How accurate is it to say that Eisenhowers New Look foreign policy increased tensions between

the superpowers in the period 1953-60?

Tensions had begun to arise between the Soviet Union and the West even before World War II was
over. The Soviets had soon developed a powerful nuclear arsenal whilst Stalins death in 1953
resulted in there being increased uncertainty as to the relations between the communists and
capitalists. However, whilst it can be argued that Eisenhowers New Look foreign policy did not
increase tensions between the superpowers in the period 1953-60 since there was already a high
level of tension present,
One reason for why Eisenhowers New Look foreign policy did not increase tensions between the
superpowers in the period 1953-60 was due to the limits that were present to the policies of
Massive Retaliation and Brinkmanship. Eisenhower was convinced that the US could not contain
communism by fighting a series of small wars. Such wars were seen to be extremely unpopular back
home as well as being too expensive. Therefore, by issuing a threat of using nuclear weapons if a
Communist state tried to seize a territory by force, the small wars can be prevented. This was known
as Brinkmanship. Furthermore, Eisenhower was able to cut military spending from $50 billion to $34
billion by cutting back on the army, which required a lot of money to maintain. At the same time, he
increased Americas nuclear arsenal from about 1,000 bombs in 1953 to about 18,000 bombs in
1961. As a result of this, America had more bang for the buck since their nuclear weaponary was
greater. This meant that countries may be less willing to indulge in practices that may anger the
United States. This was particularly evident in the Korean War of 1953 whereby U.S. officials sent
indirect hints to the Chinese government that Eisenhower might expand the war into China or even
use nuclear weapons. As a result of this, China made concessions on the question of the repatriation
of prisoners of war, and an armistice went into effect in July 1953. However, it can be argued that
such threat would actually increase tensions between the superpowers since many countries would
feel intimidated by the threat of being on the end of a nuclear attack looming over them. Likewise,
the doctrine of massive retaliation proved to be dangerously flawed, however, because it effectively
left Eisenhower without any options other than nuclear war to combat Soviet aggression. Having
said that, Brinkmanship was important in ensuring that no military conflicts would take place in the
future, meaning that in the long term, it was actually instrumental in easing tension.
Another reason for why Eisenhowers New Look foreign policy increased tensions between the
superpowers in the period 1953-60 was the U2 incident. After the Soviet Union shot down an
American U2 spy plane in 1960, Eisenhower and the U.S. government initially denied the existence
of U2 missions over the Soviet Union, but then the USSR produced the American pilot, whom they
had captured alive. Despite all this, Eisenhower refused to apologise or promise to suspend future
spy missions against the USSR. Resultantly, this caused the reversing of the thaw that was taking
place following Khrushchevs visit to the USA had brought. As a result, the Four Power Paris Summit
did not occur. The Summit between Dwight Eisenhower, Nikita Khrushchev, Harold Macmillan and
Charles de Gaulle was to be an event that could have greatly helped to bring the cold war to an end.
This meant that they were unable to discuss various issues such as nuclear arms reduction and also
how to deal with increasing tensions surrounding Berlin (which, ultimately, led to the Berlin Wall). As
a result of this, the tension present between the two increased meaning that negotiations at this
point was almost impossible.
However, Eisenhowers foreign policies did often lead to a decrease in relationship between the
superpowers. Two such New Look policies were the covert operations and the Eisenhower Doctrine.
Many of the CIAs operations took place in developing nations who blamed European imperialism
and American capitalism for their problems. They often looked to the Soviet Union as a model of
how to industrialise their countries and would have leaders who flirted with communism. One way
to stop developing nations from becoming Communist nations was to provide them with financial
aid (Eisenhower Doctrine), as Eisenhower had tried to do in Egypt. However, sometimes the threat
of communism may seem stronger, resulting in the CIA staging covert operations to overthrow anti-
American leaders and replace them with pro-American leaders. Examples of this included the CIA
operation in 1953 in which the Iranian prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, had nationalised the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and was ready to make an oil deal with the Soviet Union. Thus Dulles
sent agents to organize street riots and arrange a coup that ousted Mossadegh, and the Shahre, who
was pro-American, turned to power. These such small operations often go unnoticed , or are often
overlooked, meaning that America are essentially able to slowly tackle communism without the fear
that there would be a retaliation from USSR.


Eisenhower then agreed to a summit of Soviet and Western leaders in Geneva, Switzerland, in July
1955, the first such meeting since the Potsdam Conference in 1945.
The "Spirit of Geneva" eased tensions between the Soviets and the United States, even though the
conference failed to produce agreements on arms control or other major international issues.
Khrushchev rejected Eisenhower's proposal for an "Open Skies" program that would have allowed
both sides to use aerial air surveillance to gather information about each other's military capabilities.
A year later, the President authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to begin top-secret intelligence
flights over the Soviet Union by using the brand-new high altitude U-2 reconnaissance planes.
"Peaceful coexistence" did not extend to eastern Europe. In November 1956, Soviet tanks ruthlessly
suppressed Hungary's efforts to follow an independent course free from Soviet domination.
Administration officials had advocated the liberation of Soviet satellites, and propaganda agencies
such as Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America had encouraged Eastern Europeans to resist.
Yet Eisenhower decided not to take action to aid the Hungarian freedom-fighters since any
intervention carried the risk of a U.S.-Soviet war that could lead to a nuclear exchange. In the
aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the administration toned down its rhetoric about
liberation, much of which had aimed at building domestic political support. Instead, it emphasized
hopes for gradualand peacefulprogress toward freedom.
During his last years in office, Eisenhower hoped to achieve a dtente with the Soviet Union that
could produce a treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and oceans.
Hopes rose after Khrushchev visited the United States in September 1959 and met with Eisenhower
at the presidential retreat in the Maryland Mountains. This summit produced no arms control
agreement, but it did lead to good will and optimism known as "the spirit of Camp David."