiterating that petitioners cause of action was based on
quasi delict and had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed more than four
(4) years after the vehicular accident.
8. PETITIONERS insists that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is not based on
quasi delict.
9. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS insist that the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription was in order. They
point out that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180
of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4) years should be reckoned from the time the accident took
place.
ISSUE(S): Has the action prescribed?

HELD: NO.


RATIO:
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime
committed by Sibayan.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman. Petitioners
assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private respondents civil liability arising from
crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court dismissed

within four (4) years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
In cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from
crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and
culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an
action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil
Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar
proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
IMPORTANT: At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by
their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the
action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
The trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the
complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising
from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):























31 Cancio vs. Isip
GR No. 133978
KC

1. Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22 and three cases of Estafa,
against respondent for allegedly issuing checks without sufficient funds
2. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed the 3 Criminal Cases for Violation of B.P. No. 22.
3. Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with the RTC of Pampanga.
4. On October 21, 1997, after failing to present its second witness, the prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa cases
against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its right to file a separate civil action arising from the said
criminal cases.
5. On the same date, the trial court granted the motions of the prosecution, let these cases be dismissed without
prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect of the cases.
6. On December 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum of money, seeking to recover the amount
of the checks subject of the estafa cases.
7. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that petitioners action is barred by the doctrine
of res judicata.
8. RTC: found in favor of respondent and dismissed the complaint. The court held that the dismissal of the criminal
cases against respondent on the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the merits
which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection. It further held that the filing of said civil case
amounted to forum-shopping.
9. RTC: denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[8]
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for
collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases
HELD: NO, Petitioners cause of action is the respondents breach of the contractual obligation.
1. It matters not that petitioner claims his cause of action to be one based on delict. The nature of a cause of action is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. Neither does it matter that the
civil action reserved in the October 21, 1997 order of the trial court was the civil action ex delicto.

2. To reiterate, an independent civil action arising from contracts, as in the instant case, may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action.

3. Under the present Rules, independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even
without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a
waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code

4. Under Article 31 of the Civil Code *w+hen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, [e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

5. in Vitola, et al. v. Insular Bank of Asia and America,the Court, applying Article 31 of the Civil Code, held that a civil
case seeking to recover the value of the goods subject of a Letter of Credit-Trust Receipt is a civil action ex
contractu and not ex delicto. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the offender
and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.

6. One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the
action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a
ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely
different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.









032 Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom
G.R. No. 143360. September 5, 2002
TOPIC:
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.

AUTHOR:
NOTES:



1. On July 17, 1994, Raul Tutor crashed the tractor he was driving into the house of private respondent Myrna
Tamayo in Tondo, Manila.
2. As a result of the collision, a portion of the house was destroyed, two kids were pinned to death under the engine
of the tractor, and two adults and two more kids were injured.
3. Tutor was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple
physical injuries.
4. Upon verification with the LTO, the vehicle is registered to petitioner Equitable Leasing and leased to Ecatine
Corporation represented by Edwin Lim.
5. The aggrieved parties filed a complaint for damages against Raul Tutor, Ecatine and the petitioner.
6. On failing to locate and summon the rest of the accused, only the petitioner was impleaded.
7. The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine, hence, is it no longer in their possession
and control at the time of the incident; and Tutor was an employee of Ecatine.
8. RTC- ordered petitioner to pay actual and moral damages and attorneys fees to respondents. It held that since the
Deed of Sale between petitioner and Ecatine had not been registered with the Land Transportation Office (LTO),
the legal owner was still Equitable. Thus, petitioner was liable to respondents.
9. CA - petitioner was still to be legally deemed the owner/operator of the tractor, even if that vehicle had been the
subject of a Deed of Sale in favor of Ecatine on December 9, 1992. The reason cited by the CA was that the
Certificate of Registration on file with the LTO still remained in petitioners name. In order that a transfer of
ownership of a motor vehicle can bind third persons, it must be duly recorded in the LTO.

ISSUE(S): Whether Equitable Leasing is liable for damages?
HELD: Yes. In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is solidarily liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the negligence of the driver, in spite of the fact that the vehicle may have already been the subject
of an unregistered Deed of Sale in favor of another person. Unless registered with the Land Transportation Office, the sale
-- while valid and binding between the parties -- does not affect third parties, especially the victims of accidents involving
the said transport equipment. Thus, in the present case, petitioner, which is the registered owner, is liable for the acts of
the driver employed by its former lessee who has become the owner of that vehicle by virtue of an unregistered Deed of
Sale
1. We hold petitioner liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of the
tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994.
2. The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the
lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the
employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent. The same principle
applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service. Thus, Equitable, the
registered owner of the tractor, is -- for purposes of the law on quasi delict -- the employer of Raul Tutor, the
driver of the tractor. Ecatine, Tutors actual employer, is deemed as merely an agent of Equitable.
3. Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the deaths
and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.
4. The finance-lease agreement between Equitable on the one hand and Lim or Ecatine on the other has already been
superseded by the sale. In any event, it does not bind third persons.
**** On the issue on the award of moral damages to private respondent
Petitioner further claims that it is not liable for moral damages, because respondents failed to establish or show the
causal connection or relation between the factual basis of their claim and their wrongful act or omission, if any.
Moral damages - designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer
Viewed as an action for quasi delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2), which
provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict. Having established the liability of petitioner as
the registered owner of the vehicle, respondents have satisfactorily shown the existence of the factual basis for the
award and its causal connection to the acts of Raul Tutor, who is deemed as petitioners employee. Indeed, the
damages and injuries suffered by respondents were the proximate result of petitioners tortious act or omission
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

























033 PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and TRAVELLERS MULTI-
INDEMNITY CORPORATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988]
TOPIC:
PONENTE: SARMIENTO, J.

AUTHOR: Kikoy
NOTES: (if applicable)


FACTS:
- Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, he and a companion were repairing the
tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway. Defendant's truck
driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized.
Due to said injuries, his left leg was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk.
- Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano.
Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said
truck; that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in
installing the early warning device,
- Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving, he checked the
truck. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro
Layugan, plaintiff, while the same was at a stop position. From the evidence presented, it has been established clearly that
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. Serrano also testified that, When I
was a few meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not
function with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the
breaks did not function.
- Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent, and
says that absent such proof of care, it would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of negligence
on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of
the said truck.


ISSUE(S):
1. WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent - NO
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case - NO
RATIO:
1 NO
- (Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this Court unless it
falls down under the exceptions provided by the Court to merit review of the facts.
Reasoning
- This is a question of fact. But this case is an exception since: 1) the finding are grounded entirely on speculation, surmise,
or conjecture; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken, 3) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 4) CA
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; 5) the said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; and 6) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted on record. Hence, SC entertained review of the factual question.
- (Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Reasoning
[1] Negligence defined. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do
[2] Applying the definition and the test, it is clear that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established
by clear and convincing evidence. Whether cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the road is
immaterial taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the back of
the truck. But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a
direct consequence of such accident Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
2. NO
Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an issue in this case. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. But as far as were
concerned and relevant to our discussion in the outline, I formulated it in an issue-type. This is what the Court actually said
in the case to prove its just obiter, and its relevant to the main issue on negligence: At this juncture, it may be enlightening
and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur.
Obiter
[1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two ways to put it:
(a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management
use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care, and
(b) According to Blacks Law dictionary, Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa
loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident
happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of
negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and
control of alleged wrongdoer.
[2] In our jurisdiction, and the way we apply it in cases, particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of
evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without
direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but
merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what shall be
prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine
can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
So, it is inapplicable where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence
which is the cause of the injury, or where theres direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. And once the actual cause of injury is established beyond
controversy, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no
inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence.
In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant
driver.
Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against private respondents.


034 EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the
minors RIANNA and REIANNE RAYNERA, petitioners, vs. FREDDIE
HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA,respondents.
AUTHOR: Loi La Chica
NOTE/S:
FACTS:
1. Edna A. Raynera was the widow of Reynaldo Raynera and the mother and legal guardian of the minors Rianna
and Reianne
2. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were the owner and driver, respectively, of an Isuzu truck-trailer, with plate No.
NXC 848, involved in the accident.
3. March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a
motorcycle travelling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa.
4. The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30km/hr and loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on
both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about
35 watts each, on both sides of the metal plates.
5. The asphalt road was not well lighted.
6. Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail
lights.
7. Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo rushed him to the Paraaque Medical
Center.
8. Dr. Marivic Aguirre pronounced Reynaldo dead on arrival
9. Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department, Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation. He was 32 years
old, had a life expectancy of 65 years, and an annual net earnings of not less than P73,500.00 with a potential
increase in annual net earnings of not less than ten percent (10%) of his salary.
10. The heirs of the deceased demanded from respondents payment of damages arising from the death of
Reynaldo as a result of the vehicular accident.
11. The respondents refused to pay the claims.
12. Petitioners filed with RTC Manila a complaint for damages
13. Respondents answer: Truck was travelling slowly on the service road, not parked improperly at a dark portion of
the road, with no tail lights, license plate and early warning device.
14. At the trial, Virgilio Santos testified for petitioner that at about 1:00 and 2:00 in the morning of March 23, 1989,
he and his wife went to Alabang market, on board a tricycle. They passed by the service road going south, and
saw a parked truck trailer, with its hood open and without tail lights. They would have bumped the truck but
the tricycle driver was quick in avoiding a collision. The place was dark, and the truck had no early warning
device to alert passing motorists.
15. Truck helper Lucelo testified for the respondent that truck was slowly travelling at approximately 20-30km/hr.
16. Auto-mechanic Rogoberto Reyes testified that at about 3am of the previous day, with the help of Lucelo, he
installed 2 pairs of red lights, about 30-40 watts each, on both sides of the steel plates.
17. Traffic investigation officer Cpl. Virgilio del Monte admitted that these lights were visible at a distance of 100
meters.
18. RTC Manila: Favored Reyneras.
(1) the truck trailer had no license plate and tail lights;
(2) there were only two pairs of red lights, 50 watts each, on both sides of the steel plates
(3) the truck trailer was improperly parked in a dark area.
- Respondents negligence - immediate and proximate cause of Reynaldos death (80%)
- Reynaldo - only contributory negligence, reduced responsibility of respondents (20%)
19. CA: Reversed RTC Manila
- Factual finding of RTC are not final in this case.
- Reynaldos bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the proximate cause of his death
20. Heirs contend:
- Respondents negligent operation of the Isuzu truck was the proximate cause of the victims death
- The doctrine of last clear chance should apply

ISSUE:
Whether respondents were negligent, and if so, (b) whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the death
of Reynaldo Raynera

HELD:
NO. Affirmed CA. No other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle
into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.
RATIO:
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something, which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do.
It was established that the truck had no tail lights. Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents truck
was visible in the highway and was travelling at a moderate speed. They still complied with the Land Transportation
Traffic Code (RA No. 4136) -- installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicles cargo load extended
beyond the bed or body thereof.
Reynaldo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His
motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service
road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.
Virgilio Santos testimony strengthened respondents defense that it was the victim who was reckless and negligent in
driving his motorcycle at high speed. The tricycle where Santos was on board was not much different from the victims
motorcycle that figured in the accident.
It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear
vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
The responsibility to avoid the collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle.

NOTES:
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something, which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do.




















PRECIOLITA CORLISS V MANILA RAILROAD CO.
G.R. No. L-21291 March 28, 1969
TOPIC
PONENTE: FERNANDO, J.
AUTHOR: Jade

FACTS:
Preciolita V. Corliss was the wife of the late Ralph W. Corliss the victim.
Ralph Corliss died at the age of 21, when the jeep he was driving collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad
Company on February 21, 1957, close to midnight.
The accident happened at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force
Base.
The lower court dismissed Preciolitas complaint for recovery of damages after concluding from evidence that
Ralph, in his eagerness to beat the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side,
but unfortunately became the victim of his own miscalculation.
The damages sought by Preciolita reached the sum of P282,065.40.
Due to the dismissal of the case, Preciolita appealed to the Supreme Court.
Facts according to the Decision of the Lower Court:
Preciolita, 19 years old, married Ralph, 21 years old in December 1956.
Ralph was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base.
At the time of the accident, Ralph was driving the fatal jeep and he was with a PC soldier.
Ralph died of serious burns at the Base Hospital the next day, while the PC soldier sustained serious
physical injuries and burns.
Declaration of Preciolitas witness, Ronald J. Ennis through a deposition:
At the time of the accident, Ennis was also awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field,
which was about 40-50 yards away from the tracks. From there, he saw the jeep coming towards the
Base.
The jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing. It made a brief stop (but not dead stop).
While it was slowing down, Ralph shifted into first gear.
Ennis was able to see the train coming from the direction of San Fernando and he heard a warning but
not sufficient enough to avoid the accident.
Declaration of Preciolitas other witness, Virgilio de la Paz:
De la Paz was at the Balibago checkpoint on the night of February 21, 1957 and saw the train coming
from Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction of Clark Field.
He heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep caught fire.
He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard the sound of the horn. The jeep did not stop at
the railroad crossing.
Testimony of Teodorico Capili, the operator of the locomotive:
The locomotive was inspected and found to be in good condition.
When it approached the crossing (about 300 meters away), he blew the siren and repeated it in
compliance with the regulations until he saw a jeep suddenly spurt.
Although the locomotive was running between 20-25 kilometers an hour and although he had applied
the brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is negligence on the part of Manila Railroad

HELD: There was no negligence on the part of Manila Railroad. Negligence was found to be on the part of Ralph
Corliss. The dismissal of plaintiffs action for damages was affirmed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of November 29, 1962 dismissing the complaint,
is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

RATIO:

The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great respect. After all, the
lower court had the opportunity of weighing carefully what was testified to and apparently did not neglect it. As was
held in a 1961 decision: "We have already ruled, that when the credibility of witnesses is the one at issue, the trial
court's judgment as to their degree of credence deserves serious consideration by this Court."


It is well-settled that in the absence of compelling reasons, its determination is best left to the trial judge why had the
advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor on the witness stand.
This action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done.

Unless it could be satisfactorily
shown, therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable.
Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo

and United States v. Barias. Thus: "Judge
Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be: "The failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand
whereby such other person suffers injury."
There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus: "Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of
the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is
great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances."
A railroad track is in itself a warning or a signal of danger to those who go upon it, and that those who, for reasons of
their own ignore such warning, do so at their own risk and responsibility. Ralph, who undoubtedly had crossed the
checkpoint frequently, must have known that locomotive engines and trains usually pass at that particular crossing
where the accident took place.
Based on testimonies or witnesses, on Ralphs knowledge and his familiarity with the checkpoint and the existence of
the tracks, and on the fact the locomotive had blown its siren/whistle which was heard by witnesses, it was clear that
Ralph was sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible
accident. Ralph simply had to stop his vehicle before the crossing and allow the train to move on. A prudent man
under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner, unfortunately, Ralph did not.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
US v. Manlabat & Pasibi Doctrine: A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road
crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost
immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs and injury
results. Considering the purposes and the general methods adopted for the management of railroads and railroad
trains, we think it is incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing and
hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do everything
that a reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track.
Mestres v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light C. Doctrine: Where a person is nearing a street crossing toward which a
car is approaching, the duty is on the party to stop and avoid a collision who can most readily adjust himself to the
exigencies of the case, and where such person can do so more readily, the motorman has a right to presume that such
duty will be performed."
Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. Goodman: To 'lay down a standard once for all,' which would require an automobile
driver approaching a railroad crossing with an obstructed view to stop, look and listen, and if he cannot be sure
otherwise that no train is coming to get out of the car. The basic idea behind this is sound enough: it is by no means
proper care to cross a railroad track without taking reasonable precautions against a train, and normally such
precautions will require looking, hearing, and a stop, or at least slow speed, where the view is obstructed.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION: