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Matthew Johnson
Dr. Homan
Phil 103
9/28/14

Our Moral Obligation:

Peter Singer strongly believes that the more fortunate have an obligation to
help those in need so long as it does not hurt them in any way. Peter Singer uses this
claim to bring up the argument of whether or not it is our duty to help those in need.
Singer states, if it is in our power to prevent something very bad happening,
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we ought to
do it. (Singer 229).
Singer introduces his argument with an example about a drowning child.
Singer explains that it is his moral obligation to help the child who is drowning so
long as it does not put himself in danger. Singer brings up the point that although
you may ruin your clothes, or be late for lecture, compared to the life of a human
these things become insignificant (Singer 229). In Singers argument he uses the
example of a drowning boy to compare him to people suffering from absolute
poverty.
Absolute poverty can be defined as a condition characterized by severe
deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation
facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends not only on income
but also on access to services (Poverty 1). Singers argument is that it is within the
power of the affluent to reduce absolute poverty, without sacrificing anything of
comparable moral significance. (Singer 229). Singer believes that it is just as
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important to help someone in absolute poverty, as it is to help someone who is
drowning.
Singers main argument is that we ought to prevent some absolute poverty.
In order to satisfy this argument it is our job to help out where we can. Singer is not
saying that we need to wipe out absolute poverty as a whole, but to simply help out
where we can. Singer states, for the point is not whether my personal contribution
will make any noticeable impression on world poverty as a whole, but whether it
will prevent some poverty. (Singer 229). When put this way Singers argument
becomes much more agreeable and also possible to achieve.
Every argument has a counter argument or objection and Singers is no
different. He deals with several different objections including, taking care of our
own, our individual property rights, and population and the ethics of triage. Singer
responds to each of these objections with his own counter argument.
The first objection with Singers argument is, We should look after those
near us, our families and then the poor in our own country, before we think about
poverty in distant places. (Singer 230). Singers original argument states simply
that absolute poverty is bad and we should do something to present it, he does not
say where to prevent it first. Singer responds to this objection by saying that it is
difficult to see any sound moral justification for the view that distance, or
community membership, makes a crucial difference to our obligations. Singer
brings up an example that has to do with race. He raises the question, should
whites help poor whites before helping poor blacks? (Singer 230) Clearly this is
outrageous and we should help those who need it most regardless of race. It is for
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this reason that we should offer help to where it is needed most throughout the
world.
The second objection to Singers argument brings up the theories of Robert
Nozick, and his view on property. Nozick claims that, provided one has acquired
ones property without the use of unjust means like force and fraud, one my be
entitled to enormous wealth while others starve. (Singer 230). However there are
other views that state that if one man has a surplus the surplus should be given to
the poor. Singer responds by saying Nozicks claim is unethical. Singer is saying that
in many cases it is not the persons choice to be in absolute poverty, it was simply the
hand they were dealt. It is for this reason that the more fortunate have an obligation
to help those in need.
Another objection to Singers argument has to do with population and the
ethics of triage. The claim is made that the main cause to absolute poverty is
overpopulation, and helping those in poverty now will only ensure that more people
will be born into this poverty (Singer 231). This objection brings up triage, which in
this objection means that we would not help those who will be fine without our
help, and we would not help those who are too far gone, but that we would help
only those where the aid would mean the difference between success and failure.
Singer responds by later saying that this is unjust because it would mean that we
would sit and watch millions starve while we do nothing.
An objection to this argument that Singer did not respond to is how this aid
would be distributed and in what way. What I mean by this is if we were to give aid
who would decide what the aid is used for? Would it be money given directly to
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those in need which would make them responsible for how they use it, or would it
be given to the government for them to decide? If it were given directly to the
people how do we know that this money is going directly to the betterment of these
people, or if they are using it frivolously. A counterargument to this would be that
regardless of where the aid is sent or how it is used, the only thing that matters is
that the aid was given in the first place because it is an obligation of the affluent
according to Singer.
Singer makes a very strong argument that I agree with. I think that it is an
obligation to help out those in need if you are able to do so financially. Not only does
it make you feel better about yourself, but it also makes the world a better place in
the end. It is pointless to live a life of luxury and spend frivolously on things you
dont need if there are people around you who are suffering from absolute poverty.
Instead of buying another car, or a lake house, you should donate money to the
people whos lives depend on it.


















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Works Cited:

"Absolute and Overall Poverty." Home. N.p., n.d. Web. 29 Sept. 2014.

Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979. 229-32. Print.