Zoe Atlas

Chapter 4
MG 610

Groupthink: The Desperate Drive for Consensus at Any Cost

Janis looks at events in US history such as the Korean War, Vietnam War and Pearl
Harbor attacks from the standpoint of group dynamics. Case studies show the following two
concepts: (1) phenomena of social conformity and pressures of the cohesive group against a
dissidents objections and (2) the bolstering of morale at the expense of critical thinking.
Groupthink is defined as the deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral
judgments as a result of group pressures. Janis states that the primary danger is that a group
member will think a proposal is good without considering and scrutinizing the pros and cons of
the alternatives. In groupthink as conformity increases as group cohesiveness increases. In
addition, groupthink involves non-deliberate suppression of critical thoughts as a result of
internalization of the groups norms. As cohesion grows, members are more likely to believe in
whatever is proposed by the leader or the majority of the group. Finally, in groupthink, there is a
suppression of deviant thoughts.
In his article, Janus identifies eight symptoms of groupthink: invulnerability, rationale,
morality, stereotypes, pressure, self-censorship, unanimity, and mindguards. The first symptom
of groupthink is invulnerability. This has to do with the idea that most members of the in-group
share an illusion of invulnerability that provides them some degree of reassurance about obvious
dangers and leads them to become over-optimistic and willing to take extraordinary risks. The
second one, rationale, deals with the concept that members collectively construct rationalizations
in order to discount warnings and negative feedback that might lead the group members to
reconsider their assumptions each time they recommit themselves to past decisions. The third
symptom, morality, has to do with the idea that members believe in the inherent morality of their
in-group and therefore, they ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions. The four
one, stereotypes, is the concept that members hold stereotyped views of the leaders of enemy
groups, that theyre so evil that genuine attempts at negotiating differences are unwarranted. The
fifth symptom is pressure, which is that members apply direct pressure to any individuals who
momentarily expresses doubts about any of the groups shared illusions. The sixth one is self-
censorship, which is the idea that members keep silent about their misgivings and even minimize
to themselves the importance of their doubts. The seventh symptom is unanimity, which is the
assumption that any individual who remain silent during any part of the discussion is in full
accord with what the others are saying. The eighth and final symptom is mindguards, which is
the concept that members appoint themselves to protect the leaders and fellow members from
adverse information that might break the complacency they shared about the effectiveness and
morality of past decisions.
When a group displays these symptoms, there are likely to be a number of immediate
consequences, which are the products of poor decision-making. These tend to be that the group
views only a few, usually two, alternatives, they do not reexamine their course of action, there is
no discussion of non-obvious gains or losses that may have been overlooked, there is little
attempt to obtain information from experts, even within their own organization who may be able
to better show the potential gains and losses, they have a tendency to ignore facts and opinions
that do no support their preferred position, and they spend little time deliberating about how a
chosen policy might hinder other areas of the company or other people.
The article discuses the nine remedies of groupthink. First, the leader of the group should
assign the role of critical evaluator to each member, which encourages the group to give priority
to open objections and doubts. These are reinforced by the leaders acceptance of criticism of his
own judgments in order to discourage members from deemphasizing their disagreements. The
second one is that members should adopt an impartial stance instead of stating preferences and
expectations at the beginning. The third one is that organizations should routinely set up outside
groups with a different leader for each to prevent insulation of an in-group. The four is that
leaders should require each member to discuss the groups deliberations with associates in his
own units of the organization and report their reactions to the group. The fifth is that the group
should invite outside experts to each meeting and encourage them to challenge the views of the
core members. The sixth is that there should always be at least one member playing devils
advocate. The seventh is that it is important to devote time to survey all warning signs from
rivals and the members should write alternative scenarios on rivals intentions. The eighth is that
the subgroups should meet separately under different chairman and then come back together to
look at the differences. The ninth and last one is that after reaching a preliminary consensus, the
group should hold a second-chance meeting in which each member has the ability to express
his residual doubts.
While these remedies do have their upsides, they can also lead to prolonged and costly
debates about a crisis when a immediate decision is needed, it can lead to feelings of anger,
rejection and depression, power struggles and increased risk of security leaks. Therefore,
inventive executives should be able to implement a few of them without the side effects
occurring. In order to do so, the executives should consult with outside experts in both the
administrative and behavior science departments to prevent groupthink and the resulting
disasters.


Work Cited
Janis, Irving L. "Groupthink: The Desperate Drive for Consensus at Any Cost." Classic Readings
in Organizational Behavior. By J. Steven. Ott, Sandra J. Parkes, and Richard B. Simpson.
Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2008. 303-09. Print.