Philippine Veterans Bank vs.

Court of Appeals, The Secretary of DAR, DARAB, Davao City and Land Bank
of the Philippines
G.R. No. 132767 (January 18, 2000)


Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao which were
taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the valuation of the
Land Bank of the Philippines and the DARAB, petitioner filed a petition for determination of the
just compensation for its property with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Tagum, Davao on January 26, 1994. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was
filed beyond the 15-day reglamentary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.
The Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Petition for Review.
Issue:
Whether or not the Special Agrarian Courts are considered appellate courts in the determination of just
compensation
Held:
No.
To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly Section 50 thereof, Rule XIII,
Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
"Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The
decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of
just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for
reconsideration."
As we held in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, this Rule is an acknowledgement by the DARAB
that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is
vested in the Courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and
exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just
compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in
accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the
DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable
compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the
question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of
the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the
DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the
theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period
provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly
dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
Gerardo Rupa Sr. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Magin Salipot
G.R. No. 80129 (January 25, 2000)

Facts:
The case at bar involves an action for redemption with damages filed by Gerardo Rupa Sr.
against Magin Salipot. Rupa claimed that he had been a tenant of a parcel of coconut land
formerly owned by Vicente Lim and Patrocinia Yu Lim for more than twenty (20) years now,
sharing the harvests on a 50%-50% basis. Also, that he is the overseer over four parcels of
coconut land owned by the Lim spouses. However, without any prior written notice, the land
tenanted by the petitioner was sold to Magin Salipot for P5,000.00 in January 1981. Petitioner
averred that he only learned of the sale on February 16, 1981, and that he sought assistance
with the local office of Agrarian Reform for the redemption of the questioned property and even
deposited the amount of P5,000.00 with the trial court.
However, the Regional Trial Court of Masbate rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on
the ground that Rupa was not a tenant of the subject property and thus, not entitled to a right of
redemption over the same. On appeal, the Court of Appeals finds, in substance, that there is no
clear and convincing evidence to show that plaintiff was a share tenant of the spouses Lim and
that Rupa is bound by his admission in Criminal Case No. 532-U, entitled People of the
Philippines. vs. Mariano Luzong filed six months after the instant case wherein he admitted that
he was the overseer and administrator of the five parcels of land owned by the Lim spouses.
Thus, negating his claim of tenancy. The CA therefore affirmed on appeal the decision of the
lower court. Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the land or a mere overseer thereof.
Held:
In the case at bar, we find that there are compelling reasons for this Court to apply the
exception of non-conclusiveness of the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts on the
ground that the "findings of fact of both courts is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
but is in actuality contradicted by evidence on record." A careful examination of the record
reveals that, indeed, both the trial court and the appellate court overlooked and disregarded the
overwhelming evidence in favor of Rupa and instead relied mainly on the statements made in
the decision in another case.
A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging
to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price
certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system.
Briefly stated, for this relationship to exist, it is necessary that:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
Upon proof of the existence of the tenancy relationship, Rupa could avail of the benefits afforded
by R.A. No. 3844, as amended, particularly, Section 12 thereof which reads:
"SECTION 12. Lessee's right of redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a third
person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to
redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That the entire
landholding sold must be redeemed: Provided, further, That where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the
area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised
within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right
of legal redemption."
As correctly pointed out by the CA, this right of redemption is validly exercised upon
compliance with the following requirements: a) the redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee
or share tenant; b) the land must have been sold by the owner to a third party without prior
written notice of the sale given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR in accordance with Section
11, RA 3844, as amended; c) only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed;
d) the right of redemption must be exercised within 180 days from notice; and e) there must be
an actual tender or valid consignation of the entire amount which is the reasonable price of the
land sought to be redeemed.
The statements made in the decision that "[Rupa] claimed that he was made administrator by
the Lim spouses of their five (5) parcels of land in Armenia, Uson, Masbate" and that the
"prosecution witnesses in that case, namely, Pablito Arnilla and Antonieta Rongasan admitted
that they were hired laborers of Rupa in tilling the land in question" should not have been relied
upon by the CA to conclusively disprove the tenancy relationship.
First of all, we must look at the context in which these statements were made. The admission
made by Rupa as stated in the decision was made, as mentioned earlier, in a criminal case for
malicious mischief which Rupa filed against one Mariano Luzong, son-in-law of Salipot, on the
ground that the latter destroyed the banana and cassava plants growing in Rupa's farm. Said
statement was apparently made to prove Rupa's standing to file the complaint and to prove how
he could have witnessed the destruction made by said person.
Second, in claiming that he was administrator of the property, Rupa, a farmer of limited
education must have used the word "administrator" in a loose sense to mean one taking care of a
certain piece of property by clearing and planting on the same. As aptly pointed out by counsel
for Rupa during the trial, with no objection from the counsel of Salipot, "under common usage
in the locality, the term administrator is used interchangeably with tenancy.
Third, the CA did not bother to explain its finding on the "inherent incompatibility" between
being a tenant-farmer and an administrator or overseer. According to Rupa, he was tenant of
one parcel of land belonging to the Lim spouses and administrator or overseer of the other four
parcels of land owned by the said spouses. Salipot and his witnesses had interchangeably claimed
Rupa to be an overseer and a copra agent or copra buyer. As overseer, he may have been
receiving a fixed salary. As tenant under our legal definition, he may have been sharing the
harvests with the landowner. This may well lead a person to find an incompatibility between the
two. However, one could in fact be overseer of a parcel of land, supervising the laborers therein
and receiving a fixed salary for one's services, and at the same time, act as tenant farmer in
another landholding.
Fourth, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they were "hired laborers" should not
have been given significant weight by the CA. The rule is well-settled that the rights of a person
cannot be prejudiced by the declaration, act or omission of another, except as provided by the
Rules of Court in cases of admission by a co-partner, agent, conspirator and privies. The said
witnesses do not come under any of these exceptions.
As regards the certificate issued by the Office of the Treasurer to the effect that Rupa was a
copra buyer from May 19, 1978 toOctober 10, 1979, we find that this does not necessarily rule
out Rupa's claim that he was a tenant-farmer since 1962. Rupa has satisfactorily explained that
"pursuing two or three lines of work is nothing new. In coconut lands, harvest seasons come far
and in between, and the tenant can always engage in the business of copra-buying in the
interim." Moreover, the dates indicated therein cover only a short period of time as against
Rupa's claim that he was tenant from 1963 until his ejectment sometime in 1981.
We are therefore constrained to overturn the appealed judgment insofar as it ruled that the
records do not establish Rupa's status as an agricultural tenant. Indeed, the testimony of Rupa
and his witnesses in open court, in our view, had not been convincingly rebutted and we have no
reason to doubt the veracity of the testimonies of his witnesses. Certainly, the passing
statements contained in the decision in the criminal case for malicious mischief cannot overcome
the evidentiary value of the testimonies of said witnesses. A meticulous review of the record
would have found overwhelming evidence in favor of Rupa. A scrutiny of the entire evidence on
hand would be in line with the State's policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small
farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices.
Raymundo T. Magdaluyo vs. Atty. Enrique L. Nace
Adm. Case No. 3808 (February 2, 2000)

Facts:
Complainant accused respondent of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct. Respondent
was one of the squatters living in one of the complainant's parcels of land situated in Antipolo,
Rizal. Allegedly, when complainant offered to relocate the squatters, the latter refused and
instead filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB)
claiming to be tenants therein.
Three months later, the squatters again including respondent also filed a case before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo for the annulment or cancellation of complainant's land titles.
This time, claiming to be owners and not mere tenants of the land. They traced their alleged
ownership to an old Spanish title.
Because of the conflicting causes of action, both cases were dismissed. Complainant filed a case
against respondent accusing him of having deliberately committed a falsehood and of forum-
shopping praying that proper disciplinary sanctions be imposed against the latter.
Held:
After referral of the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the findings of the
former are as follows:
". . . while it may be true that different causes of action are indeed involved, it is their total
inconsistency, nay, total opposition with each other which raises doubts about the
respondent's sincerity. It escapes this Commission [on Bar Discipline] how Respondent can,
in good faith, allege to be a lawful tenant one moment, and be an owner the next.
Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the
law and the facts of this case. He failed to allege in his complaint the fact that a prior dispute
had been existing between the parties before the PARAB, thus deceiving the court and giving
it an inaccurate appreciation of facts.
Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as
appears to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable. It has
long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership. Yet
respondent dares raise the same in his complaint to defeat Complainant's duly registered
certificate of title. Any lawyer should know that a Spanish title would have no legal leg to
stand on in the face of Transfer Certificate of Title over the same parcel of land."
The Court concurs with the IBP's findings and recommendations being fully supported by
evidence on record.
Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility against
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. He was indeed, less than sincere
in asserting two conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all probability, he knew not to
be his.
As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oath not to do falsehood or consent to its commission
and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. The
lawyers oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action. Said acts are clearly in violation of his lawyer's oath that
the court will not tolerate.

Eudosia Daez and/or Her heirs, Represented by Adriano D. Daez vs. Court of Appeals, Macario Sorientes,
Apolonia Mediana, Rogelio Macatulad and Manuel Umali
G.R. No. 133507 (February 17, 2000)

Facts:
Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan being cultivated by the herein respondents. DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina
denied the application for exemption upon finding that the subject land is covered under LOI
474, the petitioner's total properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law.
The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T. Leong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all
affirmed the said Order and disregarded an Affidavit executed by the respondents stating that
they are not the tenants of the land. Their findings was that the Affidavit was merely issued
under duress. In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to the respondents.
Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland under R.A. No.
6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed her to retain the subject
riceland but denied the application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to
prove actual tillage or direct management thereof. This order was set aside by the DAR
Secretary Ernesto Garilao but reinstated on appeal by the Office of the President. The Court of
Appeals again reversed this Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the previous Decision of
DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence, this Appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject landholdings, despite the
fact that a previous decision denying the petition for exemption had long become final and executory
Held:
It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one
and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the
subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the
application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865 hectare riceland, even
after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and
executory.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by
the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the
rights of the landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not
meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is
land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the
government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner
afterwards, which would be a pointless process.
The issuance of EPs and CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from
retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or
CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowner's retained
area.
Bayani Bautista vs. Patricia Araneta
G.R. No. 135829 (February 22, 2000)

Facts:
In essence, the plaintiff averred that he had been the lawful tenant of a three (3) hectare parcel of
land owned by Gregorio Araneta II since 1978. In April 1991, a group of armed SECURITY
GUARDS , allegedly, were sent by herein defendant Patricia Araneta, successor of Gregorio
Araneta II and warned plaintiff to vacate and to stop cultivating the subject landholding.
Plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendant from
the continued employment of threats and harassments against his person, for the issuance of a
permanent preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case, for the maintenance of status
quo and for the recognition of his right as tenant of the land.
Defendant to summarize, denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and stated that the property
belonged to Consuelo A. de Cuesta Auxilum Christianorum Foundation Incorporated and leased
to defendant for the development of a bio-dynamic farm and ultimately for the establishment of
a training center for bio-dynamic agriculture in the Philippines and humid tropics in Asia. The
land also does not fall under CARL because it has more than 18% slope. During an ocular
inspection, defendant learned of the presence of the plaintiff. The former invited the latter to
join the project but he declined and agreed to leave the premises. However, the plaintiff changed
his mind and refused to leave. Efforts at conciliation did not push through and instead a
Complaint for Peaceful Possession with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by the plaintiff.
The PARAD ruled in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and declared him as a bonafide tenant. On
appeal, the DARAB affirmed the said Decision. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the DARAB. Hence, this Appeal.
Petitioner contends that in 1978, he entered into an oral tenancy agreement with Gregorio
Araneta II whom he has known and believed as the owner of the land. And that he regularly
delivered to Gregorio forty (40) cavans from the harvest through Lino Tocio. Petitioner,
likewise relies on the certification (ARPT and MARO) that he is a tenant on the landholding.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the subject landholding
Held:
The Appeal lacks merit.
"His reliance on the certifications issued in his favor is misplaced because they do not prove that
the landowner made him his tenant. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed, they only show
that petitioner is in possession of the land. The certifications do not disclose how and why he
became a tenant."
In sum, respondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged agricultural leasehold
agreement between petitioner and Gregorio. In the 1961 case of Lastimoza vs. Blanco, we ruled
that "tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder
who is either the 'owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land' (sec. 5 [b], Rep. Act
No. 1199), and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject
of the tenancy. . . . To rule otherwise, would be to pave the way for fraudulent collusions among
the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder."
Lastly, we can not sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual
finding of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in
favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs. Court
of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain
person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on the courts. This Court is not
necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported
by substantial evidence.
Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos represented by his widow, Arsenia Garcia vda. de Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 109992 (March 7, 2000)

Facts:
The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on execution
by the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989 and subsequently sold at
public auction on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos now substituted by his heirs and
represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50.
Private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the
reglementary period. On April 1, 1992, respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages
with an application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) docketed as DARAB Case No. 369-BUL '92 praying that
petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest
they "over-mature and become useless".
The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an Order allowing the
gathering of the mango fruits and directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the
Adjudication Board. Then on April 27, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for
Consignation before the RTC of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to redeem his land. The
petition was dismissed.
Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992, a Motion to intervene with the
DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests as the party who tended and had
the mango trees bear fruits this season".
On May 7, 1992 private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and
Document, Redemption with Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey
Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
The DARAB suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio's motion for intervention pending
the resolution of the ownership issue. On July 8, 1992, intervenor this time filed with the
DARAB, a motion to withdraw intervenor's deposited share. The Motion was granted and
intervenor was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of the P174,650.00 harvests proceeds with
intervenor Antonio being recognized as the duly constituted tenant of the land. The Court of
Appeals affirmed these orders of the DARAB. Hence, the instant petition for review
on Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the PARAD/DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters even when the question
of ownership is pending resolution with the Regional Trial Courts?
Held:
Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine
and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving
the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No.
6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act
and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the
ownership of the subject property.
In the case of Morta v. Occidental, et al., this Court held:
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute,
it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that
the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. de
Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction of the Department
of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related
problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.
Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of agrarian reform laws.
Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken
cognizance of private respondent's petition for injunction in the first place.
The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be harvested is an incident
ancillary to the main petition for injunction. As such, it is dependent on the main case. Inasmuch
as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the parties,
necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can stand. This issue, after all,
can be resolved by the trial court, which has the jurisdiction to order the gathering of the mango
fruits and depositing the proceeds with it, considering that an action has already been filed
before it on the specific issue of ownership.
Gavino Corpuz vs. Spouses Geronimo Grospe and Hilaria Grospe
G.R. No. 135297 (June 8, 2000)

Facts:
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) who, pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 27, was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land
(Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija and formerly owned by a certain Florentino Chioco.
Petitioner MORTGAGED the subject land to pay for his wife's hospitalization on January 20,
1982 in favor of Virginia de Leon. Upon the expiration of the contract, he again MORTGAGED
the property to respondent Hilaria Grospe [wife of Geronimo Grospe] for a period of four
years (from December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500.00. The
parties even executed a "Kasunduan sa Pagpapahiram ng Lupang Sakahan" which allowed the
respondents to use and/or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage. Petitioner
instituted an action for recovery of possession with the DARAB in Cabanatuan City(Region III)
against the respondents averring that the latter entered the disputed land by force and
intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991 and destroyed the palay planted on the land.
Respondents in their answer, claimed that the petitioner himself allowed them to take over the
possession and cultivation of the property until the latter has paid his loan. However, instead of
paying his loan, petitioner had allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights" over
the landholding in consideration in the amount of P54,394.00. Petitioner denied waiving his
rights and claimed that his and his children's signatures appearing on the waiver were forgeries.
The PARAD ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang
Nayon ng Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija which in turn, had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and
27 recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses who were the "most
qualified farmer(s)-beneficiaries".
The DARAB affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Likewise, petitioner's appeal and subsequent
reconsideration thereof were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the appellate court was correct in finding that the signatures of petitioner and his sons on
the waiver were not forged?
Assuming arguendo that the signatures in the waiver were genuine, was it (the waiver) null and void for
being contrary to agrarian laws?
Did the petitioner abandon his rights as a beneficiary under PD 27?
Did he (petitioner), by voluntary surrender, forfeit his right as a beneficiary?
Held:
As a rule, if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those of the DARAB an
administrative body which has acquired expertise on the matter such findings are accorded
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. The presence or the absence of forgery was an issue
of fact that was convincingly settled by the agrarian and the appellate tribunals. Petitioner
utterly failed to convince us that the appellate court had misapprehended the facts. Quite the
contrary, its findings were well-supported by the evidence.
We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate
of Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or
through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal
system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus, negating the government's
program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil. In Torres v. Ventura, the Court
clearly held:
". . . As such [the farmer-beneficiary] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the
landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted by the
government to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the
property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the
government or by hereditary succession, to his successors.
. . . [T]he then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum Circular
[No. 7, Series of 1979, April 23, 1979]:
"'Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmer-beneficiaries of
PD 27 have transferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession of their farms/homelots to
other persons or have surrendered the same to their former landowners. All these
transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 and therefore, null and void."'
Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to
desert a right or property; and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried
into effect. The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never
returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned.
The CA ruled that abandonment required (a) the tenant's clear intention to sever the
agricultural tenancy relationship; and (b) his failure to work on the landholding for no valid
reason. The CA also deemed the following as formidable evidence of his intent to sever the
tenancy relationship: (a) the MORTGAGE and (b) his express approval and conformity to the
Samahang Nayon Resolution installing the private respondents as tenants/farmers-beneficiaries
of the landholding. We disagree.
As earlier shown, the Waiver was void. Furthermore, the mortgage expired after four years.
Thus, the private respondents were obligated to return possession of the landholding to the
petitioner. At bottom, we see on the part of the petitioner no clear, absolute or irrevocable intent
to abandon. His surrender of possession did not amount to an abandonment because there was
an obligation on the part of private respondents to return possession upon full payment of THE
LOAN .
However, the nullity of the Waiver does not save the case for him because there is a clear
showing that he voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which, under
the present circumstances, may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to the government, of his
rights under the agrarian laws.
PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program shall not be
transferable except through hereditary succession or to the government, in accordance with the
provisions of existing laws and regulations. Section 8 of R.A. No. 3844 also provides that "[t]he
agricultural leasehold relation . . . shall be extinguished by: . . . (2) [v]oluntary surrender of the
landholding by the agricultural lessee . . . ."
To repeat, the land was surrendered to the government, not transferred to another private
person. It was the government, through the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the private
respondents who were declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws. Voluntary
surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require court approval as
long as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence.
Petitioner's voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to
the government because such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the
reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27.
Under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80 of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan
shall, upon notice from the agrarian reform team leader, recommend other tenant-farmers who
shall be substituted to all rights and obligations of the abandoning or surrendering tenant-
farmer. Besides, these cooperatives are established to provide a strong social and economic
organization to ensure that the tenant-farmers will enjoy on a lasting basis the benefits of
agrarian reform.
Jaime P. Corpin vs. Amor S. Vivar and the Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 137350 (June 19, 2000)

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against the private respondent with the Municipal
Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan. For failure to timely file his Answer with Motion to Dismiss
the court deemed the case submitted for judgment and rendered a decision ordering private
respondent to vacate the land in dispute. Private respondent appealed the case to the Regional
Trial Court and submitted documents to support his claim that he is a tenant of the petitioner's
lot. The Regional Trial Court in turn, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently,
petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the said Decision with the Court of Appeals. The latter
upheld the Regional Trial Court's finding and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence,
this Petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the interpretation of Section 7, Rule 40 of the Revised Rules
of Court as it considered all the documents submitted by the Private Respondent for the first time together
with the memorandum
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was a landlord-tenant
relationship between the parties
Held:
In the case of Bayog vs. Natino which the appellate court cited, we held that the metropolitan
circuit trial court, which dismissed defendant's Answer for having been filed out of time and
decided the case based on the allegations in the complaint, should not have disregarded
defendant's Answer and should have heard and received the evidence for the purpose of
determining whether or not it had jurisdiction over the case.
What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the following: (1) Pagtitibay
dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel Torres, Chairman of the BARC of Tabang; (2)
Affidavit of Dr. Teodoro Placido dated April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ambrosio T.
Mendoza dated April 22, 1996; and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay of private respondent dated April
22, 1996.
Considering the foregoing, it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby both
parties may present evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal trial court's
jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court's finding that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship
between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents attached by private
respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court only on appeal and were not
previously presented to the municipal trial court in the original case, must be set aside.
The records of the case must be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court and hear the issue of
jurisdiction.
Kooperatiba ng Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipino, Inc. (KSMP) vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, et al.
G.R. No. 139051 (June 26, 2000)
Facts:
The case stemmed from the Order dated May 27, 1975 by then DAR Secretary Conrado Estrella
granting the request for conversion of 1,837.30 hectares of agricultural land situated in
Nasugbu, Batangas into residential, commercial, industrial and other urban purposes. In essence,
the Order stated that the subject land is not economically suited for agricultural cultivation and
that if there are any tenant-tillers, disturbance compensation should be paid to them in
accordance with law.
Fifteen (15) occupants assisted by the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) claiming to be tenants
of a forty-four (44) hectare portion filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. But prior
to such, former President Ferdinand B. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 on November 27,
1975 declaring the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate, Cavite and Nasugbu, Batangas
as tourist zones more suitable for residential, commercial, industrial and urban uses.
In December 1989, apparently unaware of the conversion orders and presidential proclamation,
then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago issued Notices of Acquisition dated December
14-27, 1989. Private respondents, Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, filed their objections to
these Santiago notices.
Thereafter, on January 22, 1991, Secretary Benjamin T. Leong who succeeded Secretary
Santiago ruled on the validity of the questioned Order issued on May 27, 1975 and denied the
Motion for Reconsideration holding that pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520,
Maragondon, Ternate and Nasugbu are declared as tourist zones.
Meanwhile, on May 14, 1991, the private respondents filed a Petition with the DARAB
docketed as DARAB Case No. 0335 for the purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders
which in effect suggested the manner of invalidating the Santiago Notices as it was contrary to
the Leong Order of January 22, 1991.
Petitioner KSMP (Kooperatiba ng Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipino, Inc.) filed a complaint-
in-intervention on the aforementioned case. This was dismissed by the DAR. Subsequently,
KSMP filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals docketed as G.R. No. 47813
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the DARAB. The CA dismissed the same. Hence, this
Petition.
Held:
We find no error with the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause is lost considering that the
Conversion Orders have long become final and executory. There was, therefore, no more case to
which it could intervene. The complaint-in-intervention was, therefore, correctly dismissed
pursuant to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner's insistence that there was no final disposition yet of the conversion case, as in fact,
DARAB Case No. 0335 was initiated by the private respondents is untenable. A perusal of the
records reveal that DARAB Case No. 0335 was filed by the private respondents for the purpose
of implementing the Conversion Orders particularly the fixing of the final disturbance
compensation to the legitimate farmer-occupants. The complaint-in-intervention, however, puts
in issue petitioner's alleged tenancy relationship and security of tenure which the DARAB does
not have any jurisdiction.
Furthermore, petitioner, a juridical entity, has no personality to file the instant petition to
intervene in the case as the real parties-in-interest are the members thereof who were not even
recognized as the rightful tenants occupying the subject land. As observed by the DAR,
"members of petitioner are merely holding on to an expectancy that they will become the
beneficiaries assuming that the land is still CARPable." The fact, however, remains that the land
in question has already been excluded from the purview of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) by the Estrella and Leong Orders which had long become final and executory.

Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 108941 (July 6, 2000)

Facts:
Isabel Candelaria is the owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-58191 and TCT
No. T-59172 measuring 16 hectares and 6 hectares, more or less, situated in Barangay Del Pilar,
Naiyan, Oriental Mindoro.
On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year LEASE AGREEMENT on the
land with Pio Malabanan. The contract stipulated that Malabanan will clear, clean and cultivate
the land, purchase and plant calamansi, citrus and rambutan seeds and make the necessary
harvests of fruits. Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and clear
it.
On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land, modifying their
first agreement. Malabanan was under no obligation to share the harvests with Candelaria.
In 1983, Malabanan died.
On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-
fact having powers of administration over the disputed property.
On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria
Dinglasan, Jaime's wife, for a period of one year. Meanwhile, the Bejasas agreed to pay rent to
Victoria of P15,000.00 in consideration of an "Aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" also for a
term of one year. The Bejasas were unable to pay the full amount of the consideration. After the
aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay
on the land and did not give any consideration for its use.
On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasan again entered into a three-year lease agreement
over the land. The special POWER OF ATTORNEY in favor of Jaime Dinglasan was also
renewed by Candelaria on the same date. Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking the ejectment of
the Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the case.
Sometime on June 1987, Jaime filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro against the Bejasas for "Recovery of Possession with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and Damages". The case was however referred to the DAR who in turn certified that
the case was not proper for trial before the civil courts. The trial court dismissed the complaint
including the Bejasas' counterclaim for leasehold and damages.
The Bejasas then filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for "confirmation of leasehold
and homelot with recovery of damages" against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan. The
Trial Court ruled in favor of the Bejasas reasoning that a tenancy relationship was created
between the parties and that as bona-fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have security of tenure.
Respondents appealed the aforementioned decision. On February 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision reversing the trial court's ruling. Hence, this Appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship created in favor of the Bejasas?
Held:
The elements of a tenancy relationship are the following:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests.
After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no tenancy
relationship between the parties.
Malabanan and the Bejasas. True, Malabanan (as Candelaria's usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas
to stay on and cultivate the land. However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give
consent to the creation of a tenancy relation, still, no such relation existed.
There was no proof that they shared the harvests.
In Chico v. Court of Appeals, we faulted private respondents for failing to prove sharing of
harvests since "no receipt, or any other evidence was presented." We added that "Self serving
statements . . . are inadequate; proof must be adduced."
Candelaria and the Bejasas. Between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as
landowner never gave her consent.
The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They acknowledge
that Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanan's arrangement with them. True
enough Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanan's lease
possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when Candelaria
agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983.
We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest
sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year,
such agreement did not create a tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease.
Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law
lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.
Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is the
"aryenduhan", which states in no uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be paid, and the
term of the contract.




Edgardo Santos represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Romeo L. Santos vs. Land Bank of the Philippines,
Jesus Diaz, Roberto Ong and Augusto Aquino
G.R. No. 137431 (September 7, 2000)
Facts:
Petitioners Edgardo Santos is the plaintiff in Agrarian Case No. RTC 94-3206. On August 12,
1997, the Regional Trial Court sitting as an Agrarian Court fixed the amount of P49,241,876.00
as the just compensation for the irrigated and unirrigated ricelands owned by the petitioner
with areas of 36.4152 and 40.7874 hectares, respectively. The properties were taken by the
government pursuant to the Land Reform Program as provided in Presidential Decree No. 27.
A preliminary valuation in the amount of P3,543,070.66 has been previously released by the
Land Bank to the petitioner in cash and bonds. Hence, the balance of P45,698,805.34 was
ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be paid in accordance with R.A. No. 6657.
The Land Bank released the amount of P3,621,023.01 in cash, Land Bank No. AR-0002206 in
the amount of P4,128,024.81 to the petitioner and P948,857.52 to the Clerk of Court as
commission fees. Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution before
the Regional Trial Court praying that payment of the compensation be in the proportion of
P8,629,179.36 in bonds and P32,499,745 in cash. Before the motion could be resolved, petitioner
moved to withdraw the same and instead filed a motion for the release of the balance of the
garnished amount in cash or certified check, claiming that payment of the P41,128,024.81 in
Land Bank bonds was not acceptable. Land Bank opposed the motion contending that the
judgment amount had already been satisfied.
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order on March 20, 1998 for the Land Bank to release the
balance of P41,128,024.81 from the garnished amount in cash or certified check. The Land Bank
moved for reconsideration. Petitioner on the other hand, filed a Motion to hold the Land Bank
in contempt for its refusal to release the balance of the garnished amount in cash or certified
check.
Respondent Regional Court was presided over by a new judge who resolved the two motions in
an Order dated April 24, 1998. To summarize, the new judge ruled that the payment of just
compensation must be computed in the manner provided for in Section 18, Republic Act No.
6657 as follows:
Total land value per judgment P49,241,876.00
Amount payable in bonds:
70% (50 has) P22,323,932.75
75% (excess) 13,012,907.41 35,336,840.16
Amount payable in cash:
30% (50 has) P9,567,399.75
35% (excess) 4,337,635.81 13,905,035.56
Less:
Preliminary valuation: P3,543,070.66
Commissioner's Fee: 948,857.52
Payment to plaintiff on
12-24-97 3,621,023.01 P8,112,951.19




P5,792,084.37
The new judge further ruled that by implication, both the Order dated March 20, 1997 and the
Order dated December 22, 1997should be deemed reconsidered.
The CA upheld the questioned April 24, 1998 Order of the Trial Court. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Basis of the determination of how much should be PAID IN CASH and how much should be paid in
bonds. And in relation thereto, whether the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Villegas-Llaguno was proper?
Held:
The April 24, 1998 Order was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997 judgment which
had become final and executory. The reason is that the Order did not revise, correct, or alter the
Decision. Rather, the Order iterated and made clear the essence of the final judgment.
It is clear from the August 12, 1997 judgment that the compensation was to be paid in the
manner provided by RA 6657." Pursuant to Section 18 of the same law, payment was to be in
cash and bonds, as indicated below:
"Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP,
in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent
provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for
the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the
landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions
(a) For lands above fifty (50) Twenty-five percent (25%)
hectares, insofar as the cash, the balance to be paid
excess hectarage is in government financial
concerned. instruments negotiable
at any time
(b) For lands above twenty- Thirty-percent (30%) cash,
Four (24) hectares and the balance to be paid in
up to Fifty (50) hectares government financial
instruments negotiable at
anytime."
Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgment. Hence,
its compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment ought to have been
construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657.
Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash because such act would have been a
deviation from the dictum of the final judgment, to which execution must conform. Paying in
cash, as petitioner demands, is not compatible with such judgment.
Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the final
judgment decrees payment in cash and bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken in
conjunction with R.A. No. 6657. Since respondent bank had already given petitioner the entire
adjudged amount in the required proportion of cash and bonds, it must be deemed to have
complied with its duty under Rule 39.

Republic of the Philippines Rep. by the Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Green
City Estate Development Corporation
G.R. No. 139592 (October 5, 2000)

Facts:
The five (5) parcels of land in issue with a combined area of 112.0577 hectares situated at
Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Province of Rizal were acquired by private
respondent through purchase on May 26, 1994 from Marcela Borja vda. de Torres. The tax
declarations classified the properties as agricultural. On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR issued a
Notice of Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory acquisition pursuant to
Section 7, Chapter II of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Land Reform Law of 1988
(CARL). Private respondent filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of
the land from agrarian reform pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994 and
DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990. The DAR Regional Director recommended a denial of the
said petition on the ground that private respondent "ailed to substantiate their (sic) allegation
that the properties are indeed in the Municipality's residential and forest conservation zone and
that portions of the properties are not irrigated nor irrigable".
Private respondent filed an Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from CARP coverage,
this time alleging that the property is within the residential and forest conservation zones and
offering a portion of about 15 hectares of land (irrigated riceland) to sell to farmer beneficiaries
or to DAR. On October 19, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the application
for exemption. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was likewise denied.
Appeal was made to the Court of Appeals. The latter in turn created a commission to conduct
ocular inspection and survey. DAR likewise constituted its own team to conduct an inspection
and thereafter objected to the report filed by the commission.
On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the Assailed DAR
Orders and declaring the mountainous and residential portions of the petitioner's land to be
exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Hence, this petition for
review.

Issue:
Whether or not the landholdings subject of this controversy are exempt from CARL coverage?
Held:
There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax
declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the
tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of the land. In fact, DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations,
that must be submitted when applying for exemption from CARP. In Halili vs. Court of
Appeals, we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the Land
Regulatory Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in the tax
declaration. The classification of the Board in said case was more recent than that of the tax
declaration and was based on the present condition of the property and the community thereat.
The commissioner's report on the actual condition of the properties confirms the fact that the
properties are not wholly agricultural. In essence, the report of the commission showed that the
land of private respondent consists of a mountainous area with an average 28 degree slope
containing 66.5 hectares; a level, unirrigated area of 34 hectares of which 5 to 6 hectares are
planted to palay; and a residential area of 8 hectares. The finding that 66.5 hectares of the
112.0577 hectares of land of private respondent have an average slope of 28 degrees provides
another cogent reason to exempt these portions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10 of
the CARL is clear on this point when it provides that "all lands with eighteen percent (18%)
slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act."
Petitioner DAR and the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) contest the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the subject parcels of land have a mountainous slope on the ground that this
conclusion was allegedly arrived at in a manner not in accord with established surveying
procedures. They also bewail the consideration given by the Court of Appeals to the "slope"
issue since this matter was allegedly never raised before the DAR and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner DAR and the OSG thus claim that laches had already set in.
As pointed out earlier, the crux of the controversy is whether the subject parcels of land in issue
are exempt from the coverage of the CARL. The determination of the classification and physical
condition of the lands is therefore material in the disposition of this case, for which purpose the
Court of Appeals constituted the commission to inspect and survey said properties. Petitioner
DAR did not object to the creation of a team of commissioners when it very well knew that the
survey and ocular inspection would eventually involve the determination of the slope of the
subject parcels of land. It is the protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour. The team
of commissioners appointed by respondent court was composed of persons who were mutually
acceptable to the parties. Thus, in the absence of any irregularity in the survey and inspection of
the subject properties, and none is alleged, the report of the commissioners deserves full faith
and credit and we find no reversible error in the reliance by the appellate court upon said report.



Ernesto Bunye vs. Lourdes Aquino, et al.
G.R. No. 138979 (October 9, 2000)

Facts:
Respondents Lourdes, Cita and Roberto, all surnamed Aquino are the children of the late
Bartolome Aquino who was instituted in 1967 as a tenant over a 16,974.50 square meter lot
located at Ilaya Street, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila belonging to Zoilo Bunye, the
father of petitioner Ernesto Bunye. Sometime in 1970, Zoilo Bunye told Bartolome Aquino to
stop cultivating 14,474.50 square meters of the land since the former was going to devote the
same to commercial uses. No disturbance compensation was paid to Bartolome Aquino, but
Zoilo Bunye permitted Bartolome Aquino to continue cultivating the remaining 2,500 square
meters and promised him a homelot within the said area. Considering himself aggrieved,
Bartolome Aquino repaired to the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in order to seek judicial
recognition of his tenancy status over the remaining 2,500 square meters. The CAR rendered
judgment recognizing Bartolome Aquino as a tenant over 2,500 square meters of the subject
property with a fixed annual rental of P140.00. On November 5, 1976, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the CAR's decision. Thus, Bartolome Aquino continued in the possession and
cultivation of 2,500 square meters of Zoilo Bunye's land and he constructed his family home on a
500 square meter area thereon.
The controversy arose when Ernesto Bunye's petition for conversion of the remaining 2,500
square meters was approved by the Minister of Agrarian Reform (MAR). Petitioner was able to
eject the respondents from the 2,000 square meters but not from the 500 square meters they
occupied. Respondents filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator insisting that they are entitled to the possession of the 500 square meters of land
they occupied as homelot, it being part of the compensation for the deprivation of the 16,974.50
square meters of land originally tenanted by Bartolome Aquino.
The Regional Adjudicator held that no tenurial relations could exist between the parties as the
land ceased to be agricultural by virtue of its conversion in 1986. However, petitioner was
ordered to pay respondents disturbance compensation for the latter's dispossession from the
2,500 square meters homelot to respondents but only as an alternative relief in the event that
the disturbance compensation could not be computed. This Decision was affirmed by the
DARAB and the Court of Appeals. However, acting upon a motion for reconsideration filed by
respondents, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by increasing the size of the homelot to
500 square meters. Hence, this Appeal.
Issue:
The sole issue is with respect to the legality of the appellate court's decision to increase the size of the
homelot awarded to respondents to 500 square meters?
Held:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement as to the
period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in
a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National
Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years.
Neither petitioner nor respondents questioned the conversion decreed in 1986, which was a
factual finding of both the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Court of Appeals; therefore,
it should be presumed that the conversion was validly and legally done. Thus, even before
Bartolome Aquino died in 1988, tenurial relations had already been extinguished, leaving
respondents without any claim upon the homelot allegedly promised by Zoilo Bunye to their
father.
In the event that tenanted land is converted pursuant to section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844,
the only relief available to respondents is the payment of disturbance compensation equivalent
to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding
calendar years. The award of 75 square meters of land originally granted by the Regional
Adjudicator and subsequently affirmed by the DARAB was made in lieu of disturbance
compensation for the dispossession of respondents of 2,500 square meters of land. Although the
Court of Appeals in its November 26, 1998 Decision affirmed the grant of 75 square meters of
land as reasonable, it simultaneously declared that respondents are entitled to disturbance
compensation for the entire 16,974.50 square meters of land originally tenanted by Bartolome
Aquino.
From 1976 until 1995, respondents never sought the payment of disturbance compensation for
the 14,474.50 square meters of land. Under section 38 of Republic Act No. 3844, an action to
enforce any cause of action under such law shall be barred if not commenced within three years
after such cause of action accrued. Unquestionably, respondents' claim for disturbance
compensation for the 14,474.50 square meters of land of which their father was dispossessed in
1970 has prescribed. Thus, respondents are only entitled to disturbance compensation for their
dispossession of 2,500 square meters of land and we find that, in the absence of adequate data on
the land's harvests, the award of 75 square meters is a fair and adequate alternative relief.
Cipriano Centeno, et al. vs. Ignacia Centeno
G.R. No. 140825 (October 13, 2000)

Facts:
The present case for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for restraining
order/preliminary injunction is a mere off-shoot of the suit for cancellation of Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) filed by herein respondent against herein petitioners before the DARAB.
That previous case culminated in a decision upholding respondent's entitlement to an award of
the subject landholdings under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The case at bar is for
the maintenance of her peaceful possession of the premises and to prevent the petitioners from
further harassing her and disturbing her possession and enjoyment thereof. The PARAD, the
DARAB and the Court of Appeals all rendered a decision in favor of the respondent adverting to
the Decision of the DAR recalling and canceling the CLTs issued in favor of the petitioners.
The petitioners filed a Petition for Review assailing the jurisdiction of the DARAB over the case
for maintenance of peaceful possession averring that there is no tenancy relationship nor any
agrarian dispute present in the case at bar which would place the case under the jurisdiction of
the DARAB.
Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the instant case for recovery of possession?
Held:
Under Section 50 of R.A 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), the DAR is
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program. The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian
dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB provides:
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies,and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:
xxx xxx xxx
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of
Landownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administrative
correction thereof; (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, petitioners are barred by estoppel from raising the issue of jurisdiction of the
DARAB. A perusal of the records will show that petitioners participated in all stages of the
instant case, setting up a counterclaim and asking for affirmative relief in their answer. This
Court has ruled that participation by certain parties in the administrative proceedings without
raising any objection thereto, bars them from any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse
decision is rendered against them.

Ramon D. Ocho vs. Bernardino Calos, et al.
G.R. No. 137908 (November 22, 2000)

Facts:
The Caloses averred that their parents, Efipanio and Valentina were the original owners of a
parcel of land with an area of 23,7109 hectares located in Valencia, Malaybalay, Bukidnon
covered by OCT No. P-2066 and issued by virtue of Homestead Patent No. V-42876. Pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 27, the said land was placed under the Operation Land Transfer and
subsequently distributed to qualified farmer beneficiaries. The original farmer-beneficiaries,
however, allegedly unlawfully conveyed their respective rights over the lands granted to them
to third persons. The amended complaint thus sought the nullification of the Emancipation
Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title issued to these third persons. The PARAD rendered
his decision ordering the revocation/cancellation of all EPs, CLTs, TCTs and other titles
involving OCT No. P-2066 for being null and void ab initio. On appeal, the DARAB reversed
the decision and upheld the validity of the EPs and TCTs issued. This Decision was
substantially affirmed by the Court of Appeals except on the part of petitioner Ramon Ocho and
Vicente Polinar who were directed "to restore and surrender to the government their
landholdings". Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari on the basis of the resolution in a previous case
docketed as DAR Administrative Case No. 006-90 which the respondents have purportedly
allowed to lapse into finality.
Issue:
Whether or not res judicata exists in the case at bar?
Held:
There is no question that the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other agricultural lands
had already been passed upon by the proper quasi-judicial authority (the hearing officer of the
DAR) in Adm. Case No. 006-90. Said decision became final and executory when the Caloses
failed to file an appeal thereof after their motion for reconsideration was denied. Applying the
rule on conclusiveness of judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other
agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated.
As held in Legarda vs. Savellano:
. . . It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and
deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a
state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question
litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this
maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an important principle of public
policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization
of every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very
object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.
The findings of the Hearing Officer in Adm. Case No. 006-90, which had long attained finality,
averring that petitioner is not the owner of any other agricultural lands, foreclosed any inquiry
on the same issue involving the same parties and property. The CA thus erred in still making a
finding that petitioner is not qualified to be a farmer-beneficiary because he owns other
agricultural lands.
Angel Chico vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 134735 (December 5, 2000)
Issue:
Whether or not a tenancy relationship can exist on the mere basis of an "insidious" sale or transfer of
tenancy right by the former lessee (Eugenia Esguerra) to the petitioner (Angel Chico)?
Held:
No.
Jurisprudence has established pre-requisite conditions in order that an agricultural leasehold
relationship can be said to be extant; to wit:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;
(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
The matter of whether or not such an agreement exists between petitioner and private
respondents (the owners) over the parcel of land in question is a factual question.
Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned is essential to create a de jure leasehold or tenancy
relationship between the parties. This de jure relationship, in turn, is the terra firma for a
security of tenure between the landlord and the tenant. The leasehold relationship is not
brought about by a mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the
parties to that relationship should be primordial.
Lucia Mapa vda. de dela Cruz, et al. vs. Adjuto Abille
G.R. No. 130196 (February 26, 2001)
Facts:
To cut a long story short, Herminio Abille filed a Petition for Exemption under Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) of his landholdings alleging that he had been deprived of his constitutional
right to due process since DAR did not notify him or his representatives of the OLT coverage of
his lot.
On April 19, 1989, DAR Regional Director Antonio Nuesa, Region I, San Fernando, La Union
issued an Order denying the petition for exemption and instead merely granted Herminio Abille
a right of retention of not more than seven (7) hectares. On July 24, 1989, Herminio Abille
selected the seven-hectare retention area which included the area covered by CLT No. 0-
064711, hence, said CLT was automatically cancelled. Even the Tax Declaration issued in the
name of Balbino dela Cruz was cancelled and re-issued in favor of Herminio Abille.
Meanwhile, petitioners who are the compulsory heirs of Balbino dela Cruz filed with the DAR a
petition for issuance of Emancipation Patent. In his comment, respondent Adjuto Abille
representing Herminio Abille prayed for the dismissal of the petition by reason of the DAR
Order dated April 19, 1989. On the basis of such, on October 21, 1992, Regional Director Eligio
P. Pacis issued an Order denying the petition for issuance of Emancipation Patent. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration praying that another Order be issued declaring as null and
void the Order dated April 19, 1989 on the basis of absence of due process of law. They sought
the reinstatement of CLT No. 0-064711 and the issuance of an emancipation patent in their
favor as compulsory heirs of the late Balbino dela Cruz.
The motion for reconsideration was treated as an Appeal and elevated to the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform who rendered a Decision dismissing the instant motion for lack
of merit and instead ordered the preparation of Certificates of Agricultural Leasehold (CALs) to
the tenants as lessees thereat. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
They filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which was also dismissed by the CA
in a Decision promulgated on December 5, 1996. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for issuance of emancipation patent filed
by the heirs of Balbino dela Cruz?
Held:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that although the petitioners were not given the
opportunity to be heard when Regional Director Antonio Nuesa in his Order dated April 19,
1989 ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 on the retained area,
nevertheless, in their petition for issuance of an emancipation patent, petitioners were given
such opportunity as they raised in issue the validity of the cancellation of the said CLT, which
was resolved by DAR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis in his Order dated October 21, 1992,
and also in their (petitioners') motion for reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform and resolved in his Order dated June 20, 1994. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of (emphasis supplied).
In the case of Daez v. Court of Appeals, where the Certificates of Land Transfer of farmer
beneficiaries over some four (4) hectares of riceland were issued without the landowner having
been accorded her right to choose what to retain among her landholdings, we held that the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued on the basis of Certificates of Land Transfer issued to the
farmer-beneficiaries cannot operate to defeat the right of the heirs of the deceased landowner to
retain the said riceland. Even the issuance of an emancipation patent does not bar the landowner
from retaining the area covered thereby. Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994 provides:
"Emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership award issued to agrarian reform
beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations. This includes cases of lands which are found to be exempted/excluded from P.D.
No. 27/E.O. No. 228 of CARP coverage, or part of the landowner's retained area." (emphasis
supplied.)
The earlier cases of Locsin, et al. v. Valenzuela, et al. and Quiban v. Butalid, which were cited by
the petitioners, did not involve any issue of retention rights of the landowner, hence, the said
cases are not applicable to the case at bar.
Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar, that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness,
illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of a department head, in rendering his questioned
decisions or of a total lack of substantial evidence to support the same, such administrative
decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with.

Roberto Mito vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 126099 (March 12, 2001)
Facts:
In an Administrative transfer action in May 1985, the Gapan-Penaranda Agrarian Reform Team
Office No. 077, with station at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, cancelled a Certificate of Land Transfer
(CLT) in the name of Leonardo Flores, now deceased. Subsequently, it was re-issued in the
name of petitioner, Roberto G. Mito. Private respondent Victorino Flores, brother of Leonardo
Flores, filed a letter-complaint with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region III,
alleging that the transferred lot was actually his and that its transfer to petitioner was unlawful.
DAR dismissed the claim of private respondent Flores, declared petitioner Mito as a tenant-
beneficiary of the land and directed the MARO to issue a CLT or an Emancipation Patent in
favor of Mito.
Private respondent appealed to the DARAB, which promulgated a decision reversing the order
of the Regional Director. It ordered the DAR Provincial Office to issue an Emancipation Patent
in favor of private respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was
dismissed due to petitioner's failure to utilize the correct remedy, specifically a petition for
review without necessarily impleading the agency a quo and for violation of SC Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 on the filing of certified true copies of the material portions of
the record referred to be submitted. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Order dated January 4, 1990 of the Regional Director of DAR is supported by
substantial evidence?
Held:
We note that at the time of the promulgation of the DARAB decision on June 1, 1995, appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies like the DAR were governed by Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91). As ruled by the Court of Appeals, the remedy
should have been a petition for review, filed by petitioner in seven legible copies, without
impleading the DARAB, the agency a quo, as required by Circular No. 1-95. As found by the
respondent court, not only did petitioner implead the DARAB, all his annexes other than the
assailed resolutions of the DARAB were not certified true copies. In addition, it did not state the
date petitioner received a copy of each resolution, such that it could not be determined if the
appeal was filed on time. Petitioner's failure to comply with the requirements for perfecting an
appeal merited the dismissal of his petition before the Court of Appeals.
Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. An appeal is a
statutory privilege and it may only be exercised in the manner provided by law.
Anastacio Victorio vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Dominador Fernandez
G.R. No. 110012 (March 28, 2001)
Facts:
Sometime in 1967, Alfredo Victorio (as lessee) and Tomas Fernandez (as lessor), the fathers of
herein petitioner Anastacio Victorio and private respondent Dominador Fernandez, respectively
entered into a lease contract over a fishpond located in Brgy. Balangobon, Lingayen, Pangasinan
for a 10-year period. After the said contract expired in 1977, the same was renewed, albeit
verbally, for another 10 years until 1987 but adopting the terms and conditions of the original
contract. When the second contract expired, private respondent repeatedly asked petitioner to
vacate the premises but the latter adamantly refused. Consequently, a case for ejectment was
filed by respondent against petitioner but was consequently dismissed by the trial court on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, the regional trial court revised the decision holding that the lease contract is a civil
law LEASE AGREEMENT and ordering petitioner to vacate the fishpond in question and
surrender peaceful possession thereof.
Petitioner having been rebuked on reconsideration, elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
on a petition for certiorari. However, the Court of Appeals turned down the appeal, in effect,
ratiocinating that the court is strongly convinced and hereby finds and holds that the agreement
entered into by the parties is a civil law contract of lease and not one under the agricultural
leasehold system as expressly termed under R.A. No. 3844, as amended. The petitioner moved
for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Republic Act No. 3844 and thus entitled to
security of tenure over the fishpond in question, or a mere civil lessee whose right over the subject premises
ceased upon the expiration of the contract of lease?
Held:
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose
is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties (Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 [1198]; Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 235
[1997]; Odsique vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 [1994]; see also Sintos vs. Court of Appeals, 246
SCRA 223 [1995).
Petitioner's right to the fishpond emanated from the lease contract between his father and
private respondent's father wherein petitioner's father was designated as a "lessee" and not as a
"tenant". Petitioner cannot, therefore, be more than a lessee like his father because "the spring
cannot rise higher than its source". Secondly, there was no stipulation regarding the sharing of
the harvest, whether explicitly or implicitly. One of the essential requisites for existence of
tenancy relationship is sharing by the landowner and tenant of the produce, and no proof of this
fact has been shown in this case. What the parties agreed upon, as established by the evidence,
was for the petitioner to pay private respondent a yearly lease rental, with an advance payment
of 3 years' rental. This is not the case obtaining in a tenancy relationship where the parties share
in the produce of the land as this falls due, or as it becomes available, during harvest time.
Heirs of Pedro Atega, represented by Veronica Atega-Nable vs. Ernesto Garilao, et al.
G.R. No. 133806 (April 20, 2001)
Facts:
The land owned by the Heirs of Pedro Atega with an area of 129.4615 hectares was made the
subject of compulsory acquisition and distribution pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The Heirs protested to the MARO who ignored
the same considering that the PARO had already sent a Notice of Land Acquisition and
Valuation. Petitioners then filed an application for exemption with the Regional Director who
denied the application on the basis of the lack of approval by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) as required by DAR Administrative Order No. 6-94 and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Court
of Appeals which was dismissed for prematurity on the ground that the former failed to first
exhaust all available administrative remedies. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the
motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the petition on the ground of prematurity (for failure to first file a motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution of respondent Regional Director or an Appeal to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform) was proper?
Held:
In sum, we rule that certiorari will lie because a motion for reconsideration before the Regional
Director or an appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform will not prove to be a speedy or
adequate remedy. However, we find that the Regional Director did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioners' application for Exemption of their property from the CARP.
According to DAR Adm. Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90, an
Application for Exemption from the coverage of CARP filed before the Regional Director must
be accompanied by a certification from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance has
been approved by the Board prior to 15 June 1988, the date when the CARL took effect. In the
instant case, no such accompanying certification from the HLURB was filed by petitioners.
Lilia Gonzalez vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 106028 (May 09, 2001)
Facts:
Petitioner received two (2) orders from the DAR Regional Director directing her to surrender
the titles to her land and to submit the other requirements of Land Bank for her to be paid the
aggregate amount of P55,690.74 as compensation for two parcels of land owned by her.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order with
the Court of Appeals to restrain the enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR
Regional Director on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction. The former alleged that she
never filed a land transfer claim and that she was not notified, nor heard of in the execution of
the final survey plans and the valuation of her land.
After requiring the respondents to file a comment, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. The
Court of Appeals held that Certiorari cannot be used to substitute for Appeal. Hence, this
Petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in dismissing the petition for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies
Whether or not respondents DAR Director and LBP acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the availed Orders datedNovember 27, 1990 and April 22, 1991
Held:
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within
the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative
agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or
correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and
convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by
administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the
cause of action of the petitioner.
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies to be applicable in this case.
It may be reasonably concluded that the issuance of the assailed orders pursuant to the
operation land transfer and tenant emancipation program of the government is within the
authority and jurisdiction of the DAR Regional Director. However, questions as to the propriety
of the issuance could have still been raised before the proper administrative forum. Instead of
going directly to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, the petitioner should have sought redress in
the DARAB, and the latter's officials should have been given an opportunity to review the
matter and resolve the controversy.
The petitioner raises the following exceptions to the doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies as applicable to the case at bar: (1) where the questioned order is a patent nullity; (2)
where there is a deprivation of the petitioner's fundamental right to due process; and (3) where
the question involved is a purely legal one. We are not convinced that any of the exceptions
obtains here. As above stated, the Orders issued by the Regional Director pursuant to law are
not patent nullities, and the alleged denial of the petitioner's right to due process is intertwined
with the question of notice upon the petitioner which raises basically a factual matter, i.e.,
whether three notices were properly served upon petitioner. This issue is not to be resolved by
the Court of Appeals in the first instance on certiorari. We do not see how the controversy
raises a purely LEGAL QUESTION .
The proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to move for a reconsideration of
the orders of the Regional Director, or to go directly to the DARAB, or to its executive
adjudicator in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Prior resort to
these administrative bodies will not only satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies, but may likewise prove advantageous to the parties as the proceedings will be
conducted by experts, and will not be limited by the technical rules of procedure and evidence.
From there, the petitioner has yet another forum available the Special Agrarian Courts which
are the final determinants of cases involving land valuation or determination of just
compensation.
Thus, the procedural short-cut taken by the petitioner which finds no justification both in law
and in jurisprudence must be considered fatal to the petitioner's cause of action. Accordingly, we
rule that the Court of Appeals committed no error in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.
Ignacio Gonzales, et al. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 110335 (June 18, 2001)
Facts:
The deceased spouses Ignacio and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of two (2)
parcels of land denominated as Lot551-C and 558-A containing 46.97 hectares and 37.5735
hectares, respectively. Marina Gonzales died intestate. On the other hand, Ignacio Gonzales
executed a Deed of Donation on July 12, 1972 conveying his share of the property, specifically
Lot No. 551-C in favor of his 14 grandchildren. However, the said donation was not registered.
Thus, when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings of the
spouses were placed under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) and private respondents were
accordingly issued EPs and CLTs. On March 5, 1974, the administratix Lilia Gonzales filed an
application for retention with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform requesting that their property be
excluded from the coverage of OLT. The application was initially denied but was finally granted
by DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong. Aggrieved, the private respondents filed a petition for
certiorari. The CA reversed the action of the DAR and upheld the issuance of the certificates of
land transfer and emancipation patents. A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same wad
denied by the CA. Hence, this Appeal.
Issues:
Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27 took
effect should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer Program?
Held:
Article 749 of the Civil code provides inter alia that "in order that the donation of an immovable may
be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states
that "the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons."
It is actually the act of registration that operates to convey registered land or affect title thereto.
Thus, Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 51 of P.D. No.
1529 (Property Registration Decree), provides:
SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner . . . But no
deed, MORTGAGE , lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to
convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of
Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned.
Further, it is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that registration in a public registry
creates constructive notice to the whole world (Olizon vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 148
[1994]). Thus, Section 51 of Act No. 496, as amended by Section 52 of P.D. No. 1529, provides:
SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration Every conveyance, MORTGAGE
, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall,
if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of
such registering, filing or entering.
The ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to
exclude the subject land from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27,
which took effect on October 21, 1972. To rule otherwise would render ineffectual the rights
and interests that the tenants-farmers immediately acquired upon the promulgation of P.D. No.
27, especially so because in the case at bar, they have been cultivating the land even before
World War II.

Victoria P. Cabral vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 101974 (July 12, 2001)
Facts:
Petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of several parcels of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1670 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan among
which is a parcel of land described therein as Lot 4 of Plan Psu-164390. As early as July 1973,
petitioner had already purportedly applied for the reclassification or conversion of the land for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The application for conversion, however, was not acted upon. Instead, on April 25, 1988,
Emancipation Patents and thereafter, Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in favor of
private respondents.
Petitioner sought the cancellation of the TCTs with the BARC on January 16, 1990 and
on January 19, 1990, filed another petition for the cancellation of the said Emancipation Patents
and Torrens Title.
The said petition was dismissed in an Order dated February 11, 1990 by then Regional Director
Eligio Pacis. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Consequently,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the jurisdiction of
the Regional Director and claiming denial of due process. The petition was dismissed for lack of
merit. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied prompting the petitioner to
turn to the Supreme Court for relief. Also, on April 21, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court an
urgent Motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order alleging that respondent
Gregoria Adolfo had already conveyed the land awarded to her to the Aqualand Development
Corporation and the Sta. Rita Steel Resources Corporation for the conversion of the land from
agricultural to commercial and industrial purposes. In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, the
Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for.
Issue:
Who has jurisdiction over the instant controversy, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) as contended by the Petitioner or the Regional Director?
Held:
Petitioner is correct. Whatever jurisdiction the Regional Director may have had over the
cancellation of emancipation patents is lost with the passage of subsequent laws.
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229 (Providing for the Mechanism for the Implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program) granted DAR quasi-judicial powers to
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, to wit:
"SECTION 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with
quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)."
Executive Order No. 129-A (Modifying Executive Order No. 129 Reorganizing and
Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for other purposes) subsequently
provided for the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board, granting it the powers
and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases:
"SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. There is hereby created an
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be
composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as may be designated by the
Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, and three (3) others to be appointed by
the President upon recommendation of the Secretary as members. A Secretariat shall be
constituted to support the Board. The Board shall assume the powers and functions with
respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive Order No. 229 and this
Executive Order. These powers and functions may be delegated to the regional office of the
Department in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board."
Congress substantially reiterated Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 in Republic Act No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Law of 1988 (CARL). Section 50 thereof
states:
"SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
CARL took effect on June 15, 1988, after it was published in two newspapers of general
circulation.
In order "to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding before it," the DAR is mandated "to adopt a uniform rule of procedure" (Second par.,
Section 50, RA. No. 6657), which is, at present, the DARAB Revised Rules. The Rules were
promulgated on December 26, 1988.
The Court of Appeals has underscored the fact that Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-A authorizes the
DARAB to delegate its powers and functions to the regional office in accordance with the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Board. The authority purportedly provides additional
justification for the Regional Office's jurisdiction over the case. Precisely, however, the DARAB,
through its Revised Rules, has delegated such powers and functions to the RARADs and the
PARADs, which, under Section 3 of the Rules, "are deemed to form part of the DAR Regional
Office where they are stationed."
It is evident from the foregoing that the DAR, like most administrative agencies, is granted with
a fusion of governmental powers, in this case, a commingling of the quasi-judicial and the
executive. The growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws have impelled
this constantly growing tendency toward such delegation.
In delegating these powers, it would hardly seem practical to allow a duplication of functions
between agencies. Duplication results in confusion between the various agencies upon whom
these powers are reposed, and in the public that the agencies are supposed to serve. It divides
the agencies' resources and prevents them from devoting their energy to similarly important
tasks. The intention to avoid this very situation is evident in the various laws' distinct
delineation of the functions of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and the DAR Regional Office.
Accordingly, the Court must reject the theory of concurrent jurisdiction between the former and
the latter. We hold that the DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al. vs. Tropical Homes Inc.
G.R. No. 136827 and 136799 (July 31, 2001)
Facts:
Carlos Iigo was the registered owner of four (4) parcels of land located in Bago Iigo, Toril,
Davao City with an aggregate area of more or less one million five hundred thirty two thousand
four hundred fifteen (1,532,415) square meters. On July 17, 1971, Iigo and respondent Tropical
Homes Inc. (Tropical for brevity) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement for the development
of the property into a residential area which was later known as the "Better Living Subdivision".
Tropical even filed with the City Council of Davao an application for reclassification of the area
from agricultural to residential. On October 2, 1972, the City Council of Davao, through
Resolution No. 558 declared the site of the Better Living Subdivision as a residential area.
Carlos Iigo died. On February 14, 1975, the aforementioned properties were divided among his
heirs through a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. The old titles were cancelled and new ones
issued in the name of the heirs. When the Joint Venture Agreement initiated by the late Carlos
Iigo and respondent Tropical pushed through with the Notice and Manifestation of conformity
of the Heirs, the new titles were again cancelled and replaced by new titles all registered in the
name of Tropical.
However, the DAR through its Davao Office subjected the aforementioned properties under
CARP coverage. DAR issued three (3) Notices of Acquisition to Tropical covering one million
thirty seven thousand two hundred seventy two (1,037,272) square meters of the land.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-184249 was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Consequently, DAR through Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 301148
distributed the landholding to the identified farmer beneficiaries.
Tropical filed a petition with the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) for the cancellation of the
CLOA on the ground that the landholding was outside the coverage of the CARP. While the
petition was pending, a Motion for Intervention was filed by Rolando B. Bersamin, et al.,
alleging that they are the bona fide residents of the landholding but were excluded in the CLOA.
The PARAD ruled in favor of Tropical and denied the Motion for Intervention ruling that the
issue in intervention can be threshed out in a separate proceeding. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the ruling of the
PARAD. OnDecember 11, 1997, Tropical filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court
of Appeals and an urgent Motion for the issuance of a TRO. The TRO was granted and later
replaced by a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Later, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in
favor of Tropical. Both Petitioners and Petitioners-Appellants moved for reconsideration. The
first motion was denied for having been filed beyond the fifteen (15) day reglementary period
while the second motion was ordered expunged from the rollo on the ground that they were not
parties to the case and that at no point in the legal process from the PARAD to the CA were
they allowed to intervene. Hence, the present petitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners/appellants?
Held:
Not having perfected their appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law, the decision
of the Court of Appeals had become final and executory. Such a failure carries with it the result
that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the case. However, it is true that we
have recognized certain exceptions to this rule. In Ramos v. Bagasao, we excused the delay of
four (4) days in the filing of a notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial court
was served upon appellant at a time when her counsel of record was already dead. Her new
counsel could only file the appeal four (4) days after the prescribed reglementary period was
over. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic
despite the delay of six (6) days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since it stood to lose
hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for
educational purposes. In Olacao v. National Labor Relations Commission, we accepted a tardy
appeal considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially settled, with
finality, in another case. The dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant
being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee. Unfortunately, we find no
reason to make this case an exception. Our ruling in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson has
been in force for fifteen (15) years. It is hard to believe that petitioners were not aware of this
ruling, or assuming that they were, their utter disregard of it is simply unacceptable.
The petitioners-appellants in G.R. No. 136799 likewise committed a procedural error fatal to
their cause of action. When they filed their Motion for Intervention on November 25, 1996, the
DARAB New Rules of Procedure was already in effect. Rule IX, Sec. 3 thereof states
"SECTION 3. Intervention. The filing of a motion for intervention shall be
discouraged. Such motion shall be entertained only upon a clear showing by the would-be
intervenor that he has a substantial right or interest in the case that cannot be adequately
pursued and protected in another proceeding."
Thus, for such a motion for intervention to be entertained, two (2) requisites must concur. First,
the would-be intervenor must show that he has a substantial right or interest in the case and
that, second, it cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. The absence
of even one requisite will warrant its denial. Acting on this provision, the PARAD in fact denied
the motion for intervention, ruling that "their (petitioners-intervenors) rights over the property
. . . can be properly threshed out in a separate proceeding duly instituted for the purpose". In
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, we held that the discretion of a court (in this case a quasi-judicial
agency) to allow intervention, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled
by mandamus save in instances where such discretion has been exercised in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. Petitioners-appellants have not shown that the exercise of this discretion
was made in the manner above-described. Hence, it behooves this Court to leave the denial of
the motion for intervention to the wisdom of the PARAD. Besides, the theory of petitioners-
appellants that as bona fide occupants of the landholding, they automatically acquire a
substantial right or interest in the case is unmeritorious. The right or interest here referred to is
generally required to be direct and not consequential, and one properly determinable in the
action in which intervention is sought. The issue of whether or not they were improperly
excluded from the CLOA is an issue totally different from that in G.R. No. 136827, which is
whether the City Council of Davao, through Resolution No. 558, validly reclassified the
landholding from agricultural area to residential area, hence, rendering it outside the coverage
of the CARP. If indeed it was validly reclassified, then there would be no CLOA to speak of.
Petitioners-appellants would have had no cause of action. Conversely, if the reclassification was
invalid, then the CLOA's legality would merely be affirmed. It must be borne in mind that the
alleged substantial right or interest of petitioners-appellants is based not on the legality or
illegality of the CLOA brought about by the supposed questionable reclassification done by the
City Council of Davao through Resolution No. 558, rather, it is based on their claim that they
were improperly excluded from it. Thus, their interest is not one properly determinable in the
action in which intervention is sought. To further complicate the case by adding parties who
have totally separate interests which can be the proper subject of a separate proceeding, will
simply delay the expeditious resolution thereof. It has been settled that the right to intervene is
not an absolute right, for the statutory rules or conditions for the right to apply must be shown.
As the two (2) requisites were not met, petitioners-appellants have no standing to intervene. At
this point, the proper course of action was simply to have filed a separate proceeding altogether.
It is indeed lamentable that the two (2) instant petitions must be denied for failure to comply
with the procedural requirements set forth in the Rules of Court. While it is true that a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.
Graciano Palele vs. Hon. Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) and Tomas Sobrevias
G.R. No. 138289 (July 31, 2001)
Facts:
The properties involved in this case form part of a larger tract of land referred to as Lot No. 707
consisting of 9,939 meters in Dinalupihan, Bataan. The original holder-cultivator of the lot was
respondent Tomas Sobrevias' father, Daniel who had worked on the lot as a tenant since the
1920s. Tomas succeeded to the possession of the said lot.
On May 2, 1962, private respondent filed an application with the Department of Agrarian
Reform for the purchase of Lot No. 707. He paid the purchase price of P810.66 in five
installments and completed full payment on September 7, 1973, however, no deed of sale was
issued to him and the lot remained the property of the government. In 1981, the lot was
subdivided into four (4) parcels of lands. On September 23, 1990, petitioner Graciano Palele
applied for the purchase of two of the lots. Subsequently, DAR issued two (2) CLOAs covering
the two lots applied for. Private respondent being unaware of these incidents continued paying
the real estate taxes on Lot No. 707 and upon learning of the issuance of the CLOAs in favor of
the petitioner, filed a petition for cancellation of the certificates on August 18, 1992. On
September 23, 1993, the PARAD rendered judgment for the petitioner. This Decision was
affirmed by the DARAB. However, on appeal, the said Decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals. The CLOAs were ordered recalled and cancelled. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent has acquired a vested right on the subject landholdings
Held:
At the time private respondent applied to purchase Lot No. 707 on May 2, 1962, the law in
effect was R.A. No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines,
which took effect on August 30, 1954. Pursuant to the said law, the then Land Tenure
Administration, the implementing agency of the government, issued Administrative Order No.
2, which was approved on May 10, 1956. So far as pertinent to this case, Sections 14 and 16 of
the Order provided:
SECTION 14. Persons Qualified to Purchase; Number of Lots Granted. Subject to the
provisions of Section 16 hereof, any private individual who is qualified to acquire and own
lands in the Philippines and who will personally cultivate and/or occupy the lot or lots which
may be sold to him, may be allowed to purchase not more than one (1) home lot and/or farm
lot except that in case of farm lots with areas less than six (6) hectares, more than one (1) lot
may be purchased provided, however, that the total area of the lots which may be sold to one
person shall not exceed six (6) hectares.
The cultivation of a farm lot by the husband or wife of the purchaser thereof, and by the
members of the family of said purchaser who are dependent upon him or her for support shall
be considered as his or her cultivation for the purpose of this section and of Sections 24 and
25 hereof.
Section 16. Right of Preference to Purchase of Bona-fide Tenant, Bona-fide Occupant and Other
Persons. The bona-fide tenant and in his absence or if he fails to qualify under Section 14
hereof, the bona-fide occupant of a subdivision lot in a private agricultural land acquired by
the government shall have the right of preference to purchase said lot. In the absence of the
bona-fide tenant and/or bona-fide occupant or in case said tenant and occupant fail to qualify
under Section 14 hereof and subject to the provision of said section, the following persons
shall be preferred in the purchase of a farm lot and/or home lot, in the order in which they are
named:
(1) A person who is the purchaser of a farm lot or lots in an agricultural land acquired by
the government, the production of which yields a net profit insufficient to maintain a decent
standard of living provided, however, that he will be preferred only as to the portion of the
farm lot applied for in the same agricultural land which if added to the area of the lot or lots
already sold to him will not exceed six (6) hectares;
(2) A person who is a resident of the municipality where the lot applied for is located.
These provisions clearly require that the applicant should personally cultivate and/or occupy
the land subject of the purchase. This requirement is reiterated in Sections 23 and 24 of the
same order.
It cannot be denied that private respondent had ceased to personally occupy and cultivate Lot
No. 707 at least on August 8, 1963. Only a year after his application and before he had fully paid
the purchase price of the land, private respondent had already instituted tenants on the said lot.
This is clearly indicative of his circumvention of applicable agrarian reform laws. The fact that
in 1992 he was surprised to know that the lot had already been subdivided into smaller parcels
since 1981, and that two of which had already been awarded to petitioner, indicates quite clearly
that he was not personally cultivating Lot No. 707. Thus, the Land Tenure Administration, and
later the Land Authority, was justified in refusing to issue a deed of sale in favor of respondent
even though he paid in full the purchase price of the lot.
While it is true that due process protects vested rights, and this Court would be the first to
stress this basic principle, it is no less true that the guarantee cannot be invoked when, as in the
case at bar, no right has been acquired at all because of non-compliance with the requirements of
the law.
Heirs of Roman Soriano vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 128177 (August 15, 2001)
Issue:
May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof, whose security of
tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB?
Held:
A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of the
land whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated
differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the
area while it is being occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a
declaration that the latter's occupancy was unlawful.
Pevet Adalid Felizardo, et al. vs. Siegfredo Fernandez
G.R. No. 137509 (August 15, 2001)
Facts:
To summarize, the petitioners in the case at bar are the registered owners of a parcel of land
originally tilled by the father of the respondent. Even during the lifetime of his father,
respondent was already the one doing the duties of a tenant until the latter's death in 1995.
However, petitioners would like to institute the elder sister of respondent as tenant of the land
despite the allegation of respondent that by virtue of successional tenancy rights, he was already
the declared tenant of the land.
Issue:
Whether Siegfredo has acquired the status of agricultural tenant which would preclude petitioners from
exercising their right to choose Asuncion (elder sister of respondent) as Policarpio's successor after the
latter's death?
Held:
The undisputed fact, as found by the DARAB, is that respondent worked on the land since 1981
because his father could no longer do so. Respondent did not merely aid his father in the latter's
farm work, but completely took over that work since Policarpo was already very old and
incapable to continue farming. Section 5 (p) of R.A. No. 1199 defines "incapacity" as any cause
or circumstance which prevents the tenant from fulfilling his contractual obligations.
Respondent fully assumed his father's leasehold obligations for 15 years precisely because
Policarpo could no longer perform his duties as petitioners' tenant and respondent is the only
member remaining of the original tenant's immediate farm household.
The Regional Adjudicator correctly took judicial notice of the fact that at the age of 74,
Policarpo was not able and could not reasonably be expected to till the land anymore.
Petitioners were not unaware of this circumstance since they already dealt with and received the
land's proceeds from respondent. The incapacity of Policarpo to attend to farm work had been
evident to petitioners. The prevailing situation in the farm and the length of time which had
lapsed from the time respondent assumed the tenancy work until his father's death amply
support that conclusion.
A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly,
in accordance with Section 7 of R.A. No. 1199. As aptly held by the Regional Adjudicator:
. . . the transfer and/or delegation of such tenancy obligations to herein complainant
[respondent] was in conformity to the general practice among farmers, especially so in the
case of complainant who had been assisting his father in the farmworks (sic). When
defendants failed to intervene or object to this development, and continued to accept their
shares as proffered by the new cultivator, they have thereby impliedly consented to it giving
rise to the new tenancy relationship with the complainant.
Although petitioners did not expressly give their consent to a leasehold relation with
respondent, in our view petitioners consented to the tenancy albeit impliedly by allowing
respondent to cultivate the landholding in question and by receiving from him the landowner's
share of the harvest over a considerable length of time.
While it is true that Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844 gives the lessor/landowner the right to choose a
tenant successor in case of death or incapacity of the original tenant, in this case we agree that
said right could no longer be exercised by petitioners. Not only have they allowed the lapse of a
long period of time before attempting to exercise said right, it was also found that the successor
they had allegedly chosen, Asuncion Fernandez Espinosa, was not qualified to succeed Policarpo
because (a) she was no longer a member of the latter's immediate farm household; and (b) she
could not and did not, at any time, personally cultivate the land as shown by her unexplained
absence during the harvests subsequent to respondent's dispossession. Note also that in 1995,
she was already 65 years old.
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 112526 (October 12, 2001)
Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the registered
owner of two parcels of land situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 81949 and 84891 with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According
to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds which provide clean potable water to the
Canlubang Community and ninety (90) light industries located in the area.
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the
ecosystem. Respondents filed a civil case with the RTC of Laguna seeking an easement of a
right of way to and from Barangay Casile. Petitioner countered by seeking the ejectment of the
respondents and filed separate complaints for forcible entry against the respondents before the
Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna. After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents
petitioned the DAR for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under CARP.
Eventually, after a long and arduous process, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Miriam
Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition to petitioner and placed the properties
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program despite the protest made by SRRDC that
the property was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area being rugged in terrain
with slopes of 18% or over and that the occupants of the land were squatters not entitled to any
land as beneficiaries. SRRDC further averred that the properties were exempt from CARP
coverage because it had been classified as watershed area and were the subject of a pending
petition for land conversion. Later, the case was referred to the DARAB for summary land
valuation.
In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the RTC of Laguna, Branch 24 rendered a Decision
finding that the private respondents illegally entered the SRRDC property and ordered them
evicted.
On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a Memorandum directing the Land
Bank of the Philippines to open a trust account in favor of SRRDC for P5,637,965.55 as
valuation for the SRRDC property.
On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated its Decision which, among others, dismissed the
petitioner's protest against compulsory coverage for lack of merit, ordered the Land Bank of the
Philippines to pay SRRDC the amount of P7,841,997.64 for the landholdings covered by the two
titles and ordered the DAR through the MARO to take immediate possession of the landholding
after transfer of the titles in the name of the Republic of the Philippines for the immediate
issuance of Emancipation Patents to farmer-beneficiaries.
On January 20, 1992, the RTC of Laguna, Branch 24 rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. B-
2333 ruling that private respondents were builders in bad faith.
On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for review of the
DARAB decision. The CA promulgated a decision affirming the Decision of the DARAB. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP considering that it forms part of a watershed
area and has slopes of 18% and over
Held:
First, under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land,
Compulsory and Voluntary.
In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and farmer
beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a notice of
acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is
located.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the landowner, his
administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government
and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of
transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the
landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary
administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the
LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation
within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the
case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec. 16 of the
CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners
and the farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification process shall be
made. To fill this gap, on July 26, 1989, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12, series of
1989, which set the operating procedure in the identification of such lands.
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area
of responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory
Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the
landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over
the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries,
the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the
property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting,
the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of
coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the
representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer-beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to
DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner under
Section 16 of the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to a
conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply
with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an
exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the
CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation on the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary.
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment
of just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required
payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust accounts as was done by DAR.
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held
that "The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either."
Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a
boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds." Watersheds generally are
outside the commerce of man, so why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC?
The answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources had not declared the property as watershed area. The parcels of land in Barangay
Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao
in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued Resolution 26 voiding the Zoning classification
of the lands at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land was now classified as
agricultural land.
The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an
exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent domain. "A zoning ordinance is defined as
a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions
a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs."
In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that lands classified as non-
agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL, may not be compulsorily acquired for
distribution to farmer beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent
studies and survey showed that the parcels of land in question form a vital part of a watershed
area.
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important
product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessity. The
protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the
control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an "intergenerational responsibility" that needs to be answered now.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing,
petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted
the land from the coverage of CARL. R.A. No. 6657, Section 10, provides:
"Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used
and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries
and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and
campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites
and convents appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies
and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and
quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those
already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act."
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed parcels of land
may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high
slopes.
To resolve the issue as to the nature of the parcels of land involved in the case at bar, the Court
directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.
Rodrigo Almuete and Ana Almuete vs. Marcelo Andres and The Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122276 (November 20, 2001)
Facts:
Petitioner Rodrigo Almuete was awarded a 72,587 square meter parcel of land located at San
Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela by the then National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) on March 25, 1957. Since then, Almuete and his family farmed the
subject property peacefully and exclusively.
However, unknown to petitioner, an Agrarian Reform Technologist by the name of Leticia
Gragasin on August 17, 1979 filed false reports making it appear that Almuete has waived his
right as awardee and made it appear that one Marcelo Andres was the actual occupant of the land
from 1967 to date. Said Gragasin further recommended that the award in favor of petitioner
Almuete be cancelled and the land be awarded to respondent Marcelo.
Consequently, DAR issued OCT No. P-52521 in the name of respondent who, in turn,
accompanied by ten persons armed with bolos, immediately entered the subject property claiming
exclusive right of ownership and possession. Almuete complained to the DAR and wasted no time
in filing an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres with the
RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Br. 20 docketed as Civil Case No. Br-20-530. The Trial Court rendered
a Decision in favor of Almuete which became final and executory upon Marcelo Andres's failure
to appeal. The latter filed a petition for certiorari to prevent the implementation of the writ of
execution which was entertained by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Who between the petitioner and the respondent has a better right to the subject property considering that
both of them are awardees of the same property?
Held:
No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let
alone that which would so characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner
and respondent were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of land.
Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
"Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate
all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657,
Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No 6657, as:
"(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a
tenancy relationship between the parties. The following elements are indispensable to establish a
tenancy relationship:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, gravely erred when it granted the petition for certiorari and
held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action between
petitioners and respondent. The action filed by petitioners was cognizable by the regular courts.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela was competent to try and decide
Civil Case No. 20-530. Its decision was, thus, valid and can no longer be disturbed, after having
attained finality. Nothing more can be done with the decision except to enforce it.
Felix Pascual vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Victor Solis
G.R. No. 138781 (December 3, 2001)
Facts:
On March 5, 1992, petitioner brought an action for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with
Prayer for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction" against respondent Victor Solis before the
DARAB Region III in Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner alleged that respondent tried to enter into
possession and cultivation of the above described agricultural lots thus disrupting petitioner's
peaceful possession and personal cultivation of the same.
Respondent in his answer averred that he is a lawful tenant of the lots and insisted that as a
legitimate tenant, he enjoyed security of tenure and cannot be ejected from the land except upon
authority of the court. To substantiate his assertion, respondent presented two (2) agricultural
leasehold contracts as well as two (2) Certificates of Agricultural Leasehold (CALs).
Petitioner countered by averring that respondent abandoned the first lot and voluntarily
surrendered the second lot upon payment of a disturbance compensation of P18,000.00.
Furthermore, as a consequence of the voluntary surrender made by the respondent, petitioner
was able to sell the second lot to the spouses Jose Bernardo and Rosa Payumo as evidenced by
a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" (Venta Absoluta) dated December 11, 1985. Thus, the issue of
respondent's status as lessee should be properly addressed to the new owners.
In due course, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner)
and against defendant (respondent) Victor Solis, ruling that respondent was not a tenant of the
disputed lots.
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the findings of the PARAD and declared Victor Solis as a
legitimate tenant and entitled to security of tenure. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the DARAB. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent was a tenant of the lands belonging to petitioner and consequently entitled to
security of tenure?
Held:
Initially, the question regarding respondent's tenancy status is factual in nature which is not
proper in a petition for review, where only questions of law may be entertained. However, after a
careful examination of the evidence on record, there appears a compelling reason to modify the
factual findings below, since it appears that the appellate court and the DARAB failed to take into
account certain important considerations extant in the records.
The appellate court and the DARAB erred in rendering judgment on the assumption that these
lots are one and the same. To repeat, the second contract and CAL 022 do not pertain to Lot No.
2025. Hence, respondent cannot be declared a tenant of Lot No. 2025. No LEASE
AGREEMENT or certificate was adduced to prove that Lot No. 2025 is the same lot described
in the second contract and CAL 022.
Furthermore, there is an apparent absence of the essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy
relationship between the parties over Lot No. 2025. For this relationship to exist, it is necessary
that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is
consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is
sharing of harvest or payment of rental.
The findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and the ocular inspection indicate that respondent did
not personally cultivate the riceland portion of Lot No. 2025 or share its harvest proceeds with
petitioner. Petitioner did not consent to a leasehold agreement with respondent over Lot No.
2025, as shown by petitioner's filing of complaint below to enjoin respondent from encroaching
and planting thereon. Accordingly, respondent is not a de jure tenant of Lot No. 2025, thus, he is
not entitled to security of tenure relative to this lot.
As to the 1.3-hectare land subject of the second contract and CAL No. 022, petitioner contends
that this lot was already sold to the spouses Payumo in 1985. Therefore, the issue of respondent's
tenancy status over the 1.3 hectare agricultural lot covered by the second contract and CAL 022
is not proper for disposition in this case. Petitioner is no longer the owner of this lot and will not,
thus, be benefited or prejudiced by any declaration made herein, recognizing respondent as its
bona fide tenant. The claim of tenancy over this lot should be directed against the new
owners/vendees, who are subrogees to the rights and obligations of the agricultural
lessor/vendor.