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President Ferdinand Marcos created the Agrava Fact- Finding Board to investigate the assassination of Ninoy Aquino and the
alleged gunman Rolando Galman. The President then referred the Agrava Board reports to the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)
for its resolution. The report contradicted the version of the military. The reported concluded that Galman was only a fall
guy and that Ninoys assassination was the product of a military conspiracy and not a communist plot. Nevertheless, the
President disdained and rejected his own Boards findings and insisted on the version that Galman was Aquinos assassin.

Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman and twenty-nine other petitioners filed the action for temporary restraining order to
nullify the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and to restrain the court from rendering a decision on the merit. The
petitioners alleged that Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in
miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. The petitioners pray for a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor.
However, the Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and
totally absolving them of any civil liability.

After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila
Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," revealed that President Marcos had ordered the Sandiganbayan, the Tanodbayan, and
the prosecution panel to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.
With that, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and such was granted by the Sandiganbayan. A three- member
commission was created to investigate the charges of collusion. Their Report concluded that the proceedings in the case have
been vitiated by lack of due process because the prosecution and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of the president, which not only prevented the prosecution from fully ventilating its position and offering all the
evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case. The Sandiganbayan
approved and adopted such report. However, the respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy and argued that the
previous judgment of acquittal of the Sandiganbayan rendered the case moot and academic.

ISSUE. Did the Sandiganbayan violate the rule against double jeopardy?

NO. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or
acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction and the court rendering such decision is ousted of its jurisdiction.

As a rule legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a
valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. However, the court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process. In effect, the further hearing of the case does not constitute double jeopardy.

In the case at bar, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased
Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the
carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal is a void judgment. In legal contemplation,
it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw". Therefore, the Sandiganbayans resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction and hence no double jeopardy attaches. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all by it no rights are
divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.


Crimes: two counts Statutory rape against AAA and Attempted rape against BBB

RTC: guilty of both crimes
CA: guilty of one count of statutory rape and act of lasciviousness against BBB
SC: affirmed the decision of CA

Three information were filed against Nelson Balunsat before the RTC of Tuao, Cagayan which alleged that
Balunsat committed statutory rape against his ten year old first cousin AAA and attempted rape against his eleven year
old first cousin BBB. It was narrated during the trial that the rape happened when AAA was alone in their house,
Nelson took off the shorts and underwear of AAA and, thereafter, took off his short pants and underwear. He forced
AAA to lie down on the floor and, opening wide her legs, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. While the
attempted rape was committed when AAA and BBB were sleeping in their grandmothers house, Nelson arrived and
removed his shorts and underwear and lay down beside BBB. The accused tried to insert his fully erect penis into
BBBs private parts. However, BBB resisted and the accused could not make any penetration of his penis on the
former. Failing to satisfy his lust on BBB, the accused told her to move over and then lay himself down beside
AAA. He removed the shorts and panties of AAA and had sexual intercourse with her. Nelson pleaded not guilty. The
RTC rendered decision finding Nelson guilty of both crimes and the sentenced him to suffer the penalty of 17 years of
reclusion temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetual as maximum.

He filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court rendered decisions finding Nelson guilty
of the crime of statutory rape against AAA in the first criminal case but acquitted him in the second criminal case, while
the crime of attempted rape was downgraded to acts of lasciviousness. The penalty was reduced to four month of
arresto mayor as minimum to two years, four months and 1 day of prison correctional as maximum. He filed the
present appeal on the ground that the guilt of the accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Can the court review the three criminal cases?

HELD: No, the courts review will only be limited to his conviction of rape in the first criminal case and his
conviction on the acts of lasciviousness.

Given that Nelson was already acquitted of the charge of rape in second criminal case on the ground of
reasonable doubt, his instant appeal relates only to his convictions for rape in first criminal case and for acts of
lasciviousness. The Court can no longer pass upon the propriety of Nelsons acquittal because, the judgment acquitting
the accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its
review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals modified the guilty verdict of the RTC against Nelson from attempted rape to acts
of lasciviousness. The court can no longer review the downgrading of the crime by the appellate court without
violating the right against double jeopardy, which proscribes an appeal from a judgment of acquittal or for the purpose
of increasing the penalty imposed upon the accused. In effect, the Court of Appeals already acquitted Nelson of the
charge of attempted rape, convicting him only for acts of lasciviousness, a crime with a less severe penalty. Hence, the
court is limited to determining whether there is enough evidence to support Nelsons conviction for acts of


The Prosecution's Version
Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at the Nailon
Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydia's son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time material to this

On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from
Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby
causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her
"maxillary area", as shown by a medical certificate

issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma
continued to experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was
admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion.
Accordingly, a medical certificate was issued.

The trial court convicted Lydia of the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion. The CA
vacated the trial court's judgment and convicted Lydia of Slight Physical Injuries instead. The accused appealed to the

ISSUE: Is the re-opening of the case for appellate review will constitute Double Jeopardy?

NO. When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open for appellate review. We are then called
upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate in the exercise of our concomitant authority to review and sift
through the whole case to correct any error, even if unassigned.

The prosecution's success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does not necessarily
mean that the same physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional abortion. There
is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was
the proximate cause of the abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemma's attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr.
Jaca), was presented to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that
her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident.
It was therefore vital for the
prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydia's assault and
Gemma's abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemma's

It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981,
which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of
the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days
after the said incident were not substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the
abortion may have been the result of other factors.


Tan, being the beneficial owner of 84,030,000 Best World Resources Corporation (BWRC) shares, a registered
security which has been sold pursuant to the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership constitutes 18.6% of
the outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10% required by law to be reported, fail to file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and with the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) a sworn statement of the amount of
all BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such beneficial owner. Thus,
informations for violation of Rules of the Revised Securities Act, were filed by the People of the Philippines (People)
against Dante Tan in the Pasig RTC.

Tan filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and to admit the attached Demurrer to
Evidence. The RTC issued another granted it. The People filed a petition before the CA assailing the orders of the
RTC. In denying the petition, the CA ruled that the dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of a Demurrer to
Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal as it would
place the accused in double jeopardy.

ISSUE. Did the CA err in applying the rules on double jeopardy?

NO. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.

These elements are present here: (1) the informations filed in against Tan were sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction; (2) the RTC had jurisdiction over the criminal cases; (3) Tan was arraigned and entered a plea of
not guilty; and (4) the RTC dismissed the criminal cases on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.

This Court finds that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it conducted the proceedings of the
trial, as well as its grant of Tan's demurrer to evidence.

There is no showing that the conclusions made by the RTC on the sufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, is manifestly mistaken. Assuming, however, that there is an error
of judgment on the denial of admission of certain exhibits of the prosecution and the appreciation of the prosecution's
case, there is to this Court's mind, no capricious exercise of judgment that would overcome the defense of double

Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government
oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. While petitioner insists that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion, this Court finds that none can be attributed to the RTC. Consequently, the CA did not err when it affirmed
the assailed Orders of the RTC.

Rule 117, Sec. 3. Execution of affidavit of desistance not a ground

Demetrio Salazar allegedly raped his 12-year old stepdaughter (AAA) on two separate occasions in their
residence at Lavezares, Northern Samar. For this, he was charged with 2 counts of statutory rape by the RTC. In his
arraignment on December 13, 1999, he pleaded not guilty. He managed to escape from detention but was caught again
so the hearing of the case proceeded on July 27, 2000. Meanwhile, on February 22, 2000, AAA purportedly executed
an Affidavit of Desistance wherein he stated that she was not raped by Salazar and that she no longer intends to pursue
the cases filed against the accused-appellant. However, during the hearing, AAA explained that her own mother forced
her to execute the said affidavit upon threat of harm. RTC found Salazar guilty of 2 counts of statutory rape. CA
affirmed the conviction but modified the crime to 2 counts of simple rape since the evidence failed to establish that the
victim was 12 years old at the time of the crimes.

ISSUE. WON the Affidavit of Desistance purportedly executed by the victim should be given weight.

NO. The alleged affidavit was executed after the case had already been instituted. Thus, the Court already
acquired jurisdiction over the case and control over the proceedings. As the Court ruled in People v. Montes: x x x
the Affidavit even when construed as a pardon in the erstwhile private crime of rape is not a ground for the
dismissal of the criminal cases, since the actions have already been instituted. To justify the dismissal of the complaints,
the pardon should have been made prior to the institution of the criminal actions.

In People v. Ramirez, Jr. the Court was even more circumspect: As a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of
desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such affidavit as exceedingly
unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would later on be repudiated, and criminal
prosecution would thus be interminable.

By itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been
instituted in court. In the present case, private complainant lost the right or absolute privilege to decide
whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case had already reached and must therefore continue
to be heard by the court a quo.

Moreover, as the CA earlier ruled: the affidavit of desistance relied upon by the appellant could not be given any
probative weight considering that it was not duly sworn to. Further, when private complainant was confronted about it,
she testified that her mother threatened to kill her should she refuse to execute the affidavit.

G.R. No. 101421, February 10, 1994, EN BANC, VITUG, J.
Crime: violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act Place: Bohol
On June 14, 1990, Felix T. Rengel, filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for the investigation of an alleged
conspiracy of Gov. Torralba, Atty. Lim, Manuel Navarro, and Christopher Lim for the overpricing two (2) units of
Nissan double-cab pick-ups purchased by the provincial government. After being dismissed for lack of prima facie
evidence, the complaint was reinstated due to an audit report dated December 19, 1990 thus, Petitioner was charged
with violation of the Anti-graft law with the Sandiganbayan. On 24 July 1991, Torralba filed motions to quash the
warrant for his arrest and for reinvestigation premised on the ground that they were not furnished copies of the
resolutions of the Ombudsman and that no valid preliminary investigation was conducted in contravention of Sec. 7
AO no. 7 but the Sandiganbayan denied such motions.
ISSUE. WON the information filed against the petitioner should be quashed on the ground of the absence of a
preliminary investigation.

NO, an incomplete preliminary investigation does not warrant the quashal of the information, nor should it
obliterate the proceedings already had. Neither is the courts jurisdiction nor validity of an information adversely
affected by deficiencies in the preliminary investigation. Instead, the Sandiganbayan is to hold in abeyance any further
proceedings therein and to remand the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary
investigation, the outcome of which shall then be indorsed to Sandiganbayan for its appropriate action.
Nevertheless, the right to such preliminary investigation, is still an indispensable element of our criminal justice
system that may not be treated lightly, let alone ignored. The averment of the petitioners that they have not been served
with copies of the final Resolution of 20 May 1991, as well as of the approved modified memorandum of SPO Lantion
and the special audit report, has not been controverted. In fact, the petitioners have come to know of the resolution
only through daily newspaper accounts which chronicled the filing of the charges against them. The special audit report
itself, upon which the resolution is based, has not been presented during the preliminary investigation proper at the
level of the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas. The Solicitor General, who has begged leave to be excused from
filing a comment on the petitions, has himself opined that the petitioners should have at least been furnished with the
audit report, since the rules do grant to the petitioners the right to submit counter-affidavits and controverting

Sometime in 1997, petitioner went to the house of Felicidad in Talisay, Batangas and convinced her to work in
Taiwan by assuring the latter of a good salary and entitlement to a yearly vacation if she decides to take the job.
Petitioner promised Felicidad that she will take care of the processing of the necessary documents, including her
passport and visa. Succumbing thereto, Felicidad handed to the petitioner, in the latters house in Las Pinas, the amount
of Php120,000.00 to which no receipt was issued to acknowledge receipt of the said amount. Thereafter, petitioner sent
to Felicidad the birth certificate of a certain Armida Lim, which Felicidad would use in applying for a Taiwanese
passport, the Marriage Contract of Armida Lim's parents, Alien Certificate of Registration and an Immigrant Certificate
of Registration. These documents were submitted to and eventually rejected by the Taiwanese authorities, triggering the
filing of illegal recruitment and estafa cases against appellant. The RTC convicted the petitioner of estafa but acquitted
her of illegal recruitment, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA on appeal.

ISSUE. WON petitioners acquittal in the illegal recruitment extinguished her criminal liability in the estafa cases

NO. Illegal recruitment and estafa cases may be filed simultaneously or separately. The filing of charges for
illegal recruitment does not bar the filing of estafa, and vice versa. Sy's acquittal in the illegal recruitment case does not
prove that she is not guilty of estafa. Illegal recruitment and estafa are entirely different offenses and neither one
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in
addition, be convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. In the same manner, a person acquitted of
illegal recruitment may be held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in because illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, in which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution of
which, proof of criminal intent is necessary.

In the instant case, all the elements of estafa are present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as found by the RTC
and affirmed by the CA, that Sy misrepresented and falsely pretended that she had the capacity to deploy Felicidad for
employment in Taiwan. The misrepresentation was made prior to Felicidad's payment to Sy of P120,000.00. It was Sy's
misrepresentation and false pretenses that induced Felicidad to part with her money. As a result of Sy's false pretenses
and misrepresentations, Felicidad suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and the
money she paid was never recovered.

The Decision of the CA is hereby affirmed.

G.R. NO. 167910, July 17, 2007, THIRD DIVISION, (CHICO-NAZARIO, J.)

The Daily Informer, a newspaper of daily circulation in Iloilo City, touted the banner headline, "Gandarosa Wants Flores Out
for Personal Convenience? "Back-door-pay" anomaly exposed."

According to the article, petitioner, in his capacity as the
Assistant Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) - Regional Office, revealed to members of the
media that high-ranking BIR officials, among them Regional Director Sonia Flores and Revenue District Officer Willy
Narnola, are involved in anomalous transactions to favor certain taxpayers in the assessment of their taxes. A photo of
Sonia Flores and Willy Narnola was similarly plastered on the newspaper's front page. This prompted respondent
Evaristo Flores, husband of Sonia Flores and with the conformity of the latter, to file a Complaint (I.S. No. 2075-2000)
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City against petitioner, Manny Regalado Alcalde, the author of the
aforesaid article; and Rey P. Alcalde and Bernie G. Miaque, editor and publisher, respectively, of the Daily Informer.

Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, an Information

for Libel was filed before the RTC of Iloilo
City against petitioner, Manny Regalado Alcalde, Rey P. Alcalde and Bernie G. Miaque.

Several months following his arraignment, the DOJ issued a Resolution, reversing the Resolution of the City Prosecutor
of Iloilo City, and directing the amendment of the Information for Libel and the dropping of petitioner from the
charge. It held, inter alia, that the accusation is not synonymous with guilt; and only the persons who publish, exhibit, or
cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing are the ones responsible for Libel; and from the
evidence presented, petitioner did not cause the same. The Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the RTC a Motion
with Leave of Court to Amend Information. The RTC denied the Motion. CA denied the same.

ISSUE: Did the RTC and CA err in denying the Motion to Amend Information?

NO. Contrary to petitioner's contention, a cursory reading of the assailed Order would reveal that the RTC did
not deny the Motion on the lone basis that it had already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action. It denied the
Motion on more formidable legal grounds.

The reason for the RTC's denial of petitioner's Motion bears reiterating, viz:

Nonetheless, the instant Motion is filed after the said accused has already been arraigned. Under Section 4, Rule 117,
which allows the amendment of complaint or information, the same shall be done before the accused entered his plea,
hence, the desirability of amendment, since the Court will not entertain any Motion to Quash, after the arraignment
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 117. This is so because with accused'[s] arraignment the issue has been joined.

The crucial fact is, on 31 October 2001,

the petitioner was unconditionally arraigned. He was arraigned with the
assistance of his counsel, Atty. Marlou Ubano. He already entered his plea during his arraignment.

Subsequently, a plea
of not guilty was set in the records.

Nothing in the records discloses that petitioner's arraignment was with restriction, condition, or reservation.
Jurisprudence is clear that with the arraignment of the petitioner, the DOJ Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal
or petition for review because petitioner had already waived or abandoned the same. In the case at bar, following
petitioner's arraignment, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his petition for review earlier filed with the DOJ

Moreover, when the petitioner brought forth the denial of the Motion to Amend the Information to exclude his name
from the charge, and to seek the quashal of the Information before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, he was in error in
his choice of remedy. This Court emphasizes the established rule that the writ of certiorari will not lie against the denial
of a motion to quash an information. The remedy is for petitioner to go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision
is rendered, to appeal therefrom in a manner authorized by law.

We have, however, sanctioned a writ of certiorari on the
basis of a patent, capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion by a trial judge or when an appeal will not promptly
relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the disputed orders.

No such special circumstances are herein present
that would convince us to treat the instant case as an exception.

G.R. No. 168340, December 5, 2006, THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Rafael Gonzales filed before the Makati City Prosecutor's Office a complaint against Glen Dale arising from
the publication in the issue of Today of his article, entitled "Glad Tidings for Manila Polo Club members" in the "Bizz
'N' Fizz" column, under the nom de plume Rene Martel. The Prosecutor's Office found probable cause to hale Dale into
court for Libel. Dale filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, there
being no allegation in the Information that the offended party actually resides in Makati or that the allegedly libelous
article was printed or first published in Makati. Dale cited Article 360 of the RPC as prescribing a specific venue for
libel. The RTC granted the Motion to Quash, holding that the Information was defective for failure to allege that the
newspaper article was printed and first published in Makati or that petitioner actually resided in Makati at the time of
the commission of the act complained of. Gonzales filed a Motion (to Order the Public Prosecutor to Amend the
Information and to Admit said Amended Information), invoking Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 117 of the ROC which was
later granted. Dale filed an MR on the ground that under Section 5 of Rule 117, the order to file another information
must be contained in the same order sustaining the motion to quash since the accused would have been discharged by
the time the new information is filed. The RTC granted the MR. The Court of Appeals dismissed Gonzales petition
which assailed the orders of the RTC.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in holding that the order to file another information was discretionary with the court?

NO. In cases falling under Section 5 of Rule 117, where the motion to quash is sustained on grounds other
than those stated in Section 6 of the same Rule, the trial court has the discretion to order the filing of another
information within a specified period which is extendible to such further time as the court may allow for good cause.
The order to file another information, if determined to be warranted by the circumstances of the case, must be
contained in the same order granting the motion to quash. If the order sustaining the motion to quash does not order
the filing of another information, and said order becomes final and executory, then the court may no longer direct the
filing of another information.

It is gathered that Gonzales never asserted the propriety of amending the Information, he having maintained
that the allegations in the Information provided sufficient and adequate bases to confer jurisdiction. When the RTC
granted the motion to quash, Gonzales did not assail the same within the reglementary period. The order quashing the
Information thus became final and executory.

The clause denotes no other construction than a plain extension of time. The allowance of additional time
qualifies the period of filing a new information pursuant to an order, and not the period of issuing an order to file a new
information. It presupposes that an order has been previously issued, as signified by the prior phrase "if having been
made." As earlier stated, this order to file another information, ifthe RTC finds that circumstances warrant its issuance,
must be included in the order granting the motion to quash. The time limitation in the rule was intended to prevent the
accused from being unnecessarily detained at the whim of the prosecution. Since the order granting the motion to
quash had attained finality, it had become immutable.

At all events, the prosecution is not, under the circumstances attendant to the case, precluded from refiling an
information against respondent as long as prescription has not set in.

Rule 117, Sec. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution

The Assistant City Prosecutor accused and charged Atty. Reynaldo Dimayacyac and three others of the crime of
falsification of a public document in the RTC of Quezon City. Before petitioners arraignment, he moved to quash the
information on two grounds: (1) that the officer who filed the information had no legal authority to do so, and (2) that
more than one offense was charged in the information. Judge Benigno Dayaw of Branch 80 of the RTC of QC granted
petitioners motion to quash upon the second ground. Accordingly, the information was quashed. More than two years
after the quashal, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed against the same accused two informations for falsification of public
documents. Now, Atty. Dimayacyac argued that he would be placed in double jeopardy as he was indicted before for
the same offenses and the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

ISSUE. WON CA erred in concluding that an ORDER sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense, as it has no legal basis.

NO. The general rule is that an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense unless the motion was based on grounds specified under Section 3(g) and (i) of Rule 117. The issue in this case
boils down as to whether or not there exists double jeopardy which is one of the exemptions to the general rule.

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid
plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the

In Sta. Rita v. CA, the Court held that the reinstatement of criminal cases against the accused did not violate his right
against double jeopardy since the dismissal of the information by the trial court had been effected at his own instance
when the accused filed a motion to dismiss x x x. In this case, considering that since the dismissal of the
previous criminal case against the petitioner was by reason of his motion for the quashal of the information,
petitioner is thus deemed to have expressly given his consent to such dismissal. There could then be no
double jeopardy in this case since one of the requisites therefore, i.e., that the dismissal be without accuseds
express consent, is not present. Therefore, the general rule that an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to
another prosecution applies in the case at bar.

G.R. No. 165924, January 19, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, NACHURA, J.
On August 2, 2003, Resty Jumaquio allegedly threatened and assaulted two young men, then ages 13 and 17. As
narrated by the minors, Resty, upon seeing the younger child, belted out his anger and yelled.
Later in the evening,
while the minors and their mother were traversing the road fronting another neighbor's house, petitioner, who was then
having a drinking session, cursed them. Aghast, the mother cursed him back. Resty thence threw a stone towards the
older child, but missed him. When the children's father went out of their nearby house, Resty picked up another stone
to fling towards the father, but the older child rushed to Resty to grab it. At that moment, Resty repeatedly punched the
17-year-old. The family hurried home when Resty bellowed at his son for the latter to get a gun. Resty then pelted
stones at the family's house again cursing at them
Two informations were filed against the petitioner, one for grave threats under RA 7610 and physical injuries
under the same law. After posting bail and before the arraignment, petitioner moved for the quashal of the informations
for being duplicitous. He argued that, under the informations, he stood charged with several crimes - grave threats and
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, and physical injuries and another violation of the aforesaid law; that grave
threats in relation to R.A. No. 7610 could not be considered a crime; and that the said separate crimes could not even
be complexed, as neither may be considered to fall within the ambit of Section 10, R.A. No. 7610. Following Section
3(e), Rule 117of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the informations should therefore be quashed. The RTC
denied the motion hence, this petition.
ISSUE. WON the information filed against the petitioner should be quashed.
NO, immediately apparent is that the instant petition disregards the hierarchy of courts. While the SCs
original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is not exclusive - it is shared with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the
RTC - the choice of where to file the petition for certiorari is not left entirely to the party seeking the writ. The principle
of hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for the said petition. A becoming regard
for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first-level
courts should be filed with the RTC; and those against the latter, with the CA.
As a rule, when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, petitioner's remedy is not certiorari, but to
go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in his motion to quash. In the event that an
adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom is the next appropriate legal step.
On its merits, the petition should likewise be dismissed. The questioned informations separately charge two
distinct offenses of child abuse--Criminal Case No. SJC-78-04 for child abuse committed through the use of threatening
words, and Criminal Case No. SJC-79-04 for child abuse through the infliction of physical injuries. Thus, contrary to his
contention, petitioner is not in jeopardy of being convicted of grave threats and child abuse in the first case, and slight
physical injuries and child abuse in the second.
Moreover, an information is not duplicitous if it charges several related acts, all of which constitute a single
offense, although the acts may in themselves be distinct offenses. The specific acts are only alleged to complete the
narration of facts.
Petition Dismissed.

"Putang ina mong bata ka namumuro ka na sa akin, at susunugin ko `yung pamilya mo!"
He was shouting "Putang ina ninyo, zone leader ako papatayin ko [ kayong] lahat!"
The petitioners filed an MR of the Resolution

by the SC remanding the instant case to the RTC of Quezon City
for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of several criminal cases filed against the respondent and his co-accused. In the
said criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing
of eleven male persons bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.

The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to
be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases were with the express consent of the respondent as he
himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and
for examination of witnesses. The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
is not applicable to the said criminal cases because the essential requirements, respondents express consent to the
dismissal and due notice to the private complainants, for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued
his resolution.
ISSUE. WON Sec.8, Rule 117 of the RRCP is applicable to the criminal cases herein disputed
NO. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount,
or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent
is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of
the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of
the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in
double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.

In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the
new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the criminal cases. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any
motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a
need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The
respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of the criminal cases. Neither did he ever agree,
impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.

The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of the criminal cases or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before
said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, even if the respondents
motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his
motion for a provisional dismissal of the criminal cases, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof
prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims
were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases.

It should also be noted that when the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000,
the State only had one year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The issue
which arose from such event was whether the time-bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 thereof should be applied prospectively
and not retroactively against the State, to which the Court ruled that procedural laws may be applied retroactively.

The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the
State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of
the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. The time-bar under the new rule
does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the
right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the
State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused.
The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year
periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the delay.

MR granted. The Resolution of the Court is set aside.

G.R No. 173588, 22 April 2009, EN BANC, (Brion, J.)

Pedro was charged for carrying a loaded firearm without the required written authorization from the Comelec a day
before the May 2001 elections accusation as per BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) in Boac, Marinduque.

A Complaint was filed against him. After Inquest, the Information was filed in court. When his motion for Preliminary
Investigation was granted, it did not materialize. Hence he filed Motion to Quash arguing that the Information
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification and/or that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. He attached a Comelec Certification that he was exempted from the gun ban. The RTC granted
the quashal.

Private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos, representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedros
Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the prosecution was deprived of due process when the judge quashed
the information without a hearing. The RTC reopened the case, as Pedro did not object to Los Baos motion. Pedro
filed an MR for the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become
permanent. The RTC denied Pedros MR.

The CA initially denied Pedros petition. In his MR, Pedro manifested the exact date and time of the Marinduque
provincial prosecutors receipt of the quashal order to be 2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001, and argued that based on
this date, the provisional dismissal of the case became permanent on December 10, 2002. Based on this information,
the CA reversed itself ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because it failed to apply Section 8, Rule
17 and the time-bar under this provision.

ISSUE. Is the CA correct in applying Sec. 8, Rule 117 in this case?

NO. In People v. Lacson, we ruled that there are sine quanon requirements in the application of the time-bar rule
stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the provision is a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or
as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute
the accused.

The modifier provisional directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that
are temporary in character, and not the dismissals that are permanent. Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence,
permanent dismissals are those barred by the principle of double jeopardy, by the previous extinction of criminal
liability, by the rule on speedy trial, and the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused. Section 8,
by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional.

A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is
in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the
grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-
defined characteristics under the Rules of Court.

Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly
consents and the offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly to what
Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately
suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 i.e., one with the express consent of the accused is not intended to lead to
double jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special terms
of Section 8.

This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion to quash the
dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of
criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with
the consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal
and a provisional dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been
provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section
6. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution
shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be
confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely
provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a
dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.

The Court notes also the following differences stressing that a motion to quash and its resulting dismissal is a
unique class that should not be confused with other dismissals:

First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy of the complaint or
information filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be provisionally dismissed
at the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated under
Section 8, Rule 117.

Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these
requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal.

Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information for defects or
defenses apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons other than the
defects found in the information.

Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional
dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway provided that the required consents are

Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at which
time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the
grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by
law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the question of whether the action can still be
brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no
re-filing after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration.

To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer
to different situations that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or
extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash
under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or
information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional

The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule
117]. We find from our examination of the records that the Information duly charged a specific offense and provides
the details on how the offense was committed. Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the other hand,
we do not see on the face or from the averments of the Information any legal excuse or justification. This
COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to
quash grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly, no hearing
was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC certification.

As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.